MOVEMENT AND COUNTERMOVEMENT: LOOSELY COUPLED CONFLICT

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Movement and Countermovement: Loosely Coupled Conflict*

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Abstract

Movements often provide the impetus for counter-movements to mobilize. Movement and Counter-movement (M/CM) then engage in loosely coupled conflict as each attempts to win support from bystanders and authorities.

The paper discusses 1) appropriate models on studying M/CM interaction, including fights, games, debates and wars; 2) components for comparative analysis; 3) problems of counter-movement mobilization; 4) the battle joined, strategies and tactics of interaction; 5) the relation of movements and counter-movements to authorities. Hypotheses are developed. Illustrations are drawn for varieties of M/CM interaction and some data from a study of the anti-nuclear power/pro-nuclear interaction.
Movement and Countercollection: Loosely Coupled Conflict

The growth of the anti-abortion movement, the pro-family movement, the anti-busing movement, the rise of Moral Majority, Phyllis Schlafley's Eagle Forum, and the victory of Ronald Reagan has spawned a small industry of scholarly and popular writing about conservative and reactionary social movements. Quite reasonably, sociologists have joined the parade and we are having a small boomlet in studies of conservative countermovements. (See Useem on the anti-busing movement in Boston, Useem and Zald, 1983, on the pro-nuclear power movement, and Lo, 1982 and Mottl, 1981 for more general treatments.)

These writings join an earlier body of literature examining right-wing movements (for instance, Lipset and Raab, 1970; Daniel Aaron, 1981; Bell, 1964). This paper, too, is motivated by, gains momentum from, our awareness of the growth of right-wing movements. But its thrust, its angle of vision, is somewhat different. Most students of conservative movements search for their social bases, leading organizations, and actors. They do for countermovements what others have done for movements. But our interests are more interactional. We are interested in how movements generate a countermovement, and how they then engage in a loosely coupled tango of mobilization and demobilization. And we are interested in how, in the language of McCarthy & Zald (1977; 1981), the structure of the SM industry shapes the tactics and structure of the CM industry. Finally, we wish to explore the relationships among movement, countermovement, and authority.

Our central premise is that movements of any visibility and impact create the conditions for the mobilization of countermovements. By advocating change, by attacking the established interests, by mobilizing symbols and raising costs to others, they create grievances and provide opportunities for organizational entrepreneurs to define countermovement goals and issues. In the last two
decades social movement researchers have expanded their analytic and empirical frame of reference. We now have a rich set of tools and concepts to be used in studying social movements—the social psychology of attitudes and ideology, the dimensions and conditions of solidarity, the nature of SMO change, the processes of resource mobilization, the analysis of competition and conflict among MOs are part of the kit bag of sociology. And recently we have begun to examine the interaction of authorities and movements (Tilly, Marx), an important and much neglected topic. What is surprising, however, is the neglect of the dynamic inter-play of movement and countermovement. Much of a movement's activity is aimed at neutralizing, confronting, or discrediting its corresponding countermovement. Similarly, the countermovement gains its impetus and grows from showing the harmful effects of the movement. It attacks the movement leaders, bombs its sites of program action, and associates the movement with evil. It chooses its tactics in response to the structure and tactics of the movement.¹

This paper sketches out the components for the analysis of movement/countermovement (M/CM) interaction. In the first section we situate this analysis in the study of social conflict. The key question there is how does M/CM analysis differ from the study of any social conflict whatsoever? To use Rapoport's (1960) classification, how does it compare with the study of fights, games and debates and of wars? Section II presents a recipe book for describing M/CM location in the social structure and problems of CM mobilization. Section III discusses the battle joined, forms of conflict and interaction.

¹We suspect that the neglect of movement-countermovement interaction is related to the difficulties of diachronic, processual and interactional analysis, especially when it is applied to such diffuse and changing entities as social movements.
Section IV is devoted to the analysis of the interplay of M/CM and authorities. Ms and CMs are locked in a struggle to convince and convert authorities. In a complex polity there are a wide variety of M/CM authority relations. Finally, the conclusion addresses the place of M/CM interaction in the larger historical and cultural setting.

I. Conflict Theory, Debates, and M/CM Analysis

Zald and McCarthy define a social movement as the mobilization of sentiments in which people take actions to achieve change in the social structure and the allocation of value. A countermovement is the mobilization of sentiments initiated to some degree in opposition to a movement. It follows in time a mobilization to change society. Actors identifying with the countermovement orient themselves to the actions of the movement. That is, they see themselves as either directly countering the movement or undoing its effects. If, however, the original movement's supporters or SMOs have vanished, then the new mobilization effort must be considered a movement, not a countermovement. We should also note that a countermovement may in turn generate a counter-countermovement that is different from the original movement. Thus, for instance, the anti-abortion movement developed in response to the success of the pro-choice movement. A "counter-counter" movement then emerged motivated by the fear that the anti-abortion movement had theocratic and anti-pluralist goals. The counter-countermovement should be considered a new movement since it sought to promote goals broader than those of the original pro-choice movement and to mobilize a different constituency.

The key word in the definition of countermovement is opposition. And if we are looking for a framework to analyze opposition we turn to conflict theory and its various forms. M/CM interaction is a kind of inter-group or inter-
collectivity conflict. It shares certain attributes with fights, debates, games, and wars. The issue is what does it share with and how is it different from other forms of conflict?

M/CM interaction has several properties that have been well analyzed in the conflict literature. (For an excellent review see Kriesberg, 1982). Mobilization of one side leads the other side to mobilize as well. The literature on community conflict within established communities is well described by writers such as Coleman (1955), Heirich (1971), and Coser (1956). They show that, given an initial conflict, the ties between the contending community groups break down, permitting other preexisting issues to surface; each side in the conflict has an incentive to raise new issues that may be more salient to, and thus recruit, uncommitted bystanders; the struggle increases solidarity within each conflict group and the misperception and primitivization of the other group's behavior; and a host of other reciprocating processes take place.

As we tried to apply conflict theory here we found it somewhat limiting. First, while the explanatory power of the conflict model has been demonstrated with regard to the mobilization of geographic communities, the model fits less well when mobilization cuts across traditional community lines. When a movement's and countermovement's constituencies are not based on preexisting geographical, ethnic, or institutional community divisions, the concept of community polarization has little relevance. In those circumstances, the emergence of the movement and countermovement and their dynamic interaction arise only as a product of the movements' organizing effort itself, rather than from the disintegration of preexisting ties. For example, it would make little sense to describe the breakdown of the preexisting ties between the pro and anti-nuclear forces because the movements' constituencies did not exist as groups before the conflict began.
Second, the most general formulations of conflict theory (not Marxist class conflict approaches) pay little attention to the historical context and process by which interests in conflict get defined. Conflict theory tends to start from defined opposition. But how interests get defined and how counter interests get defined is an important problem for us. Historical process is important in another sense: conflict theory starts from the parties in view, when the latent sentiments on both sides are activated. There is a tendency to see the parties as kind of matched pairs, mobilizing at the same time. But as we thought about cases, it was clear that we needed a looser conceptualization. Countermovements vary in how quickly they mobilize. For example, both the anti-abortion and the pro-nuclear power movements mobilized relatively quickly in the face of victories and mobilization on the other side. In contrast, the anti-prohibition forces took more than a decade to get up a head of steam (see Kyvig).

But there is a larger problem--because conflict theory is very general—it must encapsulate marital and martial conflict—it ignores the specific terrain over which M/CMs conflict: Movement and countermovement conflict with specific means to promote or retard social change gains. To treat tactics at all, conflict theory must disembodily them into abstracted resources played in a series of games. But we think it necessary to stay closer to concrete tactics.

In searching for a frame of reference we turned to a specific kind of conflict. Possibly the analysis of wars would provide a template for analyzing M/CM interaction. SMs and CSMs command pools of resources to be used in a variety of battlefields. Just as one nation may be stronger at sea and weaker on land, so a SM may be stronger on the streets and weaker in the courts. Moreover, a victory or defeat in one arena or battlefield shifts the locus of attack, the nodal point for the next major battlefield. For instance, once the pro-
abortion forces won the Supreme Court to its side, anti's shifted to the issue of use of federal funds. We presume that anti-abortionists would like to gain Supreme Court support. Yet until new constitutional grounds are found, or a different reading of the biology of "life" is convincingly presented, this battlefield is moot.

The course of the war affects the salient nodal points and the ability to mobilize resources. In the course of the war, a SM, much like a state, may use up all of its resources, or through alliances gain added resources.

Certainly, the analysis of wars has a historical context, and the build-up of grievances is not treated as necessarily reciprocal. Moreover, there is differential timing of mobilization. Analysts of war also pay a great deal of attention to strategy and tactics. The mobilization of resources, the problems of logistical support, attention to the nature of the battle, the relevance of technology to different battlefields are the core of military analysis.

The analogy to war has a certain power, especially if we do not restrict the comparison to wars between nation states in the modern state system. Conventional warfare has a certain clarity of beginning and ending that lead us astray. Wars are declared, peace treaties signed. On the other hand, movements and countermovements start up and stop without formal announcement. In this respect they are more like guerrilla wars and ethnic insurgencies. One side may think the battle is over, while the other side has only gone underground.

Another limit to the analogy is the differential role of third parties. In modern warfare, third parties play significant roles either as allies or neutral arbiters between the contending states. The United States, for example, has assumed both roles in the Middle East wars. Still, most often the key battle between movement and countermovement is to capture the authorities. Rather than direct conflict and vanquishing the opponent, as in a fight or
game, the key issue for movement-countermovement conflict is the capturing or convincing of authorities. An analogous process does not exist in warfare.

In addition, conventional wars are waged between well-defined actors and who speaks for the parties is clear. This is not true of movement/countermovement conflict, where the representation of the aggrieved constituency is often contested. Moreover, the goals of conventional warfare, the destruction of the opposing army, is less ambiguous than those of movements and countermovements. Activists in movements and countermovements often have extended debates over whether to recruit, destroy, or simply ignore the other movement, authorities, and bystander publics.

Finally, in Rapoport's terms, wars are more like fights or games, while social M/CM interactions are more like debates. Fights are attempts to vanquish or conquer opponents with little or no attention to costs, in games opponents use strategies and compare costs of alternatives to outwit opponents. Debates rely on persuasion to convince and convert opponents and authorities. Of course, wars may have elements of debates, and social movements in conflict may have elements of games and fights, but in their non-violent forms, or pre-violent stages, social movements and countermovements are involved in symbolic agitation. Indeed, even when they use violence they may be signifying. The violence is not, literally, to win a decisive coercive victory, but is to signify the strength of forces and the cost of continuing battles. Moreover, except in the case where the social movement has very limited and specific goals, it is involved in an ideological battle; the long run victory is a matter of changing values, symbols and frames for action (see Gusfield, 1981).

Let us draw some guidelines from this too rambling perusal of conflict related literature. Social movement/countermovement interaction can be treated as a form of conflict behavior. Thus, the literature on polarization, spirals
of conflict, and heightened mobilization is directly relevant. But four qualifications, or limits, must be seen. First, M/CM relations must be seen as loosely coupled conflict. The parties to the conflict change over time. In addition, there may be discontinuity between the mobilization of the M and CM, so that CM sentiments may not be quickly mobilized. The definition of the conflict issues is part of the agenda. Finally, the CM and SM may fight on different battlefields so that how the issues are joined, where adherents perform is problematic.

Second, movement/countermovement is a kind of a debate. Like parties to a debate, movement and countermovement try to persuade each other and third parties with rhetoric, moral arguments, and appeals to reason. The persuasion component is absent, or less prevalent, in fights and games.

Third, the tactical repertoires of movement and countermovement are shaped by the existing technology and social structure. In this respect, movement and countermovement are like wars, but unlike games and debates where tactics are arbitrary.

Finally, movement and countermovement confront each other within the context of a larger society. They attempt to coerce, to change perceptions of, to seek support from publics, reference elites, authorities, and other external groups.

II. Getting Started: Components for M/CM Analysis

It is difficult enough to get relatively complete descriptions of a movement, let alone of a movement-countermovement and their interaction. Nevertheless, analysis of M/CM interaction must start from a well grounded description of both SMs. In this section we suggest the central elements of a M/CM analysis.
Comparative-historical description of movement and countermovement.

We now have a relatively well developed set of categories for describing social movements. These include a) the distribution of sentiments in socio-demographic space; b) the major SMOs and their interrelations in the SMI (SMI is described both in terms of the ideological range and hegemony, and monopoly-competitive relations of SMOs and also the relation of industry structure to targets. (That is, for instance, local targets require a decentralized structure, unitary national targets pull forth a more centralized structure); c) the funding-labor resource supports; d) the repertoire of tactics as these relate to social base (a-c) and to targets (e.g., courts, elites, administrative agencies, media, and legislatures.)

It should be apparent that a cross-sectional comparative analysis will reveal the differential social location and organization of the movement and countermovement. In the process the different resource dependencies and tactical dilemmas are described. Useem and Zald (1982), for instance, show how the pro-nuclear energy groups were faced with problems of credibility and legitimacy because some (many) of them emerged from and had the support of large industrial firms in the nuclear power sector.

Sociologists, unfortunately, tend to deal with short time periods. As soon as we introduce a longer time frame into our comparative analysis, shifts in both the support base, coalitions, tactics, SMI organization, and relation to authorities become apparent. Events from one period limit the choices and responses of the next. Two issues from the civil rights - anti-civil rights movement illustrate the point. First, note that in 1955 it was not at all clear that the Federal Government would use force to back up the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown. That Eisenhower did call out the national guard in the face of Orville Faubus' refusal to allow school integration to proceed in Little Rock
changed the balance of terror and violence in the remaining years of the Southern civil rights movement. Blacks and whites in the movement were still terrorized, but the fact that the Klan was in disarray and disrepute and that the Federal Government was seen as watching and might intervene limited the tactics of the anti's (see Ashmore, 1982). On the organizational side, Brown released a tremendous growth. Throughout the post World War II era there had been attempts by the pro-civil rights groups to break the back of racism in the south - challenges to the primary system, fights over voting rights, over participation in the Democratic party. None of these prompted a large anti-movement because the pro's never seemed to be winning or won only small victories. Brown signaled a direct attack on a central institution, the segregated school system. In response a large, middle class and elite non-violent mobilization occurred, the Citizens Councils (see Carter, III; McMillen; Bartley, ). What is most interesting from our perspective is, a) they disappeared as the Federal Courts insisted upon, and were backed up by federal marshals, integrating, at least in token fashion, the school system. By the early 60s they had largely vanished; b) no large scale organizational mobilization occurred in the next phase of the civil rights movement, even though southern authorities, individuals and businessmen resisted quite vehemently. We can only speculate why there was so little organizational development in the later phase. But the key point is that the mobilization and interaction of M/CM must be nested in a historical context. Cross-sectional description must be carried forward and back. Mobilization problems of the countermovement.

Although implied above, special attention must be paid to the timing of the mobilization of the countermovement. Here the war metaphor distracts, for the attack of one nation requires the mobilization of the attacked, unless the attacked is to supinely accept defeat, while movements may win major battles before CM sentiments are mobilized. What effects the timing and form of the
countermovement mobilization? We first present a simple model of movement mobilization. Using this model, we then identify four factors that are especially important in explaining the timing of countermovement mobilization. They are a clear victory or anticipated victory for the movement, the availability of resources and leadership from ongoing organizations and institutions, the problems of formulating an appropriate ideology, and societal events that shift agendas of action.

In general, a group is likely to mobilize if (1) the group's members believe that they will benefit by the achievement of a movement's goals; (2) victory is reasonably likely, and 3) an organizational infrastructure reduces costs. A victory is likely if first, the movement has many recruits, fungible resources, and an appropriate ideology. Second, the task is relatively easy in relationship to the strength of the movement. This model is elaborated below.

A. Movement success. A countermovement is likely to emerge if the movement appears to be accomplishing its goals. A movement's success makes clear to a countermovement's constituency the benefits of collective action. For example, movement victories in cases before the U.S. Supreme Court crystalized the anti-abortion and Southern anti-civil rights movement. The anti-abortion movement emerged following the Supreme Court decision to decriminalize abortion in 1973 and the White Citizens' Councils date from the 1954 decision that it is illegal to racially segregate schools.

A countermovement is unlikely to mobilize, however, if the movement wins a huge crushing victory. Under these circumstances, the countermovement will become paralyzed as supporters see little chance of success. For example, by the mid-1960s the Southern white resistance had dissipated, even though the civil rights movement continued its struggle. Between 1954 and the early
1960s the civil rights movement gained the moral support of a broad sector of the American public and the legal and coercive backing of the federal government. We suspect that the segregationists' failure to keep schools segregated contributed to their inability to mobilize in the next phase of the civil rights movement.

Similar reasoning explains why the anti-prohibition forces delayed the mobilization of the repeal movement until 10 years after the passage of the constitutional amendment prohibiting alcohol. Repeal of a constitutional amendment, especially immediately after it is enacted, is a difficult task and the anti's had become discredited and disorganized. Thus, the anti-prohibition forces needed additional time before they could launch a movement.

B. **Appropriate ideology.** Mobilization will not occur unless a movement articulates an ideology which arouses enthusiasm and creates commitment (Bottomore, 1979: 47). Countermovements often lack such an ideology at the outset, but may develop it as the struggle proceeds. For example, the Catholic Church's doctrine concerning the "sacredness" of life provided the anti-abortion movement with an ideology in place around which the movement could mobilize. This relatively narrow doctrine, however, was not capable of mobilizing individuals outside the church. Only with the development of an ideology about the relationship of abortion to family life and the role of women in society was the anti-abortion movement able to draw on a broader constituency. Similarly, the pro-nuclear movement was initially mobilized around the industry's claim that nuclear power is a safe and efficient energy source. However, the mobilization of a constituency outside the industry required a doctrine relating nuclear power to the promotion of the standard of living.

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2 Useem and Zald (1983) document the process by which supporters of nuclear power transformed their ideology and organization to appeal to and gain support from groups without direct attachment to the utilities and reactor construction firms.
achievement of independence on foreign oil, and establishing the altruism of its own constituency in comparison to the self-serving goals of the anti-nuclear activists.

C. Availability of resources. Countermovements may be delayed if there are no groups with discretionary resources available to invest in collective action. A countermovement's location in the social structure will largely determine the availability of such resources. In general, movements are launched by groups from "below" and attack established interests. Since they respond to these attacks, countermovements will often (not always) be linked to established interests and organizations. Countermovements' ties to the established order will tend to both help and hinder the provision of the requisite resources. On the one hand, countermovements will be launched by corporate groups rich in fungible resources such as money, office space, and clerical help. On the other hand, the countermovement's ties to the established order may preclude the use of these resources for non-institutionalized action. The nuclear power industry, for example, controlled many of the resources needed by the pro-nuclear movement, but was reluctant to provide them. The industry was accountable to stockholders, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and other federal, state, and local government agencies. These ties prevented the use of industry resources for any but the most mild type of protest.

These difficulties, however, are not necessarily insuperable. One strategy used by countermovements is to maintain a decentralized structure. This allows the established group within the movement to provide the necessary resources to the movement, and yet allow it to disassociate itself from actions taken by groups it has helped bring into existence. For example, Boston's political establishment was heavily involved in the anti-busing movement launched in that city in the fall of 1974. City officials held key posts in the anti-
busing movement organization and the facilities of city hall were used for anti-busing activities. City officials, however, could not easily advocate violence or other illegal forms of resistance, since the federal court and U.S. Justice Department were closely monitoring their actions. Several of them were lawyers, and feared disbarment and the loss of their livelihood should they openly resist the federal court. Militant and occasionally illegal actions, however, were taken by other adherents. For example, during the first two years of desegregation, anti-busing protestors congregated in front of the schools in their neighborhood. The demonstrators taunted black students as they entered and left the school and on several occasions hurled rocks at buses carrying blacks. After one such protest, a crowd of several hundred attacked and beat a black man who had happened to stop his car at a red light near the demonstration. The anti-busing leaders did not participate in these "spontaneous" actions. Although the established leadership did not actually participate in these actions, they often provided their tacit support for them. For example, Elvira "Pixie" Palladino, a top leader in the anti-busing organization ROAR and elected member of the School Committee, commented on the beating of a black man: "My first reaction from the pit of my stomach, was that he got exactly what he deserved. He had no business of being over there [South Boston] in the first place" (Boston Globe, 5/25/75).

D. Constraints and opportunities. Finally, a factor much overlooked in the study of movements as well as countermovements, the public agenda may or may not "permit" the emergence of movement or countermovement. Wars, depressions, the existence of other movements, the focus on other events, crowds the space for M/CM action (see Downs, Walker). It can be argued that the growth of the movement: promoting new-right economics is really a postponed effort to overturn Roosevelt New Deal economic policies, World War II and the cooptive election of Eisenhower being key events in postponing the CMs resurgence.
Similarly, World War I intervened to effectively block the anti-prohibition forces. The war discredited the leadership of the anti-prohibitionists because many were brewers of German origin (Kyvig).

In addition, political structures vary in the extent to which they provide movement opportunities. Schwartz (1981), for example, found that the American governmental system provides more points of entry to social movements than the one in Canada. Similarly, Lipset's (1968) analysis of why a mass socialist movement arose in Saskatchewan, but not in neighboring North Dakota or Alberta, emphasizes the impact of differing electoral systems on social movements. Lipset argues that since the social and economic structures of all three regions were nearly identical, structural or psychological factors cannot account for the movements' differing success in the three regions. Rather, the variations are explained primarily by differences in the electoral mechanisms in the regions.

By paying attention to the special mobilization problems of the CM, we do not imply that they have more problems in mobilization than the movement. Indeed, since CMs are often linked to the elite and established order, they may have more resources (e.g., money and established organizations) available than movements, even while their repertoire of tactics is constrained by their class origins and commitment to order. Focusing upon the timing of CM mobilization comes out of our awareness of the loosely coupled nature of M/CM interaction. It helps explain the nature of that coupling. Examination of the spirals of mobilization and demobilization also helps us understand the nature of the M/CM connection.

Spirals of Mobilization?

With a historical view of both movement and countermovement before one, it becomes possible to lay out the phases of mobilization and demobilization. Sociological analyses of conflict tend to assume a close connection between
the mobilization of one party in a conflict and the mobilization of the other. They assume a "fight," and tight and reciprocal action is expected. They also tend to focus more on the mobilization phase than on the demobilization phase. (For an exception see Kriesberg, 1982). A spiral of conflict and demobilization is most likely to occur where there is a unitary target of conflict, or, where there are unified parties to the conflict, so that one party calls forth resources as the other party calls forth resources. Wars have spirals of mobilization and demobilization because central decision bodies are able to commit the uncommitted resources of their social systems, whether through authoritative allocations or through mechanisms of propaganda and persuasion. Unitary targets, single decision points or meeting places of conflicting groups, lead to tightly connected spirals of mobilization. It is apparent to actors on both sides that a battle is taking place and that one side is missing, or threatening to win; failure to mobilize, to respond, will permit a victory to the other side. Fights over school board policy, conflicts about holding of parades, battles to integrate genders, all have a focal point for conflict.

This spiral model does apply to some social movement/CM cycles, but the loosely coupled nature of M/CM interaction means that there may be wide departures from tight spirals. First, many sympathizers and adherents are not tightly tied to SMOs and the solidary bonds that integrate them into movement oriented action. Thus, even while some part of the movement, say a SMO, may be conducting a significant battle in the courts, in the legislature, even in a community, many parts of the movement may be unaware of it, paying little attention to it. Similarly, on the CM side. Second, because the CM and SM face different environments, their cognitive maps of potential risk-reward (see Oberschall for micro risk-reward maps) may lead one party to be demobilizing because, for instance, they have recently won a victory, while the other party mobilizes because the victory for the other side presents the hard
grievance around which they can mobilize.

Finally, movement and countermovement differ in the length of time they have been fighting and in their internal social organization. Rather than a spiral of conflict, one may sometimes see opposing paths of mobilization and demobilization. If, for instance, the movement has appeared to be successful, its supporters may believe that they can rest. The emergence of a CM may create despair and hopelessness: The movement may rekindle the flame only as new generations of adherents are brought into the debate, or after the older generation has retreated and rejuvenated its commitment.

So far, we have described the spirals of conflict largely in terms of individual actors and their motivation. Another aspect is the mobilization of organizations. The SMI grows as the pool of adherents and resources enlarges and is exploited by movement entrepreneurs. SMOs are staffed by cadre with deeper commitments than mere sympathizers or adherents. There very well may be time lags and disjunctions between the cycles and peaks of sentiments and the level of SMO activity. SMOs develop protected niches, sources of funding and support from institutions (the churches, foundations, and government grants) and from individual contributors to the SMO per se (organizational loyalty). Thus, SMOs may exist and fight battles long after sentiment base support has disappeared. We take it that much of the battle over school busing is based upon movement organizations disconnected from the presumed underlying population. (In Atlanta the local black population was largely opposed to the attempt of NAACP, Inc. Fund lawyers to press the case for county-wide desegregation).

The disjunction between the mobilization level of SMOs and the sentiments for action of sympathizers is very important for understanding the interregnum periods of social movement conflict. SMOs, operating out of protected niches, continue their program and wait for another wave of social movement support to emerge so that they can once again mount the crest. At the very least, analysis
of M/CM interaction must describe the growth and decline of MOs and CMOs as well as other forms of mobilization and levels and forms of conflict.

Although we have emphasized the limits of the spiral of conflict notion, the disjunctions and even opposite patterns of mobilization of individuals and SMOs may occur, the spiral of conflict idea powerfully focuses our attention on the interaction of movement and countermovement. They are locked in a conflict dance. Movement and CM are engaged in a battle joined.

The battle joined.

Central to M/CM analysis is a description of the strategies and tactics and forms of conflict, how and where they interact. A wide range of forms of battle exists; from direct confrontation, to lobbying authorities, to speaking to disparate audiences, to debating the shadows of previous generations. Second, we need to describe the strategic goals and tactics of movements and countermovements when they meet each other.

Forms of meeting.

Where do they meet? How do they proceed to achieve goals? M/CM may meet head-on in an "encounter," a face-to-face interaction with a single focus of attention (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina, 1982: ). In an encounter, members of each group have a heightened awareness of the other group, and respond accordingly. The most dramatic encounters often take place "on the streets" or other public locations loosely regulated by authorities. For example, during the height of Boston school desegregation controversy, local anti-busing movement advocates became deeply involved in a racial confrontation between blacks and whites at Carson beach, a strip of public beach between all-white South Boston and a black housing project. The conflict began when a white crowd attacked six black salesmen visiting the city who were strolling on the beach. The NAACP then organized a "picnic" demonstration several days later to assert
blacks' rights to use the beach. The anti-busing leaders organized a counter-demonstration. A massive fight broke out between the two demonstrating groups.

Other types of encounters are more structured and less likely to involve violent conflict. For example, the representatives of the pro- and anti-nuclear movements have frequently debated on university campuses and television public affairs shows. The most highly structured type of an encounter setting is probably the court. Many of the cases described in Joel Handler's Social Movements and the Legal System (1979) involve movement and countermovement representation in legal battle (see also Barkin).

Second, movement and countermovement can be joined in the sense that they attempt to influence the same third parties. For example, the movement to legalize marijuana and the countermovement to oppose its legalization are both attempting to influence the public, national and state legislators, and the medical establishment. Rarely, however, have they met in a face-to-face encounter.

Finally, movement and countermovement may be joined only in the sense that they attempt to undo the effects of the other. It is a countermovement, not a new movement, to the extent that it is engaged with organizations and actors representing the original movement, or it debates the position of the movement. The anti-prohibition groups that got prohibition repealed come close to being a new movement. They were led by different groups than had led the original battle. Indeed, they were led by elite businessmen (who were Dupont connected). They were not so much pro-alcohol as they were anti-government interference. They converted some supporters of prohibition by arguing that prohibition was not eliminating alcohol drinking at the same time that it was contributing to lawlessness and "lack of respect for law." The AAPA was originally bi-partisan, but saw the Democrats and Roosevelt as more likely supporters of repeal.
Raskob, the leader of AAPA, became the chairman of the Democratic party. The leaders of AAPA split from the Democrats when they believed that Roosevelt was taking a statist tack. Many of them went on to found the Liberty League, an organization dedicated to restricting the role of government. We consider AAPA a countermovement because it did have to confront some of the same groups that had supported prohibition and because the debate was framed in terms of the value of the legislation which the movement had promoted.

**Strategic goals and tactics of movement/countermovement interaction.**

Movement and countermovement interactions may vary in the environmental context in which they meet. They may also vary in the extent to which the groups locked in conflict seek to exclude the other group from the political arena. Movement and countermovement may attempt to damage or destroy the other group, preempt or dissuade the other group from mobilizing, or recruit the other group's members.

**Damaging Actions.** One strategy used by movements and countermovements is to try to raise the cost of mobilization for the other group. Let us examine in some detail the efforts of the pro-nuclear movement to raise these costs for the anti-nuclear movement.

Before we proceed two caveats are necessary. First, when we consider the pro-nuclear movement's effort to damage the anti-nuclear movement, it is often difficult to distinguish "industry activities" from "movement activities." For example, when a utility company presses charges against anti-nuclear "trespassers," is this a pro-nuclear movement activity or simply a business effort to protect its property? We consider activities directed against the anti-nuclear forces "movement" activities, when those who initiate or engage in them view them as part of a political struggle. This "rule" is problematic in that it relies on often difficult to measure state of mind factors.
A second caveat is that our focus is on specific social movement efforts to damage other social movements. Of less concern are the broader strategies used by one movement to defeat another (see our comments on preemptive strategies, below). Thus, we assume that general issues concerning M/CM interaction can be distinguished from specific actions taken by one movement to damage another. For example, the attempt of anti-abortion movement groups to amend the constitution would be treated as part of overall strategy, not an action directed against the pro-abortion movement. Bombings of abortion clinics or disruption of pro-abortion rallies would be treated as direct acts against the movement.

The pro-nuclear movement took a number of actions against the anti-nuclear movement. The categories used to describe these activities are drawn from Marx's (1979) discussion of the most prevalent forms of government action against the protest movements of the 1960s. We discuss attempts to gather information, limit the flow of resources, and portray the anti-nuclear movement in a negative light.

A. Information Gathering. A central aspect of government efforts to damage the protest movements in the 1960s was the collection of information on dissidents. As Marx notes, "knowing that agents are gathering information on it may make a social movement less open and democratic, require that limited resources be devoted to security, and may deter participation" (1979: 99). Some pro-nuclear groups have initiated surveillance activities of anti-nuclear activists and organizations. Utility companies have taken pictures of anti-nuclear demonstrators, copied license plate numbers near anti-nuclear rallies, and maintained files of individual anti-nuclear activists (Wall Street Journal, 1/14/79). Whether these information gathering activities are intended to damage the anti-nuclear movement is open to question. Industry spokespeople claim that they are part of legitimate security measures. Nuclear power critics,
however, charge that the surveillance programs are designed to discourage support for their movement. For example, in a hearing before a state regulatory commission, an anti-nuclear group charged that a utility's surveillance program had served to "suppress and chill opponents of nuclear power and anyone else who differs from (the company's) policies" (Wall Street Journal, 1/11/79).

In addition to collecting their own information, several utility companies hired security firms to collect information on anti-nuclear protestors. A West Coast utility publicly acknowledged that it retained two security firms, Research West and Information Digest, for that purpose. Similar information was revealed in files obtained in the litigation that followed the 1977 and 1978 Seabrook nuclear power plant construction site. There the utility also hired two private security firms, Operational Systems, Inc. and Information Digest, to obtain information on the Clamshell Alliance (Center for National Security Studies, 1981: 69).

At least one "citizens" group, the U.S. Labor Party, collected information on the anti's for the explicit purpose of damaging the movement. The Seabrook files mentioned above revealed that the Labor Party had provided the New Hampshire State Police and the FBI with details of the Clamshell's tactical plans to occupy the power plant. When asked about these and other efforts to collect information on the anti-nuclear movement, a Labor Committee spokesman stated: "This is political warfare. We're running a political intelligence operation to expose them (anti-nuclear activists). We will cooperate with any organization willing to root out this evil" (Guardian, 12/5/79). The Labor Committee also claims to have infiltrated the Clamshell Alliance, including its top leadership, for the purposes of information gathering (Guardian, 12/5/79).

Finally, the industry's two main trade associations, Atomic Industrial
Forum and Edison Electric Institute, maintained files on anti-nuclear opponents. In at least one instance, the trade associations requested utility companies in a number of cities to attend and report back on meetings of a particular anti-nuclear group (Washington Post, 11/21/77). In addition, the AIF allegedly disseminated information on anti-nuclear leaders to its members, including utility companies (Campaign for Political Rights, 1979: 3).

B. Restricting Resources. Another tactic used by the government to damage protest movements in the 1960s was to restrict the flow of resources to them, physical space, and employment opportunities (Marx, 1979: 99-100). The pro-nuclear movement also attempted to reduce the anti-nuclear forces' access to resources. Pro-nuclear activists tried to eliminate the federal funding of citizen intervenors in regulatory proceedings. The Federal Trade Commission, ACTION, the Department of Energy, and other governmental agencies and programs traditionally provided such funds (Metzger, 1980: 40). Several pro-nuclear movement organizations, such as Americans for Nuclear Energy and the Nuclear Legislative Advisory Services, led efforts to prevent further disbursement of government funds to anti-nuclear intervenor groups (Nuclear Legislative Advisory Service, 6/21/81; Nuclear Advocate, 6/80). In another effort, several campus chapters of pro-nuclear movement groups organized efforts to eliminate the use of student fees to fund campus anti-nuclear organizations (Interview Nos. 19, 25).

Finally, two pro-nuclear groups have used civil litigation to financially damage an anti-nuclear organization. The New Hampshire Voice of Energy (NHVOE) and Americans for More Power Sources (AMPS) have sued the Coalition for Direct Action at Seabrook, a faction within the Clamshell Alliance. The suit's stated purpose is to "recover the cost to the taxpayer for the added protection necessary to protect life, limb and property" during demonstrations at the Seabrook nuclear power plant construction site (INFO No. 143, 1980: 4).
According to Tina Coruth, president of NHVOE, "Our suit is a way for the Seabrook demonstrators to pay their own way. It's not right for the New Hampshire taxpayer to pick up the tab for the added police protection during those anti-nuclear demonstrations" (INFO No. 143, 1980: 4).

C. Efforts to Produce a Negative Image. Another technique used to damage the movement in the 1960s was to create an unfavorable public image of it (March, 1979: 96-98). The pro-nuclear movement has also used this strategy. Several utility companies have collected and disseminated derogatory information on anti-nuclear groups. Between 1973 and 1977 Georgia Power Company, for example, operated a sophisticated surveillance program on company critics, including the anti-nuclear Georgia Power Project. A former company investigator described the surveillance program as "dirt gathering" efforts to label its opponents as "commies and queers" (Center for National Security Studies, 1981: 67-68). Similarly, in 1978 Philadelphia Electric Company photographed anti-nuclear demonstrators and kept files on their activities. The company gave copies of the photographs to a local television station which used them in a story that ridiculed the demonstrators. An anti-nuclear group filed an administrative complaint with the state Public Service Commission, charging that rate payers' money was being illegally used on a campaign to spy on and "suppress and smear" critics of nuclear power (Center for National Security Studies, 1981: 75).

The U. S. Labor Party has also attempted to discredit the anti-nuclear movement. In 1977, the Labor Party told New Hampshire state authorities that a planned demonstration at Seabrook construction site was "nothing but a cover for terrorist activity" (Center for National Security Studies, 1981: 7). Governor Meldren Thompson and the Manchester Union-Leader accepted and widely publicized the allegation. The Labor party has made similar charges against

The pro-nuclear movement was initiated to directly counter the increased success of the anti's in mobilizing public support. In other cases, the battle may be more indirect. Movement and Countermovement may attempt to rally different segments of the public and/or reference clients to bring pressure on authorities. Or the movement may be fighting a legal battle in court, while some countermovement organization leads a legislative battle.

Preemptive Strategies. Alternatively, a movement may design its strategy and tactics in ways which undercut the moral and political basis of a counter or a counter-counter mobilization. Ghandi's satyagraha campaigns in India and South Africa, for example, were designed to undercut the moral position of their opponents.

Similarly, Oberschall (1973: Ch.6) argues that Martin Luther King succeeded in part because he delayed a major counter-attack by Southern whites. White control of jobs and credit, the court system, and the political apparatus gave the white power structure sufficient leverages to crush a black insurgency. King's tactic of non-violent resistance made direct retaliation more difficult:

King must be seen as a man who solved a technical problem that had stumped Negro leaders for generations. As a powerless group living in the middle of a powerful majority that hated and feared them, Negroes could not stage an open revolt. To go unto the streets under those conditions with open demands for change was suicidal . . . King and the sit-in students solved the technical problems by clothing a national resistance movement in the comforting garb of love, forgiveness, and nonviolence, a transformation that enabled Negroes to stage an open revolt without calling it an open revolt. (Lerone Bennett, quoted in Oberschall, 1973: 22).

Choice of strategy involves much beyond merely the nature of the opposition - the repertoires of action, constituency acceptability, resources
available, and relations to authorities. But one component affecting choice is M/CM relations.

**Persuasion and Recruitment.** Finally, movements and countermovements may attempt to persuade the members of the opposition group to join their side of the controversy.

In general, however, movements and countermovements are unlikely to take this strategy as part of short-term strategy. First, it requires an individual to disengage from one movement and then engage one in opposition to it. The individual must both reverse his or her ideological position, and oppose a group of people with which he or she was recently associated. Second, the pool of neutral bystanders is usually much larger than the number of poten-
tially recruitable individuals in the opposition group. Thus, recruitment drives aimed at bystanders is likely to net more recruits than one directed at the opposition.

Nevertheless, there are circumstances in which movements can recruit from the opposition group. For instance, the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks assumed a movement/countermovement relationship in the period between the February and October revolutions. The Bolsheviks triumphed in part because they recruited large numbers of disaffected Mensheviks. Factors that made the transfer of allegiance possible included Menshevik support of an increasingly unpopular war, an emerging belief that only the Bolsheviks could defend the government against counter-revolutionary forces, and Bolshevik support of workers taking over factories and peasants seizing land (Thomas, 1981). In our own time we have seen "neo-conservatives" emerge from among the in-
tellectual leaders of the moderate left. We suspect that conversion occurs in loosely coupled conflict over long time periods more than in tightly coupled conflict.
The battle joined includes conflict in the courts, in the streets, and in the hearts and minds of persons. Often it involves the attempt of Movement or Countermovement to gain the cooperation of authorities. Yet there are a wide number of authority - M/CM relations possible.

Movement, Countermovement, and Authorities

The traditional model of social movement analysis begins from a stable position - a government in place, facing groups with routine access (members) and groups with no access. As groups with no access develop grievances they attempt to gain access and may mobilize social movements. Similarly, groups with routine access may find their ability to gain authoritative allocations undermined. They, too, may resort to social movement mobilization. State officials, authorities and their differentiated agents (civil servants, military officers), may have their own interests. They may "represent" groups

There is a bothersome analytic-conceptual issue in this section--is any action of an authority that bears on M/CM interaction part of the M or CM? Stated differently, how does one differentiate political and authoritative action from M/CM action? A definitive answer cannot be given, but a range of answers can. At one extreme, action by authorities that is well institutionalized and legitimated in the social system may have impact on social movements but is not in itself considered social movement activity. Through fully institutionalized means, Margaret Thatcher has impact on the fate of conservatism and socialism in Great Britain. On the other hand, Costa-Gravas' "Z" and CIA's intervention against Allende in Chile are examples of countermovement activity. This view of M/CM activity as it relates to the action of authorities is based upon a western legal rational model of state activity. It posits a separate institutionalized political sphere, with Ms and CMs operating outside of, or at the margin of, the institutionalized sphere.

At the other extreme, if one takes an ideational view of social movements, ignoring or downplaying the mobilization of movement activity in the definition of social movement, the distinction between state action and social movement action becomes meaningless. Then Margaret Thatcher is clearly part of the conservative countermovement, indeed a leader of it. But then one loses the ability to make distinctions between social movement activity and political activity in general (or one shifts it down a level, to the distinction between institutionalized and un-institutionalized). We maintain the distinction between authoritative action and social movement (or countermovement) action. However, to the extent that state action is largely directed to carrying out pro or anti-social movement actions, we have a conceptual difference with little empirical relevance.
in civil society, but they may also embody ideologies and interests which lead them to press for changes in other parts of the state apparatus. Yet, it is also possible for groups to conflict in society with but minimal state intervention; movement and countermovement proceed with marginal use of the police and authorities. Figure 1 presents some of the possible models of authority, M/CM relations. It would be possible to present a more graphically elegant and complicated set of models. Negative and positive lines could be added, identities between state and SM made, intensities shaded. But for our crude and preliminary purposes, these will suffice to illustrate the range of relations. Model A, Conflict with minimal state intervention, occurs where the movement and countermovement battle for members or for control with little attempt to change laws or to gain state support. Bromley and Shupe and Shupe, Bromley and Busching have examined the relationship between the Unification Church (Moonies) and anti-Moonies in these terms. The anti-Moonies consisted of the parents of Moonies and de-programmers. The state could have become involved if the police had been willing to intervene when the church claimed their members were being kidnapped. The de-programmers and parents used the rhetoric of "family matters" to insulate the police from action.

A striking feature of this model is how few cases it describes. Movement and countermovement usually appeal to authorities. First, movements do not control the resources and are not sufficiently stable to implement major changes in society. Rather, they attempt to shift the cost of achieving change from themselves to the government and polity at large. The civil rights movement, for example, could to some extent desegregate public facilities through their own actions. The lunch-counter sit-ins were in part an attempt to directly affect change. Still, the change they sought was so massive that it could only be achieved when the government applied its resources to the problem. Similarly, anti-nuclear demonstrators have occupied plant construction sites
Figure I

Models of SM-CM-Authority Relations

A

Movement ↔ CM
Conflict Model
Minimal State
Involvement

B

Authority ↔ Movement
Authority is the Countermovement

C

Authority

Movement → Countermovement
Competitive Model
Minimal Direct Conflict

D

Authority

Movement → Countermovement
Conflict Model, State Involvement

E

Authority in Region

Movement → Countermovement
Dual Sovereignty Model
Rebellion & Revolution

F

National Authorities

Movement → Local Authorities
Countermovement

"———" = attempts to persuade, influence, or destroy
"-.-.-.-.-." = alliance or sponsorships
with the purported goal of physically blocking further construction. Still, the overall success of the movement depended much more on the position taken by the government than specific effects of its actions on the industry.

Second, usually one side or the other will perceive that it is in their interest to seek the involvement of authorities. Schattschneider's (1960) analysis suggests that this will tend to be the weaker of the two parties, since the stronger will generally prevail as long as the dispute remains private. If, however, the stronger party feels that the government is reasonably certain to take its side, it will seek the involvement of state authorities. A clear example is offered by a recent dispute between an insurgency movement in the US. Steel Workers Union and established leadership. The insurgency movement, led by Ed Sadlowski, had expanded the scope of the conflict by obtaining the financial support of liberal and radical groups outside of the union. The union leadership sued in federal court to prevent the insurgent group from receiving outside help, and won in a Supreme Court decision.

Model B, Authority is the countermovement, occurs where the movement directly attacks the state and the state is the countermovement. Arno Mayer's analysis of conservative authorities' response to working class upheavals from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, starts from an identity of interest between conservative groups and state authority. Authorities and conservative interests are at one. (see footnote)

Model C places the state at the center of the conflict between movement and countermovement. Both movement and countermovement attempt to convince authorities of their position and demonstrate their strength. The triangle is left "open," however, since movement and countermovement do not directly attack each other. The struggle over repeal of prohibition looks something like this. Model C is a model of competitive debate.
The "closed" triangle of model D suggests that movement and counter-
movement seek to both make demands on the government and damage the other
movement. The model describes the conflict between the pro and anti-
nuclear movements, as described above.

Model E represents a revolutionary situation, where movement and
countermovement have established that to a significant part of the popu-
lation they are the government. The movements control territory, raise
taxes, conscript soldiers and perform other governmental functions
(Tilly, 1978: 190-192).

Model F indicates that the local government can be aligned with
countermovements in a struggle against central authorities. The model de-
scribes the anti-busing movement in Boston and the anti-civil rights movement
in the South. In both cases, local officials helped sponsor and mobilize
a countermovement. National officials became aligned with the movement.

It would be possible to make this analysis more complex. Not only do local
and national authorities vary in their movement alignments, but so do authorities
in different agencies at the same level. But the purpose of the analysis is to
embed M/CM interaction in the larger authority-political system. Ultimately-
movement and countermovement contend for support. They attempt to make allian-
ces, to seize opportunities for gaining power. The structured differentiation
and ideology of authorities provides the ground for political opportunity.

For politically oriented movements and countermovements, state authori-
ties and agents are the target in view, their actions are oriented to either
changing authoritative allocations or to becoming the authorities themselves.
Whether through revolution, marginal accomodation or conversion, the immediate
target is state action.

Movement and countermovement, of course, differ amongst themselves in
the breadth and depth of their ideologies. How much change is necessary to "really" accomplish goals? The variation in and depth of ideology relates to the symbolic framing of the debates.

V. Outcomes: History Social Change & Social Movements

It is possible for movements to be quite successful in winning specific authoritative allocations, yet have little impact on changing the definition of the situation. Conversely, all of the short-run battle may be lost, but in the long run the grounds of decision making are radically changed. It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter the vital discussion of the nature of culture and symbolic change that has been so invigorated in recent decades. Although we have no easy template for the study of symbolic change, large progress has been made. From the historical studies of Raymond Williams and John Dunn to the systematic study of political cognition of Gamson and Modigliani we are learning how to examine the transformation of symbol systems. Here we make some brief comments on the relation of ideology and symbolic attachments to movements and countermovements.

First, movements and countermovements are nested in long waves of ideology and counter-ideology. Ideologies are nested in class relations and in culture. Our definition of social movements rests upon sentiments about change. These ideas are rooted in long term views about right action and the relations among groups, citizens and the state. The ground for mobilization must be prepared. Some of the ground of social movement ideology may be quite remote, for instance many modern social movements assume that social relations are manipulable. That view rests upon an active, Western view of relations as objectifiable and separatable. It is probably not necessary for social movement analysts to spend much time worrying about those distant assumptions.
undergirding action. On the other hand, movement and countermovement must develop ideologies that convince bystanders and authorities of the rightness of their view. Social movements have the problem in their nascent stage of getting on the agenda and of making their priorities and view of the world acceptable to those who think the ideas are strange and wrong. There are a wide variety of techniques for doing so. Principles of rhetoric and the social psychology of belief systems tell us something about how this occurs, whether or not SM cadre and leaders consciously use the principles.

Countermovements have a different problem. They must "remember the answers." Often their leaders and cadre are in the position of defending policies whose justifications have receded into the routine grounds. They seem to be going backward, their policies justify the status quo and established routines. The problem for many countermovements is how to make older symbols relevant to newer situations. They must both discredit the ideas of the movement and show how older ideologies have relevance to new situations.

The long waves of ideology and counter-ideology are treated by historians of ideas. One point of entre for the sociologist of social movements is to map the nexus between idea entrepreneurs and specific SMOs and industry modes.

An awareness of the long wave of movement ideology also points up another issue, the maintenance of social movement and countermovement sentiment under repression. It is striking how major ideologies and political values resurge when state repression is lifted. One would have thought that the Franco regime, with its thirty-five years of dominance, could have wiped out commitment to democracy, to socialism and communism. But the end of the regime was followed in short order by full blown parties and ideological apparatuses. How many generations does it take? How deeply into primary group structure must the state intrude in order to eliminate civilizational ideologies, major systems of thought and belief about the social structure and possibilities?
Finally, but related to the last, attention to the long waves of sentiments and symbols raises the issue of how movements resurface over the decades. Feminism was strong in the early part of the century, died in the Great Depression, and was resurrected in the early 60s (Scharf, 1980). To some extent new leaders resurrect old exemplars and issues, recreate, selectively, our past to fit present needs. The debate between movement and countermovement draws upon the cultural stock, but transforms it.
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