SOCIAL MOVEMENT INDUSTRIES:
COMPETITION AND COOPERATION AMONG MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS

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August, 1979
Although the literature on social movements is vast, there has been surprisingly little systematic analysis of the interaction of social movement organizations (but see James Q. Wilson, 1973; Zald and Ash, 1966; Gusfield, 1966; Nelson, 1974). Of course, practitioners and the practical theorists have developed strategies for interorganizational relations. Lenin knew how to freeze the Mensheviks out in the cold, and his able disciple Willi Muenzenberger, knew how to create a popular front. Naturally enough, practical theorists have not analyzed the range of possible forms of social movement organization interaction, normally concentrating instead upon problems of the moment.

If social movements were unified affairs, with one charismatic leader or SMO dominating and holding together the movement, then we could ignore movement organizations, the formal organizations that pursue movement goals, and industries, the congeries of organizations that pursue the goals; at best such a focus would be marginal, perhaps devoted to understanding factionalism. But it is apparent that social movements are rarely these unified affairs. Whether we study revolutionary movements, broad or narrow social reform movements, or religious movements, we find a variety of SMOs or groups, linked to various segments of supporting constituencies (both institutional and individual), competing amongst themselves for resources and symbolic leadership, sharing facilities and resources at other times, developing stable and many times differentiated functions, occasionally merging into unified ad hoc coalitions, and occasionally engaging in all-out war against each other. Organizations associated with a social movement and with its counter-movement may also interact. By definition pursuing antithetical goals, such organizations compete for legitimacy and resources, but, under some circumstances, may also cooperate with one another.
The fundamental task of this paper is to gain analytic purchase on the variety of SMO interorganizational relationships and to begin to specify the conditions under which these various forms of interaction are most likely to occur. In order to accomplish this task we draw heavily upon a resource mobilization perspective (McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977; Oberschall, 1973) on social movements and attempt to combine its insights with the extensive research and analysis which has been done in the study of complex organizations. In the past social movement analysts and analysts of complex organizations spoke rather different languages. In our attempt to merge these approaches we will utilize the concerns of both and the conceptualizations of both. Our earlier work has been informed by the assumption that analysis of SMOs can be informed by the perspectives of organizational theory and research in general. Recent organizational theory and research has focused upon the interrelationships between society, organizational environment and organizational behavior.

Before we begin to discuss interorganizational interactions, we need to define several terms. First, we define a social movement as a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society. A social movement organization (SMO) is a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement these goals. A social movement industry (SMI) is made up of all of the SMOs with relatively similar goals (just as an economic industry is all firms offering similar products). A social movement sector (SMS) consists of all SMIs in a society no matter to which SM they are attached. We have elsewhere (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) discussed competition between the social movement sector and other societal sectors. Here we focus primarily upon competition and cooperation between organizations within the social movement sector, paying attention primarily to intra-industry relations.

Gerlach and Hine (1970) argue that a number of social movements can be characterized exclusively as a weblike structure of informal, unorganized relations of cooperation and communication among local cells. Nevertheless, many SMOs have more coherent organization structures and combine several local units. Our discussion focuses upon organizations which are bureaucratic, as Gamson utilizes that term (1975); that is, organizations which have several levels of membership, lists of members (however faulty), and some kind of written document describing the structure of the organization. Also, we focus upon organizations which pursue goals in more than a local environment; they pursue goals aimed at changing society in general rather than just local conditions.

Even though scholars writing about social movements have paid little attention to interorganizational relations, this has been a lively topic in the study of complex organizations. Dating, possibly, from Levine and White's important paper on exchange relationships among organizations (1961) and Litwak and Hylton's early paper (1962), but including also the emphasis upon organization-environment relations found in the writings of Selznick (1949) and James D. Thompson (1967), in the last decade students of organizations have mapped the forms and determinants of interorganizational relationships (for summaries, see Evans, 1978 and Negandi, 1978). They have explored exchange relations amongst social welfare agencies, the emergence of federated relations, temporary and permanent, conflict emerging from low domain consensus, the emergence of joint programs, mechanisms used to mediate between clients and organizations and those used to reduce environmental uncertainties. We draw upon a number of strands of research in this tradition. In particular we discuss perfect and imperfect competition, ideology and conflict, cooperative relations, and factionalism.
Perfect and Imperfect Competition

Although organizational analysts have tended, until rather recently (i.e., Pfeffer, 1978) to focus upon cooperation instead of competition between organizations, those who have addressed competition have normally utilized the imagery of the market mechanism while at the same time recognizing the social constraints which alter and shape such mechanisms. Let us briefly describe the current consensus about inter-organizational competition.

Businesses offering similar products to a large number of potential buyers need not directly interact, but they are able to view the consequences and behavior of others, and aware of pricing and product decisions through market mechanisms. Pure, or perfect, competitive markets involve homogeneous goods, many sellers (offerors) and many buyers (users). Imperfect competition occurs when there is product differentiation and/or barriers to entry somewhat restricting market access. Where product differentiation is possible sellers may attempt to divide the market into segments which they "capture," reduce competition and establish more dependable and organizationally favorable relations. As the number of sellers becomes smaller, we can speak of a move-towards an oligopolistic industry; buyers have limited choices and the number of sellers is small enough so that one or a few may dominate and constrain the choices of others by their influence on buyers, or the sellers may directly interact and concert behavior (establish a cartel).

Organizations (firms) offering relatively similar products may, in some cases, have to deal with a single buyer or supplier (monopoly and monopsony). Such situations create great pressures upon the organizations to concert their behavior. What does such a perspective suggest about SMO competition?

A. Competition for Resources and Legitimacy

To survive in modern society, SMOs need financial resources if they are to pursue goals in more than a local context. Money is needed for personnel, transportation, office supplies, and the like. Organizations can survive without money when personnel donate their time and money transferred to them for non-social movement purposes (Unemployment Insurance payments are widely used for subsistence by SMO organizers). Thus students can live off their parents, or other organizations may "loan" their personnel and facilities to SMOs for full-time or part-time activity. SCLC, for instance, depended heavily upon the resources of Black church groups in its early days (Oberschall, 1973), and many universities tacitly loaned faculty, chaplains, and students to the anti-Vietnam war movement. But where SMOs employ or wish to employ full-time cadre, even at starvation wages, they will need to regularize or institutionalize the flow of money into the organization. Sometimes, of course, SMOs have windfall resources. Ralph Nader sued GM, which had spied on him and attempted to entrap him in illegal and immoral behavior, leading to a one-half million dollar settlement, which he used for his enterprises (McCarry, 1972). Lenin orchestrated the courting of two sisters, heiresses to a large fortune, who provided an infusion of funds (Wolfe, 1955).

Unless individuals or organizations can be coerced to participate in SMOs (as occurs in armed conflicts where SMOs use coercive techniques to raise manpower and money), SMOs must appeal for support. Consequently, at the most general level SMOs must compete not only with all other SMOs but with voluntary organizations of other kinds as well for the time, effort, loyalty, and money which citizens can give or withhold. Here, however, we focus upon the competition between SMOs within SMIs and peripherally upon the competition between social movement industries. Competition is for symbolic dominance: which SMO has the best programs, tactics, and leaders for accomplishing goals. SMOs attempt to convince sympathizers to follow their lead.

B. Competition for Resources Controlled by Individuals

Organizations within an SMI "ought" to cooperate in goal accomplishment;
after all, they seek similar goals. However, because they share to a greater or lesser extent the same adherent pools, both individual and institutional, they are in basic competition for resources from adherents. The intensity of this competition is related importantly to resource availability, the extensity of the demands which SMOs place upon constituents, or those who provide the varied resources to the organization, the social heterogeneity of potential supporters and the interaction of these three factors.

Hypothesis 1: Under conditions of the declining availability of marginal resources, direct competition and conflict between SMOs with similar goals can be expected to increase. Although money is not the only type of resource, it is the most flexible. Obtaining funds from individual constituents (conscience or beneficiary) depends partially upon the availability of marginal dollars. The amount of discretionary resources available is linked to the state of the business cycle, the number of sympathizers, and the ability of organizations to penetrate the pool of sympathizers.

A recent case provides a useful illustration. That is what has been called an "acrimonious dispute" between the NAACP and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund. The Fund, as the latter is called, separated from the NAACP in 1957 under pressure from the Internal Revenue Service in order to preserve the tax deductible feature of its financial support. As Brown says, "Few People, however, were aware of that separation. As a result, for the past 22 years the NAACP and the Fund (LDF) often were thought of as the same group. Donations intended for one often went to the other, and that was the essence of the dispute... (1979, p. A5)." The NAACP has decided to attempt to bar the Fund from using its initials in attempts to raise funds in the future. While there has been some tension between the two organizations over the years, it is noteworthy that the conflict has become increasingly strident at a time when resources for civil rights organizations have been declining.

Hypothesis 2: Among more inclusive organizations (which demand relatively little from the majority of members) the competition for resources between similar organizations should be less intense than that between more exclusive organizations (which demand heavy commitments from members). We would expect that multiple memberships would be common in industries with many inclusive organizations, while multiple memberships are frowned upon by exclusive organizations. Exclusive SMOs treat membership as a zero-sum resource. (However, exclusive organizations may use multiple membership as a way of infiltrating other organizations. In this case, multiple memberships result from concerted policy.)

To repeat, SMOs must pursue resources, and, all other things being equal such competition should be more intense under conditions of resource scarcity. But for some SMOs, even during times when resources are not scarce, it is possible to view constituents of related inclusive organizations as potentially recruitable even while they maintain commitments to other SMOs. Given the extensive literature on voluntary associations generally and social movements in particular, we know that few people affiliate very extensively, but that a small proportion of people are rather widely affiliated. Indeed a number of studies (Von Eschen, et al., 1971; McFarland, 1977) have shown extensive multiple memberships in the social movement sector. Thus, even though SMOs in the same industry may be competing for the same resources (i.e. the labor and loyalty of the same people) since no organization commands the total loyalty of most of its constituents, this competition is not zero-sum, and, consequently, should not be especially rancorous. Once a person gives funds, future solicitations from other SMOs become more likely.

Competition between inclusive organizations in an industry takes the form of slight product differentiation (offering marginally different goals), and,
especially, tactical differentiation. Different SMOs may specialize principally in litigation strategies, or lobbying strategies, or protest strategies, or particular targets. Such differentiation provides a rationale for committed constituents to become affiliated with a number of SMOs pursuing similar goals in a number of different ways. This is, we believe, the major form of competition between inclusive SMOs within SMIs in modern America.

Since organizations pursuing similar goals compete for resources, SMOs will form that are based upon differential perceptions and tastes of adherent pools in order to capitalize on such pre-existing differences. As well, when resource availability is expanding, existing organizations can be expected to expand their range of targets and tactics when possible.

Hypothesis 3: The range of appeals and the variety of organizations which develop is partly related to the pre-existing heterogeneity of potential supporters. SMO goals and programs are, of course, importantly determined by the shape of the task, the range of institutional targets and the means to change targets which stem from a more or less well articulated ideology. But a heterogeneous potential support base calls forth and permits a range of definitions of the situation.

Though product differentiation may appear sharp to the non-members of more exclusive SMOs that differentiation is probably less important to growth and resource accumulation than it is for more inclusive organizations. Since ideological transformation is typical of more exclusive SMOs and some evidence exists to suggest that members and non-members are quite similar prior to ideological transformation (Heirich, 1977; Gerlach and Hine, 1970), what pre-existing value heterogeneity there is among potential supporters is probably of less importance for growth than the appropriateness and sophistication of recruitment mechanisms (McCarthy and Hoge, 1978). Consequently, the apparent range and variety of offerings of more exclusive organizations is more related to internal processes than to the pre-existing preferences of potential supporters.

Product differentiation is more important for recruitment for inclusive organizations and especially so for inclusive organizations which do not depend upon face-to-face interaction. For these organizations product differentiation functions much like it does in the market place. If marginal dollars are in plentiful supply the possibility of offering slight changes in products in order to capture some of the increased potential market are more likely. This may take the form of new organizations, spin-off organizations, or existing organizations expanding their range of related issues, targets and tactics. In the first two cases additional organizations are added to the field, creating the potential for increased competition for resources on the part of existing organizations. When organizations expand their offerings, they enter into competition for resources with other existing organizations with whom they have not competed with in the past. The recent history of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) provides a case in point. Originally an organization devoted exclusively to supporting litigation on first amendment issues, during the early 1970's the organization expanded its goals to ending the war in Vietnam, fighting against the Nixon administration, and for women's rights and abortion. In the process, it gained tens of thousands of new members through its mass mail solicitations. In the process it became an organization competing for resources with many other existing organizations such as NOW, NARAL and many anti-war organizations. But these were times of expanding marginal dollars, and little outward conflict occurred between these organizations. Presumably, the expanded appeals brought new members and additional funds into the coffers of the organization. The adding of new product lines for an organization such as this one with widespread name recognition, we might expect would put it, as with firms, in a better competitive
position in the social movement sector. Unfortunately, such a diversification strategy proved costly to the ACLU when it took an unpopular first amendment stand to defend the Nazi marchers in Skokie, Illinois. As Mann (1978) persuasively argues, the heterogeneity of the membership which was built by expanding the goals of the organization meant that many new members brought in by these recent appeals could not be expected to support the Skokie decision. The result was a drastic decline in membership renewals for the organization.

C. Competition for Resources Controlled by Organizations

So far we have focused upon the competition for support from individual sympathizers--how to transform sympathizers into constituents; but funds are also raised from institutional sources. These funds may be more or less restricted in purposes. Thus money given to an SMO by a governmental agency for a specific purpose comes under audit. Foundation support may be less restricted--the foundation, for instance, may provide money for a voter registration drive, but in fact not tightly control expenditures. However, since foundations are observed by Congress and their operations controlled by federal statute, they tend to be quite politically sensitive. The least restricted money from institutional sources may well be from church organizations, especially the many "social concern" departments in the protestant denominations. These groups aggregate a proportion of total giving from the membership and disburse them over a range of organizations and projects. (Such funds are probably more restricted than money provided by individual constituents, since these bodies also operate under accountability procedures.) Elsewhere (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) we have argued that in the United States, resources provided to SMOs by individuals is more insulated from political social control than are those of institutions. The more removed from political control and from membership pressure, the more an institution is free to distribute resources as it wants.

However, remember that competition for funds from individual constituents requires a very different process than attempting to obtain funds from institutional sources; the former requires more public relations skills and styles while the latter requires more program development skills. Lawson (1978) reports that the increase in funds available from institutional sources to the various organizations of the tenants rights movement in New York City has created both a wider diversity of SMOs and increased levels of competition for the available funds. Where there are limited numbers of institutional funders, competition appears to be zero-sum. Competition becomes conflict as those who cannot gain access to such funds attack the legitimacy of those who can. Most of the SMOs which Lawson describes appear to be inclusive. We are led to Hypothesis 4: Institutional funding, when publicly known, will increase conflict between more inclusive SMOs. Whether or not this hypothesis holds for more exclusive SMOs is not so clear to us, since it is difficult to untangle the effects of organizational structure, goals and institutional funding for such organizations.

II Ideology and Conflict

The conflict which occurs between SMOs over legitimacy is normally discussed by analysts under the rubric of the "functions of a radical fringe." As the SMOs of an SMI pursue related goals, some organizations offer a more comprehensive version of the problem and more drastic change as a solution. These organizations are normally called radical. Naturally enough, authorities are likely to prefer to deal with organizations which state less comprehensive versions of change. By virtue of the authorities' recognition of
some SMOs as legitimate spokespersons and others as not legitimate, conflict is almost guaranteed between SMOs. This normally takes the form of open attacks by the unlegitimated SMOs upon those who have been accepted, however marginally, by authorities. The rich rhetoric describing fine degrees of cooptation and "selling out" grows out of this process. The legitimated SMOs may gain even more legitimacy from authorities and bystanders counter-attacking the unlegitimated SMOs, but this increases the level of inter-SMI conflict. The longstanding conflicts between communist and non-communist trade unions in the United States during the 1940's and 1950's illustrates this process.

Under other conditions, no response by the legitimated SMOs reaps the reward of increased legitimacy. This process is described in detail by Killian for the recent civil rights movement. Hypothesis 5: Assuming that SMOs are competing for similar audiences, as SMOs within an industry become further apart in their conception of the amount of change and the tactic required, rancorous conflict increases.

So far we have discussed competition and conflict in which SMOs present verbal claims about themselves and their opponents and competitors. And most often the appearance of shared goals mutes the direct and more violent attack of one SMO on another. But rancorous and deadly conflict is not unknown between SMOs in the same SMI. In modern America, rancorous conflict occurs in such settings primarily over legitimacy of representation of constituency or over exclusive membership.

In the U.S., there are two settings in which SMI conflict has occurred: between sect-like SMOs with comprehensive visions of change; and between labor organizations which must, by virtue of the legal and political circumstances under which they operate, require membership exclusivity with regard to other organizations.

It is widely observed that small, sect-like SMOs tend to devote extensive energies toward bitter conflicts with other SMOs which seem to non-combatants only marginally different. For instance in the late 1960's the Black Muslims and Malcolm X's Organization for Afro-American Unity, engaged in murderous conflict. A major reason for the intensity of such conflict appears to relate to the great sacrifice and commitment required of their members: members are a scarce and valuable resource which have normally required a major SMO investment in socialization. Hypothesis 6: The more SMOs with exclusive membership requirements compete for a limited pool of potential members, the greater the potential conflict.

Another situation producing rancorous and deadly conflict occurs, at least in the local context, when organizational survival is at stake. The recent conflict between the United Farm Workers Organization and the Teamsters Union in the fields of California illustrates the intensity that such conflict can reach. Conflict between the AFT and the NEA in many school districts and colleges demonstrates the same process in a milder form. In these cases, organizations depend upon membership enrollment in order to win recognition from authorities. The loser in these battles is not accredited as a bargaining agent and must leave the scene.

Utilizing our resource mobilization logic, then, and viewing the social world from the point of view of a particular SMO highlights the possibilities of conflict between it and other SMOs offering similar products. But the relative lack of conflict and the extent of cooperation among related SMOs then calls for some explanation. How can we account for cooperation between SMOs which, all other things being equal, our theoretical perspective leads us to believe should be vigorously competing?
III Cooperation: Exchange, the Division of Labor and Domain Consensus

In the production of a product or the carrying out of social functions, a set of organizations may develop differentiated but interlinked roles. They then establish exchange relations. Here is where the emphasis upon exchange, domain consensus and conflict over domain has become relevant to analysts of complex organizations. These relationships vary in their importance to the parties, their stability, and the amount of coordination and mutual adjustment that takes place. To review:

1. Ad hoc, small item exchanges may take place in which lower-level personnel of an organization find it advantageous to utilize the services, products, or facilities of another organization.

2. Policy coordination and rules governing interchanges are likely to emerge when two or more organizations are dependent upon each other for an important part of their input or output. These policies and rules are likely to be reviewed by upper-level personnel in organizations. Where the interchange is regular but over changing conditions or issues, interagency committees or liaison groups may emerge to monitor the relations.

3. Cooperative relations occur to the extent that the skills, competencies, tasks, and prices of the partners to the exchange are agreed upon by all parties (this is what is meant by domain consensus).

4. Where stable relationships have emerged with highly differentiated but interlinked domains, the organizational partners may exchange information and monitor their environments for mutual enhancement.

5. In some cases, cooperating organizations may set up joint organizations or projects. As opposed to coordination, the joint program involves some autonomy of action for the personnel of the joint program; in essence a new organization is created.

These cooperative relationships occur in both the profitmaking and nonprofit sectors. And a number of researchers have pursued a description of the role of interlocking boards of directorates in the business sectors, showing their widespread occurrence, their patterned nature, and speculating upon their probable role in coordinating the inter-organizational sector.² There have also been studies of joint ventures in the for-profit and nonprofit sectors.

Other researchers, such as Donhoff (1976), have explored social relations between the leaders of private sector organizations, again showing widespread contact and extensive communication allowing the development of inter-organizational undertakings about cooperative ventures. Finally, several analysts have argued that private sector organizations have cooperated in the development of certain federal regulatory agencies as a means of reducing competition and of stabilizing industry operation.

Following such leads there are a number of factors we can isolate which serve to facilitate and shape cooperation among SMOs. We shall discuss several of these: task specialization, social control, interlocking boards of directors, overlapping membership constituencies, and inducements from authorities and elites. Each of these factors may produce either formal or informal cooperation.

A. Task Specialization

Where an SMI is fairly well established, comprised of several different SMOs, informal domain agreements and exchanges emerge. They emerge usually between those organizations sharing relatively similar conceptions of goals and allowable tactics. First, SMOs may agree upon geographic and functional turf. Basic to domain consensus are economies of expertise and closeness of constituent relationships.³ On the one hand, legal organizations, lobbying
and information groups, and other technical services develop within specific SMI and consequently have available an expertise which other SMOs in the SMI would find difficult and expensive to duplicate. On the other hand, the highly technical groups rarely develop strong links to constituents. Hypothesis 7: Domain agreements are more likely to be reached allowing extended cooperation among SMOs with different but not contradictory task specializations than among those which pursue goals with similar tactical formulas. Although SCLC employed lawyers, they largely protected the organization and its leaders from arrest. We know that clear domain agreements existed between CORE and the NAACP during the "Freedom Rides" in the South, where the NAACP strained its resources to provide legal defense for CORE members arrested in local areas (Meier and Rudwick, 1973). We suspect that a similar exchange relationship developed at the height of the civil rights movement between the SCLC and both the ACLU and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.

B. External Social Control

Hypothesis 8: Social control produces increased cooperation among SMOs, when social control efforts threaten the very existence of a number of SMOs. Violence, legal restrictions upon operating procedures, and arrests not only commit SMO constituents to their own SMOs (Gerlach and Hine, 1970), but also commit SMOs within the same SMI to one another. This is a pattern which appears in even broader contexts, sometimes even including SMOs from diverse SMIs in momentary cooperative ventures. For instance, the Japanese invasion led to uneasy cooperation between the Nationalists and the Communists in China during World War II. The Berkeley Free Speech Movement (FSM) at the University of California is another example of a coalition which formed as a response to an outside threat. The FSM grew out of an attempt by authorities to restrict off-campus political organizing by on-campus organizations. A wide variety of organizations with sometimes related and sometimes disparate goals coalesced when their base of operations was threatened. Originally the United Front was formed which eventually became the FSM. The United Front included all three campus Republican groups along with a right-wing conservative society and a wide array of left groups (Draper, 1964).

Social control engenders the same kind of cooperation between SMOs within the same SMI. Political trials regularly have such an effect. The notorious trials of WWI leaders during the 1920's served to develop cooperative relations between organizations which normally worked at arm's length from one another (Dubofsky, 1969). The cooperative defense funds which normally arise in such circumstances serve to informally link SMOs to one another. An unintended effect of such trials when they are badly managed (as in the United States during the 1960's and in pre-revolutionary Russia) is to develop bonds between leaders of diverse SMOs, thereby setting the stage for future cooperative ventures.

C. Overlapping Constituencies

Boards: Much like modern corporations, many inclusive SMOs in modern society develop boards of directors or advisory councils. These boards serve various purposes including providing legitimation, providing links with various constituencies, technical and political advice to SMO leaders, and providing links to various elite and institutional funding sources. We are not aware of a systematic evaluation of boards of this type, but a quick look at boards within any SMI shows extensive overlapping membership—-or in recent parlance, interlocks. For instance, the leaders of one SMO may be found on the board of directors of similar SMOs. Dignitaries such as Ramsey Clark or Benjamin Spock can be found on a wide variety of boards. It may be possible to describe inter-SMI and SMO relations by inspecting the amount of interlock, much as this has been attempted by analysts of the corporate world in
modern America. Of course, such interlocks can also be used to infer integration into the larger society by attending to the other positions held by members. 4

Hypothesis 9: The more the interlocks, the greater the cooperation among SMOs. The perspective of the board member who sits on the boards of two similar SMOs ought to incline that individual toward counseling cooperation in goal pursuit. Though board members are normally in a formal position of approving the behavior of the SMO, we suspect that these boards, like corporate boards, are often rather less than vigorous. However, the circulation of information in these settings ought to keep each SMO so linked abreast of the activities of the closest competitors for resources. Following what we know of similar processes in the corporate sector (Oomhoff, 1974), we would not be surprised to find the existence of watering holes (such as Stewart Mott’s Townhouse across from the Supreme Court in Washington, D.C.) where those who occupy extensive interlocking positions gather socially. It is known, for instance, that leaders of the Civil Rights movement in the South convened at the Highlander Folk Center in Tennessee, and later in Kentucky. These informal groupings should serve to further coordinate the activities of SMOs within an SMI and relations between ideologically linked SMOs. 5

Memberships: As we noted above, many citizens belong to a number of voluntary associations, and a subset of them belongs to a number of SMOs. Consequently, any SMO should have some set of its constituents who belong to other related and other apparently unrelated SMOs. We could characterize SMOs by their degree of overlapping constituencies; the inclusive/exclusive dimension includes the end of this continuum as one of its elements. Hypothesis 10: The more SMOs have overlapping constituencies, the more they should be constrained toward cooperation. (However, where we normally refer to the inclusive SMO as a "front group," the cooperation is induced through infiltration.) Though not as directly as interlocking boards of directors, overlapping memberships ought to provide communication between affected SMOs.

Overlapping memberships have different sources and consequences at national and local levels. In local organizations, or chapter of national organizations, clusters of people may belong to a number of similar organizations which pursue similar but discrete goals. The clustering is created through interpersonal networks. Meier and Rudwick (1973) describe the operation of CORE and the NAACP in the South during the height of the Civil Rights movement of the 1960’s as one commonly marked by overlapping membership at the local level. In some circumstances there was almost complete overlapping membership, hence tactical cooperation was guaranteed.

National organizations with inclusive and non-federated or only partly federated constituents may find themselves in a situation where many of their constituents hold memberships in similar SMOs created through interchanged membership lists. McFarland (1976) shows, for instance, that approximately 30 percent of the members of Common Cause are also members of the League of Women Voters. There is extensive overlap between the membership of the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), Planned Parenthood, and the National Organization of Women (NOW) (Personal Communication). Some of this overlap appears to occur when the same or similar mailing lists are used in solicitations for membership in parallel SMOs. SMOs loan or rent their lists to one another. SMOs may also contract with a single firm to handle solicitations, and the same pool of lists may be used. We would expect, for instance, that Richard Viguerie’s centrality as a mailing firm for organizations on the right would serve to increase the likelihood of overlapping memberships between similar conservative organizations. The extensity of the overlaps should constrain potential conflict between such organizations. Membership
surveys are not all uncommon among such organizations, so it is reasonable to assume that many leaders are aware of such overlaps. Since such membership is quite unstable (many organizations with a mail order membership experience less than 50 percent renewals each year), one would expect leaders to be rather careful to show appropriate cooperation, while at the same time retaining images of product differentiation.

D. Elite and Third Party Constraints

Finally, cooperation between SMOs may be encouraged by authorities and elite institutions. During the days of the Johnson administration, the President held many meetings with "Civil Rights Leaders." Though there was extensive conflict between some of these groups at times, some element of cooperation was encouraged as the leaders of SNCC and the more moderate civil rights groups maintained ties through the offices of the President. Churches and foundations which support the social movement sector regularly call for cooperation between SMOs pursuing similar goals. Such institutional funders most likely hold efficiency visions of goal accomplishment, and from their vantage point conflict is counterproductive. When in the business of providing resources, such institutions can back up such encouragement with threats and actual sanctions. Dealing with a small number of funders or authorities puts contradictory pressures on SMOs; it heightens conflict because zero-sum situations are created, but it also creates a demand for cooperation. Hypothesis 11: If the funding institution is selecting one among many proposals from different SMOs, conflict is encouraged; if coalitions grants are being made, cooperation is encouraged.

SMOs in modern society are linked to one another and to other organizations in a wide variety of ways. These linkages serve to mute the conflict which might be expected from a conception of SMOs as just organizations seeking survival and growth. It is those organizations which are isolated from widespread linkages where we would expect to find more rancorous inter-SMO conflict.

E. Alliances, Cartels, Federations, and Mergers

Organizations not only cooperate and exchange, they sometimes form supra-organizations--cartels, federations, alliances, and mergers. These forms of organizational behavior have been extensively discussed by organizational analysts. In the merger, two or more formally separate organizations combine into one new organization; the merger can occur by mutual consent or through a hostile takeover. In the federation, units retain their identity but give up certain discretionary rights to the new organization, or, in the dominated alliance, to one of the component units. Federations and alliances differ in their depth and purposes. Indeed the relatively permanent coordination of policies discussed above can be considered one form of alliance. The formation of alliances, however, is also likely to result from the necessity of dealing with a powerful (monopolistic) resource provider or buyer. Public and private organizations offering similar services and products may need "trade associations" to represent them to the outside world.

Finally, a wide variety of private sector organizations may cooperate in ad hoc alliances when an outside threat or a potential outside advantage is perceived. Examples are alliances formed to counter federal taxation and labor policies.

A managerial technocrat might see in the plethora of SMOs in an industry a magnificent opportunity for rationalization by merger. After all, economies of scale would result from the merger of these small, inefficient organizations. And just think how much simpler it would be if the movement spoke with one voice! But an organizational realist such as James Q. Wilson (1973) would surely point out that the managerial technocrat is both unwise and naive. Naive, because
the technocrat assumes that efficiency is a prime concern of SMO leaders when it is not, and because they miss the strong drive to organizational maintenance of leaders and their key constituents. Unwise, because they assume that speaking with one voice increases the effectiveness of the movement when in fact the effectiveness of a movement, both in mobilizing support and attaining change, may be aided by having many organizations. Moreover, as Gerlach and Hine (1970) demonstrate, there are major advantages to having diversity within an SMI: diversity allows for innovation in tactics and makes it difficult for authorities to target social control efforts.

But ideologically compatible SMOs do form alliances and mergers under special sets of circumstances. SMOs will join together for special events. Marches and mass demonstrations are often run in consortium fashion with several different organizations mobilizing constituencies and interlinked networks. Joint planning and ad hoc liaison committees are used for these occasions. Our conception of ideological leadership and Olson's theory (1965) of the contributions of organizations to the provision of collective goods leads us to believe that: Hypothesis 12: The leading or dominant organization in a movement will make contributions greater than its proportional share of resources to carrying out large events for special purposes.

Although coalitions, both formal and informal, are common, mergers between SMOs seem relatively rare. One condition which seems to spur merger is the same one which can also spur bitter conflict, and that is between competing labor SMOs. The United Farm Workers Organization identified with Cesar Chavez, for instance, was formed out of two ethnically distinct SMOs, and the merger of the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O. is well known. The condition of labor representation seems to offer an incentive for both conflict and merger which does not normally exist to the same extent in other SMIs.

As we noted above, monopoly funders may require, as part of their commitment to fund, united action or programs on the part of SMOs, or at least the working out of domain agreements. In this sense, funders may have a technocratic bias that may or may not correspond with organizational effectiveness. Monopoly funders also create formal alliances as did the Ford Foundation in its funding of the Southwest Council of La Raza (Goulden, 1971: p. 270 ff.). This council was designed to fund and direct local boards drawn from existing Mexican-American organizations in a number of states to create united action. Similarly, political power-holders may impose an alliance because they want to know to whom they can speak—who represents the movement. On the SMO side, unification comes about because the SMO's leaders realize the elite will pick up on divisions and magnify them, or will not know to whom to listen. A related environmental press toward the formulation of alliances is the need to present a united front in lobbying activities. Lawson's (1978) description of the development of federations of tenant organizations in New York City in recent years seems to represent such a process. The state legislature provided not only the potential for statutes affecting common goals, but also resource flows to various organizations engaging in tenant actions of a diverse nature.

Alliances may often come about as the SMO scents victory; then coordinated action to achieve goals has a higher priority than organizational maintenance. Besides, at such times organizational maintenance is not under threat, and money and resources tend to be easily mobilized. But at such times no one worries about actual mergers. On the other hand, mergers are often suggested in declining movements; then mergers may represent the only mechanism for maintaining a viable organization.

Let us mention one other form of alliance, the popular front. It represents a coalition of like-minded SMOs against a clear-cut countermovement group. We
suspect that: Hypothesis 12: The more clear-cut and vigorous the countercmovement, the easier it is to mobilize an alliance. The need for a unified defense transcends ideological differences. The Southern Conference for Human Welfare represents just such an alliance. Formed in 1938, Krueger says, The Southern Conference was not a Communist Front (as many had charged), but a popular front, a conglomeration of individuals from organizations as diverse as the Baptist Church and the Communist party united about a minimum program on which all of the constituent factions could agree. That minimum program aimed at repairing the defects of American Capitalism, bring the South up to the economic and social standards of the rest of the country, and finally obtaining elementary justice for American Negroes (p. 181).

Of course, alliances may stem from common ideological prescription of targets as well.

IV Factionalism

Both economists and sociologists have a bloodless conception of inter-organizational relations. And the sociologists, oddly enough, tend to ignore power imbalances in these relations. The language of domain consensus tends to assume that the partners have shared or at least non-conflicting goals. But organizations may wish death on one another; they may want to absorb the other, take over its domain, squash the competition. As we have noted the greater the commitment to a zealot’s view of the proper state of the world, and the less effective the control of competition, the more one can expect illegitimate, violent, and deadly interorganizational relations. Finally, one other aspect of interorganizational relations deserves mention. Interorganizational relations may emerge from intraorganizational factionalism. Especially in social movements (see Zald and Ash, 1966, and Gamson, 1975), factionalism in SMOs may lead to splits and the formation of new organizations. A similar process occurs in other organizations when principals (partners, senior executives) split, taking resources and reputations with them.

Factionalism is probably the variety of inter-SMO relations which has received the most note historically. Probably as a result of the extensive factionalism within left, sect-like organizations during the 1930’s in the United States, the impression was left that exclusive SMOs are more likely to develop factions, leading to the amoeba-like growth of new SMOs. Gamson’s (1975) evidence on 53 SMOs suggests that exclusive organizations are no more likely to faction than are inclusive organizations. It may be the case that the impression derives from the fact that bitter conflict tends to occur between newly-formed SMOs of the exclusive variety with the parent organization, while bitter conflict is not so likely when inclusive SMOs spin off factions. The impression comes, then, from the after-split behavior of the SMO. Some sub-set of the constituents of an SMO may split off to form a new SMO relating to similar goals for a number of reasons, and under a number of different conditions.

The organization of Afro-American Unity, Malcolm X’s organization, represented an off-shoot from the Black Muslims of Elijah Muhammad. The new organization included several members of the Muslims, and was clearly viewed by the Muslims as a competitor for their exclusive members. The bitter conflict which occurred between these two organizations fits older impressions of the process of factionalism.

The Students for a Democratic Society represent a somewhat different case (Sales, 1973). Originally a youth arm of the League for Industrial Democracy, they split off from the parent body when the price of a stable resource flow was non-deviation from the operating tactics and, especially, membership criteria of the LID. Neither organization was exclusive in structure, and,
though pursuing somewhat similar goals, the two organizations did not compete for the same constituency or engage in open conflict.

Another case, again quite different, is that of the splitting off from the Sierra Club of the Friends of the Earth (FOE). This organization was created after a faction of the leadership of the Sierra Club lost several debates about tactics. The forming of the new organization was not an occasion for acrimony, however, and the parent organization lent the new organization its mailing list, as FOE attempted to recruit a constituency which backed up its more aggressive lobbying tactics (Wagner, 1972). FOE seems to have drawn its constituency importantly from the constituency of the parent organization, and the two SMOs have cooperated in a number of joint activities since. Here, two inclusive organizations, the second a result of factionalism within the parent body, have not engaged in bitter conflict, and in fact have cooperated rather extensively. FOE has received grants from institutional funders for operational expenses, especially during its early phases.

These three cases suggest: Hypothesis 14: When factionalism and the spinning off of new SMOs occurs, the extent of exclusivity of membership and the extent of integration into a wider array of non-SMO organizations are both related to the extent of after-split conflict.

Conclusions

Inter-SMO relations are a central dynamic of any social movement. Whether one reads the history of the making of the Russian revolution or the spread of evangelical Christianity, the pattern of conflict and cooperation leaps to the eye. The resource mobilization perspectives' focus upon SMIs led us to ask how interaction within industry parallels the forms and dynamics of organizational interaction found in the literature of economics and the sociology of complex organizations. The parallels are striking.

Only the naive assumption that SMOs all share a common goal and therefore have little interest in conflict and competition has kept scholars from examining such central processes. In addition, since scholars often do case studies of single SMOs (the usual style is to move from a concern with a movement to a study of that movement's dominant organization) industry-wide phenomena are usually treated only in passing.

We have offered a number of hypotheses about the pressures toward cooperation and conflict in an industry, and the forms and permanence of these interactions. Obviously, analysis of these processes is dependent upon a prior description of the structure of an industry. Thus another theoretical task remains: accounting for the differences in industry structure—the number, size, and market locations of SMOs in an industry.

Even with such an analysis, our job would not be finished. Although we think the parallel with economic processes is striking, we should remember the differences. In particular, competition for dominance among SMOs is often for symbolic dominance, for defining the terms of social movement action. Social movement leaders are seeking symbolic hegemony. At some point social movement analysis must join with cultural and linguistic analysis, if it is to fully understand cooperation and conflict in its socially specific forms.


Dubofsky, Melvyn, We Shall Be All, Chicago, Quadrangle Books. 1969.


FOOTNOTES

*We wish to thank Roberta Ash Garner, William Gamson and Louis Kriesberg for their useful comments upon earlier drafts of this paper.

1. Systematic violent conflict between competing SMOs in such contexts, of course, demands special organizational structures. The Teamsters organization, the Black Muslims and Synanon, for instance, possess squads who specialize in such tactics. Most SMOs do not.

2. See, for instance, Pfeffer (1972) and Allen (1974).

3. Mitchell and Davies (1978) in discussing environmental movement coalitions argue that newer members of pre-existing coalitions implicitly accept the existing division of labor in joining them. Stallings (1977) argues that the pre-existing structured relations in local communities affects the likelihood and shape of emergent coalitions.

4. See Aveni (1978) on the NAACP and Curtis and Zurcher (1973) on local anti-pornography campaigns for examples of the importance to SMOs of linkages to individuals and organizations both within and beyond particular SMIs.

5. Mitchell and Davies (1978) point to the importance of common headquarters locations in Washington, D.C. as well as sporadic conferences of professional staffs for the cooperative efforts of many national environmental organizations.

6. Later, in fact, FOE split again when some staff members left to form the Environmental Policy Center, designed as a lobbying group without members (Wagner, 1972).

7. Even in Gamson's (1975) otherwise notable study of 53 SMOs, sampling procedures were used that led to ignoring the position of SMOs in an industry—as if we could study the Russian revolution by studying the Mensheviks alone.
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