MACRO ISSUES IN THE THEORY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

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Counter-Movements and Cross-National

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Copies available through: Center for Research on Social Organization University of Michigan 330 Packard Street Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109 MACRO ISSUES IN THE THEORY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

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Determinants of the Social Movement Sector*

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MACRO ISSUES IN THE THEORY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

In recent years, many social movement theorists and researchers have loosened their ties to collective behavior analysis and moved closer to political sociology. The sources of this shift have been several: 1) the events of the 1960s-the anti-war movement, the civil rights movement, the anti-abortion movement, the rise of the womens' movement, led both participant and observer to highlight the interaction of political process and change with social movement processes; 2) empirical studies testing individualistic assumptions about personal strain and deprivation, assumptions which underlie some version of collective behavior theory, have found them wanting; 3) the development of resource mobilization theory provided tools of analysis more compatible with political sociological and political-economic basic assumptions and guiding metaphors.

Resource mobilization theory comes in several guises. In McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977), it has an economistic slant, with a good deal of emphasis on the infra-structure of societal support, industry competition, cost-benefit of modes of mobilization, and the like. In its more political guise (cf. Tilly), social movement activity is a continuation of political activity, directly affected by the political structures and processes of the larger society, social movement activity is nested amongst the moves of individuals and groups contending for power.

Whatever their guise, resource mobilization approaches move to center stage macro-scopic issues of the organization of movements and their

nesting in larger societal processes. Micro issues central to collective behavior and psychological analysis, such as the nature of grievances, interpersonal processes, the recruitment of members, and the joys of participation, are not dismissed, but are moved to a supporting rather than central role. Emphasis is given to external structures and processes of political regimes and of the larger society.

Although resource mobilization theory has received much attention in recent years and has opened up a number of issues for research that were barely touched in earlier work, it is by no means a finished or well-developed theory. The work of Tilly, Oberschall, and of McCarthy and Zald open up or suggest a number of theoretical issues that require development. I would like to sketch three macro issues that deserve detailed treatment: the study of movement-counter movement interaction, the dynamics of social movement industries, and the shape, size, and orientation of the social movement sector.

Let me briefly identify the central problematic for each issue. Then

I will attempt to sketch the major units of analysis or major dimensions that
will be of interest.

1) Movement-Countermovement. The typical strategy of social movement analysis has been to examine the adherents and organizations comprising a social movement. Often the focus has been upon one segment of a movement—an SMO and its adherents. Resource mobilization theory leads one to focus upon the relations of movement organizations and adherents to authorities and their agents. Yet such a focus ignores a central aspect of almost any movement: that a movement very often generates a counter movement that may become independent of the authorities. Much of the mobilization potential of a movement, its tactics, and its ultimate fate stem from its battles with a

countermovement; that is true for pro- and anti-abortion, the abolition movement, and nuclear and anti-nuclear power. The theoretical issue is how best to describe this interaction.

- 2) The Structure of Social Movement Industries. McCarthy and Zald introduced the concept of a social movement industry as an analogue to the economist's concepts of an industry, a group of organizations (firms) offering similar products to a market of buyers. Social movement industries are all the SMOs striving for similar change goals in a society. It should be immediately apparent that the concept alerts us to aspects of movements largely ignored. Few movements are dominated by a single organization; and any sophisticated movement leader recognizes the continuing tension of cooperation and conflict with other units of the industry. Yet to date we have not had explicit models or propositions to deal with the issue.
- defined as the combination of all social movement sector has been defined as the combination of all social movement industries in a society.

 McCarthy and Zald (1977) introduce the concept to get at the issues of the generalized readiness to support movements for change in a society. Because of their economistic bias and because they largely focus upon the American case, they mainly discuss how levels of affluence, discretionary time, communication facilities, and repression act as inhibitors or facilitators of the sector. This is, however, an incomplete approach. Casual inspection would lead one to note that other societies, seeming as open and rich as ours, have fewer social movements, and these are differently integrated into the political structure of society. The issue to be posed is: how does the social movement sector articulate with the social and political structure of society? This is a problem for cross-national and historical analysis.

Movement and Countermovement

A social movement can be defined as a set of mobilized preferences for social change in a society. Using this very inclusive definition leaves open to question how much change is sought and how the preferences manifest themselves in organized activity. Preferences for change without manifest behavior or mobilization will be called a <u>latent</u> social movement. A countermovement is a set of preferences opposed to those changes. No specific direction is implied by these definitions. Movements can be "backward" looking or forward looking, left or right. Countermovements occur in response to movements. The concept of a <u>latent</u> movement and countermovement is useful to combat a possible ahistorical use of the concept of movement and countermovement. For instance, it would be a mistake to see the anti-abortion countermovement as <u>iust</u> a response to the abortion movement. The beliefs opposing abortion were well in place, indeed institutionalized. They become mobilized, transformed into an active countermovement, in response to the successful actions of pro-abortion movement and authorities.

Both movement and countermovement can be described in terms of the usual components of social movement analysis—support bases, movement organization, tactics, SMO interaction, and the like. What, however, are the major problematics of SM-CSM interaction? I have identified four overlapping issues:

1) At a global level, what is the best way to conceptualize movement-countermovement interaction?

- 2) How does the level of mobilization and progress of a movement affect the level of mobilization and the progress of a countermovement?
- 3) How does the <u>location</u> of a movement and countermovement in the social structure affect their interactions?
- 4) Related to the above but more narrowly focused, how does the relation of movement and countermovement to <u>authorities</u> affect the tasks and tactics of each?

Conceptualizing Movement-Countermovement Interaction. I believe that the best metaphor for thinking about SM-CSM interaction is to think of them as nations at war. SMs and CSMs command pools of resources to be used in a variety of battlefields. Just as one nation may be stronger at sea and weaker on land, so an SM may be stronger on the streets and weaker in the courts. Moreover, a victory or defeat in one arena or battlefield shifts the locus of attack, the nodal point for the next major battlefield. For instance, once the pro-abortion forces won the Supreme Court to its side, anti's shifted to the issue of use of federal funds. I presume that anti's-abortionists would like to gain Supreme Court support. Yet until new constitutional grounds are found, or a different reading of the biology of "life" is convincingly presented, this battlefield is moot.

The course of the war affects the salient nodal points <u>and</u> the ability to mobilize resources. In the course of the war, an SM, much like a state, may use up all of its resources, or through alliances gain added resources.

The war metaphor has several limitations. First, the metaphor implies relatively unified antagonists, yet SMs are best described in terms of congeries of groups and MOs (since wars are often fought by coalitions, this is a matter of degree). Second, the nature of the battle, tactics, and

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resources are quite different in war and in social movement, Wars always imply the use of physical coercion; some social movements may battle only with persuasive techniques. Third, the state may act as arbitrator and guide where no third party constrains wars, at least not between major powers.

Yet the advantages of using the metaphor are quite striking. At each point in time, it sets a frame for weighing the advantages and disadvantages facing each party to the conflict. Moreover, it opens up social movement analysis to the powerful analysis of tactics and tacit bargaining stemming from game theory and analysis of strategic bargaining (Schelling).

Mobilization Processes Thinking about social movement -countermovement interaction as groups at war highlights an important process central to any inter-group conflict; mobilization of one part heightens or affects the mobilization of other parties. Two decades ago, James S. Coleman (1957) published a long paper on community conflict. It has not been supplanted and is directly relevant to our task here. Two aspects of his analysis are especially important. First, the emergence of a conflict issue polarizes or increases cleavage in a community. Second, the mobilization of one side in a conflict issue creates the conditions for the mobilization of the other side.

How does it create the conditions for mobilization of the opposition?

First the SM threaten values, (salient interests); it raises the probability of loss, unless action is taken. Second, the mobilization of an SM-C-SMOs present sharp threats around which they can mount specific defensive action; that is, the activities of the movement or countermovement create clear lines of alternative action for their counterpart. Often MOs and C-MOs can not mobilize because their program of activities is only remotely related to perceived chances of goal attainment. But the creation or mobilization of an active movement sharpens the threat to the latent countermovement.

The idea of a spiral of conflict or increased polarization as a cause of mobilization is attractive, but too simple. First, we need to have a better understanding of the counterpart processes of de-mobilization and de-escalation. They are not merely reciprocal to the mobilization process. Mos will fight for survival, organizational schisms and mergers may take place, tactical changes occur. Second, we need to consider the possibility that under some conditions, mobilization of a movement or countermovement decreases the mobilization of the other side: sometimes mobilization of one side increases hopelessness and despair and interferes with expectations of success, key elements of an implicit risk-reward analysis. Finally, the role of the mass media in mobilization and demobilization must be better understood. Do they operate as score keepers, calling and signalling trends in mobilization and demobilization?

Location in the Social Structure. Just as nations at war can be described in terms of their geo-political and economic resources so, too, can SMs and C-SM be described by their location and resources in the social structure. Movement and countermovement are described by: a) the number and social characteristics of adherents, b) the number and kinds of MOs, c) the tactics of MOs (which link to resources), d) ideology, and 3) the expectations of supporters. Since SM and CM have different organizations and locations, their tactical and strategic opportunities vary. For instance, the anti-nuclear power movement has characteristics of a mass movement, while the pro-nuclear power movement resembles more an institutionalized pressure group with one or two peak associations. It is hard to imagine the pro-nuclear power movement mobilizing a march on Washington, while the anti-nukes have. On the other hand, the pros have enormous resources of technological expertise, far outweighing the antis.

The relative resources of each side affect the battlefield on which SM and CSM meet.

Relation to Authority. At any point in time and on different issues, SM and CSM stand in different relation to authorities. Conceive of authorities as the set of pivotal and public agencies (national, state, and local) that command or control authoritative allocational decisions. In one situation, authorities may be co-terminous with the C-SM, speaking for it, guiding its activities, resisting the SM. In other situations, authorities may be relatively neutral or immobilized, (See Mayer, 1971, for a discussion of counter revolutionary movements.) National authorities may favor the SM and local authorities the CSM, as during the height of the civil rights movement in the South. White citizens councils were supported and encouraged by elites. As the civil rights movement in the South progressed, local authorities and elites detached themselves from the CSM, because local elites changed their views and because the legal matrix changed. As the movement moved north, national and northern local authorities became more detached, neutral, and even hostile to the movement, without embracing the CSM.

When an SM wins, it either captures authorities, now utilizing them and their resources as agents of the movement, or changes their decision premises. The C-SM then faces a different set of tasks, has a lower command of authority resources, must choose a different set of targets, and has a lower legitimacy with authorities.

One of the advantages of the SM-CSM analysis and the analogy to war is that it forces a dynamic interactional and over time analysis. It forces us to examine a movement in a historical process, not as a social curio, an artifact of a particular moment.

Industry Structure and MO Interaction

McCarthy and Zald (1977) introduce the concept of a social movement industry (SMI) as the organizational analogue to a social movement. The SMI is all of the SMOs oriented toward SM's change goals. Drawing upon the analogy between an SMI and industry as defined by economists, they develop a number of hypotheses about the growth of industries, the survival and growth potential of specific MOs within an industry and the internal differentiation of the industry. Here are the first set of hypotheses (1977) they stated concerning industries or MOs in an industry:

Hypothesis 2. The greater the absolute amount of resources available to the SMS, the greater the likelihood that new SMIs and SMOs will develop to compete for these resources (p. 1225).

Hypothesis 3. Regardless of the resources available to potential beneficiary adherents, the larger the amount of resources available to conscience adherents, the more likely is the development of SMOs and SMIs that respond to preferences for change (p. 1225).

Hypothesis 6. Older, established SMOs are more likely than newer SMOs to persist throughout the cycle of SMI growth and decline (P. 1233).

Hypothesis 7. The more competitive an SMI (a function of the number and size of the existing SMOs), the more likely it is that new SMOs will offer narrow goals and strategies (p. 1234).

Hypothesis 9. The larger the SMS and the larger the specific SMIs, the more likely it is that SM careers will develop (p. 1235),

In their forthcoming paper (1980), Zald and McCarthy develop a number of propositions about cooperation and competition within an industry.

They develop their hypotheses out of two bodies of theory: economic models of competition, and organizational theories about the dynamics of interorganizational relations. I do not want to repeat their analysis here.

Examples of some of their hypotheses are:

Hypothesis 2. The range of appeals and the variety of organization is partly related to the heterogeneity of potential supporters (p. 12).

Hypothesis 4. Assuming that SMOs are competing for similar audiences, as SMOs within an industry become further apart in their concept of the amount of change and the tactics required, rancorous conflict increases (p. 14).

Hypothesis 6, Domain agreements are more likely to be reached allowing extended cooperation among SMOs with inter-dependent task specializations than among those which pursue similar goals with similar tactical formulas.

Hypothesis 8, The more the (board) interlocks, the greater the cooperation among SMOs.

I am persuaded by logic and empirical cases that Zald and McCarthy are on the right track. Here I want to raise two issues they didn't discuss: 1) what determines whether a industry is locally based and fragmented or has a more nationally oriented focus? 2) How does an MO dominate a MI?

Local and National Structures

In our 1977 and 1980 papers, we slide right by an issue that deserves explicit treatment. We nod in the direction of Gerlach and Hine (1970), but in practice ignore them. Because Gerlach and Hine focus upon local ideological and solidary groups and we were more interested in the garnering of resources and influencing authorities, no real attempt has been made to integrate the two. Integration of the two perspectives may give a clue to the determinants of industry structure.

Gerlach and Hine describe the pentecostal movement and the Black Power movement as being similar in that they are decentralized, segmented, and reticulated. Decentralization refers to the local autonomy of units in making decisions; segmented refers to the extent to which units offer slightly different programs for members from different backgrounds; reticulated refers to the communication and learning that occurs between

units. I presume that movements might also be centralized and integrated,

A unified revolutionary movement with one encompassing SMO might be an

example,

Some movements, usually those offering individual change, and salvation fit the Gerlach and Hine model. But a single SMO in a salvation—and individually-oriented movement may provide a centralized structure of program and tactics. I assume the Unification Church of the Reverend Moon fills the bill. As John Lofland (in Zald and McCarthy, 1979) analyzes the resource mobilization techniques of a millenarian sect, mushrooming on the national scene, it resembles the analysis of Zald and McCarthy much more than that of Gerlach and Hine.

Still other movements combine the localistic features described by Gerlach and Hine as well as multiple, national, politically-oriented MOs.

The modern feminist movement fits this description. (See Jo Freeman in Zald and McCarthy, 1979). A way to analyze this variety of structures may be found by using the economists concept of a industry structure.

Let me describe the components of industry structure more explicitly. Economists describe structures largely in terms of the degree of concentration of firms serving a market. A fragmented industry has many firms serving a market; a concentrated or monopolistic industry has few firms, or only one, serving a market. If transportation costs are high and local information is at a premium, a market may be small, local, and monopolized within, yet at a national organizational level be large and fragmented (the construction industry is the prime current example). Transportation costs are high in construction, because, it would be difficult to pool labor

in one or just a few assembly sites or to move labor to and from just a few offices. Industry structure refers to the number and degree of concentration of establishments (plants, productive units) and enterprises (or firms; that is, linked establishments) in an actual market. Analysis of structures examines both the degree of concentration and the causes of the degree of concentration (for example, rent, barriers to entry, economies of scale, and the like).

The structure of an SMI is shaped by: 1) the amount of demand for its products; 2) the organizational-technological requirements to deliver its product; and 3) the amount of ideological and organizational hegemony of the goals leading SMOs. "Products" or goals, are varied but may be either individual or collective. To the extent that a movement offers individual satisfaction and change, solidarity, and interpersonal satisfactions, it must have small units delivering rewards at the location of potential numbers.

That is, SMOs cannot deliver solidarity through the mails or over radio or TV. The "product" entails a local unit. To the extent that an SMO works at changing national or state laws, it must have units aggregating demands and resources and lobbying or pressing at those levels (cf. Salsbury, 1968).

An SMO with national-level political goals can do without local units. It could collect resources and support from isolated individual constituents or from major centralized funding sources and have a centralized lobbying and media development unit. An SMO or industry pressing for state acts must

develop state-level constituencies and vehicles for representing it. Thus, as movement goals include both political and individual aspects, we would expect a more complex national and local structure.

Elsewhere (1977) we have argued how increased market size (increased demand) leads to the entrance of new competitions in an industry. There are few barriers to entry to social movement organizations; the major barrier seems to be the necessity to differentiate products-goals or tactics sufficiently to <u>warrant</u> competition. (Where competition is its own justification amongst businesses, competition amongst SMOs in a supposedly altruistic SMI requires justification.) So as the movement grows so will the number of MOs in the industry. But we have little in knowledge of how MI growth at the national level relates to MI growth at the local level.

MO Domination of an Industry

How is hegemony or domination over an industry achieved? Economists treat the problem in their discussions of market share and leadership in concentrated industries. (Interestingly, economists are better at describing the <u>effects</u> of domination, than the reasons a particular firm comes to dominate. The latter issue is discussed by management theorists.) What are the factors that lead a movement industry to be monopolized or dominated by one or two MOs? Two answers have traditionally been given, and they aren't bad ones; for shorthand purposes they can be labeled charisma and coercion. A third answer is survival of the fittest.

Charisma and Symbolic Hegemony. One path to industry domination is through the capture of key symbols. The MO and its leaders articulate the vision and the pathway or program to the vision that seems to give the most

¹Analysts sometimes blur the distinction between plants (establishments) and firms (enterprises). They do do at considerable hazard,

Much of the literature of political science dealing with state and national politics and pressure group structure may be relevant to the analysis.

hope to sympathizers. The articulation of the vision and the pathway lead energy and money to flow toward the rising MO. Other MOs begin to copy the dominant MO or to pattern their program and vision partly to differentiate themselves from the dominant MO, partly to find a mode of accruing resources that comes only by cooperating with or fitting into the dominant penumbra.

Coercion. The second mode of acquiring a dominant position is through coercion. The church militant and the revolutionary party are alike in believing there is only one true answer and it is theirs. SMOs are in the business of acquiring power. Where the MO neither grants the legitimacy of alternative pathways nor foreswears the use of coercion, MOs may systematically destroy opposition, including MOs committed to similar goals but maintaining autonomy.

Survival of the Fittest. Finally, where the MI exists in a very inhospitable environment, especially extreme repression, the MO that goes underground, that adopts a conspiratorial cell structure, may survive as other MOs disappear. They dominate by default. When repression lifts, other MOs may flourish again, but the surviving MO has the advantage of a working leadership and an organization in place. Even so, other MOs may more clearly link to the preferences of the latent social movement. And, as repression lifts, the MOs in place may not capture the new wave. Recent events in Portugal and Spain seem to represent this process; the communist-party organizations maintained themselves through the long period of repression, but when the dictators died and their regimes were dismissed, social democrats and socialist organizations easily remobilized.

The concept of a social movement industry raises a number of questions that have been largely ignored

by students of movements. It helps us to think about the relationship of a movement to all MOs in the movement. It helps put boundaries around the question of inter-MO relations, and it raises questions about industry structure, entry, domination, number, local and national relations that have not been systematically treated. It does not, however, deal with one issue that begs for analysis: Why do some societies have more social movement activity than others.

The Shape of the Social Movement Sector

The subtitle of McCarthy and Zald's 1977 article was "A Partial Theory."

They believed their theory was partial because it was based largely on a vision of social movements in the American context, and they noted that it ignored variations in the amount and organization of social movements caused by variation in political structure. Since some social movements are a continuation of politics by other means, it is extremely important to understand just how social/political structures shape or channel social movement activities. Their work was also partial because it bypassed the linkage of social movement to cleavage and class structure.

In their economism, McCarthy and Zald placed a great deal of emphasis on availability of resources, on how affluence makes available both money and energy to SMOs. Yet other affluent nations mobilize fewer resources this way. Recently I have been working with Roberta Garner, who has taken the lead in writing a long theoretical paper that addresses the determinants of the changing shape of the social movement sector. Here let me just state the nature of the problem and highlight the directions our analysis is taking.

The social movement sector is defined as the aggregate of all social movement industries, that is, all of the SMIs (and C-SMIs) working for social

change. Descriptively, sectors differ in the number of SMIs that are active, the amount of activity across the industries, the extent of articulation of SMIs with each other, and the ideological distribution and dominant orientation of the movements. (By ideological distribution, I mean the range of change goals that are articulated. For crude, heuristic purposes, the distribution can be described on a left-right continuum or on the distribution of extreme- moderate goals and tactics,)

Two key issues are the articulation of the sector with the institutionalized political structure, and the articulation of the sector with the
system of social class and cleavages. Moreover, since our analysis is
historically grounded, it is important to note that the dominant orientation
of the sector changes over time. The sector may be mainly concerned with
class and labor issues in one time period; in another it may be dominated by
issues of environment; in another it may be dominated by issues of political
access; in still another it may be dominated by issues of local resistance to
the spread of state power. As Charles Tilly (1978) has so forcefully taught
us, the forms and directions of contention change over time and must be
related to the changing infra-structure of society as well as to political
choice. As old SMIs win battles and disappear or are institutionalized, new
industries develop responsibility to changing opportunities and developments.
New SMIs draw upon the changing cleavages and issues of society and upon the
potentials for mobilization.

Our analysis of variety in the social movement sector draws upon three major lines of analysis. First, it assumes the resource mobilization perspective. Second, it uses a modern Marxian analysis of the class system and the changing economic system to account for both the dominating orientation

of SMIs and the systemic crises that breed periods of high and low activities. Third, it treats the structure of political systems as a major determinant of social movement sectors. In particular, it examines: 1) the extent to which parties and institutions articulate with the range of social classes and groups in society; 2) the extent to which the political parties and institutions funnel or aggregate change preferences; and 3) the extent to which the political system discourages (represses) non-institutionalized activities.

We draw upon the work of political sociologists and political scientists such as Duverger, Rokkan, Rose, Dahl, and Lipset, as well as upon class analysts such as Abendroth, Hobsbawm, and Thompson.

I am not prepared at this time of offer a systematic set of propositions in which some aspect of the SM sector is seen as dependent or caused by some aspect of political or class structure. But some illustrative propositions and observations are in order.

- 1) The size and range of issues in the SMs is inversely related to the costs of mobilizing. Where social control and repression is high and systematic and descretionary economic resources are low, social movement activity will be low.
- 2) In modern times, the relation of class organization to the party system is a major determinant of the degree to which social change preferences are highly articulated by the parties. In particular, where the labor movement "owned" or grew up in close relation with mass parties, change preferences have had an acceptable institutional vehicle. On the other hand, a more autonomous social movement sector develops where either the political party structure is not articulated with the class structure, because the parties are omnibus vehicles, or because they excluded groups.

Everything else being equal, a social movement sector separate from the established political parties is a more costly method of achieving change.

It is more likely to be used when the parties are unresponsive or do not represent groups' interests.

3) The social movement sector is shaped by the structure of political decision making in a society. The structure of decision making can be characterized by its degree of centralization-decentralization and its fragmentation within any level of centralization. Polities vary in the extent to which power is concentrated at the national level or is widely dispersed to local and regional levels. They also vary in the extent to which courts, legislatures, and executive agencies provide alternative venues for decision making. As a general proposition, the greater the decentralization and disarticulation of levels, the more the opportunity for social movement organizations to make claims. Moreover, the existence of differentiated decision venues encourages tactical differentiation among movement organizations.

The centralization-decentralization distinction has ramifications for the structure of movements as well as for the size of the sector. In particular, centralized polities encourage social movements to aggregate resources to that level, whereas decentralized polities encourage the formation of local movements. (See above) Action becomes feasible without recourse to national politics (see Dahl, 1966).

4) The predominant <u>issues</u> of the social movement sector are shaped by the stages of economic and political development. When the emerging nation states attempted to extend their power and control over local economies and populations, the characteristic rebellion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the tax rebellion. Although taxes continue to provide grist for political and social movement actions, the tax <u>rebellion</u>, with local communities or

regions using violent tactics as a source of resistance, has disappeared. At a later stage of capitalist economic development, issues of political and organizational rights for the lower classes and then of economic security and working conditions become dominant issues.

As new issues surface, the old institutionalized solutions become inadequate for articulating problems and grievances, and the orientation of the social movement sector changes. In our own time, the left-right ideology of the class-oriented political solution is largely irrelevant to the new issues of the post-industrial society--issues of the control of nuclear power, pollution, alternative life styles, and abortion have little relation to the major class issues and political forms that dominated the early part of the century. Not that they don't articulate with the interests of groups with specific social locations. Indeed they do. But they do not articulate with the constellation of groups and institutionalized channels that represent the political solution of the industrial revolution. This disarticulation represents the opportunity for whole new social movement industries to grow. Of course, the current party system is partly an outcome of earlier social movements, as challengers to the polity became members of the polity.

5) The social movement sector also responds to major national and international forces. The history of major parties found in European countries—the Christian democrats, the socialists, and the communist parties—cannot be written without major attention to the international political scene nor to the specific fate of counterpart parties in other countries.

Similarly, the current Islamic revival in Iran must be seen in conjunction with Islamic fundamentalism throughout the broad sweep of middle eastern and far eastern countries. Thus the structure of the sector and its orientation is partly a response to international ideological trends, to

international movement support and to the positioning of parties and movement organizations in an ongoing international political arena. International processes provide models and cues for action, as well as direct support or opposition to nationally based movements.

The "action" in understanding the social movement sector will come on the macro and institutional side, largely because behavioristically-oriented social scientists have focused on the social psychological side. Preferences for change are related to an active stance on the part of members of a society, and there is a well known literature on citizen attitudes, mobilization and political participation, from De Tocqueville to Verba and Almond, that gives a social psychological explanation for the size of the sector. The macro perspective heightens our awareness of how social structure effects the options for participation, the costs of participation and the shape and orientation of social movement activity. At some point, we may be able to combine the findings of the earlier literature with a more structural perspective.

I have examined three major areas where fruitful theorizing and research need to take place: the relation of movement to countermovement; the structure and process of industries; and the shape, size, and orientation of the social movement sector. For each of these large issues, I have suggested some answers or at least the line of analysis which I think

will be fruitful in providing answers.

These three issues grow out of my preoccupation with the resource mobilization perspective and the analysis of social movements as part of political sociology. But they are hardly the only important problem.

Indeed, the most important problem may lie at the very different level.

Earlier I used the phrase symbolic begemony. But American analysts of

social movements have shied away from serious attention to ideology, to symbol systems, their internal socio-psycho logic. Recent developments in semiotics, hermeneutics, and culture systems, however, may soon make it possible to bridge that gap. Without attention to meaning systems, analysis of macro structural factors may risk missing the shaping content of concern of social movement action, with only symbolic analysis we risk analysis empty of cost, constraint and opportunity.

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