
BREAKING THE CHAINS OF DEPENDENCY:
FROM PATRONAGE TO CLASS POLITICS,
TOULOUSE, FRANCE, 1830-1872

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September 1976

CRSO Working Paper #142

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*This research was sponsored by a dissertation research fellowship from the Social Science Research Council. The archivists at the municipal archives of Toulouse and at the departmental archives of the Haute Garonne helped to make this research an enjoyable and fruitful experience. The author gratefully acknowledges the advice and inspiration provided by Charles Tilly and the insightful comments and criticisms of Bruce Fireman, Mary Jo Maynes, and Olivier Zunz. I would also like to thank the Center for Research on Social Organization of the University of Michigan for providing an exciting and stimulating research environment over the past five years.

Working-Class Royalism in Toulouse

During the 1830's and early 1840's, there was a strong and well-organized royalist movement in Toulouse, dedicated to the restoration of the "legitimate" Bourbon dynasty overthrown by the Revolution of 1830. This legitimist movement had important roots among working-class Toulousains. Throughout the 1830's and early 1840's, Toulousain workers organized banquets to celebrate legitimist electoral victories and took to the streets to serenade royalist leaders. In September of 1833, a group of working-class royalists gathered in the courtyard of the Hôtel de France to serenade the legitimist deputy Berryer. The police soon arrived to disperse the demonstration. Two months later, in November of 1833, police raided a meeting of legitimist workers, seized a portrait of Charles X, the Bourbon pretender to the throne, and arrested several workers for participation in a counter-revolutionary conspiracy. (A.D.:4M50) That same year, police reported the existence of a secret legitimist counter-revolutionary army, estimated to number over one thousand men, and composed largely of workers. In January of 1835, twenty-five Toulousain artisans, several of whom had been arrested in the police raid of 1833, held a banquet to celebrate the recent electoral victory of the legitimist M. de Fitz-James. After the banquet, these workers gathered for drinks at two well-known legitimist cafes. After leaving the cafes, they paraded through several neighborhoods of the inner city singing legitimist songs, some of which fondly recalled the White Terror of 1815. (A.D.:4M48)

By the 1850's, such popular manifestations of legitimist political allegiance had disappeared from the political scene and working-class royalism was largely a thing of the past. As late as July of 1850, police reported the existence of meetings of working-class legitimists, but Toulousain workers were not involved in the legitimist collective actions of the 1850's and 1860's. Workers were noticeably absent from the legitimist theater riot of January, 1863, to protest the showing of a play which attacked the clergy and satirized royalist party leaders. They were also absent from the legitimist demonstration of July, 1867 to welcome the archbishop of Toulouse back from his voyage to Rome and demonstrate in favor of the temporal power of the Pope. The paramilitary secret legitimist army, which once counted

hundreds of workers, still existed in 1852, but by then it had only sixty-seven members. (A.N.:F^{1c}III9) In 1864, the Procureur Général, the city's highest ranking judicial official, reported the change as follows: "In the past, in this area, the legitimist party had a very large number of adherents among the working classes. This element is now completely detached from a cause which now lives, to a certain extent, only by abstraction....The people have turned away, with scornful indifference, from a political party which denies progress and condemns legitimate aspirations." (A.N.:BB³⁰388)

The story of the decline of working-class royalism in Toulouse is not simply the history of a political party. It is also the history of the transformation of the social and political relations which linked Toulousain workers to the city's elite. Patron-client structures of dependency provided the social and material bases of legitimist party affiliation, and it was changes in these structures that ultimately undermined working-class royalism.

Patron-Client Relationships

Prior to, and during, the 1830's, Toulousain industry was based upon handicraft production, and the city's small-scale artisanal production catered mainly to a local and regional market. The city of Toulouse was a military, religious, educational, commercial, and administrative center for the entire southwest of France. The wealth of the city was highly concentrated into the hands of a powerful and influential urban aristocratic elite and a small commercial and administrative bourgeois elite. This wealth was based upon Toulouse's position as a regional entrepot, especially for the profitable grain trade of the wheat-growing Garonne valley. Most of the wealth of the city's elite was invested in land and commerce, and very little of it was devoted to industrial or financial purposes. During the 1830's,

the city's economy remained closely tied to agricultural production, and relations between Toulouse's landowning urban aristocratic elite and the city's working class also remained quite traditional. These social relations were patron-client in character.¹ Aristocratic patrons provided workers with employment, the means of subsistence, during periods of economic crisis, brokerage and influence, and leadership for communal activities. Their working-class clientele in turn provided patrons with deference, compliance, political support, and various labor services, including bearing arms.

The material basis of Toulousain working-class royalism was centered around the economic and social power of the aristocracy and the clergy. Property and wealth not only bestowed the right to vote upon its owners; it also provided the basis for the economic dependencies which were crucial to the maintenance of legitimist patronage networks. During the Bourbon Restoration, public political patronage was used to build up a royalist clientele through the distribution of judicial posts, government offices, contracts, and favors. Private patronage maintained a constituency through the distribution of jobs, to lawyers, estate agents, clerks, church employees, tutors, and domestic servants, and the distribution of charity. The conspicuous consumption of the city's legitimist notables helped to maintain a loyal clientele of merchants, shopkeepers, and artisans and to provide employment for jewellers, upholsterers, furniture makers, hatmakers, tailors, wigmakers, decorators, and carriage makers. The aristocracy relied upon members of the legal professions to represent their interests in the courts, and thereby cultivated a distinguished and loyal clientele. The Church, well endowed by wealthy aristocratic notables, spent a good deal of money on education and charity and for the maintenance of the city's many convents, monasteries, and seminaries. Local authorities

attributed the political influence of the aristocracy to the tremendous wealth under their control. "It is very true that the nobility has much influence in this department", wrote the Procureur Général in January of 1831. "In general, members of the nobility are wealthy, possess large land-holdings, and receive the attention that inevitably accompanies the possession of great wealth." (A.D.:4M48)

The information gathered by local police on legitimist party militants provides evidence of the aristocratic control of the party and of the patronage basis of party affiliation. (See Table I on page 5) The upper ranks of the party remained the domain of the city's urban nobility, who held 65% of the leadership positions. Former government and military officials under the Restoration Monarchy and members of the legal professions, many of whom were of aristocratic origin, also played an important role in the direction of party affairs. Although legitimist party leadership was drawn almost exclusively from the aristocracy, the occupational backgrounds of party activists reveal a great diversity of class origins, a pattern generated by the vertical loyalties of patronage. The ranks of Toulousain legitimist party activists included 23 aristocrats (12%), eight members of the clergy (4%), 26 legal professionals (13%), 21 former government and military officials (11%), 18 bourgeois (9%), 18 petite bourgeois (9%), 16 students (8%), primarily law students, and a large contingent of 69 workers (35%). The sixty-nine working-class royalists were by and large either employed directly by the aristocracy, the Church, the former Bourbon regime, or the city's legitimist newspapers, or they were local artisans catering to a wealthy aristocratic clientele. Artisans constituted 58% of the working-class activists, and their occupational backgrounds represented a great diversity of trades. No single occupation dominated their ranks. Included among these legitimist artisans were five bakers, three hatmakers, eight furniture makers, three tailors,

Table I

Social Class Composition of Legitimist Party Militants, 1830-1870 ²

	Legitimist Party Leaders	% of Total	Legitimist Party Activists	% of Total
Aristocracy	48	64.8%	23	11.5%
Clergy	1	1.4%	8	4.0%
Legal Professions	8	10.8%	26	13.0%
Former Gov't. & Military Officials	7	9.5%	21	10.5%
Legitimist Newspaper Editors	8	10.8%	0	0
Bourgeoisie	0	0	18	9.0%
Petite Bourgeoisie	1	1.4%	18	9.0%
Working Class- Total	1	1.4%	69	34.5%
Church or ex-gov't. employees	0	0	5	2.5%
Legitimist newspaper employees	0	0	10	5.0%
Other Employees	0	0	7	3.5%
Artisans	1	1.4%	40	20.0%
Semi- and Unskilled Laborers	0	0	7	3.5%
Agriculture	0	0	1	.5%
Students	0	0	16	8.0%
Total (with occupations listed)	74	100%	200	100%
Missing (no occupations listed)	27	-	46	-
Grand Total	101	-	246	-

Note: Party activists include: a) cited in police records as legitimist party activists; b) who were members of legitimist party organizations, including l'Affiliation Catholique and its secret counter-revolutionary army; the Société de Défense Mutuelle; and the masonic lodge La Sagesse; c) arrested or identified by police as participants in legitimist collective political protests or for legitimist political crimes. Legitimist party leaders included those so designated in police surveillance reports, those holding official positions in the organizations just listed, the editors of legitimist newspapers, as well as those chosen to run for political offices as legitimist party candidates.

three housepainters, five plasterers, a mason, two upholstery workers, a watchmaker, a jeweller, two wig makers, a bookbinder, a miller, a shoemaker, a metal craftsman, a locksmith, and a carriage worker.

The urban nobility retained an image of workers as servants who owed respect and loyalty to their masters. They desired to generalize their paternalistic relationships with the domestic servants they employed to the working class as a whole. Most Toulousain workers were not, however, domestic servants. In 1830, domestic servants comprised 19.6% of the city's working class and by 1872, they constituted only 12.1%.³ Wage laborers sold their labor power on the marketplace to whoever could pay for it and, unlike domestic servants, usually had no long-term contractual obligations to any one employer. Their labor power was available as a "free" commodity, readily mobilizable for productive tasks and readily discardible during periods of economic downturn. Their employers had no obligations to feed, cloth, or properly look after their workers as aristocratic employers did for their domestic servants. In the case of domestic servants, the provision of room, board, and other non-monetary rewards provided a social underpinning to the economic relations between workers and employers. Where such direct, personal, non-monetary ties of dependency were absent, the Church provided the social nexus which linked workers to the patronage, though not the persons, of the urban aristocracy.

The Church relied heavily upon the aristocracy for financial support. The clergy in turn served the aristocracy by providing an intermediate link between wealthy aristocratic patrons, who typically spent only three months of each year at their urban mansions in Toulouse, and their Toulousain working-class clientele. The Catholic Church hierarchy of Toulouse retained a close association with the city's legitimist party and with local legitimist notables. Toulousain legitimists made the Church a center of their political activities, using religious holidays,

festivals, and processions as an opportunity to publicly display their political sentiments. Clerical control of the city's educational and charitable institutions ensured that they retained strong royalist as well as religious connections. Numerous religious confraternities, mutual benefit societies, and patron saint festivals linked Toulousain workers to both religion and royalism. Confraternities (confréries) of local artisans combined religious devotion with trade solidarities and obligations of mutual aid to fellow tradesmen. In 1812, there were over 45 such confraternities in Toulouse, several of which were presided over by well-known legitimist notables. It was the artisans of Toulouse, not the city's unskilled laborers, who formed the working-class base for popular royalism. These artisans were dependent upon charity during periods of economic crisis, and it was the charitable activities of the religious confraternities and mutual benefit societies which linked them in a formally organized manner to the local royalist movement. When bread prices rose sharply or a long hard winter prolonged the annual period of seasonal unemployment, artisans as well as unskilled workers were forced to turn to charity to feed themselves and their families.

In August of 1831, the prefect reported that the city's most important legitimist associations, including the ultra-royalist Affiliation Catholique and the legitimist masonic lodge La Sagesse, had organized "political bread distributions". (A.D.:4M49,50) During this period, bread constituted an estimated 50% of an average Toulousain workers' total budget and 65% to 70% of a workers' food expenses. (A.N.:BB³⁰389) Each member of the Affiliation Catholique's secret army of legitimist workers received eight livres of bread per week every winter for their services. (A.D.:4M50) These payments, coming at a time of year when seasonal unemployment deprived many workers of their subsistence level incomes, were no small remuneration.

Patronage involved a non-contractual exchange relationship, but it was not simply a matter of economic rationality. The system had strong moral underpinnings, and was based upon traditional conceptions of justice. There were certain minimal requirements traditionally expected of patrons as part of the moral economy of patronage, including the obligation to ensure subsistence during periods of economic crisis. It was during times of economic and political crisis that the obligations and payoffs of patronage relations became clarified, that previous declarations of loyalty were put to the test, and that expectations were validated or betrayed by experience. The economic crises of 1828-1832 and of 1844-1847 thus provide important points of reference for a study of changes in one of the important ties of patronage, the distribution of charity.

There is some evidence that during the economic crisis of 1828-1832, Toulousain legitimist notables, after thirteen years of relatively unchallenged political domination, were somewhat reluctant to meet the obligations and responsibilities imposed upon them by the moral economy of patronage. In March of 1829, the ultra-royalist abbe Berger failed in an attempt to raise subscriptions of 500 francs from one hundred of the city's wealthy notables to provide interest-free loans to the city's artisans.⁴ Despite the lack of support by the local nobility for this particular effort to alleviate suffering among the city's working class, examples of well-organized legitimist charitable activities were not absent. As we have already noted, several legitimist party organizations ran bread coupon programs of private charity during this period. By the time of the economic crisis of 1844-1847, however, evidence of such organized legitimist private charitable activity is scant. During this crisis period, the bulk of charitable activity was carried out by the government, not the Church or the Legitimist party. The private charitable activities of Toulouse's aristocracy and clergy were insufficient to

deal with the threat of famine which faced the city's working class. In January of 1847, in order to prevent widespread famine, the local government organized a bread distribution program which provided food to 14,000 of the city's workers and opened up charity workshops for the unemployed. The patron-client system of dependencies failed to meet its moral obligations to ensure the subsistence of the city's working class. The provision of charity was not, however, the sole tie between aristocratic patrons and their working-class clientele. Aristocratic and clerical patrons were becoming both incapable and unwilling to meet other important patronage obligations as well, including the provision of jobs, protection, and leadership. Their working-class clientele, in turn, increasingly rejected the benevolent paternalism of patronage and refused to provide the deference, compliance, and political support demanded of them. Both the patron-client system of dependencies and the working-class royalism which it sustained were in decline.

Three major factors account for the decline of legitimist patron-client relationships and of working-class royalism in Toulouse: 1) changes in the distribution of wealth which accompanied the emergence of an urban-industrial class structure based on control over capital and labor rather than land; 2) the growth of class solidarities and consciousness among Toulousain workers and the threat posed to private property and public order by the ensuing class struggles; and 3) the emergence of working-class counter-institutions, which was facilitated by the character of a changed urban setting.

The Redistribution of Wealth

The long-term economic transformation which marked the period from 1830 to 1872 effectively undermined what was once a dominant feature of Toulousain political life by altering the distribution of wealth among social classes. Legitimist patron-client networks declined at the same time that the urban aristocracy witnessed a decline in their share of the city's wealth. The material resources which kept legitimist patron-client links active were slowly being redistributed into the hands of the city's commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. This redistribution of resources, alongside the growing importance of liquid (9) as opposed to landed capital, was part of

a general economic transformation taking place throughout France.

Jean Sentou's study of nineteenth century Toulousain inheritance records discovered a gradual decline in the proportion of landed capital assets in favor of liquid capital during the course of the nineteenth century. These records also revealed the gradual decline of the old landed wealth of the nobility and the rising commercial, industrial, and financial wealth of bourgeois merchants, bankers, industrialists, and government officials.⁵ The reports of government officials corroborate the picture painted by these inheritance record statistics. The sub-prefect of Muret reported the following observations to his superior in Toulouse in April of 1866: "The economic and social condition of the provincial aristocracy has drastically changed during the past years. The growth and movement of public wealth and general economic growth have lead to a disruption of the position of certain families. Those who were at the summit of the social hierarchy are now at the bottom; we have often seen the attorneys and business agents of certain important landowners become the owners of estates on which their fathers waxed floors....In the last ten years I've witnessed the collapse of all the great landowning fortunes, all of the great names! Not one piece of land of any importance in the area surrounding Toulouse belongs today to the family that had owned it for the past three hundred years! Is it no wonder that the wives and daughters of the aristocracy no longer fill the theaters, balls, and official soirees of the prefect and general? They have fallen back upon religion and legitimism; but these are merely easy pretexts which hide the real cause of their troubles, the only cause, which is that they can no longer compete with the industrialists, bankers, merchants, and state officials whose wealth is crushing them."

(A.D.:4M)

After 1830, not only did the Toulousain nobility witness a decline in the private resources at their disposal, they also lost political control over a vast amount of public resources controlled by the government. The widespread purge of office holders which followed the Revolution of 1830 deprived many devoted legitimists of their jobs as well as their influence. The entire prefectural administration, all the sub-prefects of the department, and the departmental general council was entirely replaced. In the department, 412 new mayors were appointed along with 358 new deputy mayors. There was also a thorough purge of all those employed

by government agencies, including the tax bureau, the bureau of weights and measures, the customs bureau, the police, and the judiciary. (A.D.:4M49)

The shift in the distribution of both private and public resources from the aristocracy to the bourgeoisie did not simply mean that bourgeois patrons created or took control of patron-client relations to serve their own political interests. Impersonal wage labor relations between workers and their employers contrasted sharply with the personal character of patron-client relationships. These social relationships did not resemble the paternalistic, non-contractual social relationships of traditional patronage. The bourgeoisie had no powerful institution possessing strong moral authority to link workers to bourgeois class interests through the maintenance of a popular cultural tradition productive of vertically integrated solidarities. The Church had once played just such a role for the city's aristocracy. The ideology of laissez-faire provided bourgeois employers and the bourgeois monarchy of Louis-Philippe with a justification for the abdication of paternal responsibilities toward the working class. Certain Toulousain bourgeois, mainly members of the liberal professions, did attempt to become patrons and political leaders of working-class organizations; but their efforts were by and large unsuccessful. By 1848, Toulousain workers were rejecting bourgeois political leadership and forbidding bourgeois sympathizers from attending their political rallies. Economic changes slowly undermined the existing system of dependencies and fostered the growth of working-class consciousness.

The economic and social decline of the landed nobility did not lead to the disappearance of political patronage. It did result in the increasing substitution of personalized private patronage by bureaucratized public patronage. Government bureaucrats, elected officials, and political party administrators slowly replaced local aristocratic and clerical notables as patrons. The private patronage ties of the city's legitimist notables resembled what anthropologists generally regard as patronage, informal personalized exchange relationships between persons in different class positions. The public patronage of Orleanist and Napoleonic officials resembled what political scientists generally refer to as patronage, a formal system of political

authority in which party leaders distribute public resources or special favors
in return for electoral support and loyalties. 6a

During the Second Empire, the growth of central state power and the increasingly important role of the state in economic development lead to a tremendous increase in public resources, in jobs and money, administered and controlled by the central state and by Napoleonic political officials. These resources were used to build up party patronage and win elections. The patronage politics of the Imperial regime did not, however, establish networks of personal dependencies nor did it create a loyal following in the local community. It served only to win votes for a nationally organized and central state directed political party. The public patronage of the Imperial regime was incapable of generating the sentiments of loyalty and respect that the private personalized patronage of the urban aristocracy once commanded. Toulousain workers no longer welcomed being saved from starvation by the charity of a benign patron and they no longer accepted charity with gratitude and deference. During the difficult winter of 1867-68, the city government allocated 102,000 francs for a bread distribution program to aid needy workers. The Procureur Général reported the following reception by those workers who were the beneficiaries of the program: "It is distressing to note that those aided are not very grateful; they have been so strongly convinced of their rights that they accept what we give them as partial and incomplete restitution and, in a way, as a settling of accounts." (A.N.;BB³⁰ 390) The following summer, the city witnessed the largest strike wave that Toulouse had ever seen. The benevolent paternalism of patronage had already given way to the militant solidarities of social class.

Class Struggles, Social Control, and Public Order

Patronage was a means of social control as well as a basis of political power. When the vertical loyalties of patronage were unable to maintain social control, the harsh sanctions of the legal system remained to deal with those who dared to take by force what others had learned to accept with obsequious gratitude. The group of workers with whom the aristocracy came into contact most frequently were domestic

servants. The harsh legal repression these workers faced if they dared to betray their loyalty by stealing from their masters is documented by the severity of convictions imposed by the courts. Throughout the 1830's, domestic servants in Toulouse were convicted to several years imprisonment for stealing silverware or linen. Many Toulousain workers received jail sentences for collectively demanding a decent wage which might obviate the necessity of charity. Throughout this period, the theft of food remained a widespread crime for which many Toulousain men and women spent time behind bars. The alternative to the benevolent paternalism of patronage was social control through reliance upon the legal repression of a harsh penal code, designed to protect the propertied from the propertyless. The patronage system of authority and dominance, based upon the supposedly shared moral and religious values of patrons and clients alike, was quite deceptive on the surface. The threat of legal violence, though usually quite remote, underlay a seemingly peaceful relationship of charity, benevolence, and gratitude.

The response of legitimist notables to the political crisis of 1848 demonstrated that when the benevolent paternalism of patronage could no longer ensure public order, repression and legal violence were the chosen alternative. 1848 witnessed the mass political mobilization of Toulousain workers following the February Revolution, and in April of 1848, a crowd of Toulousain workers demanding arms assaulted the Prefecture. The fears of legitimist notables, following the bloody June, 1848 uprising of Parisian workers, were summed up by the city's highest ranking judicial official, the Procureur Général: "The insurrection which has just been defeated is not the work of a political party that is trying to replace one form of government with another, that also accepts as its basis the eternal laws of society: private property and the family. The war which has just erupted, it is painful to confess, is a war of one class of society against another. It is a desperate effort to transfer, by means of violence, property, wealth, and riches." (A.N.:C931) The paternalistic ethic of legitimist political ideology did not withstand the new social and political realities, highlighted by the class struggles of 1848. As patron-client relationships gave way to the solidarities and conflicts of social class, legitimist party leaders, in the wake of

the class warfare of June, joined forces with their former Orleanist enemies in a conservative political coalition, known as the "party of order", to meet the threat from the working class.

In the local elections of March, 1849, the conservative coalition's electoral slate, entitled "the Friends of Order", won a narrow victory, garnering 10,000 votes to slightly over 9,000 for the Republican candidates. The Procureur Général, worried about the polarized political atmosphere which prevailed, commented on the slim and unstable conservative majority. Noting that a shift of only several hundred votes could have meant a different outcome, he estimated that 2,000 persons voted under administrative pressure and probably would have voted differently had public patronage been under the control of a different administration. In addition, he added, there were many who, "to please their masters or to placate their creditors, voted against their traditional friends." (A.N.:BB³⁰ 365) In other words, the narrow conservative victory was based upon an unstable political foundation, the continuation of existing patronage dependencies. Class struggles, and the aspirations and fears they generated, transformed political coalitions and political relationships in Toulouse.^{6b} The emergence, and collective expression, of political solidarities based upon social class was related to the way in which urban population growth helped to transform working-class social and political organization.

Urban Growth and Working-Class Counter-Institutions

The population of the city of Toulouse increased from 59,630 in 1831 to 112,000 in 1872. All of this increase was due to urban migration, not to any natural increase of the population. During the period from 1821 to 1851, Toulouse grew faster than any other city in France. It had a growth rate of 79%, compared to 77% for Marseille and 59% for Paris.⁷ During the years from 1836 to 1871, over 58,000 migrants arrived and settled in the city. By 1872, only 38% of those living in Toulouse had been born in the city. 32% had been born in the surrounding rural area of the Haute Garonne, 17% in the six neighboring departments, 8% elsewhere in France, and 5% outside of France. (A.M.:Recensement de 1872) Urban growth

transformed the social, as well as the physical, structure of the city.

In 1830, a majority of the city's population (61%) lived in the small inner-city area on the right bank of the Garonne river which had until just recently been surrounded by large medieval walls. (See map on page 16). Thirty-nine percent of the city's population lived either across the river on the left bank of the Garonne, mainly in the working-class faubourg of St. Cyprien, or on the right bank outside the boundaries of the old city walls, primarily in the faubourgs St. Michel, St. Etienne, St. Aubin, Matabiau, and Le Busca. (See Table II on page 17) Beyond these faubourgs, which bordered the inner city area, lied a rural area which in many ways resembled a hinterland to the center city area. Industrial, commercial, administrative, and political activities were concentrated on the right bank of the river, within the densely populated area once encircled by the walls. Wealth and power were also heavily concentrated in this area. It was here that the city's elite resided, and this was also where the centers of political power, the city hall and the Prefecture, were located.

The dismantling of the massive city walls, fifteen meters high and two meters wide, didn't begin until 1829, and the job took several years to complete. The physical destruction of the old walls did not destroy the social boundaries that marked off the city. During the 1860's, massive public works projects were inaugurated to transform the land on which the walls once stood into Toulouse's first boulevards. These newly constructed wide boulevards contrasted sharply with the narrow cobblestone streets which wound about the inner city. By this time, a majority of the city's population (62%) lived outside the boundaries of the new boulevards, although economic and political power remained concentrated within. In addition to the rapidly growing older working-class faubourgs just outside the the boulevards, new working-class neighborhoods, including Bonnefoi, Minimes, Guillemery, Cote Pave, and Pont des Demoiselles, had arisen across the canal and beyond the boundaries of the octroi line.¹¹ The new boulevards separated heavily working-class areas, such as the older faubourgs of St. Michel, St. Etienne, St. Aubin, and Matabiau, from wealthy inner-city neighborhoods, such as St. Sernin,

Table 11

Urban Growth: 1830-1872

 Neighborhoods of Toulouse⁹

	%Total Pop. 1830	%Total Pop. 1872	%City's W. Class 1830	%City's W. Class 1872	%City's Elite 1830	%City's Elite 1872
Capitole	9.7%	5.6%	9.7%	6.0%	14.2%	2.4%
La Daurade	8.4%	5.1%	9.6%	5.1%	8.2%	7.1%
St. Sernin	8.5%	7.4%	8.4%	7.8%	8.7%	9.4%
Arsenal	.9%	1.0%	1.3%	.9%	1.0%	1.3%
St. George	6.1%	4.8%	7.1%	5.7%	5.5%	4.0%
La Dalbade	14.9%	8.1%	15.1%	8.7%	19.5%	12.1%
St. Etienne	12.7%	6.5%	15.4%	7.0%	25.3%	14.3%
Center City Total	61.2%	38.5%	66.6%	41.2%	82.4%	56.5%
St. Cyprien	8.1%	8.1%	7.9%	9.1%	2.2%	3.8%
Amidonniere	.8%	1.3%	.9%	1.1%	0	.6%
St. Pierre	.1%	.6%	.1%	.5%	0	.4%
Arnaud Bernard	.5%	2.2%	.4%	2.1%	.2%	3.2%
Matabiau	1.6%	5.6%	1.5%	4.7%	2.4%	8.7%
St. Aubin	4.8%	6.7%	4.4%	7.7%	3.1%	3.7%
Fbg. St. Etienne	2.2%	2.7%	1.5%	2.4%	1.2%	4.5%
Le Busca	2.4%	4.2%	1.5%	3.9%	1.2%	3.9%
St. Michel	5.8%	6.0%	5.5%	6.6%	3.6%	3.2%
Minimes	.8%	1.8%	.6%	1.4%	.5%	.4%
Bonnefoi	.3%	1.9%	.2%	1.7%	0	.5%
Guillemery	.8%	5.5%	.6%	5.6%	.5%	1.8%
Cote Pave	.2%	1.9%	.2%	2.0%	0	.9%
Pont des Demois- elles	.2%	1.4%	.1%	1.4%	.2%	.2%
Purpan	.4%	.6%	.4%	.5%	0	.4%
Croix de Pierre	.4%	1.0%	.3%	.6%	0	.6%
Faubourgs Total	29.4%	51.5%	26.1%	51.3%	15.1%	36.8%
Sept Deniers	.5%	.7%	.2%	.5%	.2%	.2%
Lalande	2.3%	1.9%	1.3%	1.0%	.2%	.4%
Les Cocus	.3%	1.3%	.1%	.4%	0	.1%
Croix Daurade	.5%	1.5%	.2%	1.2%	.2%	.9%
Montaudran	.6%	.8%	.4%	.8%	0	.5%
Rangueil	.3%	.2%	.3%	.3%	0	.1%
Pouvoirville	.9%	.6%	.6%	.4%	.2%	.6%
La Fourquette	.5%	.6%	.4%	.6%	0	.7%
Le Mirail	.6%	.5%	.5%	.4%	0	.4%
St. Simon	1.2%	.8%	.8%	.5%	.2%	1.4%
Lardenne	.8%	.6%	.9%	.6%	0	.5%
St. Martin de Touch	1.4%	.6%	1.4%	.6%	1.2%	1.2%
Suburbs Total	9.9%	10.1%	7.1%	7.3%	2.2%	7.0%

St. Etienne, Dalbade, and Capitole, where a majority of the city's bourgeois and aristocratic elite resided in relative comfort and luxury. A sizable number of workers, comprising 41.3% of the city's working-class population, still resided within the inner city area. This working-class population included a large number of semi- and unskilled manual service workers(30.4%), mainly domestic servants, as well as a large proportion of non-manual laborers engaged in clerical and sales jobs(15.9%). Artisans constituted 33.4% of the inner city's working-class population, while semi- and unskilled industrial workers accounted for 20%. The composition of the working-class population of the faubourgs differed from that of the inner-city neighborhoods, in that it contained a smaller proportion of both non-manual laborers(11.9%) and of manual service workers(13.9%) as well as a larger proportion of highly skilled artisans(39.7%) and semi- and unskilled industrial workers(34.3%). In other words, the working-class population of the faubourgs was composed of a larger proportion of wage laborers whose relationships with employers were relatively devoid of the benevolent paternalism which characterized patron-client relationships. It was not simply urban growth, but rather urban growth in the context of early industrial capitalism, that facilitated the transformation of working-class political solidarities. Workers settling in the newly inhabited faubourgs, by and large, worked for bourgeois employers in an increasingly impersonalized and alienating work setting, producing goods for a national and international market. Their center-city counterparts included a larger proportion of workers engaged as domestic servants and employees catering to the needs of a small clientele of wealthy aristocrats.

The geographic concentration of working-class royalism into several inner-city neighborhoods of Toulouse was evident during the reign of Napoleon I. David Higg's study of popular royalism in Toulouse during the First Empire revealed that "lower class royalists were drawn mainly from the central districts of the city, the sections which had been the most affluent, with noble residents providing employment..."¹⁰ Police and judicial dossiers on royalist political militants for the period from 1830 to 1870, as well as membership records of legitimist party organizations for the same period, reveal a similar geographic pattern of political

solidarities. (See Table III on page 20) During the July Monarchy, 98 of the 214 (45.8%) persons cited in police records as royalist political militants had their addresses listed. 87% of them resided in the neighborhoods of the inner city area, and the party's leadership was entirely from the inner-city quarters of St. Etienne, Dalbade, and Capitole. Police records for the Second Republic and Second Empire, though listing addresses in only 19.2% of the cases, reveal a similar pattern of geographic concentration. Although a majority of the city's population lived outside the inner-city area by 1872, very few royalist militants were drawn from the rapidly growing faubourgs.

Membership records of legitimist political organizations also confirm the spatial pattern of legitimist political solidarities suggested by police records. The entire leadership of the Affiliation Catholique's high council (Grand Prieuré), with the exception of the baker Bilas, was composed of wealthy aristocratic notables, all of whom lived in the inner-city neighborhoods of St. Etienne, Dalbade, and Capitole. The membership list of the legitimist charitable society St. Vincent de Paul reveals a similar geographic pattern. The six members who listed their occupations as property owners (proprietaires), in all likelihood members of the urban aristocracy, all lived in the inner-city neighborhoods of St. Etienne and Dalbade. Most of the organization's membership was drawn from these two neighborhoods. Twenty-three members lived in the St. Etienne neighborhood and twenty in the Dalbade neighborhood. All but two of the members, a doctor and a merchant, both of whom lived in the faubourg St. Cyprien, resided in one of the seven neighborhoods of the right bank inner-city area. (A.M.: 2Q7) The older inner-city area remained the stronghold of a declining legitimist movement, while popular royalism simply failed to take root in the expanding working-class faubourgs. The social and political institutions of these faubourgs were not based upon patronage relationships with the urban aristocracy or clergy, nor were they tied to the old organizations and social networks of the Church.

The politically royalist, patronage-based institutions in the center of the city were incapable of integrating the growing number of workers arriving in Toulouse. At the same time, new counter-institutions were slowly emerging and becoming firmly

Table III

Residential Distribution of Legitimist Party Militants

	JULY MONARCHY(1830-1848)				2nd Republic & 2nd Empire(1848-1870)			
	Party Leaders	Party Activists	Total	% of Total	Party Leaders	Party Activists	Total	% of Total
Capitole	3	9	12	12.2%	0	6	6	20.7%
Daurade	0	1	1	1.0%	0	0	0	0
St.Sernin	0	22	22	22.4%	1	8	9	31.0%
Arsenal	0	2	2	2.0%	0	0	0	0
St.George	0	2	2	2.0%	0	0	0	0
Dalbaac	5	5	10	10.2%	0	0	0	0
St.Etienne	10	26	36	36.7%	5	6	11	37.9%
Center City	18	67	85	86.7%	6	20	26	89.7%
TOTAL								
St.Cyprien	0	5	5	5.1%	0	2	2	6.9%
Amidonniers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
St.Pierre	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Arnaud Bernard	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Matabiau	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	3.4%
St.Aubin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fbg.St.Etienne	0	2	2	2.0%	0	0	0	0
Lebusca	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
St.Michel	0	1	1	1.0%	0	0	0	0
Minimes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bonnefoi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guillemy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cote Pavé	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pt.des Demoiselles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Purgan	0	1	1	1.0%	0	0	0	0
Croix de Pierre	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Faubourgs	0	9	9	9.2%	0	3	3	10.3%
TOTAL								
Sept Deniers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lalande	0	1	1	1.0%	0	0	0	0
Les Cocus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Croix Daurade	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Montaudran	0	1	1	1.0%	0	0	0	0
Rangeuil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pouvoirville	0	2	2	2.0%	0	0	0	0
LaFourquette	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LeMirail	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
St.Simon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lardenne	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
St.Martin de Touch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suburbs	0	4	4	4.1%	0	0	0	0
TOTAL								
CITY-TOTAL	18	80	98	100%	6	23	29	100%
MISSING DATA (no address listed)	13	103	116		64	58	122	
GRAND TOTAL	31	183	214		70	81	151	

established in the rapidly growing faubourgs. Migrants settling in Toulouse's faubourgs were not rootless and anomic; they created their own new social networks and organizations, independent of clerical and aristocratic domination and freed from the grip of institutions which reinforced traditional social and political values. Standards of behavior were not absent, as bourgeois moralists bemoaning the decline of working-class docility or Catholic clerics lamenting the dechristianization of the working class would have us believe; they were different. A new breed of urban workers, no longer dependent upon the clergy or nobility for employment, was flooding into what were once the outskirts of the city. The powerful bonds of patronage which tied center city workers into networks of loyalties to the Church and legitimist notables, and provided the foundation for working-class royalism, did not take root in these areas of the city. Workers settling in the faubourgs lived beyond the boundaries of a world where ties of personal dependence largely determined political behavior. Rapid urban growth helped to create a new urban setting in which older forms of personal obligation and dependency no longer dominated working-class political relationships. Working-class migrants created new counter-institutions, and became enmeshed in new social networks, which developed relatively autonomously of the old social forces and influences.

The growth of class and political consciousness among Toulousain workers involved the slow emergence of autonomous working-class social and political counter-institutions. These counter-institutions emerged in direct confrontation with traditional institutions dedicated to the extension of the hierarchical social relations of the workplace into the everyday interactions of social life. Working-class counter-institutions mobilized workers against traditional vertical patron-client structures of dependency and challenged the cultural hegemony of the ruling class. Elite dominated institutions of socialization and social control, such as the schools and the Church, reproduced and reinforced the traditional social relationships of hierarchy, dominance, and subordination of the workplace. Working-class counter-institutions, including neighborhood cafes and taverns, mutual benefit societies, and trade associations provided areas of respite from the struggle for

survival as well as enclaves of resistance to the subordination and inequality of the workplace. These autonomous counter-institutions offered areas of sociability where a spirit of camaradery and brotherhood, not hierarchy and domination, prevailed. Cafes, taverns, cabarets, dancehalls, social clubs, mutual benefit societies, and labor associations became centers of new regularized patterns of interaction which fostered and sustained new sets of social and political values. These organizations and communication structures helped to propagate the collective recognition of common problems and aspirations among workers. The political attachments of the small informal friendship groups which gathered in these areas of sociability played a major role in shaping the political solidarities of recent urban migrants. The social relations which prevailed in these counter-institutions reflected the newly emerging broad-based solidarities of social class, to which Republican and socialist political ideology appealed, rather than the narrow individualistic and corporate interests upon which legitimist patronage politics was based. Unlike the Republican party, the legitimist party lacked a solid core of working-class party activists who maintained regular access and input to these centers of working-class sociability. "The legitimist party leadership", observed the Procureur Général in January of 1855, "lacks what it takes to influence urban populations. They lack the activity, the means of contact, and the aptitude for propaganda..." (A.N.:BB³⁰ 388)

During the period from 1830 to 1872, older forms of working-class organization, including confraternities and compagnonnages, were slowly disappearing, and mutual benefit societies, resistance societies, producers' cooperatives, and trade unions were gradually taking their place. These new organizations, which began taking root in Toulouse during the late 1830's, provided workers with alternative sources for the satisfaction of needs previously met by institutions controlled by the city's elite. Workers increasingly turned to these associations in times of need rather than rely upon clerical, legitimist, or bourgeois controlled charitable institutions. These new organizations not only encouraged self-help by providing unemployment, accident, sickness, and old age insurance; they also played an active role in

resisting wage reductions and fighting for better hours, wages, and working conditions. The transformation of associations dedicated to mutual aid among Toulousain workers reflects the way in which working-class organizations slowly took on an increasingly secularized, politicized, class-based, and militant character.

In 1843, there were an estimated 24 mutual benefit societies in Toulouse, with a total membership of approximately 1,336. In 1842, these local mutual benefit societies had distributed a total of approximately 10,000 francs in aid to needy workers (A.D.: 4M54,55). During 1848 and 1849, Republican party militants actively encouraged workers to form such organizations, and the food crisis of the early 1850's greatly stimulated the development of these associations. By 1855, there were 90 mutual benefit societies in Toulouse, and by 1862 there were 96 of them, with an estimated membership of 18,000 workers.¹² At the same time that they were gaining widespread popularity among Toulousain workers, these organizations were also breaking off their ties to the Church and becoming more secularized.

During the Restoration, various groups of Toulousain artisans, including joiners, macons, tinsmiths, carpenters, cabinet-makers, forgers, and roofers, attempted to form secularized versions of confraternities of mutual aid. In 1821, complaining of the high cost of clerical direction, they petitioned the mayor requesting that they be allowed to form mutual benefit societies without clerical direction or patron saints. The mayor rejected their petitions. Fifty years later, however, a large majority of the city's working class mutual benefit societies had escaped the constraints of clerical domination, and the secularized version of this organizational form was dominant. By 1852, although most mutual benefit societies retained the custom of taking on the name of a patron saint, only 34 of the city's 64 mutual benefit societies had meeting places in local churches. The custom of naming a cleric as president of the society had completely disappeared by 1852.¹³ Not only did these working-class associations become more secularized; many also became politicized agents of class struggle, actively involved in strike organization.

During the strike wave which swept the city in the summer of 1855, many mutual benefit societies provided strike payments to workers, and, according to authorities, these associations provoked and facilitated strike actions. Mutual benefit societies were constantly suspected by authorities as dangerous centers of strike activity, and in January of 1865, the Procureur Général expressed these suspicions as follows: "I must once again point out the danger posed by working-class trade associations which, under the cover of mutual aid, have organized the trades, subjected workers to rigorously enforced clandestine regulations, and often placed employers at the mercy of their workers. These numerous associations have treasuries which, in the event of a work stoppage, can serve to support a strike..." (A.N.:BB³⁰389)

The rapid urban growth generated by early industrial capitalism did play an important role in transforming the political landscape of Toulouse. Its major effect was to help restructure regularized patterns of social interaction and to facilitate the growth of new counter-institutions, rather than to dissolve or destroy social ties. Rapid urban growth played an important part in the transformation of the organizational structure of working-class communities. This organizational transformation, rather than the socio-psychological impact of uprooting upon recent migrants to the city helps to explain the changes which took place in working-class political behavior. Historians have often assumed that migrants arriving in the city were disorganized, uprooted, or marginal, and that the negative aspects of their adjustment to city life determined their political behavior. Instead of assuming that urban migration necessarily generates social disorganization, this research has attempted to understand how, during the course of rapid urban growth, new regularized patterns of interaction and new forms of organization emerged to shape the collective political expression of group solidarities and interests.

Conclusion

One of the many changes wrought by early industrial capitalism was the redistribution of resources among elite groups, away from the old aristocracy into the hands of a rising bourgeoisie. Economic transformation also stimulated massive population movements, which produced rapid urban growth in Toulouse and in other cities in France. This rapid growth alone did not destroy patron-client relationships nor did it create the counter-institutions which arose to challenge existing structures of dependency. The new urban environment did, however, greatly facilitate both of these developments by helping to foster regularized patterns of interaction and structures of communication which reinforced emerging solidarities of social class.

Changes in class structure, in the distribution of wealth, and in the urban environment altered the degree of dependency and autonomy of different groups in the population, and reshaped the social and political relations which linked these groups to one another. Large-scale social changes reallocated resources and restructured patterns of interaction; they thereby helped to create and destroy organizational and institutional structures of patronage dependencies and transformed working-class political solidarities. As struggles to break the chains of dependency sounded the death knell for traditional patron-client relationships, Toulousain working-class royalism slowly became a mere relic of the past.

FOOTNOTES

1. Patron-client relations involve largely instrumental friendships in which persons of one social class or status group use their resources and influence to provide protection and/or benefits for persons of a different social class or status group. The latter, in turn, reciprocate by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron. See Jim Scott, "The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social Change in Rural Southeast Asia," University of Wisconsin, Department of Political Science; pre-publication paper.

2. A.N.: BB¹⁸ 1208, 1214, 1319, 1338, 1412, 1443, 1445, 1679; BB³⁰ 416, 418, 388, 395; F^{1C} 14.

A.D.: 4M48-52, 55, 58-60, 66, 69, 82-84; 223U9, 17, 19, 25.

A.M.: 1171.

3. A.M.: Recensements de 1830, 1872. These figures are based upon a systematic sample of every tenth individual listed in the manuscript censuses of 1830 and 1872.

4. David Higgs, "Poverty and Charity at Toulouse, 1750-1850," in John Boshier (ed.), French Government and Society, 1500-1850; Essays in Memory of Alfred Cobban, (London, 1973).

5. Jean Sentou, "Toulouse," in Les Fortunes en France au XIX^e Siecle, (Paris, 1965), 570-572, A. Daumard (ed.).

6a. Alex Weingrod, "Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties," Comparative Studies in Society and History, X(July, 1968), 377-400.

6b. For a discussion of class consciousness, working class social networks, and political coalitions, see Ronald Aminzade, Class Struggles, Social Change, and Political Conflicts: Toulouse, France, 1830-1872, University of Michigan, Department of Sociology, Ph.D. dissertation, 1977.

7. Charles Pouthas, La Population Francaise pendant la Première Moitié du XIX Siecle, (Paris, 1956), 98-107.

André Armengaud, Les Populations de l'Est Aquitaine, (Paris, 1961), 262.

8. The octroi was a tax on goods entering the city, and the prices of consumer goods, including food and drink, were lower in the areas of the city located beyond the octroi boundary lines.

9. Op.cit., Recensements de 1830, 1872.

10. David Higgs, "Lower Class Royalism in Toulouse," unpublished paper for the Canadian Historical Association meeting, June 1, 1971.

11. These figures are based upon the archival sources listed in footnote #2. The definition used to identify party leaders and party activists was the same as for Table I.

12. Jules Delaye, Rapport sur Les Sociétés de Secours Mutuels d'Ouvriers, (Toulouse, 1862).; A.N.: BB³⁰388; A.D.: 4M54.

13. Paul Droulet, Action Pastorale et Problemes Sociaux Sous La Monarchie de Juillet chez Mgr. d'Astros, (Paris, 1954), 298-299.

A.N.: Archives Nationales de la France

A.D.: Archives Départementales de l'Haute Garenne

A.M.: Archives Municipales de Toulouse