Movement and Countermovement: Loosely Coupled Conflict

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Abstract

Movements often provide the impetus for countermovements to mobilize. Movement and Countermovement (M/CM) then engage in loosely coupled conflict as each attempts to win support from bystanders and authorities.

The paper discusses 1) getting started problems of countermovement mobilization; 2) the battle joined, strategies and tactics of interaction; 3) the relation of movements and countermovements to authorities. Hypotheses are developed. Illustrations are drawn from several M/CM interactions and some data from a study of the antinuclear power/pronuclear power movement.
Movement and Countermovement: Loosely Coupled Conflict

The growth of the anti-abortion movement, the pro-family movement, the anti-busing movement, the rise of Moral Majority, Phyllis Schlafley's Eagle Forum, and the victory of Ronald Reagan has spawned a small industry of scholarly and popular writing about conservative and reactionary social movements. Quite reasonably, sociologists have joined the parade. (See Useem on the anti-busing movement in Boston, Useem and Zald, 1983, on the pronuclear power movement, and Lo, 1982 and Mottl, 1981 for more general treatments.)

These writings join an earlier body of literature examining right-wing movements (for instance, Lipset and Raab, 1970; Daniel Aaron, 1981; Bell, 1964). This paper, too, gains momentum from our awareness of the growth of right-wing movements. But its thrust, its angle of vision, is somewhat different. Most students of conservative movements search for their social bases, leading organizations, and actors. They do for countermovements what others have done for movements. But our interests are more interactional. We are interested in how movements generate a countermovement, and how they then engage in a loosely coupled tango of mobilization and demobilization. We are interested in how, in the language of McCarthy & Zald (1977; 1981), the structure of the SM industry shapes the tactics and structure of the CM industry. Finally, we wish to explore the relationships among movement, countermovement, and authority.

Our central premise is that movements of any visibility and impact create the conditions for the mobilization of countermovements. By advocating change, by attacking the established interests, by mobilizing symbols and raising costs to others, they create grievances and provide opportunities for organizational entrepreneurs to define countermovement
goals and issues. In the last two decades social movement researchers have expanded their analytic and empirical frame of reference. We now have a rich set of tools and concepts to be used in studying social movements—the social psychology of attitudes and ideology, the dimensions and conditions of solidarity, the nature of SMO change, the processes of resource mobilization, the analysis of competition and conflict among MOs are part of the kit bag of sociology. And recently we have begun to examine the interaction of authorities and movements (Tilly, Marx), an important and much neglected topic. What is surprising, however, is the neglect of the **dynamic inter-play of movement and countermovement.** Much of a movement's activity is aimed at neutralizing, confronting, or discrediting its corresponding countermovement. Similarly, the countermovement gains its impetus and grows from showing the harmful effects of the movement. It attacks the movement leaders, bombs its sites of program action, and associates the movement with evil. It chooses its tactics in response to the structure and tactics of the movement.¹

This paper addresses three interlinked questions in movement-countermovement analysis. First, what are the determinants of the timing and strength of countermovement mobilization? Countermovements vary in how rapidly they mobilize and in the strength of their mobilization. They may or may not appear when the movement is at its peak and they may not "match" the movement in form of mobilization and organization. These differences then shape the forms of movement-countermovement interaction. Second, we wish to describe the battle joined. How do movement and countermovement conflict: In which sites? With which repertoires and strategies? In the extreme case the movement has all but disappeared as the countermovement

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¹ We suspect that the neglect of movement-countermovement interaction is related to the difficulties of diachronic, processual and interactional analysis, especially when it is applied to such diffuse and changing entities as social movements.
attempts to undo its effects. At the other extreme, movement and counter-
movement may be locked in direct collective violent combat. Rappoport's
analysis of the forms of conflict as fights, games and debates will be
of use here. Third, how are authorities involved in movement-counter-
movement interaction? Since social movements, especially those aimed
at political change, (in contrast to expressive and religious movements),
fight for a change in authoritative allocations, authorities are often
centrally involved in CM interaction.

I. Getting Started: Countermovement Mobilization

The growth of a movement is not neatly balanced by the growth of the
countermovement. Opponents of a movement, those who have preferences at
variance with the movement, may not take the movement seriously. They
may label the movement participants as deviant and marginal (Gitlin, 1980;
Schur, 1979); they may lack awareness of other individuals and groups that
also oppose the movement; they may believe that their own claims on authori-
ties are so strong and that their own beliefs are so clearly legitimate,
that the movement has little chance for success. To the extent that mo-
bilization of M and CM are tightly coupled it is likely that a spiral of
mobilization and conflict occurs. (See Coleman, 1956; Heirich, 1970)
On the other hand, to the extent that movement and countermovement are only
loosely coupled the cycle of mobilization for one side may be quite se-
parate from the cycle of mobilization for the other.² What are some of the
major determinants of the emergence and growth of countermovements? We
discuss four factors—movement progress and success, the formulation of
CM ideology, resource availability, and constraints and opportunities in

²For a recent sophisticated discussion of the notion of spirals of
collict, see Kriesberg, 1982.
A. Movement progress and success. Movement representatives may be contending for redefinitions of policy and authoritative allocations, and even gaining some success, yet opponents of the movement may assume that authorities are protecting them or that the successes of the movement cannot or need not be contested. Doug McAdams (1982) perceptively notes that Roosevelt’s accession to the Presidency created a belief amongst the NAACP leadership that opportunities for civil rights actions were present. Throughout the late 1940s and early fifties small civil right successions were won, and some defeats were occasioned (e.g., Harry Truman desegregated the military, open primaries and the seating of black delegates at state and national party conventions became zones of combat). But supporters of the status quo believed that local politicians and national representatives were protecting segregationist interests. Little organization of opposition outside of established channels occurred. However, success in capturing central policies or symbols signals to the opposition that established means are no longer sufficient. At that time, an organized countermovement is facilitated. For example, movement victories in cases before the U.S. Supreme Court crystallized the anti-abortion and Southern anti-civil rights movement. The anti-abortion movement emerged following the Supreme Court decision to decriminalize abortion in 1973 and the White Citizens' Councils date from the 1954 decision that it was illegal to racially segregate schools. Thus, it is a particular kind of movement victory—one that signals that the government is now willing to promote the interests of the movement's constituency—that is likely to generate a countermovement.

A countermovement has difficulty maintaining mobilization, however, if the movement wins a large victory. Under these circumstances, the countermovement will become paralyzed as supporters see little chance of success. For example, by the mid-1960s, the Southern white resistance had dissipated,
even though the civil rights movement continued its struggle. Between 1954 and the early 1960s the civil rights movement gained the moral support of a broad sector of the American public and the legal and coercive backing of the federal government. We suspect that the segregationists' failure to keep schools in the South segregated, when they had claimed that they would never allow black children to go to school with whites, contributed to their inability to mobilize in the next phase of the civil rights movement. (Bartley, 1969; Carter, 1959; McMiller, 1971).

B. Appropriate CM Ideology. Mobilization will be difficult and slow unless a movement articulates an ideology which arouses enthusiasm and creates commitment (Bottomore, 1979: 47). Countermovements often lack such an ideology at the outset, but may develop it as the struggle proceeds. For example, the Catholic Church's doctrine concerning the "sacredness" of life provided the anti-abortion movement with an ideology in place around which the movement could mobilize. This relatively narrow doctrine, however, was not capable of mobilizing individuals outside the church, less theologically attuned. Only with the development of an ideology about the relationship of abortion to family life and the role of women in society was the anti-abortion movement able to draw on a broader constituency. Similarly, the pronuclear movement was initially mobilized around the industry's claim that nuclear power is a safe and efficient energy source (Useem & Zald, 1983). However, the mobilization of a constituency outside the industry required a doctrine relating nuclear power to the promotion of the standard of living, achievement of independence on foreign oil, and establishing the altruism of its own constituency in comparison to the self-serving goals of the anti-nuclear activists. Countermovements may have to "remember the answers," rediscover the justification for policies and programs which have slipped into the implicit assumptions of society.
C. Availability of resources. Countermovements may be delayed if there are no groups with discretionary resources available to invest in collective action. A countermovement's location in the social structure will largely determine the availability of such resources. Usually, movements are launched by groups from "below" and attack established interests. Since they respond to these attacks, countermovements will often be linked to established interests and organizations. Countermovements' ties to the established order will tend to both help and hinder the provision of the requisite resources. On the one hand, countermovements will be launched by corporate groups rich in fungible resources such as money, office space, and clerical help. On the other hand, the countermovement's ties to the established order may preclude the use of these resources for non-institutionalized action. The nuclear power industry, for example, controlled many of the resources needed by the pronuclear movement, but was reluctant to provide them. The industry was accountable to stockholders, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and other federal, state, and local government agencies. These ties prevented the use of industry resources for any but the most mild type of protest.

These difficulties, however, are not necessarily insuperable. One strategy used by countermovements is to maintain a decentralized, loosely articulated, structure. This allows individuals and groups within the countermovement to provide the necessary resources to other groups, and yet allows them to disassociate themselves from actions taken by groups it has helped bring into existence. For example, Boston's political establishment was heavily involved in the anti-busing movement launched in that city in the fall of 1974. City officials held key posts in the anti-busing movement organization and the facilities of city hall were used for anti-busing
activities. City officials, however, could not easily advocate violence or other illegal forms of resistance, since the federal court and U.S. Justice Department were closely monitoring their actions. Several of them were lawyers, and feared disbarment and the loss of their livelihood, should they openly resist the federal court. Militant and occasionally illegal actions, however, were taken by other adherents. For example, during the first two years of desegregation, anti-busing protestors congregated in front of the schools in their neighborhood. The demonstrators taunted black students as they entered and left the school and on several occasions hurled rocks at buses carrying blacks. After one such protest, a crowd of several hundred attacked and beat a black man who had happened to stop his car at a red light near the demonstration. The anti-busing leaders did not participate in these "spontaneous" actions. Although the established leadership did not actually participate in these actions, they often provided their tacit support for them. For example, Elvira "Pixie" Palladino, a top leader in the anti-busing organization ROAR and elected member of the School Committee, commented on the beating of a black man: "My first reaction from the pit of my stomach, was that he got exactly what he deserved. He had no business of being over there [South Boston] in the first place," (Boston Globe, 5/25/75).

The general point is that authorities and established interests may be constrained from mobilization to resist a movement. Only as new vehicles are created, can the countermovement realize its full oppositional potential.

D. Constraint and Opportunity. CM mobilization is also facilitated or dampened by intervening events in society and political life. We have already argued that CM sympathizers do not mobilize immediately because they may lack a sense of immediacy and threat, appropriate ideology, and
an infrastructure of resources. But even if these conditions are met, the changing political-public scene inhibits the opportunities for mobilization, coalition, and appearance on the public agenda.

A number of scholars have begun to articulate a political process-opportunity model that stresses the receptivity-non-receptivity of the political environment that encourages or discourages mobilization. (See McAdams, Tarrow, Eisinger, Walker). Without being exhaustive, we list structures and processes that facilitate and hinder CM (and M) mobilization.

1) Dominating events, such as popular wars, and depressions, crowd out some social movements and countermovements. They do so by creating central foci of attention for authorities, elites, and large segments of the public and institutions. Popular wars create an atmosphere where the expression of discontent and conflict is perceived as unpatriotic. Both the right wing reaction to Roosevelt (Miles, 1980) and labor-management conflict was suppressed by the outbreak of World War II.

Large events such as wars not only crowd the agenda, they may discredit movement and countermovement leaders. Kyvig argues that the first group of leaders of the anti-prohibition forces were discredited in the period around World War I, because so many brewers were of German origin.

2) Political instability creates opportunities for movements both by providing current models for action and by limiting the repressive-control possibilities of authorities. Movements and countermovements learn from each other. Just as the women's movement and the gay rights movement learned from the civil rights movement, so, too, did the anti-abortion countermovement and the pronuclear power movement learn from these earlier movements. Repertoires of organization and tactics can be copied from foes as well as friends.
Political instability is also reflected in the rise and fall of new parties and political alignment. At such times established authorities or contenders may seek new allies.

3) Elections encourage already developed movements and countermovements both because they create a focus on politics, providing opportunities for immediate gains or losses in political power, and leading to ideological polarization and appeals. However, it may well be that approaching elections are more useful for movements and countermovements already organized and mobilized than for facilitating early mobilization. During an early stage, elections may provide an alternate focus, crowding out new issues and non-electorally related mobilization.

4) Changes in electoral coalitions and the rise and fall of politically oriented groups and organizations also present opportunities and threats to movements and countermovements. These changes in coalitional and power potential change risk-reward balances. No simple proposition summarizes the relation of coalitional possibilities to M/CM mobilization, but the sharper or more dramatic the shift in coalitional alignments, the more likely it is that movement mobilization is clearly facilitated.

The model of countermovement mobilization which we have described helps account for the degree to which M/CM are tightly coupled. To the extent that the CM is much delayed, whether because of the intervention of dominating events, the absence of appropriate ideology, the lack of an infra-structure of resources, or the constraints of political structure and opportunity, to the extent that the movement is largely demobilized by the time the CM emerges, direct M/CM conflict does not occur. The CM fights the ghost of the movement as it attempts to convince the authorities and bystander publics to turn back the clock. Short of that extreme, groups and individuals aligned with M and CM may lock in direct and violent con-
frontation, may join in formal legal suits, may lobby competitively, or may engage in debates with unseen adversaries before unseen audiences.

II. The Battle Joined.

Central to M/CM analysis is a description of the strategies and tactics and forms of conflict, how and where they interact. A wide range of forms of battle exists, from direct confrontation, to lobbying authorities, to speaking to disparate audiences, to debating the shadows of previous generations. Moreover, they have a wide range of strategic goals and tactics. They attempt to inhibit each other's mobilization, as well as persuade authorities and bystanders.

Forms of meeting.

Where do they meet? How do they proceed to achieve goals? M/CM may meet head-on in an "encounter," a face-to-face interaction with a single focus of attention (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina, 1982: p. 10). In an encounter, members of each group have a heightened awareness of the other group, and respond accordingly. The most dramatic encounters often take place "on the streets" or other public locations loosely regulated by authorities.

For example, during the height of Boston school desegregation controversy, local anti-busing movement advocates became deeply involved in a racial confrontation between blacks and whites at Carson beach, a strip of public beach between all-white South Boston and a black housing project. The conflict began when a white crowd attacked six black salesmen visiting the city who were strolling on the beach. The NAACP then organized a "picnic" demonstration several days later to assert blacks' rights to use the beach. The anti-busing leaders organized a counter-demonstration. A massive fight broke out between the two demonstrating groups. For at least some participants,
the confrontation is a fight, designed to fully defeat the enemy.

Other types of encounters are more structured and rule governed. They resemble debates or games. For example, the representatives of the pro- and antinuclear movements have frequently debated on university campuses and television public affairs shows. Here, the encounter occurs to influence amorphous third parties. No immediate decision is expected. The most highly structured type of an encounter setting is probably the court case, which combines game and debate characteristics. Many of the cases described in Joel Handler's Social Movements and the Legal System (1979) involve movement and countermovement representation in legal battle (see also Barkin).

Second, movement and countermovement can be joined in the sense that they attempt to influence the same third parties. For example, the movement to legalize marijuana and the countermovement to oppose its legalization are both attempting to influence the public, national and state legislators, and the medical establishment. Rarely, however, have they met in a face-to-face encounter. Lobbyists are involved in indirect competition.

Finally, movement and countermovement may be joined only in the sense that they attempt to undo the effects of the other. It is a countermovement, not a new movement, to the extent that it is engaged with organizations and actors representing the original movement, or it debates the position of the movement. The anti-prohibition groups that fought for the repeal of prohibition come close to being a new movement. They were led by different groups than had led the original battle. Indeed, they were led by elite businessmen (who were Dupont connected). They were not so much pro-alcohol as they were anti-government interference. They converted some supporters of prohibition by arguing that prohibition was not eliminating alcohol drinking at the same time that it was contributing to lawlessness and "lack of respect for law." The AAPA was originally bi-partisan, but saw the
Democrats and Roosevelt as more likely supporters of repeal. Raskob, the leader of AAPA, became the chairman of the Democratic party. The leaders of AAPA split from the Democrats when they believed that Roosevelt was taking a statist tack. Many of them went on to found the Liberty League, an organization dedicated to restricting the role of government. We consider AAPA a countermovement because it did confront some of the same groups that had supported prohibition and because the debate was framed in terms of the value of the legislation which the original movement had promoted.

At any one point in time, M/CM may vary widely in the form of their conflict. The form of conflict at one point in time, shapes strategy and tactics for the next round.

**Strategic goals and tactics of movement/countermovement interaction.**

As noted, movement and countermovement interactions may vary in the environmental context in which they meet. They may also vary in the extent to which the groups locked in conflict seek to exclude the other group from the political arena. Movement and countermovement may attempt to directly damage or destroy the other group, preempt or dissuade the other group from mobilizing, or recruit the other group's members.
Damaging Actions. One strategy used by movements and countermovements is to try to raise the cost of mobilization for the other group. Let us examine in some detail the efforts of the pronuclear movement to raise these costs for the antinuclear movement.

The pronuclear movement took a number of actions against the antinuclear movement. The categories used to describe these activities are drawn from Marx's (1979) discussion of the most prevalent forms of government action against the protest movements of the 1960s. We discuss attempts to gather information, limit the flow of resources, and portray the antinuclear movement in a negative light.

A. Information Gathering. A central aspect of government efforts to damage the protest movements in the 1960s was the collection of information on dissidents. As Marx notes, "knowing that agents are gathering information on it may make a social movement less open and democratic, require that limited resources be devoted to security, and may deter participation" (1979: 99).

Two caveats are necessary. First, when we consider the pronuclear movement's effort to damage the antinuclear movement, it is often difficult to distinguish "industry activities" from "movement activities." For example, when a utility company presses charges against antinuclear "trespassers," is this a pronuclear movement activity or simply a business effort to protect its property? We consider activities directed against the antinuclear forces "movement" activities, when those who initiate or engage in them view them as part of a political struggle.

Second, our focus is on specific social movement efforts to damage other social movements. Of less concern are the broader strategies used by one movement to defeat another (see our comments on preemptive strategies, below). Thus, we assume that general issues concerning M/CM interaction can be distinguished from specific actions taken by one movement to damage another. For example, the attempt of anti-abortion movement groups to amend the constitution would be treated as part of overall strategy, not an action directed against the pro-abortion movement. Bombings of abortion clinics or disruption of pro-abortion rallies would be treated as direct acts against the movement.
Some pronuclear groups have initiated surveillance activities of antinuclear activists and organizations. Utility companies have taken pictures of antinuclear demonstrators, copied license plate numbers near antinuclear rallies, and maintained files of individual antinuclear activists (Wall Street Journal, 1/14/79). Whether these information-gathering activities are intended to damage the antinuclear movement is open to question. Industry spokespeople claim that they are part of legitimate security measures. Nuclear power critics, however, charge that the surveillance programs are designed to discourage support for their movement. For example, in a hearing before a state regulatory commission, an antinuclear group charged that a utility's surveillance program had served to "suppress and chill opponents of nuclear power and anyone else who differs from (the company's) policies" (Wall Street Journal, 1/11/79).

In addition to collecting their own information, several utility companies hired security firms to collect information on antinuclear protestors. A West Coast utility publicly acknowledged that it retained two security firms, Research West and Information Digest, for that purpose. Similar information was revealed in files obtained in the litigation that followed the 1977 and 1978 Seabrook nuclear power plant construction site. There the utility also hired two private security firms, Operational Systems, Inc. and Information Digest, to obtain information on the Clamshell Alliance (Center for National Security Studies, 1981: 69).

At least one "citizens" group, the U.S. Labor Party, collected information on the anti's for the explicit purpose of damaging the movement. The Seabrook files mentioned above revealed that the Labor Party had provided the New Hampshire State Police and the FBI with details of the Clamshell's tactical plans to occupy the power plant. When asked about these and other efforts to collect information on the antinuclear movement, a
Labor Committee spokesman stated: "This is political warfare. We're running a political intelligence operation to expose them (antinuclear activists). We will cooperate with any organization willing to root out this evil" (Guardian, 12/5/79). The Labor Committee also claims to have infiltrated the Clamshell Alliance, including its top leadership, for the purposes of information gathering (Guardian, 12/5/79).

Finally, the industry's two main trade associations, Atomic Industrial Forum and Edison Electric Institute, maintained files on antinuclear opponents. In at least one instance, the trade associations requested utility companies in a number of cities to attend and report back on meetings of a particular antinuclear group (Washington Post, 11/21/77). In addition, the AIF allegedly disseminated information on antinuclear leaders to its members, including utility companies (Campaign for Political Rights, 1979. 3).

B. Restricting Resources. Another tactic used by the government to damage protest movements in the 1960s was to restrict the flow of resources to them, physical space, and employment opportunities (Marx, 1979: 99-100). The pronuclear movement also attempted to reduce the antinuclear forces' access to resources. Pronuclear activists tried to eliminate the federal funding of citizen intervenors in regulatory proceedings. The Federal Trade Commission, ACTION, the Department of Energy, and other governmental agencies and programs traditionally provided such funds (Metzger, 1980: 40). Several pronuclear movement organizations, such as Americans for Nuclear Energy and the Nuclear Legislative Advisory Services, led efforts to prevent further disbursement of government funds to antinuclear intervenor groups (Nuclear Legislative Advisory Service, 6/21/81; Nuclear Advocate, 6/80). In another effort, several campus chapters of pronuclear movement groups organized efforts to eliminate the use of student fees to fund campus antinuclear organizations (Interview Nos. 19, 25).
Finally, two pronuclear groups have used civil litigation to financially damage an antinuclear organization. The New Hampshire Voice of Energy (NHVOE) and Americans for More Power Sources AMPS) have sued the Coalition for Direct Action at Seabrook, a faction within the Clamshell Alliance. The suit's stated purpose is to "recover the cost to the taxpayer for the added protection necessary to protect life, limb and property" during demonstrations at the Seabrook nuclear power plant construction site (INFO No. 143, 1980: 4). According to Tina Coruth, president of NHVOE, "Our suit is a way for the Seabrook demonstrators to pay their own way. It's not right for the New Hampshire taxpayer to pick up the tab for the added police protection during those antinuclear demonstrations" (INFO No. 143, 1980: 4).

C. Efforts to Produce a Negative Image. Another technique used to damage the movement in the 1960s was to create an unfavorable public image of it (March, 1979: 96-98). The pronuclear movement has also used this strategy. Several utility companies have collected and disseminated derogatory information on antinuclear groups. Between 1973 and 1977 Georgia Power Company, for example, operated a sophisticated surveillance program on company critics, including the antinuclear Georgia Power Project. A former company investigator described the surveillance program as "dirt gathering" efforts to label its opponents as "commies and queers" (Center for National Security Studies, 1981: 67-68). Similarly, in 1978, Philadelphia Electric Company photographed antinuclear demonstrators and kept files on their activities. The company gave copies of the photographs to a local television station which used them in a story that ridiculed the demonstrators. An antinuclear group filed an administrative complaint with the State Public Service Commission, charging that rate payers' money
was being illegally used on a campaign to spy on and "suppress and smear" critics of nuclear power (Center for National Security Studies, 1981: 75).

The U. S. Labor Party has also attempted to discredit the antinuclear movement. In 1977, the Labor Party told New Hampshire state authorities that a planned demonstration at Seabrook construction site was "nothing but a cover for terrorist activity" (Center for National Security Studies, 1981: 7). Governor Meldrim Thompson and the Manchester Union-Leader accepted and widely publicized the allegation. The Labor Party has made similar charges against antinuclear activists in Maryland and New York (Center for National Security Studies, 1981: 7).

The pronuclear movement was initiated to directly counter the increased success of the anti's in mobilizing public support. In other cases, the battle may be more indirect. Movement and Countermovement may attempt to rally different segments of the public and/or reference elites to bring pressure on authorities. Or the movement may be fighting a legal battle in court, while some countermovement organization leads a legislative battle.

**Preemptive Strategies.** A movement may design its strategy and tactics in ways which undercut the moral and political basis of a counter-or a counter-counter mobilization. Gandhi's satyagraha campaigns in India and South Africa, for example, were designed to undercut the moral position of their opponents.

Similarly, Oberschall (1973: Ch.6) argues that Martin Luther King succeeded in part because he delayed a major counter-attack by Southern whites. White control of jobs and credit, the court system, and the political apparatus gave the white power structure sufficient leverages to crush a black insurgency. King's tactic of non-violent resistance made direct retaliation more difficult:
King must be seen as a man who solved a technical problem that had stumped Negro leaders for generations. As a powerless group living in the middle of a powerful majority that hated and feared them, Negroes could not stage an open revolt. To go unto the streets under those conditions with open demands for change was suicidal. . . . King and the sit-in students solved the technical problems by clothing a national resistance movement in the comforting garb of love, forgiveness, and nonviolence, a transformation that enabled Negroes to stage an open revolt without calling it an open revolt. (Lerone Bennett, quoted in Oberschall 1973: 22).

Choice of strategy involves much beyond merely the nature of the opposition - the repertoires of action, constituency acceptability, resources available, and relations to authorities. But one component affecting choice is M/CM relations. Strategy is multi-pronged and multi-functional. It addresses by-standers, authorities, reference elites, and opposition groups.

**Persuasion and Recruitment.** Finally, movements and countermovements may attempt to persuade the members of the opposition group to join their side of the controversy.

In general, movements and countermovements are unlikely to use this strategy in the short-run. First, it requires an individual to disengage from one movement and then engage in one opposed to it. The individual must both reverse his or her ideological position, and oppose a group of people with which he or she was recently associated. Second, the pool of neutral bystanders is usually much larger, and more accessible, than the number of potentially recruitable individuals in the opposition group. Thus, recruitment drives aimed at bystanders is likely to net more recruits than one directed at the opposition.

Nevertheless, there are circumstances in which movements can recruit from the opposition group. For instance, the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks assumed a movement/countermovement relationship in the period between the February and October revolutions. The Bolsheviks triumphed in part because they recruited large numbers of disaffected Mensheviks. Factors that made
the transfer of allegiance possible included Menshevik support of an increasingly unpopular war, an emerging belief that only the Bolsheviks could defend the government against counter-revolutionary forces, and Bolshevik support of workers taking over factories and peasants seizing land (Thomas, 1981). In our own time we have seen "neo-conservatives" emerge from among the intellectual leaders of the moderate left. We suspect that conversion occurs in loosely coupled conflict over long time periods more than in tightly coupled conflict.

The battle joined includes conflict in the courts, in the streets, and in the hearts and minds of persons. Often it involves the attempt of movement or countermovement to gain the cooperation of authorities. Yet there are a wide number of authority - M/CM relations possible.

III. Movement, Countermovement, and Authorities

The traditional model of social movement analysis begins from a stable

4 There is a bothersome analytic-conceptual issue in this section—is any action of an authority that bears on M/CM interaction part of the M or CM? Stated differently, how does one differentiate political and authoritative action from M/MC action? A definitive answer cannot be given, but a range of answers can. At one extreme, action by authorities that is well institutionalized and legitimated in the social system may have impact on social movements but is not in itself considered social movement activity. Through fully institutionalized means, Margaret Thatcher has impact on the fate of conservatism and socialism in Great Britain. On the other hand, Costa-Gravas' "Z" and CIA's intervention against Allende in Chile are examples of countermovement activity. This view of M/CM activity as it relates to the action of authorities is based upon a western legal rational model of state activity. It posits a separate institutionalized political sphere, with Ms and CMs operating outside of, or at the margin of, the institutionalized sphere.

At the other extreme, if one takes an ideational view of social movements, ignoring or downplaying the mobilization of movement activity in the definition of social movement, the distinction between state action and social movement action becomes meaningless. Then Margaret Thatcher is clearly part of the conservative countermovement, indeed a leader of it. But then one loses the ability to make distinctions between social movement activity and political activity in general (or one shifts it down a level, to the distinction between institutionalized and un-institutionalized). We maintain the distinction between authoritative action and social movement (or countermovement) action. However, to the extent that state action is largely directed to carrying out pro or anti-social movement actions, we have a conceptual difference with little empirical relevance.
position - a government in place, facing groups with routine access (members) and groups with no access. As groups with no access develop grievances they attempt to gain access and may mobilize social movements. Similarly, groups with routine access may find their ability to gain authoritative allocations undermined. They, too, may resort to social movement mobilization. State officials, authorities and their differentiated agents (civil servants, military officers), may have their own interests. They may "represent" groups in civil society, but they may also embody ideologies and interests which lead them to press for changes in other parts of the state apparatus. Yet, it is also possible for groups to conflict in society with but minimal state intervention; movement and countermovement proceed with marginal use of the police and authorities. Figure 1 presents some of the possible models of authority, M/CM relations.

It would be possible to present a more graphically elegant and complicated set of models. Negative and positive lines could be added, identities between state and SM made, intensities shaded. But for our crude and preliminary purposes, these will suffice to illustrate the range of relations.

Model A, Conflict with minimal state intervention, occurs where the movement and countermovement battle for members or for control with little attempt to change laws or to gain state support. Bromley and Shupe and Shupe, Bromley and Busching have examined the relationship between the Unification Church (Moonies) and anti-Moonies in these terms. The anti-Moonies consisted of the parents of Moonies and deprogrammers. The state could have become involved if the police had been willing to intervene when
Figure I

Models of SM-CM-Authority Relations

A

Movement → CM
Conflict Model
Minimal State
Involvement

B

Authority → Movement
Authority is the Countermovement

C

Authority
Movement → Countermovement
Competitive Model
Minimal Direct Conflict

D

Authority
Movement → Countermovement
Conflicts Model,
State Involvement

E

Authority in Region
Movement → Countermovement
Dual Sovereignty Model
Rebellion & Revolution

F

National Authorities
Movement → Local Authorities
Countermovement
Pluralistic Government Model

"-----" = attempts to persuade, influence, or destroy

"--.--.--.--." = alliance or sponsorships
the church claimed their members were being kidnapped. The deprogrammers and parents used the rhetoric of "family matters" to insulate the police from action.

A striking feature of this model is how few cases it describes. Movement and countermovement usually appeal to authorities. First, movements do not control the resources and are not sufficiently stable to implement major changes in society. Rather, they attempt to shift the cost of achieving change from themselves to the government and polity at large. The civil rights movement, for example, could to some extent desegregate public facilities through their own actions. The lunch-counter sit-ins were in part an attempt to directly affect change. Still, the changes they sought were so massive that they could only be achieved when the government applied its resources to the problem. Similarly, antinuclear demonstrators have occupied plant construction sites with the purported goal of physically blocking further construction. Still, the overall success of the movement depended much more on the position taken by the government than specific effects of its actions on the industry.

Second, usually one side or the other will perceive that it is in their interest to seek the involvement of authorities. Schattschneider's (1960) analysis suggests that this will tend to be the weaker of the two parties, since the stronger will generally prevail as long as the dispute remains private. If, however, the stronger party feels that the government is reasonably certain to take its side, it will seek the involvement of state authorities. A clear example is offered by a recent dispute between an insurgency movement in the U.S. Steel Workers Union and established leadership. The insurgency movement, led by Ed Sadowski, had expanded the scope of the conflict by obtaining the financial support of liberal and radical groups
outside of the union. The union leadership sued in federal court to prevent the insurgent group from receiving outside help, and won in a Supreme Court decision.

Model B, Authority is the countermovement, occurs where the movement directly attacks the state and the state is the countermovement. Arno Mayer's analysis of conservative authorities' response to working class upheavals from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, starts from an identity of interest between conservative groups and state authority. Authorities and conservative interests are at one. In our own time, the anti-war movement of the 1960s directly attacked the state.

Model C places the state at the center of the conflict between movement and countermovement. Both movement and countermovement attempt to convince authorities of their position and demonstrate their strength. The triangle is "open," however, since movement and countermovement do not directly attack each other. The struggle over repeal of prohibition looks something like this. Model C is a model of competitive debate. The AAPA used publicity campaigns and contributed funds to political parties and appealed to officials who would support the repeal of the Volstead Act.

The "closed" triangle of Model D suggests that movement and countermovement seek to both make demands on the government and damage the other movement. The model describes the conflict between the pro- and antinuclear movements, as described above. It also, in part, describes the pro- and anti-abortion movement. The antis have picketed and even bombed Family Planning clinics.

Model E represents a revolutionary situation, where movement and countermovement have established that to a significant part of the population they are the authorities. The movements control territory, raise taxes, conscript soldiers and perform other governmental functions (Tilly, 1978: 190-192).
Model F indicates that the local government can be aligned with countermovements in a struggle against central authorities. Eisenhower's calling out of the troops in Little Rock signalled to local authorities the limits of their opposition. It shifted the balance of forces for the next decade (Ashmore, 1982). The model describes the anti-busing movement in Boston and the anti-civil rights movement in the South. In both cases, local officials helped sponsor and mobilize a countermovement. National officials became aligned with the movement. National political structure thus shapes the form of M/CM conflict (see Garner and Zald).

It would be possible to make this analysis more complex. Not only do local and national authorities vary in their movement alignments, but so do authorities in different agencies at the same level. But the purpose of the analysis is to embed M/CM interaction in the larger authority-political system. Ultimately—movement and countermovement contend for support. They attempt to make alliances, to seize opportunities for gaining power. The structured differentiation and ideology of authorities provides the ground for political opportunity.

For politically oriented movements and countermovements, state authorities and agents are the target in view, their actions are oriented to either changing authoritative allocations or to becoming the authorities themselves. Whether through revolution, marginal accomodation or conversion, the immediate target is state action.

Movement and countermovement, of course, differ amongst themselves in the breadth and depth of their ideologies. How much change is necessary to "really" accomplish goals? The variation in and depth of ideology relates to the symbolic framing of the debates.
IV. Outcomes: History, Social Change & Social Movements

It is possible for movements to be quite successful in winning specific authoritative allocations, yet have little impact on changing the definition of the situation. Conversely, all of the short-run battle may be lost, but in the long run the grounds of decision making are radically changed. Our analysis of loosely coupled conflict is largely aimed at the short-run battle. It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter the vital discussion of the nature of culture and symbolic change that has been so invigorated in recent decades. Although we have no easy template for the study of symbolic change, large progress has been made. From the historical studies of Raymond Williams and John Dunn to the systematic study of political cognition of Gamson and Modigliani we are learning how to examine the transformation of symbol systems. Here we make some brief comments on the relation of ideology and symbolic attachments to movements and countermovements.

First, movements and countermovements are nested in long waves of ideology and counter-ideology. Ideologies are nested in class relations and in culture. Our definition of social movements rests upon sentiments about change. These ideas are rooted in long term views about right action and the relations among groups, citizens and the state. The ground for mobilization must be prepared.

Movement and countermovement must develop ideologies that convince by-standers and authorities of the rightness of their view. Social movements have the problem in their nascent stage of getting on the agenda and of making their priorities and view of the world acceptable to those who think the ideas are strange and wrong. There are a wide variety of techniques for doing so. Principles of rhetoric and the social psychology of belief
systems tell us something about how this occurs, whether or not SM cadre and leaders consciously use the principles.

Countermovements have a different problem. They must "remember the answers." Often their leaders and cadre are in the position of defending policies whose justifications have receded into the routine grounds. They seem to be going backward, their policies justify the status quo and established routines. The problem for many countermovements is how to make older symbols relevant to newer situations. They must both discredit the ideas of the movement and show how older ideologies have relevance to new situations.

The long waves of ideology and counterideology are treated by historians of ideas. One point of entre for the sociologist of social movements is to map the nexus between idea entrepreneurs and specific SMOs and industry modes (see Himmelstein and Zald, forthcoming).

An awareness of the long wave of movement ideology also points up another issue, the maintenance of social movement and countermovement sentiment under repression. It is striking how major ideologies and political values resurge when state repression is lifted. One would have thought that the Franco regime, with its thirty-five years of dominance, could have wiped out commitment to democracy, to socialism and communism. But the end of the regime was followed in short order by full-blown parties and ideological apparatuses. How many generations does it take? How deeply into primary group structure must the state intrude in order to eliminate civilizational ideologies, major systems of thought and belief about the social structure and possibilities?

Finally, but related to the last, attention to the long waves of sentiments and symbols, raises the issue of how movements resurface over
the decades. Feminism was strong in the early part of the century, died in the Great Depression, and was resurrected in the early 60s (Scharf, 1980). To some extent new leaders resurrect old exemplars and issues, recreate, selectively, our past to fit present needs. The debate between movement and countermovement draws upon the cultural stock, but transforms it (Gusfield, 1981).
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