
REPRESSIVE STRATEGIES AND WORKING CLASS

PROTEST IN LYON, 1848-1852

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Much of political sociology has its roots in the history of the French revolution of 1848. Between the collapse of the July Monarchy in February, 1848 and the proclamation of the Second Empire in December, 1852, powerful factions vied for control over the state. The outcomes were uncertain until the coup d'etat of December, 1851 ended the Second Republic and secured the control of the Bonapartist party. Generations of analysts would carry on the debates of contemporaries over the failure of the working class to take state power in the months following the February Revolution.

Among contemporary interpretations, the most enduring was offered by Karl Marx. In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1963), Marx traced the shifting coalitions of class actors against the background of events which culminated in the demobilization of the democratic-socialist movement and the coup d'etat. For Marx, the revolution was the work of a coalition among the urban proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie, and the progressive fraction of the bourgeoisie. As the revolutionary leadership failed to expand its program or its power, the coalition began to disintegrate and the workers and the bourgeois fought for control over the national government. A conservative coalition of rural notables and bourgeois backed Bonaparte's effort to demobilize the democratic-socialist movement which voiced the interests of the working-class and the propertyless in the city and the countryside.

The demobilization of the democratic-socialist movement played a secondary role to interests, organization, and the formation of coalitions among classes in Marx's account. Much of the historical literature on the revolution accepts the broad outlines of Marx's interpretation of the failure

of the working class political movement in 1848. However, recent work on the Second Republic shifts the balance and gives new weight to the success of the authorities in destroying the working class movement (Merriman, 1978). As the democratic-socialists mobilized to take control of the national government, the authorities mounted an extensive program of counter-mobilization. The coup d'etat was the final act in their long struggle to crush the opposition.

Mobilization, repression, and demobilization summarize the history of the working class movement in Lyon. The center of French silk manufacture since the sixteenth century, Lyon had a long history of class conflict (Bezucha, 1974). The months following the February Revolution of 1848 brought a massive political mobilization. With the introduction of manhood suffrage and new guarantees of the rights of press, of assembly, and of association, working-class political activism reached levels unseen since the silkworkers' revolts which rocked the city in 1831 and 1834. Led by the prefect and the political police, the authorities attacked working class organizations in general and the democratic-socialist movement in particular. Working to outmaneuver the opposition, they tried to deliver the population to the party of order. The revolutionary enthusiasm of early 1848 gave way to the relative quiescence of the working class movement under the early empire.

This paper describes the political struggles which followed the February Revolution and the ways by which the forces of order consolidated state power. Changes in repressive strategies were central to their success. The intensification of preemptive tactics relative to responsive tactics characterized the shift in strategy. We analyze the set of changes which explain the shift toward preemptive tactics. Political process models argue that changes in the mobilization of the authorities and the challengers shape repressive strategies

(Tilly, 1978). This paper argues that changes in the circumstances of conflict between the authorities and the democratic-socialists in Lyon explain the intensification of preemptive tactics.

Repressive strategies refer to the overall game plan of the authorities in dealing with groups which challenge state power. These strategies involve a variety of tactics or specific types of action directed against the personnel and activities of protest groups. At any point in time, a government's repressive strategy is the set of all tactics currently in use to demobilize the opposition.

Standard treatments of repression do not distinguish between repressive tactics. Criticizing their unidimensional characterization of repression, David Snyder (1976) proposes a multiple-form approach which takes into account the timing of government coercion and the extent of violence employed by official forces. His scheme maps four forms of government coercion: first, preemptive nonviolent actions which primarily include restrictions on civil liberties such as freedoms of assembly, association, or the press; second, responsive nonviolent actions which include tactics of containment and persuasion such as the show of force directed toward mass gatherings; third, preemptive violent actions such as arrest or attacks directed against groups which are mobilized but are not acting collectively; fourth, responsive violent actions which include various forms of violence directed against collective actors. The multiple-forms approach locates tactics within the general framework of repressive strategy. Timing and the use of violence distinguish forms of repression. The analysis presented here pays special attention to the timing of repressive activities. Preemptive and responsive tactics differentiate between repression applied to groups in the process of mobilization and repression applied to groups which are acting collectively. The preponderance of preemptive tactics indicates a

preemptive strategy; the preponderance of responsive tactics demonstrates a responsive strategy.

Our interpretation builds on the work of two French historians, Howard Payne and John Merriman. In The Police State of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte (1966), Howard Payne adopts a portion of our agenda. Payne analyzes the legal and organizational dynamics which underly the Bonapartist police state. Payne claims that Bonaparte and his ministers adopted a two-pronged strategy. Broadening the definition of "public order" to include all activities which might give rise to anti-government sentiment or activity among the population, they expanded police powers into every aspect of public life. Seeking to consolidate control over policing, they enlarged the police apparatus of the national state and exercised greater authority over local police forces. Through massive commitments of money and manpower and legislation which broadened police powers, the national government increased the capacity and sphere of influence of the chief agents of political repression in France: the prefects, the magistrates, the police, and the army.

John Merriman's The Agony of the Republic locates the roots of the Bonapartist police state in the repression of the democratic-socialist movement during the Second Republic. While Payne concentrates on the organization of the repressive apparatus, Merriman emphasizes its impact on working class political mobilization. Merriman uses intensive studies of five départements to complement a national account of the repression of working class social and political organizations, the republican press, and the leadership of the democratic-socialist movement. While the book does not examine variations in the strength and effectiveness of repression, it demonstrates that the wide range of repressive activities contributed substantially to the demobilization of the democratic-socialists and working class politics throughout France.

While Payne and Merriman call attention to the organization of the repressive apparatus and its impact on the democratic-socialist movement, they stop short of explaining the determinants of repressive action. Nevertheless, their interpretations provide important starting points for the analysis of changes in the forms of repression. Changes in the organization of the repressive apparatus expanded the range of repressive tactics available to the authorities. The impact of repression on the democratic-socialist movement influenced the formulation of repressive strategies. Shifts in the balance of power between the national government and the opposition played an important role. Finally, the circumstances of the revolution, especially the extension of the suffrage and the experience of working class political mobilization, changed the context of the struggle between the state and the democratic-socialists. These factors are important parts of the explanation for the intensification of preemptive tactics relative to responsive tactics.

In conventional treatments, repression has been identified with the authorities and mobilization with groups which challenge state power (For a review of these accounts, see Snyder, 1976). The political process perspective suggests that repression and mobilization are cut from the same theoretical cloth. Repression and mobilization are part of the same process of political conflict. Political process theorists adopt the Marxian perspective of examining interests, organization, formation of coalitions, and activities in the analysis of repression by the state. An introduction to the political process perspective lays the groundwork for an historical analysis of the conflict between the central police force of Lyon and the democratic-socialists who provided leadership to large sections of the city's working class.

Charles Tilly's From Mobilization to Revolution (1978) provides the basis

for our examination of repression within the context of a political process perspective. Tilly describes political conflict as the continuous process of contention for power among groups which mobilize resources for political action. Mobilization is the process of acquiring new resources or increasing control over existing resources. Resources conventionally refer to labor and capital, but the term can be generalized to cover the entire range of goods and services used to carry out political work. Mobilization is largely a function of the extent of organization of a group. Collective action refers to a group's joint action in pursuit of common ends. The extent of mobilization of a group measures its control over resources and indexes its capacity to act. Collective action describes activities which apply the group's accumulated resources to some end. Opportunity or the incentive to act mediates the linkage between mobilization and collective action.

Both mobilization and collective action involve some costs on the part of a group. Repression refers to any action by another group which raises the cost of mobilization or collective action. Conversely, facilitation refers to any action which lowers the cost of mobilization or collective action. Political repression and facilitation refer specifically to the actions of governments.

Repressive strategies practiced by the authorities involve elements of repression and facilitation. Standard treatments of repression ignore facilitation and limit the meaning of repression to coercive action. Coercive action directly reduces a group's level of mobilization and/or collective action. However, repressive tactics often influence protest groups indirectly. Authorities frequently raise the costs of mobilization and collective action to challenging groups by facilitating the mobilization of groups which support the government or pose no apparent threat to its interests. By facilitating the mobilization of loyal or neutral organizations, governments increase the

relative costs of acquiring new members and thereby raise the cost of mobilization to challenging groups. Determining how and how much repression and facilitation alter the schedule of costs and benefits of mobilization and collective action is central to the analysis.

The mobilization of the authorities involves the elements of capacity, opportunity, and interaction with other groups. Capacity refers to the ability to act; opportunity to the incentives to act. Standard treatments often do not distinguish between these factors. They confound measures of capacity such as the number of troops under the control of the authorities or the size of police budgets with measures of repressive action such as the number of military interventions into civil strife or the number of arrests for political purposes (Snyder, 1976). The political process perspective suggests that repressive potential and repressive action should be separate elements of our analysis. Repressive potential refers to the threat of force or sanction. Repressive action refers to the application of force or sanction.

The archives tell us a great deal about the application of force. Much of the business of state involves keeping careful records of its repressive activities. Records of the character and consequences of repressive action abound. Arrest reports, police logs, judicial records, newspaper articles, descriptions by observers, and routine correspondence between the authorities provide a firm ground for interpretation.

The archives tell us very little about the threat of force or its impact on the activities of challengers. We should bear in mind that the records of the repressive agencies provide an indirect account of changes in the mobilization of the challengers. If we consider threat as a product of the interaction between authorities and challengers, the evidence on repressive activities can be read as a measure of the extent of threat posed by the

authorities. In the analysis, we assume that challengers interpret the threat of repression on the basis of their accumulated experience with the authorities. The method sets threat squarely within a historical context in which actors perceive the likelihood of repression as a function of its application in the past.

Many treatments of repression ignore the division of labor among repressive agencies. Governments generally parcel out their repressive work among several agencies which specialize in the application of different types of repression. The political process perspective suggests that the organization of the repressive forces matters as much or more than the total amount of resources under their control. A group's organization sets limits on its mobilization and collective action (Tilly, 1978: 87). The amount of coordination among the repressive agencies is crucial. Large numbers of political arrests produce little return for the authorities if judges fail to prosecute or juries fail to convict. Surveillance of groups which are in the process of mobilizing for collective action is ineffectual if the police cannot draw manpower from agencies like the military which specialize in crowd control. Conflicts among civil, military, and judicial authorities produce a net loss in the efficacy of repressive action; cooperation yields a net gain. The effectiveness of repression depends on the amount of coordination among the repressive forces relative to their combined control over resources. States which seek to increase the capacity of the repressive forces choose between increasing their control over resources or strengthening the coalition among the repressive forces.

Opportunity stands between capacity and repressive action. In addition to capacity, the political circumstances faced by the authorities influence the forms and extent of repressive action. Guarantees of civil liberties set limits on the forms and targets of repression. Jurisdictional boundaries set limits on the geographical range of repressive action. To be sure, authorities

routinely ignore these limitations in their work. Nevertheless, they represent de jure constraints which raise the costs of various tactics to the authorities. For the challengers, limitations on repressive action extend the range of action. In France, the national legislature regulated the rights of citizens and the responsibilities of the police. The revolution changed the political rules which governed the acquisition and application of resources by the forces of order. Policies set in Paris shaped the repressive strategies of local authorities. Limitations on the opportunity of the authorities influence selection of repressive strategies.

Interaction between the authorities and challengers influences the balance between responsive and preemptive strategies. Changes in the relative power of the authorities and the challengers shift the balance between responsive and preemptive strategies. Changes in the relative power of these groups are often the result of repression itself. As the state marshals its forces to raise the costs of mobilization and collective action, challengers turn to less visible and less vulnerable forms of mobilization. The political club gives way to the secret society, the political banquet to the back room of the cafe. Dynamic models must take into account the prior effects of repression on the current state of mobilization by the authorities and challengers. Interaction gives the authorities experience with repressive strategies which shape their strategies in future conflicts.

Interactions over time between the authorities and protest groups make historical analysis crucial. Moreover, we rely on historical analysis to clarify the larger political context which underlies changes in repressive strategies. Let's step aside from the theoretical discussion to consider the historical circumstances which favor the intensification of preemptive tactics. The increasing centralization of political power in the national state under the Second Republic and the Second Empire lay behind the shift in

repressive strategies. The centralization of political power brought large increases in the resources of the national government and strengthened the coalition among the repressive forces. When organizations expand their control over resources and increase coordination, they can implement a much wider range of repressive tactics. Why then did the authorities favor preemptive actions?

Repressive actions directed against groups which are mobilizing often involve much lower costs and greater possibilities for deterrence than actions directed against groups which are engaged in collective action.

Charles Tilly elaborates the argument:

From a government's point of view, raising the costs of mobilization is a more reliable repressive strategy than raising the costs of collective action alone. The anti-mobilization strategy neutralizes the actor as well as the action, and makes it less likely that the actor will be able to act rapidly when the government suddenly becomes vulnerable, a new coalition partner arises, or something else quickly shifts the probable costs and benefits of collective action. Raising the costs of collective action alters the pattern of effective demand from mobilized groups, while raising the costs of mobilization reduces demand across the board (100-101).

Responsive tactics include activities directed against particular groups which are acting collectively. Preemptive tactics refer to activities which impede mobilization. Preemptive tactics include actions directed against particular groups and actions which alter the environment in

which all groups mobilize for political purposes. Revolutions alter the relative power of contenders and increase the opportunities for political mobilization. After 1848, the expansion of the suffrage and the experience of working class organization lowered the cost of mobilization. Preemptive strategies are especially appealing to governments bent on consolidating their power. They constrain the mobilization of existing challengers and facilitate the detection and deterrence of potential challengers. The suppression of working class organizations disrupts the bases of political mobilization. Surveillance of the population allows the authorities to outmaneuver the opposition by taking soundings on the mood of their potential supporters. Creating an environment which facilitates the work of the police is central to preemptive strategies.

Our discussion covers a great deal of theoretical ground. The political process perspective falls for a research program which is far too grand for a short paper. The historical account takes a modest slice of time and of France in which to apply the perspective. We focus on the conflict between the central police force and the democratic-socialist movement in Lyon during the years between the February Revolution and the proclamation of the Second Empire. We examine the relationship between the mobilization of the authorities and the working class and changes in repressive strategies. We scrutinize changes in the capacity and opportunity of the police and the democratic-socialists, follow their interactions, and try to explain the intensification of preemptive strategies relative to responsive strategies of repression.

Before the February Revolution, the repression of working class politics rested on the enforcement of legislative restrictions on the rights of association and the disenfranchisement of most workers (MacDougall, 1974: 164-244). The revolution brought new rights of association, of assembly, and of the press. In addition, the introduction of manhood suffrage, although circumscribed by restrictive qualifications introduced by the law of May 31, 1850, conferred the franchise on the majority of workers. The experience of politicization and organization during the early months of the Republic provided new opportunities to the democratic-socialist movement and made workers aware of the possibilities of political action.

These circumstances enormously complicated the workings of the repressive apparatus. The politicization and organization of the population overwhelmed the capacity of the authorities for surveillance and control of associations which challenged the policies of the national government. In Lyon, the policing of hostile political associations involved a variety of agencies whose concerted actions defined repressive strategies. The police, the courts, the military, and top administrative officials were all empowered to act against the working class movement. While this account focuses on the activities of the central police force in Lyon, it recognizes the interdependence of specialized agencies which formed the repressive apparatus.

Relative to the size of the politically active working class population, the police were a small force whose political branch specialized in surveillance, strategic planning for the Prefecture, and coercive activities such as political arrests. They relied on the army to suppress large gatherings and on local representatives of the Ministry of Justice to prosecute activists.

The police repeatedly complained that the budget for their political branch was insufficient and appealed to national officials for special subsidies (AML I¹ 2-B: 136). While the central police force played a pivotal role in the work of repression, the size of police budgets or manpower represents only a small portion of the total capacity of the repressive forces. The strength of repressive forces depended on character of the coalition among administrative, judicial, and military authorities who carried out the work of political repression. The extent of coordination and mutual support among these repressive agencies is a more accurate representation of the repressive capacity of the authorities.

Changes in the capacity of the authorities and their interest in adapting to new political circumstances promoted the intensification of preemptive strategies relative to responsive strategies. However, new forms of mobilization by the democratic socialists were more fundamental in explaining changes in repression. Interaction between the authorities and the challengers effected their relative power, their propensity to act collectively, and their choice of forms of action. The conflict between the political branch of the central police force and Lyon's democratic-socialists demonstrates the importance of studying interaction and provides the focus of our account.

Organized after the Lyon silkwormers' insurrection of 1834, the police politique were charged with the surveillance of working class organizations and the repression of political movements among the population (AML, I² 41: Rapport du Commissaire Spécial de la Police Politique, 17 juillet 1852). They spearheaded the attack on working class political mobilization and played a pivotal role in the formulation of repressive strategies. After 1848, their chief opponents were the democratic-socialists, the largest and most

prominent of the groups which sought to mobilize the working class of Lyon.

Not a mass political party, the democratic-socialists were a coalition of leftists of various political opinions who advanced a remarkably coherent and consistent social program based on the belief that the democratic republic should become "social" by moving to resolve the "social question." The social question encompassed more than just the relatively miserable condition of the laboring classes, urban and rural. The February revolution dramatically posed the question, which had developed during the July Monarchy, of the place of workers in relationship to the ownership of the means of production and in France's national political life (Merriman, 1978: xx).

In Lyon, the democratic-socialist coalition united a large body of artisans engaged in silkweaving and other forms of household production, a number of small retailers (petits commerçants), and a handful of members of the liberal professions. The coalition had its origins in the activities of artisans and liberal bourgeois to secure political rights and ensure the economic well-being of silkweavers. Under the July Monarchy, their efforts to develop durable forms of organization for economic and political purposes were checked by constraints on the rights of association. While consumer cooperatives and mutual aid societies proliferated, their membership operated under the threat of stiff sanctions if they engaged in political activities. Their finances and activities were subject to constant scrutiny by the police. Political action was largely confined to secret societies formed among co-workers, members of religious confraternities, and habitués of neighborhood cafes

(MacDougall, 1974; AN BB³⁰ 379: Rapport du Procureur-Général au Ministère de la Justice, 2 juin 1851).

In February and March 1848, the government expanded the rights of association. The democratic-socialists recognized the opportunity and focused their energies on mobilization of the working class for the democratic and social republic. Their success in the early months of the revolution brought changes in the repressive actions of the authorities. Between the February Revolution and the proclamation of the Second Empire, changes in repressive strategies distinguish three shorter periods. For each period, the account examines the relationship between the capacity and circumstances of the central police force and their repressive strategies. It models interaction by looking at the effects of these strategies on the forms of organization available for democratic-socialist political action.

Table 1 about here

These relationships are schematized in Table 1. Repressive capacity refers to the extent of coordination and mutual support between the central police force and other repressive actors. The key political circumstances are identified as the extent of legal authority to act against working-class associations and the extent of police jurisdiction over local areas in Lyon. Legal authority describes constraints on police action against political associations which were imposed by official guarantees of the rights of assembly and association. Jurisdiction refers to legal limits on the extent of policing by the central police force within the independent municipalities of the Lyon metropolis. Differences in the character of these factors distinguish each period.

The first period covers the sixteen months between the February Revolution and the Lyon insurrection of June 1849. The February Revolution opened avenues for political participation and organization which had been closed to the bulk of the population under the July Monarchy. Charles Tilly and Lynn Lees note the appearance of

a newly mobilised population responding to a changed political climate. For the first time in decades the government permitted men to write, to assemble, and most important of all, to organise with complete freedom. The political life that Orleanists had tried so hard to limit to the juste milieu now extended to the entire population

(1975: 179).

In Lyon, manhood suffrage opened national and local politics to workers who had previously stood outside the political process. On January 15, 1848, Lyon officials counted 4,954 voters among a population of 161,763. Under the liberalized suffrage qualifications, the list had grown to 43,595 by April, 1848. Elections of representatives to the Constituent Assembly and of members of the municipal councils provided the democratic-socialists with the opportunity to elect candidates sympathetic to working class interests. Electoral committees became an important vehicle of working class mobilization. For example, the predominately working class Central Democratic Club represented one hundred and forty four political clubs and workers' corporations in the electoral campaign of April, 1848. Lyon workers made new claims on the government which in the early months of the Second Republic seemed to promise a solution to the "social question." The proclamation of the workers' right to associate in February, 1848 brought demands to organize cooperatives of

production and a wave of strikes (MacDougall, 1974: 257-275, 321-337; Dutacq, 1910: 91-349; Annuaire de Lyon, II^e partie, 1849).

In the early months of the Republic, workers' political and economic organizations were tolerated by the authorities. The guarantees of the rights of association limited police authority over these organizations. Police activities were also limited by the fragmented political geography of the city. In the faubourgs, the politically autonomous communes which surrounded the city of Lyon, the central police commissioner received little support from local police. In these areas and in certain silkweavers' neighborhoods of the central city, paramilitary organizations took over policing. Their activities were condoned and sometimes encouraged by officials of the early Republic. In the silkweaving town of the Croix-Rousse, the police commissioner provided food and tobacco at municipal expense to the most prominent of these paramilitary groups, the Voraces, which had originated in a drinking society among journeymen silkweavers. The Voraces and other paramilitary organizations used policing as a tool for political action. They disarmed suspected opponents of the Republic, protected workers from arrest by the central police commissioner, and pressured judicial officials to drop charges against workers accused of machine-breaking. In June, 1848, the premier avocat-général wrote that policing was no longer possible in the Croix-Rousse where leaders of the clubs and other radical^s dominated (MacDougall, 1974:288-308; Dutacq, 1910: 182-186, 365-392; AN BB³⁰ 361: Rapport du Premier Avocat-Général au Ministère de la Justice, 27 juin 1848).

Judicial officials provided little support to the authorities. In November, 1848, the director of the political police for the region reported that the Parquet was "very weak" and "not capable of the role it must play

in this difficult period." The prosecutor initiated no actions against working class political associations until the decree of July 28, 1848 which regulated the political clubs. While nominally recognizing the right of association, the decree required the attendance of police officials at meetings and subjected the clubs to prosecution as secret societies if political matters were discussed. In Lyon, the decree had little immediate effect, in part because of the wide latitude of official interpretations of what constituted political discussion. In 1849, when ^{the} authorities increased their activities against the clubs, many responded by transforming themselves into mutual aid societies or electoral committees to avoid the provisions of the law (AN, BB³⁰ 327: Rapport du Jouve du Bor au Ministère de la Justice, 19 novembre 1848; Dutacq, 1908; MacDougall, 1974: 378, 401).

Lyon had a large military contingent which was barracked in the ring of forts built to surround the city after the insurrection of 1834. In 1848, its support was uncertain. The garrison offered little resistance to the Voraces who took over the forts of the Croix-Rousse during the early days of the revolution. While the troops intervened more frequently after retaking the forts in June, 1848, the population did not regard them as a threat. In December, a crowd of fifteen-hundred chased and stoned dragoons from a regiment which had taken part in the repression of the 1834 insurrection. Many soldiers fraternized with the radicals in violation of orders from their commanders. Crowds of workers often defied officers who sought to discipline the troops. Attempts to secure the loyalties of the troops were complicated by the democratic-socialists who sought to convert them to their program by sending newspapers and political propaganda to the barracks during election campaigns (Dutacq, 1910:110-112; MacDougall, 1974: 288-292, 378-384, 406-407).

In June and July 1848, the authorities scored a victory against the threat of armed violence by the working class. They regained the forts in the Croix-Rousse and disarmed the national guard and the paramilitary organizations. These actions were accomplished without force and restored official control over the means of violence.

The disarmament did not stop the work of the democratic-socialists who concentrated their energies on the electoral campaigns of late 1848 and early 1849. Repressive actions ^{against} the political clubs had driven much of the leadership into secret societies. These had been the most resilient form of hostile political organization under the Monarchy and would endure the repression of the Second Republic. Activists soon found a second course of action. Because they operated under official sanction, the electoral committees provided opportunities for the members of the secret societies to return to the work of organizing the working class. Their efforts contributed to the mobilization which culminated in the insurrection of June 1849.

The insurrection had its origin in the efforts of the democratic-socialists to orchestrate popular protest against the national government for its decision to send troops into the Roman republic. Acting on a false report of a popular uprising in Paris, activists in Lyon went to the barricades. The army responded quickly with troops and artillery and the insurrection culminated in a running street battle which left numerous casualties among the military and the insurrectionaries. The uprising represented an enormous setback for the democratic-socialists. ^{When} the territory of the sixth military division including Lyon and its hinterland was clamped under a state of ~~seige~~ ^{siege}, their ranks were thinned by the arrest of many activists and the flight of others who sought to escape prosecution. The structure and strategy of the movement ^{were} laid bare by interrogators. Even more important, the power of the authorities

had been forcefully demonstrated (Dutacq, 1928; MacDougall, 1974: 411-426).

Beginning the second period, the state of séjge marked a turning point in the circumstances of the authorities. The state of séjge "profoundly altered the powers of military, administrative and judicial authorities." The War Ministry instructed the military commander to cooperate with civil and judicial officials; "because all administrative and general police powers are in your hands (SHAT, F¹ 26: Dossier 21 juin, 1849, Copie de la dépêche de M. le Ministre de l'Intérieur en date du 18 juin 1849; Dossier 19 juin 1849, Ministère de la Guerre. Bureau de la Justice Militaire. Modifications aux premières instructions sur l'état de séjge, 19 juin 1849). With authority over all matters concerning public order, the military commander, General Gémeau, possessed more extensive powers than the prefect. His first actions were aimed at organizations which threatened public order. Immediately after the proclamation of the state of séjge, he banned all clubs and political assemblies. All cafes, cooperatives and houses of prostitution in the Croix-Rousse were closed. Those which were allowed to reopen were placed under strict surveillance. Beginning in September, 1849, the Ministry of Interior allocated secret funds for surveillance. Much of the money appears to have been used to pay police spies whose recruitment was acknowledged by the chief inspector to be the most important task of the political police (Réceuil des Actes Administratifs du Département du Rhône, 1849, No. 30; AML, Croix-Rousse, I¹ (Police), Dossier Cafes-Police-Ouverture-Fermeture 1820-1849; MacDougall, 1974, 427-428; AML, I¹ 2(B): 148, 164; I² 41, Rapport du Commissaire Spécial de la Police Politique, 17 juillet 1852).

The state of séjge provided opportunities for the officials to step up the repressive program. The jurisdiction of the military commander stretched

into the working class faubourgs and the military seconded the central police force in the seizure of arms and the arrest of individuals suspected of participation in the insurrection. The military courts were empowered to prosecute persons arrested for their role in the insurrection and individuals accused of political crimes. Beginning in July, 1849, the public prosecutor used the military courts to launch an attack against the secret societies and workers associations such as cooperatives which he suspected of covert political activities (AN, BB¹⁸ 1474B: Rapport du Procureur-Général de Lyon. Poursuites contre les clubs et associations, Lyon, 1848-1850).

The secret societies endured, especially in the working class faubourgs where radical municipal councillors and large expanses of unpoliced rural space provided a safe haven for activists. The electoral campaigns for the elections of 1849 and 1850 were the only events which gave shape to the working class movement under the state of séjge. Continued support for the movement was clearest in the working class faubourgs of the Croix-Rousse and LaGuillotière where the democratic-socialists regained their seats on the municipal councils (MacDougall, 1974: 436-438, 441-443; AML, I¹ 41 #64; AN BB³⁰ 379: Rapport du Procureur-Général de Lyon, 2 juin 1851).

Under the state of séjge, the presence of radical strongholds in the faubourgs and the surrounding communes presented the chief obstacle to the repression of the working class movement. These communities provided radical workers with a rallying point for electoral politics and provided their leadership with a refuge from police action. The solution lay with the national government which was especially eager to neutralize the threat of the democratic-socialist movement. In December, the Interior Ministry replaced the prefect with the Commissaire Extraordinaire Lacoste who was given powers over the sixth military division which matched the jurisdiction

of the military commander. In September, 1849, the Minister of the Interior introduced a bill to reorganize the municipality by annexing the radical faubourgs and attributing the powers of the mayor and the municipal council to the prefect. One of the purposes of the proposed reorganization was to strengthen the police, especially the political police. The measure was strongly opposed by the municipal councils of the faubourgs. The public prosecutor proposed an intermediate solution: the reorganization of police powers under the control of the prefect. The law of June 19, 1851 adopted his suggestion. It gave the prefect control over the police forces in the Lyon agglomération whose borders were drawn to include the working class faubourgs and towns in adjoining departments which fell within Lyon's political orbit (Annuaire de Lyon, II^e partie, 1850: 56-108; Reveil, 1904: 63-64; AN BB³⁰379, Rapport de Procureur-Général au Ministre de la Justice, 1 décembre 1849; Bulletin officiel des lois, CXDIII, no. 3001).

Beginning the third period, the coup d'état of December 2, 1851 was the final act in the destruction of the working class movement. When news of the coup reached the city, leaders of secret societies issued a general order for mobilization against the government. The call to action yielded meagre results. The opposition mustered a small and poorly organized force which was quickly dispersed without violence by the military. Informed of the intentions of the secret societies, the police and the military quelled the workers' uprising with relative ease. Preemptive measures produced substantial returns for the authorities (Vergez-Tricom, 1920: 236-253).

Sporadic episodes of resistance to the coup were quickly contained and the authorities mounted an intensive attack against working class activists and associations. The decree of December 9 granted the authorities broad powers to act against members of secret societies and they interpreted its

intent to include all politically suspect associations. The police used the decree indiscriminately to arrest radical members of the municipal councils, owners of cafes where radical workers met, participants in the insurrection of 1834, and persons of "questionable character" including anyone suspected of opposition to the government. By the end of December, the few remaining legal associations, such as the cooperatives, were disbanded (MacDougall, 1974: 449-457; Vergez-Tricom, 1920: 231-237, 243-250).

The instruments of local politics were destroyed. In December and January, the prefect dissolved^{the}/elected municipal councils in the radical faubourgs and replaced them with appointees loyal to the government. Under the law of March 24, 1852, the radical faubourgs were annexed to the city and Lyon was stripped of its municipal powers. The action ensured control over local affairs by the central government (AML, La Guillotière, D 12: Délibérations du Conseil Municipal, 1851; Kleinclausz, 1952: 162).

The centralization of power in the national government facilitated the coordination of the chief agencies of repression. At the national level, the coup united the Ministries of Interior, Justice and War in a concerted program against the democratic-socialists. In Lyon, the clearest example of the coordination was the commission mixte, a special tribunal composed of the prefect, the general prosecutor, and the commanding general which judged those arrested after the coup. However, the distribution of powers between central and local authorities and among the prefecture, the judiciary and the military continued to trouble the national government during the early years of the Second Empire (Merriman, 1978; Payne, 1966; Vergez-Tricom, 1920: 246).

Increased coordination among the repressive forces strengthened the capacity of the authorities. Empowered with extensive authority against political associations and centralized jurisdiction over the Lyon agglomération,

the authorities consolidated their advantages against the democratic-socialists. Confident of the impotence of the opposition, the national government lifted the state of ^{of} siege in March 1852. After the use of coercive tactics had effectively demobilized the democratic-socialists, the authorities favored the development of preemptive strategies. The expansion of national political life through the enlargement of the suffrage and the experience of political mobilization during the Republic required the authorities to shape repressive strategies with an eye to the largely working class electorate. To the traditional concern of ensuring obedience to the law was added the new task of securing loyalty to the regime. In the short run, these political considerations led the authorities to combine repressive tactics directed against the opposition with the facilitation of pro-government activities. In the long run, the authorities tried to control the political environment through the tactics of regulation, counter-mobilization, and sponsorship.

After the coup, the main objective of the repressive program in Lyon was a more effective penetration into working class life. While spies carried out surveillance of political activities, the authorities used registration and licensing to monitor working class economic and social life. They required workers to obtain work cards and to register their movements within France with the prefecture. Public assemblies, including dances, festivals, and meetings of most organizations, required official authorization and the presence of police officials. Many of these requirements were already in force, but after the coup, they were more carefully enforced. Registration provided the means for surveillance of the population at a very low cost. Regulation offered the possibility of penalizing opponents to the regime and of limiting the mobilization of potential challengers (AML, I¹ Police Locale and I² Police Générale).

The involvement of the police in electoral politics characterized the

program of counter-mobilization. Adopting the tactics of the opposition, Lyon authorities worked with local officials to organize demonstrations in support of official candidates. They scrutinized the voting lists to exclude workers who did not meet the electoral qualifications. In critical elections, they helped the government get out the vote. During the plebiscite of November 1852, the police commissioner in the Croix-Rouasse reported:

Last night I worked with M. Cabias [the mayor] on a plan to deliver 400 yes-votes today; it consisted of reading the names of the 8,000 électeurs, discerning those who are sensible among the électeurs who haven't yet voted, and encouraging them to go to the polls (AN F⁷ 12166, Rapport du Commissaire, Quatrième Arrondissement, Premier Quartier a l'Inspecteur Général, 22 novembre 1852).

The commissioner's report demonstrates the direct involvement of the police in mobilizing electoral support for the regime.

Finally, the authorities administered a wide-ranging experiment in social welfare through the encouragement of mutual benefit societies, which became the dominant form of working class organization in Lyon during the early Second Empire. The majority were craft-based and provided the members of a single trade or set of closely related trades with benefits for illness or injury and burial expenses. Under the law of July 15, 1850, they were required to obtain official authorization, to permit police officials at their meetings, and to report annually on their finances, administration, and membership. The law of March 26, 1852 offered subsidies to societies which accepted honorary members and allowed the appointment of their presidents by the government. By encouraging the societies to accept large landowners, government officials, and merchants as honorary members, the authorities hoped

to diminish working-class consciousness. To exclude opponents of the regime from holding office, the police scrutinized the lists of nominees before selecting the presidents. The sponsorship of the mutual aid movement typified the intensification of preemptive strategies which were intended to block working class political action (ADR, 5X-1954: Objets divers; Sheridan, 1978: 269-270).

By 1852, the strategy of intensifying preemptive tactics relative to responsive tactics was set firmly in place. While the threat of force remained, the authorities preferred to avoid open confrontation. They emphasized tactics which undercut the mobilization of the democratic-socialists and held coercive action in reserve. Preemptive tactics included direct action against the mobilization of challenging groups, activities which raised the costs of mobilization to all political groups, and attempts to mask the interests and manipulate the organization of the working class. Maurice Agulhon writes that the Bonapartist strategy involved a dissociation between the political and the social: "the republican movement was totally proscribed and destroyed whenever possible; in contrast, the labor movement was controlled and channeled . . ." (1973: 214).

The political process perspective clarifies the circumstances which were responsible for changing repressive strategies. Changes in capacity and opportunity and interactions with the democratic-socialists led the authorities to emphasize preemptive strategies over responsive strategies. Shifts in the balance of power between the national government and the opposition made a crucial difference in the situation faced by authorities. The extension of the suffrage and the experience of working class political mobilization during the months after the February Revolution changed the con-

text of the struggle between the state and its challengers and complicated the work of repression. The actions of the national government were extremely important in turning the situation to the advantage of the local authorities. All these factors influenced changes in repressive strategies.

Changes in the mobilization of the authorities accompanied changes in their capacity and opportunity. The most important increases in the capacity of the authorities did not involve changes in the direct control over resources by the police. Municipal expenditures on police in Lyon and the faubourgs remained roughly constant. Until late 1851, special subsidies from the national government represented a small fraction of the police budget. The reorganization of the police which followed the law of June 19, 1851 had a stronger effect on capacity than subsidies from the national government. In the long run, the crucial factors were increases in the extent of coordination and mutual support among the repressive agencies. In Lyon, the state of *sage* cemented the coalition among the repressive forces.

After the coup, the state made clear its engerness to maintain the same level of coordination in the absence of serious threats to public order.

The political circumstances faced by the authorities set limits on their opportunity to act against the democratic-socialists. To a large extent, the political circumstances confronting Lyon authorities represented decisions made in Paris. The national legislature regulated the authority of the police over political associations. After the February Revolution, guarantees of the rights of association opened the way for a massive increase in the number of political organizations. Beginning with the July 1848 decree regulating the clubs, legislation steadily circumscribed the rights of association for political purposes. The law imposing the state of *sage* gave Lyon authorities the power to act against any association which threatened public order. They

applied its provisions liberally and broadened their interpretation after the coup. By January, 1852, all working class associations with the exception of the mutual aid societies had been closed. The political club, the paramilitary organization, the cooperative, and the electoral committee disappeared from the repertoire of the democratic-socialists. The secret society remained the sole refuge of the activists.

The national government also centralized jurisdiction over the Lyon agglomeration. The state of seige allowed the authorities to supercede the prerogatives of local administrations. The law of June 19, 1851 placed the prefect in charge of the policing of local areas. In August, 1851, the government introduced joint financing of the police by the municipalities and the Interior Ministry. The law of March 24, 1852 which annexed the faubourgs and removed Lyon's municipal powers gave the prefect firm control over the territory.

Our examination of the interactions between the authorities and the democratic-socialists rest on an analysis of changes in the mobilization of these parties. The circumstances of working class organizations which were the chief targets of repressive strategies provide a perspective on changes in the mobilization of the democratic-socialists. Political and economic organizations flourished during the early months of the Republic. The authorities turned from toleration in the early months of the Republic to surveillance and suppression after the law of July 28, 1848. The state of seige accelerated the repression of these associations. Until the coup, however, the authorities reacted to the initiatives of the democratic-socialists. After the coup, they employed preemptive strategies including the sponsorship of mutual aid societies which they hoped would divert the working class from political action. While in principle, they recognized the right of association,

in practice, the authorities worked to limit its application to supporters of the national government.

What does the conflict between the central police force and the democratic-socialist movement in Lyon tell us about the process of repression? Structural conditions shape the character of repressive strategies. First, the agencies of repression act collectively. The character of the repressive coalition was central to the formation of repressive strategies. Changes in the extent of coordination and mutual support among the repressive forces were more important than changes in the total amount of resources in increasing the capacity of the authorities. Second, political circumstances set limits on the range of action by the authorities. Guarantees of the rights of association and limits on the extent of jurisdiction imposed constraints on the repression of the democratic-socialist movement. Third, the balance of power between the national and local authorities influences the shape of repressive strategies. In Lyon, the actions of the national government altered the capacity and political circumstances of the authorities. Fourth, the repressive process involves a variety of tactics which call for a broader characterization of repression. Identifying repression with coercive actions obscures the repertoire of repressive tactics. The account demonstrates that finding the balance between responsive and preemptive tactics is central to the implementation of repressive strategies. In the long run, the authorities intensified preemptive tactics relative to responsive tactics. Finally, faced with the expansion of the electorate and the politicization of the working class, the authorities are likely to favor preemptive tactics. After the coup, the Lyon authorities applied a two-pronged strategy which combined coercive tactics directed against hostile political organizations with the facilitation of organizations which eschewed political action. Coercive tactics raised the costs

of mobilization to challengers and inhibited the appearance of new contenders. The sponsorship of mutual aid societies provided the opportunity to act on the interests and organization of the working class. The involvement of the police in electoral politics promised to consolidate support for the regime and to preempt the mobilization of the opposition. The experience of Lyon confirms the interpretation suggested by the political process perspective.

Repression provides part of the explanation for the demobilization of the democratic-socialist movement in Lyon. Internal divisions within the working class contributed to the failure of class action. Competing political organizations appealed to diverse interests. Conflict between these organizations impeded working class mobilization. Repression made mobilization even more difficult. Frustrated by the failure of political action, working class political ardor waned after the insurrection of June, 1849. The intensification of preemptive strategies undercut the efforts of the democratic-socialists to resolve conflicting interests and to reanimate working class mobilization (AN BB³⁰ 379: Rapports du Procureur-Général au Ministère de la Justice, décembre 1849 - novembre 1851).

The combined effects of structural problems which impeded class action and repressive strategies which blocked working class mobilization explain the failure of the democratic-socialist movement. Mobilization and repression are crucial concepts for the analysis of working class protest. This analysis demonstrates that the processes of change in repressive strategies explain a great deal about the history of working class mobilization and demobilization in France.

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TABLE 1

Correspondences between changes in the mobilization of the police, forms of working class organization, and changing repressive strategies, 1848 - 1852.

	1848- 1849	1849- 1851	1851- 1852
<u>Capacity</u>			
Coordination	low	increased	high
Support from other agencies			
Military	weak	strong	strong
Judiciary	weak	strong	strong
<u>Political Circumstances</u>			
Authority	limited	broadened	extensive
Jurisdiction	fragmented	fragmented	centralized
<u>Forms of Working Class Organization</u>			
Political clubs	yes	no	no
Paramilitary groups	yes	no	no
Electoral committees	yes	yes	no
Cooperatives	yes	yes	no
Secret societies	yes	yes	yes
Mutual aid societies	yes	yes	yes
<u>Repressive Strategies</u>			
Stance toward working class organizations	toleration, moving to harassment	suppression of political organizations	destruction of all unsponsored organizations
State of siege	none	imposed	lifted
Enforcement of regulations	limited	increased	intensified
Political countermobilization	limited	limited	intensified
Sponsorship of associations	none	none	initiated