SINEWS OF WAR

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PROLOGUE

Writing this talk was something like the experience of a carpenter who sits down with his tools and a pile of wood, then starts to make a new piece of furniture. When I first stared at the raw materials, I thought I might turn out a piece the likes of which had never before been seen, yet which would be both functional and full of beauty. The longer I worked over the materials on the bench, however, the more the object taking shape began to look like a chair. Just a chair. Worse yet, it began to look a lot like other chairs I had made, and even like chairs other people had made.

What a comedown! Could it be that all I know how to make is chairs? Well, there's a consolation: a chair of familiar design will most likely support you when you sit in it. From the viewpoint of people who enjoy a half-hour nap after dinner, this chair has another advantage: you can sleep in it. The good stories come at the beginning, and there's a conclusion at the end. In between, there is just about time for your customary snooze.

My topic, by the way, is "Sinews of War".
Let's begin with some more or less incontrovertible, and therefore boring, historical facts. In 1635 France declared war on Spain. In 1636 France declared war on the Empire. Both declarations formalized hostilities which had actually been accelerating unofficially for five or six years. Both also greatly expanded France's military efforts. Louis XIII's chief minister, Richelieu, undertook to raise the men, money and supplies required by a major seventeenth-century war. The government's military expenditures rose from about 28 million in a total "budget" on the order of 50 million livres tournois in 1630 to about 40 in a total of 60 million livres in 1640. Given debt service and huge cuts for the tax collectors, that meant an increase in gross governmental revenues between 1630 and 1640 from about 50 to about 80 million livres. The assessments for the chief property tax, the taille, shot up from about 36.6 million livres in 1635 to about 72.6 million in 1643 (Clamageran 1867-1876: II, 460-511; Briggs 1977: 218-219; Bonney 1978: 175-176; cf. Chaunu & Gascon 1977: 187). Pierre Chaunu guesses the governmental revenues of 1640 at some 15 percent of the French Gross National Product, close to half the value added in agriculture (Chaunu & Gascon 1977: 188). In an agrarian economy, that was a heavy burden.

The lightning increase in taxes also produced evasion and rebellion on an unprecedented scale. 1636 was, in retrospect, one of the calmer years of the period. It did not seem so at the time. In 1636 serious insurrections, beginning with resistance to one form of taxation or another, occurred in Limousin, Brittany, Auvergne, Saintonge and Angoumois -- that is, in five of the nineteen administratively-bounded provinces of the time. Other, smaller seditions (to use the period's own terminology) arose from taxation in Poitou, Normandy, the Lyonnais, and no doubt elsewhere. In September 1636, the intendant at Rennes wrote of "a ferocious three-day sedition." During those three days, he reported, there was nothing day and night but meetings of the people -- armed, and once to the sound of a drum. Sometimes there were a hundred people, sometimes two hundred, sometimes up to four or five hundred people shouting "Vive le Roy et sans gabelle, instead of the sou we pay for an apple they want us to pay ten or twenty ecus. Let's kill the agent [commissaire]!" And sometimes they added "Vive le Roy et M. le duc de Brissac sans gabelle, we'll each have a piece of the agent's hide!" They did plenty of violence, including coming to my lodgings two or three times a night to break the windows, to try to break down the door, and to threaten to burn the place down (Mousnier 1964: I, 348). "The agent" was, of course, the intendant himself, the outsider Richelieu had sent from Paris to impose new taxes. The Duke of Brissac, insider and provincial military governor, managed to calm down the protestors after three days, but only at the expense of releasing the prisoners his troops had taken and abstaining from prosecution of the movement's leaders.

Last the tax rebellions of 1636 should seem to be simple, disorganized responses to misery and xenophobia, we might look at one more event. After the royal prosecutor in Angoulême helped to restore order in June 1636, he reported that:

Last Friday the sixth of June, the inhabitants of the chastellenie of Blanzac, three leagues from Angoulême by the measure of Poitou, mustered about four thousand men armed with harquebuses and pikes, grouped in twelve or fifteen companies led by their parish priests, marching in good order to the sound of fifes and violins (for lack
of drums). They went to the city of Blanzac, where the fair was underway, with shouts and confused threats against the lives of all the gabeliers, by which they mean all collectors of His Majesty's taxes, with the exception of the taille, the taillon and the surtax for garrisoning, which they say they are ready to pay, indeed to bring to Paris (Mousnier 1964: I, 345; Mousnier identifies the correspondent as "La Force", while Bercé [1974: I, 372] identifies him as François Du Fossé, sieur de la Fosse, royal attorney at the presidial of Angoulême. Bercé's greater detail, later date of publication and more intimate familiarity with the region in question lead me to prefer his identification; since the crucial documents are in Leningrad, however, I shall have to leave this enormously important point in suspense.)

The crowd seized two bystanders: "The two suspects were interrogated, searched, confronted. One of them was released, the other put to death in a spectacular manner after having an arm cut off and being paraded around the square" (Bercé 1974: I, 371). The crowd at Blanzac sought victims, but it also made fine discriminations among acceptable and unacceptable taxes. In general the same seventeenth-century observers who tell us of the ferocity of tax rebellions also tell us of the specificity of the grievances around which they crystallized.

1636 was, as I have said, one of the calmer years of the 1630s and 1640s. To mention only the best-known struggles, those two decades brought France the rebellion of the Cassaveux of Aix in 1630, the rebellion of Montmorency in Languedoc and elsewhere, 1632, an invasion of the country by the king's brother Gaston d'Orléans in 1632, the rebellions of the Croquants and similar groups in southwestern France (almost continuous from 1634 into the 1640s), the Va-Nu-Pieds movement of Normandy in 1639, the Conseils of Armagnac in 1640. To cap them all, the multiple conflicts and rebellions of the Fronde, from 1648 onward. It would quite confuse our understanding of the seventeenth century -- and undermine the main argument of this paper -- to imagine all this insurrection either as a mechanical response to the hardship imposed by heavy taxation, or as a clever, calculated equivalent of the twentieth-century tax haven. The people involved in the great movements and the small were, on the whole, indignant about violations of their rights, and concerned about what was happening to the structure of power. The tax rebellions were genuine power struggles. Yet the other side also deserves attention. New, increased and altered taxes of different kinds were by far the most important stimuli for the larger conflicts of the French seventeenth century, and an almost necessary condition for popular participation in the great rebellions. And the building of bigger, more active, more expensive armed forces was by far the dominant reason for the Crown's resort to new, increased and altered taxes.

Tax rebellions were not, however, the only popular reactions to the Crown's expanded military effort. Much more so than today, armies of the time lived off the land: seized their food, lodging, supplies, recruits and
sexual satisfaction from whatever, and whoever, was defenseless and at hand. Local people fought those exactions when they could. One story will stand for many. An article in the newspaper Gazette de France reported from the frontier war zone in May 1636:

Governor de Chilmy having sent two hundred infantrymen to forage in the woods of Moncornet, Châtelet-en-Ardennes and other nearby places, they took a few oxen in the Haêt woods from the peasants of Kevin. But these peasants having chased them to the woods of Auberval took back their booty, killed a number of them, and brought a number of prisoners [to Nocroy], including their captain, sieur Pouchet, son of the King of Spain's ironmaster in Hainaut, who was worth more than a hundred thousand ecaus when he died. They set his reward at ten thousand. But the prisoner, not wanting to live with his shame, removed the dressings from his wounds at night and died, to the great regret of his captors (Gazette, 19 May 1636).

The story is extraordinary in one regard: the peasants won game and set, if not match. Yet even away from the war zone rough encounters between soldiers and civilians were commonplace. Only the month before, troops marching through Noyon had taken a peasant’s horse. The peasant had unhorsed the offending soldier, another horseman had wounded one of the protesting neighbors, and “all the inhabitants armed themselves and threatened to massacre the cavalrmen” (Moussier 1964: 1, 340-341). The same sorts of struggles surrounded the rapes, impressments, billeting and seizure of food and drink with which seventeenth-century armies made their ways across the country. Most of the time, however, the soldiers won. What is more, the authorities -- seeing no short-run alternative to wresting the army’s livelihood directly from a reluctant populace -- protected the soldier-felons from civilian justice.

The administrative triumph of the next half-century was to make that extraction of resources indirect and regular. In the process of building a regular, paid, supplied, centrally-commanded standing army, Louis XIV and his ministers created a civilian bureaucracy, the Intendance, which served as prototype for other governmental bureaucracies in France and elsewhere. Regimental colonels continued to recruit, train and pay their own troops, but otherwise the civilians were everywhere: buying and distributing fodder, food, arms and other supplies; verifying the musters and accounts; supervising the transportation and lodging of armies on the move.

At the same time, such ministers of finance as Colbert and their provincial agents, the Intendants, built the massive fiscal structure which was to sustain the army and the bureaucracy up to the Revolution. It was, admittedly, a shaky structure. The structure was weakened by the repeated tactic of mortgaging future revenues, at a large discount, in return for ready cash to meet current expenses: tax farming and the sale of offices which assured annuities and fiscal privileges were only two of the most notorious versions of this tactic. In order to understand the French fiscal system properly, we would have to take up a topic which I must, to my regret, pass by in this discussion: the interplay between state-making and the growth of capitalism. Both the accumulation of liquid capital and the increase of production for exchange were crucial to the government’s extractive efforts. The tie also ran the other way: the government used its growing army and bureaucracy to enforce the privileges of the people who put up the cash, and to draw or drive goods into the national market. The structure was shaky, but for a century and a half it served to extract a growing quantity of resources from the country’s peasants and artisans. Indeed, with a few lapses and many modifi-
cations, the real per capita tax burden of French citizens has continued to
grow up to our own time.

Notice what was happening. The formation of a large standing army led
to the creation of not one, but two big, interlocking bureaucracies: one for
the direct management of military affairs and one for the acquisition of
the resources needed for military affairs. The procedures which the monarchy
adopted to manage military affairs and acquire the necessary resources
created supplementary bureaucracies, both local and national. Most of the
vast apparatus for controlling the quality of manufactured goods, for example,
came into being as a means of taxing trade at its point of origin. Purists
will, to be sure, object to calling these old-regime organizations "bureaucracies".
The bulk of the important officers owned their offices, treated
them to some degree as private investments, and had substantial claims on
future royal revenues. Those features constituted at once the genius and the
fatal flaw of the system. It was the Revolutionaries who completed the work
of the bureaucratization, the creation of a corps of financially and adminis-
tratively dependent full-time professionals. Nevertheless, Louis XIV and
his successors essentially created the complex of activities and offices which
the Revolutionaries nationalized.

Ordinary people and regional power-holders fought against the new
creations when the innovations infringed on their rights and interests (which
was often) and then they, people or power-holders, had the means to resist
(which was less and less often). The crown, for its part, devoted ruthless
ingenuity to coopting, neutralizing or destroying those who had the interest
and the capacity to resist. With the critical, instructive exceptions of the
Fronde and the Revolution, the crown won. These processes created the strong,
centralized national state which made eighteenth-century France the model for
many other western countries.

The brutal process has an ironic side. The French monarchs did
their statemaking work, to a large degree, unintentionally. They meant
to build a military organization effective enough to awe their rivals
abroad and cow their opponents at home. In pursuing that aim, they
created a vast fiscal structure and a centralized bureaucracy. Neither was,
so far as I can tell, really part of the program; they were simply means
to another end. Louis XIV claimed, in the self-righteous memoir he began
producing toward the end of his reign, to have aimed from the start at the
creation of an orderly, prosperous, powerful realm. In the parlous years
of the seventeenth century, however, he and his ministers certainly acted
as though any means which would keep the army going and hold off internal
rebellion was justified. The rulers of France discovered, or recalled,
an old truth: that money was the "nervus belli," "war nerves" in a schoolboy
translation, the sinews of war in a more accurate rendering. The so-called
absolutist state which resulted from the pursuit of that truth was less
a deliberate creation than a by-product of the military effort.

The by-product was, however, of great significance. The fiscal
structure and bureaucracy made it possible for the statemakers to take on
new activities as the opportunity or necessity came along. They absorbed
courts, intervened in trade, built roads, established police forces. Much
of the new activity had some military or fiscal advantage. But it also
had its own logic, and served interests which had their own logic. In
the long run, the bulk of the state's activity, as measured by personnel
or expenditure, came to be non-military. Welfare activities, broadly
defined, finally took over first place from wars. Whereas a Richelieu
might devote a majority of the state's net revenues to the armed forces,
French peacetime budgets of the last century or so have typically committed
twenty or thirty percent to the military. Only the heat of open war has
sent the proportion up much higher than that.
The complex: warmaking, taxation, bureaucratization, resistance, repression, state making. If we are to look at transitional epochs -- the theme, after all, of this meeting -- in France since 1500 or 1600, those must be our key words. Note how the financing of the Seven Years War and the American War of Independence precipitated the fiscal crisis which led to the fateful assembly of the Estates General in 1789. Note how Napoleon's wars drove up the tax burden (and called back into action many of the old regime's detested indirect taxes) after the momentary respite of the early Revolution. Note how military expenditures continued to drive the national budget, and therefore the level of taxation, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Gabriel Ardant (himself a career fiscal official) has argued a strong, reciprocal relationship between the development of popular representation at the national level and the last two centuries' moves, however incomplete, toward equalization of tax burdens. If the stark seventeenth-century connections among warmaking, taxation, bureaucratization and state making have disappeared from view, that is not because war and taxes have lost their importance.

What of conflict and resistance? Open tax rebellions never again assumed the threatening proportions they had taken during the seventeenth century, but an important part of the Revolution's early direct action consisted of attacks on the tax officials and fiscal organizations of the old regime. The Revolution of 1848 faced its own revolt against the forty-five centime surtax. And the Poujadist movement was only the most prominent of a series of twentieth-century reactions to fiscal pressure. Although it was Prussia for which German scholars coined the term Steuerstaat, Tax State, the administrative structure of the French state also came into being largely as a consequence of the fiscal strategies the French employed to raise money for their armed forces.

Yet Prussia certainly deserves the name as well. These days the historiographical convention is to treat the fiscal improvisations of the Great Elector Frederick William as crucial choice points. "In 1653," writes Michael Howard,

at the outset of one of those Baltic wars in which the northern and eastern lands of his Electorate were involved, he secured from all his Estates a small grant to raise an army a few thousand strong in return for the confirmation of all existing privileges. The nobility were given full jurisdiction and security within their lands and a guarantee of preferment in both secular and ecclesiastical office; the towns were confirmed in their judicial immunities and guild restrictions. But the Estates were prevailed upon to agree to the introduction of royal officials throughout the land to assess and levy the tax required to make up their contributions for the army -- the Generalkriegskommissionsat. So they forfeited, in this essential particular, their traditional right -- the real guarantee of their independence -- to tax themselves. They lived to regret it (Howard 1976: 67).

That thin edge, Howard tells us, was the start of an enormous wedge.

No doubt the real historical process was slower and more complex. Yet the myth of the fateful decision of 1653 does sum up the direction of a powerful set of changes. Rudolf Braun lists the main elements of the "militarization, fiscalization and bureaucratization" of Prussia in these terms:

[1] the creation and building of a standing army, firmly in the Elector's grasp;
The regular increase of direct and indirect taxes — levies in money, commodities and services, primarily fitted to the maintenance of the army, and essentially based on military traditions;

the building of a fiscal and financial administration, likewise tailored according to military tradition, initially part of the military organization itself, and then, as a civilian institution, becoming the nucleus of the centralized Prussian government, which thenceforth drew its chiefs preferentially from among former military men, and leaned toward military models in its style of leadership and administration;

the overlaying and elimination of old regional and Estate law through a new administrative law which borrowed heavily from military law, as well as the overlaying and elimination of regional and Estate courts in favor of courts integrated into the state bureaucracy;

the weakening or elimination of territorial and Estate governmental institutions in favor of a centralized government (Braun 1977: 247-248; numbering added).

That is how Prussia became at once a Tax State and a War State.

Braun goes on to compare Prussian developments with those of England. The comparison leaps invitingly to the eye: England’s small and late regular army, her greater reliance on customs revenues, the relative absence of exemptions from taxation, the monopolization of tax power by Parliament, and so on. Holt and Turner, making their comparison of England with Japan, China and France, seize on the same points of difference. Nothing is easier to establish than general correlations between the differences in taxation and the differences in government as a whole. Indeed, the correlations continue to build up as we extend the comparison: not only Prussia and England, but also France, and Spain, the Netherlands, and down the roster. Eventually the correlation touches tautology; the extraordinarily decentralized fiscal system of the seventeenth-century United Provinces, and their heavy reliance on excise taxes, were not simply correlates but critical features of the whole Dutch system of government (see Dickson and Sperling 1970: 294-298).

The difficult task, then, is not to establish the correlation of taxation and statemaking, but to explain it. I join a venerable tradition in claiming that, whatever else was involved, the strategies adopted for raising and maintaining armed forces significantly shaped the whole structure of states. Strategies of taxation were central, but they were not everything: the direct commandeering of labor, food, lodging and supplies played a significant part, as did governmental intervention in markets to make sure they delivered food, lodging, supplies and, sometimes, labor when the pinch was on. Over the long run of modern European experience, war and preparation for war were, I believe, the most significant immediate causes of major alterations in the form, bulk and texture of European states.

In addition, significant realignments in the system of European states characteristically occurred via wars and the peace settlements which followed them. 1648, 1815, 1918, 1945 are the great dates in the redrawing and simplification of the European political map, the points at which the
hundreds of seventeenth-century states consolidated into the twenty-odd of our own time. One would be surprised if it were otherwise; realignment of the state system is, after, one of the main things war is about.

In fact, not much of my argument is new -- certainly not the bit about money as the sinews of war. That notion was already such conventional wisdom in the sixteenth century that Machiavelli devoted one of his discorsi to refuting it. Good soldiers, countered Machiavelli, are the true nervo della guerra. His reasoning? Money will not always buy you good soldiers, but good soldiers can always find you money. Whatever the value of that reasoning in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Machiavelli's counter has lost strength since then; the cost of armed forces has risen much faster than the ransoms and booty they bring back with them. It might be, of course, that warmaking is sometimes profitable to a whole economy, or at least to those who run a whole economy; that would make it easier to understand why contemporary states spend precious resources on mayhem and the threat of mayhem. But even if that were so, the actual assembling of the means required for the care and feeding of armed forces in the contemporary world would be a matter of pull, push and shove, of capturing money, commodities and labor power from citizens who would rather use them otherwise. Money, commodities and labor power are still the sinews of war.

State makers and practical politicians have long behaved as if that truism were true; they have had to get the bills paid. Have we, then, simply returned to the catchwords of the sixteenth century and the common sense of the twentieth? Perhaps. Yet a careful look at recent writings on political change persuades me that scholars have so compartmentalized the subjects of war, taxes and political structure that the powerful connections among them have almost disappeared from view.

Let us concentrate on the analyses of Stein Rokkan. There are several reasons for letting Rokkan represent the state of the art. First, among theorists of state making and nation-building, he is one of the most self-consciously historical. Second, he has made a particular point of digging into the same European historical experience I have been discussing. Third, he is rather clearer than most political-development theorists just what it is that has to be explained. The final reason is more sentimental: Stein Rokkan was, as you know, supposed to give this very talk. Grave illness prevented him from coming. I only wish I could summon up the hearty good humor, the perceptive eye and the engaging Welsh-Norwegian accent Stein carries with him. Sorry; I can only summon up the tribute of respectful criticism.

From early in his analytical career, Rokkan has stressed two fundamental issues: 1) in keeping with the announced master theme of this meeting, the causes and, especially, the effects of major transitions in political participation within European countries; 2) the historical sources of similarities and variations in the character of mass politics among contemporary European countries. Those of you who are familiar with Rokkan's writings on these issues will see immediately the chief difficulty in mounting a sustained critique of his views: although he has ever been systematic, his systems have moved, elaborated and evolved incessantly. The newest bright idea, the latest objection, the most recent competing conceptualization appears as an additional variable or -- portentous word -- dimension in the next version of the Rokkanian scheme. The resulting schemata usually have a composite quality, like one of those sculptures.
by Jean Tinguely: amid the tangle of wires and scrap, we make out a wheel, a lever and perhaps an old shoe. I remember my astonishment one day when Steinhokkan unveiled a structure in which the viewer clearly saw fragments of Albert Hirschmann, Harrington Moore and Talcott Parsons, joined with bolts and straps of Rokkan's own design. (I leave it to you to decide which was the wheel, which the lever, and which the old shoe.) With an artist that inventive, the critic hesitates to impose any categories whatsoever.

On the issue of major transitions, nevertheless, it is fair to say that Rokkan has moved in the main stream of political-development theories: assuming, if only for heuristic purposes, a continuous process of differentiation from a primitive community; leaning toward the idea that the differentiation process breaks into phases, each involving the solution of some sort of systemic problem in a particular sphere of public life, and each contributing to the creation of an active, organized, differentiated national public life; hospitable toward the notion of a "cumulation of crises", a tendency for states which enter the developmental process late to face more acute versions of the systemic problems, in a shorter time span, than their predecessors. Thus, presumably, Italy and France went through broadly similar processes of mobilization, integration of center with periphery, and so on. But Italy, goes the account, had less time to deal with the stresses of those processes than did her northwestern neighbor. I am skeptical of that account, but do not want to document my skepticism here.

The second Rokkanian issue has been the historical sources of similarities and variations in the character of mass politics among contemporary European countries. Consistent with political-development ideas, Rokkan begins with some implicit but important assumptions: first, that all parts of Europe began from roughly similar primitive conditions; second, that in some sense all countries solved the same problems; it follows that the overall process of European political development included many centuries of divergence among different parts of the continent, followed by a shorter period -- say four hundred years -- of convergence toward the modern state.

The convergence, in Rokkan's account, is never complete. Each country's contemporary politics bear the traces of the particular path the country followed to modernity. Rokkan begins his serious comparisons before the time of convergence, but well after the departure from primitive origins.

The problem, then, is to explain the differences among European countries in current political configurations -- to explain them as a function of systematic variations in the prior histories of those countries. The analysis takes for granted that the units to be compared are today's national states: Belgium and Italy, not the Spanish Netherlands and Savoy, certainly not the Holy Roman Empire or the Habsburg lands. That means the analysis is necessarily retrospective, working back from effects to presumed causes.

In taking on this task, Rokkan behaves differently from a Reinhard Bendix or a Theda Skocpol, with their paired comparisons of a few thickly-documented experiences. He differs from a Cyril Black, whose squads of modernizers have different histories depending on when they began the great race. He acts very much like a survey researcher who seeks, by cross-tabulation and elaboration, eventually to capture every single case in a grid of causal variables; perhaps he learned the style of thought from the Michigan electoral analysts with whom he was once closely associated.
The later versions of Rokkan's quest produce grids which he calls "conceptual maps" of Europe: representations, in an idealized geography, of the major variables underlying the observable differences in current political structure. The ease of establishing large, contiguous, sharply-bounded national territories is supposed to have increased, for example, with east-west distance from the old band of commercial cities extending through the Low Countries, down the Rhine and into northern Italy. Again, distance northward from Rome is supposed to have conditioned whether a territory remained essentially Catholic, became religiously mixed, or ended up predominantly Protestant; this variable, runs the Rokkanian hypothesis, determined whether the modern states which resulted were riven by state-church or interconfessional conflicts. You grasp the style of argument. To be sure, Rokkan disarms his readers repeatedly by insisting that these are first rough sortings of the evidence, ways of clarifying the research agenda. So they are. They are often illuminating. Yet they communicate a distinctive way of conceiving the problem at hand. They express the hope of flattening the previous history into a rigorous, exhaustive, more or less linear set of explanatory variables.

Now, what do these massive grids have to do with the sinews of war? Well, not enough. That is my first point. Fiscal systems do not really figure in the Rokkanian explanations at all. War appears indirectly, either as a function of a statemaker's physical location within the European geopolitical system, or as the means by which the "center" built itself up. The analytic approach which stresses the cross-classification of structural conditions shares with the analogous survey research a certain resistance to the treatment of processes and strategies as the causes of differing outcomes. So a Stein Rokkan, deeply aware of the importance of war and taxes at the level of the individual country, must abandon his insight when it comes to seeking systematic explanations.

A second difficulty is equally serious. Setting up the problem as the analysis of individual cases, traced backward from the present, makes it hard to detect the sinews of war. Most of the organizations which once levied taxes and waged war in Europe exist no longer. They have disappeared into other, larger national states. Among the more important powers which sent delegates to the conferences which produced the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, after all, were not only Spain, France and England, but also Brandenburg, Hesse-Cassel, Bavaria, the Palatinate, Saxony, Venice, Lorraine, Savoy, Zeeland, Holland, the Empire, the Hanseatic League and the Papacy. The actions, interactions, creations, conquests and dissolutions of just such political entities were part and parcel of the European statemaking experience. They left profound scars on the political entities which exist in the twentieth century. The nominalism of retrospective country-by-country comparison, however, hides the scarification and the scars. To those who noticed how many of the concrete examples in my earlier discussion illustrated just that sort of nominalism, let me concede instantly that it is often convenient and instructive to look back through the experience of a France or a Britain, and even to compare their experiences. But let me also insist that in order to comprehend the strong links between war and statemaking we must frequently shift to the perspective of a Burgundy, of a Rhenish free city, or of the European state-system as a whole.
The final difficulties to Rokkan's schemes stem from their strong orientation to problem-solving. "What are the different ways in which various countries solved this particular problem?" we ask, "Who succeeded and who failed?" That orientation has real advantages. It escapes the tyranny of the one-path developmental model. It reduces the chances of mechanistic determinism. It places the fact of fallible human choice squarely in view. But it also offers obstacles to the understanding of indirect linkages, compositional effects, by-products, unintended consequences of intended actions. The vices and virtues of voluntaristic sociology easily cancel one another.

In the case of war, taxes and statemaking, the vices are greater than the virtues. Reasoning backward, the problem-solving orientation inclines us to believe that the warmakers really meant to build centralized, bureaucratized states. Reasoning forward, it inclines us to believe that something other than war and taxes must have brought those states into being. In either direction, we need a better sense of the limits that the solution of one problem in a particular way sets for the solution of all other problems.

My complaint with Stein Rokkan's analysis, and others like it, reduces to three charges: 1) the basic argument attributes too little weight to the effects of warmaking and the creation of the means of war on the whole process of statemaking; 2) the stress on the retrospective comparison of the European states which exist today makes it difficult to give warmaking its due; 3) the analysis of statemaking as if it consisted mainly of national leaders' conscious adoption of one solution or another to standard problems correctly emphasizes alternative national strategies, but understates the powerful constraints within which all such choices operate, and obscures the multiple, systematic, unanticipated consequences of the choices made.

Now, the slighting of war and taxes, the employment of retrospective comparisons and the stress on conscious problem-solving are not idiosyncrasies of Stein Rokkan's thought. They are quite general in analyses of political development.

That includes analyses of European political development. One tiny sign is the program of this very meeting. Out of forty-five sessions, one deals with military changes and organizations, and none -- at least directly -- with fiscal problems. Of the nearly 150 papers announced for other sessions, the title of one mentions taxes, and the only explicit mentions of wars are as timeposts: interwar, postwar, et cetera. Since self-conscious "Europeanists" (for reasons which would be worth exploring some other time) consist mainly of specialists in the twentieth century, maybe this balance represents the declining importance of war and taxes in our own time. Maybe we understand the operation and interconnections of war, taxes and statemaking so well we have no need to discuss them further. Maybe the papers' titles disguise their veritable obsession with war and taxes. Or maybe I have it right: despite a still-flowing stream of thought exemplified by Otto Hintze, Europeanists have generally adopted analytical perspectives which make it difficult and uninteresting to trace the great impact of war, preparation for war and the gathering of the wherewithal for war on the structure of national states.
Think back to the seventeenth-century stories I told you at the start. Surely they make plausible a causal web connecting warmaking, taxation, bureaucratization, resistance, repression and statesmaking. Is that causal web a peculiarity of France, or of the heroic epoch the stories portray? I do not think so. Without threading our way through that web, we will have a hard time understanding -- or even identifying -- Europe's great transitional epochs.

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