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Charles Tilly
University of Michigan
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Changing Forms of Collective Action

"Social change" is such a massive notion, and our own time one of such rapid social change, that we can easily slip into imagining everything important now changes faster than it used to. After all, many things certainly do: this year's means of storing, processing, and transmitting information is already obsolescent, and the tempo of innovation in information-whirling will no doubt increase for some time to come. Not all changes, however, follow a logistic curve.

Let us examine one that does not: alteration in the basic means of collective action. In that respect, the residents of Britain, France, and a number of other western countries experienced their last major round of change over a century ago. They are still using what we might call a nineteenth-century repertoire of collective action. The demonstration, the strike, the public meeting, the social movement, and a number of associated forms of action all came into their own in most western European countries during the nineteenth century, have altered in only secondary ways since then, and have in the interim added no distinctly different forms to the nineteenth-century array.

No doubt I should expect a British audience, fresh from witnessing the struggles of Brixton and Toxteth, to find puzzling the notion of little change since the nineteenth century. Let me confess instantly my unreadiness to battle Britons on their own contemporary ground. My most recent systematic evidence on British conflicts is a full 150 years old; it dates from 1831. My documentation on 1981's conflicts is hopelessly thin; it includes only the sorts of reports carried by major American newspapers, plus a few early commentaries in British periodicals enterprising enough to find their ways into the library of an American university. Given thin documentation, I could easily have missed important signs of long-term change.

The news reports, in any case, provide many reminders of the British past;
they call to mind especially the sustained effort of nineteenth-century British authorities to establish police control over working-class areas, both English and Irish, and the repeated resistance of people in working-class neighborhoods to that control. They recall how frequently Ireland has served as the proving ground for police routines later to be installed in Great Britain. The very routines of confrontation and looting have plenty of historical precedent. Notice that in August *New Society* began publishing a series called "the riots in perspective", emphasizing continuities between this year and the past. Jerry White's review of 1919 in the first article brings out that year's four rounds of rioting:

In May and June, there were race riots in seaports; in July, riots by soldiers who were awaiting demob or just discharged; in August, mass looting in Liverpool after the abortive Police Union strike; and in July and August, running battles between London youth and the police, with some casualties (White 1981: 260).

All those events had established nineteenth-century antecedents.

Flashback to 1919 provides a dual reminder: First, then as before and since, by using such words as "riot" and "disturbance", observers adopt the authorities' usual perspective, lump together forms of action which are actually quite distinctive, obscure the similarity of form between the violent and nonviolent instances of the same routine. Second, the nineteenth-century repertoire did not preclude violence or direct action, although neither was central to its operation. Sometimes the violence consisted of a direct attack on the person or premises of an enemy. Sometimes it spun off the edges of a largely nonviolent demonstration or strike. Sometimes it emerged from a struggle with a rival group which attempted to block the action's initiator from making its point. Most often, however, the violence resulted from a direct confrontation between members of the group making claims and police, or other representatives of the authorities, who sought to check their action. In almost all these cases, nevertheless, the violence simply cast into relief the same recurrent

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nineteenth-century routines: meeting, rally, and so on.

If we were tallying continuities between 1981's conflicts and those of the past, we could easily push back before 1919. Considering the recurrent theme of civilian resistance to police control, we could move all the way back to the very installation of the New Police in 1829 and thereafter. True, the conjunction of segregated racial minorities, police harassment, and outbreaks combining property destruction with looting has a twentieth-century American air; almost every American ghetto rebellion of the 1960s that did not begin with police intervention in a black civil rights demonstration began with a contested police arrest of a black person in the presence of many others, and in the context of repeated complaints against discriminatory patrolling of black areas. That particular combination, so far as I know, never appeared in nineteenth-century Britain. Nevertheless, the recent confrontations in Britain's urban minority areas have their counterpart in the contested policing of Irish areas in nineteenth-century British industrial towns. Here the central action was not typically a demonstration or a strike; instead, people employed the very old routine which had served against such powerful but unwanted outsiders as tax-collectors and billeted troops: gathering, threatening, taunting, stoning, impeding, retreating, only to regroup elsewhere.

This nineteenth-century defensive routine actually predates the nineteenth century. We can see it clearly and repeatedly among the food riots, Rough Music, machine-breaking, and other standard forms of eighteenth-century conflict. Few of those forms of action survived much past the 1830s. The routine for defending a territory against powerful outsiders was an exception. It survived to occupy a regular place in a new and distinctive repertoire.

The discussion which follows offers a very general account of the shift from the repertoires of collective action prevailing in Britain and France through the early nineteenth century to the repertoires prevailing in Britain and France since then.

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The account is schematic, the illustrations are few, the evidence presented fragile at best. I have skipped the illustrations and bypassed the evidence in order to sharpen the argument. Consider the paper a statement of a working hypothesis, and a proposal for research. Then we can reflect on what the world should look like if the hypothesis is correct, and what sort of evidence it would take to subject the hypothesis to proper scrutiny.

**Repertoires of Collective Action**

A distinctive nineteenth-century repertoire came into being as part of the same process which established the terms of direct popular participation in national politics within each of the countries. It emphasizes the same characteristics as are rewarded by national electoral politics: the mobilization of numbers and commitment on behalf of articulated claims to power and/or on powerholders. When it comes to demonstrations, strikes, public meetings, social movements, and similar forms of collective action, those groups are more successful, on the whole, which can produce the highest multiple of numbers, commitment, and articulation of claims.

Don't all repertoires work that way? No, in past and present people have organized repertoires around displays of lethal force, of links to powerful patrons (not necessarily human or even earthly), of certification by sacred texts, of one esoteric skill or another. Once claims cross international boundaries, furthermore, the mobilization of numbers and commitment on behalf of articulated claims to power and on powerholders has little impact in the contemporary world; the effects of those forms operate almost entirely within the bounds of a single state. Illusions and hopes to the contrary result, I think, from confounding the direct effect of a demonstration or rally on a foreign powerholder with the impact of the demonstration or rally on the host state's actions toward the foreign powerholder. We are examining a repertoire of collective action that grew up with, and is still largely confined to, action within the sorts of polities created as national electoral politics developed in Western Europe and 19th century...
Whether national electoral politics somehow caused the repertoire is more difficult to say. Another connection is equally plausible: the same struggle that created some direct national representation of ordinary citizens also crystallized the repertoire and gave it precarious legitimacy. A variety of different groups with a considerable range of interests and power acquired a common interest in protecting the means of action involved. The repertoire's availability for electoral claims made it difficult for authorities to block its extension to non-electoral claims, and thereby increased the advantages offered by the new repertoire to all sorts of contenders. In comparison to other forms of action people might, in principle, have adopted, the routines in the new repertoire were more likely to convey a clear message and less likely to call down vigorous repression.

All such advantages impose costs. The new repertoire inevitably disserved some kinds of groups: those for whom small numbers or secrecy were essential, those concerned mainly with their own right to exist rather than with the structure or exercise of national power, and so on. Where the object of a group's wrath was visible and local, meetings, rallies, demonstrations and the like were likely to be indirect, ineffective ways to reach the object, as compared with older forms of retribution. Out of incessant struggles among claimants, objects of their claims, and intervening authorities grew a series of half-stated but compelling definitions and rules: when a meeting was really a meeting, when the police could and should enter a gathering, who could march where, and so on. The definitions and rules, being political products themselves, tended to work against groups with few powerful allies. The resulting structure simultaneously encouraged and contained popular collective action.

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Let us sharpen the contrast between the "eighteenth-century" and "nineteenth-century" repertoires. We should do so in full realization a) that the "eighteenth-century" repertoire stretched back in time before then and survived into the nineteenth century, while the "nineteenth-century" repertoire continued into our own time; b) that the dichotomy suggests a neat distinction which the historical reality denies. On balance, performances in the older repertoire involved:

1. People's frequent employment of the authorities' normal means of action, either as caricature or as a deliberate, if temporary, assumption of the authorities' prerogatives in the name of the local community;

2. Common appearance of participants as members or representatives of constituted corporate groups and communities rather than of special interests;

3. A tendency to appeal to powerful patrons for redress of wrongs and, especially, for representation vis-à-vis outside authorities;

4. Extensive use of authorized public celebrations and assemblies for the presentation of grievances and demands;

5. Repeated adoption of rich, irreverent symbolism in the form of effigies, dumb show, and ritual objects to state grievances and demands;

6. Convergence on the residences of wrongdoers and the sites of wrongdoing, as opposed to seats and symbols of public power.

One might sum up the repertoire as parochial and patronized. Concretely, the repertoire included such routines as food riots, collective invasions of forbidden fields and forests, destruction of barriers, attacks on machines, Rough Music, serenades, expulsions of tax officials and other unwaned outsiders, tendentious holiday parades, fights between gangs from rival villages, pulling down and sacking of private houses, forced illumination, mobbing of outcasts, and the acting out of popular judicial proceedings. Those and a few other forms like them constituted the eighteenth-century repertoire.
The "nineteenth-century" repertoire with which we still live operates on quite different premises. As compared with the earlier repertoire, its performances show these tendencies:

1. The employment of relatively autonomous means of action, of a kind rarely or never employed by authorities;

2. frequent appearance of special interests and named associations or pseudo-associations (e.g. Coalition for Justice, People United Against ________);

3. direct challenges to rivals or authorities, especially national authorities and their representatives, rather than appeals to patrons;

4. deliberate organization of assemblies for the articulation of claims;

5. display of programs, slogans, signs of common membership;

6. preference for action in visible public places.

Let me insist that these are average differences, not absolutes. They describe a tendency toward action we might label national and autonomous. Concrete examples of these "national and autonomous" forms are strikes, demonstrations, electoral rallies, public meetings, petition marches, planned insurrections, and invasions of official assemblies. Sometimes several of these combine into the sustained challenge on behalf of an unrepresented constituency we commonly call a "social movement" or "political movement". Sometimes, likewise, they coalesce into the series of claims for votes we call an "electoral campaign". Those are the dominant performances available within the nineteenth- and twentieth-century repertoire.
We could schematize this already schematic summary as a two-dimensional diagram; the diagram places some of the characteristic performances within each repertoire with respect to the usual scope of their action, and the usual orientation to the authorities -- patronized or autonomous -- involved:

The diagram indicates a) that the various performances occupy somewhat different positions with respect to their characteristic scope and orientation to powerholders, b) that taken as wholes the two repertoires overlap somewhat in both respects, c) that nevertheless a significant net movement along both dimensions -- toward autonomous action which was national in scope -- occurred in the shift from one dominant repertoire to the other.

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Let us be clear about one thing. The notion of repertoire is a simplifying model. As I have stated it so far, it incorporates a sense of regularity, order, and deliberate choice into conflict; the model may well appear to leave no room for anger, drunkenness, spontaneity, and the pleasure of a good whack at an enemy's shins. In my sketch, it makes little allowance for variation by time, place, and social group, and implies neat, rapid, comprehensive transitions from one limited set of forms to the next. All that sounds hopelessly unrealistic.

I do mean to stress the order in collective action, in opposition to the disorder communicated by words such as "mob", "riot", and "disturbance". I do, furthermore, want to draw attention to the widespread and relatively rapid alteration in the means of collective action which occurred in Britain during the era of Reform. Yet nothing requires that rule-bound collective action be bloodless and calm, any more than a rough conformity to the rules of football excludes a bit of mayhem on the field. Nor is a massive net shift in the prevailing modes of action inconsistent with the occasional revival of the displaced modes of action. Workers' direct-action "outrages" still occurred in Sheffield and Manchester in the 1860s; but they were the more outrageous by then for being remnants of a time when physical attacks on knobsticks' persons and employers' premises were standard accompaniments of local turnouts.

In its weakest version, the notion of repertoire is simply a metaphor to remind us that routines such as the turnout recur, become recognizable to participants as well as to observers, and have something of an independent history. In its strongest version, the notion of repertoire amounts to an hypothesis of deliberate choice by contenders among well-defined alternative modes of action, with both the available alternatives and the choices contenders make among them changing continuously as a consequence of the outcomes of previous actions. In its intermediate version, the notion of repertoire states a model in which the accumulated experience -- direct and vicarious -- of contenders interacts with the strategies of authorities to make a
limited number of forms of action more feasible, attractive, and frequent than many others which could, in principle, serve the same interests. This intermediate version of the simplifying model is the one I have in mind here.

Some Explorations of Repertoires

My own work on repertoires of collective action sometimes looks vast to me. Yet it is still microscopic compared to the sort of evidence one would require for genuine confidence in the regularities the intermediate model implies. In the case of Britain, I am collecting information about a narrow slice of collective action: a manufactured category of events called "contentious gatherings". A contentious gathering is an occasion on which a number of people -- ten or more, in most of our practical applications -- gather in a publicly accessible place and make claims which would, if realized, bear on the interests of some other person(s). When specified and made reliable, such a definition captures just about any event an observer or historian would call a "disorder", a "disturbance", a "riot", an "affray" or something of the sort, plus a great many routine public meetings, wardmotes, contested elections, and the like. On the other hand, it tends to exclude small-scale acts of destruction such as arson or some kinds of machine-breaking, as well as coordinated but dispersed actions linked by patron-client networks, farflung conspiracies, or distant correspondents. As we use it, finally, the definition is quite vulnerable to variations in the quality of the available sources of evidence; in our nineteenth-century sources, for example, we often learn that a strike is in progress, but rarely find an explicit report of a gathering among strikers that meets our minimum requirements.

In the case of Great Britain, we have two overlapping studies in progress. The first deals with the London area -- Kent, Surrey, Sussex, and Middlesex -- in eleven years scattered from 1758 to 1834. There we are trying to learn how the changing social geography of the metropolis affected the geography of contention: whether, for example, the increasing class segregation of east from west in central London reduced
the frequency with which workers confronted masters and owners on what was home
territory for all concerned. On the one hand, we have information on the distribution
of population, trades, land uses, public services, and so on from such sources as the
Kent Directories and gazetteers. On the other, we have reports of contentious
gatherings and their contexts drawn from the systematic reading of a number of
periodicals, such as the Times and the Chronicle, augmented to some extent with
material from London archives. The point, then, is to see to what extent the
alteration in the geography of different kinds of contentious gatherings within the
metropolis over about seventy-five turbulent years corresponded to the general
reorganization of routine social geography.

Our second overlapping study concentrates on the period from 1828 through
1834, but deals with Great Britain as a whole. Those years included struggles around
Catholic Emancipation, the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, a Factory Act,
the new Poor Law, and a whole parade of other divisive issues, not to mention
Reform, the Swing rebellion, a great deal of industrial conflict, and much more
contention. They were also arguably pivotal in the transition from the eighteenth-
century repertoire of collective action to the repertoire we live with today. For that
period, we are trying to learn how the interactions of challengers and authorities
altered the strategies of each of the parties, and thereby altered the repertoire itself
-- for example, by asking to what extent the partial success of the campaign for
Catholic Emancipation provided a warrant and a model for subsequent challenges on
other issues. Our catalog of thousands of contentious gatherings comes from a close,
systematic reading of a number of periodicals, including the Morning Chronicle and
Mirror of Parliament, once again supplemented to some extent with material drawn
from British archives.

My work on France sprawls across four centuries, but rarely achieves the
concentration of the two British studies. In the past my group has assembled uniform

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evidence on a great many French strikes from 1830 through 1967, plus massive reports on violent events between 1830 and 1960. In recent years I have been making a careful but less intensive inventory of contentious gatherings in five regions of France -- Anjou, Burgundy, Flanders, the Ile de France, and Languedoc -- from 1600 to the present, and attempting to interpret their differences and changes as a function of the development of capitalism and the growth of the national state in France. In combination, the bodies of evidence on strikes, violent events, and contentious gatherings make it possible to follow changes in the predominant forms of French collective action over large periods of social change. They leave no doubt of fundamental alterations in the forms of action, or of the emergence of today's repertoire, in its fundamentals, during the nineteenth century.

**France vs. Britain**

The comparison of nineteenth-century changes in France and Britain sheds light on the whole process by which repertoires change. At the century's outset, the two countries stood about even in the creation of new repertoires. On one side of the channel, Britain had produced a series of innovations -- from John Wilkes to Lord George Gordon to London's Radicals, with some assistance from others such as Protestant Dissenters and Spitalfields weavers -- which came close to constituting the national social movement as we know it: the sustained challenge to national authorities in the name of an unrepresented constituency, in the course of which people make organized public displays of their strength and determination. On the other side, however, the French had gone through a Revolution in which -- at least for two or three years -- public meetings, organized marches, and demonstrations in something approaching their contemporary form did a significant share of the nation's political work.

Three or four decades later, the contrast had become much sharper. Under a series of repressive regimes, France had returned for most purposes to a reduced
version of its eighteenth-century collective-action repertoire. Ordinary people who shared a grievance or a hope were most likely to act, if they acted at all, by staging a mocking ceremony, by simulating the same punishments and controls that authorities usually visited upon offenders, by organizing a turnout, by taking advantage of an established public ceremony to voice or symbolize their claims. The Revolution of 1830 ruptured the continuity for a few months, as relaxed repression and National Guard mobilization encouraged a temporary return to some of the militant action of the earlier Revolution. During the 1830s and 1840s, bourgeois circles and clubs, working-class journeymen's associations and mutual-aid societies, and conspiratorial political groups led lives ranging from clandestine to semi-public. Occasionally they broke the silence with a public meeting, an electoral rally, a demonstration, an attempted insurrection, or a banquet devoted to a cause. (The subscription banquet, for example, became a major vehicle for the voicing of opposition to the regime in the months just before the Revolution of 1848.) Turnouts, and even strikes, became more frequent.

Nevertheless, the chief innovations in political expression in France between the Restoration of 1814-1815 and the Revolution of 1848 involved pressing old, established forms of action to the limits of official toleration: turning the funeral of a public figure or a victim of repression into a mass march, directing a charivari or serenade away from the offender or defender of private morality toward a public figure, and so forth down our checklist. For the most part, the contentious gatherings which occurred in France during those three decades took familiar eighteenth-century forms: food riots, mobbing and expulsion of tax collectors, invasion of enclosed or posted fields and forests, displays during authorized public ceremonies and celebrations. Only the fever of meeting, marching, and deliberating during the spring of 1848 shifted the balance toward what I am calling, with increasingly obvious inaccuracy, the nineteenth-century repertoire.
By 1848, Britain had already experienced ten years of Chartist meetings and marches. She had left the final campaign for Catholic Emancipation twenty years behind, had gone sixteen years past the great mobilization for Reform, had produced round after round of strikes, and had thoroughly installed the open meeting, the electoral rally, and the demonstration as ways of doing collective business. One might still detect eighteenth-century tones in the resistance to the new municipal police, in strikers' applications of Rough Music to recalcitrant members of their trades, in the hauling of effigies through protest marches, and perhaps in the brawling of rival candidates' supporters. Other prominent eighteenth-century forms -- notably the pulling down of enemies' houses, the breaking of machinery, invasions of enclosed or posted land, attacks on tollgates, and the classic food riot -- had, however, virtually disappeared.

To be sure, each of these changes has a particular history: Parliamentary enclosures slowed, the declining relative price of corn and the increasingly efficient distribution of food reduced the incentives and opportunities for people's forceful intervention in the market, the repeal of the Combination Acts in 1824 eased workers' ways to legal and public action against employers, a generation of workers grew up with big machines. All these changes, and more, affected both the interests different groups had in acting collectively, and their capacity to do so.

We must, furthermore, take care: there is a risk of conflating "backward-looking", "traditional" and "eighteenth-century" forms of action into a formless category of resistance to innovation. As John Stevenson declares:

What is important to recognise is that they were present at least as much in the seventeenth century and earlier and continued into the industrial era: although sometimes regarded as 'pre-industrial' forms of protest or communal expression, they can be found in Luddism, 'Captain Swing', anti-Poor Law disturbances, reactions to cholera hospitals, to the professional police, and to the immigrant Irish. Even in late Victorian and Edwardian England examples of popular resistance to innovation which are recognisable in these terms can be found, as in the reactions to compulsory vaccination during the 1870s, attacks on the Salvation Army in the 1880s, and the actions of 'jingo' crowds during
the Boer and Great Wars (Stevenson 1979: 310).

It is not, in short, their frequently defensive deployment that distinguishes the eighteenth-century forms from the nineteenth-century repertoire. Despite a broad, on-the-average, association between certain forms of collective action and certain issues, we must separate the form as such from the circumstances in which it most frequently occurs. That is, indeed, the justification for introducing into the discussion the alien term repertoire.

Transition to the "Nineteenth Century"

Through all these qualifications, certain important differences between Britain and France still appear. After an irregular series of collective-action innovations beginning after the Seven Years War, the pace of change in Britain's predominant forms of collective action accelerated after Waterloo, and reached a peak around the time of Reform. By the 1840s, for most purposes, the eighteenth-century repertoire had given way to a recognizable version of the repertoire that has prevailed since then. In France, a similar transition occurred, but significantly later. Despite the precocious innovations of the early 1790s, rapid, extensive, and durable alteration of the French collective-action repertoire did not begin until the 1840s. What is more, it halted during the extensive repression of the 1850s, and only completed its cycle in the 1860s. Nevertheless, the crucial moment of the transition arrived during the revolutionary months of 1848. 1832 for Britain, 1848 for France, mark the installation of the nineteenth-century repertoire.

Britain's 1832 and France's 1848 have something important in common. Each brought a decisive expansion of the national electorate, and a clear establishment of the principle that persons, not corporate interests, had the right to representation at the national level. The Reform Bill of 1832 fell far short of universal suffrage. Yet its extension of the vote to most bourgeois and some master craftsmen by means of a property-tax requirement defined a general limit within which almost all persons
qualified. It thereby shifted the debate to the proper location of that limit. By eliminating rotten boroughs and establishing constituencies for growing population centers, the Bill ratified the radical notion of representation in rough proportion to the number of persons represented.

In France, the right to vote in national elections followed a zigzag course for sixty years before 1848: swinging between near-manhood suffrage and various tax-payment qualifications during the revolutionary regimes, moving to stringent property qualifications with the Restoration, and somewhat less stringent property qualifications with the Revolution of 1830. In the revolutionary enthusiasm of spring, 1848, however, France enacted manhood suffrage with few exceptions. Although Louis Napoleon managed to reduce the effective electorate by tightening registration requirements and broadening the interpretation of 1848's rules for disqualification, even he did not dare to break with the official of principle of manhood suffrage. The more so, because he used the plebiscite -- simulacrum though it was of a true general election -- to advertize the legitimacy of his regime. Nor did any subsequent French regime dare attack manhood suffrage, not even the fearful Republic that formed after the Commune of 1871.

With the extension of the suffrage, in both countries, came a degree of protection for the right to campaign, to organize, to meet for the purposes of choosing, supporting, or influencing candidates. In both countries, especially Britain, non-electors had long taken the occasion of elections to assemble, to display their colors, to cheer, jeer, and brawl on behalf of their preferences. The broadened suffrage extended the protection for those activities, and increased the incentive to build durable political organizations which could mobilize votes. The warrant for electoral activity and organization provided an opening for quasi-electoral, semi-electoral, even pseudo-electoral activity and organization; because protected parties developed a strong interest in the right to assemble and to state preferences, it
became more difficult for governments to deny those rights arbitrarily. The increasing importance of national elections, in its turn, reinforced the advantage of groups who could muster large numbers of disciplined followers, and thus pose the threat or promise of converting the numbers and discipline into effective votes. Numbers and discipline became the keys to successful strikes, demonstrations, public meetings, petition drives, and other newly important forms of collective action. In these ways, the rise of national electoral politics promoted the shift to the nineteenth-century repertoire.

Yet the influence was surely mutual: in both Britain and France, disfranchised citizens used the new forms of collective action to press their demands for the expansion of suffrage and the guarantee of free, binding elections. Rather than being an automatic by-product of electoral politics, the new repertoire grew through a series of historically specific innovations and transfers. In Britain, for example, the success of Daniel O'Connell and his allies in pressing for Catholic Emancipation on the base of a mass-membership Catholic Association offered a model and a precedent for the organizers of Political Unions to press for Reform from 1830 onward. In France, the July Monarchy's relative tolerance of workers' mutual-aid societies made them a convenient vehicle for the creation of underground trade unions and political associations.

In both countries, the demonstration came into being as a distinctive form through a series of more or less deliberate alterations in older, protected forms of action -- for example, through Wilkes' and Gordon's provocative expansion of the petition march to Parliament or the king into a public display of mass support for their causes. In both countries, the creation of the social movement as a way of doing collective business resulted from a cumulative learning process in which the lessons usually emerged from the successes and failures of the country's own contenders, but sometimes came from careful observation of contenders in other
countries.

My working hypotheses, then, come down to the idea that the nationalization of power and politics from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century provided incentives to collective-action innovations which increased the national visibility of a given group's claims, as the expansion of national electoral politics created a milieu favorable to the protection and success of those innovations. The same processes reduced the feasibility and effectiveness of the standard eighteenth-century repertoire, with its emphasis on patronage and local scope. The eighteenth-century forms declined rapidly in importance, although they never quite disappeared. Since the frenzy of change in collective action centered on 1832 in Britain and 1848 in France, the pace of innovation has slowed.

One might want to single out sitdown strikes, mass picketing, urban guerrilla, or some other forms as genuine additions to the collective-action repertoire. One might want to argue that the presence of mass-media reporting has recast all the nineteenth-century forms. One might want to inquire whether amid the massive power of corporations and states the puny efforts of demonstrators and strikers now make any difference to the actual exercise of power. One would certainly want to round out my account with an analysis of the changing technology of repression. One could profitably look forward, and ask whether new forms, or even whole new repertoires, are in the offing. Meanwhile, I think, we continue to find people acting together in ways that were almost inconceivable during the eighteenth century, and yet which crystallized in something like their present forms well over a century ago.
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