

A COMPARISON OF THE DISSATISFACTIONS AND
COLLECTIVE ACTION MODELS OF PROTEST: THE CASE OF THE
WORKING CLASSES OF LANCASHIRE, ENGLAND, 1793-1830.

by

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Historians of early modern western Europe are taking a closer look at the role of the common people in the political development of modern polities. Not only is the focus of these historians on the much understudied peasantries and proletariats, but they have begun to lay a basis for criticizing explanations of participation in protest and political movements found in modern sociology and economics literature. In much of the contemporary social science literature, protest is characterized at best as a mechanical reaction to empty bellies, or similar forms of psychological stress, and at worst as a form of deviance. George Rude has begun to put "faces" on typical participants in protests in the 18th and 19th centuries in England and France, and what we have discovered are the defenders of community food supply, workers with claims on traditional job roles, agricultural laborers driven from the land by mechanization and enclosure, and artisans with a variety of grievances against masters in the trade and against governments for their roles in the artisans' declining future in an industrializing economy. Still more important, under the impact of contributions of Rude, E. P. Thompson, E. J. Hobsbawm, Charles Tilly and others (see for example, T. Cobb 1968; A. Soboul 1958; M. Agulhorn 1970) the participants in popular protests have begun to resolve themselves into collections of persons with distinct claims against resources such as food, land, men, money and work organization. And they have resolved themselves into collective actors whose capacity to contend with power holders for control of these resources was dependent upon the strength of social structure linking participants together.

What I propose to do in this paper is to offer a brief critical comparison of two views of protest, and then to present data from my research on workers in the English Industrial Revolution which throw interesting light on all three lines of explanation. In the short space allotted I will not be able to do justice to either set of theories or to my own data, but I hope that I will at least have raised several meaningful questions about the social organization of participation in protest.

The Sociology of Dissatisfaction and Revolt

Modern sociological theory has addressed itself frequently to the question of participation in and timing of collective violence, strikes, and political movements. A major theme of the literature is the linking of rapid social change to relatively spontaneous forms of protest. Industrialization and urbanization, two major components of large scale social change in the 19th and 20th centuries, are linked by these theories directly to violence and political upheaval through individual experiences of the processes. Hardship, social structural breakdown and loss of social integration, rising expectations combined with failure to achieve expected returns (hence relative deprivation) are some of the most common mechanisms which mediate change and individual participation in these theories.*

Neil Smelser has provided us with a compact statement of the process, versions of which can be found in other recent studies of social change (see for example Huntington 1968; Kornhauser 1959; Gurr 1969):

* For views and reviews of this literature see A. Oberschall 1973 and T. R. Gurr 1969; Bienan 1968; Tilly 1970.

Within the economy itself, rapid industrialization, no matter how coordinated, bites unevenly into the established social and economic structure. And throughout the society, the differentiation occasioned by agricultural, industrial and urban changes always proceeds in a seesaw relationship with integration; the two forces continuously breed lags and bottlenecks. The faster the tempo of modernization, the more severe are the discontinuities. This unevenness creates anomie in the classical sense, for it generates disharmony between life experiences and the normative framework by which these experiences are regulated. (Smelser 1964: 270)

Consequently, "the scope and intensity of the social dislocation created by structural changes" is first among the factors in the "genesis and moulding of social disturbances."

Smelser's study of structural differentiation among the textile workers of England in the Industrial Revolution is still among the most insightful works on industrialization. In it Smelser describes the accumulation of resources and technology which permit structural differentiation in the organization of production in spinning and weaving in the cotton textile industry of Lancashire, England. As a direct result of this process workers in textile trades experience a) loss of economic security--in the short run from the cycle of depression and boom, and in the long run from displacement by new job roles or machines, b) uncertainty from poor industrial management in the early stages of industrial growth, and c) stress due to the change in the structure of the working class family required by factory jobs. There are other consequences of structural differentiation in spinning and weaving described by Smelser, but these three constitute the main foci of his argument. In practice, Smelser's formula for explaining the timing and content of protest is simple and attractive. Considering the contraction of economic opportunities for the handloom weavers

in the face of mechanization and in the face of the increase in number of weavers in the early decades of the 19th century, he states it thus:

While the potential for explosive regression was perpetuated by long-term pressures to force hand-loom weaving out of the economy, actual violence tended to occur during trade slumps. As we shall see, business conditions determined the timing, structural pressures the content of the violence. (Smelser 1959: 248)

The greater the structural pressure due to unemployment and declining opportunities, the greater the violence during economic depression. The less well-integrated and more anomic the handloom weavers become, the more likely they will, in a period of economic depression, seek utopian political solutions such as land redistribution, the de-industrialization proposed by Cobbett, and Parliamentary reform. (Smelser 1959: 248-251)

In view of Smelser's explicit interest in the mechanisms generating collective behavior and in view of the wide acceptance which the stress/dissatisfactions models of protest and collective behavior have achieved, a great deal rides on Smelser's statement concerning the timing of violent protest among the handloom weavers. The timing of protest seems to me to be one important measure of the process producing protests. If violence and political protest are a mechanical reaction to stress then there should be a strong correlation between periods of high economic distress and protest. But, if as I shall argue below, the production of stress in individuals, and the mobilization for protests by groups represent two quite different processes, then the timing of protest will be governed by factors affecting mobilization for protest.

This view of English workers' protest during the Industrial Revolution by an American sociologist of collective behavior fits quite well with the established dictum of British social historians. E. J.

Hobsbawm maintains:

Before 1850, and in some backward countries after that date also, social movements were greatly affected by catastrophic and simultaneous increases in misery for most of the working population, which even the sketchiest evidence reveals... Depression . . . began in the main in the agrarian sector--most often with bad harvests--and affected the industrial sector --through raw material shortages, but chiefly through contracting the main body of home demand, which was rural. Consequently, high unemployment tended to occur at times of famine prices, a situation which almost compelled rioting." (Hobsbawm 1968: 130)

Hobsbawm presents enough data to make this proposition interesting, mostly in the form of visual comparisons of lists of depression years and some of the great social disturbances and political movements of the early 19th century.

Curiously, Hobsbawm himself documents examples of protest and protesters which should begin to persuade us that a different process produces group protest. His work on banditry underscores the importance of community cooperation and support for bandits' survival (Hobsbawm 1969). Machine-breaking demonstrated how carefully issues were drawn by protesters who rarely harmed anything but the obnoxious machines. And in his work on the 18th century labor sects of England he emphasizes how important their training of potential leaders of the labor movement was. (Hobsbawm 1959.) Similarly, E. P. Thompson has repeatedly drawn attention to the importance for group political protest of the bases for group action within the parish and of informal forms of association by members of the working classes, such as the weavers'"taking home"day. The prior existence of bases for action permitted communication, specification of claims, and coordination of efforts, and in many cases gave regional protest its characteristic form.


The work of these historians suggests an alternative model of protest. We begin by assuming that food riots, machine-breaking, as well as strikes and political movements are instrumental, reasonable, often successful means of gaining access to desirable resources. Modern interest group theory has argued that individuals tend to act not as isolates but through formal interest groups and that the existence of an interest group increases the likelihood that a claim shared by a number of individuals will be presented. (Olsen 1968; Common 1950)

In the absence of such formal organizational bases for acting, group capacity for action depends upon the availability of underlying social structures in communities, neighborhoods, or among persons who associate at work, through religious organizations or in other roles which link them together. The existence of friendships, communication networks, shared conceptions of rights, or memberships in associations make possible the coordination of efforts by individuals and make group action more likely. Therefore, group contenders for power are required to have two things: a) they must possess a shared claim against other actors in the society, and b) the members of the group must exert collective control over resources. Resources may consist of money, buildings, weapons, members, and so on. The process of acquiring collective control over resources we call mobilization. The more resources mobilized, the greater the capacity of the group for contention. Collective action is defined as the application of pooled resources to common ends. (Tilly 1973)

Protest, therefore, is a form of collective action, in which contenders for power apply resources to influence, displace, or destroy other contenders, members of the polity, or the government itself.

Contention for power does not occur in a vacuum. The reactions, opposition, counter-mobilization by opponents and third parties are an important part of the process of contending for power. Reactions of other actors comprise a continuum from facilitating responses to non-action, to active opposition. We define repression, the most important form of reaction for present purposes, as action by any actor in a society which raises the costs of collective action (i.e. makes utilization of additional resources necessary for collective action) for contenders in the society. For completeness, power we define tentatively as the return for resources expended. Thus if a contender applied resources to influencing government and gets more than it once did, we say it is gaining power. A member of the polity of a society will receive resources from the government with relatively little expenditure of resources compared with a non-member of the polity.

Figure 1



At least three conclusions follow directly from the model of collective action which contrast sharply with the predictions made by Smelser and Hobsbawm.

1. For protest we need mobilized contenders. Conditions which hinder mobilization such as the break-up of communities, their friendship networks, and identities, ultimately destroy their capacity for collective action. Long term economic depression in a given trade or community should eventually reduce its capacity for collective action, not lead to greater violence. Conversely, the growth of associations, informal communication and friendship networks, whether or not tied to territoriality as the rural community was, makes collective action possible. However, it follows that recent migrants to an urban environment are less likely to be participants in protest than residents with established neighborhood or associational ties. In large scale political protest of all forms we would expect to find members of relatively well-mobilized groups rather than protesters who are isolated, anomic or poorly integrated into the community. (Aminzade 1973)

2. Repression, in the long run should result in a decline in collective action by the targets of repression. In the short run, the impact of repression on collective action may be complex, sometimes leading to rallying of resources, sometimes forcing a change in the form of collective action rather than a change in its frequency.

3. Thirdly, since I have argued that collective action is instrumental group behavior, we would expect collective action to be timed with opponents weaknesses whenever there is a choice for the contender. (In the case of food riots, for example, there is little choice that can be exercised about when to protest.) For industrial

workers, that implies that strikes will occur in boom periods not in depressions when there is little demand for labor. In the case of illegal trade unions or political contenders, activity should increase in the presence of other challenges to government. (Snyder 1974) More generally, the presence of coalitions of contenders, like increases in mobilization, increases the likelihood of collective action.

Comparing Alternative Explanations of the Timing of Protest

The data I have assembled make it possible to test the arguments made by Smelser and Hobsbawm on the data from which they were derived. I have assembled information on protest and collective action by both working classes and non-working classes in the county of Lancaster, England, modifying the boundaries slightly to include towns outside the county but which were closely tied to the textile industry in Manchester. The data cover the years between 1793 and 1830, that is the years between the actual outbreak of hostilities with France and the rise of agitation leading to the first Parliamentary Reform Act (1832). The period includes the reform agitation and repression of the early war years, the great weavers strikes of 1808 and 1818, the Luddism in Lancashire in 1812 and 1826, the intense political reform agitation and consequent repression in Lancashire between 1816 and 1819, and the massive strike waves in the years 1818 and 1830. Statistical series on strikes, and other forms of collective action are not available in published sources.

The annual data used in this research were compiled from reports in three local newspapers, Home Office correspondence in the Public Record Office, and criminal court records for the County of Lancaster. A few variables were available at the time this paper was written for analysis of over-time correlations between economic trends and collective action. A much larger set of data had been accumulated for nine selected years between 1800 and 1830 which permitted close examination of some of the processes affecting participation in protest.

Comparing Alternative Explanations of the Timing of Protest

The data which are offered here are not intended to provide a conclusive comparison of alternative models. There are too many alternative specifications of such concepts of relative deprivation, or stress, to permit a single test. But the time series data raise problems for some simple versions of these models. First I will consider three types of protest separately: collective violence (five or more persons attempting to injure persons, damage or destroy or seize property), strikes, and working class collective action in which fundamental political change is a manifest objective. As measures of the fluctuations in stress experienced by members of the working classes I used a) oatmeal prices at a major market in Lancaster county and b) the A. D. Gayer trade cycle index. Gayer's index of the trade cycle is tuned particularly to unemployment, hence is a direct measure of stresses due to loss of jobs and wages. Thirdly, I used annual increments in Hoffman's index of industrial production as a measure of the pace of industrialization. Unfortunately, we lack direct measures of mobilization such as the presence or strength of community networks, the associational members^{ship} of individual participants in protest, or

TABLE 1

STANDARDIZED REGRESSION. TIME SERIES DATA: LANCASHIRE 1793-1830

Equation	N	Dependent Var.	Time ^a	Trade Cycle ^b	Prices ^c	Mid.Cl. Reform ^e	W.Cl. Reform ^e	Strikes	Change ^d Ind.Pr.	R ²	D-W
1	29	Strikes	.25	.12	-.08	.52*			.24	.40	1.56
2	29	W.Cl. Reform	-.05	-.33	.23	.37*			.17	.34	1.90
3	38	W.Cl. Reform		-.17		.47*				.27	2.03
4	29	Collect. Violence	.30	-.01	.37*	.33**			-.20	.47	1.81
5	38	Collect. Violence	.18			.02	.21	.45*		.37	2.07
Equation	N	Dependent Var.	Time	Trade Cycle	Prices	Mid.Cl. Reform	W.CL. Reform	Strikes	RD ^e	R ²	D-W
6	31	Strikes	.28		-.06	.46*			-.25	.36	1.50
7	31	W.Cl. Reform	-.01		.18	.38*			.12	.22	1.97
8	35	W.Cl. Reform				.49*			.08	.25	
9	31	Collect. Violence	.27		.43*	.38*			.13	.43	2.07

*Regression coefficient more than twice its standard error. **Significant at .06 level.

a - Year of observation.

b - Gayer Trade Cycle Index. See A.D.Gayer, W.W.Rostow, and A.J.Schwartz, The Growth and Fluctuation of the British Economy 1790-1850, Oxford, 1953, p. 355.

c - Average annual price (in d) of oatmeal per load at Lancaster market. Abstracted from the Lancaster Gazette.

d - W.G.Hoffman Index. See B.R. Mitchell and P. Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, Cambridge, 1971, p. 271.

e - See Appendix.

even union membership, with the exception of a few examples which I will present below. As a measure of opportunities for coalition with non-working class contenders and of the availability of middle class support for working class mobilization I will use an index of middle class efforts to obtain Parliamentary and local government reform. Like the other indices of collective action, the data on which this index is based are specific to the region of the study. These data are presented in table form in the appendix to this paper.

For lack of better models, the relationships among the variables were presumed linear and time series regression was employed to test them. Two versions of the basic linear equation were tested. In the first, prices, the trade cycle, time and middle class contention for power were used as predictors of collective violence, strikes, and working class political movements. (See Table 1, Equations 1-4) Prices and the trade cycle were poor predictors of strikes and political action. Lagging these variables one or more time periods did not improve their predictive power. It may be argued that these measures are too simple and that some combination of expectations and current economic return better represents the processes generating discontent. (It is worth noting that a simple relationship between trade cycles, prices and protest has been maintained. See Rostow 1949; Hobsbawm 1968; Roberts 1968.) In a second version of the regression equation, a measure of economic relative deprivation constructed from the trade cycle data replaced the trade cycle and industrial expansion measures.* This

*The construction of this measure followed a suggestion by Halaby (1974), and methods recommended by Hibbs (1974). A description of this index and another which was tried with similar results is contained in the appendix.

measure of relative deprivation was also a poor predictor of strikes and working class political movements in Lancashire. (See Table 1, Equations 6-9)

The relationship between collective violence and economic stress in Lancashire is a more interesting one. High prices predict collective violence while the trade cycle, industrial expansion and economic relative deprivation do not. Three forms of collective violence predominated in Lancashire in times of high food prices: food riots, poaching and machine-breaking. There is a great deal of evidence that these forms of protest were highly organized in themselves and directed to restoring traditional price or food supply levels, or traditional work organization. (Rude 1964; Peacock 1965; Hobsbawm 1968) Women at markets seized food and sold it at reduced prices, returning the proceeds to the original owner. Community members seized food as it was being transported away from the local market or at ports where it was to be shipped to larger cities, or they simply threatened millers and warehouse owners into supplying the local market from stores believed to have been withheld to drive prices up. Similarly machine breaking by the bands of highly organized luddites which prevailed in the West Riding of Yorkshire in 1812 or the larger yet cohesive crowds of machine breakers in Lancashire in 1812 and 1826 also selected targets with care. Sometimes factories were destroyed which had been built to house power-driven machinery. But more often they selected those particular machines which were believed to be responsible for a decline in job opportunities or to the trade, leaving other machinery, the buildings, and the dismayed owner unharmed. Poaching in gangs of 10-15 asserted a traditional right to hunt game in winter months against

the interests of landed elite which was increasingly protective of the rights to use land for pleasure. The fact that each of these occurred predominantly in times of extreme pressure on consumption does not deter us from arguing that each required considerable prior mobilization. The impact of rapid, short term, price increases evidently is to make more likely collective violence based on community mobilization. Other forms of collective violence, for example violence during strikes, were not correlated with rises in prices.

The strongest and most consistent finding which these data support is a positive relationship between all forms of working class collective action and contention for political power by the middle classes in Lancashire. The relationship is consistent with predictions based on the mobilization/collective action model of protest. But since we have no measure of mobilization in this regression model, this is at best indirect evidence of a relationship between strong political challenges to the polity and mobilization by working class contenders. We must, therefore, attempt to clarify the relationship between contention for power by the middle classes in Lancashire and working class collective action.

First let us examine strikes in Lancashire. The large strike waves among workers in the county, which involved handloom weavers in 1808, and all trades in 1818, 1825, and 1830, each coincide with a gain in momentum in middle class political activity. In 1807 and 1808 the commercial elites of Lancashire and other northern industrial counties began agitation for peace with France. In 1818, middle class radicals in Lancashire actively mobilized on a local level to displace an entrenched elite in Manchester. Between 1816 and 1819 middle class support

for Parliamentary reform revived. In 1825, liberal members of Parliament obtained repeal of the Combination Acts (although these M.P.s were not from Lancashire), and 1830 marked the rise of middle class agitation for reform which was finally successful. Moreover, in each of these years there is direct evidence of cooperation and coalition among the middle classes and the trades of Lancashire, although not on political issues. In 1807 large manufacturers in weaving petitioned on behalf of the weavers for minimum wage legislation. In 1818 Sir Robert Peel, a Lancashire industrialist, introduced his second factory act in Parliament, a measure widely supported by the factory operatives who struck that year. In 1824 and 1825 trades in Lancashire and Cheshire sent delegates to appear before the Parliamentary committee considering repeal of the Combination Acts. And in 1830, workmen, with substantial middle class support, petition for new factory legislation and legislation preventing payment of wages in truck.

But tracing the thread, if it exists, from resources mobilized by the middle classes to the collective action of workmen is considerably more difficult. Direct support of strikes by the middle classes, particularly the wealthier members of the middle class, was highly unlikely. Nevertheless it is not unlikely that the presence of a middle class challenge to political elites greatly encouraged "testing" opponents by trade unions. Moreover, the petition drives which were directly supported by the middle classes no doubt did contribute to the linking of separate working class groups in different towns and across trades. In 1808, 1818 and 1830, for example, the strike waves were marked by considerable success in coordinating the efforts of previously independently organized groups within trades and by the first efforts to organize a general union

including all trades. (Cole 1953) Unfortunately our information about cooperation between middle and working classes is sporadic. With more continuous measures of cooperation we could be sure that the examples I have cited here are not simply the successful cases of attempted cooperation.

Still more plausible is the relationship between middle class and working class political challenges to government. There is much descriptive evidence of the complex and intermittent alliance between the two classes in support of Parliamentary reform. In the first decade of the Napoleonic Wars (1793-1803) working class mobilization for political reform tended to overlap but also proceeded independently of middle class reform efforts. The massive legislative and local police repression of political agitation quickly dampened middle class support for reform after 1794, but working class agitation was not driven underground until the turn of the century. Between 1800 and 1815, when the wars ended, working^{class} political mobilization bore little relationship to middle class leadership, but at the same time it was relatively limited in scope. Beginning in 1816, working class political movements grew in waves, stimulated both by middle class agitators and leaders and by political debating societies whose program and form were patterned on successful middle class models. Thus petitions and resolutions emanating from working class political assemblies in this period have a very middle class ring to them. In 1819 at the large, well-known meeting at Burnley, Lancashire the speaker spoke not only of the mounting government repression but also of nothing more nor less revolutionary than reform of the law of forgery. I mean, of course, not to detract from the strength of working class commitment to

political reform, but to demonstrate the infusion of distinctly non-working class positions in the platforms promoted by the movements which they supported. In 1830, the alliance between middle class and working class reform interests was, if anything, even more explicit. Middle class leaders in the reform movement quite conscientiously organized political union societies with a view to promoting working class and middle class cooperation in bringing about Parliamentary reform.

Finally, not only does the presence of middle class challenges to government seem to encourage strike waves and working class political challenge, but the data seem to show that working class collective violence was also encouraged by middle class political challenges. Equation 5 in Table 1 casts more light on the relationship. Collective violence is strongly associated with strikes (and strikes as I have shown occur in the presence of middle class political challenge), but collective violence does not occur in conjunction with middle class political challenges apart from strikes.

Moreover, Equation 5 also shows that working class political movements are not associated with collective violence during the early decades of the 19th century, contrary to Smelser's prediction. I should emphasize at this point that what I have called collective violence in my data is violence in which a group of citizens assault another group of citizens or authorities. Violence by authorities

repressing working class collective action does not appear as "collective violence." Those familiar with the Spa Fields Meetings in 1816, the march of the blanketeers in 1817, and with the Peterloo massacre in 1819 will recall that these political events are reknowned for the number of arrests and the magnitude of the carnage by authorities and not for the violence of the citizens who met on those occasions.

Participation and Mobilization

The time series data should at least throw doubt on those theories which argue that collective violence and protest are natural correlates of economic depression, rapid industrialization and relative deprivation. If the data do no more than to make us take a closer look at the process by which participants are brought together at a particular place and on behalf of a particular claim, they will have served a purpose.

But even conceding the lack of continuous measures of the level of mobilization by contenders we can draw some conclusions from such detailed sources of data on participation as arrest records, and from the scattered historical research on trade union formation in the early 19th century. I will conclude these arguments with two brief examples which point to the importance of mobilization in explaining two forms of protest, strikes and political collective action.

First, if relatively high levels of mobilization in a particular trade are what make strike action possible then we would expect to be able to observe strike patterns which reflect a reduced capacity for striking when no union exists, and a higher strike rate when union organization is strong. An informative comparison of unions in two

Lancashire textile trades, the handloom weavers and the mule spinners, has been made by the British historian H. A. Turner. (Turner 1962)

The handloom weavers, particularly the multitudinous broadloom weavers, comprised a relatively unskilled trade. The trade was commonly gravitated to by unemployed workmen in other trades when there was a slump, it was the part-time summer and full time winter occupation for small farmers, and it was the occupation that most Irish migrants to Lancashire assumed on arrival. Since weaving was outwork, the employees of a single large employer were scattered over the nearby countryside in dozens of small villages. Under these conditions formation of an association for concerted action among weavers of any one employer was extremely difficult; forming a union which controlled entry or exit to the trade was unthinkable. Strikes by the handloom weavers should conform to their brief periods of countywide mobilization, and they do. Apart from the strike waves in 1808, and 1818 which apparently correspond to the only periods in which a countywide union existed, there are very few strikes by weavers before 1825.

Mule spinners, by contrast were a highly organized textile trade. Turner attributes their success in organizing to the fact that they were factory based beginning in the 18th century. Daily contact at work, and the advantage of being able to strike by controlling access to a single factory site promoted tight union organization first at the shop level and ultimately between shops and towns. corresponding to this pattern of organization, the spinners' strikes at the shop level occur more or less continuously. Their superior organization resulted in sophisticated strike tactics. Spinners struck regularly when trade was up or when new orders for yarn had just arrived, not when trade was depressed. Strike waves by spinners correspond, as we found before, to periods of broad political challenge to government.

The second example also concerns the handloom weavers. The weavers, precisely because of their declining economic state and lack of organization as a trade, have been credited with disproportionate participation in political movements in Lancashire. In March, 1817, the first wave of Parliamentary reform agitation among the working classes in the 19th century reached its climax in the so-called march of the Blanketeers. More than ten thousand persons, virtually all working class, gathered at Manchester to march to London to present petitions for Parliamentary reform and for relief of the country's economic distresses. They were called the Blanketeers because each was instructed to carry a rolled blanket for sleeping. Typically weavers are the only occupation mentioned in connection with participation in the march of the Blanketeers.

The assembling of such a large number was made possible by the intensive recruitment of members beginning in 1816 by the working-class based Hampden Clubs of Lancashire. We know from reports of informers that recruitment of members for the Hampden Clubs made extensive use of friendship networks, and group ties formed in factories or through attendance at Dissenting chapels. If handloom weavers tended to be poorly integrated in precisely these ways, as Smelser has claimed, then in spite of their desperate economic position we would expect their rate of participation to be below that of other trades, not above it. Weavers comprised some two thirds of the labor force of southeastern Lancashire. By contrast only 44% of the some 200 persons arrested for participation in the march were weavers. About 12% were spinners while 29% were members of crafts. Once again economic distress alone is a poor predictor of protest participation. The enormous proportion of members of crafts comes as a surprise, but should not surprise us for long. Artisans have had a reputation among historians as political activists during the Industrial

Revolution, allegedly as a result of the contraction of their power over their trades (Scott 1974; Hobsbawm 1968; Thompson 1965). It is revealing that their participation rate in this case is much higher than that of a trade with admittedly far worse economic problems. Their disproportionate presence is at least arguably linked to the superior mobilization within their trades which resulted in greater integration into the community and a greater participation rate in the march.

(For a similar finding see Aminzade 1973)

Conclusions

These data show that protest by workers in at least one of the classical industrial revolutions does not seem to be a simple effect of the rhythm of the harvest cycle or of the pinch of crop and business failure. Instead these data support an alternative model of protest which treats protest as we treat ordinary group behavior, something made possible by the social-organizational fabric of society. These data also support the argument that protest is instrumental and a form of contention for power. Because protest is instrumental it is sensitive to political context: repression by government, opportunities for coalition formation, and weakening of opponents. The data I have presented do not provide full or complete support for these propositions; most of the picture remains to be sketched in. But in its broad outlines, the picture reveals protest as an integral part of the political growth and transformation of societies.

APPENDIX

Year	Strikes	Trade ^A Cycle	Prices	Coll. Viol.	Mid.Cl. ^B Reform	WK.Cl. ^C Reform	Industr. ^D Production
1793	00	00	MD	02	0	0	MD
1794	00	01	MD	01	3	0	MD
1795	05	25	MD	07	3	0	MD
1796	01	30	MD	05	3	0	MD
1797	00	00	MD	00	0	0	MD
1798	00	10	MD	01	0	0	MD
1799	01	30	MD	01	0	0	MD
1800	01	40	848	13	0	0	MD
1801	02	30	571	12	0	3	53
1802	03	50	358	04	0	0	56
1803	07	10	400	04	0	0	57
1804	02	15	412	00	0	0	59
1805	02	25	439	02	0	0	60
1806	00	30	449	04	0	3	61
1807	01	20	484	10	2	1	63
1808	19	10	565	28	3	1	60
1809	03	40	560	10	3	0	61
1810	06	50	509	22	1	0	67
1811	00	00	483	02	1	0	70
1812	00	10	766	69	2	3	66
1813	00	15	675	03	0	3	68
1814	03	25	448	02	0	0	66
1815	01	30	424	08	0	0	74
1816	04	00	400	20	3	3	72
1817	02	30	666	07	2	3	79
1818	36	50	543	24	3	0	82
1819	02	00	456	16	3	3	79
1820	02	10	420	03	2	3	81
1821	03	15	324	00	0	0	85
1822	05	20	325	03	2	3	89
1823	01	30	397	01	0	0	94
1824	03	40	460	07	0	0	99
1825	10	50	405	02	0	0	108
1826	06	00	466	25	1	0	99
1827	11	15	484	03	1	0	112
1828	06	20	343	09	0	0	119
1829	11	00	422	33	1	0	115
1830	55	15	446	56	3	3	126

- A. A.D.Gayer trade cycle index X 10. See Table 1 for exact reference.
- B. Index of Middle class local and national governmental reform or or fundamental policy challenge (opposition to the war, Orders in Council or the corn laws): 1 - 1-3 petitions or memorials addressed to local or national government, 2 - more than 3 petitions, 3 - any number of petitions plus evidence of active agitation such as forming organizations, founding newspapers or forming a political party for sustained mobilization for change.
- C. Index of Working class local and national governmental reform or fundamental policy challenge. (See B, supra.)
- D. W.G.Hoffman index of industrial production X 10. See Table 1 for exact reference.

The measure of relative deprivation used in this paper consists of the difference between a measure of economic expectations and a measure of economic achievement of workers. The general formulation follows Gurr (1969), but appears frequently in the literature in roughly the same form. Halaby (1973) suggested a measure of expectations consisting of a weighted sum of prior values of the variable used to measure current economic achievement. Since "expectations" can be measured directly some such indirect measure must be substituted. The weighted sum suggested by Halaby consists of an infinite series of prior values of the measure (in practice the series would be truncated at some reasonable point) whose terms are weighted by coefficients which form a geometric series summing to 1. The weighted sum used here is simplified. It performed poorly, and attempts to find the right combination of coefficients were not pursued. The trade cycle index was used as the measure of achievements. It seemed to reflect the "structural stress" used in Smelser's arguments best, since it explicitly takes into account unemployment. A second measure of relative deprivation not reported in Table 1 (see text) was constructed using prices as the measure of achievement with similar results. Let TC_t be the value of the trade cycle index at time t :

$$\text{Expectations} = \frac{TC_{t-3} + 2 \times TC_{t-2} + 3 \times TC_{t-1}}{6}$$

$$\text{Achievements} = TC_t$$

$$\text{Relative Deprivation} = \text{Expectations} - \text{Achievements}$$

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