
AMERICAN CONSERVATISM AND GOVERNMENT FUNDING
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE ARTS

Jerome L. Himmelstein

and

Mayer Zald

University of Michigan

May 1982

CRSO Working Paper No. 266

Copies available through:
Center for Research on
Social Organization
University of Michigan
330 Packard Street
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109

AMERICAN CONSERVATISM AND GOVERNMENT FUNDING
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE ARTS

Jerome L. Himmelstein

and

Mayer Zald

University of Michigan

Paper presented to the session on "The Rise of the Right Wing and the Future of the Social Sciences" at the 1982 Meetings of the Southern Sociological Association, Memphis, Tennessee, April 16, 1982.

(This paper was written while the first and senior author held a postdoctoral fellowship under an NIMH training program in Sociology, Social Policy, and the Professions (#MH-14598) at the Center for Research on Social Organization at the University of Michigan. After September 1, 1982, he will be an assistant professor of sociology at Amherst College, Amherst, MA 01002.)

INTRODUCTION

Upon taking office, the Reagan Administration proposed substantial reductions in government funding for the social sciences and the arts. The most spectacular and publicized of these were slated for the National Science Foundation (NSF), where the FY1982 budget for economic, social, and behavioral research faced cuts of up to 75% from President Carter's FY1981 budget, and the National Endowments for the Arts and the Humanities (NEA and NEH), for which 50% reductions were announced. These were accompanied by less dramatic reductions in the social research budgets of the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration, the Justice Department, and the National Institute of Education and in appropriations for health manpower training, museum services, and college libraries. Cuts in federal funding for the arts and the social sciences, if not universal, were certainly widespread. [1]

The arts and the social sciences, to be sure, were not the only victims of the budget ax, which fell also on research and development appropriations as a whole. [2] To the extent that they did bear the burden of disproportionately sharp reductions in funding, however, the immediate reason seems clear enough: They were especially inviting targets, because neither appeared to have a broad, powerful constituency. The Administration apparently looked forward to at least one set of unopposed budget reductions. [3]

As it turned out, the Administration was wrong. Social scientists mobilized quite effectively through the Consortium of Social Science Associations and other organizations. By July, 1981, when the House of Representatives took up the issue of social science cuts, not only did a large majority of Congressmen favor restoring much of the slashed funds but also debate on the issue was marked by a respect for the social sciences rarely

shown in the past. Noticeably absent were the often voiced claims that the social sciences were trivial and useless. Enough pressure was also brought to bear by the supporters of the arts to restore about half of the proposed cuts at NEA and NEH. [4]

The arts and social sciences, however, are not yet out of the woods. The FY1983 budget calls for further cuts or for modest increases that fail to keep pace with inflation. The Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics are eliminating some basic surveys, and Guaranteed Student Loans and other kinds of training support may be threatened. [5]

More importantly, government funding for the arts and social sciences faces opposition that goes deeper than the matter of budget pruning. The Reagan Administration is an alliance of two distinct forces--a mainstream, corporate-oriented Republicanism and a revitalized independent conservative movement. Its budget cutting accordingly reflects two distinct impulses--the standard Republican/corporate capitalist desire simply to curtail government spending and the conservative desire not only to cut spending in general but also to "defund the left" in particular by eliminating especially those programs it regards as the basic source of liberal and radical social change in the U.S. Government funding for the social sciences and the arts is on this conservative hit list.

Although the agenda of the conservative movement is not identical with that of the Reagan Administration as a whole, conservatives nonetheless remain a potent force; and their priorities will continue to be heard, if not always followed. Administration opposition to government funding for the social sciences and the arts therefore will continue to arise from ideological as well as cost-cutting considerations. It will not be wholly sated by a balanced budget nor fully chastened by effective lobbying.

To understand this deeper ideological threat to government support for the social sciences and the arts, let us look more closely at American conservatism. Our discussion has three parts. The first traces the history of contemporary American conservatism and identifies its central ideological themes. The second argues that the belief that government and intellectuals are the two main sources of liberal social change has led conservatives to target government programs allegedly guilty of social activism and to develop their own relatively autonomous "counterintellectual" network. The third examines how this political agenda and institutional structure have influenced conservative opposition to government funding of the social sciences and the arts.

AMERICAN CONSERVATISM

The term "conservative" has gone through numerous and sometimes tortuous changes of meaning since it was first applied to the intellectual reaction to the French and Industrial Revolutions in the early nineteenth century. In the United States, the term now refers to the movement that began as the delayed intellectual and political reaction to the New Deal in the early 1950s and found expression first in McCarthyism, later in the Goldwater movement, and most recently in the New Right. Since the 1950s, this movement has sought to develop a "coordinated, self-consciously conservative intellectual force" in American life and in the process has given "conservatism" a new and distinctive meaning. [6]

The cornerstone of this emerging conservatism in the 1950s was the conviction that the United States and Western civilization were threatened by a growing tide of what was termed "statism," "collectivism," or "rationalism"--the trend toward centralization of power in the state and the use of that power to reorganize and plan social life in a systematic, self-conscious way. In the conservative view, fascism, communism, social democracy, and the New Deal were merely different versions of this same trend--some more benign than others. [7]

Contemporary conservatism developed from this core belief as a synthesis of three ideological tendencies: a libertarianism eager to reassert the values of individualism, freedom, and the market against the encroachments of government and the trend toward "collectivism"; a traditionalism struggling to reestablish the importance of religion, shared values, and social constraints in the face of what it perceived as a secular, atomized, mass society; and finally, a militant anti-communism convinced that the West

was locked in a life-or-death struggle with an implacable Communist adversary with whom no co-existence or compromise was possible. Each spoke a distinctive language: The libertarian emphasis on freedom and individualism differed dramatically from the traditionalist emphasis on constraint and community, while both differed from the anti-communist stress on imperatively coordinated mobilization against a mortal foe. [8]

The synthesis accordingly has often been uneasy, and differences between the three tendencies have often erupted in acrimonious debate in the pages of conservative journals. Some libertarians have regarded the traditionalist emphasis on restraint and its suspicion of individualism as one more kind of collectivism; others have mistrusted the militarist mentality of anti-communism. Traditionalists for their part have sometimes viewed libertarianism as one more example of corrosive materialist, secular thought. Discussion of the relationship between libertarianism and traditionalism continues even today. [9]

Despite the continuing ideological contention, the conservative movement in the 1950s and 1960s increasingly succeeded in binding sympathetic individuals into a common set of organizations and formal networks. Conservatives developed or adopted common forums for ideas (National Review, Human Events, Modern Age), political action groups (the American Conservative Union), and organizations to educate a new generation (the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, the Young Americans for Freedom). Although they did not reach an intellectual consensus, they at least developed a common focus of disagreement and debate and a recognition that they shared common enemies. More importantly, the conservative movement developed relatively clear boundaries separating those who belonged from those who did not. The precise intellectual justification may not have

always been clear or unanimously accepted, but libertarians who were too militantly secular (e.g., Ayn Rand) or anti-militarist (e.g., those who opposed American involvement in Vietnam and left the Young Americans for Freedom to form the Libertarian Party) and traditionalists who found the New Deal quite consistent with conservative principles (e.g., Peter Viereck) found themselves unambiguously beyond the pale.

In the last decade, the conservative movement has expanded rapidly, feeding upon the political reaction to the progressive movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s. It has developed a broader, more effective network of political organizations (known as the "New Right"), which comprises such groups as the National Conservative Political Action Committee, the Conservative Caucus, the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, Coalitions for America, the Moral Majority, and Stop ERA.^[10] With the help of corporate funding and neo-conservative allies, it has also fostered a growing intellectual network of research institutions, about which we shall say more shortly.

Conservatives today self-consciously focus on three sets of issues: first, support of a market economy against government intervention and regulation; second, a defense of morality, family, and religion against perceived processes of moral decay, secularization, and cultural revolution; and third, a call for a stronger, more aggressive international campaign against the Soviet Union and communism in general. This combination of issues defines contemporary American conservatism (in the eyes of its proponents as well as opponents) and just as clearly demarcates it from what it is not: American conservatism is not a simple anti-modern conservatism of the kind found in nineteenth-century Europe and in a weaker form in the U.S. among groups like the Southern Agrarians: Indeed, it enthusiastically

embraces many of the central features of modern society--industrialism, capitalism, advancing technology, and economic growth. Nor is it a pure libertarianism like that of the contemporary Libertarian Party: Its enthusiasm for individual freedom does not extend beyond the marketplace. Still less is it simply a big business ideology concerned exclusively with economic issues: Conservatives often find business too noncommittal on both social and national security matters. [11]

FIGHTING THE LEFT

The conservative opposition to government funding of the social sciences and the arts arises from the deep-seated conviction that the major source of liberal (and radical) social change is political and intellectual elites. From this perspective, the expanded role of government in economic life, the decline of the nuclear family, and the growing permissiveness on moral issues reflect neither the inherent strains of American social structure nor real aspirations of most Americans. They are simply the result of liberal activists in government and liberal intellectuals in the universities and mass media. Except for their influence, the market, the family, religion, and other social institutions that conservatives cherish would constitute a naturally harmonious, self-maintaining order. Take away the liberals' ability to use government funds to promote social change and counter their dominance of intellectual life, and liberalism and the Left would collapse. "Defunding the Left" and building a counterintellectual network thus are important for conservatives.

Defunding the Left

Liberal and left-wing causes, conservatives maintain, are largely government subsidized. According to Richard Viguerie, the major New Right fundraiser and publisher of Conservative Digest,

For more than a decade, the Left has relied on government subsidies to finance its activities... My estimate is that 70 percent of the Left's financing comes from the government. While liberals loudly claim to represent the people, they are primarily financed by compulsory tax dollars. [12]

Or in the words of Howard Phillips, director of the Conservative Caucus,

In the name of fighting poverty and overcoming inequality, tens of billions of dollars have been assigned, since the early 1960s, to support hundreds of thousands of full-time activists employed by tens of thousands of 'non-profit corporations' promoting virtually every 'liberal' cause of the past two decades from abortion on demand, to forced busing, to quotas, to 'welfare rights'. Opponents of U.S. defense policies, militant homosexuals, radical feminists, supporters of the Ayatollah Khomeini, organizers of rent strikes and prisoners' unions, foes of capital punishment and many more of the same ilk have been subsidized by hard-working taxpayers to promote their narrow, nihilistic political goals. [13]

A major source of these subsidies, according to conservatives, is the Legal Services Corporation (LSC). Conservatives picture the LSC as a "\$300 million subsidy for liberal causes" [14] and regard it as a home for all manner of political undesirables.

...there is no question that the Corporation is in the hands of radicals, eager to bring about a major social upheaval in American society. Legal Services attorneys have been involved in mobilizing rent strikes, promoting abortions, fostering unions, and backing prison 'rights.' [15]

The Legal Services Corp. is infested with liberals, radicals, and Marxists who want to reshape American society. [16]

Family planning and population research funds provided under Title X of the Public Health Services Act appear as equally subversive: By underwriting "contraception, abortion referrals, antilife research, and immoral sex education" and supporting radical groups like Planned Parenthood, government has promoted a revolution in sexual values and behavior. [17] A variety of other government programs, including the Community Services Agency and the National Endowment for the Humanities (about which we shall have more to say), stand indicted in similar terms.

In short, the argument is that while conservatives go to the people for funding, liberals run to the government. "Defunding the Left" by ending its government subsidies is thus at the heart of the conservative agenda. Conservatives have lobbied vigorously against the LSC and other offending programs and have supported block grants as a way of permanently getting money out of the hands of the liberal activists in the federal government. [18]

Last June, despite misgivings about Reagan's personnel appointments and his commitment to the social issues, Viguerie pronounced himself "pleased and in many respects pleasantly surprised" by the President's performance because

at least 70 percent of just about every conservative's agenda is being handled beautifully by President Reagan, Stockman, and others in the administration. That 70 percent is what conservatives call "de-funding the Left." [19]

Building a Counterintellectual Network

The notion that intellectuals and the institutions they inhabit have been a major source of political protest and social change has been popular among conservatives of all kinds ever since Edmund Burke. Conservatives have cultivated what may be called a "counterintellectual" tradition.

Since the French Revolution, the intellectuals have never ceased to be shadowed by the counterintellectuals--the party of public thinkers that opposes the typical adversary role the intellectuals play in public life. [20]

The counterintellectual has perennially charged the intellectual with elitism, radicalism, illegitimate power, remoteness from the practical world, and an antagonistic, even treasonous stance to society.

Since its birth in the 1950s, contemporary American Conservatism has embraced this "counterintellectual" stance, accusing universities and the media of a leftward bias and blaming intellectuals for undermining established American institutions and beliefs. The seminal work of this conservatism, after all, was William F. Buckley, jr.'s God and Man at Yale, which indicted the author's alma mater for being a hotbed of socialism and secularism.

Similar claims about intellectuals and cultural institutions in general have resounded through conservative writing ever since. In recent years, for example, conservatives have commonly argued that intellectuals are the vanguard of an entire "new class" of college-educated professionals working in the information-processing, governmental, and non-profit sectors of the economy. This "new class" is the culprit behind all manner of radical movements aimed at redistributing income, limiting economic growth, weakening American power in the world, and revolutionizing morals. Through government, the media, and the universities, it has propagated an anti-capitalist, anti-materialist, anti-Puritanical "adversary culture" and has even challenged the hegemony of the capitalist class. [21]

The conservative counterintellectuals in America have thus consistently distanced themselves from the liberal intellectuals, and the latter have usually returned the compliment: In the 1950s and early 1960s, conservatives were either read out of the American tradition or dismissed as

a lunatic fringe in works like Louis Hartz's The Liberal Tradition in America and Daniel Bell's The Radical Right.

In reaction to the radicalism of the late 1960s and early 1970s, many who once dismissed conservatism now make common cause with it (a phenomenon sometimes called "neo-conservatism"). Although the line of demarcation has thus shifted, it still exists: Conservatives, whoever they may be at any given time, constitute a counterintelligentsia, standing in alienation from what they regard as the mainstream intellectual world.

The antagonistic stance of conservative counterintellectuals has led them to build a relatively autonomous intellectual network of research institutions. This network, which grew slowly through the 1950s and 1960s, has expanded rapidly in the past decade thanks to an infusion of corporate money and neo-conservative support.

Corporate capitalism has recently launched a major ideological offensive to praise the free market and discredit government regulation and the welfare state. This new corporate activism has underwritten public television shows, chairs of free enterprise at universities, advocacy advertising, books, and educational films, but above all it has subsidized the vast expansion of conservative research institutions. [22]

In the forefront of this ideological assault have been a number of especially active corporate foundations and trusts that have focused their contributions on research institutes and individuals developing free-market and other conservative ideas. The John M. Olin, Smith Richardson, Adolph Coors, Samuel Roberts Noble, Bechtel, Hearst, and Lilly Foundations; the J. Howard Pew Freedom Trust; and the various Scaife family foundations and trusts together funnel over \$25 million a year into the development of conservative ideology. [23]

The Scaife family trusts, based in Gulf Oil, Alcoa, and Mellon Bank money, are the largest of these conservative donors and their contributions are fairly representative. Under the aegis of Richard Mellon Scaife, they increased their donations to conservative causes during the 1970s to \$10 million a year. Since 1970, the Scaifes have given over \$5 million each to the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI), the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the National Strategy Information Center, as well as \$4.1 million to the Hoover Institution, \$2.6 million to the Heritage Foundation, and smaller amounts to numerous similar institutions. [24]

This corporate largesse has been elicited and organized in part by neo-conservative intellectuals (especially those clustered around The Public Interest and Commentary) in an effort to fight against the "new class" and its "adversary culture." [25] Irving Kristol, for example, who is editor of The Public Interest, a contributing editor to the Wall Street Journal, and an AEI fellow, has used the specter of the "new class" to convince corporate capitalists to invest more heavily in the creation and dissemination of conservative ideology. He has sought to coordinate business support for conservative intellectual work by co-founding (with William Simon) the Institute for Educational Affairs (IEA) in 1978. Initially funded by Olin, Smith Richardson, and Scaife money, IEA has attempted to act as a clearinghouse for channelling corporate money into suitably conservative intellectual projects. In 1980, it had some 74 corporate patrons and gave 45 grants totalling over half a million dollars. [26]

As a result of this combination of new corporate activism and intellectual neo-conservatism, the network of conservative think tanks has expanded considerably. The annual budget of AEI, the largest of the conservative research institutes, increased tenfold in the 1970s to \$10.5 million,

and Kristol is credited with gaining much of AEI's new corporate support. Stanford University's Hoover Institution, on the verge of bankruptcy in the early 1960s, now has an annual budget of \$5.7 million, while Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies now spends \$4.5 million a year. Joining these venerable think tanks are a host of new ones, the most famous of which is probably the Heritage Foundation. Begun in 1973 with several hundred thousand dollars from industrialist Joseph Coors, Heritage now has an annual budget of \$5.3 million. Its biggest contributors include Scaife and Coors, as well as Noble, Olin, and 87 major corporations. The growing list of other conservative think tanks and information centers includes Center for Law and Economics, Center for Public Choice, Institute for Contemporary Studies, International Institute for Economic Research, Center for Free Enterprise, Center for Research in Government Policy and Business, Ethics and Public Policy Center, Center for the Study of American Business, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, National Strategy Information Center, and the Lehrman Institute. [27]

This growing conservative counterintellectual network has not only provided a steady stream of conservative ideas and Reagan advisers but also reinforced the conservative sense of independence from the "liberal" intellectual world and its sources of funding. This sense may not be wholly accurate--conservatives also rely directly and indirectly on governmental largesse--but it has helped to condition the attitudes of some conservatives toward government funding of the social sciences in particular.

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE ARTS

Ostensibly, the conservative case against government funding for the social sciences is simply that most social science research is trivial and a waste of money. This argument, which has been repeated by conservatives in Congress for years, found especially clear expression about a year ago in an article by Donald Lambro in Human Events. [28] Lambro ridiculed the usefulness and importance of a number of NSF-funded social science projects based on their titles and official project abstracts: studies of food tastes in rats, dating behavior of teenagers, and speech patterns in Philadelphia.

There is more here than immediately meets the eye, however. The conservative case against the social sciences rests on a methodological double standard. Conservatives admit that it would be foolish to dismiss research in the natural sciences on the basis of a cursory reading of titles and abstracts. Apparently arcane research on the growth of viruses in the kidney cells of monkeys, after all, can ultimately lead to eminently useful things like polio vaccine. Yet they see no problem in pronouncing summary judgment on the social sciences on that very same basis.

This double standard suggests that an inherent, tacit bias against the social sciences lurks in the conservative mind. It seems plausible that this bias is rooted in the counterintellectualism that we have already mentioned. The social sciences appear to be subversive of conservative values in a way that the natural sciences are not.

This is partly because conservatives see the social sciences as deeply tainted with liberalism. Among all intellectuals and academics, social scientists appear as the most liberal in their political attitudes, while the social sciences themselves seem to be used consistently on a day-to-day level to justify liberal programs and policies. There is something more

fundamental, however: Beyond whatever specific policies it justifies, conservatives believe the application of science to society intrinsically leads to the centralized planning and rationalization of social life. Social science, in other words, equals social engineering, which leads to the very statism that lies at the dark heart of conservative nightmares.

This view of social science is manifest in the supply-side economics currently popular among conservatives. This theory is the quintessential product of the conservative counterintellectual network, bringing together corporate money, conservative think tanks, and neo-conservative stewardship. Alerted to supply-side ideas by Irving Kristol, the Smith Richardson Foundation subsidized their development through grants to think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute and the International Center for Economic Policy, individuals like George Gilder and Jude Wanniski, and journals like The Public Interest.^[29] Not surprisingly, supply-side economics has taken a counterintellectual stance to mainstream economic theory. It rejects "academic" economics for being scientistic: for treating the economy as an impersonal system rather than as an ensemble of individual actions and motivations; for dealing only with quantifiable factors that can be fit into complex models, while ignoring the qualitatively human; and for promoting theories that are inherently managerial in style. In short, mainstream economics appears to supply-siders as necessarily leading to social engineering of some kind.^[30]

Although not all conservatives embrace supply-side economics, it certainly has ignited the imagination of many, and it does accurately embody a broader conservative attitude toward the social sciences. This attitude, reinforced by the seeming autonomy of the counterintellectual network, powerfully predisposes conservatives against government funding for the social sciences.

The conservative case against government funding for the arts is considerably more complex than the case against the social sciences. Two very different, even contradictory, conservative arguments (which we shall call the "libertarian" and the "traditionalist") manage to co-exist with hardly any sense of paradox or conflict. Both oppose the current way that government supports the arts, but for very different reasons.

The libertarian argues that government funding of the arts is inherently wrong and necessarily counterproductive. Art is not a transcendent good that everyone should be forced to support. It is a matter of taste, and different persons have different artistic preferences. Government has no right to use taxpayers' money to subsidize the artistic preferences of some. As Ernest van den Haag put it in a Policy Review article:

It is not the task of a democratic government to decide for the people what is essential to them and to buy it for them with money taken from them--when people could, if they so desired, purchase for themselves what the government provides. [31]

Government funding, moreover, ruins art. The infusion of funds attracts the less talented and less committed, inflates costs, and encourages mindless experimentation. It gives control over art to bureaucrats and experts. From the libertarian perspective, as expressed by Tom Bethel, "the principle instrument for eliciting creativity in people of artistic disposition is the marketplace itself." [32] Having to please a paying audience forces the artist to do his best; the cushion of a guaranteed government subsidy encourages bad work. In short, for the libertarian, art is and ought to be a commodity like everything else; all government support should be ended.

The traditionalist, in contrast, believes that government funding for the arts is both good and necessary, but not in the current form or at the current levels. As Michael Joyce argued in the Heritage Foundation's report

to President Reagan, [33] art is not simply a matter of taste; it involves the pursuit of a definable excellence. Government has the duty to promote that pursuit of excellence and defend it against the egalitarian, levelling impulses of American society. Leaving art to popular preference on the market or otherwise means opening it to debasement. Established funding policies in NEH and NEA, however, are misguided and counterproductive: Rather than protecting art from the debasing effect of popularization, the Endowments have sought to bring art to a wider audience by underwriting the expansion of cultural facilities and subsidizing admission costs. In addition, they have encouraged the politicization of art and have sought to enact quotas for recipients of grants. Once these spurious activities are eliminated, government's proper role can be fulfilled at a much lower level of funding.

One can hardly imagine two more different attitudes toward art. The one argues that there really is no such thing as art, but only artistic preferences; the other insists on the reality of artistic excellence. The one argues that art thrives as a commodity; the other fears the impact of the market on art. The one believes that government has a role in promoting the arts; the other believes it has an essential (albeit reduced) role.

Despite the disparity, the two arguments co-exist with little friction. They are not the province of different kinds of conservatives writing in different places. To the contrary, both cases have been made in the publications of the Heritage Foundation. Indeed, one can sometimes find them together in the very same article without the author apparently sensing the least inconsistency. In a 1980 article in Policy Review, for example, Kingsley Amis indiscriminately mixes traditionalist and libertarian arguments

against government subsidy of the arts. [34] At one point he argues that government subsidies endanger art by popularizing it: "The trouble with bringing art to the people is that it tends to get fatally damaged in transit." At another point, he argues that government subsidies endanger art by taking it away from the public: "The public's whim is better than the critics' whim or the experts' whim or the bureaucrats' whim." No doubt these two cases could be reconciled: Perhaps the "people" in the first quote are not quite the same as the "public" in the second. The point, however, is that the need for reconciliation goes unrecognized.

The libertarian and traditionalist cases against government funding for the arts are held together the way libertarian and traditionalist strands of conservatism have always been held together: The sense of a common enemy overrides philosophical differences. Both positions agree that existing government funding for the arts has encouraged radical cultural and political trends. Conservatives have widely condemned the National Endowments for the Humanities for "bankrolling" a "Leftist Democratic Network" by supporting educational and cultural projects of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, the AFL-CIO Labor Studies Center, District 1199 of the Drug and Hospital Employees Union, World Without War Council, The Sierra Club, the Feminist Radio Network, and various gay periodicals. [35]

For conservatives, this is a clear case of government subsidy to liberal-left movements and to an adversary culture. It is accordingly the very core of what they object to in government funding for the arts, whatever the varying philosophical contexts in which they place it.

CONCLUSION

Opposition to government funding of the arts and the social sciences is rooted deeply in American conservatism. It reflects conservatism's counter-intellectual tradition and its broader priority of "defunding the Left." These deeper determinants of the conservative position on government funding are not always explicit, but they help make sense of otherwise inexplicable surface contradictions in conservative arguments.

How much this conservative stance will shape the political agenda of the Reagan Administration remains to be seen. As we have noted, the Reagan Administration is an uneasy coalition of corporate capitalists and conservative ideologues. Although they often work together, their goals are fundamentally different. The former seek practical adjustments in government spending and regulation to enhance the immediate and real prospects for capital accumulation; they would rather trade with than confront the Soviet Union; they generally avoid social issues like abortion. The latter seek to remake society more broadly in the image of "free enterprise"; they demand a more aggressively anti-communist foreign policy; they give high priority to the social issues. The Reagan Administration so far has kept this alliance together by acting like the former, while talking like the latter. As the Administration continues to confront difficult economic and foreign policy issues, however, its ruling coalition is bound to become increasingly rent by conflict. The outcome of this conflict--which side of the coalition triumphs and what concessions the losers receive--may well determine the fate of government funding of the social sciences and the arts.

NOTES

1. Constance Holden, "Dark Days for Social Research," Science 211: 1397-1398 (27 March 1981); American Psychological Association, letter to members of Research Support Network (March, 1981); Richard D. Lyons, "Reagan May Double Science Agency Cut and Add Farm Fee," New York Times (2 March 1981), p. 1+; Chronicle of Higher Education 22(1): 10-11 (23 February 1981), 22(4): 11-14 (16 March 1981), 23(10):17 (4 November 1981), and 23(12):22 (18 November 1981).
2. Robert Reinhold, "Scientists at U.S. Agency Troubled About Future," New York Times (8 July 1981), p. B6; Chronicle of Higher Education, 23(10): 17 (4 November 1981), 23(11): 1 (11 November 1981).
3. Mitchell C. Lynch, "Cuts Raise a New Social-Science Query: Does Anyone Appreciate Social Science?" The Wall Street Journal (27 March 1981), p. 54.
4. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology, "National Science Foundation Authorization Hearings" (12 March 1981); Robert Reinhold, "Social Scientists Fight for Government Funds," New York Times (29 July 1981), p. 18; Chronicle of Higher Education 23(10): 1, 19 (4 November 1981); Kenneth Prewitt and David L. Sills, "Federal Funding for the Social Sciences: Threats and Responses," ASA Footnotes 9(9): 4-8 (December, 1981).
5. "1983 Federal Agency Research Budgets: Complex and Deceptive," ASA Footnotes 10(3): 3 (March, 1982).
6. George Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945 (New York: Basic Books, 1979). See also Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America (New York: Random House, 1962) and Michael Miles, The Odyssey of the American Right (New York: Oxford, 1980).

7. Frank Meyer, "The Recrudescant American Conservatism," pp. 75-92 in Did You Ever See a Dream Walking?, edited by William F. Buckley, jr. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970).
8. Nash, 1979.
9. Nash, 1979: 154-185, 308-319; Intercollegiate Studies Institute Campus Report, Spring, 1981: 5,11; Modern Age 24(1), Fall, 1980.
10. Richard Viguerie, The New Right: We're Ready to Lead. (Falls Church, Virginia: The Viguerie Company, 1980).
11. For a more detailed discussion of conservative ideology and the New Right, see Jerome L. Himmelstein, "The New Right: An Overview," forthcoming in Robert Wuthnow and Robert Liebman (ed.), The Politics of Morality.
12. Conservative Digest, June, 1981, p. 40.
13. Ibid., April, 1981, p. 23.
14. Ibid., June, 1981, p. 26.
15. "Labor Panel Flinches in Legal Services Showdown," Human Events, 21 March 1981, p. 4.
16. "GOP Lawmakers Sandbag Reagan on Legal Services," Human Events, 4 April 1981, p. 3. See also "House Gives \$241 Million to Legal Services Corp.," Human Events, 19 September 1981, p. 56; Howard Hurwitz, "LSC Meddling in Schools Should be Halted," Human Events, 27 June 1981, p.15; and Elizabeth Drew, "A Reporter at Large (Legal Services Corporation)," The New Yorker, 1 March 1982, pp. 97-113.
17. Conservative Digest, April, 1981, pp. 22-23. See also "Federal Funds Fuel Sexual Revolution," Human Events, 10 October, 1981, pp. 8, 10; Patrick J. Buchanan, "Schweicker Hangs Tough on Sex Education," Human Events, 4 April 1981, p. 14.

18. Michael E. Hammond, "Block Grants Approach Could Cool Hot Issues," Human Events, 17 March 1981, pp. 4, 6; "'Reagan Revolution' Unfinished," Human Events, 15 August 1981, pp. 1, 8.
19. Conservative Digest, June, 1981, p. 40.
20. Peter Steinfels, The Neo-Conservatives (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), p. 189.
21. B. Bruce-Briggs (ed.), The New Class? (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Irving Kristol, On the Democratic Idea in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1972). Seymour Martin Lipset (ed.), The Third Century (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979).
22. David Vogel, "Business's 'New Class' Struggle," The Nation 229: 609+ (1979).
23. Dan Morgan, "Conservatives: A Well-financed Network" Washington Post (4 January, 1981); Bernard Weinraub, "Foundations Support Conservatism by Financing Scholars and Groups," New York Times (20 January, 1981), p. 17.
24. Karen Rothmyer, "Citizen Scaife," Columbia Journalism Review 20(2): 41-50 (1981); David Warner, "Scaife: Financier of the Right," Pittsburgh Post Gazette (20 April 1981).
25. See Steinfels, 1979, for more on neo-conservatism.
26. Vogel, 1979; Walter Goodman, "Irving Kristol: Patron Saint of the New Right," New York Times Magazine, 6 December 1981, p. 90+; Peter H. Stone, "The I.E.A.--Teaching the Right Stuff." The Nation 233(8): 231-235 (1981).
27. Peter H. Stone, "Conservative Brain Trust," New York Times Magazine 10 May 1981, p. 18+; Malcolm G. Scully, "More than GOP's 'Government in Exile'," Chronicles of Higher Education 21(17): 3 (1980); Janet Hook, "Georgetown's 'Intellectual Brokerage House'," Chronicles of Higher Education 21(16): 3-4 (1980); Stewart McBride, "Leaning to the Right," Christian

Science Monitor (2 April, 1980); Jack McCurdy, "A Reagan 'Brain Trust': Hoover Institution Finds It's in the Public Eye," Chronicles of Higher Education 21(15): 3 (1980), Morton Kondracke, "The Heritage Model," The New Republic (20 December 1980); Morgan, 1981.

28. Donald Lambro, "Love and Passion at the National Science Foundation," Human Events, 28 March 1981, pp. 10-11.

29. Goodman, 1981; Geoffrey Norman, "Neo-conservatism: An Idea Whose Time is Now," Esquire 91: 23-42 (13 February 1979); Chris Welles, "The Supply-side Cabal," This World, 20 September 1981, pp. 8-12.

30. Tom Bethel, "The Death of Keynes: Supply-side Economics," National Review 32: 1560-1566 (1980); Irving Kristol, "Ideology and Supply-side Economics," Commentary 71(4): 48-54 (1981); Jude Wanniski, "The Mundell-Laffer Hypothesis--a New View of the World Economy," The Public Interest 39: 31-52 (1975).

31. Ernest van den Haag, "Should the Government Subsidize the Arts?," Policy Review 10: 63-73 (1979).

32. Tom Bethel, "Cutting the Endowments," Washington Post, 22 March 1981, p.11. See also James Bovard, "Why the Arts Endowment Should be Abolished," Human Events, 1 August 1981, pp. 11, 15.

33. Michael S. Joyce, "The National Endowments for the Humanities and the Arts," pp. 1039-1056 in Charles Heatherly (ed.), Mandate for Leadership: Policy Management in a Conservative Administration (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1981).

34. Kingsley Amis, "An Arts Policy?," Policy Review 14: 83-94 (1980).

35. Bovard, 1981; "Humanities Department Bankrolling Leftist Democratic Network," Human Events, 31 October 1981, pp. 1, 10.