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URBANIZATION, CRIME AND COLLECTIVE
VIOLENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE

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This investigation treats the plausibility of "structural" and "tension" analyses of the relationships among crimes against persons, crimes against property, collective violence, urban population and urban growth. It treats France during the century after 1830. Over the long run crimes against property appear to have declined significantly in frequency, crimes against persons fluctuated mildly without trend, and collective violence varied sharply from year to year; none of them shows a close correspondence to the pace of urban growth. Cross-sectional comparisons of the 86 French departments at five-year intervals from 1831 to 1861 bring out a strong relationship of property crime to urban population, a highly variable relationship of collective violence to urban population, and no reliable relationship of personal crime to urban population. The relationships with the pace of urban growth in all these regards are weak or nonexistent. There is no detectable association between crime and collective violence. We interpret the weight of the evidence as against "tension" arguments and toward "structural" ones.
The linking of crime, violence and disorder to urban growth must fall into the category of things people simply want to believe, for the belief rests on no substantial foundation of verified fact or systematic analysis. As compared with the sophistication of recent efforts to identify criminogenic environments within communities or to pin down the characteristics of individual rioters, the standard demonstration that aggregate rates of reported crime are higher for large places seems laughably inadequate to the task of proving a causal connection between urbanization and criminality, just as the simple observation that riots occur mainly in cities falls far short of establishing that city life produces a propensity to riot (see Shaw and McKay 1931, Bettman, Marshall, Jameson and Miles 1932, Boggs 1965, Christiansen 1960, Clinard 1964, Ferracuti 1969, Szabo 1960, Tobias 1967, Venter 1962, Wolfgang 1968).

Our guess is that the conventional wisdom of these matters will turn out to be a trifle true, but mainly false. True, in suggesting that the peculiar organization of cities and urban life shapes the means men adopt to express their discontent and to hurt one another. False, in supposing that urban growth -- by dissolving social ties, disrupting existing controls, or disorienting newcomers to the city -- has a strong and consistent tendency to increase the level of crime, violence and disorder.
The research reported here nibbles at a corner of the problem. It is an attempt to try out various arguments linking violence to cities and to urbanization through a close examination of violent crime and collective violence in nineteenth-century France. It deals with France for two basic reasons:

1. France of the nineteenth century's middle decades was undergoing just the kind of rapid urbanization and industrialization which is commonly said to generate disorder in the contemporary world, and French social critics of the time tended to believe that urbanization was causing disorder in both its individual and collective forms;

2. The data available concerning urbanization, crime, and collective violence in France during that period are exceptionally rich and exceptionally uniform, compared with the data available for any part of the world today or yesterday.

We shall concentrate on the departments of France -- the 80 to 90 administrative units into which the country divided at the Revolution. Although the general investigation we have undertaken includes analyses of individual communities and of time series for France as a whole, this paper deals almost exclusively with cross-sectional comparisons of departments during seven separate census years of the nineteenth century. The main period under examination is 1831 to 1861, spanning France's first great modern surge of industrialization and urbanization. The research reported employs a variety of quantitative procedures to determine the
relationships among a) crime and collective violence, on the one hand, and b) the concentration of the department's population in cities and the current rate of urban growth, on the other.

The diverse theories which link crime, collective violence, urbanity and urbanization ordinarily invoke such phenomena as psychic states of individual migrants, encounters of families with the city, struggles of different groups of workers for power and fluctuations in the fortunes of different sorts of social movements. The evidence in this paper belongs to a very different level of aggregation; it has a coarser grain. At best, we are in a position to distinguish between the implications of two general kinds of argument: a) structural arguments stressing the impact of organizational setting on the form of individual and collective action; b) tension arguments treating a variety of disapproved behaviors as responses to strains and disorientations. To the extent that diverse forms of "disorder" occur independently of each other and vary as a function of their organizational setting we shall be inclined to give credence to structural arguments. To the extent that they cluster together and correspond to the sheer pace of structural change we shall tend to accept tension arguments.

The work at hand provides the opportunity to compare the two lines of argument at several different points. We may ask whether three forms
of "disorder" -- crimes against property, crimes against persons, and
collective violence -- vary together. We may ask whether they vary as a
function of the urbanity of the setting, and whether the patterns of
variation are stable over time. We may ask whether they vary as a func-
tion of the rate of change in the urbanity of the setting (as a function,
that is, of urbanization), and whether those patterns of variation are
stable over time. Finally, we may compare the strengths of relationship
of the various forms of "disorder" to urbanity and to urbanization.
These questions set the frame of the evidence in this paper.

DATA AND PROCEDURES

The data come from the files of an investigation of changes in the
classification of several different forms of conflict in western Europe,
especially France, since about 1830. The sources of the three main bodies
of information drawn on here are:

1. published reports of the national censuses of France conducted
   in 1831, 1836, 1841, 1846, 1851, 1856, 1861, 1866, and 1872;

2. coded descriptions of 771 incidents of collective violence oc-
curring in France from 1830 to 1880, consisting of every event
   involving at least one group of fifty persons or more in which some
   person or object was seized or damaged over resistance which was
   encountered by trained readers of two national newspapers for each
day in the thirty-one year period; the coded information concern-
ing the incidents came from French archives, political yearbooks
and historical works as well as from the newspaper accounts;
3. annual reports of criminal justice in France (the Compte général de l'administration de la justice criminelle en France) for the same years.

In each case, the data employed here comprise only a small part of the information coded from the source. The machine-readable files of census data we have prepared, for example, include information concerning labor force characteristics, age-sex distribution, vital rates, migration, and a great many other items; here we have used only urban population (persons in places of 10,000 or more) the total horsepower of steam engines currently operating in the department, net migration to the department in the previous five years, and total population.

Let us distinguish clearly between urbanity and urbanization. The urbanity of a department, for our purposes, is the proportion of its population living in communes of 10,000 persons or more at a given point in time. The crimes and collective violence for which we are attempting to account did not, by any means, occur exclusively in those cities of 10,000 or more. The analyses reported here make no distinction between "urban" and "rural" events in this narrower sense. They provide no reliable means of inferring within what sorts of communities the events in question occurred. Instead, we regard urbanity as a characteristic of the department as a whole. The probability that the influence of cities of 10,000 or more will radiate throughout departments averaging some 300,000 persons in 2,000 square miles makes this seem a reasonable
procedure. The urbanization of a department is the current rate of change in the proportion living in communes of 10,000 or more. Normally we calculate the urbanity of a department for a census year and its urbanization for the five-year period since the previous census. Urbanity then, is our chief indicator of the structural condition of the department. Urbanization represents its recent experience of tension-producing change. We supplement and specify these two main variables with information concerning the mechanization of industry and recent migration. But urbanity and urbanization remain the central issues.

The data concerning collective violence include a wide range of observations of the organization of the participants, the character of the action, the nature of the setting, the stated objectives of the parties involved, and so on, but the information used here deals only with the magnitude of the collective violence as represented by the estimated number of participants, the duration, and the number killed, wounded and arrested. The crime data actually include individual observations on a wide variety of offenses, but here we have selected and grouped together only a minority of them: crimes against persons (the number of persons accused of murder, poisoning, infanticide and patricide), crimes against property (the number of persons accused of any variety of theft or robbery) and willful destruction of property.

The crime reports are, of course, open to all the usual defects of this sort of official statistic (Biderman 1966, Skolnick 1966, Reiss 1967, Graham 1969, Lane 1969, Pittman and Handy 1962, Newmann 1962, Lejins 1968, Chilton 1968, Gatrell and Hadden 1972). Within those limits, the French
reports have considerable advantages: French criminal law and police practice crystallized during the Revolution and changed only slightly and slowly afterward; reporting procedures and categories remained remarkably constant over the period under study. The one change which deserves serious attention is the general expansion of police forces -- especially in the large cities of France -- from the 1830s onward (Bayley 1971, Du Camp 1869, Le Clère 1964, Payne 1966, Stead 1957).

Our analyses of the relationships among these variables have gone through four phases:

1) the study of long trends in reported crime for France as a whole and for individual departments, in an effort to determine whether the timing of changes in criminal activity corresponded to the timing of urban growth;

2) cross-tabulations of rates for different classes of criminal offenses for each census year from 1831 to 1861;

3) analysis of the intercorrelations of the variables representing urbanity, urbanization, other structural characteristics, collective violence and criminal activity across all departments for each census year from 1831 to 1861;

4) testing of a number of models linking those variables via multiple regression techniques.

Here we offer an extremely condensed report of the findings.
Long-Run Trends in Crime and Collective Violence

Over the century from 1831 to 1931, charges and convictions for crimes against property declined steadily in frequency. From a high point of 174 persons accused per 100,000 population in 1836, the rate fell to the 10 registered in 1931. In 1872 the rate increased temporarily to 100, in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War. But in 1876 it was down again, to 72 per 100,000. As is always the case with criminal statistics, several uncertainties stand in the way of any confident inference that the actual rate of theft and robbery in France as a whole was declining. First, the number of such offenses reported rose somewhat as the number of persons charged and the number convicted went down (Davidovitch 1970). One might allege that the police were becoming more lenient and/or more inefficient in identifying culprits and bringing them to trial. From what we know of the organization and practice of the French police, we doubt that interpretation, but cannot disprove it. Second, it is distantly possible that as the century wore on an increasing proportion of crimes against property were referred to minor courts instead of coming before the Assize Courts from which our data come. However, the total number of persons charged before the principal local courts -- the tribunaux correctionnels -- declined irregularly from 624 per 100,000 population in 1831 to 514 in 1930, with higher and lower points in between. In fact, the main trend runs neither up nor down, but swings around a value of 550. So it is unlikely that the striking
decline in serious property crimes tried before the Assizes resulted simply from the transfer of offenses to the minor jurisdiction. Our provisional conclusion is that theft and robbery did, indeed, decline in frequency.

At first glance, the conclusion is surprising. It certainly flies in the face of the idea that "disorder" rises with the spread of urban-industrial social life. One might well be tempted to attribute it to peculiarities of the French, or of their statistical reporting system. Yet France was not alone. In England and Wales, Gatrell and Hadden (1972) have made a close study of crimes known to the police from 1805 through 1892. Up to the middle of the century, they find some evidence of an increase in the rate of reported property crime, but they point out that the increase accompanied a great expansion of British police forces, and may have been caused by that expansion. In any case, their stronger evidence for the period after 1850 indicates a decisive decline in property crime up to the century's end. They also argue that nineteenth-century crimes against property rose and fell with economic hardship, with year-to-year fluctuations following the trade cycle, and the decline later in the century presumably associated with the general prosperity of the Victorian era. In their view, the relationship reversed itself in the twentieth century, so that after 1900 property crimes tended
to rise in times of prosperity. Their view is compatible with the large increase in the British crime rate -- especially for property offenses -- after World War I (McClintock, Avison and Rose 1968). Our own tentative explanations of the decline in French rates give greater weight to the effects of policing itself. Neither interpretation of the nineteenth-century experience lends much credence to urbanization as a cause of crime.

Detailed information for the period 1831 to 1871 in France gives further support to the observation of a general decline in crimes against property. Frequencies for almost all types of property offenses fell throughout the period, although the rate of decline varied with the offense. While all types of thefts and robbery showed declines, arson and vandalism displayed an overall increase, with marked year-to-year variations. In 1856, 1861, and 1866, for example, arson of buildings was at its height (6 per 100,000 in each of the three years), while in 1831 and 1836 the rates had been 3 and 2. Combined with all other crimes against property, however, arson and vandalism do not change the trend. In general, crimes against property declined.

The inspection of the trends for departments at different levels of urbanity (Figure 2) makes it clearer what happened. Rates dropped steadily in all classes of departments, especially in the most urban and the most rural ones. In the big-city departments, we find a dramatic drop -- from 24 to 16 per 100,000 population -- in the period 1836-1841, and a steady decline thereafter. By 1861 the absolute range of the rates had narrowed
considerably: from 2.8 in the least urban departments to 5.9 in the most urban. Furthermore, the progression of rates from rural to urban had become more orderly than in 1831.

Figure 2 about here

The variations in crimes against persons during the same period displayed a different pattern. Throughout the century the rates of crime against persons remained much lower than those of crimes against property. They also fluctuated within a narrower range. During the thirty years from 1831 to 1861, for example, the overall rate fell from 19 to 10, with an intermediate high point of 18 in 1851. From 1872 the personal crime rate rose slowly to 1881, went down to its lowest level in 1886, then rose to its highest point over the next three intervals. The fluctuations reveal no general trend whatsoever. While crimes against property were declining and crimes against persons were fluctuating without trend, the suicide rate continued to rise during the nineteenth century. Only a little before the turn of the century (about the time that Durkheim was studying them so intensely) did they enter a slow decline. In short, personal crimes display no master pattern of movement.

Figure 3 about here

Collective violence fluctuated independently of crimes against
property and crimes against persons, and much more sharply than either one of them. Figure 3 shows the number of violent incidents we have enumerated in each year from 1830 through 1880. The number ran high in 1830, 1832, 1848, 1851 and 1871 — major periods of transfer and consolidation of power at a national scale. The years from 1835 to 1838, from 1842 to 1845 and from 1851 to 1867 produced negligible numbers of disturbances. Collective violence swung far more widely and rapidly from year to year than crimes against persons and property ever did. Furthermore, the swings in collective violence did not correspond to those of urbanization, which in France as a whole was moderate in the 1830s, accelerating but interrupted by economic contraction (and perhaps by the revolution of 1848 itself) in the 1840s, and moving with unprecedented speed in the 1850s; in fact, the gross correlation over time is negative: rapid urban growth, little collective violence. Collective violence fluctuated much more directly as a function of the quickening and slowing of struggles for power at the national level.

To sum up, we have made four broad observations about long-term trends, but have not attempted to corroborate them in detail:

1) Urban growth continued at varying paces throughout the nineteenth century, but there was no particular tendency for periods of rapid growth to be periods of high crime rates.

2) Crimes against property declined with hardly a break throughout the century from 1831 to 1931.
3) Crimes against persons fluctuated considerably from 1831 to 1931, with a minor and irregular decline occurring during the study period of 1831-1861.

4) The year-to-year fluctuation of collective violence was much greater than that of crime. It did not correspond to fluctuations in the rate of urbanization, but did correspond to the rise and fall of struggles for power at the national level.

We only intend these general observations on trends as stimuli to further inquiry and as context for the detailed geographic comparisons we are about to report. We believe them to be correct, but are unable to rule out all the uncertainties which beset the interpretation of such long trends. In particular, it remains possible that the actual number of property crimes committed (as opposed to the number of persons tried for such crimes) did not fall so precipitously as we have said -- that the figures we are interpreting reflect changes in police and judicial practice or effectiveness. Again, we are unable to study the short-run impact of fluctuations in urbanization on crime, for lack of reliable data on urban population outside of census years. Nevertheless, the overall trends at a national scale cast doubt on any close relationship between crime in general and collective violence. They also make implausible any close connection between these forms of "disorder" and the pace of urbanization.
Variation Among Departments in 1841, 1846 and 1851

We have attempted to identify the effect of urbanity, urbanization and several related phenomena on crime and collective violence in France by means of separate cross-sectional analyses for each census year from 1831 through 1861. In each case, we have studied the product-moment correlations of all the variables involved over the 86 departments which comprised the France of this period, and have tested a number of alternative models of the relationships among those variables by means of multiple regression. The main hypotheses we pursued were very simple:

1) that property crimes, being facilitated by the accessibility of wealth and the ease of escaping detection, would tend to rise with the urbanity of the department;

2) that crimes against persons would display significant regional effects related to the acceptability of regulating differences through interpersonal violence, but would be essentially unrelated to urban population;

3) that the relationship of the level of crime to the current pace of urbanization would be small, and largely spurious, due to the association of current urban growth with the existing concentration of the area's population in cities;

4) that collective violence would fluctuate between urban and rural concentration depending on the nature of the major political issues.
dividing the country at the time, but would in no case be closely related to crime.

This paper does not present evidence on all these hypotheses. Our analyses have, for instance, turned up some important regional patterns in crimes against persons -- for example, the enormously high rates of homicide, true to the stereotype, in Corsica -- but we do not present them here. Nor does the paper go very far into the political issues dividing France in 1841, 1846 and 1851, or the nature of the actions which comprise our grand totals of collective violence. We concentrate on the quantitative relationships among aggregate levels of crime and collective violence, on the one hand, and gross structural characteristics of departments, on the other.

We have, furthermore, implicitly taken the pattern of repression (especially policing) to be irrelevant. On our own argument, that is a poor assumption. We have not, however, been able to index the government's repressive capacity or propensity any more directly than via the number of troops stationed in the department. So the fact that the results came out generally as expected still leaves uncomfortably open the extent to which they result from selective governmental response to collective action and to illegal behavior.

In this analysis we correlate absolute numbers (of persons in cities, participants in collective violence, individuals accused of crimes against property, and so on) rather than rates and proportions. That procedure
avoids the confusions of rate correlation and provides a separate measure of the effects of scale. On the other hand, it produces misleadingly high zero-order correlations, since each coefficient includes the scale effect. In our full analyses, we deal with this problem by partialing each zero-order matrix for total population; here we omit that intermediate step.

We only report the results for 1841, 1846 and 1851, the three census years for which we have the fullest range of data at our disposal. The years 1841 and 1846 fall into a relatively quiet phase of Louis Philippe's July Monarchy. There were 36 disturbances in 1841, notably tax rebellions and different forms of resistance to the census. (The census was widely -- and not entirely wrongly -- believed to be the opening wedge for new taxation.) Some 35,000 people took part in the year's 36 disturbances. There were 28 disturbances in 1846, many of them the first part of a string of food riots indirectly stimulated by the poor harvest of that fall. Perhaps 40,000 people took part in the disturbances of 1846. 1851 was the last year of the Second Republic, and a turbulent one. The Second Republic had come into being through the revolutionary overthrow of the July Monarchy in 1848, and came to an end for practical purposes (despite its continuing existence as a fiction for a few more years) with Louis Napoleon's coup d'état of December, 1851. The 93 disturbances of 1851 (and the roughly 91,000 participants in disturbances) came almost entirely in the widespread rebellion against the coup. Although it was one of the largest popular uprisings France produced in the nineteenth century, the rebellion failed. Our three years, then, differed considerably in the character and extent of collective violence.
The matrix for 1841 (Table 1) sets the pattern for the other two. It shows a strong positive association between urban population and crimes against property, a weak positive association between urban population and crimes against persons, and further strong positive associations with the number wounded and arrested in collective violence -- which measure, in effect, how vigorously police and troops put down protests and demonstrations, rather than how many protests and demonstrations took place. Urbanization shows weaker positive relationships with all these variables; they are weak enough, in fact, to reflect no more than the association between urbanization and urbanity. There are some apparent relationships between crime and collective violence which deserve a closer look later on.

The matrices for 1846 and 1851 (Tables 2 and 3) greatly resemble the one for 1841. There are two important differences. First, urbanity and urbanization were very closely associated in 1846 (r = .948). From 1841 to 1846, that is, urban growth was almost exactly proportional to the existing urban population, while in the periods 1836-41 and 1846-51 there was considerable disparity between the patterns. That association between urbanization and urbanity in 1846 makes the correlations of these two variables with the other variables in the set more similar than in the matrices for 1841 and 1851. Second, the urbanity of collective violence varies among the years. In the first two years we find zero-order correlations of +.287 and +.253 between urban population and participants in collective violence, whereas the rural base of much of the 1851 insur-
rection produces no correlation at all: +.024.

Because of the considerable association among our explanatory variables and the inclusion of a scale effect in the zero-order correlations the three matrices leave the patterns of relationship among the variables unclear. Table 4 provides some clarification by summarizing the standardized partial regression coefficients and residuals for the principal multiple-regression analyses we have performed for the three years. A glance at the residuals will make it clear that in none of the years did this set of explanatory variables account for a substantial amount of the variance in crimes against persons. For crimes against property, on the other hand, $R^2$ ran consistently close to .90, largely because of the strong association between property crimes and urban population. On the whole, these variables account for much less of the variance in collective violence, and the coefficients in question are considerably less constant from year to year. That result, of course, follows directly from what we already know about the differences in the geographic distribution of collective violence in 1841, 1846 and 1851.

The multiple regressions reinforce the distinction between the effects of urbanization and of urbanity. Neither one of them has a strong and reliable effect on crimes against persons, but a sharp difference between them appears when it comes to crimes against property. In each of the three years there is a strong positive relationship between property
crimes and urbanity, even after allowance for the effects of mechanization, migration and urbanization. The beta-coefficients for urbanization vary from − .18 to +.24, and are in each case smaller than the corresponding coefficients for urbanity. These conclusions are least certain for 1846, where the geographic similarity of the patterns for urbanization and for urbanity was so great as to make it hard to distinguish their effects statistically. Even in that year the coefficient for urbanity (+.57) is considerably larger than the coefficient for urbanization (+.24). The analysis casts considerable doubt on the current rate of urban growth as a cause of crime, hence indirectly on explanations of crime as a response to tension. The insignificance of net migration into the department as a predictor of crime reinforces our doubt. And the moderate negative coefficients for the regression of crimes against property on steam power (−.17 and −.20 in the two years for which we have steam power data) suggest that something about the organization of cities as such, rather than the presence of mechanized industry, promotes crime against property.

As expected, the predictability of different features of collective violence from structural characteristics of departments varies considerably from year to year. The multiple regression specifies some of the relationships in interesting ways. In all years we discover an important positive relationship between the frequency of arrests for participation in collective violence and the urbanity of the department. The relationship of arrests to steam power and to urbanization, on the other hand, is negative, and that to net migration nonexistent. We attribute
this to the concentration of police and military forces in the urban departments. Although the pattern for 1846 goes in a different direction, the data concerning wounding (which is done mainly by troops and police) suggest the same conclusion.

The multiple regressions, finally, produce an important observation concerning the possible relationship between crime and collective violence. Geographically speaking, there is none. The largest coefficient linking crime to participants in collective violence is the .08 for crimes against persons in 1841. Although urbanity affects the patterns of crime and the patterns of collective violence in different, complex ways, there is no evidence at all that crime and collective violence are interchangeable, or even interdependent.

To sum up the analysis, let us recast a number of the multiple regressions for 1851 -- the year with the largest number of participants in collective violence -- in the form of a path diagram. The only new information in the diagram (Figure 4) concerns the relationships among the variables we have previously treated as independent. It is reassuring to see that they come out in the usual way: with urbanization a function of net migration and of steam power, and so on. The diagram dramatizes the insignificance of the impact of urbanization on crimes against property and on participation in collective violence. It restates the strong impact (in 1851) on participation in collective violence. And it reminds us that crime and collective violence do not vary together.

Figure 4 about here
Conclusions

The largest conclusions one can draw from this analysis are negative ones. In a number of different ways the general patterns of crime and collective violence in nineteenth-century France tell against arguments tracing either one back to the tensions generated by urbanization. Once allowance is made for other factors easily confused with urbanization, the geographic distributions of crime and collective violence do not correspond to the pattern of urban growth. Nor do crimes against persons, crimes against property and collective violence correspond to each other, either in their geographic distribution or in their fluctuation over time. The general decline in the frequency of crimes against property over France's major period of urbanization likewise weighs against any direct and positive link between the two.

The alternative line of argument to which our analyses lend support treats crime and collective violence as quite distinct varieties of behavior whose frequencies are strongly shaped by the structures of the social settings in which men find themselves -- rather than the rates at which those structures are changing. Urban settings, not the process of urbanization as such, are conducive to crimes against property and to certain forms of collective violence. Our findings reveal, in fact, a strong and persistent relationship between the frequency of property crimes and the urbanity of the department in which they occur. The geography of collective violence varies much more decisively and rapidly than that of crime, depending on the nature of the political conflict which lies behind it. In nineteenth-century France, the repression of participants in collective violence (as measured by arrests and the like) was more clearly and persistently urban than was the violence itself.
Many kinds of "tension" explanation for crime or collective violence can survive this particular attack. One simple way to hold on to the idea of both phenomena as responses to normlessness (or some related condition) is to claim that normlessness is intrinsic to urban organization itself instead of a consequence of change in that organization. Although we doubt this revision as much as we doubt the original statement, our evidence cannot rule it out. Likewise, a great range of "structural" explanations remain compatible with our findings: the opportunities for criminal activity, the costs of organizing to carry it out, the availability of models for crime all vary systematically with urbanity. Our gross data do not discriminate effectively among these and many other possible factors.

Nevertheless the findings deserve attention as a commentary on existing theories and as a guide to further investigation. Although we have concentrated this report on 1841, 1846 and 1851, the less complete results for 1831, 1836, 1856 and 1861 come out essentially the same. Over three important decades of urbanization and industrialization in a major western country the actual geographic patterns of crime and collective violence fail to conform to reasonable inferences from "tension" theories -- including those specifically formulated for the France of that period by such sociological historians as Louis Chevalier. It would be prudent at least to suspend the use of such theories as explanations until they have received closer scrutiny. That closer scrutiny should, of course, repair the weaknesses of the investigation we have
reported here by dealing more directly with the immediate settings, precipitants and personnel of crime and collective violence. Someone must erase (or confirm) the possibility that changes or variations in reporting procedures account for the pattern of findings we have reported here. And the investigation must go beyond nineteenth-century France to other urbanizing times and places.

The lines of further inquiry we propose treat criminal activity and collective violence as quite different sorts of behavior, each requiring substantially different explanations and methods of investigation. No doubt "crime" will eventually decompose into a number of different kinds of behavior whose common property will reduce to the fact that police and other specialists in coercion are charged with their suppression; if so, the things we will be able to say in general about "crime" will be statements about the way suppression works. We suspect, however, that the various crimes which involve physical attacks on one person by another ordinarily occur together, and depend on the rules and expectations small groups learn in regulating their differences. The Wolfgang-Ferracuti notion of "subcultures of violence" provides a plausible starting point for the explanation of variations in this sort of behavior.

We expect, on the other hand, that the explanations of major variations in property crimes will lie in three main sets of variables:
1) the relative ease with which individuals can remove property from the control of other individuals and groups in one setting or another (which will, to be sure, depend on the definitions of "property" prevailing
in the setting); 2) the ways in which different groups of poor people are drawn into the social organization of the setting, especially with respect to the general relations established between them and those in the same setting who control more property; 3) the extent to which acquiring property makes it possible for people to carry on their valued day-to-day activities, and to which not having property makes these activities impossible. Left in this form, our proposals are vague, and partly tautological. Nonetheless, they point away from a search for individual and group disorganization as a cause of crime, and toward the analysis of the social organization of behavior settings which has been undertaken in very different ways by Erving Goffman, Arthur Stinchcombe and Sarah Boggs.

As for collective violence, we view it as a by-product of collective efforts to exert disputed rights. In the long European experience we have been studying, we find two broad types of action behind most instances of collective violence. In the one, an agent of authority lays claim to some valued resource -- a person, land, money, property, or something else -- and members of the affected population forcibly resist that claim. Violent resistance to taxation, which was probably the most common origin of large-scale collective violence in Europe as a whole from 1500 to the present, illustrates the sort of action involved. Food riots, anti-conscription rebellions and many attacks on the police have essentially the same character. In the other kinds of action, a group of people visibly lays claim to certain objects or actions, and
some other group -- most frequently agents of government -- forcibly resist either the symbolic statement of the claim or its actual exercise. The insurrection in which rebels seize governmental buildings falls into this category, but so does the typical violent demonstration. The collective violence is a by-product in the sense that 1) agents of authority seize a great many valued resources in essentially the same way without forcible resistance, and 2) many groups lay collective claims without meeting immediate retaliation; given the initial action, the presence or absence of violence depends on the availability of organized groups prepared to challenge the claims being made.

Laying out our ideas concerning the conditions under which such claims and counter-claims appear would take us far beyond the purposes of this particular report. Yet it should be clear that if our general approach to the problem is correct the prevailing pace of change, the extent of individual malaise and the rate at which social ties are being dissolved should have little direct relationship to the amount of collective violence. Instead, the structure of power, the capacity of deprived groups for collective action, the forms of repression employed by the authorities and the disparities between the weak and the powerful in shared understandings about collective rights to action and to use of valued resources will provide the chief explanations of the appearance and disappearance of violence on the large scale.
FIGURE 1: PERSONS ACCUSED OF CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS AND PROPERTY
PER 100,000 POPULATION FOR CENSUS YEARS, 1826-1962

NOTE: HORIZONTAL SCALE IS SLIGHTLY DISTORTED
BECAUSE OF SPACING OF CENSUSES
FIGURE 2: PERSONS ACCUSED OF CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY PER 100,000 POPULATION
BY URBANITY OF DEPARTMENT, 1831 TO 1861

BIG CITY: MORE THAN 15 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION IN CITIES OF 10,000 OR MORE

RURAL: NO CITY OF 10,000 OR MORE
FIGURE 3: NUMBER OF DISTURBANCES AND PARTICIPANTS (IN THOUSAND) IN DISTURBANCES, 1830-1880

--- No. of DISTURBANCES
----- No. of PARTICIPANTS
FIGURE 41  STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AMONG VARIABLES AFFECTING CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY, 1851
<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>urbanization</th>
<th>urbanization</th>
<th>net migration</th>
<th>total population</th>
<th>participants</th>
<th>killed</th>
<th>wounded</th>
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Table 2: Zero-Order Correlations of Selected Indicators of Crime, Collective Violence and Structural Characteristics of French Departments in 1846

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<td>+.008</td>
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Table 3: Zero-Order Correlations of Selected Indicators of Crime, Collective Violence and Structural Characteristics of French Departments in 1851

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<td>+.676</td>
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Table 4: Standardized regression coefficients for each dependent variable for 1841, 1846 and 1851

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FOOTNOTES

1. The Canada Council and the National Science Foundation supported the research reported in this paper. We are grateful to Cindy Aron, Joan Baker, Sue Richardson, Ann O'Shea and Virginia Perkins for research assistance. Other recent reports of the larger inquiry to which this particular investigation belongs are L. Tilly 1971 and 1972, R. Tilly 1970, Rule and Tilly 1972, Shorter and Tilly 1971a, 1971b, 1971c, Snyder and Tilly 1972, Lees and Tilly 1972, C. Tilly 1969, 1970a, 1970b, 1972a. The previous reports most closely related to the present paper are Lodhi 1971, Lodhi and Tilly 1971 and C. Tilly 1972b.

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