HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL PROCESSES

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London, 1830

If you were a Londoner of literary inclinations in 1830, you might well have frequented the Chapter Coffee House in Paternoster Row, near St. Paul's Church. Writers, booksellers, collectors and clergymen often gathered there. The Chapter was then a comfortable place, over a century old. Its Proprietor, James Ellis, presided over good rooms, excellent meals, a rich library supported by subscriptions, a large file of periodicals stretching back into the eighteenth century and, of course, a wide choice of current newspapers and magazines for the day's patrons.

Let us say you come in on New Year's Day 1830. You take your usual seat by the fire, order a coffee, grog or ale, and unfold the day's Morning Chronicle. The first of January falls on a Friday this year, so there is plenty of workaday news to read. It takes a while to get to the news, for the Chronicle's first page is largely advertisements: "A LADY, between thirty and forty years of age, of highly respectable family, who has moved in the best society, is reduced by a series of misfortunes to seek the means of support by offering her services to SUPERINTEND the DOMESTIC CONCERNS of a WIDOWER, who may require the attention of a Friend or Companion . . ." "THE GRAND CIGAR DIVAN AND ESTAMINET is now OPENED, at 102, STRAND . . ." "USEFUL AND ELEGANT PRESENTS FOR CHRISTMAS AND THE NEW YEAR . . ." and so on.

Soon, however, you are learning about the weavers in Norwich who last week " . . . had announced their intention to collect contributions in order to enable them to hold out against the proposed reduction of wages . . .". The Magistrates had replied that if the weavers tried collecting, they would use the Vagrancy Act against them. A handbill from the Weavers' Committee had proposed mortgaging local taxes for up to two years to raise money for the manufacture of bombazines, and thus to employ local workers. On Tuesday night, the 29th, at about 10:30

. . . a large number of persons entered the Boatman's Call-yard, in St. Augustine's, and commenced a violent attack upon the house of Mr. William Springall, manufacturer, which they broke into, and ten or twelve entered, having their faces covered with handkerchiefs, and threatening to shoot any person who might resist them.

Mr. Springall did resist. One of the attackers shot him in the belly. Then the group proceeded to the seven looms in the attic, cut the work out of the looms, and left quickly. The Magistrates appointed peace officers to patrol the streets, posted a reward of 100 pounds for the apprehension of the assailant and, later, called in a party of the Seventh Dragoons.

Elsewhere in the Chronicle you find reports of less violent struggles for power: Supporters of Sir Robert Peel dine at the Bull Inn, Aldgate, to celebrate the election of Michael Scales to the Common Council of Portsoken Ward. Thirty or forty members of the chemists' and druggists' trade meet at the Crown and Anchor to organize resistance to the heavy taxes and licensing fees to which they are liable. Still other meetings are announced.

The Chronicle also participates directly in the political debate. A columnist criticizes a recent article which advocated education for the poor as a device to secure their political allegiance. That education, according to the article being criticized, would help overcome the influence of institutions which are "challenging obedience, some of which have sprung up in imagination, some in passion, some out of the subsiding
conflict of the blindest forces . . . " The columnist expresses his doubts "whether the education of the lower orders is calculated to make them better subjects; that is, is calculated to add to their affection for rotten boroughs, licensing, game and corn laws, an overgrown church establishment, oppression, taxation, &c." The columnist terms his target's indictment of opposition institutions "a very transcendental way of stating that a man who labours sixteen hours out of the twenty-four for a subsistence of oatmeal, or potatoes and water, finds it very difficult, by his unaided reason, to understand why he should thus be forced to toil and starve, in order that a number of people should live in idleness and luxury." So you read on through the conflicts, affairs and opinions of the day: pitched battles between poachers and gamekeepers, protest meetings, calls for aid to the poor.

Whether you regard all this news and comment as "political" depends on whether your personal definition of politics is broad or narrow. Whatever you call it, your news and your life are certainly full of people striving for power. Last Tuesday -- on the same day the weavers of Norwich were cutting the work from Mr. Spriggall's looms -- about 25 booksellers met in this very coffeehouse to work together against the underpricing of new books. As you sat by the Chapter House fire the last few days, you have read about riotous gin-drinkers, about a meeting of the inhabitants of Bread Street Ward to protest against the Council's vote-fixing, about other meetings to demand the repeal of the Malt Duty, to consider the Poor Laws of Scotland, to reestablish the privileges of citizens of Cripplegate Without, to provide work for the parish poor. Tomorrow you will encounter a gathering of Radical Reformers in Leeds, more meetings to demand aid for the poor, and plenty of other political intelligence. No Morning Chronicle will appear the day after tomorrow, which is Sunday. But on Monday the fourth one of the first news items to catch your eye will be an angry gathering of 3,000 weavers in Norwich. The power struggles continue.

On New Year's Day 1830, in fact, you have three of the most turbulent and critical years of British political history before you. You may find it hard to imagine that the conflicts of 1830 to 1832 will be sharper than those you have just gone through. After all, the last few years have brought hard-fought battles over parish government, over Catholic Emancipation and over the Corn Laws, in addition to the usual struggles concerning wages, work, poor rates, hunting and taxes. But as you sit by your fire, sip your coffee and peruse your Morning Chronicle for the next three years, you will find 1828 and 1829 paling into insignificance. This year you will witness intense industrial conflict, a campaign for a Ten Hour Law, a great swelling of the movement for Parliamentary Reform, and the widespread rising of agricultural workers which will eventually come to be known as the Last Laborers' Revolt or as the Swing Rebellion.

Next year, in 1831, will come two huge but unsuccessful efforts to pass a reform bill, punctuated by a bitter election campaign. In 1832 the struggle will resume, and a royal threat to pack the House of Lords will finally force the bill through; one will still have to possess substantial property in order to vote, but the principle of representation in proportion to the number of persons represented will have been established. All this will take place in the company of meetings, speeches, demonstrations, protests and violence. As journalist and agitator John Arthur Roebuck (who, incidentally, will fight a duel with the editor of the Morning Chronicle in 1835) will recall it later: "Processions, meetings, harangues,
revolutionary resolutions, banners, mobs, assemblages both by night and day, all like a furious hurricane, swept over the face of the political waters." When Roebuck wrote those recollections in 1848, he had been through many a further struggle: the battle over the 1834 Poor Law reform, the rise and demise of the great Chartist movement, and much more. Whatever else it was, nineteenth-century British political life was not uneventful.

Reform in History and in Political Analysis

Historians have written endlessly about those turbulent years. Political analysts who are not mainly interested in the historical detail have also turned repeatedly to the period of the Reform Bill. In Karl Marx' view, the new English manufacturing bourgeoisie "gained direct political power as a result of the Reform Bill." It "captured direct representation in Parliament and used this to destroy the last remnants of real power left to the landed proprietors" (Marx 1973: 255). But Marx denied that Reform gave the working class any significant gains.

Among recent analysts, Barrington Moore echoes Marx: "Even if the Reform Bill of 1832, which gave the industrial capitalists the vote, disappointed the hopes of its more ardent advocates and belied the fears of its more ardent opponents, its passage meant that the bourgeoisie had shown its teeth" (Moore 1966: 33). Most contemporary political analysts assign greater importance than that to the Reform Bill and the struggles around it. G. Bingham Powell is more representative:

The Reform Act of 1832 is a landmark in British history. The expanded electorate and the elaborate registration laws stimulated development of organized political interest groups and formal party structures. The alliances across social and geographic lines provided an example of a range of shifting, pragmatic political strategies that later political "entrepreneurs" exploited and consolidated. The debates of subsequent decades show quite clearly that the successes of pragmatic alliance and popular mobilization in 1832 were not soon forgotten. The 1832 crisis contributed some significant memories and themes to British political culture: The idea that Britain had some special ability to accommodate diverse interests, and ability sharply distinguished from "continental" instability, became widely accepted in England (Powell 1973: 103-104).

As Gabriel Almond sums it up, "The British Reform Act of 1832 ... is generally viewed as the exemplar of incremental democratization, a largely peaceful adaptation of a political system to basic changes in economy and social structure" (Almond 1973: 23).

Almond is right. British resolution of the struggles of the early 1830s serves regularly as a point of reference for the analysis of twentieth-century political processes. Most analysts treat it as a major chapter in a success story: the successful extension of representation, the successful incorporation of wider and wider segments of society into national politics. If we accept that assessment, we may use the British experience of those years as an ideal, as a source of practical teachings, or as a baseline with which to compare the current experiences of states which are now building representative institutions.

That is not the only contemporary context to which we might try to link the British struggles of 1830 to 1832. Following the line sketched
by Marx and Moore, we might treat them as instances of class action in politics. Following the rhetoric of 1831 and 1832, we might treat the
Britain of that time as a negative case in a comparative analysis of revolution: the case in which revolution could have happened, but did not.
We might broaden our scope to include the whole range of politically-
relevant action reported in the Morning Chronicle -- Reform meetings,
weavers' marches, booksellers' lobbying, and so on -- in order to try out
our favorite theories of political mobilization or political participation.
Or we might narrow the scope to look closely at the crucial voting pat-
terns in Parliament or in the election of 1831 as tests of general models
of voting. We might narrow the scope even more to scrutinize the inter-
personal networks and influence processes which connected the principal en-
gineers of Reform, and thereby refine our theories of micropolitics.

The events of 1830 to 1832, then, offer an unending series of op-
portunities for different sorts of political analysis. For the sake of
clarity, let us think about three major opportunities: the study of mobil-
ization, the study of statemaking and the study of revolution. The three
topics recommend themselves because people who pursue them usually have to
dig into history for ideas and evidence.

Mobilization

In essence, mobilization is the process by which groups of people
acquire the capacity to act on behalf of their common interests and goals.
The study of mobilization has been on the agenda of political analysis for
centuries, but usually under such headings as "will" or "leadership".
When western political scientists and sociologists turned their attention
to Third World political processes after World War II, however, they re-
thought the question. They became increasingly interested in the organi-
izational changes which increase the collective capacity to act. They be-
came concerned about the relationship between those changes and such mas-
sive social rearrangements as industrialization and urbanization. The
word "mobilization" had earlier applied mainly to the calling up of mil-
tary forces. Now it became a favorite term for the organizational changes
increasing the capacity to act.

There are still plenty of disagreements about which organizational
changes are crucial and how they work. One broad division separates the-
tories emphasizing changes in attitudes and information from theories empha-
sizing changes in the material and organizational means of action. In the
first view, an increase in the proportion of a population who are in con-
tact with mass communications is crucial. Karl Deutsch proposed some pos-
sible measures of the mobilized population:

... the set of persons who live in towns; the set of persons en-
gaged in occupations other than agriculture, forestry, and fishing;
the set of persons who read a newspaper at least once a week; the
set of persons who pay direct taxes to a central government; or
are directly subject to military conscription; the set of persons
who have attended public or private schools for at least four
years; the set of persons attending markets at least once a
month; the set of persons sending or receiving a letter at least
once a month; the set of literate adults, of movie-goers, of radio
listeners, of registered voters for elections, or of insured
persons under social security schemes; or all persons working for
money wages in units with five or more employees; and many more
(Deutsch 1966: 126).
In the second view, the population’s accumulation and pooling of resources is crucial. After distinguishing among utilitarian, coercive and normative resources, Amitai Etzioni discusses measurement strategies:

It is relatively easy to measure utilitarian mobilization. For instance, one aspect which can be measured quite readily is changes in the control of manpower -- e.g. the ratio of people employed by the mobilizing unit as against the sub-units. A relative increase in the ratio of those employed by a federal government as against state and local governments is a measure of the centralization of the system and the power of unit-controls as compared to sub-unit ones. The same holds for the percentage of the GNP taxed by all levels of government and the distribution of these funds among them.

Coercive mobilization, reflected in changes in the control of troops, arms, and so on, is also relatively easy to measure. On the other hand, it is more difficult to develop reliable measurements of normative mobilization, e.g. changes of loyalties. Changes of attitudes expressed in sequential public opinion polls provide one indicator. Changes in the frequency of the use of various symbols in the press have been used to study historical changes of loyalties (Etzioni 1968: 391).

In these passages, Deutsch and Etzioni are focusing on large political units: national states and the equivalent. That is where most discussions of mobilization have concentrated. But the basic ideas and arguments also apply to smaller units: communities, classes, linguistic minorities, and others. In all these cases we can reasonably ask how such a group gains -- or loses -- the capacity to act together. In all these cases we have an initial choice between giving priority to changes in attitudes or information and giving priority to changes in the material and organizational means of action.

Some of the disagreement between the two views is simply a matter of definition: Which changes can we properly call mobilization? Yet beyond the clash of definitions stands a genuine, important set of questions: How crucial to collective problem-solving are changes in attitudes and information? What about changes in available resources? What is the connection between the two kinds of changes?

Those questions are doubly relevant to historical inquiry. They are relevant, first, because in one form or another historians have been asking them for a long time. In the case of the British movement for parliamentary reform, historians generally agree that widespread mobilization occurred at the end of the 1820s. They disagree on who mobilized, how much, and how. Derek Fraser identifies "six strands in that reform movement whose opinions had become so decisive during 1830" (Fraser 1970: 36):

1. new reform demands of the ultra-Tories, resulting from their dissatisfaction with the "unreformed" Parliament’s enactment of Catholic Emancipation;

2. political excitement resulting from the 1830 general election and the French Revolution of 1830:

3. economic distress and cholera, both of which maintained discontent;
4. the threat of attacks on property, made realistic by such events as the Swing Rebellion; the threat, according to Fraser, activated middle-class fears and strengthened the conviction that something had to be done;

5. influence of the Press on behalf of reform;

6. the organization of activist associations called political unions: "they were both the sixth element in the Reform movement and at once the means by which the other five were mobilized" (Fraser 1970: 41).

The list is the usual historian's mixed bag. The first five items fall on the attitude/information side of the line. The sixth, the impact of political unions, is emphatically organizational. Together they comprise a simple model of mobilization for reform. Figure 1 sketches Fraser's implicit model. It presents a challenge: specify the links among the model's elements, estimate their relative weights, test the explanation as a whole.

Questions about mobilization are also relevant to historical inquiry in the opposite way. Evidence from such events as the Reform movement provides an opportunity to verify and falsify general models of mobilization. C. Bingham Powell's analysis of Reform, quoted earlier, is an attempt to apply a general model of "developmental causation" in which mobilization plays a major part. Gabriel Almond's summary of the analytical agenda for that model appears in Figure 2. As a practical matter, analysts using the scheme lay out the background of an historical transition in accordance with the scheme's categories, break the events into...
phases, group the relevant actors into principal contenders over the issues in question, trace the mobilization of each of the contenders at each phase of the action, and treat the coalitions among mobilized contenders as major determinants of the outcome. Thus for Powell the chief mobilized contenders were:

- Tories: Ultras and Center
- The Whig Party
- The Crown Faction
- The Counterelite Movements: Radicals and Irish

The central events in Powell's complex analysis are the mobilization of the Radicals and the formation of an effective Radical-Whig-Crown coalition. It is difficult, and perhaps fruitless, to stage a confrontation between Fraser's analysis of Reform and the Almond-Powell analysis; one is quite concrete, the other quite abstract. Nevertheless it is clear that the two explanations differ to some extent: although they agree on the importance of Radical mobilization (which took place especially via the political unions), the Almond-Powell scheme discounts diffuse excitement, anxiety and fear and stresses the implicit coalitions of defined interest groups. That disagreement is an invitation to new research.

State making

We can also consider the British events of 1830 to 1832 in the context of state making: the process by which national states come into being and gain strength. In addition to dealing with mobilization, the Almond-Powell analysis does just that. It suggests that state making occurs as a by-product of the efforts political leaders make to deal with pressing short-run crises. The long-run consequences are often unforeseen, and sometimes unwanted:

Figure 2. Gabriel Almond's Agenda for Transforming a Historical Episode into an Analytical Episode.
For example, consider a developmental episode such as the British Reform Act of 1832. A Whig-Radical coalition forms the cabinet and enacts electoral legislation eliminating many of the "rotten boroughs," and lowering and standardizing suffrage requirements. In the short run, antisystem pressure is reduced, but in the longer run the introduction of electoral reform triggers demands for further extensions of the suffrage to enfranchise the working class, and for welfare legislation. Public policy in the next decade or two alternates between welfare measures intended to alleviate working conditions, the lowering of food prices by eliminating agricultural protection, and repressive measures (Almond 1973: 33).

These developments, according to Almond's account, then contributed to the creation of disciplined parties, a regular cabinet system, and a full-fledged governmental bureaucracy.

Barrington Moore offers a contrasting account. It differs from Almond's in two important ways: 1) in considering the crucial decisions which produced Britain's nineteenth-century state to have been made with the class struggles of the seventeenth century; the victory of the landed classes over the Crown, the elimination of the peasantry as a political force, the establishment of Parliament as the prime political institution occurred in the English Civil War and its aftermath; the nineteenth-century changes were simply adjustments and concessions by a firmly-seated ruling class; 2) in portraying the state as the manipulated instrument of the governing classes, and the struggle over Reform as a result of the penetration of town-based capitalists into the governing classes.

As usual, the confrontation between the two views is imperfect: Almond and Moore are asking somewhat different questions, considering quite different spans of time, dealing with a different level of historical detail. Nonetheless, in comparing the two views we can identify two rather different ways of approaching the process of statemaking, and of placing transitions such as 1830-32 within the process.

In his analysis, Almond is seeking to formulate a general model of the process by which major and relatively rapid alterations in governmental structures occur. Moore is attempting something quite different: an explanation of the differences among the parliamentary politics of modern Britain, the authoritarian politics of Nazi Germany, the attenuated democracy of modern France, and the contrasting fates of Russia, China, India and other countries. Still other approaches to statemaking are available. Much of the literature which goes under the various names "political development," "political modernization," and "nation-building" consists of efforts to specify the conditions under which emerge governments which are at once stable, effective and responsive to the interests and/or demands of the population at large. Some even attempt to identify standard paths to stable, effective, responsive government. Such a program is more ambitious than the analysis of statemaking alone, but it necessarily includes an analysis of statemaking. The analysis often builds on historical examples. Historical examples are important because old western states are, implicitly or explicitly, favorite models of relatively stable, effective, responsive governments and because existing historical accounts make it convenient to examine the changing character of old western states over substantial spans of time.

We have innumerable schemes of political development to choose from.
Three of the most judicious and historically grounded are the schemes of Reinhard Bendix, Stein Rojan and Cyril Black. Bendix' analysis, indeed, is so judicious and historically grounded that it hardly counts as a "scheme" at all. Bendix considers nation-building to have two main components: the creation of a national citizenry including the bulk of the population; the government's acquisition of nationwide authority. The central problem, in Bendix' portrayal, is that while in the long run a national citizenry and an authoritative government reinforce each other, in the shorter run they are often contradictory. A relatively authoritative government which serves the interests of a ruling class and relies on it for support faces the outsiders' demand for political rights, but the extension of rights to the outsiders threatens the position of the existing rulers. Refusal to extend political rights, however, turns the outsiders from demands for inclusion in the existing system to demands for the creation of a new one. The dilemma leads to breakdown or revolution.

England is therefore not so much a model as an exceptional case. As Bendix sees it, English workers did not turn to the nationalism which later became common among European workers because England industrialized early; that meant English workers were fairly prosperous in comparison with the workers with whom they might compare themselves, and that there was no superior nation with whose successes they might compare the accomplishments of their own government. More important, the English somehow managed to extend citizenship:

There are some manufacturers who acknowledge the traditional obligations of a ruling class. Among some magistrates the principle of noninterference by government is adhered to by a detached and critical attitude, even in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Finally, the demand for equality of the developing working class is cast in a more or less conservative mold in the sense that on balance it adds up to a quest for public acceptance of equal citizenship. In other words, English society proved itself capable of accommodating the lower class as an equal participant in the national political community, though even in England this development involved a prolonged struggle and the full implications of equality as we understand them today evolved only gradually (Bendix 1964: 70-71).

Thus we return indirectly to the era of Reform. Bendix gives us yet another way of relating the historical experience to contemporary political analysis. It is like Almond's in searching for recurrent developmental sequences, like Moore's in attempting to explain distinctive political outcomes through close comparison of national experiences. It differs from either one in treating the extension of political rights as the crucial problem and process.

Stein Rojan shares Bendix's concern for the extension of political rights. Two other lines of inquiry separate Rojan's historical analyses from Bendix's. One is the effort to delineate the geopolitical component in the divergent state-making experiences of European countries. The other is to identify standard crises and sequences in the emergence of competitive mass politics. In contrast to Bendix, Rojan is nothing if not a schematizer. (In fact, one of the difficulties in dealing with Rojan's analyses is that the criticism and new research it generates is always out of date; there's always a new scheme on the way.) Figure 3
Figure 3. Stein Rokkan's Schematic Geopolitical Map of Europe.

Presents one of Rokkan’s schematic geopolitical maps of Europe. Instead of locating countries in simple latitude and longitude, it converts the north-south dimension into broad religious differences: Protestant, Mixed, Catholic countries do, indeed, group themselves roughly from north to south. It converts the east-west dimension into a scale which compounds a) distance from the band of city-states which long extended from Flanders down the Rhine, across the Alps into Italy and b) seaward vs. landward orientation.

Rokkan uses the geopolitical scheme to organize a number of historical generalizations. On the whole, according to Rokkan, ethnic and religious diversity presented greater problems to statesmen in the Mixed zone of the north-south dimension; as a result, they developed more elaborate "consociational" institutions which guaranteed a distinct voice for each minority. On the whole, the states which were adjacent to, but not in, the intensely-commercialized central band of city-states had the greatest opportunity and incentive to build up strong political centers; they could profit from the trade without undergoing the intense fragmentation trade brought where it was most active. Yet their relatively central locations made them vulnerable to military attack; that encouraged them to build large military establishments, which then increased the size and effectiveness of the state structure. And so on through a number of other interesting comparisons.

Britain appears in the geopolitical scheme as a peripheral seaward empire of mixed ethnic-religious composition. As such, Britain did not have a pressing need for a large military force, but did need to elaborate mechanisms for the management of diverse interests, and was able to benefit from maritime commerce. Rokkan argues that Britain's position favored
the early commercialization of agriculture and the convergence of urban
and rural economic interests -- a quite different situation, for example,
from the continuous struggle between landlords and urban merchants in
Prussia.

Rokkan also proposes four standard phases in European state-
making:

1. penetration: "... a series of bargains are struck and a
variety of cultural bonds are established across networks of
local power-holders and a number of institutions are built for
the extraction of resources for common defense, for the mainten-
ance of internal order and the adjudication of disputes, for the
protection of established rights and privileges and for the ele-
mentary infrastructure requirements of the economy and the polity"

2. standardization: "... brings in larger and larger sectors
of the masses into the system: the conscript armies, the compul-
sory schools, the emerging mass media create channels for direct
contact between the central elite and parochial populations of
the peripheries and generate widespread feelings of identity with
the total political system, frequently, but not necessarily, in
protracted conflict with already established identities such as
those built up through churches or sects or through peripheral
linguistic elites"

3. participation: "... typically through the establishment of
privileges of opposition, the extension of the electorates for
organs of representation, the formation of organized parties for
the mobilization of support and the articulation and aggregation
of demands"

4. redistribution: "... the building of public welfare services,
the development of nationwide policies for the equalization of
economic conditions, negatively through progressive taxation,
positively through transfers from the better-off strata to the
poorer, from the richer to the backward regions" (Rokkan 1975:
571-572).

Rokkan says the phases provide a fairly good description of the experiences
of the older European states; but the more we approach the present, he
tells us, the more we find phases 2, 3 and 4 overlapping.

How would we relate the experience of nineteenth-century Britain
to these two schemes? The geopolitical grid helps explain the distinctive
political structure which nineteenth-century Britons inherited from the
past. It therefore provides us with the beginning of a broad comparison
between the Reform struggle in Britain and, say, the revolutions of 1848
in France, Belgium and Germany. We would probably place Reform Britain
somewhere in phase 3 -- Participation -- of Rokkan's developmental scheme.
That, too, would lead on to comparisons. Instead of comparing the Britain
of 1830 with the United States of 1830, for example, we might look for a
comparable phase of development in American history. Presumably it would
come much later than 1830.

Cyril Black, a historian, builds a general model of modernization
on a sequence of political processes. Modernization, for Black, is "the
process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the
rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in
man's knowledge, permitting control over his environment, that accompanied
the scientific revolution" (Black 1966: 7). Black charts out the moderniza-
tion of various countries into four successive phases, each marked by
the confrontation with a critical problem:

1. the challenge of modernity: "the initial confrontation of a
   society, within its traditional framework of knowledge, with
   modern ideas and institutions, and the emergence of advocates of
   modernity"

2. the consolidation of modernizing leadership: "the transfer of
   power from traditional to modernizing leaders in the course of a
   normally bitter revolutionary struggle often lasting several gene-
   rations"

3. economic and social transformation: "the development of economic
   growth and social change to a point where a society is transformed
   from a predominantly rural and agrarian way of life to one pre-
   dominantly urban and industrial"

4. the integration of society: "the phase in which economic and
   social transformation produces a fundamental reorganization of
   the social structure throughout the society" (Black 1966: 67-68).

Looking at the modern history of the world as a whole, Black lays out
seven different "patterns of modernization". In general, they group
large geographic areas together. Britain (or, rather, the United King-
dom -- Black's analysis deals with the larger, later political entity)
falls with France into the "First Pattern":

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consolidation of Modernizing Leadership</th>
<th>Economic and Social Transformation</th>
<th>Integration of Society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1649-1832</td>
<td>1832-1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1945-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1789-1848</td>
<td>1848-1945</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1945-</td>
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</tbody>
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The critical dates for France, according to Black, are the beginning of
the eighteenth-century Revolution (1789), the Revolution of 1848 and the
end of World War II. For the United Kingdom, we find the beginning of
the Civil War (1649), the Reform Bill, and again the end of World War II.

In the First Pattern, as Black sees it, the two cases had the fol-
lowing characteristics:

1. The transfer of political power to modernizing leaders occurred
   relatively early and was thus little influenced by external
   models.

2. The immediate political challenge of modernity was essentially
   internal.

3. The countries experienced continuity of territory during the
   modern era.

4. The countries were self-governing in the modern era.

5. The countries entered the modern era with developed, adap-
   table institutions.

"Several consequences," writes Black,

have flowed from this pattern of development. One is that in Great
Britain and France the adaptation of traditional institutions to
modern functions evolved more slowly than in the countries that modernized later. Although both countries experienced the upheavals of revolution and restoration -- France in a much more dramatic fashion and on several occasions -- substantive change in the political, economic, and social spheres took place only gradually. In the case of Great Britain one may consider the transition from traditional to modernizing leadership as having taken place between 1649 and 1832. The political problems of economic and social transformation were encountered between 1932 and 1945 (Black 1966: 108).

Here 1832 is the culmination of the transfer of power to modernizing leaders. Thus Britain experienced "a relatively orderly and peaceful adaptation of traditional institutions to modern functions" (Black 1966: 109). As is often the case, Britain turns out to be a standard against which other cases are compared. The Reform of 1832 plays a central role in an analysis intended for application to contemporary politics.

**Revolution**

Mobilization and statemaking are obvious contexts for the analysis of nineteenth-century British Reform. But revolution? That is not obvious. By no standard definition did a revolution occur in the Britain of 1832. Yet we have good reasons for thinking about the British experience in the context of revolution. First, contemporary leaders talked a good deal about whether a revolution would occur if Reform were not enacted. Subsequent historians picked up the same theme:

W. N. Moleworth ... writing about public feeling in October, 1831, after the Lords' rejection of the Bill, said that a "stirring word thrown among the multitude at that moment might have produced a revolution." Spencer Walpole contended that the Lords' rejection "brought the country to the verge of civil war." Sir Frederick Pollock claimed that in 1832 "a large part of the English people were of opinion that the difference between an unreformed and a reformed Parliament was worth a civil war; and it was the knowledge of their opinion and of their readiness in extremity to act on it that then narrowly saved the State." And Dicey has noted that while "the inflexibility of French constitutions has provoked revolution, the flexibility of English institutions has, once at least [in 1832], saved them from violent overthrow" (Hamburger 1963: 112).

Second, if no revolution occurred at that time, a number of important rebellions and violent conflicts did occur. The most widespread was the so-called Swing Rebellion of 1830, in which rural workers burned hayricks, broke up agricultural machinery and attacked the property of big farmers and landlords (Hobsbawm and Rude, 1969). The Reform movement itself produced a whole series of violent encounters. It is worth asking whether these conflicts constituted anything like a revolutionary situation.

Third, in those years major changes in the distribution of power were going on in Britain. Were they "revolutionary" even if no revolution occurred? Did Britain find the way to peaceful revolution? Many later analysts have thought so. As Richard Rose puts it:

The Reform Act of 1832, which recognized some claims of the rising middle class for political influence, marks the beginning of the gradual adaptation of political institutions to keeping
with changes in society and in the political culture. The Whigs carried the bill, not because they believed in democracy, but because, in Briggs' words, "they believed that unless the privileged sections of the community were prepared to adapt and to 'improve,' waves of dangerous and uncontrollable innovation would completely drown the existing social order." The object of this and of many later reforms was to adapt parts of the system in order to preserve the fundamental framework (Rose 1964: 31).

Finally, in elaborating and testing our theories of revolution, we have great need of negative cases. In particular, we need cases in which we might have expected revolution to occur, but it did not. Such cases are valuable in the early stages of theorizing because they help us compare for crucial differences between superficially similar situations. They are valuable in testing established theories because a strong theory not only provides an intelligible account of the cases in which the effect in question occurs, but also predicts to the cases in which the effect does not occur. Britain of the 1820s and 1830s is a valuable negative case: pervasive social change, extensive conflict, widespread mobilization, no revolution. Why?

Here we need a distinction between revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes. Each is controversial in its own right, but the identification of the two is most controversial of all. To make things easier and more familiar, let us neglect "revolutions" which might occur in a single community, a region, a family, a firm or the world as a whole. A revolutionary situation, roughly speaking, is a time in which some significant segment of the population in a country is breaking with existing political procedures and making a serious challenge to the established
structure of power. This is a poor working definition. Every element is controversial: What is a "significant segment"? How much of a break with existing procedures, and how do we know which procedures count as existing? Whose perception of a "serious challenge" matters? All these doubts come to the surface when we consider whether a coup d'état in which forty colonels attempt to seize power is "revolutionary" or not. What about when one anarchist shoots one president? But that is the point: any trenchant working definition must cut through the controversy concerning the three main elements: 1) the significant segment of the population, 2) the break with existing political procedures, 3) the serious challenge to the established structure of power. These are standard problems in beginning any comparative political analysis, including historical analyses.

A revolutionary outcome is a significant alteration in the distribution of power within a country. Again the controversies cascade: How much alteration, and which kind is "significant"? How fast and/or visible must it be? What about a colony which gains independence. What about -- to return home to Britain -- an extension of the vote which ultimately has far-reaching effects on the distribution of power? A working definition must resolve these difficulties, while a general definition can languidly watch them proliferate.

The typology is nothing but a typology. Without working definitions of revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes (not to mention "none", "some" and "much"), it is not even much of a typology. Yet we have a great deal of theorizing about the relative frequencies with which the case in different cells of the table appear in real life. Crane Brinton, for example, implicitly argued that the table's ninth cell was empty: There was no such thing as a Great Revolution; every so-called revolution involving an extensively revolutionary situation, he said, eventually undid most of its accomplishments as moderates returned to power. Anarchists have sometimes offered the implicit argument that there is no such thing as rebellion, on the ground that if you can create a truly revolutionary situation -- such as the grand general strike advocated by Sorel -- the existing structure of power will inevitably crumple. Theda Skocpol argues, among other things, that the number of cases in the category "great revolution" is tiny as compared to the number in the category "rebellion", because the structural conditions for a thorough alteration of national power structures are so demanding and rare.

Our typology helps situate the debate about the revolutionary character of the Reform era in England. Some of the debate concerns the position of England on the horizontal dimension: How revolutionary was the outcome? How significant, that is, was the resulting alteration of the power structure? Gabriel Almond tells us that if we consider indirect consequences and the long run the answer is "much". Walter Arnstein, who portrays the British aristocracy as holding extensive power well into the twentieth century, implicitly replies, "At most, some."

Some of the debate concerns the vertical dimension: to what extent did a significant segment of the British population break with existing political procedures and make a serious challenge to the established structure of power? Michael Vester, for example, calls 1826 to 1832 a period in which working-class action solidified, and 1832 to 1834 the time of experiment with revolutionary syndicalism; that analysis implies a considerable break with politics as usual, a major challenge to the authorities. Joseph Hamburger, on the other hand, claims that the rhetoric of 1832 has duped subsequent historians into exaggerating the revolutionary potential.
of the time.

Now, that argument edges over into the third area of controversy: about the relationship between our two dimensions. For some of the disagreement concerns whether Great Britain could have produced as much political change as she did in the nineteenth century without a major challenge from the working class. To generalize outrageously: conservatives tend to argue that a revolutionary outcome occurred although (perhaps even because) no revolutionary situation ever emerged; radicals tend to argue that there was a serious revolutionary situation, but -- for reasons which are matters of dispute among radical historians -- the outcome was not very revolutionary. The disagreement about the facts of reform contains a disagreement about revolutionary processes in general.

Suppose we enter the great forest of models of revolutionary processes, looking for a tree on which we can hang the case of Great Britain in the 1830s. (We should not confuse it with Albion's Fatal Tree, which was William Blake's name for the gallows.) We have hundreds to choose from. A simple one comes from John Dunn's lucid, witty and historically-sophisticated treatment of twentieth-century revolutions. Dunn identifies three main conditions as essential to revolution in the modern era:

1. the presence of revolutionaries;
2. a failure of social control;
3. large-scale revolutionary mobilization.

None of these is as simple or as self-evident as appears at first glance. Much of the value of Dunn's analysis consists of showing in which ways the three are complex and problematic. For our purposes, however, it is enough to note that Dunn regards conditions 1 and 2 -- the presence of revolutionaries and the failure of social control -- as very common conditions in the

modern world, while the third condition, a large-scale revolutionary mobilization, is rare and difficult. The major historical problem, in his view, is therefore to specify the conditions under which revolutionaries mobilize widespread support for their position. Although Dunn is as subtle and tentative in this regard as in others, his chief suggestion is that revolutionary mobilization depends on the extent to which the revolutionary program corresponds visibly to the general population's own short-run definition of its pressing interests.

What would such an analysis make of Britain in 1832? It would give us three obvious tasks: to decide whether a significant set of the supporters of Reform qualified as revolutionaries committed to a project which would, if realized, give them political power and put it to the purpose of a distinctive social transformation; to see whether the Britain of that time had experienced more than the usual failure of social control; to determine whether mobilization around the available revolutionary project(s) had reached unusual levels. All these are inevitably comparative questions. They take us into comparing the Britain of that time with itself at other points in time, and with other countries at the same or different times. If the outcome of all three inquiries were yes -- yes to the presence of revolutionaries, yes to the failure of social control, yes to revolutionary mobilization -- that would cast doubt on the applicability of Dunn's analysis to nineteenth-century Europe, and perhaps cast doubt on its general validity. If, on the other hand, the score ran something like yes/yes/no or yes/no/yes, that would by no means constitute a strong confirmation of the analysis, but it could have two useful outcomes: a) to narrow our search for the specific historical conditions which separated Britain from a revolutionary seizure of power; b) to broaden our search for comparisons...
which would elucidate the special properties of Reform Britain and/or check the general validity of Dunn’s analysis. A conclusion that two of Dunn’s factors, or all three of them, were lacking would, unfortunately, give us less guidance as theorists or as researchers.

To try out another model of revolution, we might look at Peter Calvert’s treatment of the subject. After pointing out that one can also apply the word “revolution” to the process by which a state becomes discredited, a program of change contingent upon the seizure of power or the myth a group of powerholders forms concerning their acquisition of power, Calvert closes in on the revolutionary event. It is “a change of government (transition) at a clearly defined point in time by the use of armed force, or the credible threat of its use . . . ” (Calvert 1970: 4). Calvert’s main argument follows a classical political model: the balance of forces. If revolutionaries mobilize a force greater than the government can mobilize, the government falls. (For a subtle treatment of the theme that control of armed force -- and, especially, disloyalty of regular armed forces -- is critical to the success of modern revolutions, see Russell 1974.)

Figure 5 schematizes the balance-of-forces part of Calvert’s analysis. It immediately raises new problems. The most obvious are a) deciding who are the government and who the revolutionaries; b) estimating the forces controlled by government and by revolutionaries, as well as the equivalencies between them; c) stating what determines the willingness and effectiveness of either side in the use of its available force; d) identifying the determinants of how much force either side has available in the first place. Calvert deals with the problem of identifying government and the revolutionaries by working out from transfers of power from one group...
to another, and situations which come close to such transfers; the revolutionaries are simply the newcomers. Calvert sums up the available forces as \( \text{Bm}^2 \) and \( \text{Rn}^2 \), where \( m \) is governmental military manpower, \( n \) is revolutionary military manpower, and \( B \) and \( R \) are empirically-estimated variables associated with the tactics of the two kinds of adversaries. As determinants, Calvert emphasizes the relative importance of civilians and military personnel among the revolutionaries and the extent of outside aid for either side. Thus his analysis clearly focuses on 1) the short-run determinants of revolutionary outcomes rather than on 2) short-run determinants of revolutionary situations or 3) long-run determinants of either one.

In order to apply Calvert's model to nineteenth-century Britain at all, we have to alter it considerably. Yet the alteration is not difficult or implausible. Despite its military trappings, the model is actually quite a familiar portrayal of revolution. Its central proposition runs: if the organized opponents of a regime have enough force at their disposal, they will strike against the regime; if that force is superior to the force the regime can bring to bear, those opponents will seize power. In the nineteenth-century context (and, I would argue, in Calvert's twentieth-century context as well) we have to consider a wider range of resources than military force alone. Information, the availability of participants for demonstrations and strikes, accumulated funds all matter. With an enlarged view of the relevant resources, the model becomes a more plausible portrayal of the conditions for a revolutionary outcome, given a revolutionary situation. It is still not a very plausible model of the conditions for a revolutionary situation.

In order to make the junction between Calvert's model and the Reform crisis, we have first to decide whether Reform is a relevant case:

whether an organized opposition attempted to use force to effect a transfer of power. We have already seen that the question is controversial. In this case the answer is: probably not. But the confrontation of case and model clarifies both the one and the other.

We have seen, then, that a rich, important series of events such as the conflicts surrounding Reform in Britain articulates usefully with a considerable range of political analyses designed to deal with processes still going on in the contemporary world. Historical cases serve as standards, as sources for hypotheses, as negative or positive tests for purportedly general models of political processes.

The General Relevance of History

The point is much more general. British events and evidence from the 1830s are relevant to a wide variety of contemporary political concerns. They present challenges to a wide variety of currently available models of political behavior. The events and evidence are accessible to today's students of political behavior. And the same is true for a wealth of other historical experience. Although the points of contact with contemporary concerns would vary, we could go through the same sort of review of the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the German Peasant War of 1525 or the decline of the Roman Republic. All history is grist for our mill.

If we become generous in our definition of history, that dictum becomes a truism. Last week's Congressional hearings and yesterday's opinion polls are already history by the time we get around to analyzing them. By a more modest definition, however, history stops where the personal memories of living people begin. That rule of thumb does not define a precise limit, but a slope; the slope begins with the oldest living person's jumbled recollections of childhood and ends with yesterday's
forgotten trivia. Beyond that slope, we have only the traces the events left behind: the buildings, tools, landscapes, skeletons, fossils, artifacts and, especially, the writings. For if historians attempt to interpret all these traces of previous human activity, they specialize in the interpretation of written documents. At the center of historical work lies the attempt to reconstruct human experience before the personal memories of living people from the written traces of that experience.

Historians often venture out from that center. Some move over into archeology, reconstructing human experience from house types, pots, tools, coins, graffiti and midden heaps. Others undertake the oral history of the recent past, tape-recording the testimonies of survivors. In some branches of history, buildings, machines, paintings, animals, plants, tools or languages become the principal objects of study; the people who built, invented, painted, domesticated, cultivated, manipulated and spoke them are secondary. A Journal of Contemporary History publishes articles of great interest to students of current political behavior. My own inquiries into political processes run right up to the present. Nevertheless the central terrain of history and historians consists of the written traces of human experiences which are beyond the reach of living people's active memories.

Let us bring an important distinction into the open. It is the distinction between historical material and historical analysis. The material we might use to study political behavior is historical to the extent that it consists of reliable traces of past behavior. The standard historical materials are written records. The correspondence of Abraham Lincoln is obviously historical material which we can use for the study of political behavior. The observations we make this year as direct participants in an election campaign are not very historical -- although we could make them more historical by recording them as notes and storing them for a while.

An analysis is historical, on the other hand, to the extent that it is attached to some specific past place and time, or to some specific set of past places and times. We might imagine a continuum running from analyses which have no time-place limits whatsoever, at the one extreme, to analyses which are limited entirely to a specific time and place at the other:

\[
\text{relatively unhistorical} \quad \text{relatively historical}
\]

\| NO TIME-SPACE LIMITS | TIME-PLACE SPECIFIC |
---|---|

In political analysis, theories of coalition structure are usually rather unhistorical: they are supposed to apply in all sorts of times and places; the character of the time and place is not supposed to affect their operation significantly. Theories of electoral behavior, in contrast, are usually rather historical: at a minimum they allow for significant differences between modern industrial countries and all their predecessors.

It is possible to use historical material in analyses which are not very historical. For example, we might attempt to test a theory of coalition structure with evidence drawn from the writings of ancient Greece, Ch'ing China and Nazi Germany. Greece, China and Germany would simply be convenient sources of data. It is also possible to use non-historical material in analyses which are quite historical. For example, we might try to test a theory about the special character of post-industrial politics in western countries by interviewing political activists. The analysis builds in space-time constraints, but the material comes from current observation.
There is nevertheless a broad correlation between the utility of historical analysis of a given problem and the utility of historical material in that analysis. For some problems, neither historical material nor historical analyses are particularly advantageous. A case in point is the study of small-group dynamics in politics -- the fine interpersonal processes which produce a jury's verdict or a committee's recommendation. If we knew enough about England's Reform agitation of 1831-32, we would undoubtedly find such processes at work in Parliamentary maneuvering and the formation of pressure groups. But on the whole, historical sources contain only sparse information about those processes. Furthermore, we have no compelling reason to build time and place restrictions into our theories of small-group political dynamics. On both counts, it is a mainly non-historical problem.

The study of statemaking stands at the other extreme. If we are trying to understand how national states come into being and gain strength, the great bulk of the usable evidence is historical. It consists of the documentary residue of past statemaking activity -- administrative correspondence, tax records, military recruitment files and the like. If we had been on the spot in 1832, we could no doubt have put aside our Morning Chronicles to go out and observe or interview. Even in 1832 we would very likely have wanted to fortify our understanding of the statemaking process then proceeding in Britain by looking back to the evidence concerning 1812, 1795 or earlier. The necessary evidence about statemaking is spread over time. No matter where we start, the time spans take us into history. Furthermore, the analysis itself can hardly escape being historical. At a bare minimum, for example, any useful theory of statemaking has to distinguish between the initial situations of the old states of western Europe and the new states of post-colonial Africa.

Figure 6 sums up the broad correlation between the utility of historical material and the utility of historical analysis. The diagram indicates that there are no cases in which historical analysis is highly useful but historical material useless. Nor are there any cases in which historical material is highly useful but historical analysis useless; all real problems fall into the oblong. The diagram claims that if you are trying to analyze small-group dynamics you are not likely to gain much from using historical materials and historical analyses. Revolution and statemaking lie at the other end of the oblong. In those problems, you will gain great advantages by setting up your inquiry with both historical materials and historical analyses.

The diagram places two other problems in intermediate positions: the study of mobilization and the study of determinants of individual voting. In the case of mobilization, historical material has the advantage of making long time-lines possible. The advantage is slightly tempered by the difficulty of documenting the attitudes, beliefs, and motives involved. With respect to mobilization the advantages of historical analysis are more mixed; a case can be made for considering mobilization as a process which operates in the same general way in all times and places. When it comes to the determinants of individual voting, historical material has the advantage of making a wide variety of observations available. It has the disadvantage, however, of rarely yielding much information about the particular voter and the immediate context of his or her voting decision.

The conditions in which historical material and historical analysis are advantageous for students of political behavior therefore overlap, but are not identical. In very general terms, historical material is
especially likely to be useful to political analysis when one or more of these things is true:

1. You need to establish some distance between yourself and the subject, because the current versions of the political process are so controversial. Example: movements of national liberation.

2. The range of cases available for observation in the contemporary world is narrow, either because the phenomenon is rare or because some important conditions for variation in the phenomenon are rare. Example: revolution.

3. The process works slowly and/or over a long period of time, and you want to observe both early and late phases of the process in the same social unit. Example: political consequences of industrialization.

4. The argument you are working with is explicitly time-bound -- for example, makes an important distinction between political processes before and after a world war. Example: statemaking before and after 1945.

These are common circumstances in political analysis. Where they apply, you are unlikely to get very far without digging into history.

The conditions for the utility of historical analysis are a bit more complex. In one of the cases just mentioned, you might very well conduct a relatively unhistorical analysis: for example, combine movements of national liberation from the past and the present into a test of a general argument concerning the structural conditions for such movements.
An historical analysis attaches itself explicitly to some specific past place and time, or to some specific set of past places and times. Black's analysis of modernization, which we looked at earlier, is relatively historical in two regards. First, it deliberately distinguishes major patterns grouping sets of related countries which underwent the same general political experiences during the same historical eras. Second, it builds in the idea that when something happened made a difference to how it happened: as firstcomers, for instance, France and England faced a much more open environment than their successors, who already had models of modernization before them.

Broadly speaking, we can place standard analyses of political processes along a continuum of historical specificity like the one we considered before:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>GENERAL</th>
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<th>DEVELOPMENTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>CONCEPT</td>
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<td>ANALYSIS</td>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
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<tr>
<td>no time/place limits -----------------+ time/place specific</td>
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General concepts such as "power" and "political culture" are supposed to apply over a wide range of times and places. Even if the cases come from the past, there is nothing particularly historical about an analysis which shows that one can use the same concept fruitfully in a number of different settings. The attempt to apply an apparently general concept to historical cases is often edifying, since it often reveals ways in which the concept is time- or culture-bound. The concept of revolution, to take one we have already discussed, turns out to be very hard to apply outside the historical range of relatively centralized national states.

Nevertheless, the application of general concepts to cases, whether historical or contemporary, is on the whole an unhistorical enterprise.

Functional analyses are likewise generally rather unhistorical. Functional theories state what other conditions must obtain if a given condition is to appear. The requisite conditions need not be internal to the unit being analyzed; they may have something to do with its environment. Some people argue, for example, that the labor force of a poor region will not become highly skilled unless the region develops mass education, installs substantial wage incentives for skilled positions, and imports both capital and technology. Such a theory predicts a relationship between educational levels, wage differentials and flows of capital and technology, on the one hand, and labor-force characteristics on the other. It does not really specify the process, or even the sequence, by which a change from low to high levels of skill occurs.

Now, mass education, wage incentives and so on are historically specific: they have been absent from most of world history. But the theory, in its simplest form, says that wherever and whenever the critical conditions did appear, a skilled labor force would tend to form. Time and place do not figure in the theory itself. Nor need they figure in the analysis to test the theory. We might well try to learn whether to the extent that education, wage incentives, capital concentration and high-energy technology grew in the past, skilled labor tended to form. The evidence might well be historical, but the form of the analysis would still be essentially functional.

Developmental theories describe some standard process of transformation to which all social units of some type -- societies, regions, organizations or something else -- are subject as a consequence of forces which are internal to those social units. Developmental theories commonly
(but not necessarily) posit standard stages. Sometimes, in fact, they consist of little more than an enumeration of stages. They also commonly (but not necessarily) identify a single underlying factor as fundamental to the change in all the others: the accumulation of wealth, the economizing of space, and so on. Developmental theories of economic growth, for example, have often proposed a standard sequence (which may or may not fall into sharply-delineated stages) through which national production or national income rises as a consequence of changing patterns of investment, the diffusion of new technology, etc. As Sidney Pollard says, "... we have tended to treat each country like a plant in a separate flower pot, growing independently into a recognizable industrialized society according to a genetic code wholly contained in its seed" (Pollard 1973: 636):

The recent literature on large-scale political change has abounded with stage and sequence theories in which democratization, political participation, stabilization or, more vaguely, political development follow similar paths in country after country. The idea of "modernization" belongs mainly in this category, but as an agenda rather than as a well-defined theory. The agenda is to find some master process to which economic development, political development, urbanization and other presumably desirable changes all belong.

Many ostensibly developmental analyses which examine large numbers of areas at the same point in time in order to identify the correlates of industrialism, urbanism, high literacy or other characteristics of "modernity" are actually functional in approach. Functional theories of large-scale change do, however, generally imply that a cluster of variables change together. They may, furthermore, specify standard lags within the cluster: e.g. that changes in investment come first, then changes in education, then changes in labor force characteristics. The more fully these lags are specified, the more the functional theory turns into a developmental theory.

Historical theories account for the characteristics and changes of particular social units through their relationship to some historical transformation affecting a larger set of units simultaneously. At the limit, the "larger set of units" is the world as a whole. There is a version of the theory of industrialization, for example, which (in caricature) considers the industrial revolution to have been the development of a set of technical solutions to longstanding problems, seen those problems as common to all countries which are at risk to industrialization, treats the set of solutions as spreading from its initial base (England being the standard nominee) to the rest of the world at varying rates of speed, and has people in other parts of the world adding new solutions to the net, which continues to diffuse as a single complex. Thus the position of any particular household, community, region or country in the process of industrialization is supposed to depend mainly on the communications lines linking it to the centers of diffusion, its own receptivity to the changes being disseminated, and most likely the accumulation of some set of material and organizational prerequisites. (The inclusion of prerequisites, however, adds a functionalist edge to the historical argument.)

There are similar theories for the diffusion of democratic government, urban styles of life and, for that matter, military techniques. But not all historical theories of large-scale change rely on diffusion as the central mechanism. A number of notions of economic growth, for instance, consider the existing world division of production and of markets to constrain strongly the markets and branches of production which any newcomer can enter. The most coherent non-diffusionist theories today are no doubt theories of international dependency and of the growth of the capitalist world-economy. Both of them draw a good deal of their inspiration from Lenin's
version of Marxist historical analysis.

The most historical form of analysis on our continuum is not, strictly speaking, an analysis at all. It is an historical description which is specific to a particular time and place. Political analysts find themselves doing specific historical descriptions for several reasons. First, particular events sometimes figure importantly in historical, developmental or even functional analyses; they sometimes even serve as the test cases for general concepts such as revolution. The British Reform crisis figures so widely in political analysis, as we have seen, that getting the description of Reform right is in itself a significant contribution to political analysis. Second, before we know whether an event, group or process from the past is a relevant case for analysis, we commonly have to do some careful description. We saw what was involved in deciding whether Reform was relevant negative case for a theory of revolution. Finally, a benefit about which this essay has said far too little: as a way of acquiring insight, formulating hypotheses and developing a research strategy for dealing with a particular political process, nothing beats a serious effort to study the working out of that process in a well-documented historical instance. To be sure, the study will be more fruitful if you begin with well-defined questions and some sense of the available concepts and theories. But a major part of the effort will go into getting the description right. The past is there, the past is relevant, the materials are rich, the opportunities for effective political analysis are unlimited.

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General Note: As I sat down to plan this essay, I faced an interesting choice. I could concentrate on a small cluster of historical problems and settings, and discuss them at length. I could make the discussion more coherent by emphasizing familiar events and authors, by avoiding the technical difficulties of modeling and measurement. That approach would give an idea of the interplay of models, methods and materials, a sense of the richness and complexity of the historical record, an intimation of the value of acquiring a working knowledge of the historical context before snipping "cases" and "data" out of it. But I also had a second choice. I could range widely over contrasting topics, techniques and time-periods. I could identify new research and fresh ways of analyzing the evidence. Either choice had much to recommend it. Either choice had visible disadvantages. Rejecting a compromise and despairing of a synthesis, I finally took the first choice: extended discussion of a relatively narrow range of problems, relying mainly on familiar examples. This bibliography compensates for that choice. In addition to the items mentioned in the essay and a number of background items for the topics the essay takes up, it includes many examples of recent historical research which are remote from the essay's subjects, but relevant to the contemporary analysis of political behavior. Because of my own uneven knowledge, the list emphasizes modern western Europe and studies of conflict. I have, however, also tucked in an especially large set of references to America in the period of the Revolution. That should provide a nucleus of documentation for a set of
changes which readers may find interesting to compare with Reform in Britain. Finally, the list also includes some surveys of historical materials and research. For these reasons, the bibliography is longer and more diverse than my essay would lead you to expect.

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