CITIZENSHIP, GENDER AND WORK ORGANIZATION:
Considerations for Labor Process Theories 1

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A critical reexamination of the organization of production and trends in the development of new productive forms has emerged in the wake of Harry Braverman's masterful Labor and Monopoly Capital. Studies of the capitalist labor process by Edwards (1979) and Burawoy (1979), in particular, have occasioned a new direction in the sociology of work, organizations and stratification. 2

Sweeping assumptions about the nature of industrial and "post-industrial" systems of production have been subjected to intense scrutiny and reformulation as sociologists and political economists seek a better understanding of technological change and its relationship to conflict, negotiation and consent among owners, managers and workers. Shortcomings in industrial sociology have been recognized through attempts to link up the social organization of work with the world outside the factory, the office and the field. Furthermore, case studies in specific production settings (e.g., machine shops, longshore gangs, computer centers and corporate offices) offer significant empirical insights for research on stratification and income determination, especially the work based on dual economy and segmented labor market models. By going back to the material roots of capitalist society, one might argue, sociologists are rediscovering the vitality of Marxian theory.

There is, however, a catch to contemporary labor process research and theory. While analysts such as Braverman, Edwards and Burawoy have been quick to point out that the labor process in late 20th century capitalism differs significantly from Marx's 19th century observations, their theories have by and large sought to squeeze 20th century observations into a 19th century model. To be more precise, Braverman, Edwards and Burawoy focus on the transformation of the labor process coincident with the transformation of the capitalist economy and enterprise. Each offers a distinct approach to the context and consequences of the rise of large-scale, monopolistic organizations. Yet, all three largely adhere to a model of society which places primary emphasis on class as the fundamental category of social life and social action and which locates the origin of inequality in the labor process. Non-class categories and relations, such as race, gender and citizenship, are viewed as appendages to, or functional aspects of, class inequality. Even in the face of historically persistent social, political and economic inequality between and among racial groups, sexes and nationalities, Braverman, Edwards and Burawoy insist on a "class-first" (Hartmann and Markusen 1980, p. 87) theory of the labor process in contemporary capitalist society. Are these merely ideological distinctions used to politically fragment an otherwise

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1 Portions of this research were supported by grants from the National Science Foundation and the Graduate School of Northwestern University. Special thanks go to Arnold Feldman, Whit Sue, Michael Reich, Michael Burawoy, William J. Wilson and James Baron for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

2 Although Braverman, Edwards and Burawoy represent only three of a growing number of people with work on the labor process, I have chosen to concentrate on them because they provide the most thoroughgoing analyses published recently
wise homogeneous working class? Or, can non-class categories have an impact on the organization of the labor process? In other words, can we develop an understanding of race, gender or citizenship as products of systems of inequality without rejecting Marx's theory of the labor process?

In this article, I will attempt to address those questions through data collected in a case study of the labor process in industrial agriculture. The empirical object of the study—the harvest process in the Southwestern U.S. lettuce industry—offers a unique opportunity to assess the relationship between citizenship, gender and work organization. With interview, participant-observer and survey data, three basic arguments will be presented. First, I will argue that differences in citizenship and gender serve to distinguish among labor market participants. That is, differences in citizenship status and gender do not necessarily reflect market-based characteristics of workers (e.g., skill, education, experience or seniority) but do reflect statuses produced external to participation in economic organizations. Thus, I will suggest, citizenship status and gender are not indicators of an individual's or group's ability to work or acquire skills; rather, they pertain to the social and political status of the individual or group in the larger community of which the labor market is a part.

Second, I will argue that non-market statuses affect not only the distribution of individuals into positions in the labor process, but that they also provide distinct advantages to employers in the creation and maintenance of different labor processes. Through a comparison of two separate harvest processes I will demonstrate how citizenship and gender are manipulated to enhance managerial control over the organization and pace of work.

Finally, I will argue that citizenship and gender have a material basis external to the labor process, i.e., they are not simply labels attached to workers. But, in order to understand the origin of those statuses it is necessary to step outside the confines of the labor process. In particular, I will argue that it is crucial to develop theories of patriarchal authority in the family and of citizenship inequality in order to understand the role of gender and citizenship in the organization of the labor process.

Before proceeding to the case study, I will elaborate briefly on what I see to be shortcomings or ambiguities in the analyses offered by Braverman, Edwards and Burawoy.

Braverman’s (1974) contribution to the study of work organization and technological change has been a mighty one. By drawing attention to the social and organizational forces which mediate technological change, he managed to sweep aside a number of sociological cobwebs and to make problematic once again the mechanisms of capitalist control over production. With an emphasis on how control is made possible through the separation of conception and execution, the labor process in the era of monopoly capitalism acquires the nature of an “expressive force” (Burawoy 1978): a linear model of capitalist development and change working its way through all sectors of society and social relationships.

Though his argument seems to capture the historical sweep of capitalist development, a major theoretical problem remains: Braverman fails to provide an adequate explanation for the continuing division of the population along the lines of race, gender and, increasingly, citizenship status. Race and gender inequality is subsumed under the more general, but less useful, rubric of the industrial reserve army of labor (pp. 377-401). For Braverman, the industrial reserve army of labor is a segment of the working class created and sustained as
a buffer for the oscillating and uneven development of capitalism. This "relative surplus population" (p. 386) is composed, in part, of those people unemployed as a result of business cycles, technological change and regional or sectoral uneven development. However, a significant segment of that labor pool is accounted for by those for whom steady employment is rare or unattainable or who are crowded into relatively limited niches in the economy (e.g., service, agricultural or domestic employment). It is in this portion of the industrial reserve army that one finds a disproportionate share of blacks, hispanics, women and immigrant workers.

It is, however, precisely this coincidence between non-market status and real or potential market position which constitutes the major problem for the reserve army formulation. Why should blacks, women or other groups be concentrated in the industrial reserve army? Moreover, how do we account for the historical persistence of that concentration? Braverman provides few clues to these questions. In large part, his conceptualization of capitalism as a system of inequality presumes that the categories of actors in that system are determined entirely by their positions in the labor process. Thus, all other categories and organizations are determined entirely by, or are a function of, that fundamental relationship. Yet, what is often critical in the case of the industrial reserve army composed of blacks and women is that they are full or part-time participants in something other than a capitalist labor process: for example, housework or welfare transfer programs. In other words, participation in those other organizations provides the means for material existence when an individual is not engaged in value-producing activities; and, at the same time, participation in those organizations confers a status separate from class position.

Unfortunately, Braverman's use of the industrial reserve army concept does not provide sufficient clarity as to how or why certain groups should show up in its ranks consistently nor what distinct status is attached as a result. Thus, the reserve army comes to represent a residual category. I would argue, by contrast, that it is necessary to develop a better understanding of the distinctive processes responsible for constructing the category and for maintaining its important social and political consequences.

Edwards (1979), by way of contrast to Braverman, recognizes that race and gender are important considerations in the analysis of work organization and stratification. For example, he writes: "For members of both groups (blacks and women), their daily existence as workers is always conditioned by their special status" (p. 197). Yet, Edwards is only slightly more helpful when it comes to identifying the basis of that special status or demonstrating how it is reproduced over time. With the exception of passing reference to the "special dialectics of race and gender" (pp. 194, 196) and to a cultural legacy of slavery and women's subordination to patriarchal authority (p. 197), the analysis focuses instead on the labor market positions of blacks, women and, to some extent, alien workers.

While it might be unfair to criticize Edwards for not having broadened his analysis to account for parallel systems of inequality, the "special status" of blacks, women and other identifiable groups plays an important role in his research on the labor process. In particular, his concept of "simple control" (pp. 34-6) in peripheral enterprises is built around the additional (non-market) leverage exercised by employers over workers. Simple control infers paternalistic authority, lack of formal job rights and arbitrary employment practices. This form of control, according to Edwards, is rooted in both the personal qualities of the employer and in the vulnerable position of employees. What accounts for their vulnerability?

The only answer provided by Edwards is a partial one: vulnerability de-
rived from the concentration of workers into specific (segmented) labor markets. That is, when there exists an overabundance of people to fill a limited number of positions and when those positions require little personal or organizational investment in training, then the specter of replacement by a labor market competitor creates vulnerability among employees and, therefore, leverage for employers. However, that explanation is incomplete in two senses: (1) it fails to account for the mechanisms which produce the vulnerability of secondary workers external to the labor process; and (2) it displaces to the level of the labor market the explanation for why some markets are crowded (and competitive) and others are not.

Again, let me suggest that for Edwards, as for Braverman, the inability or unwillingness to allow for the existence of a system of inequality not directly determined by the structure of the labor process leads to a rather incomplete explanation. Although Edwards concludes that racism and sexism have "become real material forces in society" (p. 195), we are neither directed to a material base nor to a set of organizational practices which might serve as their foundation.

Finally, there is the recent work by Michael Burawoy (1979). While Burawoy offers an important theoretical contribution to labor process research, he also creates an obstacle to explaining the relationship between race, gender and citizenship and the organization of work. In the introduction to his case study of a modern machine shop, Burawoy warns (p. 25):

The political, legal and ideological institutions of capitalism guarantee the external conditions of production. Under capitalism, these institutions mystify the productive status of workers, capitalists, managers, etc. Thus, the political, legal and ideological apparatuses of the capitalist state transform relations among agents of production into relations among citizens, sexes, races and so on.

In other words, the explanation for the continued participation of workers in the capitalist inequality relationship lies squarely in the labor process. For Burawoy, the organization of the labor process simultaneously obscures the capitalists' appropriation of surplus and secures workers' participation in the wage labor contract (pp. 23-30). Therefore, workers' interests cannot simply be taken as given nor can opposition (or cooperation) between workers and managers be assumed as invariant characteristics of industrial organization. Rather, interests, opposition and consent are manufactured through the activities of the labor process.

Although Burawoy's argument presents a formidable challenge to underlying (but generally unsubstantiated) assumptions about conflict or harmony, his theory of the structural determination of interests and attitudes tends to overlook the ways in which the status of workers external to work organizations can be manipulated internally. This is evident in two ways. First, the theory is heavily weighted in the direction of work structures and practices found in monopoly or core industries. The insulation of the machine shop labor process from the vagaries of market fluctuations made possible the development of bureaucratically-administered job structures and increased the importance of seniority and job rights over against other worker characteristics, such as race and gender. However, outside of such enterprises, Burawoy's theory lends little insight. How, for example, do we account for the manipulation of women or minorities in settings which do not provide job rights equivalent to internal labor markets?

Second, even in those enterprises or industries ostensibly employing internal labor markets, job segregation by race and gender have not been eliminated. As Doeringer and Piore (1975) point out, internal labor markets can
operate quite effectively to produce segregated job ladders in which the recruitment of women and minorities facilitate the separation of labor processes. Equally important, supposedly objective testing criteria within internal labor markets are often suborned by subjective assessments made about workers by supervisory personnel.

In this light, Burawoy's assertions about the primacy of activities in the labor process must be questioned. If statuses created external to the organization do indeed have consequences internally, then how are those statuses produced and what impact do they have on work organization? Similarly, if those statuses are manipulated to the advantage of employers, ought we not expect them to have a direct bearing on relationships between workers as well?

**CITIZENSHIP, GENDER AND THE HARVEST LABOR PROCESS**

In order to shed some light on these issues, I will now move to an analysis of data collected in a year-long (1978-79) study of the social organization of lettuce production in the Southwestern U.S. The analysis will focus most directly on the organizational and economic affects of citizenship status and gender on the harvest labor process. I will begin by comparing the two predominant labor processes in harvesting and demonstrate how citizenship and gender inequality are related to the form of the labor process. The concluding section will concentrate on developing the outlines of an amended theory of the labor process.

**The Industrial Setting**

The lettuce industry provides a useful focus for the analysis of work organization in modern agriculture for several reasons. First, the lettuce industry is an integral part of the agricultural economy of the Southwest: 85% of the nearly $1 billion national crop comes from California and Arizona (Calif. Crop Reports 1979). Second, lettuce production is highly concentrated organizationally. Nearly 50% of Southwestern lettuce is accounted for by the three largest firms (see Thomas 1980, p. 53, and Friedland, et al, 1981 for two different calculations of market share). Individual firms account for up to 40% of the lettuce shipped during certain seasons (Federal Trade Commission 1976, p. 1675). The three giants of lettuce production are examples of complex, diversified corporate organizations: they harvest and ship lettuce (and a variety of other crops) on a year-round basis. Entire harvest operations are shifted with the season in a loop stretching from central to southern California and then east to Arizona.

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3 Whit Soule pointed this out to me in conjunction with his survey of job-related discrimination cases.

4 Data collection was organized into three main activities: In-depth interviews; field work in the lettuce harvest; and survey interviews with a sample of harvest workers. In-depth interviews were conducted with individuals from the following groups: growers, managers and industry representatives; organizers and officials of the United Farm Workers union (UFW) and Teamsters; and present and retired lettuce workers. These interviews and the survey instrument were broadened by over four months of field work. I worked in two different harvest crews: one organized around piece-rate production and the other paid on an hourly basis.

A quota sample of 152 workers was selected for the survey interviews. The

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(cont.) survey (written and administered in Spanish) focused on three major areas: work histories; patterns of migrancy; and workers' economic and political status. Contacts made during the field work enabled me to include undocumented workers in the survey sample. This provided the opportunity for comparing undocumented workers with others in the lettuce harvest along dimensions of work history, migrancy and earnings. For a more detailed discussion of the methodology, see Thomas 1980, pp. 20-24.
Third, lettuce production is organized around a labor-intensive production process. Wages average close to 60% of direct production costs (Monterey County 1979). Despite more intensive use of chemical herbicides and pesticides, hand labor remains the overwhelming force in cultivation and harvest operations. Approximately 12,000 to 15,000 workers each year harvest the crop (Farn Labor 1979). Fourth and finally, the lettuce industry is the most highly unionized of the major fruit and vegetable crops in the Southwest. Approximately 70% of lettuce companies are covered by a contract administered either by the United Farm Workers (UFW) or the Teamsters union. 5

Lettuce harvesting is carried out in two organizational forms: the ground or piece-rate crew and the wrap machine crew. Close to 80% of the lettuce shipped from California and Arizona is harvested by ground crews; the remainder is wrapped in the field on machines prior to shipping (Dosseler 1976). I will briefly describe the labor process in each.

Ground Crews

The average ground or piece-rate crew (the names are used interchangeably) consists of a total of 36 workers. The major sub-unit of the crew is the three-person team or trio; an average crew will contain nine trios and nine auxiliary workers. Each trio is a team of two lettuce cutters and one packer. The auxiliary workers assemble and distribute cartons for the packers, seal the filled cartons and load them onto trucks for transport out of the field. The largest companies often have in excess of twenty crews working during the peak of harvest in any single production area.

The cutters lead off the crew and walk stooped through the rows of mature lettuce cutting and trimming the heads. Packers follow behind squeezing the lettuce into empty cartons (24 heads per carton). The cartons are then glued, stapled shut and loaded for transport to the cooling facilities where they will be loaded on pallets and forklifted onto trucks or railroad cars headed for market. In the field, all the work is done by hand. With the exception of a few mechanical aids, no other form of machine is used in the harvest process. Although the length of the work day may vary according to weather, field or market conditions, the physical exertion required is tremendous. One needs only imagine walking stooped for ten hours a day or completing 2,500 toe-touches to get a sense of the endurance needed in the cutting and packing of lettuce. The labor process takes its toll; "careers" in the industry are generally short. Older and retired workers reported that a long career ranges in the neighborhood of 10 to 18 years.

The harvest labor process of the ground crew may be quite demanding and destructive, but it is also remarkably productive, efficient and adaptable. The division of labor among crew members is quite precise and controlled: workers interact with one another in such a fashion as to minimize extraneous movement and to establish a routine. A crew of 36 workers can, under normal conditions, cut, pack and load 3500 cartons of lettuce per day, i.e., enough to fill three-and-a-half railroad cars.

Trios, the central workers in the crew, are paid on a per-carton piece-rate basis. Cutters and packers will divide among themselves the total earnings of the trio for production during a given period, i.e., usually a week. The auxiliary workers are most often paid on an hourly basis. However, efficiency and pro-

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5 Space does not permit an adequate consideration of the role of union organization, differences in union structure and jurisdictional conflicts in this article. See Thomas (1981) for a more thorough analysis.
ductivity depend much more on crew coordination than on individual or trio ability. While individuals and trios may be particularly adept at the activities they perform (e.g., cutting and packing), wages are ultimately determined by the overall speed and, therefore, coordination of activities within the crew. Workers reported that the time required for acquiring individual proficiency is relatively short: as little as a day or two. Crew coordination and articulation, on the other hand, are much more difficult to obtain. The crew in which I worked only began to develop a high degree of teamwork after the fifth week of being together.

Since the coordination of all crew members is quite important in determining work pace and earnings, cutters, in particular, may push fellow members to coordinate their activities and to maintain the crew's pace. For example, one of the veteran cutters gave the following pep talk to the crew in which I worked during one of the infrequent rest breaks:

You guys aren't making our job easy. You have to keep up or you mess up the rhythm. My money depends on you getting the boxes closed good. And your money depends on me cutting a lot of those heads. If you start falling behind, then you screw everything up....

The collective dimension of skill in the harvest is, therefore, embodied in the high degree of mutual coordination and experience which shows up among crew members.

In this regard, the ground crews bear clear similarities to other work groups which rely on immediate and mutual coordination of group members in the labor process. Gouldner's (1954) description of the contrast in interaction between surface (factory) and mining workers highlights the common features of mining and harvesting crews:

Unlike most workers in the board plant, members of the mining teams worked together in closest association. The size of their work group was larger, their rate of interaction more intensive, and their expectations of informal work reciprocities were more pronounced.... The nature of their work permitted a greater degree of discretion (p. 133).

Whyte notes a similar combination of individual and collective skill in the administration and performance of glass-making (1961, p. 220). In his analysis of longshoring gangs, Finlay (1980, p. 7) concludes: "The gang is an amalgamation of different activities, and the element of skill derives from the coordination of these activities--it has no single occupational base." In harvest crews, like the miners, glass-blowers and longshoring gangs, the administration and performance of the activities of production are united.

In addition, most harvest crews are characterized by social interaction beyond the workplace itself. That is, they also exist as relatively cohesive social units external to the labor process. This shows up in two ways: in recruitment of new members and in the ways in which they deal with the exigencies of migration. In the first instance, many crews recruit and help train their own members. Kinship often serves as an important avenue of entry into the crew. In addition, overlapping ties, such as distant family relations or common village origin in Mexico serve to bind the crew and to facilitate entry. The second form of social cohesion involves the migrancy of the crew. Since most crews migrate with their employer or between employers, the crew represents a fairly closely knit collection of married and single bachelors.

Finally, the adaptability of the ground crew is an important aspect of work organization in the lettuce harvest. Weather, field and market conditions
rondor work schedules uneven. Even in the largest firms, where stable marketing and sales arrangements have been negotiated with large buyers, fluctuation still exists in the amount of work available in any given period. Skilled harvest crews, in contrast to capital intensive machinery, can be activated for varying periods of time, adapted to a wide range of field conditions and easily transported between fields at a moment’s notice.

Taken in combination, these attributes—productivity, efficiency and adaptability—underscore the critical role played by the ground crews in the harvest labor process. It would not be an exaggeration to argue that they constitute formidable social harvesting machines.

Wrap Crews

Approximately one-fifth of the lettuce shipped from California and Arizona is sent out enveloped in plastic film (Drossler 1976). Known as “wrapped” or “source-wrapped” lettuce, it is the product of a labor process which differs in several important respects from the ground crew. The wrap machine and its auxiliary equipment mark a significant increase in the capital intensification of lettuce harvesting. Individual machines cost in the neighborhood of $75,000 to $125,000 each—about the price of the largest and most powerful generation of farm tractors. Given the fact that two machines are necessary to match the output of one ground crew (Zahara, et al 1976), investments approach nearly a quarter of a million dollars per ground crew equivalent. Thus, in contrast to the minimal hand tools necessary to outfit the ground crews, wrap machines represent a sizeable increase in fixed costs. Although the total volume of wrapped lettuce

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6 The machine consists of a steel frame with hinged wings which fold back for highway transport. Electrically-powered conveyor belts are mounted on the wings and center section of the machine for moving lettuce between fixed work stations. For a schematic diagram, see Thomas (1980, p. 79).
The harvest labor process in the lettuce industry thus poses two sets of problems. First, in contrast to an "unstructured" labor market (Fisher 1953) created by a highly variable demand for unskilled workers, the labor process in the ground crews calls for the development of well-organized and skilled work teams. Yet, as I will go on to show in the next section, the ground crews are largely unable to extract compensation or status commensurate with their labor market position or to exercise control over the content of their work. How can such valuable labor be had at so low a price? Second, the wrap machine with its changes in work organization, wage rates and capital intensity has undercut the basis for worker commitment to crew and company. Now, then, do lettuce firms resolve this problem? How is sufficient labor found and workforce stability induced? 

Using data collected in the three-part research design, the remainder of this article will be devoted to demonstrating that there exists a strong relationship between citizenship, gender and work organization in the lettuce industry. Furthermore, I will argue that the relationship can be explained in terms of the relative advantages to employers of distributing workers of varying degrees of social and political vulnerability to different positions in the labor process. That is, the concentration of undocumented workers in the ground crews has two important effects: (a) the subordination of productivity levels to manipulation of the basis of workers' external political status; and (b) the denial to both undocumented and documented workers of the capacity to claim higher status or reward for their skills or to mount a sustained challenge to control over the labor process. On the other hand, the concentration of documented and citizen workers, especially women, in the wrap crews has the effect of: (a) ensuring the availability of low-skilled, low-status workers; and (b) transforming the social and economic restrictions associated with gender and alien status into the means for increasing workforce stability. 

LABOR SUPPLY AND CONTROL OVER PRODUCTION

Data collected in a survey of lettuce workers and in semi-structured interviews demonstrates that citizenship and gender are critical factors in both the construction of the labor market and in the organization of harvest crews. Results depicted in Table 1, below, show that for the survey sample there is a strong relationship between citizenship status and an individual's crew location (harvest occupation): undocumented workers are concentrated (83.4%) in the ground crews and citizens (94.7%) show up largely in the wrap crews.

| Table 1 about here |

The importance of citizenship status is also reflected in the distribution of weekly earnings. While the amount one can potentially earn is most strongly affected by crew type, Table 2 presents a finding which tends to run counter to most expectations. That is, on average, undocumented workers tend to earn more than either documented or citizen workers: 27.8% of undocumented workers reported making $251 or more per week compared to 15.3% for citizens and 8.5% for documented immigrants. 

| Table 2 about here |

The figures for average weekly earnings represent estimates for periods when there is work to be had. Because of shifts in production areas, inclement weather and disemployment due to injury or need for rest, the average work year for most lettuce harvesters comprises less than 9 months. For a more detailed discussion, see Thomas 1980, Chapters 4 and 5.
### Table 1: Percentage Distribution of Harvest Occupations by Citizenship Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Harvest Occupation</th>
<th>U.S. Citizen</th>
<th>Documented Immigrant</th>
<th>Undocumented Immigrant</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground Crew (skilled)</td>
<td>. . . . . 5.3%</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td>83.4%</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrap Crew (unskilled)</td>
<td>. . . . . 94.7%</td>
<td>65.9%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(97)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>(152)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2: Percentage Distribution of Average Weekly Earnings by Citizenship Status of Respondent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Weekly Income</th>
<th>U.S. Citizen</th>
<th>Documented Immigrant</th>
<th>Undocumented Immigrant</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$101 - 150</td>
<td>. . . . 47.4%</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$151 - 200</td>
<td>. . . . 47.4%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$201 - 250</td>
<td>. . . . 0.0%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$251 - 300</td>
<td>. . . . 5.3%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$301 - 350</td>
<td>. . . . 0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>. . . . 100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(94)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>(149)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Missing = 3
Finally, the division of employment by gender is reflected in the concentration of women into categories of documented immigrant or citizen and in the complete segregation of women into the wrap crews. As demonstrated in Table 3, there were no undocumented women found working in the harvest and (in Table 4) those women employed in the harvest worked exclusively in the wrap crews.

Table 3 Percentage Distribution of Citizenship Status by Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship Status</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Percent Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Citizen</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>-26.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documented Immigrant</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>71.6%</td>
<td>-12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented Immigrant</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>(92)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Citizenship and Ground Crew Organization

The high degree of mutual coordination and the potential for internal regulation in the ground crews creates the basis for the crew to emerge as an alternative locus of control. What distinguishes the organizational potential of the ground crew from the more influential miners, glass-makers or longshore workers described earlier, however, is the general inability of lettuce workers to effectively use their skill as a negotiating device. Even with the implementation of favorable labor legislation in California and the aggressive unionization drives spearheaded by Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers union, work in the lettuce harvest remains poorly paid, physically destructive and largely unchanged in its organization.

Table 4 about here

8 Fuller and Mamer (1978) provide a useful description and analysis of the potential implications of the California law (the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975).
The most common explanation for this state of affairs (see, for example, Fisher 1953 for a widely cited argument) is the competitive nature of the labor market. And, indeed, competition is a powerful force: having achieved a berth in a crew provides no guarantee that an individual (or an entire crew, for that matter) can retain his or her position indefinitely. Moreover, the availability of potential replacement workers makes it possible for employers to exercise considerable leverage over individual and crew performance. Within the crew, as well, competition gets translated into internal efforts to sustain high levels of productivity. At the extreme, crews have been known to “burn out” (fatigue to the point of exhaustion and embarrassment) members who are either unpopular or incapable of maintaining an accustomed pace.

However, competition is a factor which must itself be explained; as Edwards (1979, pp. 166-5) points out, competition exists to some degree in all labor markets. Furthermore, real job insecurity (i.e., the constant removal of crew members) would operate against the maintenance of mutually experienced and skilled crews. Rather, let me suggest, competition must be constructed. In the case of the ground crews, that competition is a product of the construction of a labor system around the political inequalities associated with differences in citizenship status.

The systematic recruitment of undocumented and non-citizen labor creates the basis not only for engendering competition among workers in the same labor market, but it also acts to enhance managerial control over skilled crews. Let me begin by considering the effects of citizenship status on workers’ employment strategies.

Significant differences in the employment strategies of documented and undocumented workers emerged from the in-depth interviews and field work. Undocumented workers expressed a sense of urgency in describing their work experiences and plans. Documented workers, on the other hand, focused on the monetary and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crew Type</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Percent Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground</td>
<td>69.6%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>69.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrap</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>(15.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutter</td>
<td>(17.4)</td>
<td>(1.7)%</td>
<td>(12.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packer</td>
<td>(13.0)</td>
<td>(25.0)</td>
<td>(73.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrapper</td>
<td>(0.0)%</td>
<td>(73.3)</td>
<td>(152)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.02</td>
<td>100.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
organizational advantages of work in the lettuce harvest. These different orientations appear quite openly in terms of categories of citizenship status, as the comments below demonstrate. Typical of many of the undocumented workers, a young cutter summarized his position this way:

Anywhere I work I take chances of being picked up and sent home. Sure, it's easy to get work in the strawberries or with the (lettuce) machines, but you don't make much money.... So, if you have to take so many chances, you better make as much money as you can.

Another locilupero (lettuce worker) explained:

If I was ten years younger and had papers, I might look at things differently. But I am 30 years old and I've been working in the lettuce for 8 years.... If I could get papers, maybe I'd work as a tractor-driver or something and make less money. Then I could work more years. I was arrested once and besides it takes so long to get papers.... So, I stay cutting lettuce until I can't do it anymore. Then I go home.

Documented workers, on the other hand, tended to concentrate on achieving a balance between maximum earnings and the physical demands of working. A green-card (permanent immigrant) who began working in the fields without papers offered an insightful comparison of the difference between his past and present orientations:

Before, I wanted to make as much money as I could when I got work. It was a struggle all the time. If I found a job, I had to lay low and keep out of trouble.... I worried all the time about getting picked up by la migra (Border Patrol). Now it's different. I can walk the streets and not worry. For me it means that I can get a job and make money when I want. If I get tired of this, I can maybe try to get a job driving a truck. I won't make as much, but at least I'll still be able to work.

While citizenship acts to limit the occupational opportunities of all immigrants, the range of choices appears wider for legal immigrants than for the undocumented ones. Documented workers at least can choose between higher-paying, physically destructive work and lower-paying, less demanding work. Undocumented workers, on the other hand, are susceptible to apprehension and deportation wherever they work; thus, many attempt to maximize earnings when and where possible. Nonetheless, the potential for higher wages and steadier work in lettuce draws both groups to seek employment in the crews. Jobs in the lettuce harvest are, therefore, the object of intense and sometimes bitter competition between documented and undocumented workers. The nature of that competition is, however, profoundly affected by the differential statuses of the competitors. That is, precisely because documented workers and citizens have neither the legal nor the organizational means by which to close-off the flow of undocumented aliens or to sanction employers for hiring undocumented aliens, they are forced to compete on the same terrain with that most vulnerable category of labor. Thus, the perpetuation of competition turns on the capacity of employers to manipulate citizenship status to their advantage, i.e., to, in effect, reproduce the vulnerability of undocumented workers as control over a labor process which engages both undocumented and documented workers. An important element of that control is the conflict it engenders between workers who share the same national and ethnic heritage but who have a different status in the labor market.

In a fashion very similar to what Bonacich (1976) describes as a split-labor market, undocumented workers pose a significant dilemma for documented immigrants, particularly union members and supporters. On one hand, they are countrymen and
and women who share a common background as Mexicans; on the other hand, however, they belong to a segment of the labor force which, because of its vulnerability, has historically acted to undercut both formal and informal worker organization against management. 9

For example, when looking for work in the fields, I often talked with farmworkers in local gathering places, e.g., bars, grocery stores and friends' houses. 10 In most cases, I tried to tap into the grapevine for jobs by asking for an assessment of particular companies: how were they to work for? was it a good place to learn to cut lettuce? On several occasions, I was told that crews at certain companies were inordinately hard-working and that the reason for this was their high percentage of undocumented workers. On one occasion, I was warned:

You don't want to work at Salad Giant! They're real fast.

You wouldn't be able to keep up because all those guys are illegals...every one of them. That's all Salad Giant hires.

They bring those guys up and work them till they drop....

Efforts to more systematically sample comparisons by other workers bore similar results: most documented workers and citizens argued that undocumented workers did indeed work harder. Those employers who would respond to questions about undocumented workers agreed, as well. An undocumented worker, in response to my

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9 I examine this situation much more closely in a part of the larger study devoted to relations among workers in a large unionized lettuce firm, cf., Thomas (1980, Chapter 5).

10 Two important issues being explored presently are the role of informational networks in maintaining migrant flows and the manipulation of those networks by lower levels of management. In many respects, the job networks described by lettuce workers paralleled those charted by Granovetter (1974). I am indebted to James Baron for pointing this out.

query about relations with documented lechugeros (lettuce workers), remarked quietly:

A lot of those guys think we're just zapilotes (buzzards). You know, men who go around stealing other men's work. It's not that way ... we all have to eat and we have families who need to eat.

When you have no papers and you have a chance to work, you take it. It's not stealing.... Me and my friends have to work harder or the ranchers take away our jobs. We all support Chavez and his union, but our stomachs and our childrens' stomachs are more important right now.

The remarks of workers both with regard to their job strategies and their assessments of performance reflect consciousness of the effects of citizenship status. For undocumented workers, vulnerability is a fact of life. Potential political sanctions get translated into strategies of work and performance which are designed to acquire and maintain employment. In other words, the accessibility of work and the ever-present threat of deportation are viewed not so much as contradictory elements of a larger labor system, but as invariant conditions of employment. For documented workers and citizens, job strategies are constructed within limits imposed by constrained job opportunities. However, the presence of undocumented workers acts to further constrain their degrees of freedom both in job choice and in performance on the job. The differential effort displayed by undocumented workers and the greater desirability of these workers in the eyes of employers are translated into competition for work and, ultimately, into competing norms of performance.

Finally, the presence of undocumented workers has a direct affect on the organization and conditions of work for all lettuce workers in the ground crews. More than simply being vulnerable labor, undocumented workers represent an ident-
If a category of "rate-busters." Rather than being randomly distributed across a labor pool, these rate-busters can be identified and actively recruited by lettuce firms. Thus, for industry managers, they serve to maintain high levels of productivity and to undermine the organizational potential of the ground crews. Unlike the classic rate-busters depicted in the literature on output restriction and (see, for example, Roy 1952; Collins, Dalton and Roy 1946), undocumented workers do not comprise one or two deviants within an informal network of workers. On the contrary, the location of undocumented workers in the most influential positions in the crews--cutting and packing--tends to shift the balance in the opposite direction, i.e., toward the imposition of sanctions against those who cannot make the rate.

Limitations on the availability of productivity figures make this argument difficult to support statistically. In a separate analysis of the survey data, I used earnings as a rough surrogate for productivity (calculating output as a function of wages divided by piece-rates) and found that among ground crew workers in the sample there was no substantive relationship between citizenship status and earnings. This lends some support to the conclusion that crews constitute a "community of fate" (Stinchcombe 1965) determined by the status of the most vulnerable members.

Field work and interviews produced more supportive findings. In particular, interviews with workers from a cross-section of crews revealed that few crews are composed entirely of documented or undocumented workers; most contain a mix. According to several workers (which were corroborated by interviews with a company foreman), mixed crews are brought about by crew members bringing in friends and relatives (who may be documented or undocumented). Alternatively, foremen may use their leverage to intervene in the recruitment process. Often they will do so in order to inject undocumented workers. In either case, the undocumented workers are especially vulnerable to manipulation because of their citizenship status. When they are kin or friends of other crew members or when they are put into leading positions in the crew, the effect is the same: the fact of illegality becomes a lever with which the entire crew is moved in the direction of higher productivity.

Gender and Wrap Crew Organization

In the wrap machine labor process, the shared experience, commitment and coordination of the ground crew is replaced by a system which minimizes group interaction, individualizes skill acquisition, reduces skill requirements and enhances managerial control over workplace and organization. It represents a shift to what Edwards (1979, pp. 110-30) refers to as "technical control." For workers, wages are much less a function of crew skill than they are of the total number of hours worked in any given period. The reorganization of harvesting has recreated the traditional conditions of agricultural employment: a high demand for low-skill labor, low (hourly) pay, restricted occupational mobility and little or no incentive for employment stability. Yet, the change has been accomplished by means of a substantial increase in fixed capital investment. In other words, the replacement of crew skill by technical control devices has not made the economics of production impervious to the potential effects of low worker commitment and high employee turnover. Therefore, labor force sta-

11 Industry representatives and employers would not provide such information. The Teamsters union representatives also refused to make the data available. Finally, staff of the United Farm Workers reported the union did not collect productivity figures.

12 For a more detailed discussion of the procedures and findings of this analysis, see Thomas (1980, pp. 118-24).
bility remains a critical issue.

In this section, I will argue that firms have been able to simultaneously increase capital intensity and labor demand through recruitment from another low status labor pool: women. While the costs associated with turnover have not been eliminated, they have been reduced by means of recruitment from large local and stable supplies of women workers. The advantage of this system resides in the disadvantaged social, political and economic status of women, especially non-citizen and Mexican-American women. In the ground crew, manipulation of the political vulnerability of non-citizen (especially undocumented) workers enhanced managerial control over productivity. In the wrap crew, I will argue, manipulation of women's disadvantaged position in the labor market and subordinate position in the family enhances workforce stability.

Data collected in the survey and through in-depth interviews demonstrates that, on the whole, women wrap crew workers differ from their male counterparts in several important respects. Among the most relevant to this discussion are the following: (1) Women workers tend to be more evenly distributed by age than men. Men tend to be either relatively young (age 17-23) or relatively old (age 52 and above). (2) A much higher proportion of women are married (75%) than men (33%). (3) Nearly twice as many women have dependent children who need some daily care (66.7% vs. 34.6%). (4) Women were six times more likely to have a working spouse than men. And (5) less than one-fifth of the women worked away from their home, while over 90% of the men migrated. These findings tend to substantiate the argument that women are drawn from a much more localized, geographically stable labor pool.

Equally important, women also tend to be much more stable in terms of their employment. As Table 5, for example, points out women in the survey sample reported working much more consistently with the same company than male wrap crew workers. Similar findings were revealed for job and crew tenure (see Thomas 1980, pp. 190,192).  

The greater overall stability of women in terms of work, company and crew is itself a product of the factors which serve to segregate women into a separate labor market. Two major constraints operate on women's labor market chances: those imposed by women's status vis-a-vis all other labor market participants and those imposed by women's traditional family roles. Together these constraints reduce the range of job opportunities for women and, in turn, make women highly accessible as a pool of labor for low-paid, low-status employment. While it is not possible here to discuss gender segregation in employment in great detail, it is important to show how women come to constitute the primary source of labor for wrap crew production and how those jobs come to be defined as "women's work."

Many of the women I interviewed in the course of this study were acutely aware of the range of jobs open to them. When asked why she did not seek work in some other job in town, a 19 year old wrapper replied:

You mean like at Penny's or Mervyn's (department stores)? I make better money out here a lot of the time! Anyway, those jobs are no

Table 5  Years of Employment with Present Company by Gender (N = 82)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years With Present Company</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>% Difference (women-men)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1 year</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>-35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 1 yr. &lt; 3 yrs.</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 3 yrs. &lt; 5 yrs.</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 5 yrs.</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Better. All the men have the good jobs... If you're a woman, nobody wants to hire you. Everybody says that they don't want to train you to do a job because you'll just run off and get married. If you're a woman, that's one strike against you. If you're a woman and Mexican, forget it.

Even when women seek to work outside the fields, they are often steered back there. In an interview with a male counselor at a state employment office in Salinas (California), I was told:

Most Mexican-American women who come in here are given the names of employers who need field help. We have one woman who all she does is handle those calls. When a Mexican woman comes in, we just send her right over to talk to Dolores. It saves a lot of time...especially if they don't speak English.

The barriers to non-farm employment are real ones for women and, moreover, within agriculture work opportunities are restricted. In a study of women farm workers in California, Barton (1978) found that even when women workers seek to acquire skills, they are often met by hostile employers and insufficient training programs.

Women's traditional role in the family acts as the other major constraint on employment opportunities and also serves to influence job tenure: The division of labor in the family is often cited as a major obstacle to the working careers of married women (cf., Gubbele 1977; Jones 1970, and Oppenheim 1970). The obligation to perform household labor and childrearing has traditionally fallen on women farm workers, even those who migrate (Barton 1978). Nearly all married women I interviewed reported that they performed the major household chores on a regular basis. The remainder said they divided that labor between themselves and older children (in most cases, older daughters). All of this work is carried out in addition to working in the fields during the harvest season.
As one of the women with whom I worked explained methodically:

Every morning in the summer I get up at 4 to make my lunch, his lunch and the children's breakfast. At 5 I take the kids to my mother's house down the street. At 6 I leave for work. Then, at 3 in the afternoon he gets home and takes a nap... he works real hard. I am usually home by 4. I start dinner and then get the girls (daughters). After dinner I do the dishes and maybe some cleaning.... If I'm lucky I get to bed around 8 or 8:30.

While many of the women complained about the tremendous amount of work to be done each day and on weekends, the dual roles of housewife and wage earner are most often accepted as a condition of their employment and the family's well-being.

The subordinate position of women in the family is also reflected in the practice of determining whether or not a wife will work. In almost all instances, women reported having to secure their husband's permission prior to taking a job, i.e., 93% of the women lettuce workers surveyed said that their husbands held veto power over their employment. A woman's wage may represent an integral part of the family budget (particularly in the case of families living in the United States and border areas), but the range of work opportunities and the duration of her employment are limited by her status as wife, mother and domestic laborer. Thus, the availability of work in low-skill, seasonal production allows women to carry out those roles. At the same time, however, the availability of this attractive labor pool facilitates expansion of those jobs.

Furthermore, the forces which restrict the employment opportunities of women also act to stabilize that labor pool residentially. The role of wife and mother, the subordinate status of a woman's work to that of her husband's, and the various earnings strategies families develop severely limit the geographic mobility of married women. In some instances, migrancy is a feature of the work career, but only under conditions that the family migrate as a unit. In the majority of cases, however, married women remain in one location whether or not their husband's have jobs which require seasonal relocation.

Making It "Women's Work"

The ratio of women to men found in the wrap crews differs from company to company and sometimes from crew to crew. However, the numerical predominance of women in that segment of the harvest labor process is clear. Evidence collected in this study showed that with the exception of jobs which require considerable physical strength, women were represented in all occupational categories (for example, see Table 4). However, a search for the origins of the concentration of women on machines yields little illumination of the present situation. More important are the processes by which certain jobs become "women's work." I will argue that there are three related processes taking place: (1) employers actively recruiting women; (2) men reacting to the negative status attached to the work; and (3) efforts on the part of women to monopolize access to the work.

For most employers, the actual recruitment of women is taken more as a matter of standard procedure than as an innovative technique. That is, the fact that in certain situations women are more attractive labor is not constantly rediscovered. Rather, employers simply look around and see that women have been continuously employed in canneries, packing sheds and harvesting in other industries (e.g., the mechanical harvest of canning tomatoes) and follow suit. Said one grower: "So far we haven't found anything better or faster than women doing the wrapping. They're fast and efficient" (Pecker 1977, p. 16C).

The recruitment and job allocation process, however, is an active part of making and perpetuating women's work. Employers intervene directly in an at-
tempt to ensure that the same category of labor continues to show up where it is most advantageous. This takes two forms in the wrap crews. First, wage reductions eliminate the basis for men working in those jobs because earnings are neither sufficient to encourage migration nor high enough to support the single family paycheck. Second, women are actively recruited through a variety of networks to occupy positions on the machines. The utilization of foreman's networks and those of women crew members enables firms to perpetuate identification of gender with occupation.

The successful construction of enclaves of production as women's work also acts to discourage the voluntary entry of men into those positions. As in most organizations where women are concentrated into an occupational category (e.g., secretarial and clerical work), the occupation comes to reflect the status of the occupants, not the requisite skills or aptitudes of the work they perform (for a broader discussion of this process, see Kanter 1977). There is nothing feminine about the job of wrapping, for example, though most employers assert that women are better suited to do the work (e.g., women are "more patient" or are capable of doing "mindless chores"). Nevertheless, workers and managers both respond to the status associated with the occupants and internalize it as a condition of employment. Even on those occasions when one or more women workers were absent from the crew in which I worked, the foreman took women from other jobs and made them wrap. When I asked the foreman why he did not use male cutters (which would have balanced the crew) as replacements, he replied simply: "It's a woman's work." The brevity of the explanation assumed that enough was said. 14

Finally, the construction of women’s work is a process in which women themselves take a hand. Though certainly not intending to further management's purpose, women may organize around their communal status for the purpose of monopolizing access to jobs defined as women's work. For example, one wrapper in her thirties explained that her crew was entirely female with the exception of the closers and loaders. That situation, she argued:

...is much better than having some men and some women. The women all get together and talk. We all get along and we don't have to worry what the men think.

Any time an opening occurs in cutting, wrapping or packing, kinship networks are used to fill it:

We don't have any agreements...that men shouldn’t be hired.

It's just that we like having all women together....Nobody's ever tried to bring a man in.

Thus, on the one hand, the making of women's work involves the purposive activity of management and, to some extent, women; on the other hand, it involves the reaction of men to the gender identification of the occupation. The net result is the perpetuation of an enclave of occupations in which women are concentrated.

Gender differences are thus used to create and enforce the distinction between crews. Like citizenship, gender is a communal status which, while socially constructed external to the labor process, has considerable consequences for the organization of work and wages. The status of women external to economic organizations, such as the lettuce firm described in this article, enables employers to use their labor in particular ways. The severe restriction of women’s labor market opportunities is seized upon by employers as a means for recruiting large

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14 The foreman's remark proved an understatement in comparison to the view held by many male workers. After the incident described above, several workers told me straightforwardly that men who wrap are usually suspected of being homosexual.
quantities of low-skilled labor. But, additionally, the enforced geographic stability of farm worker wives and children enhances the availability of women's labor on a regular, seasonal basis. Employers can avail themselves of this element of an internal labor market without having to pay wages sufficiently high to encourage labor migration with the firm. Put, slightly different, women's geographic stability, a product of their subordinate family and economic position, makes their labor available on a regular seasonal basis. Employers, therefore, are ensured that at least a portion of the labor they trained (at an earlier juncture) will be available in local labor pools in each production area. As a result, the high costs of regularly training new workers are reduced through the attachment of local women to the firm.

CONCLUSION

This case study of the labor process in the lettuce industry has attempted to show that a system of labor recruitment and utilization built around citizenship and gender inequalities has provided considerable advantage for employers. The principal dimensions of advantage are found in control over the productivity of the labor process and in the enhancement of workforce stability.

In the ground crew harvest, in particular, the recruitment of non-citizen workers enhances managerial control over skilled production teams. Furthermore, the recruitment of undocumented workers serves as a form of insurance for the organization's investment in training individual workers and crews. The non-market control exercised by employers over workers virtually prevents that skill (acquired within the organization) from being appropriated by labor and withheld from the firm for the purpose of wage negotiation or negotiation over the content of the work itself. In other words, the political vulnerability of undocumented labor prevents skill from showing up as the property of the worker independent of the organization. Even when skills are acquired external to the organization which purchases their use (i.e., in the event that individuals or crews are trained in another firm), workers cannot use that skill as the basis of wage negotiation. In the wrap crews, by contrast, the pace of work is much less influenced by the skills or coordination of workers than it is by the technology of the machine. Thus, the value of undocumented workers in the ground crews, i.e., their vulnerability to political manipulation, is less important in the wrap crew. However, recruitment of women (both citizen and non-citizen) enables firms to reorganize production without having to make concessions or compensation to the work force. At the same time, the concentration of women in the crews creates a gender identification with key positions in the crews, especially in wrapping, and acts to enhance external control over production.

In both the ground and the wrap crew harvests, the recruitment of non-citizens and women enhances the stability of the labor force. That stability translates into savings in production costs, i.e., it reduces the number of workers who have to be trained to carry out tasks associated with the harvest. In the wrap crew, in particular, the recruitment of women and older workers enables firms to turn labor's vulnerability to the organization's advantage.

Overall, these findings suggest quite strongly that it is necessary to more directly connect status inequalities external to the labor process with the way in which activities and positions are structured internal to economic organizations. In this examination of the role of citizenship and gender in the harvest labor process, I have attempted to show that statuses produced outside the lettuce industry are seized upon by employers to facilitate the organization of highly productive labor processes. The utilization of labor in particular ways may succeed in reproducing segmentation in the labor force and citizenship and gender identification with certain occupations; however, the political and economic vulnerability of undocumented workers and women is itself the product of their part-
icipation in another set of processes.

The nature of those processes and their relationship to class inequality remain to be more fully developed. Burawoy, in his comparative analysis of migrant labor systems in U.S. agriculture and South African mining (1976), provides one starting point for a theory of citizenship inequality. The separation of productive activities of the migrant worker in one economy from the reproductive activities of the worker and his family in another, according to Burawoy (1976, p. 1056-67), enables employers to enjoy certain economic and political advantages. In particular, it is suggested, the separation of production and reproduction results in lower labor costs. Though that point is debatable, a more general implication is important. The denial to foreign workers of the rights and entitlements of citizenship in the host economy (e.g., the U.S. for Mexican workers) creates a form of political stratification divorced from, but consequential for, the organization of the labor process. In this context, I would argue, citizenship is not limited to an ideological phenomena, but is instead associated with participation in a concrete political unit, i.e., a nation-state. To the extent that claims to certain rights and entitlements (e.g., negotiation of legally enforceable work contracts or non-work related subsistence when unemployed) can be accepted or denied, citizenship represents a structure of inequality parallel to, but not directly determined by, the labor process.

With regard to gender inequality, another set of processes may be identified. As Hartmann and Markusen (1980) and others have argued, the structure of relations between men and women cannot be immediately deduced from theories of class inequality under capitalism. Rather, the nature and functioning of patriarchal authority and the sexual division of labor in the family provide a material basis for understanding how gender roles are produced external to the labor process. That gender inequality may be seized upon by employers is not disputed. However, the analytic separation of family and economy makes it possible to see how those two organizations structure one another.

These comments can but indicate a future direction for theory and research on the labor process. Hopefully, the case study analysis presented in this article can contribute to that pursuit.

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15 The concept of inequality based on citizenship has been raised elsewhere (e.g., Castells 1975 and Castle and Kosack 1975) but within the context of working class politics, not the organization of the labor process.
REFERENCES


