CENTER-PERIPHERY CONFLICT: ELITE AND POPULAR INVOLVEMENT IN THE BOSTON ANTI-BUSING MOVEMENT

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This paper uses the "center-periphery" model to explain local elite and popular involvement in the Boston anti-busing movement. Consistent with the center-periphery model, local elites became deeply involved in the movement primarily as a result of a federal court's restriction on their freedom of action. The federal court interfered with the local elite's patronage system, ability to maintain a racially segregated school system, and control over the day to day administration of the schools. Several center-periphery factors helped motivate the average Boston resident to protest. One factor was the feeling that the court had unfairly sided with blacks in a longstanding controversy and trampled upon the rights of white residents. Another factor was the perception of whites that the center's intrusion had placed new burdens on them.

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The center-periphery model postulates that social movements are best seen as efforts by people in a "periphery" to resist the penetration by the "center" (Shils 1974; Eisenstadt 1966; Kothari 1971; Rokkan 1970; Esman 1975; Rose 1971; Gottman 1980). "Penetration" usually refers to the central government establishing its authority in peripheral areas and attempting to implement basic policies.

Several generalizations have emerged from center-periphery research concerning the reasons why both elites and ordinary people in the peripheries organize politically to resist the center's penetration. First, the center's penetration may upset the balance of power between locally subordinate and superordinate groups. Especially destabilizing are actions by the center which promote a subordinate but rising group. When this occurs, members of the superordinate group will often support resistance movements.

Second, the center's intrusion often places new demands on the periphery's resources, such as military conscription, taxes, and forced production. These new burdens are especially resented when they exacerbate pre-existing conflicts. Third, center penetration often imposes an alien authority structure on the local population. The new authority structure is usually less accessible than its predecessor to the average person. Under such circumstances, ordinary people in the periphery will join efforts to repel the center's intrusion. Finally, center penetration, by definition, infringes upon the authority of local elites. Their traditional prerogatives, such as the right to allocate services and patronage, are imperiled by the center's intrusion.

Research using the center-periphery model has focused primarily on events in "modernizing" societies. One exception is Bergesen's (1976) analysis of the pattern of violence by police during the urban riots of the 1960s. In the course of the disorders, according to Bergesen, police violence escalated and became increasingly unrelated to civilian actions. Bergesen maintains that these "police riots" grew out of collective efforts to repel federal intervention into local affairs on behalf of blacks. Still a central purpose of this article is to test the relevance of the center-periphery framework to political protest in fully industrialized societies. The empirical focus of the analysis is the Boston anti-busing movement.

THE BOSTON ANTI-BUSING MOVEMENT AND THE VENDEE

The term "anti-busing movement" is used to refer to the collective and widespread, but not necessarily organized effort that had the stated goal of preventing busing for the purpose of school desegregation in Boston and which used non-institutionalized means to achieve its goal. The anti-busing movement emerged in the fall of 1974, and over the next four years it mobilized people to join school boycotts; support neighborhood "information centers;" form a city-wide organization, Restore Our Alienated Rights (ROAR); and participated in dozens of mass demonstrations, some of them violent.

The school busing controversy can be traced to the summer of 1963, when black leaders demanded that the Boston School Committee (BSC) publicly acknowledge the existence of segregation in the schools. The BSC flatly refused, denying that any problem existed. The BSC's refusal led to a black boycott of the schools, which was met by strong support for anti-integration candidates at the polls. By 1965, opposition to school desegregation became a prerequisite for election to local office. Throughout the decade, the existence of segregated schools remained an issue as blacks and various state and federal agencies attempted to compel the School Committee to desegregate the schools. The committee was unwilling to do so. In June, 1974, however, Federal Judge Arthur Garrity ruled that the School Committee and the Superintendent of Schools were guilty of purposefully creating and maintaining racial segregation throughout the school system (Morgan v. Hennigan 1974). Judge Garrity ordered
the desegregation of the schools using a plan which required the busing of substantial numbers of both black and white students. Anti-busing activists organized a popular movement several weeks after Garrity's decision.

The relevance of the center-periphery framework to the anti-busing movement can be demonstrated by considering the similarity between the anti-busing movement and the Vendee, the 1793 French counterrevolution named after the rural area in which it originated. Many of the processes underlying the two movements appear similar to each other and to those identified by the center-periphery researchers. We outline these similarities below, then more rigorously test the usefulness of the center-periphery model for understanding the anti-busing movement. Our arguments as to the Vendee are based on the careful historical and sociological research by Tilly (1964) and Moore (1966).

Tilly and Moore have identified a number of reasons why local elites in the Vendee region became involved in the counterrevolution. Similar reasons also explain local elites participation in the Boston anti-busing movement. These reasons correspond with center-periphery theory.

Following the 1789 French revolution, the central government launched a three-pronged attack on the Vendee's traditionally dominant authority figure, the cure. The new government forced a reorganization of the local government; seized and sold the church's holdings; and, the pivotal measure, required all cures to swear allegiance to the revolutionary government. Whenever a cure refused to make this pledge, as almost all those in the Vendee did, the central government replaced him with one from outside the area (Moore 1966, p. 98-99). Because of these assaults on their position, the cures provided the counterrevolution with its leadership.

A similar process appears to have occurred in Boston. We hypothesize that an intrusion by the "center," here the federal government, imposed sharp restrictions on Boston elected officials. Such restrictions, we suggest, motivated elected officials to become involved in the anti-busing movement. Evidence supporting these claims is presented below.

Ordinary people participated in the Vendee for at least some of the reasons that would be predicted by center-periphery theorists. One reason was that the center's intrusion favored an upstart group. The chief beneficiary of the 1789 revolution in the Vendee was an ascending group, the small town bourgeoisie. The benefits of the revolution devolved on the bourgeoisie as a result of the sale of the church's property. The bourgeoisie quickly bought all the land, leaving none for the peasants (Moore 1966, pp. 99).

In accord with the center-periphery model, we hypothesize that the Boston anti-busing activists viewed the federal court's decision as an unjust intervention on the side of blacks. The court's finding that a dual school system existed and its busing remedy may have looked like federal support for one side in a highly charged and long standing political controversy. The extent to which Boston residents in fact held this view will be examined empirically.

The second reason for popular participation in the French counterrevolution and possibly the Boston anti-busing movement was that the center's penetration resulted in the imposition of an "alien" authority structure. Traditionally, the cure was an extremely important authority figure to the peasants. The cure assumed great importance because "he stood at the center of the relatively few networks of cooperation that existed in this society of isolated farmhouses and scattered hamlets" (Moore 1966, pp. 98). As noted above, the revolutionary government deliberately undercut the authority of the cures. Peasants, therefore, feared that the center's intrusion would replace the cures with authorities who would not assume their traditional role (Moore 1966, pp. 98-99).

In Boston, we hypothesize, federal intervention imposed an alien authority structure on white residents. The federal court became involved in the routine administration of the schools. Boston residents may have felt that the court's administration was insensitive to their needs. We will assess this argument below.
Third, the center placed new demands on the periphery's resources following the 1789 French revolution and, we hypothesize, the center placed new demands on the periphery's resources following the 1974 Boston desegregation decision. In addition, in France and possibly Boston, the new demands exacerbated pre-existing conflicts. The revolutionary government in France demanded higher taxes than had the old regime and instituted military conscription (Tilly 1964, pp. 100-181, 308-314). The latter policy was especially resented because the conscription law discriminated against those opposed to the revolution. According to Tilly (1964, pp. 309), "nothing could have been more of a goad to the rest of the people."

In Boston, residents may have felt that the federal government's busing policy placed new burdens on them. Public officials consistently asserted that busing was largely responsible for a fiscal crisis and series of tax increases that began in 1974. Also, public officials tended to define the acts mandated by the desegregation decree, such as riding on school buses or attending integrated classes, as disproportionately and unfairly burdensome on white students. Whether white residents also held this point of view will be examined empirically.

Having shown the relevance of the center-periphery model to the Vendee and the Boston anti-busing movement, the next step in the analysis is to examine more closely the usefulness of the center-periphery model for understanding the anti-busing movement. Before doing so, however, we briefly describe our data.

DATA AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Data for the analysis are drawn primarily from a survey of 468 white Boston residents between 25 and 53 years old who were U.S. citizens (the "Area Survey"). To simplify the analysis and to insure that an adequate number of anti-busing activists were in the sample, the "Area Survey" was restricted to sections of the city that were predominantly white, heavily affected by the federal court's busing order, and were locations of anti-busing activities. The sample was drawn from the 1977 City of Boston "Annual Listing of Residents," which provides names, addresses, birthdates, and citizenship. Respondents were selected in "clusters" of three.

Eleven trained professional interviewers and the author conducted the interviews between December 1977 and April 1978. Although the interviewing period extended over several months, no important events relating to the busing controversy occurred during this period. Thus, it is unlikely that the delay between the first and last interview introduced bias into the data. Interviewers were instructed to interview only those respondents who were selected in the sample and to make at least three attempts to interview each potential respondent. Sixty-five percent of the people selected were interviewed.

We use three dependent variables. "Attitudinal support for the anti-busing movement" measures the extent to which respondents identified with the anti-busing movement and endorsed its goals and tactics. The scale was derived from two questions. First, respondents were asked how strongly they supported or opposed the following items: school boycotts to protest forced busing; the establishment of private academies for students who refused to be bused; attending anti-busing protest marches; and participating in anti-busing groups. Second, respondents were asked how much "in common" they felt with anti-busing demonstrators and the anti-busing group ROAR.

"Participation in the anti-busing movement" measures membership in the movement and participation in its activities, based on two sets of questions. First, respondents were asked if they participated in school boycotts, the
establishment of private academies, protest marches, or organized anti-busing groups. Second, respondents were asked separately if they had been active in any of nine specific anti-busing organizations. Respondents were scored a point each time they mentioned having participated in an anti-busing activity or organization.

The third dependent variables, "opposition to government actions directed against the anti-busing movement," measures support for government constraints on the activities of the anti-busing movement. This scale is based on the assumption that if people agree with the goals and tactics of a movement, they will not approve its suppression. Respondents were asked if the State Board of Education should have strictly enforced the truancy laws against boycotting students; if anti-busing demonstrators who broke the law by interfering with the busing order should have received stiff fines or worse; and whether Boston Mayor White should have refused to issue permits to anti-busing groups that wanted to demonstrate right outside the schools. Cronbach's alpha for each of the three scales is above .80, which suggests the scales are reliable.6

CENTER PENETRATION AND LOCAL ELITES' PARTICIPATION IN THE ANTI-BUSING MOVEMENT

We first examine the involvement of local elites in the anti-busing movement, using the center-periphery framework. More specifically, we assess the center-periphery hypothesis that the center's restrictions on local elites motivate their participation in anti-center movements.

In desegregating the schools, the federal court restricted city officials in a number of ways. First, Garrity's 1974 decision undercut the ability of local politicians to provide their most highly touted "service," racial segregation in the schools. Since 1965, most Boston politicians have pledged to their white constituents that desegregation would "never" come to Boston. For nearly a decade, they were able to carry out this promise. School Committee Chairman John McDonough put it this way in 1975:...since the Racial Imbalance Law went into effect in 1965...the School Committee told the people of the city that their position was opposed to busing. When it got down to the crunch, the majority of the School Committee lived up to their promise to the people...And I think this is probably the finest thing that we have done. (Testimony before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1975a, p. 466)

Thus, the 1974 desegregation order undercut the local politicians' ability to fulfill their "promises to the people."

Second, court intervention substantially reduced the patronage resources available to School Committee members. Traditionally, patronage was dispensed through a system of fund-raising "testimonial dinners" for School Committee members. School employees who failed to succumb to the heavy pressures to buy tickets were denied promotions and transfers. Patronage especially dominated promotion in the upper echelon of the school bureaucracy. Appointment to a post in the central administration required a candidate to have a personal advocate on the Committee. Committee members supported only those individuals who had contributed to their testimonial dinners (Edmonds 1978, p. 902).

Moreover, a Boston Finance Commission (FinCom) investigation into School Committee corruption revealed that in one year, 1972, 74 percent of all votes taken in School Committee meetings concerned personnel matters. According to the FinCom, the School Committee's preoccupation with individual personnel decisions, rather than educational issues, is a "mark of patronage" (Boston Finance Commission 1975, p. 20).

The practice of promoting individuals on the basis of their financial contributions to Committee members ceased with court-ordered desegregation.
In order to end discriminatory hiring and assignment practices, the federal court required the School Committee to adhere to a set of formal criteria for promoting personnel and to hire certain percentages of black teachers and administrators (Edmonds 1978, p. 901; Phase II Reporter 11/75). Employees hired in this fashion would have no reason to contribute to the Committee members. Thus, court intervention undercut the ability of School Committee members to use their positions for personal advantage.

Third, the court restricted local officials by directly intervening in school affairs. To insure the success of the desegregation order, Judge Garrity became deeply involved in many of the school system's administrative affairs. Issues brought before the court during the first two weeks of October, 1975, for example, included whether the School Committee should be required to appoint an associate superintendent to oversee the vocational education program; how to reduce racial tension in South Boston High School; the use of "late buses" for students staying after school; and the location of a community superintendent's office (Phase II Reporter 11/75). These issues are typical of the myriad of administrative issues debated and decided in federal court. In effect, Judge Garrity assumed the role of a school administrator.

Advocates of busing have argued that local officials' persistent refusal to fulfill their responsibilities forced the federal court to intervene in the daily operations of the schools. According to this line of reasoning, local officials thus had only themselves to blame for the court's inordinate involvement in day-to-day affairs (See, for example, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1975b; Sorgi and Smith 1977). From the point of view of Boston politicians, however, such an argument "blames the victim." For most Boston politicians, the alternative of active compliance with the court's orders was simply not politically or personally viable.

Center-periphery theorists maintain that when local leaders freedom of action and power to dispense patronage and services are restricted by the center, these leaders are likely to participate in an opposition movement. A substantial proportion of the Boston political establishment did become involved in the anti-busing movement. Several elected officials, John Kerrigan, Albert "Dapper" O'Neill, Louise Day Hicks, and Elvira "Pixie" Palladino, assumed highly visible leadership roles. Other Boston politicians regularly spoke at anti-busing functions. They included City Councilors James Michael Connelly, Gerald O'Leary, Christopher Iannella, and Frederick Langone; State Representatives William Bulger, Michael Flaherty, and Raymond Flynn; and School Committee members Paul Tierney, Patrick McDonough, and Paul Ellison. In addition, non-elected city officials participated in the movement. For example, Hicks' administrative assistant on the City Council, Rita Graul, chaired ROAR during its first two years. Virginia Sheehy, employed in the School Department's central administration, held posts on the executive boards of both ROAR and the South Boston Information Center.

City officials openly displayed their involvement in the anti-busing movement. During the first year of desegregation, ROAR was able to hold its weekly meetings in the City Council's main chamber, with the press and non-members of ROAR excluded from the sessions (Bullard, Grant, and Stoia 1981, p. 42). For over a year, a huge sign with the letters "R-O-A-R" hung in the windows of City Hall.

In sum, according to the center-periphery model, center intrusion into the periphery may impinge upon the autonomy of local elites. When this occurs, local elites are likely to participate in an opposition movement. These processes appear to have occurred in Boston.
CENTER INTRUSION AND THE LOCAL BALANCE OF POWER

According to center-periphery theorists, ordinary men and women as well as leaders resent the center's intrusion into the periphery. A person belonging to a locally superordinate group will be especially opposed to the center's intrusion if it promotes the interests of a subordinate but rising group. Most Boston residents felt that the federal court had unfairly sided with an upstart group, blacks.

As noted above, the 1974 desegregation ruling followed a prolonged and emotional struggle between blacks and whites. A central issue in the controversy was the existence of racial segregation in the schools. Judge Garrity ruled that a dual system did exist. Thus, Judge Garrity appeared to white residents to be siding with blacks in a long-standing conflict.

To assess the extent to which white residents felt that Judge Garrity had unfairly sided with blacks, we included two questions in the Area Survey. We asked each respondent if he or she agreed with Judge Garrity's ruling that over the years, the School Committee had kept white and black children segregated. Less than one-third of the sample (31%) said that the Committee had segregated the schools. We then asked the sub-sample of respondents who believed that the schools had been segregated if they agreed with Judge Garrity's finding that the School Committee had deliberately segregated black and white students. Only 79 respondents, 54 percent of the sub-sample and 17 percent of the total sample, said that the School Committee deliberately segregated the schools. Thus, the vast majority of residents disagreed with Judge Garrity's finding that the School Committee had willfully run a dual school system.

Furthermore, most residents also felt that Judge Garrity not only sided with blacks, but also discriminated specifically against whites by ordering busing. The extent to which white residents felt that Judge Garrity violated their rights is demonstrated by the Area Survey data. We asked each respondent, "Do you believe that court-ordered busing in Boston has or has not violated the constitutional rights of Boston citizens?" Eighty-seven percent of the sample said that busing had violated Boston residents' constitutional rights.

In addition, we asked the sub-sample of respondents who said that busing had violated their rights, what those rights were. The rights which busing allegedly violated included the "right" to choose one's children's schools; the "right" not to be assigned to schools on the basis of race; and the "right" to entrust social policy decisions exclusively to local-elected officials. Thus, most residents felt that Judge Garrity had not only sided unfairly with blacks, he had also abused whites in the process.

BURDENS IMPOSED ON THE PERIPHERY

According to the center-periphery model, the center often places new burdens on the population of the periphery. These burdens are especially represented when they are distributed inequitably. We hypothesize that Boston residents felt that federally mandated busing was costly to them in three ways.

Financial Burdens

White Boston residents perhaps felt that busing burdened them financially. Writing several years before court-ordered busing in Boston, Pettigrew (1971) argued that the "Achilles' heel" of opposition to school desegregation is money. His survey of Boston residents revealed that citizens would accept school desegregation if failing to do so would increase their taxes."
Pettigrew concluded, "offers an effective lever for social change" (1971, p. 228). What Pettigrew did not add, however, is that the reverse may be equally true. Where social change is perceived as financially burdensome, residents will be especially resistant to change. This perception, and the association of that perception with resistance to change, occurred during the desegregation controversy.

City officials maintained that busing was extremely costly to the city. In the Spring of 1974, for example, Mayor White publicly blamed the city's deficit and a proposed tax hike on the supposed costs of desegregation. Most Boston residents as well believed the politicians' argument that busing placed a heavy financial burden on the city, as can be demonstrated using the Area Survey data. We asked each respondent whether he or she thought busing resulted in Boston's property taxes going up. Respondents answering affirmatively were then asked how they felt about the causal relationship. Table 1 displays the distribution of the response to the two questions. Four-fifths of the respondents felt that busing had increased their taxes. Of this group, four-fifths of them reported that they were either "very dissatisfied" or "outraged" that taxes went up because of busing.

We next combine the responses to the above two questions to form a scale labelled "Taxes Up." We then correlate the Taxes Up scale with support for and participation in the anti-busing movement. The correlations between Taxes Up and SUPPORT, PARTICIPATE, and ANTI-REPRESS are .421, .282, and .369, respectively. The positive sign associated with each coefficient indicates that respondents who perceived and felt angry about a rise in taxes because of busing were especially likely to support and participate in the anti-busing movement. Thus, the data support the center-periphery theorists' hypothesis that residents in the periphery resent burdens placed on them by the center, and this resentment will help motivate protest participation.

Threat of Violence

Another burden allegedly placed on whites because of busing was the threat of black violence. White fear of black violence, and its connection with busing, is graphically displayed in a "Declaration of Clarification" written by Louise Day Hicks and two other anti-busing leaders in 1974. The widely publicized statement, issued after the first week of busing, purported to explain white's resistance to busing:

"(I)t is against our children's interest to send them to school in crime-infested Roxbury. There are at least 100 black people walking around the black community who have killed white people during the past two years. They have gone unapprehended."

(South Boston Tribune 9/19/74).

The Boston firemen's union issued a similar statement reading, in part, "the good people of South Boston or any other part of Boston are justifiably worried about sending their children into these crime-ridden garbage pits."

(Quoted in Boston Globe 10/4/74).

In addition, the fear that school integration endangers white children appears to have been an important political force, even prior to federally mandated busing. For example, in 1971 several hundred white parents protested assignment of their children to the Lee school, a newly opened elementary school in a predominantly black neighborhood. White parents argued that the neighborhood was "unsafe." Responding to the protest pressure, the School Committee voted to allow parents to transfer their children to schools in white neighborhoods (Boston Globe 5/25/75; Bullard, Grant, and Stoia 1981, p. 35).
To assess the prevalence of whites' fear of black violence, we rely on a 1975 survey commissioned by the Boston Herald American (8/14/75). The Herald American survey consisted of telephone interviews of 1,000 Boston adult residents. The interview schedule included the question, "During the court ordered (forced busing) last year, how many of Boston's school children were in real physical danger as a result of busing? Would you say it was a large majority, a small majority, a large minority, or a small minority?" Half of those questioned felt that a majority of students were endangered by busing.

We cannot, however, use the Herald American data to examine why respondents felt busing put students in danger. There may have been reasons other than the alleged lawlessness of blacks. For example, some respondents may have felt busing endangered students because desegregation gave rise to a violent anti-busing movement. Thus, the hypothesis that white residents felt that busing exposed their children to black violence cannot be tested without more direct evidence.

Adverse Effect on Education

Anti-busing activists claimed that desegregation adversely affected white children's education. Louise Day Hicks, for example, tirelessly argued that blacks are "culturally deprived" and thus undisciplined and less intelligent than their white classmates. Because of these traits, according to Hicks and other busing opponents, the presence of black students necessarily lowers schools' academic standards. Similarly, a School Committee member stated the belief this way: "White children do not want to be transported into schools with a large portion of backward pupils from unprospering Negro families who will slow down their education. . . ." (Quoted in Bullard, Grant, and Stoia 1981, p. 34).

The Area Survey did not include a question on the educational effects of busing. Two other surveys, however, did include such questions. The Boston Herald American survey included the question, "During the past year, would you say the quality of education in Boston Public Schools you know about was better, about the same, or worse than in previous years?" The majority of white respondents (52%) believed that education had worsened since the time when, one year earlier, busing had begun. Only a tiny fraction of whites interviewed (6%), believed that education had improved.

The distribution of responses tends to support the hypothesis that Boston residents felt that busing hurt their children's education. This inference, however, should be viewed with particular caution, for two reasons. First, respondents may have felt that busing itself did not cause this deterioration. They may have blamed instead, for example, the nationwide decline in the educational quality of big-city school systems in the 1970s, or the extended white student boycott. Second, even if the respondents felt that busing per se was the cause of the educational decline, the Herald data do not allow us to explore what aspects of busing were thought to hurt education.

Stinchcombe and Taylor's (1980) analysis of another survey of white Boston residents bears more directly on our argument. Stinchcombe and Taylor examine the relationship between the belief that students' test scores decline when they attend desegregated schools and three measures of support for anti-busing protest. The three measures are approval of a white student boycott of the schools, support for the Boston School Committee's defiance of Judge Garrity's court order, and opposition to busing for desegregation. Stinchcombe and Taylor find that respondents who believe that test scores decline under desegregation were somewhat more likely than others not holding this view to resist the desegregation order. Thus the findings are consistent with the
argument that Boston residents felt that busing hurt white children's education, and this perception caused support of and participation in the anti-busing movement.

Inequitable Distribution of Burdens

Finally, we hypothesize that Boston residents perceived that the costs of busing were distributed inequitably to their disadvantage. Judge Garrity's desegregation order did not extend beyond the Boston city limits. Like most metropolitan areas, priviledged groups tend to live in the suburbs that surround the city (Tilly 1965, p. 6). In addition, wealthy individuals could avoid some of the costs of busing by placement of their children in private schools. Thus, Boston residents may have felt that they were forced to assume a disproportionate share of the costs of busing.

While survey data is not available to test this argument, interviews of Boston residents conducted by psychologist Thomas Cottle and psychiatrist Robert Coles supports the contention. A white working class mother of several children, for example, told Cottle,

"A person says, my principle is that busing is good for all the kids involved. So you ask him, what about your kid? Will you voluntarily bus your kid a long way from your home just to desegregate some school somewhere? Of course the families in the suburbs are for busing, some of them. Why shouldn't they be? Their kids aren't involved and never are going to be involved (emphasis in orig., 1976, p. 54)

Similarly, a working class father of five explained to Coles,

"My brother says that people near Harvard, the professors and doctors and lawyers and fat-cat businessmen, their kids, a lot of them... go to fancy private schools and they have nice summer homes and all the rest. Well, who has the money to afford those private schools? Not us." (Quoted in Ford 1975, p. 459)

In sum, one factor that helped motivate popular participation in the Boston anti-busing movement was the belief that the court's desegregation order placed new and unfair burdens on white residents. These burdens included increased taxes, a threat of violence against children, and worsening education.

Imposition of Alien Authority

Center-periphery theorists postulate that center penetration often imposes an alien, inaccessible, and deeply-resented authority on the local population. Boston residents may have felt that the federal court's busing policy imposed such an alien authority structure in Boston. As we noted above, Judge Garrity became deeply involved in the routine management of the school system. Anti-busing activists frequently charged that Judge Garrity did not care about or understand the concerns of white, central city residents. In addition, under desegregation, personnel from outside the system assumed important administrative posts. Traditionally, administrative positions were filled exclusively by promotions within the system (Schrag 1967, p. 54-56). For example, Judge Garrity ordered control over South Boston High School placed in the hands of a court appointed receiver, and the replacement of the school's headmaster, football coach, and all full-time, non-academic administrators (Phase II Reporter 3/76). South Boston residents especially resented the dismissal of the headmaster, William Reid. Reid had worked in South Boston High School for over three decades, lived in the neighborhood, and been very popular among white students. The night Judge Garrity issued his decision the headquarters of the local NAACP was firebombed, and the day became widely known in South Boston as Black Friday (Bullard, Grant, and Stoia 1981, p. 52-55). The new headmaster, Jerome Winegar, was chosen by Judge Garrity and the receiver.
When Winegar arrived in South Boston, he was greeted with jeers and carefully painted signs on the street in front of the school, "Go Home Jerome" and "Winegar, We Don't Want You" (Bullard, Grant and Stoia 1981, p. 54).

The Area Survey included a question tapping residents' attitudes toward the authority system imposed by the courts. The question asked respondents if they agreed with the statement, "because of busing, the schools are controlled by a social and economic elite which is unsympathetic to the majority of Boston's residents." Table 2 shows the distribution of response to this question.

Over three-quarters of those responding expressed agreement with the statement. We then correlated the responses to the statement with the three dependent variables. The correlations between the item and SUPPORT, PARTICIPATE, and ANTI REPRESS were .427, .306, and .322, respectively. The positive sign associated with the coefficients indicate that individuals who perceived that the courts imposed an alien authority were more likely than others to support and participate in the anti-busing movement.

Measuring Racial Attitudes

Drawing on Vanneman and Pettigrew (1972), we classify the racial attitudes included in the Area Survey into several categories. First, "inter-racial contact" involves feelings about relatively intimate contact with blacks. This dimension is measured by the following questions. We asked the respondents if they agreed with the statements "black people too often push themselves where they're not wanted," "blacks and whites can never become close friends because they can't really be comfortable with one another," and "white people have a right to keep black people out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and black people should respect that right." We also asked each respondent how much he or she would mind if a black family with about the same income and education moved next door. Finally, we asked the respondents if they would object to sending their children to a school where 50 percent of the children were blacks.
Second, "government aid to blacks" measures the extent to which respondents approved of governmental actions designed to help blacks. We used two questions in the Area Survey to measure this dimension of racial attitudes. Each respondent was asked how strongly he or she agreed with the statements: "many of the government's policies designed to help blacks are a form of unfair 'reverse discrimination' against whites" and "Irish, Italians, Jewish and other immigrants overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favoritism."

Finally, "perception of discrimination" measures the extent to which respondents believe that blacks experience racial discrimination. We used the following two questions to measure this dimension. We asked the respondents if they agreed with the statements, "many black people miss out on good housing because white owners or real estate agents won't rent or sell to them;" and "in the years before court ordered busing in Boston, black children's public education was inferior to that of whites."

In order to determine if we correctly classified the above questions, we factor analyzed the nine questions. The results of the factor analysis are reported in Table 3. The factor extracted in the first column confirms the existence of an "interracial contact" dimension. Forming this dimension are the questions asking the respondents if blacks and whites can become close friends; if white people have the right to keep black people out of their neighborhoods; whether they would object to sending their children to a school where 50 percent of the children are blacks.

The factor extracted in the second column supports the existence of a "government aid to blacks" dimension. Loading highly on this factor are the questions asking the respondents if government policies designed to help blacks are reverse discrimination, and if blacks should work their way up without any special favoritism. Unexpectedly, however, the question concerning whether blacks too often push themselves where they are not wanted loads more highly on the government aid to blacks dimension than on the interpersonal contact dimension.

Finally, the factor extracted in the third column confirms the existence of a "perception of discrimination" dimension. The items loading highly on this factor are questions asking if blacks' education was inferior to that of whites and if blacks are discriminated against in the housing market.

Using the factor scores, we constructed three scales labeled "interracial contact," "government aid to blacks," and "perception of discrimination."

Results

Displayed in Table 4 are the correlations between these three scales and the three dependent variables. As anticipated by the center-periphery model, the government-aid-to-blacks scale correlates strongly with SUPPORT (r=.539), PARTICIPATE (r=.347), and ANTI-REPRESS (r=.344). The positive signs associated with each coefficient means that supporters of and participants in the anti-busing movement are more opposed to governmental effort to help blacks than are other residents.

Also in accord with our expectation, perception of racial discrimination correlates moderately with the dependent variables. The correlations between perception of discrimination and SUPPORT, PARTICIPATE, and ANTI-REPRESS are .315, .164, and .295, respectively. The positive signs associated with each coefficient indicate that anti-busing activists are more likely than other respondents to deny that blacks experience racial discrimination.
Finally, the correlations between interracial contact and SUPPORT, PARTICIPATE, and ANTI-REPRESS are .353, .073, and .316, respectively. These correlations indicate that interpersonal hostility toward blacks is moderately related to the two measures of support for the anti-busing movement and very weakly related to participation in the movement. The weak correlation between interracial contact and participation is consistent with the center-periphery interpretation suggested above. The correlations between interracial contact and the two measures of attitudinal support for the anti-busing movement, however, are slightly stronger than expected.

In sum, compared to other respondents, anti-busing activists are substantially more opposed to government policies to help blacks; moderately less aware that blacks experience racial discrimination; and have slightly to moderately more interpersonal hostility toward blacks. These findings provide modest support for the center-periphery interpretation of racial attitudes.

CONCLUSION

Using the center-periphery framework, we have found that the anti-busing activists appear to have protested, in part, for the same reasons that the French peasants protested 180 years earlier. Both movements were reacting to the center's intrusion into their community. More specifically, residents in both Boston and the Vendee resisted the center's intrusion since they felt that the center imposed new burdens, promoted an upstart group, and imposed an alien authority on the local population. In both Boston and the Vendee, local elites were additionally motivated to protest by the center's constraints on their freedom of action.

In addition, we have analyzed the role racial attitudes played in mobilizing anti-busing movement support and participation. As anticipated by the center-periphery model, opposition to government aid to blacks, and to a lesser extent interpersonal hostility toward blacks and failure to perceive anti-blacks discrimination, seems to have helped motivate residents to support and join the anti-busing movement.

What are the advantages of the center-periphery framework? One is the model provides an explanation for why elites may become involved in political protest. Social movement theorists have designed their models primarily to explain popular, rather than elite, mobilization (cf. Marx and Wood 1975). Thus, the center-periphery model may help fill an important lacuna in social movement theory.

Second, the center-periphery model corroborates recent work on popular mobilization. This research suggests that the grievances that produce rebellion are most often concrete and involve violations of established rights (Tilly 1978, p. vii-viii). This argument contrasts sharply with earlier research (e.g., Gurr 1970) which views rebellion as an expression of diffuse feelings of frustration and discontent. Third, the model provides a framework for analyzing the relationship between racial attitudes and protest. In particular, the model specifies which type of racial attitudes are likely to generate protest.

Finally, the center-periphery model helps identify common processes underlying seemingly unrelated types of events. At first glance, the conflicts over busing in Boston and revolutionary reforms in 19th century France would appear to have little in common. The preceding center-periphery analysis, however, suggests otherwise. Whether the specific processes that caused mobilization in Boston and Vendee have occurred elsewhere requires further empirical research. One such instance which appears analogous is a recent controversy in West Virginia over who has the right to determine school textbooks (Warren 1976). Protest groups demanded that decisions on textbooks be
placed in the hands of local parent groups, rather than "outside" professionals. Another such instance is the resistance of regions in France to the construction of nuclear power plants in their communities by the central government. In the Brittany section of France, for example, local residents have used unorthodox and occasionally illegal tactics that challenge the right of the government to construct a nuclear power plant in that region. According to one report, the efforts to build a nuclear plant in Brittany have become "hated symbols of a central government that the Brittons believe is trying to destroy their way of life" (New York Times 3/14/80).

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent Expressing View that Busing Increased Taxes: Percent Angry Because of Tax Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Do you think that court ordered busing did or did not result in Boston's property taxes going up?&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did result in property taxes going up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not result in property taxes going up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"When you think of the tax rate going up because of busing, do you feel not especially dissatisfied, mildly dissatisfied, very dissatisfied, or outraged?"

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not especially dissatisfied</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mildly dissatisfied</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very dissatisfied</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(130)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outraged</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(385)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

Percent Expressing View that Busing Imposed an Alien Authority Structure

"Because of busing, the schools are controlled by a social and economic elite unsympathetic to the majority of Boston residents."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Mildly Agree</th>
<th>Mildly Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Don't Know; Refused</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(254)</td>
<td>(97)</td>
<td>(56)</td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(22)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3

Rotated Factor Matrix for Race Attitude Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Object to sending children to school where 50% are blacks</td>
<td>.609</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Object to a black family moving next door</td>
<td>.809</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Blacks and whites can never become really close friends</td>
<td>.595</td>
<td>.268</td>
<td>.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Whites have a right to keep black people out of their neighborhood</td>
<td>.644</td>
<td>.371</td>
<td>.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Government's policies to help blacks are &quot;reverse discrimination&quot;</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>-.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Blacks too often push themselves where they're not wanted</td>
<td>.393</td>
<td>.660</td>
<td>.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Blacks should work their way up without any special favoritism</td>
<td>.216</td>
<td>.683</td>
<td>.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Black children's education was inferior to that of whites</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>.283</td>
<td>.715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Black people miss out on good housing because of discrimination</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>.867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of total variance</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of variance accounted for by all three factors:

- Indicates a loading above .400
Table 4

Correlations among Government Aid to Blacks, Perception of Discrimination, Interracial Contact and SUPPORT, PARTICIPATE, and ANTI-REPRESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SUPPORT</th>
<th>PARTICIPATE</th>
<th>ANTI-REPRESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Aid to Blacks</td>
<td>.539</td>
<td>.347</td>
<td>.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of Discrimination</td>
<td>.315</td>
<td>.164</td>
<td>.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interracial Contact</td>
<td>.353</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES

2. A problem with center-periphery research is that the terms "center" and "periphery" are used quite differently by various analysts. For example, Moore's (1966) analysis of the transformation of agrarian societies to industrial ones can be usefully considered as part of the center-periphery tradition. Moore defines a society's center in terms of the alliances which are necessary for the establishment of a central regime. The periphery, according to Moore's scheme, consists of those actors left out of the "nation-building alliance."

In contrast, Shils (1975) defines the center of a society as its "ultimate" or "sacred" symbols, values, and beliefs and the institutions in which they are embodied. The periphery is normally composed of recipients of the symbols and commands emitted from the center. Finally, Geertz's (1975, p. 151) definition emphasizes that a society may have more than one center: "centers...are essentially concentrated loci of serious acts; they consist in the point or points in society where its leading ideas come together with its leading institutions to create an arena in which the events that most vitally affect its members take place." Of the available definitions of center and periphery, Geertz's is the most useful for our purposes. There are problems, however, with his definition. For example, Geertz does not provide a basis for distinguishing "serious acts" from less serious acts, or "leading ideas" from other ideas. We will not, however, attempt to resolve these conceptual problems here.

3. The analysis explicated in the next four paragraphs is based primarily on Oberschall (1973; pp. 44-45) and to a lesser extent on Eisenstadt (1966), Kornhauser (1964), and Rokkan (1970).

5. The three neighborhoods meeting these criteria are South Boston, Hyde Park, and West Roxbury.

6. See (Uscom 1979, ch. 2) for a full discussion of the reliability and validity of the dependent variables.

7. The patronage system resulted in a top-heavy bureaucracy. One administrator was employed for each 3 or 4 teachers. Compared to other cities with the same number of students (e.g., Denver), Boston had four times the number of administrators (Phase II Reporter 1/77).

8. The Boston Finance Commission is a public agency created to oversee expenditures by the city of Boston.

9. The position that busing violates the constitutional rights of Boston citizens was taken by many public figures, including Senator Samuel Ervin. Referring specifically to the Boston desegregation decision, Ervin stated that "[t]he right of students to go to their neighborhood schools has been denied. In South Boston they are busing members of the white race into Roxbury and are busing members of the black race into South Boston... The equal protection clause is as clear as the noonday sun, but the judges don't seem to realize this" (South Boston Tribune 12/5/74). Although the well-known legal scholar Ronald Dworkin (1977, p. 267) has persuasively argued that these constitutional "rights" do not exist, our concern is limited to Boston residents' beliefs about their rights.

10. At the time of Pettigrew's survey, both the federal and state governments were threatening to withhold school aid because of the city's failure to desegregate the schools.

11. Although the validity of the competing claims concerning the cost of busing is not at issue here, it is worth noting that a Boston University Law School analysis demonstrates that busing did not, in fact, place a substantial burden on the city's resources. A massive influx of federal and state aid paid for most of the cost of both busing itself and other desegregation costs (Phase II Reporter 1/77).

12. Stinchcombe and Taylor exaggerated the strength of their findings. They concluded that "peoples' attitudes about what will happen to test scores predicts very strongly how much opposition they will show to the court order" (1980, p. 177). The three regression coefficients, however, are only between .09 and .11.

13. The solution was computed using a principal component factor procedure and a varimax rotation.
REFERENCES


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