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COAL MINERS AND THIRD-PARTY
POLITICS IN ILLINOIS, 1880-1924:
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF VOTING BEHAVIOR*

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I. Introduction

This paper is part of a larger study whose purpose is to establish why, in Great Britain in the early part of this century, the organized coal miners abandoned their commitment to one or the other of the two major parties in the political system and took up radical, third-party action in support of an independent labor party; and why, in the United States, they did not, despite strong comparable pressures on them to do so. In a previous paper, Laslett and Hodge advanced a number of hypotheses concerning the relative failure of independent labor politics in the United States compared to their success in Great Britain, which they are attempting to pursue in other research using the coal miners, who played a major role in the national politics of both countries, as the central focus of their analysis.¹

Numerous other variables, including both geographical and occupational mobility, differences in working class ideology, and the differential impact of religious and ethnic factors on the labor force of both countries, will be introduced into the larger study. It should be made clear at the outset, however, that this paper is concerned only with analyzing some of the sources (and some of the characteristics of those sources), of support for socialist candidates for state and national offices in Illinois, from 1880 to 1924, concentrating primarily on the coal miners, but with references also to other elements in the Illinois labor force. It does not, as does

the other paper presented to this session by Professor James Green,² attempt an in-depth descriptive account of the great variety of regional and local factors which may also have contributed to the presence (or absence) of a significant socialist movement among the coal miners of the state. Nor does it have a comparative Anglo-American dimension. The authors will attempt to provide both of these elements--which are, of course, essential before any final results can be obtained--in their subsequent research. It does, however, attempt to correlate the voting returns for Socialist Party of America (SPA), Socialist Labor Party (SLP), Populist and other minor radical party candidates at various levels in Illinois between 1880 and 1924 in ways which have not been used before, and which we believe provide some interesting results. It is the first of a series of state by state studies to be completed in the context of the larger investigation, and later to be compared with analyses derived from British election data.

In the larger study we have chosen to focus on the coal miners for the purposes of comparative analysis because they constituted the largest single element in the organized labor force of both Britain and the United States during most of the years between 1865 and 1950, which constitutes the entire period under review. The United Mine Workers of America (U.M.W. of A.), with over 300,000 members nationally by 1905, comprised twenty per cent of the total membership of the American Federation of Labor, and was the largest union in the federation throughout most of this period.³ Thus by virtue of their numbers alone, the members of the U.M.W. of A. were in a position to exert an important degree of influence over the

political policies of the labor movement of the United States.

Equally important, as was also suggested in Laslett and Hodge's earlier paper, the labor force in the American mines was at first largely composed of English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish immigrants, some of them ex-Chartists, who were influenced by the British tradition of labor radicalism, and who later admired the British Labour Party. The coal industry experienced similar problems in both countries in relation to technological change, demands for regulatory legislation, relations with government, etc. In 1919, for instance, the American miners adopted resolutions in favor of nationalization, as their English counterparts had done. The difference, of course, was that in England the mines were nationalized, whereas in America they were not. The importance of coal mining in nineteenth century industry in both countries, and the salience of mining strikes, mining disasters, etc. in the public mind, also meant that more governmental attention was paid to coal mining, in the form of reports, census data, and in federal, state, or parliamentary investigations than to almost any other industry, increasing the evidence available to the researcher.

Third, and perhaps most important, the geographical location of the industry in certain mining areas gave the miners great political power, which in Britain was used to elect miners' M.P.s to Parliament, for years under the aegis of the Liberal Party, and then under that of Labour. In Illinois, Pennsylvania, West Virginia and elsewhere, potentially at least the miners had comparable power. On the whole, however, unlike their English counterparts, to the extent to which they used this power they exerted it within the

framework of the traditional American two-party system, and failed to make use of it on behalf of the socialists in any major way, although there is evidence (up to this point largely impressionistic) of considerable socialist and labor party influence among coal miners in these and other American states both before and after the First World War.⁴

We have chosen Illinois as the first state to be examined in detail on the American side for what we consider to be sound practical, as well as historical reasons. The practical reason is that, as it turned out, we had available to us an annual time series for each county in Illinois bearing upon the extent of mining activity, including the number of mines, the number of employees, and total annual production figures. The results offered in this paper are therefore based primarily upon attempted correlations between census data concerning the mining and other elements in the Illinois labor force as reported in the federal censuses of 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, and 1920; federal reports on wealth, debts, and taxation issued at decennial intervals over the period under review; voting returns for Illinois for all statewide offices between 1880 and 1924; and an annual time series of mining data provided by the Illinois State Bureau of Mines for the period 1882-1920.⁵

As for the historical reasons, during the period under review Illinois continued to be both a center of coal mining, and of radical third-party activity. Chicago was the location of the national headquarters of the Socialist Party of America. Terre Haute, Indiana, not far across the Indiana state line from the Illinois coal fields, was the home of Eugene Victor Debs and the

Debs Standard Publishing Company, which frequently sent socialist literature into the coal fields, as did the branches of the Socialist Party of America in St. Louis, to the west; and in the early years of this century both Debs and other socialist leaders were familiar figures in the coal mining districts of the southwestern and other parts of the state. Illinois District 12 of the United Mine Workers of America contained about 80,000 members in 1903, or more than a quarter of the total U.M.W. of A. membership. In addition, between 1900 and 1917 the Socialists controlled many of the leading offices in the district. Adolph Germer, National Secretary of the Socialist Party between 1916 and 1919, had himself begun work as a miner in the Belleville sub-district of Illinois at the age of ten, and had held various offices in District 12 (including the influential Secretary-Treasurership in 1914-1915), before becoming a national official of the SPA in 1916. John H. Walker, president of District 12 between 1906 and 1913, was for many years an influential member of the Socialist Party in Illinois, besides becoming president of the powerful Illinois State Federation of Labor in the latter year. And Frank Hayes, who became International President of the U.M.W. of A. for three years between 1917 and 1920, had also risen through the ranks of the U.M.W. hierarchy in Illinois, for more than ten years as a member of the SPA.⁶

Finally, Illinois has frequently been the focus of attention for historians in their efforts to trace the sources and character of radical third-party activities in the United States, both in older narrative types of studies, such as Chester M. Destler's account of the attempt to establish a socialist-labor-populist

alliance in Illinois in the 1890's, and more recent quantitatively-oriented analyses of the social bases of midwestern politics, as in Paul Kleppner's and Richard Jensen's two recent books.⁷

2. Methodological Considerations

Sufficient impressionistic evidence of the potential for radicalism among the Illinois coal miners exists in the previous literature to warrant the detailed consideration of their voting behavior in relation to the Socialist Party, the SLP, and other radical parties active in this period, which now follows. We are of course aware, as Professor Green points out in his paper, both of the inherent limitations of voting analysis, and of the particular difficulties associated with it as a research tool in evaluating the reasons for radicalism among workingmen. Transiency, deliberate abstention, the lack of voting qualifications due to immigrant status, and the manipulation of the workingman's vote due to overt pressure, or to deferential behavior patterns brought from the peasant societies of Europe or from previous places of residence in the United States, all make it a rather crude index of radical beliefs. Nevertheless, voting analysis is a necessary, even if it is not a sufficient, criterion for the measurement of political behavior; and in this study it should be taken simply to indicate the degree of support which coal miners and other elements in the labor force were willing to give radical third parties during the period under review, not in any sense as a final or complete analysis of sources and character of their radicalism.

Nevertheless, in order to give our analysis a somewhat broader base, we have not limited it to discussing the relationship between Socialist voting and employment in coal mining alone, but have also included measures of three other factors associated with the potential for radical politics in any labor force, namely: urbanism, measured by the proportion of the total population of each county living in places of 2,500 or more (= U); ethnicity or national origins, measured by the proportion of the white population of each county who are foreign-born whites (= F);⁸ and wealth, as indexed by the per capita assessed dollar value of all property in each county subject to ad valorem taxation (= W). The indicator of mining activity (= M) is given by the proportion of the male population in each county who were employed in mines. The independent variables used throughout this paper are defined as stated here, except for a few trivial modifications, dictated by the available census information, which are noted in the tables below.⁹

The indicators defined above are available, with only minor changes (noted in the tables below), for all 102 counties of the state of Illinois at decennial intervals over the period 1880 to 1920. These 102 counties serve as the units of analysis for all of the cross-sectional, ecological regression analyses of voting reported below. Because counties, rather than individuals, are the units of analysis we cannot legitimately talk about the voting behavior of miners, urbanites, the foreign born, or the wealthy as individuals. Nevertheless we will occasionally make statements at the individual level and the reader is warned that such statements, although perhaps true, can only be inferred from the results

herein. They cannot be proved. We can only make statements about the voting behavior of populations residing in counties with high concentrations of wealth, urbanites, foreign born, and miners, since it is simply not possible, at the level of analysis, to know if it is the miners, the urbanites, the foreign born, or the wealth alone who are doing the observed voting.¹⁰

Another difficulty frequently encountered in statistical analysis occurs when the independent variables are themselves highly intercorrelated. This problem, technically identified as multicollinearity, is often found in aggregate data of the kind employed in this paper and makes it virtually impossible to isolate the specific effects of the different variables. One can perhaps most easily grasp this difficulty by considering the two extremes which can occur when only two independent variables are employed. If the two variables should turn out to be uncorrelated with each other, then there is no problem about isolating their relative effects upon the dependent variable. In this case, their respective influences are mutually exclusive since no part of the effect of either variable can be attributed to the other. At the other extreme is the situation in which the two predictor variables are perfectly correlated with each other. In this case there is no way whatsoever of untangling the separate effects of the two variables. Owing to their perfect association, the two variables cannot be distinguished from each other and the effects of either on the dependent variable could be attributed to the other. Multicollinearity exists when the independent variables are highly, but imperfectly correlated. Its presence makes the estimates of their

effects (or coefficients) unstable, since a large fraction of the total variation in the dependent variable explained by the predictor variables is jointly shared by one or more of the independent variables and cannot, therefore, be uniquely assigned to any one of them.¹¹

The correlations between the major independent variables used throughout this paper are shown in Table 1 for each decennial period. For the most part, these associations are modest and no appreciable problem of multicollinearity is posed by the correlations for any decade. The correlations between the foreign-born variable and the indicators of urbanism and wealth are somewhat larger than we would like, but they are well within the limits that permit reasonably stable estimates. This, of course, is crucial in the present analysis, since we want to interpret the changing effects of the variables on socialist voting from one election to the next. If the independent variables were highly intercorrelated with each other, their changing effects upon the vote from decade to decade might well be attributable to modest shifts in their intercorrelations rather than to meaningful realignments of the electorate. Needless to say, our final selection of a standard set of independent variables was informed by an attempt to avoid the problems of multicollinearity.¹²

Insert Table 1 about here

Another potential problem, that of interpreting the results from alternative years, is largely mitigated by the substantial

stability over time of the independent variables used here. If, for example, we find that areas with a high concentration of immigrants support Socialist candidates in one election and swing against them in the next, two possible explanations of the observed phenomena present themselves. The most obvious conclusion and the one we would like to draw is that the vote in areas with large immigration populations shifted between the elections. (In so far as one can draw individual level conclusions from ecological data, this interpretation implies a realignment of the foreign-born vote.) However, another interpretation also suggests itself. It may well be that the area concentration of the foreign born also changed between the two periods so that the explanation of the changing effect of immigrant concentration on socialist voting rests not upon a realignment of the vote but upon the changing area distribution of the foreign born. If, however, the area concentration of the foreign born is stable from decade to decade, this second interpretation can be ruled out. As the reader can see in Table 2, which shows the correlations over time between the independent variables, all of the predictor variables are highly stable from one decade to the next. Indeed, more than three-fifths of the 1920 variation in the foreign born, urbanism, and wealth indicators can be accounted for by the observations on the same indicators in 1880. Only the mining variable exhibits any substantial change in its pattern of area concentration between 1880 and 1920. However, the area distribution of mining activities changes slowly, so that even the indicator of mine employment is quite stable across adjacent decades.

Insert Table 2 about here

Thus owing to the substantial stability over time in the independent variables, it is very unlikely that any short run shifts in their observed effects upon the socialist vote can be attributed to population movements which alter their pattern of area concentration. Such swings from election to election almost surely reflect the shifting mood of the electorate.

Two final points merit discussion before we proceed to the substantive findings. Table 3 shows the proportion of the total Presidential vote cast for Socialist candidates in both Illinois and the United States from 1896 to 1924. As the reader can see, there are numerous fluctuations in the level of support for Socialist candidates during this period. These fluctuations are often abrupt, as between 1912 and 1916 in Illinois where Debs' high water mark of over seven per cent of the Illinois Presidential vote in 1912 fell off to a low water mark of less than three per cent in the succeeding election due, perhaps (although this is a surmise drawn from the other literature available on the subject,¹³ which has not yet been re-examined in specific terms for Illinois) to the popularity of the foreign policy stand or the reforming labor legislation passed by President Woodrow Wilson's first administration, and to the fact that the Socialists nominated a relatively unknown candidate, Allen Bensen, for the presidency in 1916.

However, the point is that although one important part of the analysis of voting behavior is properly concerned with the changing

fraction of the vote captured by the various parties, another and equally important part of the analysis is not so much concerned with the changing level of support for the parties, but with the changing correlates of their support regardless of its level. The questions posed in this paper are primarily restricted to the latter kind: we are not as concerned with how much support Socialist candidates drew (which was never very much, save in a few isolated areas) as we are with who supported them. Because the focus of our interest is upon whether Socialists ran relatively well in poor, urban, mining, and ethnic areas and changes therein, we have reported all the regression coefficients in this paper in standardized form. The coefficients in raw score form would, from election to election, tend in some measure to reflect the changing scale or level of the Socialist vote, as well as the scales of the several independent variables. Standardized coefficients are obtained when all the variables, independent and dependent, are expressed in a common metric with mean zero and unit variance; they may be compared from one regression to the next and between variables in the same regression. Shifts in the standardized coefficients reveal whether the socialist vote--whatever its aggregate total--is more or less concentrated in areas with relatively large poor, urban, mining, or foreign-born populations.

Insert Table 3 about here

Lastly, it is perhaps appropriate to insert a word of caution about the generality of the findings presented below. Although we

would be surprised if the results from Illinois are not in broad outline applicable to other comparable states--such as Ohio, Indiana, and Pennsylvania--with large immigrant, urban, and mining populations, we prefer to leave the generality of present findings an open question to be answered as our own work develops. It is true that the changing level of support for Socialist Presidential candidates in the United States after 1900 is fairly closely mirrored by the support they received in Illinois alone. However, it is also true that they ran somewhat more strongly in Illinois than in the rest of the country, and that fact alone is a sufficient caution against premature extrapolation beyond Illinois.

3. Origins of Socialist Voting in Illinois

The socialists did not enter candidates into statewide election campaigns in Illinois until 1896. There were, however, other radical third parties active prior to that time: Greenbackers, Populists, the Union Labor Party, and the Union Reform Party. (The Greenback Party [1874], the United Labor Party [1888], and the Union Labor Party [1888] were originally agrarian reform parties seeking monetary reform, railroad regulation, and protective labor legislation which picked up considerable electoral support of the Midwest. The People's Party [1892] was, of course, much the largest and most powerful of these groups.)

Two questions regarding these predecessors to the socialist parties are of interest. First, to what extent did support for these parties come from areas with high concentrations of miners, foreign born, urbanites, and the least prosperous counties? And

second, did the counties that voted for pre-socialist radical third-party candidates shift their support to socialist candidates later?

We begin by looking at the vote for James B. Weaver, Presidential candidate of the Greenback Party in 1880. Regressing

G = proportion of Presidential vote cast for the Greenback Party candidate in 1880,

on the four independent variables obtained from the 1880 census yields the following standardized regression coefficients (the standard errors of the regression coefficients are given in parentheses):

$$\begin{aligned} b_{GM.FUW}^* &= .172 (.103) \\ b_{GF.MUW}^* &= -.094 (.132) \\ b_{GU.MFW}^* &= -.082 (.120) \\ b_{GW.MFU}^* &= .205 (.118) . \end{aligned}$$

(Note: M = the number of miners in 1882 [the earliest date for which we had data] over male population in 1880; F = foreign born over total population; the remaining two independent variables are unchanged.) The most striking result of this regression is the very low coefficient of determination, R^2 ; only seven per cent of the variance in votes cast for the Greenback Presidential candidate in 1880 was explained by the four independent variables. The miners apparently tended to vote for the Greenback candidate, as evidenced by the positive value of the regression coefficient for miners.

We need not look at every election individually. Table 4 shows the standardized regression coefficients for selected party candidates in the Presidential elections of 1880 to 1900. In 1884

the standardized regression coefficient of the proportion of vote cast for the 1884 Greenback Party Presidential candidate (= G') on the proportion employed in mines, net of the other three independent variables, is $b_{G'M.FUW}^* = .262 (.100)$, which is greater than twice its standard error. Counties with high proportions of miners gave heavy support to the Greenback candidate in Illinois in 1884. This result is substantively important for two reasons: it shows that miners were block voting for third-party candidates as early as 1884, and second, that they were unlikely to be voting in response to union dictates, for although the Illinois miners had some form of union organization going back to the Civil War, it probably remained too small and weak to have any major impact upon the voting behavior of its members.

Insert Table 4 about here

The counties with large numbers of miners supported candidates of the two labor parties, as one might expect. The Union Labor Party in 1888 and the Union Reform Party in 1900 drew heavy support from counties with large proportions of miners.

The results for the Populists are interesting, for taken in conjunction with the evidence concerning mining support for Greenback and Union Labor Party candidates, they throw doubt upon Laslett's earlier suggestion, put forward in Labor and the Left, that "the People's Party was the first radical third-party movement to capture the attention of the coal miners on any scale." In fact, as we see from Table 4, counties with large numbers of miners

gave no more support to Populist candidates than did other counties, net of the other three variables. The zero-order correlation coefficient was $r_{PM} = -.132$ in 1892 and $r_{PM} = .034$ in 1900, where P = proportion of vote cast for People's Party candidate. These results do not, of course, mean that large numbers of miners were not supporting Populist candidates; they imply only that counties with substantial mining activities were no more likely to support Populist Presidential candidates than were other areas.

Finally, Table 4 shows that although miners gave little support to the Socialist Labor Party in 1896, perhaps because of the dual-unionist, anti-U.M.W. of A. tactics of Daniel DeLeon's Socialist Trades and Labor Alliance, which had been founded in 1895, in 1900 the mining counties gave considerable support to the candidates of both the SLP and the Social Democratic Party (in 1901 to become the Socialist Party of America). Whether this was due to the relative popularity of the Socialist candidates, to the expansion of party organization in the state of Illinois, or to local conditions affecting the mining community, remains to be seen.

The second question we asked of pre-socialist voting in Illinois was the extent to which the pattern of socialist voting could be explained by the pattern of other radical third-party voting in Illinois prior to 1896. Table 5 shows the zero-order correlation coefficients of Presidential elections for selected parties from 1880 to 1904. The correlations for the same party in adjacent years are fairly high, indicating some stability in electoral support. In general, however, the correlations in Table 5 are relatively low, indicating little similarity in the pattern of voting by county in

Illinois from one radical third party to another. The implication is that in making their appeals to voters, the radical third parties either deliberately concentrated on different groups of voters, or, what is more likely, attracted different combinations of groups irrespective of the specific intentions. We have no grounds for saying that Greenbackers switched allegiance to the People's Party, for example; the correlation between the 1884 Greenbacker vote and the 1892 People's Party vote is .194, so that the Greenbacker vote explains only 3.8 per cent, i.e., $(.194)^2$, of the People's Party vote in 1892.

Insert Table 5 about here

It is similarly incorrect to say that the Illinois voters analyzed here who had been attracted to the People's Party became supporters of the socialists. The distribution by county of the proportion of the vote cast for the People's Party in 1892 and 1900 correlate negatively with all later votes for both the Socialist Party of America (the Social Democratic Party in 1900) and the Socialist Labor Party, at least until 1904. The counties that supported the People's Party did not later support socialists. This does not mean that groups of radical voters among the miners never switched allegiance from one third party to another. As we have seen, the regression coefficients in Table 4 showed that counties with large proportions of miners did lend significant support to candidates of the Greenback Party in 1884, to the Union Labor Party in 1888, and to the Socialists in 1900. It does mean,

however, that those Illinois voters who had voted Populist did not tend to switch their allegiance to the Socialists when the People's Party declined in the late 1890's.

Although these results come from only one state, they may also throw some light on an important area of controversy among historians of American radicalism, namely: how far the socialist movement generally in the Midwest took over some of the ideology, as well as some of the areas of support, which had formerly gone to the Populists. Both Norman Pollack, in his discussion of the potential for a practical alliance between Populists and socialist trade unionists on a number of issues in which both had a common interest (as well as Melvyn Dubofsky in his analysis of working class radicalism in the Rocky Mountain states) attempted to demonstrate common ground between Populists, Socialists, and radical trade unionists.¹⁶ The evidence from these voting returns, however, tends to throw doubt upon these similarities, and to underscore the differences between the two movements. The returns also show the fragmented and episodic nature of the support which radical third parties received, suggesting that (at least before the advent of the Socialist Party itself) they were more likely to have been the vehicle for local and temporary discontents, than they were of a consistent groundswell of radicalism within a particular class.

4. The Support Base for Socialist Parties

We began this study with the intention of replicating the analysis for each national and statewide election in Illinois.

It became readily apparent that such detail was unnecessary. The pattern of socialist voting for any one office was so similar to the distribution for any other office that little is gained by a comparison of the returns for the several offices. Illustrative evidence for this conclusion is provided in Table 6, which shows the correlations between the socialist vote for President, Governor, Lt. Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, and State Treasurer in 1912. All of the correlations are in excess of .99 and many round up to 1.000 with three significant digits. These results imply that virtually all of the area variation in the socialist vote for any particular office is known once the variation in the socialist vote for any other office has been determined. Owing to this situation, the remainder of our analysis is restricted to the series pertaining to State Treasurer, a choice dictated by the fact that elections for that office are held every two years. Thus, by utilizing the State Treasurer series we double the number of observations we are able to make over time. Although our analysis in this paper is limited to discussion of the State Treasurer series, we in fact performed parallel analyses of the Presidential and Gubernatorial series. As one would expect given the observed correlations between the votes for different offices, the Presidential and Gubernatorial series essentially replicate the observed findings on the State Treasurer series in Presidential election years. A few minor differences can be found, but these are inconsequential and attempting to interpret them would produce nothing but idle speculation.

Insert Table 6 about here

The results of the regression analysis of the proportion of votes given to socialist candidates for State Treasurer are shown in Table 7. The series begins in 1896 for the Socialist Labor Party (SLP), the date marking the first election in which the SLP ran a candidate for the office. In 1900, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) first sponsored a candidate for State Treasurer. The SDP vote in 1900 is here treated as historically continuous with subsequent voting for the Socialist Party of America (SPA) which first emerged in the 1902 elections.¹⁷ The series ends for both parties in 1924, a somewhat arbitrary but nevertheless historically significant cut-off date which marks the independent candidacy of Robert M. La Follette on behalf of a group of former Progressives, Socialists, and farmer-laborites under the banner of the Conference for Progressive Political Action. In that year the Socialist Party of America, by far the larger of the two Socialist parties--by this time the DeLeonite Socialist Labor Party was little more than a rump--threw its support in the Presidential election to La Follette, thus marking a temporary end to SPA sponsorship of independent candidates for President.

The series reported in Table 7 was derived by regressing the fraction of the vote for SPA and SLP candidates in each election on a changing set of independent variables. The independent predictors used in each regression are the values of the independent variables observed in the census year closest to the election in

question. Thus, the observations on the independent variables in 1900 are used to predict the vote in elections between 1896 and 1904; the 1910 values of the independent variables are used to predict the election results from 1906 to 1914; and the 1920 observations are utilized to round out the series from 1916 to 1924. As we noted above, the independent variables are very stable over time and much the same results would be obtained for the mid-decade elections if one used the observations at either end of the decade or some average of them.

Interpreting all of the small shifts which can be found in the coefficients reported in Table 7 is beyond the scope of this paper. Minor changes could, in any case, be generated by the changing match of the dependent to the independent variables. Consequently, we restrict our attention to the more dramatic movements which are unlikely to be affected by modest changes in the method of derivation.

As the reader can see from Table 7, throughout the period under study there was a tendency for both SPA and SLP candidates to run well in counties where miners, immigrants, and urbanites were concentrated and to run poorly in those areas where wealth--as indexed by the value of property subject to ad valorem taxation--was concentrated. A coalition between a rural proletariat and the urban working class appeared, therefore, to be a potentially viable, since the groups involved were both numerically large and potentially crucial in determining the outcome of any election. Yet the Socialists were never able to capture more than a very modest fraction of the total vote, or win a statewide election. Although they made signif-

icant inroads among miners, urbanites, and immigrants, these were never strong enough to attract a majority of voters in these areas away from the major parties. While such votes as the socialist candidates received were drawn disproportionately from mining, urban, and immigrant areas, they were able to develop, even in these areas, only a small plurality of the vote. The failure of the Socialists to develop strong majorities in these areas where discernible pockets of strength existed may well be rooted in their inability to retain equally strong footholds in these places from election to election. For while Table 7 makes clear that both the SPA and SLP drew their support more heavily from immigrants, miners, and urbanites, it makes equally clear that the relative concentration of their support among these groups was subject to substantial fluctuation during the first quarter of the century--pointing again to the fractionalized and unstable character of the Socialist vote.

Throughout the period under review, SPA candidates for State Treasurer drew their votes disproportionately from areas with relatively large immigrant populations. The coefficient of the foreign-born variable is always positive and always at least twice its standard error. Despite their consistently good performance in these areas, there are some noteworthy variations in the record. First, we note that in 1912 the association (as indicated by the standard form regression coefficient) between the SPA vote and the foreign-born variable drops off to a low of .185. The coefficient remains fairly low at .236 in the 1914 off-year election before climbing to its previous level in 1916. A similar phenomenon occurs in 1924, when the coefficient drops from .478 to .280. Although

Debs received a larger fraction of the Presidential vote in 1912 than any SPA Presidential candidate was ever to receive, we also know that the third-party candidacy of Theodore Roosevelt won strong support in foreign-born areas. Again in 1924, La Follette, who was endorsed by the SPA, ran well in areas with large immigrant populations. It is, therefore, plausible that straight ticket voting in these areas for Progressive Party candidates may have served in both 1912 and 1924 to reduce the usual strength of SPA candidates among the foreign born.¹⁸

The other main fluctuation in the association between the performance of SPA candidates and the concentration of immigrants occurs in 1920, just after the close of World War I. From its low of .185 in 1912, the coefficient of the foreign-born variable rose steadily to its all-time peak of .671 in 1920, neglecting the well-known fact that after the Socialist-Communist split of 1919, the SPA vote is drawn largely from the foreign born. Thus, throughout the war years, the SPA vote became increasingly concentrated in areas with large immigrant populations. As we shall presently see, however, whatever support an anti-war platform may have won the SPA in areas with large numbers of anti-Allied immigrants was more than offset by its alienation of voters elsewhere.

Like the SPA, the smaller SLP also drew its vote disproportionately from immigrant populations. However, the association between the SLP vote and the foreign-born variable is subject to a wider range of fluctuations. Still further, these fluctuations seemingly defy, unlike those in the SPA series, explanation by reference to particular historical events. They are, however,

systematically related to a structural characteristic of elections. In Presidential election years, the average association of the foreign-born variable with the SLP vote is .151; in off-year elections the average is more than twice as large, being .356. Thus, while SLP candidates always ran relatively strong among the foreign born, they tended to run more strongly in off-year than in Presidential elections. Why this should be so is not clear, though it may well be related to the large element played by personal appeal in Presidential politics.

Insert Table 7 about here

The SLP first entered a candidate for State Treasurer in 1896 and the SDP followed in 1900. Neither party drew especially well in urban areas during these initial campaigns. However, both the SLP vote in 1898 and the SPA vote in 1902 was significantly concentrated in urban areas. In each election between 1898 and 1914, the urban variable is significantly related to the SLP vote. During this period, its coefficient never rises above .4 and falls below .25 on only one occasion. A similar stability in the relative strength of SPA candidates in urban areas is observed in the elections of 1902 through 1916. The differential appeal of Socialist candidates to urban voters, however, collapses in large measure during World War I. The association between the SPA vote and urbanism falls steadily from .414 in 1912 to a trough of .120 in 1918, where it remains in 1920 before recovering somewhat in 1922 only to fall off again at the end of the period. A similar pattern of decline

is observed in the association between the SLP vote and urbanism, though the 1920 recovery is preserved through 1924. Thus, the urban strength of both parties, but especially of the SPA, was largely dissipated during the war. From their inception to the eve of World War I, both SPA and SLP candidates ran appreciably better in urban than in rural areas. By the close of the war, they were not doing much better in urban than in rural areas. The anti-war stand of the SPA, the growing strength of nativism coupled with the appeal of socialist ideologies among immigrant populations, and the Red Scare in the aftermath of the war appeared to have contributed, along with other factors, to the demise of urban electoral support for socialist politics in Illinois. How far this development was true in other states--and whether New York, with its continued if not increased support for socialist candidates both during and after the war was an exception to a more general national pattern--remains to be seen.

Both SPA and SLP candidates ran poorly--as expected--in prosperous areas through the quarter century spanned by the series reported in Table 7. The wealth variable is, with a single (and statistically insignificant) exception, negatively related to both the SLP and the SPA vote. The coefficients are, however, fairly modest in size, never rising above .25 in absolute magnitude. Although there is some fluctuation from election to election in these coefficients, the observed shifts are not precipitous and bear no obvious connection to historical events of which we are aware.

Like urbanites and the foreign born, miners were a significant source of socialist electoral support in Illinois throughout the

first quarter of the 20th century. Their support was, however, rather more fickle than that which derived in the initial decade of the century from the foreign born and the urban classes. Among other things, it flowed and ebbed on the four-year cycle of Presidential elections. During off-year elections, neither SPA nor SLP candidates, but especially the latter, fared particularly well in mining areas. In Presidential elections, the vote for both parties was relatively more concentrated in these areas. Thus, we find from Table 7 that the standardized regression coefficient linking the indicator of mining activity to the SLP vote averaged .406 in Presidential election years and .204 in off-year elections. The corresponding averages of the coefficients relating the mining variable to the SPA vote are .297 and .135, for Presidential and off-year elections, respectively. These swings from election to election are substantial and indicate that neither the SPA nor the SLP was able to maintain the strength exhibited among miners in Presidential elections through the off-year elections. Apparently, both parties could mobilize their support among miners best during national elections; their inability to retain that support during off-year elections required them to recapture it, rather than build upon it, in Presidential years. Why this was so, and what its implications are for other elements in the voting labor force, remains to be seen.

Although the swings from Presidential to off-year elections account for much of the fluctuation in the support received by both the SPA and the SLP in mining areas, a variety of other developments, specific to the two parties, are superimposed upon these cycles.

For example, if one ignores the off-year elections, it becomes very clear that the concentration of the SLP vote in mining areas was augmented in each succeeding Presidential election. In 1896, the SLP ran only a little better in mining areas than elsewhere, but by the Presidential election of 1920 the areal variation in their support was very closely mirrored by the distribution of mining activities. This transformation of SLP support among miners progressed gradually from one Presidential election to the next. The coefficient relating the mining variable to the SLP vote in 1896 was a scant .151; in successive Presidential election years, the corresponding regression coefficients rise to .209, .349, .445, .434, and .585, before reaching a peak of .715 in 1920. Excepting the off-year election swings, the concentration of the SLP vote in mining areas increases right through the war years and there is no indication that the concentration of SLP support among miners was diluted by the war. However, in the period between 1920 and 1924, the relative strength of SLP candidates among miners is largely dissipated, the coefficient of the mining variable falling off sharply to .357. One can only surmise that La Follette's candidacy undermined the support SLP candidates garnered among miners, but there seems little question that the SLP was vulnerable to such a swing, despite the growing concentration of their vote in mining areas, owing to their failure to retain their strength in off-years.

The growing concentration of the SLP vote in mining areas during Presidential election years is not mirrored in the SPA series. While there is no evidence of an increasing concentration

of SPA support among miners, there is a diminution over time in the amplitude of the off-year election swings in support for SPA candidates. At the turn of the century, the coefficient relating the mining variable to the SPA vote fluctuated wildly, but it, unlike those pertaining to the SLP vote, settled down to a more stable value by 1910. As was the case with urban voters, miners appear to have withdrawn their support of SPA candidates during World War I. However, unlike the gradual decline between 1912 and 1920 in the coefficient of the urban variable, the coefficient relating the indicator of mining activity to the SPA vote drops off abruptly. In 1916, its value was .313; by 1918 it dips to a scant .033 and recovers insignificantly in the succeeding two years. After the close of the war, in 1922 and 1924, the support of SPA candidates in mining areas returns to its prewar level. Although the withdrawal of SPA support in mining areas could have been stimulated in part by the SPA's anti-war stand, the demise of mining support occurs too late and persists too long after the war to make such an interpretation very plausible by itself. We are also inclined to trace the abrupt shift observed in the voting data to the development of the Americanization movement which reached its heyday in 1916-1919 and to the Red Scare following the close of the war.

In addition to the particular changes noted above, there is evidence that SPA support in mining areas moved systematically in response to national economic conditions. Taking the standardized regression coefficients relating the mining variable to the SPA vote as the dependent variable, we found they correlated .711 with the per cent unemployed in the civilian labor force of the U.S.

in the same year, $-.281$ with the average annual earnings of bituminous coal miners in the U.S., and $-.469$ with the ratio of the average annual earnings of bituminous coal miners to the average annual earnings in all industries (excluding farm labor). Thus, the mining areas in Illinois offered their greatest relative support to SPA candidates when national unemployment was large and when the earnings of coal miners, especially their relative earnings, were depressed. Strike activity in the national coal industry did not, however, appear to influence radical voting among Illinois miners, since a correlation of only $.014$ was observed between the coefficients of the mining variable and the number of man-days idle because of strikes in the U.S. bituminous coal industry.¹⁹ Only the strength of the SPA vote in mining areas was, however, responsive to national economic conditions, since the coefficients relating the mining variable to the SLP vote were virtually uncorrelated with unemployment and relative earnings and, implausibly, tended to be larger when earnings (but not relative earnings) were high and strike activity low. Why SLP support among miners did not respond to economic conditions is unclear, but it is what one might expect to find if SLP voters--who were never numerous--were comprised mainly of dedicated party members and a random, but changing mixture of independents and major party defectors.

5. Persistence in the Vote

In the preceding section, we traced the shifting pattern of support received by the SLP and the SPA from urban, immigrant, mining, and prosperous areas during the first quarter of the century.

This pattern of analysis contains an implicit theory of how people vote. At the individual level, this theory sees the potential voter as a rational actor who at each election recalculates his interests and gives his support to the party and candidates he deems most likely to do him the most good. The kinds of interests he may take into account are many and varied, but we know that among them are the location of the voter and the groups with which he identifies in the socioeconomic structure. And, of course, the voter need not vote for the candidate with whom he is in greatest agreement, especially if he sees that candidate as having no chance of winning and views an almost equally acceptable contender as standing a good chance. Basically, a theory of this kind, which it is unnecessary to elaborate at length here, underlies most ecological studies of American voting behavior. We know there is an element of truth to such a theory, because groups of voters do realign themselves from one party to another as their interests change, much as the strength of SPA support among miners fluctuated with economic conditions. But while there is an important component of truth to such a theory, we also know that it makes the voter a more complicated creature than he is. There is an important element of habit in voting behavior and voters, having once identified with a party for whatever reasons, tend to go on voting in the same way. Loyalty of this kind allows parties to build up stable sources of strength and to concentrate their energies on winning the support of independents and new groups. The same loyalty also creates a degree of stability from election to election in the vote, which would shift more precipitously if every voter freshly recalculated and acted on his

interests at each election.

Nevertheless, the unstable character of the electoral support which the Socialists received is a marked feature of the results analyzed here, and may present an extremely interesting contrast to the supposedly more stable patterns of party allegiance which characterized working class voting behavior in England.

In our analysis to this point, we have ignored persistence in socialist voting patterns in order to see how far an analysis of the group bases of voting would take us. We now turn to examine persistence in the vote for socialist parties by adding a further independent variable to those already considered. We recomputed the regressions reported in Table 7 after including the vote in the preceding election for the candidate of the same party for the same office as a predictor variable. (Exceptions to this rule are noted in the accompanying table and occur when a party had no candidate in the preceding election.) The results are given in Table 8, where it can be seen from the uniformly significant coefficients of the vote in the preceding election that there was substantial persistence in socialist voting patterns which cannot be traced to the continuing support offered to socialist parties by the foreign born, urbanites, and miners and the continuing rejection they found in prosperous counties.

Before examining the results pertaining to persistence in greater detail, a few remarks about the coefficients of the remaining variables are in order. The reader will recall that, in selecting the independent variables, we consciously attempted to choose them so as to keep the intercorrelations between them as low as possible.

Once we enter the vote in the preceding election into the analysis, a substantial amount of intercorrelation between the independent variables is also introduced into the analysis. This multicollinearity between the independent variables is as great as the coefficients of determination already reported in Table 7, since they reveal the extent to which the variance in the vote in the preceding election is explained by the independent variables we have already examined. Reference to Table 7 will convince the reader that this figure is not trivial and usually runs around 40 to 50 per cent, which is like having two independent variables in a two variable regression whose intercorrelation is on the order of .6 to .7. Owing to the introduction of this degree of intercorrelation between the new variable and those previously studied, we can expect the coefficients observed in the new regression to be somewhat different than those reported previously. That this is, indeed, the case is readily verified by comparing the coefficients of M, F, U, and W reported in Table 7 and Table 8. Generally, the coefficients in the latter table are less in absolute value than those previously studied, just as one would expect to happen as M, F, U, and W start to share appreciable variance with another variable which jointly explains the dependent variable with them. However, despite the altered scale of the coefficients of M, F, U, and W, the pattern in their coefficients from election to election remains much the same. The observations made about Table 7 apply in large measure to the results displayed in Table 8. There is neither need to repeat them here nor cause to linger over the minor differences in detail which could be rooted out of a comparison of the tables.

Insert Table 8 about here

Examination of the coefficients associated with the returns of the previous election reveal that there was a systematic increase in the stability of the SPA vote for State Treasurer during the years prior to the opening of World War I. Since the SPA first ran a candidate in 1902, the series begins by relating the 1902 SPA vote for State Treasurer to the 1900 vote received by the candidate of the Social Democratic Party. This shows a very modest amount of transfer in the votes from one party to the next, the coefficient being only .265. However, through 1910 the stability in the SPA vote increases dramatically, as indicated by the coefficients of .489 and .775 observed in 1904 and 1910, respectively. Perhaps in response to the significant Progressive third-party movement headed by Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, the stability in the SPA vote decreases somewhat in 1912, but it recovers to an all time high in 1914, when the coefficient of the SPA vote in the preceding year was .858. Thus, before the war, the SPA was apparently beginning to build up a stable core of loyal voters--raising interesting questions about the vexed issue of just when the party reached its electoral peak. The areas in which they ran well in one election tended to be the ones in which they ran well in the next and the stability increased from year to year. This development must have seemed encouraging at the time to the party organization, because, even though the SPA share of the total vote remained small, it seemed to be developing a stable following.

The trends observed prior to World War I disintegrate rapidly during the course of the conflict. After 1914 the stability of the SPA vote falls with each succeeding election. A trough is reached in 1920, when the coefficient of the SPA vote in the preceding election is only .386. There is some recovery of stability in 1922, but it dips off again in 1924 at the close of the period. It is reasonably plain from these figures that there was a substantial shift in the areal bases of SPA support during the war, even after the behavior of significant population groups--miners, immigrants, urbanites, and the prosperous--has been taken into account. Why this should be so is not clear, but it doubtless represents the response of the electorate to a combination of factors already identified: nativism, the Socialist Party's anti-war stand, wartime nationalism, and the alleged Russian menace to name a few. If the causes of this transformation in the area bases of SPA support are unknown, its consequences are rather more obvious, for once again it made the SPA a competitor in the political arena without a solid albeit small, cadre of loyal supporters.

Although the persistence of SLP vote was quite substantial between 1898 and 1900, for the most part the area concentration of the SLP vote was considerably less stable than that of the SPA. In the period before the war, there is no indication of increasing stability in the support base of the SLP and, during the war, there is very little carryover from election to election in SLP support. With a continuously shifting, as well as extraordinarily small, base in the electorate, SLP organizers doubtless found it difficult to manage campaigns effectively. Without a stable base of loyal

supporters, however small, the SLP was ultimately doomed to collecting scattered protest votes at each election rather than building upon and enlarging known and stable pockets of strength.

6. Concluding Remarks

Although we have employed quantitative techniques familiar to sociologists and political scientists throughout this paper, our task has remained the distinctively historical one of recording the changing support base of socialist parties in Illinois. We have eschewed the more typical sociological task of using historical cases to demonstrate general theories about third-party movements, such as those used by Duverger.²⁰ We have been more concerned with what happened to SLP and SPA electoral support than with why it happened. We must, of course, address the question of causation in the larger endeavor of which this paper is a small part. But to do so first requires that we lay out the known historical terrain, so that we can then augment the evidence from these kinds of systematic statistical studies--which, as noted at the beginning of this paper, must include analyses of wage data, geographical and occupational mobility trends, and other quantifiable characteristics of working class life--with evidence from diaries, letters, journals, and biographies, which are the lifeblood of finished history.

Notes

1. John H.M. Laslett and Robert W. Hodge, "Coal miners and Politics in Britain and America, 1865-1940: A Study in Comparative Historical Sociology," (Paper read to American Sociological Association, Washington, D.C., September 2, 1970), 4-8.
2. James R. Green, "Coal Miners and Southwestern Socialism, 1896-1916: A Study of the Relationship Between Industrial Unionism and Agrarian Radicalism in Oklahoma, Kansas, and Arkansas," passim.
3. American Federation of Labor, History, Encyclopedia, Reference Book, (Washington, D.C., 1919), 63; 480.
4. Laslett and Hodge, op. cit., passim.
5. The sources of data are: U.S. Bureau of the Census: Population of the United States: 1890, Vol. 1, Part 1, (Washington, D.C., 1895), Tables 8, 15, and 79; Population: 1900, Vol. 1, Part 1, (Washington, D.C., 1901), Tables 18 and 19; Population: 1910, Vol. 2, Report by States, Part 1, (Washington, D.C., 1913), 484-503; Population: 1920, Vol. 1, Number and Distribution of Inhabitants, (Washington, D.C., 1921), Table 49; and Vol. 2, General Report and Analytic Tables, (Washington, D.C., 1922), 1335-1336; Wealth, Debt, and Taxation: 1890, Vol. 15, Part 2, Valuation and Taxation, (Washington, D.C., 1895), 68-70; Wealth, Debt, and Taxation: 1913, Vol. 1, (Washington, D.C., 1915), Table 6; Wealth, Public Debt, and Taxation: 1922, Vol. 1, Assessed Valuation and Tax Levies, (Washington, D.C., 1924), Table 6; Secretary of State, State of Illinois, Blue Book of the State of Illinois, (Springfield, biennial); and Department of Mines and Minerals, State of Illinois, "Annual Figures of Number of Mines, Total Production, and Number of Employees, by County, Illinois, 1882-1968," Xeroxed.
6. For this and other preliminary information concerning socialist and radical influences among the Illinois coal miners, see Laslett, Labor and the Left: A Study of Socialist and Radical Influences in the American Labor Movement, 1881-1924 (New York, 1970), Chapter 6, passim; and Laslett, "End of an Alliance: Selected Correspondence Between Socialist Party Secretary Adolph Germer, and U.M.W. of A. Leaders in World War One," Labor History, XII (Fall, 1971), 570-595.

7. See Chester M. Destler, American Radicalism, 1865-1901, (New London, 1946), especially chapters 8, 9; Paul Kleppner, The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Midwestern Politics, 1850-1900, (New York, 1970), especially pp. 234-249; Richard Jensen, The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888-1896, (Chicago, 1971), chapter 9.
8. We are well aware that it is an oversimplification to treat immigrants as an undifferentiated mass. We are now undertaking further work to determine the support given to socialist parties by different ethnic groups. This analysis, however, introduces complications, especially of the methodological variety, which goes beyond the scope of this paper.
9. Despite the shortcomings in the indicators adopted here, it should be noted that during the period covered by the present analysis, they, when augmented by the proportion black in each county (a factor which has no bearing on the vote for socialist parties), account for as much as 67 per cent of the major party Presidential vote.
10. The problem of inferring individual correlations from ecological data was first identified by W.S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," American Sociological Review, 15(June, 1950), 351-357. Despite difficulties in inferring individual relations from ecological ones, there are many circumstances under which valid inferences about individual behavior can be drawn from ecological data. The method of ecological analysis is widely used in quantitative historical studies because, often only ecological data are available. Jensen, op. cit., passim; Kleppner, op. cit., passim provide illustrations of its use in historical studies. Procedures for inferring individual correlations from ecological ones have been developed by Otis Dudley Duncan and Beverly Davis, "An Alternative to Ecological Correlation," American Sociological Review, 18(December, 1953), 665-666; and Leo A. Goodman, "Some Alternatives to Ecological Correlation," American Journal of Sociology, 64(May, 1959), 610-625.
11. For a discussion of the problem of multicollinearity and related issues in regression analysis, see Robert A. Gordon, "Issues in Multiple Regression," American Journal of Sociology, 73(March, 1968), 592-616; or consult any standard econometrics text.
12. In numerous preliminary investigations, we considered a variety of variables not introduced here. These included the literacy rate, urban influence (or rural isolation) as indexed by the distance of a county from St. Louis and Chicago, the proportion of native white of foreign or mixed parentage, the value of farm land, and the per cent Catholic. All of these variables were deleted from the analysis presented herein owing either to their multicollinearity with the variables included or to

their lack of relevance to the explanation of the socialist vote. Extensions of this experimental work will be reported in future research.

13. See David Shannon, The Socialist Party of America, A History, (New York, 1955), chapters 4 and 5.
14. For a general discussion of the history and character of these parties and reform groups and their relations to labor and the socialist parties, see Nathan Fine, Labor and Farmer Parties in the United States, 1828-1928, (New York, 1928), 56-87, ff.; Howard H. Quint, The Forging of American Socialism, Origins of the Modern Movement, (New York, 1953), 219-230, 260-263, 210-247, ff.
15. Laslett, Labor and the Left, 200.
16. For this, see Laslett, Labor and the Left, 148-150, 200-202, 298-299; Norman Pollack, The Populist Response to Industrial America, Midwestern Populist Thought, (Cambridge, 1962), ff; Melvyn Dubofsky, "The Origins of Western Working Class Radicalism, 1890-1905," Labor History, VII (Spring, 1966), 131-154.
17. The continuity between the SDP and SPA is readily apparent in Table 5. The 1900 SDP Presidential vote is correlated .735 with the 1904 SPA Presidential vote. Its correlations with the SLP Presidential vote in 1896, 1900, and 1904 are all positive but substantially less in magnitude.
18. These claims are based on unpublished analyses of the Presidential vote. In regression analyses of the Progressive vote in 1912 and 1924, which included M, U, F, and W, as well as the percentage black, the foreign-born variable received standardized regression coefficients of .617 and .399, respectively. Both coefficients are several times larger than their standard errors.
19. All of the variables introduced in this paragraph concerning employment, earnings, and strike activity were derived from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957, (Washington, D.C., 1960), 73, 91, 358.
20. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, trans. by Barbara and Robert North, (New York, 1954).

TABLE 1

Zero-Order Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations of Four Independent Variables, 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920

Variable*	Correlation Coefficients				Mean	Standard Deviation
	M	F	U	W		
	<u>1880</u>					
M	.296		.166	.143	.0106	.0238
F		.512		.477	.1216	.0841
U			.200		.1266	.1662
W					242.306	89.248
	<u>1890</u>					
M	.308		.099	.174	.0118	.0228
F		.508		.513	.1181	.0904
U			.161		.1634	.1938
W					206.221	72.658
	<u>1900</u>					
M	.271		.103	.056	.0200	.0378
F		.587		.554	.0970	.0784
U			.224		.2082	.2032
W					187.380	72.666
	<u>1910</u>					
M	.255		.079	-.189	.0353	.0676
F		.504		.252	.0899	.0783
U			-.079		.2538	.2208
W					408.164	159.951
	<u>1920</u>					
M	.245		.127	-.309	.0360	.0752
F		.523		.149	.0701	.0645
U			-.190		.2890	.2367
W					654.287	248.455

TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)

*The variables are:

M = number of men employed in mines in 1882 over total male population in 1880; = number of males employed in mines during census year over total male population, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920.

F = foreign born over total population in 1880 and 1890; = foreign-born whites over total white population in 1900, 1910, and 1920.

U = population in places size 2,500 or more over total population, 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920.

W = per capita dollar value of all property subject to ad valorem taxation, 1880, 1890, 1902, 1912, 1922.

Table 2

Zero-Order Correlations Through Time of Four Independent Variables

Census Year	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920
	Proportion of Males Employed in Mines (M)				
1880		.87	.77	.46	.26
1890			.90	.52	.29
1900				.69	.46
1910					.90
1920					
	Proportion of Population Foreign Born (F)				
1880		.97	.95	.87	.80
1890			.99	.93	.86
1900				.95	.89
1910					.98
1920					
	Proportion of Population in Places 2,500+ (U)				
1880		.96	.92	.86	.81
1890			.96	.91	.85
1900				.94	.90
1910					.96
1920					
	Per Capita Assessed Valuation of Property (W) ^a				
1880		.96	.91	.80	.78
1890			.93	.84	.82
1902				.92	.89
1912					.98
1922					

^aObservations on the years 1880, 1890, 1902, 1912, 1922.

TABLE 3

Per Cent of Total Vote Cast for Socialist Candidates for President, Illinois
and United States, 1896-1924

Year of Election	<u>Socialist Party of America</u>		<u>Socialist Labor Party</u>	
	<u>Illinois</u>	<u>United States</u>	<u>Illinois</u>	<u>United States</u>
1896	0.11	0.26
1900	0.86*	0.63*	0.12	0.28
1904	6.43	2.98	0.44	0.23
1908	3.01	2.83	0.14	0.09
1912	7.09	5.99	0.36	0.19
1916	2.80	3.17	0.11	0.07
1920	3.57	3.44	0.17	0.12
1924	0.09	0.13

*Social Democratic Party

Source: Historical Statistics of the United States;
Colonial Times to 1957, p. 682; Blue
Book of the State of Illinois, biennial

Table 4

Standardized Regression Coefficients of Selected Presidential Candidates
Regressed on Four Independent Variables, 1880-1904

<u>Dependent Variable</u>		<u>Independent Variables**</u>				Coefficient of Determina- tion R^2
<u>Political Party</u>	<u>Year</u>	Miners =(M)	Foreign Born =(F)	Urban =(U)	Wealth =(W)	
Greenback	1880	.172	-.094	-.082	.205	.066
Greenback	1884	.262*	-.131	.074	.230*	.116
Union Labor	1888	.345*	-.280*	.054	-.061	.143
United Labor	1888	-.144	.316*	.281*	-.189	.221
People's	1892	.031	-.322*	-.158	-.280*	.356
Socialist Labor	1896	.172	.246	.197	-.153	.181
People's	1900	.100	-.155	-.133	-.185	.139
Socialist Labor	1900	.268*	-.034	.332*	.046	.192
Social Democratic	1900	.371*	.373*	.168	-.101	.423
Union Reform	1900	.211*	.074	.003	-.304*	.119
Socialist Party of America	1904	.223*	.408*	.449*	-.207*	.606
Socialist Labor	1904	.369*	.225	.333	-.215*	.408
People's	1904	.249*	.032	-.061	-.148	.082

*Coefficient is at least twice its standard error.

**Independent Variables: See Table 1

TABLE 6

Zero-Order Correlations of Combined Vote for Socialist Party of America and
Socialist Labor Party, by Office, Illinois, 1912

OFFICE OF:

Office of:	Pres..	Gov.	Lt. Gov.	S. of S.	A. G..	S. T.	<u>Mean*</u>
President		.997	..998	.998	.998	.998	7.45
Governor			.999	.997	.998	.998	7.11
Lt. Governor				.999	1.000	1.000	7.60
Secretary of State					1.000	1.000	7.93
Attorney General						1.000	7.76
State Treasurer							7.74

* Per Cent of total vote in state cast for two socialist parties

TABLE 7

Summary of Regression Analysis of Proportion of Votes Cast for Socialist
Candidates for State Treasurer, Illinois, 1896-1924

Party and Year of Election	Independent Variables**				Coefficient of Determina- tion
	Mining (=M)	Foreign Born (=F)	Urbanism (=U)	Wealth (=W)	
Socialist Party of America	Regression Coefficients in Standard Form.....				R ²
1900 ^a	.410*	.347*	.129	-.096	.409
1902	-.057	.452*	.337*	-.196*	.394
1904	.229*	.416*	.430*	-.207*	.596
1906	.072	.535*	.342*	-.134	.608
1908	.361*	.348*	.340*	-.165*	.599
1910	.208*	.339*	.407*	-.217*	.553
1912	.343*	.185*	.414*	-.225*	.529
1914	.321*	.236*	.359*	-.180*	.474
1916	.313*	.336*	.294*	-.150	.528
1918	.033	.404*	.120	-.228*	.277
1920	.070	.671*	.126	-.203*	.604
1922	.230*	.478*	.242*	-.146	.564
1924	.352*	.280*	.138	-.145	.371

*Coefficient is at least twice its standard error.

**Independent variables: See Table 1

^aSocial Democratic Party

TABLE 7 (CONTINUED)

Party and Year of Election	Independent Variables				Coefficient of Determina- tion
	Mining (=M)	Foreign Born (=F)	Urbanism (=U)	Wealth (=W)	
Socialist Labor Party	Regression Coefficients in Standard Form				R ²
1896	.151	.312*	.126	-.169	.170
1898	.305*	.238*	.373*	-.130	.413
1900	.209*	.063	.347*	.011	.219
1902	.138	.437*	.359*	-.102	.509
1904	.349*	.235	.342*	-.200*	.407
1906	.358*	.337*	.328*	-.072	.546
1908	.445*	.343*	.181*	-.171*	.534
1910	.135	.339*	.290*	-.120	.351
1912	.434*	.031	.376*	-.120	.414
1914	.147	.247*	.357*	-.202*	.364
1916	.585*	-.046	.171	-.069	.413
1918	.143	.535*	.074	-.202*	.426
1920	.715*	.032	.246*	-.078	.685
1922
1924	.357*	.240*	.246*	-.051	.387

*Coefficient is at least twice its standard error.

**Independent variables: See Table 1

^aSocial Democratic Party

Table 8

Summary of Regression Analysis of Proportion of State Treasurer Vote Cast for Socialist Candidates, Including vote in Preceding Election as a Predictor, Illinois, 1898-1924.

Party and Year	Independent Variables**					Coefficient of Determination
	Foreign Mining (=M)	Born (=F)	Urbanism (=U)	Wealth (=W)	Vote for Candidate of Same Party for Same Office in Preceding Year (=V _{t-1})	
Regression Coefficients in Standard Form						R ²
<u>Socialist Party of America.</u>						
1900	.327*	.282*	.026	-.060	.275* ^b	.453
1902	-.165	.360*	.303*	-.170	.265* ^a	.435
1904	.257*	.195*	.266*	-.111	.489*	.741
1906	.039	.268*	.128	-.073	.572*	.756
1908	.314*	.001	.118	-.077	.650*	.765
1910	-.072	.070	.143*	-.089	.775*	.793
1912	.213*	-.027	.160*	-.090	.626*	.704
1914	.027	.078	.004	.013	.858*	.820
1916	.087	.086	.064	-.019	.775*	.824
1918	-.170	.187	-.071	-.131	.649*	.476
1920	.057	.516*	.080	-.115	.386*	.712
1922	.187*	.065	.164*	-.021	.616*	.714
1924	.231*	.029	.012	-.068	.524*	.490

*Coefficient is at least twice its standard error.

** Independent variables: See Table 1

^a Social Democratic Party in 1900

^b Socialist Labor Party vote (for State Treasurer) in 1898.

Table 8 (Continued)

Party and Year	Independent Variables**					Coefficient of Determination
	Mining (=M)	Foreign Born (=F)	Urbanism (=U)	Wealth (=W)	Vote for Candidate of Same Party for Same Office in Preceding Year = V_{t-1}	
Regression Coefficients in Standard Form						R^2
<u>Socialist Labor Party</u>						
1898	.240*	.103	.318*	-.057	.430*	.566
1900	-.035	-.127	.048	.115	.800*	.594
1902	.080	.419*	.263*	-.105	.278*	.570
1904	.281*	.018	.164	-.149	.495*	.527
1906	.278*	.244*	.203*	-.022	.373*	.636
1908	.332*	.237*	.078	-.149	.315*	.579
1910	-.088	.167	.199*	-.034	.501*	.468
1912	.395*	-.066	.293*	-.086	.288*	.468
1914	-.046	.233*	.189	-.149	.444*	.479
1916	.553*	-.113	.105	-.026	.212	.441
1918	.007	.546*	.034	-.186*	.232*	.457
1920	.691*	-.057	.234*	-.044	.167*	.701
1922
1924	.224*	-.035	.107	.033	.575* ^c	.530

*Coefficient is at least twice its standard error.

**Independent variables: See Table 1

^cSocialist Party of America (for State Treasurer) in 1922
(SLP ran no candidate for State Treasurer in 1922).