THEORY AND RESEARCH IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:
A CRITICAL REVIEW

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There has been an explosion of theoretical and empirical writings on social movements and collective action within the last decade. These writings have triggered debates, a new school of thought, defenses of old schools of thought and advances. Moreover, important research on social movements is being conducted in various disciplines including sociology, political science, history, economics and communications. For example, The Central States Speech Journal (1980) recently devoted an entire volume to social movement articles. Studies of movements and protest transcend national boundaries as epitomized by the Conflict Research Group of the European Consortium for Political Research. This group (Webb et al., 1983) is developing New European perspectives based on a six-nation study of 180 protest groups over a 20-year period (1960-1980) using a resource mobilization perspective. The field of social movements is thriving and contributions are being made from diverse camps.

The purpose of this chapter is three fold: to review and evaluate theory and research on social movements; established whether a paradigmatic shift has occurred and if so how; and to identify several key unresolved theoretical problems and suggest promising lines that research should take to solve some of them.

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The availability of excellent review articles is one indication that a field is undergoing a renaissance. Review articles on movements from the perspectives of collective behavior (Marx and Wood 1975; Turner 1981; McPhail and Wohlstein 1983) deprivation approaches (Gurr 1980) and resource mobilization (Oberschall 1978; Jenkins 1983) have appeared recently. Our discussion is based on these and other published works and ten interviews with major formulators of collective behavior theory (eg. Ralph Turner, Lewis Killian, Neil Smelser, Kurt and Gladys Lang) and resource mobilization theory (eg. Charles Tilly, William Gamson, Anthony Oberschall, Mayer Zald, and John McCarthy).

The taped interviews lasted approximately an hour and fifteen minutes each. They address important issues including the theorists background, their participation in movements, the social and intellectual factors that shaped their theoretical approaches, whether they believe a paradigmatic shift has occurred and what they consider to be the outstanding unresolved theoretical problems. We will draw on these interviews throughout and they provide core data for our discussion of a paradigmatic shift. Before proceeding we need to address an important question—what is a social movement?

Conception of Social Movements

No definition of social movement enjoys a scholarly consensus and there probably will never be such a definition because definitions inevitably reflect the theoretical assumptions of the theorist. There are a number of competing frameworks in the field and each conceptualize movements differently. Even scholars within the same "school" define movements differently depending on their particular theoretical formulation. We will examine various conceptions of social movements advanced by the major schools and distinguish between conceptions within a school when they differ fundamentally. Thus we will explore conceptions of social movements embedded in Marxian, Weberian, collective behavior, mass society, relative deprivation and resource mobilization
Marx's View of Social Movements

Marx was primarily interested in the causes and dynamics of revolutionary movements aimed at dismantling the capitalist system. He argued that movements grow out of basic social and economic relations which establish the bases of power in a society. Thus, he focused attention on how capitalism generates the necessary conditions for a revolutionary reconstitution of capitalist societies.

Marx viewed revolutionary movements as both normal, and inevitable under capitalism, because capitalism contains and generates endemic structural contradictions. The main contradiction that inevitably leads to efforts geared toward structural change is the existence of two classes with mutually exclusive interests. Marx argued that as they were faced with falling rates of profit, the capitalists—"owners of the means of social production and employers of wage labour" (Marx and Engels, 1968:35)—would attempt to maintain their profits by increasing their rate of exploitation of workers because higher rates of exploitation mean higher rates of profit for them. Hence, it is in the interests of capitalists to exploit workers as much as possible; it is in the interests of workers to avoid as much exploitation as possible. These diametrically opposed interests produce inherent class antagonisms which culminate into a revolutionary conflict between workers and capitalists.

Workers -- the revolutionary class -- would engage in several stages of activity to resist further efforts of exploitation. Initially workers would constitute an incoherent mass in which individual workers experience self-estrangement and powerlessness. They would attack their machinery and set factories on fire. In the next stage, workers form trade unions against the bourgeoisie through which they demand higher wages, better working conditions, and other limited objectives while engaging in sporadic rioting and localized violence. Next, workers create national and international networks which link
them across localities enabling local struggles to take on national and international significance. In the next stage, workers organize themselves into a class for itself. At this time, legislatures begin recognizing the interest of workers, and internal differences among the bourgeoisie intensify. In the next stage, enlightened segments of the bourgeoisie join the ranks of the proletariat. And finally, the proletariat engages in successful revolution against the bourgeoisie, gain control over the means of production, do away with the bias of class antagonisms—private ownership of the means of production—and class conflict dissipates.

Marx's theory calls attention to a number of factors often overlooked by alternative theories of social movements. For example, he linked inequality and other properties of the society to the rise of revolutionary movements. He pointed out the centrality of interests, especially class interests. Thus, he made the case that participation in movements is rational, purposive activity. Marx also emphasized the necessity of internal organization and networkings. And finally, by showing how movements are products of the societies in which they arise, Marx showed that revolutionary movements are not abnormal occurrences unconnected to the larger society. Because of its focus on class, however, Marx's analysis may have limited explanatory power for social movements where other factors play prominent roles.

Weber's View

Weber's (1947, 1968) treatment of charismatic authority provides an overview of his conception of charismatic movements. He conceptualized the charismatic movement as a social change force, arguing that "within the sphere of its claims, charismatic authority repudiates the past and is in this sense a specifically revolutionary force" (1947:362). Furthermore, "in a revolutionary and sovereign manner, charismatic domination transforms all values and breaks all traditional and rational norms..." (1968:1115). For Weber, the struggle for power and change
are the main objectives of charismatic movements. Charismatic movements originate in social systems that are undergoing great stress and are unable to meet the needs of a significant number of people (Weber, 1968:1121). Charismatic leaders are paramount because their extraordinary personal qualities lead people in stressful situations to treat them as if they possess superhuman powers. The charismatic leader attracts followers because they identify with his divine mission believing that its realization translates into their own well being. Thus, the leader's personal magnetism and world view serve as the recruiting force that pulls people into the charismatic community where they establish an emotional and communalistic form of existence.

For Weber charismatic movements are nonroutine forms of collective action that emerge outside of preexisting social organizations, norms, and bureaucracies. Such movements are inherently unstable because the pure charismatic element provide them with resources and solidarity only during their early stages. Hence, Weber advanced a life cycle scheme arguing that if charismatic movements are to endure they must routinize their activities because of economic, administrative, and leadership succession problems they inevitably face. When routinization occurs, the charismatic movement establishes a sound organizational base and become integrated into the society.

Weber's analysis calls attention to 1) charismatic leadership, 2) belief systems, 3) social systems undergoing stress, 4) routinization of charismatic authority, and 5) the revolutionary nature of charismatic movements.

Collective Behavior View

Collective behavior theorists view social movements as noninstitutionalized social change efforts (Jenkins 1983;529). Thus, Blumer (1951:199) defined "social movements as collective enterprises to establish a new order of life "and maintained that in the beginning," a social movement is amorphous, poorly organized and without form." Lang and Lang (1961:490) defined the social
movement as "a large-scale, widespread, and continuing, elementary action in pursuit of an objective that effects and shapes the social order in some fundamental aspect." Finally, Turner and Killian [1972:246] define a social movement as:

"Collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist a change in the society or group of which it is a part. As a collectivity a movement is a group with indefinite and shifting membership and with leadership whose position is determined more by the informal response of the members than by formal procedures for legitimizing authority".

The "social movement" is the unit of analysis in these definitions. Turner (1981:3) wrote "the primary focus of interests for students of collective behavior is the social movement as a sociological phenomenon and as a form of collective behavior." Therefore, the movement in collective behavior approaches is conceptualized as a phenomenon sui generis with its own properties, processes, and internal logic.

In short, collective behaviorists view social movements as non-routine forms of collective action geared toward social change. They cannot be explained by prior social organization, norms, and culture because movements are emergent forms that acquire organization during their life cycles. Once such forms become institutionalized they cease to be objects of inquiry as social movements. The tasks then are to identify the origins of movements; investigate how they give rise to change; analyze the fluid processes, dynamics, life cycles of movements; and group movements into comprehensive classificatory schemes.

Mass Society View

Mass society theorists view social movements as phenomena which occur when previously unorganized individuals band together to change some part of their social milieu (e.g., Kornhauser, 1959; Arendt, 1951; Lipset, 1963; Hoffer, 1951; Cantril, 1941; King, 1956). Mass society definitions of movements are not vastly different from those of collective behaviorists. For example, King (1956:27) defines a social movement as "a group venture extending beyond a local community
or a single event and involving a systematic effort to inaugurate changes in thought, behavior, and social relationships," and Toch (1965:5) defines a social movement as "an effort by a large number of people to solve collectively a problem they feel they have in common."

Mass society theorists usually emphasize the characteristics of "mass societies" which make movements possible: cultural confusion, social heterogeneity, weak cultural integration mechanisms, and a lack of attachments to secondary group structures. Thus, they are less likely than collective behaviorists to examine movements directly. Instead, they analyze the properties of societies, specify the "personality traits" and psychological states which those societies produce, and explain how these factors generate movements. Their conception of social movements calls attention to the interface between social structure and personality.

Relative Deprivation View

Unlike collective behaviorists and mass society theorists, relative deprivation proponents have not focused attention on social movements, per se. Rather, they study episodes of political violence and revolution; thus their interest are more limited than collective behaviorists and mass society theorists.

Gurr (1970:3-4), a leading proponent of relative deprivation, states that his research is concerned with political violence — "all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors... or its policies." He further elaborates on the forms of political violence with which he is concerned:

Turmoil: Relatively spontaneous, unorganized political violence with substantial popular participation, including violent political strikes, riots, political clashes, and localized rebellions.

Conspiracy: Highly organized political violence with limited participation, including organized political assassinations, small-scale terrorism, small-scale guerrilla wars, coups d'etat. and
mutinies.

Internal war: Highly organized political violence with widespread popular participation, designed to overthrow the regime or dissolve the state and accompanied by extensive violence, including large-scale terrorism and guerrilla wars, civil wars, and revolutions (p.11).

Thus, most behaviors discussed in relative deprivation literature qualify as "social movement" activity and will be included in this review. Moreover, theorists using the relative deprivation framework have also analyzed social movements (e.g., Pettigrew, 1964). Because relative deprivation perspectives focus on the genesis of political violence instead of social movements, per se, there are two points to keep in mind: relative deprivationists examine the genesis of political violence but do not focus on the dynamics of such violence; and they focus on political violence, while not analyzing other forms of political protest.

Resource Mobilization View

Resource mobilization approaches have produced different conceptions than those reviewed above and substantially different conceptions of movements exist within the school. To capture the external and internal differences we will examine the approaches of McCarthy-Zald and Tilly.

McCarthy and Zald have formulated an organizational-entrepreneurial model of social movements. In their view, [1977:1217-18], "a social movement is a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society." This definition excludes both organizational factors and the struggle for power. Indeed, the definition implies that latent movements are forever present in societies because no society lack individuals who possess preferences for change. In McCarthy and Zald's logic social movements are nothing more than preference structures directed toward social change (1977:1218).

For McCarthy-Zald the social movement can serve as one unit of analysis
because analysts may investigate "who holds the beliefs" and/or "how intensely are they held?" But different units of analyses are needed to explain open conflict, mobilization, or outcomes of collective action. To understand those issues the unit of analysis shifts to movement organizations, industries, sectors, and entrepreneurs. Later it will be clear that McCarthy-Zald utilize these additional units of analysis when they investigate the dynamics between these various groups and preference structures for changes. Their definition of movements, however, differs sharply from previous ones by explicitly excluding actual conflict, mobilization, and social change activities.

Charles Tilly (1973) advances a "political process" view of movements arguing that collective action derives from a population's central political processes. Tilly (1979:12) defines a social movement as:

"A sustained series of interactions between national powerholders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly-visible demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those demands with public demonstrations of support."

For Tilly the focus is sustained interactions rather than the "social movement" as a phenomenon sui generis. Tilly (1978:49) breaks from previous definitions by refusing to treat the social movement as the unit of analysis, arguing instead that a movement is not a group that emerges and transforms over time.

Tilly roots the concept of 'social movement' in historical time and space. The social movement is argued to be a nineteenth-century creation generated by the nationalization of politics and the rise of special purpose associations. During that century political parties, unions, and other associations became the chief vehicles through which groups struggled for power and institutionalized their interests. Still large groups remained disenfranchised without their interests routinely satisfied through elections and labor-management negotiations? Tilly argues that these people constitute social movements and like their institutionalized counterparts, they struggle for national power
through special purpose associations. What distinguishes social movements from their institutionalized counterparts is their political situation which causes them to rely heavily on a repertoire of disorderly tactics such as strikes, demonstrations, violence and protest meetings to accomplish political ends.

Nevertheless, social movements and formal political parties are mirror images because both are political actors pursuing power. In short, both set of actors are propelled by the same political process wherein the social movement is a party with broad aspirations and a unifying belief system and the political party is a tamed, nationalized social movement (Tilly 1979:11).

Tilly paints two views of a movement: that of national power structures and that of movement participants. Social movements from the "perspective of national power structures... are coherent phenomena; they exist so long as they offer a challenge to dominant interests and beliefs." But "seen from the bottom up,... [social movements]... are usually much more fragmented and heterogeneous: shifting factions, temporary alliances, diverse interests, a continuous flux of members and hangers on" (Tilly 1979:19). The task of the analyst therefore, has three prongs: 1) investigate the response of power holders to social movements, especially their ability to protect their interests through repression, forming coalitions, bargaining, and cooptation 2) investigate the dynamics through which movement actors advance their interests by creating the illusion of unity, mobilizing large numbers of supporters, and making strategic choices and 3) combine these two perspectives into a dynamic analysis of collective action The next section focuses on the conceptual frameworks in which these conceptions are embedded.

Classical Models: Collective Behavior, Deprivation, and Mass Society

Classical models differ in their approaches to social movements. Our strategy is to explore the common premise underlying classical models while highlighting their important differences. In our view, classical models explain
the origins, development, and outcomes of social movements by focusing attention on 1) structural breakdown that leads to noninstitutionalized social change efforts 2) psychological states of movements participants and 3) the role shared beliefs play in guiding movements.

Classical theorists occasionally refer to the role that prior social organization and strategic choices play in movements. However these are not central variables and do not constitute the central message of the classical approach. Following Patinkin (1983:314) the central message of a theory can be identified because it is announced early in the work (and frequently in its title) and by repetition, either verbatim or modified in accordance with the circumstances (1983:14). Our discussions of classical models are concerned with their central messages regarding origin, development, and outcome of movements.

Chicago School of Collective Behavior

The Chicago School of collective behavior was the dominant approach to social movements until the early 1970s. Among its numerous proponents are Park and Burgess (1921), Blumer (1951), Turner and Killian (1957, 1972), Lang and Lang (1961). The collective behavior approach is social psychological in orientation rooted in symbolic interaction theory (Turner 1981:6). Thus social structures have no existence independent of subjective meanings actors attach to them. Symbolic interactionists focus on the processes by which actors continuously construct meanings through social interactions, which provide the basis for human action. They argue that human behavior cannot be understood with grand theories and positivist methodologies (Coser 1977:575). Rather, it is to be grasped through careful descriptions and synthesizing concepts which capture the "crucial processes by which actors endow the forces acting upon them as well as their own behavior with meaning" (Ritzer 1983:301).

For Chicago theorists social order is tenuous and always evolving and changing. Nevertheless, they argued that everyday conventional behavior is guided
by prior social organization and culture, while collective behavior is not. Collective behavior analyses began with the assumption that societies consist of two coherent realms -- institutionalized behavior and collective behavior. Building on Park and Burgess; Blumer provided the guiding conception of collective behavior; it "is not based on the adherence to common understandings or rules" (1951:171), rather, it is behavior "formed or forged to meet undefined or unstructured situations" (1957:130). The central message of the Chicago School is that "collective behavior occurs when the established organization ceases to afford direction and supply channels for action" (Turner & Killian 1972:30). Therefore, collective behavior arises under some form of structural breakdown -- dramatic event, migration, natural disaster, urbanization, rapid social change, etc. -- that leads to noninstitutionalized efforts aimed at reconstituting ruptured social structures. This distinction between institutionalized and collective behavior leads Chicago theorists to argue for a special sociology with its own theoretical principles to explain collective behavior.

Social movements are one form of collective behavior. Other forms include panics, mobs, riots, fads, sects, cults, religious revivals, and revolutions. For collective behaviorists, an inner logic permeates these forms and bind them into a coherent family. The logic consists of unstructured situations in which social organization and meaning systems no longer provide a basis for social action.

Chicago theorists focus on how people in collective behavior situations act collectively in the absence of guiding cultural definitions and social organization. They investigate the cognitive processes by which actors formulate a new basis for action when confronting unstructured situations. Thus, collective behaviorists "have tended to work from the inside out, that is, looking at people and working from there" (Turner, 1983). Killian (1983) captured the puzzle collective behavior is thought to give rise to: "the
situation becomes unstructured, the people don't have their usual sources of information and then they know something is wrong, but they don't have any clear guidelines as to what. They have got to start reconstructing a picture of reality to enable them to act”.

The emergence and development of a movement is, therefore, contingent on actors formulating a shared understanding which makes collective action possible. Chicago theorists (Park and Burgess, 1921; Blumer, 1951; Lang and Lang, 1961) have argued that crude, nonrational, psychological communicaton processes form the new basis for collective action. Drawing from crowd psychologists (e.g., Le Bon, 1960; Tarde, 1903; Sighele, 1898), they posited that contagion, circular reaction, imitation, suggestibility, and convergence constitute the mechanisms through which actors reconstitute ruptured social structures. Under such influences actors are often portrayed as releasing frustrations, insecurities, alienation and inner tensions. In a characteristic statement Blumer (1951:171) wrote:

"Externally, the activity is likely to be erratic, lacking in consistency, and rather similar to a sort of indefinite prowling; internally, it is likely to take the form of disordered imagination and disturbed feelings. In its most acute form it is characteristic of neurotic behavior." 

In this view movements, especially in their early stages, are characterized by spontaneity, emotionality and non rational behavior.

Turner and Killian (1957, 1972) rejected the view that collective behavior is irrational and emotional. Following Park and Burgess and Blumer, Turner and Killian attempted to account for the new definition enabling people to act collectively when the structure breaks. However, they differed by arguing that collective behavior is guided by a property of social structure— an emergent norm. Such a norm provides "a common understanding as to what sort of behavior is expected in the situation", and it can explain why people with a great variety of motives came to act collectively (Turner and Killian 1972:22). Accepting the
view that collective behavior occurs in unstructured situations, they argue that "since the norm is to some degree specific to the situation, differing in degree or in kind from the norms governing noncrowd situations, it is an emergent norm" (p. 22). The new or revised or reapplied norm that guides social movements creates a sense of injustice and provide a "vital sense that some established practice or mode of thought is wrong and ought to be replaced" (Turner and Killian 1972:259).

The emergent norm approach suggests that movements are not fundamentally different from organized behavior. Nevertheless, Turner and Killian do not explicitly link movements with prior social organizations, and ongoing power struggles. Thus Killian (1964:427) wrote that social movements "is not the study of stable groups or established institutions, but of groups and institutions in the process of becoming." Moreover, the emergent norm approach accepts the idea that crude communication processes are central to movements because the norm develop through a process of rumor which "is the characteristic mode of communication in collective behavior" (1972:32).

Chicago theorists argue that organization and tactics are important in the growth and spread of movements. However, these factors are not central because they take a back seat to spontaneity, construction of meaning frames and social psychological processes. Thus Lang and Lang (1961:497) argue that movements are largely spontaneous and characterized by contagion but co-ordinated by core groups. The organized core group crystalizes the vague unrest of the movement, but even here the role of the core group in a movement is never planned (1961:493). The assumption of an uneasy fit between movements and organization is so entrenched in classical approaches that Heberle (1951:8), who pays considerable attention to organizational factors, concludes that "movements as such are not organized groups" and he distinguishes movements from political parties arguing that the latter is formally organized (1951:19). For Blumer
social movements do not come into existence with structure and organization already established. Instead, he argues, organization and culture develop in the course of the movement's career. This formulation ties organization to a movement's development but rules organization out as a casual factor in the genesis of movement.

The emergent norm approach does not come to grips with the role of organization in movements. Turner and Killian maintain "movements are in a state of flux, their character changing from day to day." (1972:252). The emergent norm itself... matures and crystallizes with the development of the movement. Turner and Killian argue (1972:247) that effective organization is crucial in sustaining movements but provide no explanatory framework to assess and analyze organizational factors. In short collective behavior theory is geared to the central message that movements break from pre-existing organization and that movement organizations are always in a state of emerging and becoming. Hence, this perspective "is decreasingly applicable to movements as they become formalized and institutionalized" (Turner, 1981:8). Additionally, collective behavior theory provides little insight into the casual connections between movement emergences and prior social organization.

Collective behaviorists have not provided theoretically specific statements of movement outcomes. Pointing to this gap, Marx and Wood (1975:403) concluded "...most statements about the consequences of social movements are primarily descriptive or taxonomic." The view that movements progress through stages is the most widely used descriptive account collective behaviorists have produced to assess outcomes. This natural history approach (Dawson and Gettys, 1929; and Hopper, 1950) maintains that successful movements pass sequentially through the preliminary stage of social unrest to the popular stage, formal organization stage, and finally, the institutional stage. Summarizing this strategy Turner & Killian (1972:254) wrote it "permit us to discover the additional conditions that
have to be present if a movement is to proceed from any given stage to the next.”

Thus, it can provide explanations “for movements that make impressive beginnings and then fail and for movements that have weak beginnings and suddenly burst into rapid development” (1972:254). However, as Turner and Killian note, the natural history approach has serious limitations because the variety of social movements do not lend themselves to typical sequences and it is difficult to predict when movements may move backward, forward, or skip stages.

The influence of symbolic interactions lead collective behaviorists to stress the fluidity and changing character of movements. According to Turner (1981:5) “collective behaviorists see goals arising, evolving, and constantly changing through the interplay of collective definition among movement adherents and public opinion.” Thus, “...the complex and volatile nature of movements makes assessments of success and failure difficult, and collective behaviorists often find it more meaningful to develop theory concerning process than concerning movement success” (1981:5). But symbolic interaction imagery is misleading because movements often pursue stable goals such as the Civil Rights movement which did not swerve from the goals of desegregating public facilities and enfranchising Southern Blacks. Nor did the antiwar movement swerve from its goal of ending the Viet Nam war. A fruitful theory of movements outcomes must account for the conditions under which movements fail or succeed to accomplish stable goals and the conditions under which goals become unstable and change overtime.

Thus the collective behavior perspective has directed attention from assessing movement outcomes because it often view movements and activists as creative victims of fluidity and evolving realities rather than as controllers of those processes. Tilly (1983) had this in mind when he concluded:

"The idea that people are making some kind of a tactical choice itself, even if that is an implicit choice, is a liberation...There has been alot of complaint in the literature recently about the weakness of our
statements about outcomes. Why didn't we make that complaint for fifty years before? It is because we had a framework that didn't require it. In fact, even blocked us from thinking of these events as having outcomes..."

Smesler and the Structural Approach to Collective Behavior

Neil Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior (1962) was a landmark in the field. Yet, Chicago theorists (e.g. Killian, Turner, Lang and Lang) argue that Smelser's work does not reflect the collective behavior tradition. Turner (1983) stated:

"what I want to say is that that view [Smelser's] is not from the collective behavior viewpoint...they [critics] accepted that [Smelser's work] as the definition of what the collective behavior tradition is and I would suggest that they look back at the real collective behavior tradition."

Smelser broke from the Chicago School in two ways. First, his aim was to analyze collective behavior with a distinctively sociological approach (1962:1X) and he explicitly rejected the claim that collective behavior and conventional behavior constitute separate coherent realms of reality. He argued it is "possible to use the same theoretical framework to analyze both conventional and collective behavior" (1962:23). Second, Smelser's theoretical framework and style differed from the Chicago approach. Smelser's utilized grand theory to arrive at a theoretical synthesis of collective behavior by explaining these phenomena with Parsonian structural/functionalism. He was interested in identifying the specific structural conditions that make it possible to predict and explain the occurrence of specific forms of collective behavior.

The Chicago School maintains that such a goal cannot be accomplished. Killian (1983) stated: "I think its dangerous...to develop grand theory...some people think you should not do it prematurely. I think that anytime in sociology it is premature." At bottom these different theoretical outlooks stem from the debate between Chicago symbolic interactionists and structural functionalists during the 1950s. The latter viewed society as a functionally integrated system
resting on a value consensus. Whereas the Chicago School "followed...Robert
Park's view of society as... a loose system of accomodation not a functionally
integrated system...[for] Park... conflict and competition [are] the fundamental
processes [Turner, 1983]. In short Smelser rejected the idea that collective
behavior has unique characteristics that must be explained by a special branch of
sociology, and he adopted a structural functionalist approach to collective
behavior.

For Smelser collective behavior can be explained and predicted with his six
variables value-added model. That model maintains that the interaction between
structural conduciveness, strain, generalized belief, precipitating factor,
mobilization, and social control produces collective behavior episodes.

In Smelser's treatment only conduciveness, strain, and social control were
explicitly structural (Smelser 1983). Conductivness refers to the extent that
structural characteristics permit or encourage collective behavior. Social
control refers to how authorities encourage, prevent, interrupt, deflect, or
inhibit collective behavior. The "strain" variable is most prominent because it
links Smelser's analysis to Parson's structural/functionalist framework. Smelser
(1962:47) defines strain "as an impairment of the relations among and
consequently inadequate functioning of the components of social action. Those
four components of social action are: values, norms, mobilization into organized
roles, and situational facilities (1962:24-34). Thus Smelser focuses on
"structural strain" rather than individual strain. Hence, there is "value
strain", "normative strain", "mobilization strain" and "facilities strain". In
Parson's terms such strain occurs when the components of an integrated social
system becomes malintegrated. In Smelserian terms this is the strain that "must
be present if an episode of collective behavior is to occur." (1962:48).

Mobilization for Smelser is the process by which participants are mobilized
for action. Similar to Chicago theorists, Smelser argued that movements proceed
through stages and that pre-existing or newly created organizations facilitate the growth and spread of movements after they emerge. Smelser distinguished between the mobilizing role of preexisting and newly created organizations (1962:276), but his central message was that strain and generalized beliefs were the driving forces of movements while organizations and leaders facilitated the process after being drawn in. In his words, "I felt that the mobilization dimension in my own book was rather undeveloped. It was kind of acknowledged to be an important variable but it was not developed."

Smelser's social control variable focused almost exclusively on how authorities block or prevent collective behavior. His basic message was that if authorities vacillate, appear weak, or refuse to use necessary force they facilitate the growth and spread of movements (1962:73, 261-266). After serving as chief negotiator for Berkeley's administration during the Free Speech movement, Smelser realized the limitation of stressing only repressive and permissive dimensions of social control agents; "what I came to define as much more important was the negotiation between the authorities and movement leaders...If I were to rewrite that section on social control, I would make it more of a two way business" (Smelser, 1983).

Smelser's approach shares basic premises with the Chicago School. The first link between the two is a common definition of collective behavior. Following Blumer Smelser writes, "collective behavior... is not institutionalized behavior. According to the degree to which it becomes institutionalized, it loses its distinctive character. It is behavior 'formed or forged to meet undefined or unstructured situations" (1962:8-9). Smelser argued that conventional and collective behavior could be explained with a common theory, but follows the Chicago School by viewing movements as noninstitutionalized behavior geared toward repairing a ruptured social structure.

The second link between the two approaches is the common argument that
collective behavior forms -- panics, fashion cycles, revivals, riots, movements and revolutions -- constitute coherent phenomena explainable with a single theory. Like the Chicago School, Smelser fails to confront the idea of whether substantial theoretical differences exist between the various forms so as to warrant different theoretical explanations. That is, can the same theoretic logic be used to explain both revolutions and the hula hoop phenomenon?

The third crucial link between Smelser and Chicago theorists is the view that a special cognitive definition provides the basis for collective action in unstructured situations. Thus Smelser (1968:8) defined collective behavior as "mobilization on the basis of a belief which redefines social action". A central role is attributed to the "generalized belief" because "collective behavior is guided by various kinds of beliefs..." and it is the basis for uninstitutionalized mobilization as well as the criterion by which collective behavior forms can be distinguished. The generalized belief serves the same function as Blumer's "circular reaction", Lang and Lang's "collective redefinition" and Tuner and Killian's "emergent norm": it provides the shared definition that enable people to act collectively in the task of reconstituting a ruptured social structure.

However, the generalized belief differ from collective behavior accounts stressing rationality, especially Turner's emergent norm approach. For Smelser (1962:72) the generalized "belief differ... from those which guide other types of behavior. They involve a belief in the existence of extraordinary forces... which are at work in the universe... the beliefs on which collective behavior is based... are thus askin to magical beliefs." Moreover, "adherents to such movements exaggerate reality because their action is based on beliefs which are both generalized and short-circuited" (1962:72). This stress on non-rational beliefs lead some Chicago theorists to reject Smelser's formulation because it brings Le Bon and related accounts of irrationality back to center stage.
Moreover it does matter whether rationality or irrationality is stressed. For example, Tilly (1983) distinguished Turner and Killian's approach from Smelser's: "You don't really have the Smelserian cycle of irrational response to strain. What you have is people who are creatively trying to reconstruct reality...It has people trying to reorganizing reality so that it makes sense and constitute a basis for action." Similarly, in Park's (1928) view structural breakdown may free individuals enabling them to become emancipated, enlightened and cosmopolitan. Yet, Smelser's stress on nonrational processes is not incongruent with most accounts of the Chicago School. In his words "I suppose... I did not deny that processes like suggestions, ... milling, and contagion took place." Rather, Smelser's objective was to "improve our theory about understanding these processes by seeing when and under what [structural] conditions they take place."

Smelser's central message that collective behavior is non-institutionalized, guided by and mobilized on the basis of a cognitive belief and occurs under strain and breakdown links him with the Chicago School. This message restricted his structural analysis and prevented him from moving the field into mainstream sociology. Yet, the thrust of criticisms leveled at Smelser's formulation did not stress structural features. Why then did Smelser's approach receive disproportionate attention and foreshadow theoretical breakthroughs?

Our interview data revealed possible answers. Ralph Turner (1983) advanced an "intellectual snobbery" explanation arguing that critics "are snobs when they look toward Harvard in the East Coast [and that] may account to the fact that they then accepted that [Smelser] as the definition of what collective behavior is and what the collective behavior tradition is." Tilly's (1983) reflections suggest Smelser's style of theorizing may account for the attention:

In a way the other collective behavior people got a hum rap from Smelser. Because Smelser did a far more elegant job of synthesizing the literature than any of them had ever done. Even though his basis for synthesis was one that they would reject. [Smelser gave] dignity to what had previously seem to be a marginal phenomenon.
Finally, Gamson (1983) concluded that the attention Smelser received is linked to the academic reward system:

What is going on is that Smelser is getting this focus and attention because he's a student of Parsons... [and] because of its [structural/functionalism] influences and centrality that's what one confronts. There is more points to overthrowing Smelser than Lang and Lang. I think the point of how you score points in academia is valid in a lot of ways.

Whatever the reasons for the one-sided attention, it directs the focus from versions of collective behavior theory that may contain useful ideas about social movements.

Smelser's analysis foreshadowed breakthroughs because it included mobilization and social control as central variables and argued against the need for a special field to study collective behavior. Two resource mobilization scholars -- Oberschall and Gamson -- were critical of the thrust of Smelser's analysis but concluded that its structural aspects were steps in the right direction. According to Oberschall (1983), "Smelser said some rather interesting things about social control, mobilization, structural conduciveness... certain pages there about social control, mobilization, and structural conduciveness are useful." Gamson (1983) maintained, "I thought Smelser's theory of collective behavior was really a big step forward and I still think that way. It had a couple features that were different from the traditional collective behavior approach... It tried to integrate it [collective behavior] into a more general theory [and] it didn't have so sharp a separation [between] normal institutionalized behavior... and "crazy" behavior... [and] it began to suggest... an interaction [between] social control strategies of authorities and the outcomes of collective behavior." Later we will examine resource mobilization analyses and its focus on structural variables. Presently we will address mass society and deprivation theories of movement.
Mass Society and Relative Deprivation Approaches

The mass society perspective, another variant of the classical model, shares some similarity with collective behavior approaches and draws from similar intellectual roots (e.g., LeBon, 1960; Tarde, 1903; Sighele, 1899; and Durkheim, 1933). Recent proponents include Hopper (1950), Hoffer (1951), Kornhauser (1959), Lipset (1963), King (1956) and Arendt (1951).

Mass society theorists (e.g., Kornhauser, 1959) argue that "mass societies" are characterized by detachment and isolation. In contrast to pluralist and well-integrated societies, mass societies lack strong networks of secondary groups which cross check their members and lead them to be selective in their political participation. Mass societies have few structures which facilitate attachments between elites and masses that usually serve to moderate demands made on elites. These societies have relatively few secondary groups which socialize citizens to accept their lot and compromise rather than raise challenges. Moreover, such societies have a shortage of intermediate groups to penalize individuals for engaging in illegitimate means to attain their (often fanatical) goals. Finally, because the levels of group memberships are so low, high levels of alienation and anxiety are pervasive and the detached members of these societies are inclined toward extremist activities.

Proponents argue that, given these characteristics, contemporary mass societies cannot effectively prevent people from participating in mass movements during periods of rapid change. Thus, religious groups, political parties, community organizations, trade unions, and voluntary associations which ordinarily restrain antisocial behaviors breakdown and become ineffective. Primary group attachments become increasingly weaker, and atomization of the individual occurs. It is the inability of mass societies to integrate and restrain people during periods of rapid change, then, that
is the underlying source of mass social movements and other non-routine collective action.

Hence, movements grow and spread because numerous individuals become detached and susceptible to proselytization and suggestibility (e.g., Hoffer, 1951). Mass society theorists usually view movement participants as fanatical, irrational, malintegrated, alienated, and even psychopathological. Thus, participants are interchangeable from movement to movement; i.e., they are discussed as "rebels without a cause" who are as likely to participate in radical movements as reactionary ones (e.g., Hoffer, 1951; and Hopper, 1950). Again, movements proliferate when societal institutions are unable to serve their integrative functions in light of rapidly changing conditions: the more anomie the conditions, the more likely movements of all types will flourish.

Organizations, in this view, play a conservative role because they are integrating mechanisms which hinder rather than promote movements. As movements evolve, successful ones eventually become organizations. However, organization is not a prior nor concomitant facilitative conditions in the development of movements. In general, mass society theorists ignore movement dynamics and like collective behaviorists, they have relied on life cycle and natural history explanations to account for movement processes and outcomes.

A final variant of the classical model is the relative deprivation perspective which can be traced to such theorists as Mosca (1939), Pareto (1935), and Durkheim (1933). Recent proponents include Gurr (1968; 1970; 1973), Runciman (1966), Huntington (1968), Davies (1962), Pettigrew (1964), and Crosby (1976). This approach focuses on the relationship between social conditions, perceptions of those conditions, and behaviors resulting from those perceptions. In most versions (e.g., Gurr, 1970; Davies, 1971;
and Crosby 1976), proponents offer frustration-anger-aggression explanations. They argue that when people perceive great discrepancies between the power and privileges they possess and the amount they ought to possess, they become frustrated, angered, and subsequently participate in movements and protest to offset feelings of deprivation.

Relative deprivation theorists differ over the sources of felt deprivation and over the forms of deprivation (e.g., progressive/J-curve, aspiration/v-curve, decremental, and egotistical) that are important in predicting protest. Nevertheless, they agree that changes in felt deprivation result from rapid social changes which cause incongruencies between what people expect and what the society delivers. Rapid changes which generate relative deprivation include socioeconomic changes (e.g., depressions or economic booms (e.g., Olson, 1963), industrialization (e.g., Feierabend et al., 1969), urbanization (e.g., Hibbs, 1973), political modernization (e.g., Huntington, 1968), and increased exposure to mass media and education (e.g., Parvin, 1973).

Therefore, it is important to examine unusually rapid and dramatic changes because they lead to: (1) changes in expectations; (2) frustrations about discrepancies between expectations and outcomes; (3) political anger resulting from frustrations; and (4) politicized anger which finds expression through participation in movements and protest. In short, periods of rapid change followed by changes in expectations give rise to social movements.

Relative deprivation theories do not claim that participants differ from nonparticipants, (i.e., participants are not alienated rebels without a cause); rather, participants find themselves in different circumstances which cause them to act differently. Nevertheless, relative deprivation shares with mass society theories the claim that movement and protest
activity: (1) is a result of the structural strain of rapid changes in societies, (2) is preceded by changes in the psychological state of those who participate, (3) is guided by emotional rather than meaningful tactical considerations, (4) is relatively rare and short-lived, (5) is abnormal because it is not structurally defined by the normal operation of institutions, and (6) is inherently different from institutional activity.

Because these theorists focus on macro changes and subsequent psychological changes in individuals, they have paid little attention to the "nuts and bolts" of social movements. They have not explained how participants coalesce, nor how activities spread between locales. Rather, collective action is treated as the result of aggregates of individuals who engage in similar forms of protest at the same time. Moreover, because episodes of collective action are treated as independent, unrelated events, they are not related to each other or to larger social movements. Finally, like other classical models, this perspective has not illuminated movement outcomes.

Relative deprivation approaches have been criticized methodologically and substantively. One problems stems from using aggregate indicators to make inferences about psychological states of participants. Second, no direct evidence has been produced on the actual feelings of participants prior to protest participation (see for example, Orum, 1978; Oberschall, 1978; Tilly, 1978; and Marx and Wood, 1975). Furthermore, critics have questioned how the analyst knows a priori what determines which comparison groups or equity norms a person will select in deciding whether he is relatively deprived. Third, because these approaches explain the genesis of movements on the basis of individual deprivation, they have not elaborated the process by which the relatively deprived come to act collectively. Finally, critics point to occasions in which rapid changes occur, but no
protest emerges, or when protest occurs in the absence of rapid change. Thus, critical problems remain for relative deprivation theories of social movements and political protest. We turn now to resource mobilization formulations which challenge the classical approach.

**Resource Mobilization Models: Rational Action, Organizational-Entrepreneurial and Political Process**

The recently formulated resource mobilization approach has become central in the analysis of social movements and collective action. It has produced models that challenge the classical approach. As with classical approaches these models differ in emphases and explanations. Yet they share the following central message: there are no fundamental differences between movement behavior and institutionalized behavior; movement participants and their actions are rational; social movements pursue interests; movement mobilization occurs through an infrastructure or power base; outcomes of collective action are central, and they are products of strategic choices made by participants; either support or repression by elite groups affects the outcomes of movements.

Components of the central message are by no means shared equally by all resource mobilization models. By treating the models separately we will examine how each explain the origins, development, and outcomes of movements.

**Rational Action Approach**

In marked contrast to the view that movement and protest activities are motivated by irrational impulses, the rational approach argues that movement participation is guided by utilitarian cost-benefit calculations. This approach is akin to formulations by Mill (1950) and other utilitarians (e.g., Smith, 1910; Bentham, 1789) which explain collective action in strictly self-interested individualistic terms. Such analyses are
ultimately reducible to choice which *individuals* make while pursuing some goal which they share with others. Thus, in its "pure" form, the rational action approach explains movements and collective action as consequences of rational choices made by individuals in pursuit of goals which could not be achieved as efficiently through other means.

Rational action proponents differ in the degree to which they relax the claim that utilitarian logic explains protest and movement activity. Some give prominence to utilitarian logic in their models and argue that self-interests are sufficient for explaining virtually all aspects of collective action (e.g., Granovetter, 1978; and Olson, 1965). For others the assumption that movement participants are rational is just one part of a more general approach which gives far more weight to group, organizational, strategic, and political considerations (e.g., McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tilly, 1978; Gamson, 1975; and Oberschall, 1973). Nevertheless, there is agreement "that the lower the risks and the higher the rewards for an individual and members of a group or social stratum, i.e., the lower [the] risk/reward ratio, the more likely are they to become participants in a social movement of opposition, of protest, or of rebellion" (Oberschall, 1973:162).

Rational actionists reject the idea that movements result from system breakdowns, relative deprivation, irrational motivations, and rises in the levels of grievances. Instead, movements occur because individuals and groups resort to participation in movement activity to realize their interests. The McCarthy-Zald (1973:1215) version argues that, given enough power and resources, "grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations" which reinforce major interest cleavages in the society. In other words, social movement activity can be (and on occasion is) manufactured and generated by those with vested
interests in the occurrence of such activity.

Similarly, rational action proponents argue that participation in social movement and protest activity is based on a cost-benefit calculus: A person will participate when the perceived benefits of doing so exceed the perceived costs. Granovetter (1978:1422), posits a "threshold model" of collective action in which he defines one's threshold as "the proportion of the group [one] would have to see join [in a collective action] before he would do so." For Granovetter, a person will participate in collective behavior only when a sufficient number of others participates such that the risks of participation become reduced to the point where net benefits exceed net costs. He argues that because each individual is activated into collective action only when his particular threshold is exceeded, the key to understanding the spread of collective action is the frequency distribution of thresholds, not the average preference for collective action. Thus, collective action occurs when thresholds are distributed in a manner such that "contagion" can occur. When lower level thresholds are absent from a distribution, higher level thresholds will not be triggered, making the spread of collective action impossible.

Granovetter's formulation has several limitations. His approach explicitly assumes that collective action participants are "rational actors with complete information" (p. 1433, emphasis added) who always act to maximize their utility. An obvious shortcoming of such assumptions is that they draw attention from behavior which do not fit economic, means-ends or risk-reward schemes in which individuals are all-knowing. Another deficiency is the omission of an explanation of how and why actors come to be in the same location at the same time. Furthermore, it claims that "all crowds are simple random samples from the population at risk" (p. 1431) and thus, it erroneously assumes that crowds that are socially and
demographically different will, nevertheless, have similar (normally distributed) threshold distributions. A related problem is the model's lack of method for determining individuals thresholds a priori, and thus, after-the-fact thresholds can be invoked to explain collective participation. Finally, no explanation of why collective action ceases once everyone's threshold has been activated is provided.

In contrast to Granovetter's arguments concerning mobilizing participants for collective action when the number of participants is too small, Olson (1965) points to the difficulties involved once the pool of potential participants is sufficiently large and the goal at hand is not a tangible product which can be divided up only among those who participate. Olson argues that it is not rational for a person to contribute to or participate in collective action when (1) the contribution of no one person will make a significant difference to the group or any of its members, and (2) all members will receive the same collective goods regardless of their level of participation; therefore, only the provision of "selective incentives" -- distinct, divisible benefits (or costs) -- will provide a solution to this "free-rider" problem. Thus, given Granovetter's and Olson's claims, it becomes difficult for people to participate in movements without receiving selective incentives. In the early stages, not enough people have become involved to make participation cost-effective for an individual; similarly, when the number of people who could make contributions is so great that an additional participant would not make a noticeable difference, participation is not cost-effective, especially for an individual who will receive access to collective goods any way.

Nevertheless, participation in the absence of selective incentives does occur (Marwell and Ames, 1979), and social movements do grow and spread. Rational actionists who relax the assumption that strict, individual
self-interest and utilitarianism are of paramount importance explain collective action by arguing that "collective interests" exist which have varying degrees of conflict with individual interests (Tilly, 1978), by pointing to "collective incentives" (Jenkins, 1982), and by calling attention to "bloc recruitment" of preexisting solidary groups (Oherschall, 1973). Rational action theorists who do not relax the assumption of strict individual interest (e.g., Granovetter, 1978; and Olson, 1965) are silent on the issue of increases in participation without increases in rewards to risks ratios.

Rational action theorists who discuss outcomes of social movements and collective action have done so with (at least) three slightly different emphases: McCarthy and Zald (1977) focus on movement organizations' choices of support bases as being critical to understanding their successes and failures. For them, the selection of a support base is a strategic task which has implications for the amount of resources which can be aggregated, the ranking of priorities and goals, the range of tactics which can be used, and the relation of the movement to authorities and other parties. All of these factors, in turn, affect the success of social movement organizations in realizing their preferences. In a similar vein, Tilly (1978) focuses on groups' "repertoires of contention" as one key in explaining outcomes of collective action. He argues that "actors approach defined objectives with strategy and tactics..." but actions and outcomes "cannot be explained by looking at the challenging groups alone...they result from the interplay of interests, organization, and mobilization, on the one side, and on repression/facilitation, power, and opportunity/threat, on the other" (p.138). Given these factors, participants decide which actions will be least costly but effective in the accomplishment of objectives. To the extent that these actors are correct, collective action episodes have higher
probabilities of success. Finally, Oherschall (1978) maintains that those involved in confrontations have three options which affect their outcomes: (1) They can submit to their adversaries and abandon their cause, (2) they can make a conciliatory move, or (3) they can make a coercive move. He posits that each point in the confrontation, those involved will choose the alternative which maximizes their expected benefits. Thus, outcomes, too, are determined by cost-benefit analyses.

In sum, rational action approaches explicitly reject the notion that movement activities are motivated by irrational impulses. Instead, they argue that a movement's genesis, participants, dynamics, and outcomes can all be understood by examining the rational choices of individuals in pursuit of goals. In their pure form, however, they are virtually incapable of explaining occurrences which are not consistent with the notion of individual self-interests. Hence, those who use rational action formulations have had to look to other factors to accommodate such occurrences.

Organizational-Entrepreneurial Approach

McCarthy-Zald's organizational-entrepreneurial model has become one central focus within the resource mobilization approach. This model has received attention because it seeks to explain modern American movements. Indeed, the model argues that these movements are best conceptualized as professional movements relying on the affluent middle class for funds, entrepreneurial leadership, and professional movement organizations. Moreover, this model has stimulated research by non sociologists including political scientists (Walker 1983) interested in the rise and fall of interest groups and comparative analysts (e.g. Tarrow, n.d.) interested in movements across western societies.

McCarthy-Zald's model can be traced to three intellectual antecedents:
organizational sociology, political science interest group theory, and micro
economics. McCarthy and Zald's heavy stress on formal movements
organizations derive from classical organizational studies including Weber

McCarthy-Zald easily transfer insights from organizational studies to
formal movement organizations because such analyses take the formal
organizations as the unit of analysis. The model also draws heavily on
Salisbury's (1969:12) exchange theory of interest groups by adopting its
claim that "the entrepreneur in any organizational situation is the
initiater of the enterprise". Finally, from economics McCarthy-Zald accept
Olson's (1965) "free rider" dilemma as a major underlying problem that
analysts of collective action must solve (McCarthy and Zald 1977:1216).

A main thrust of the model is to solve the "free rider" problem by
utilizing organizational and economic concepts. For Olson the only way to
entice rational individuals to engage in collective action is by providing
each with selective incentives. In McCarthy-Zald view (1977:1226) this
solution hardly work for movements because such groups with serious
objective deprivations and preexisting preferences for change, tend to be
very limited in their control of discretionary resources which are crucial
to collective action.

Nevertheless, such groups are confronted with the problems of
aggregating resources for collective purpose and building at least minimal
forms of organizations. Hence, social movements groups must solve this
mobilization problem in spite of being unable to provide their members with
selective incentives. McCarthy and Zald arguments' suggest that this
problem is not serious because modern movements depend on affluent
individuals and organizations from outside the oppressed groups.

By defining movements simply as preference structures for change,
McCarthy-Zald focus specifically on the outside organizations and individuals which, in their view, make mobilization possible. Key actors in the organizational-entrepreneurial model are social movements (SMs), social movement industries (SMIs), social movement sector (SMS) mass adherents, conscience constituents, professional cadre, workers, and transitory teams.

SMOs, SMIs, and SMS are the social structures through which preferences for change (SMs) can be mobilized and activated. The social movement sector "consists of all SMIs in a society no matter to which SM they are attached (1977:1220). The level of resources within the SMS determines the emergence and viability of SMIs and SMOs. The SMS must compete with other sectors and industries but is at a distinct disadvantage because it is a low-priority competitor which flourishes only after the satiation of other wants occur. The SMS is supported by discretionary resources which includes money and time that can easily be reallocated to social movements. It is affluent middle class individuals who have discretionary resources that are donated to the SMS. These resources determine the likelihood that new SMIs and SMOs will develop and be able to compete. Thus societal wealth and donations by affluent individuals determine the capacity of the SMS.

The Social Movement industry consists of all SMOs organizations that have as their goal the attainment of the broadest preferences of a social movement (1977:1219). A social movement is usually represented by a number of SMOs belonging to the same industry, but such industries is not necessarily dependent on any particular movement because firms within industries may produce products that can be used across industries. Nonetheless SMIs which are dependent on the SMS provide crucial resources that support the efforts of a social movement. "A social movement organization (SMO) is a complex, or formal organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and
attempts to implement those goals" (1977:1218). However, in order to accomplish goals SMOs must possess resources. Herein lies the problem because SMOs represents groups with few discretionary resources needed to keep the organizations in business, and members of such groups are not likely to participate in collective action on their behalf because of the "free rider" dilemma.

In McCarthy-Zald's view modern American movements have solved this problem. They argue (1973:18) that whereas major classical social movements of the past depended on its membership for money, manpower, and leadership, "modern movements can increasingly find these resources outside of self-interested memberships concerned with personally held grievances". That is, these resources can be drawn from outside elites because it is they "who control larger resource pools" (McCarthy and Zald 1977:1221). Therefore modern movements are led by professional movement organizations whereby it is increasingly possible that their financial support is totally separate from its presumed beneficiaries" (1973:18). In short, SMOs, SMIs, and the SMS are the structural configurations that give rise to and provide money and manpower for modern movements.

Modern social movements, like classical ones, involve mass constituents, adherents, bystander publics, and opponents. Yet these groups cannot generate and sustain movements because of their limited resources. In the organizational-entrepreneurial model conscience constituents provide the money and resources that generate and sustain movements." Conscience constituents are direct supporters of a SMO who do not stand to benefit directly from its success in goal accomplishment" (1977:1222). Such individual have discretionary wealth which can be "made available to cause beyond the direct self-interest of the contributor." These individuals donate money to movements because they get satisfaction by sympathizing with
the goals of the underdog. By attributing a central financial role to conscience constituents Zald-McCarthy solve one aspect of Olson's free rider problem. Indeed, Olson (1965:159-60) argue that "the theory is not at all sufficient where philanthropic lobbies, that is, lobbies that voice concern about some group other than the group that supports the lobby, or religious lobbies are concerned." Thus philanthropic groups avoid the free rider problem because their rewards are derived from the heart rather than on the basis of rational individual interests. For McCarthy-Zald it is these philanthropic conscience constituents that support the efforts of professional movement organizations.

In the model professional movement organizations are the vehicles of modern movements. These organizations direct resource appeals primarily toward conscience adherents and tend to utilize few constituents for organizational labor (1977:1223). Other key characteristics of the professional movement organization include 1) a small professional entrepreneur cadre who provide leadership and accomplish tasks through small transitory teams 2) a very small or nonexistent membership base 3) outside money and resources from elite groups including foundations, churches and the government that largely support the organization and its staff and 4) professional entrepreneurs who define, create, and manipulate the grievances associated with oppressed groups (1973:20).

Social movement entrepreneurs loom large because they represent the movements' cause (at time create it) and form the organization that pursues the cause (1977:1226). Given that the leadership and small transitory teams are hypothesized to perform the work of modern movements, McCarthy-Zald have solved another aspect of the free rider problem on two fronts. First, movement entrepreneurs receive selective incentives because the available discretionary funds from the affluent provide them with the resources to
pursue professional movement careers. If the entrepreneur is unsuccessful in linking to or creating grievances among the oppressed she may switch to another SMI where the grass is greener. Oberschall (1973:159) has developed a similar view of movement leadership arguing that leaders are to be understood in terms of the "individual incentives, gains, risks, and opportunities for advancement that participation in a social movement represents for them. Social movements leaders are political entrepreneurs just as politicians are." Second, movement workers who consist of small volunteer transitory teams who perform the bulk of the movement's tasks also receive selective incentives because small face-to-face groups receive solidary incentives—selective benefits of a nonmaterial sort (1977:1227).

In the McCarthy-Zald model, modern movements, then, have solved the free-rider problem pertaining to movement financial support, leadership, and workers.

The central message of this model is that the growth and spread of modern movements is a function of societal wealth available to SMOs, SMIs, and SMS. Moreover the efficiency and achievements of such movements depend on the efforts of small professional movements organizations guided by entrepreneurs rather than the intensity of grievances held by the oppressed group. Indeed the model argues that "in accounting for a movement's successes and failures there is an explicit recognition of the crucial importance of involvement on the part of individuals and organizations from outside the collectivity which a social movement represents" [1977:1216].

Joining McCarthy and Zald in this important claim are Oberschall (1973), Jenkins and Perrow (1977) and Lipsky (1968 all contributors to the resource mobilization approach. A similar claim was advanced earlier by Lenin (1975) who argued that workers will not spontaneously develop a revolutionary consciousness and mobilize for more than limited economic goals without the
leadership provided by intellectuals in a disciplined vanguard organization with a clear vision and analysis to lead them. For McCarthy-Zald the conditions of modern society are such that the fate of oppressed group hinges on the activity of outside groups.

This provocative model raises a number of issues. First, should groups that McCarthy-Zald discuss — AFL-CIO lobbyists, National Union for Social Justice, and National Council for Senior Citizens — be conceptualized as movement organizations or interest groups? It is well known that many problems social movements groups face—mass mobilization and solidarity, loyalty, intense grievances, repressive authorities, etc. — often differ from those faced by interest groups so that an important distinction needs to be made between the two. Oberschall (1983) pointed to this problem: "Zald comes at this study from organization theories. A lot of things that he describes are actually interest groups and they are really what he calls professional social movements... he always tends to emphasize the social movement organization rather than the whole movement." Second, the model directs attention from mass-based movements that may be "quietly emerging" on the modern scene. Such conceptual neglect in the 50s allowed the mass movements of the 60s to catch social scientists by surprise. Third, is the McCarthy-Zald view that poor oppressed groups are always without the resources needed to conduct collective action an accurate portrayal? Such groups have established organization, institutions, leaders, networks and skills. A key question is what are the conditions that lead such groups to mobilize and pursue their collective interests? A theory that does not take these factors into account can fall victim to what Morris (forthcoming, 1984) calls the outside bias. Nevertheless, McCarthy and Zald have directed attention to the unique forms that some modern movements may take.

Political Process
Major formulations of the political process model include Charles Tilly (1979), William Gamson (1975; 1982) and Anthony Oberschall (1973). These theorists are uncomfortable with the term "resource mobilization" because it fails to capture crucial aspects of their approaches (interviews, 1983). Thus Tilly (1983) stated:

...it brings together the idea that manipulators are somehow central to all kinds of social movements which I think is in fact a variable... Second, it identifies the amassing or spending of resources as the absolutely central phenomenon and to that extent distracts attention away from power struggles and from group organization... The term itself... just makes me worry that one of the least structural feature of this line of thought should be the thing that is singled out".

For Gamson, Oberschall, and Tilly the study of movements is the study of the political process and the collection action it generates.

Political process theorists do not view the social movement as the unit of analysis. In Tilly's view, "the different forms of collective action are part of the regular processes of struggle. The coherent phenomena is a process that has a orderly side and a disorderly side. The central process is a process of sets of people acting together on their interest and that is what we ought to be theorizing about." The dependent variable for political process theorists is collective action. Oberschall (1983) maintained:

I feel that by emphasizing terms like resource mobilization or social movements, you tend to cut yourself off from the larger theory... I feel very strongly that what the real dependent variable should be is collective action... Collective actions are generated by interest groups, some are by just routine politics, some are by social movements, other are by just crowds. So there is a theoretical core around the dependent variable and it is not the term social movement or mobilization, its collective action".

Focusing on continuous political struggles, these theorists reject collective behaviorist's claim that social movement analyses require unique concepts and theories. According to Gamson (1983)... you don't have to have some fundamental different set of processes to explain it... resource mobilization tries to apply or to incorporate into the single theory both conventional
political behavior and unconventional political behavior." In contrast to collective behaviorists, political process theorists focus on political movements rather than cults, religious revivals, and the like. In Gamson's view the model focuses on movements engaged in political conflict and "its useful... to treat it as a conflict between insurgents and authorities. That's... the core of the dynamics." Tilly argues that fads, changes in style, panics, etc., are a different set of phenomena than wars, revolutions, and political movements. Tilly breaks from collective behavior arguing that "that is part of my objection to that particular framework... because they are putting into the same box, things I would say are not in the same family." As to the advantages of studies focusing on political movements Tilly maintains that "the next ones that come out are much less likely to be Seventh-Day-Adventists, or people who believe that we are at the crack of doom... It will be less cookie stuff and more interest in explaining what Common Causes is doing or where the anti-abortion forces are coming from." Having identified the central dynamic we can now explore how political process theorists analyses the key dependent variable—collective action.

Why do groups engage in collective action typically ascribed to social movements such as demonstrations, boycotts, strikes, violence, riots and sit-ins? Political process theorists argue that it is the political situation of movement group that give rise to "unruly" tactics and strategies. By utilizing a polity model (Tilly 1978; Gamson 1975) it is argued that challengers --movement groups -- are excluded from the polity which means they do not have routine, low cost access to resources controlled by the government. Thus, the interest of challenging groups cannot be realized through legitimate governments because they respond to the interests of polity members. Collective action and its accompanying tactics are the vehicles of groups who rationally pursue group interests. It is the struggle for power between polity members and challenges that give rise to collective action.
Focusing on the excluded interests of movement groups, this model investigates the social structures and processes enabling challengers to pursue power through collective action. The first requirement is that challenging groups have internal organization. Organization is the extent of common identity and unifying structure among members of the challenging group (Tilly 1978:54). The relevant internal organization consists of various forms including established institutions, professional and informal networks, and formal movement organizations (Morris 1981). Some formulations imply that a centralized bureaucratic organization is the hallmark of a movement. But this need not be the case because the theory has greater power when "the type of organization that works best is treated as an empirical issue... It is more infra-structure than a particular form of organization that is emphasized in resource mobilization theory— particularly structures of solidarity and communication" (Gamson, forthcoming). Contrary to classical approaches many of these forms exist prior to the movement and play a distinct role in generating large volumes of collective action. Organization is important because through it movements groups are able to collectively plan and strategize, hold meetings, organize and coordinate demonstrations, raise money, and facilitate the mobilization process. In this approach organization is crucial to both the emergence and success of movements.

Though potential movement groups usually possess organizational structures and resources, they must be mobilized if challenges are to contend for power. Mobilization refers to the process by which challenging groups gain collective control over recourses that make collective action possible (Tilly 1978:84). For example, in the Baton Rouge bus boycott of 1953 the cars of private citizens had to be collectively mobilized into an alternative transportation system; money from the pockets of black church members and from other black organizations had to be raised on a consistent and rapid basis to finance the entire struggle; and, black
leaders including ministers and other organizational actors had to coalesce and provide the boycott with collective leadership (Morris forthcoming). These internal resources were brought under the collective control of the newly created umbrella movement organization—United Defense League—that constituted the backbone of this effective boycott which was central to the rise of the civil rights movement. Thus "mobilization is a process of increasing the readiness to act collectively by building the loyalty of a constituency to an organization or to a group of leaders" (Gamson 1975:15).

The political process model analyzes the link between the mobilization process of movement groups and their preexisting structures and resources. Unlike classical models which often portray new movement groups as having the awesome tasks of creating new symbolic systems and constructing new organizations, political process theorists argue that the task is usually much easier because these groups already have many of these resources. "Thus the conflict group escapes, to some extent, from the great cost of starting at zero mobilization" (Tilly 1978:81). Preexisting organization rather than its breakdown facilitate mobilization. The model predicts that individuals who are well integrated into preexisting community structures constitute the bulk of the early participants of collective action (Oberschall 1973). When preexisting social organization and the mobilization process are cojoined they generate collective action.

Under ideal circumstances it is an increase in the organizational and resource capacity of a subordinate group coupled with mobilization that give rise to movements. Resource mobilization theorists have not formulated precise theoretical statements of movement causation leading Smesler to argue "they don't talk much about what starts them, they talk about it once they have gotten started." Similarly, Gamson concluded:

"resource mobilization is really not so much concerned with why do people
engage in collection action, tends to take it for granted or is nonproblematic. Resource mobilization doesn't really offer a separate theory of that. It sorts of basically assume that there are kind of injustices or there is some condition here that people are concerned about and the issue is sort of how, what's the process by which they do that, so in that sense it really doesn't confront it directly.

Nevertheless, in the political process approach organizational capacity and mobilization are preconditions that must be present if sustained collective action is to occur.

Circumstances are usually not ideal for collection action by movement groups. The extent of repression by social control agents and the power position of challenging groups play an important role in determining whether movements materialize (Tilly 1978:100). High levels of repression and low power can force challengers to withdraw from power struggles because they raise the cost of mobilization and collective action. In Tilly's view repressive action aimed at demobilizing the challenging group is an effective strategy against collective action:

...raising the costs of mobilization is a more reliable repressive strategy than raising the costs of collective action alone. The antimobilization strategy neutralizes the actor as well as the action, and make it less likely that the actor will be able to act rapidly when the government suddenly becomes vulnerable, a new coalition partner arises, or something else quickly shifts the probable costs and benefits of collection action" (Tilly 1978:100-101).

Demobilization may occur when authorities disrupt the challenger's organization and communication system and freeze crucial resources that make a challenge possible.

Therefore, interest, organization, mobilization, and the opportunity to act are major variables in the analysis of collective action. Moreover, the model attributes an active role to participants and leaders for their strategic choices will affect the growth and spread of collective action. In Gamson's view "collective action is a craft; there are skills and routines for carrying it out" (forthcoming). Thus Gamson is concerned with conditions enabling challenging
groups to pursue successful rebellious careers (Gamson 1982). Similarly Tilly (1983) maintains that "we are much more serious now about discovering the point at which people turn to forms of action that authorities or even most other people disapprove of". Hence the model focuses on the varied strategic choices that confront movement participants and the likelihood of their success.

Movement participants are confronted with organizational choices. They must decide whether to adopt formal or informal, centralized or decentralized forms of organization and they must deal with internal factionalism. Collective actors must make tactical choices including decisions about whether to adopt "mild unruly" tactics such as boycotts and strikes or whether mass demonstrations and violence would be more instrumental in reaching goals. The careful and explicit study of violence reflects the willingness of political process theorists to analyze and empirically investigate the instrumental role that disruptive tactics play in collective action. With respect to violence Tilly (1978:183) argues that "out of the entire stream of collective action, only a small part produces violence" and when violence occurs it usually grows out of strategic interactions among groups rather than heightened emotions. Thus, violence is normal and usually results from prior non-violent confrontations. Confronting the issue head-on Gamson (1975:81) concluded that "violence should be viewed as an instrumental act, aimed at furthering the purposes of the group that uses it when they have some reason to think it will help their causes." Thus, Gamson (1975) presents evidence which suggest that groups who use violence and other unruly tactics are more likely to succeed.

In addition to organizational and tactical choices, movement groups must decide whether to pursue limited or radical goals or some combination. This choice will affect the degree to which authorities employ extensive repression against the group. Finally, participants make decisions as to whether they will rely on money and resources from outside or within. In Oberschall's version,
subordinate groups are often portrayed as resource deficient who must depend on outside resources if their efforts are to be successful. Gamson's (1975:63:66) systematic test of this proposition reveals that outside resources minimize the free rider problem but that such groups "are only very slightly more successful than the others". Moreover, when the size of the movement group increases and when it overcomes the free rider problem "the help of rich or powerful sponsors is largely irrelevant in determining outcome." More studies documenting the relative advantages and disadvantaged of outside resources are sorely needed.

In short the central message of the political process model is that political movements emerge within the organizational and resource base of subordinate groups pursuing group interests and that mobilization of resources make collective action possible. Furthermore, the growth, vitality, and success of movements are associated with strategic choices made by movement participants and leaders. Likewise, repression by authorities and unfavorable political realities increase the chances that challengers will be forced to demobilize and withdraw from collective action.

Resource mobilization models in general and the political process approach in particular are attractive because they address what McCarthy call the "nuts and bolts of movement" by examining realities and choices that actually confront movement participants. However, the political process model needs a theoretical account that specify the variable conditions that give rise to heavy volumes of collective action within given periods. Moreover, the preexisting organizations and resources of challenges don't always give rise to collective action. The political process model needs explicit statements about the links between mobilization and prior organization. Here the role of ideology may be significant in providing the bridge that links the two (Smelser 1983). Then too, great movements often give rise to charismatic leaders such as Martin Luther King, Mao Tse-Tung, Gandhi, and Hitler. The political process model needs to
investigate the role that charisma plays in the mobilization and success of movements or theoretically demonstrate its irrelevancy. We will return to these issues at the end of the chapter. Presently the task is to assess the empirical support for both classical and resource mobilization approaches.

Evidence: Classical and Resource Mobilization Models

With respect to recent empirical findings and theoretical formulations, the resource mobilization approach has fared better than the classical approach. Proponents of the classical approach have produced studies supporting their claims (e.g., Gurr and Duvall, 1973); however, they have not escaped methodological and substantive criticisms by scholars operating within the classical framework and by those raising fundamental challenges to the basic premises of the approach. On the other hand, resource mobilization theorists have marshalled substantial evidence in support of their primary claims. Nevertheless, a number of disagreements exist among resource mobilization proponents and between these theorists and those using the classical approach. The areas of controversy include theories of social movement causation, distinctions between conventional and collective behavior and between social movement and interest groups, explanations of movement dynamics, formulations concerning the role of organization, characterizations of movement participants, and specifications of the determinants of movement activities and outcomes. The evidence relevant to these debates is discussed below.

Emergence of Movements

There is little empirical support for the claim that movements emerge from conditions of structural breakdown and social or psychological strain accompanying rapid change and catastrophe. Contrary to the classical approach, Bwy (1968) reports a negative relationship between the rate of economic growth and political violence and protest in Latin American countries. Tilly (1969) found no support for the claim that rapid urbanization, per se, leads to
political violence. Flanigan and Fogelman (1970) report a negative relationship between the rate of economic development and the occurrence of political violence. And finally, Zimmerman (1980) concludes that the sources of change covered (including economic growth, economic decline, urbanization, and modernization) proved to be unreliable predictors of political protest. Thus, the rapid change-breakdown-protest nexus proposed by virtually all classical theories is weak in explanatory power and lacks empirical verification.

Research on the genesis of social movements has not fundamentally undermined resource mobilization explanations of when protest actions will occur; however, not much in the way of supporting evidence has been produced either. For example, McCarthy and Zald's (1973) argument that discontent can be created and manipulated by social movement entrepreneurs has not been established. McCarthy and Zald have modified their claim that grievances are basically irrelevant in generating social movements to a modest claim that grievances are "sometimes a secondary component in the generation of social movements" (McCarthy and Zald, 1977:1215). No study, however, has directly addressed the issue of whether discontent and grievances can be manufactured by movement entrepreneurs. Other resource mobilization theories which argue that grievances are virtually always present in certain populations (and thus are not a very powerful variable) argue that movements will occur when there is an opportunity to act. This position, which is akin to Smelser's (1962) notion of "structural conduciveness" is both circular and untestable to the extent that, by definition, movement activity occurs when (and only when) there is an opportunity to act. In order for this formulation to become more theoretically fruitful, it must specify more concretely when and why opportunities to act occur. Similarly, Granovetter's thesis is so difficult to operationalize that there has been no rigorous test of his threshold model. In short, the resource mobilization approach has shown that classical formulations regarding the emergence of movements and protest are
fundamentally incorrect; however, they have failed to substantiate their alternative explanations and to specify the combination of variables that give rise to movements.

**Distinctions between conventional, collective, and interest group behavior**

Resource mobilization proponents have effectively diffused arbitrary distinctions between "conventional" and "collective" behavior. There is little support for the claim that major discontinuities exist between the two. Major formulators of classical (especially collective behavior) approaches (e.g., Turner and Killian, 1957, 1972; and Smelser, 1962) have maintained that one can understand a great deal about movements by employing the same theoretical models used to analyze conventional behavior. Hence, Weller and Quarantelli (1973) argue against viewing collective behavior as the flip side of conventional behavior and offer a framework stressing continuities between the two. Moreover, Marx and Wood (1975:365) argue that the tendency to show the continuities between conventional behavior and noninstitutionalized behavior has accelerated to a point where important aspects of collective and conventional behavior can be conceptualized within a common framework.

Distinctions have become so blurred and undefined, in fact, that some resource mobilization scholars are vulnerable to the charge that they study political parties, interest groups, and formal organizations rather than social movements. Such controversies cannot be resolved until a consensus definition of "social movement" is established, and movement scholars agree on what it is that they study. As pointed out earlier, no such definition now exists nor probably ever will.

**Nature of participants**

Evidence concerning movement participants is both substantial and contrary to classical approaches which posit that participants are detached or isolated, malintegrated and psychopathological, suffering from psychological strain or
frustration, and less than rational vis-a-vis nonparticipants. Numerous studies show that individuals who first participate in social movements and protest are well-integrated into collectivities (e.g., Morris, 1981; Flacks, 1967; Paige, 1971; Freeman, 1973; Fogelson and Hill, 1968). Several studies have refuted the notion that movement participants are psychopathological and malintegrated (e.g., Keniston, 1968; Flacks, 1967; Kerpelman, 1972; and Ahromowitz, 1973). No direct evidence has been presented which demonstrates that participants suffer from strain or frustration, and Orum (1972) found no relationship between feelings of deprivation and participation in his study of the black student movement. And finally, no evidence demonstrates that movement participants are any less rational than nonparticipants. In short, most claims about movement participants that theorists within the classical approach have presented have not been supported empirically.

Nevertheless, debates about the nature of movement participants continue. One debate has revolved around the "suprarational" participant advanced by some rational action theorists. Hence, the question has been "when will people participate in collective action?" Extreme rational action views posit that individuals will participate in/contribute to collection action only when it is cost-effective for them individually; others claim that loyalty and solidarity factors override the utilitarian logic. Experimental evidence supports the latter view. A second area of controversy involves the contention by the organizational-entrepreneurial perspective that movements among underdog groups do not rely on indigenous leadership, mass participation, and resources from grass root sources. Bailis (1974) and Jenkins and Perrow (1977) have provided support for their claims; however, Morris (1981, forthcoming, 1984) and McAdam (1982) have presented evidence to the contrary. Clearly though, this controversy is concerned with the sources of resources (leadership skills, manpower, funding, etc.) rather than their centrality to movements.
Explaining the dynamics of social movements and protest activity has been one of resource mobilization's strong points. Meanwhile, classical approaches that rely on "natural history" and "life cycle" formulations to explain movement dynamics have been found to have limited explanatory power, as numerous studies have demonstrated that movements spread and are mobilized through friendship, familial, and organizational networks which precede movement activities (e.g., Freeman, 1973; Morris', 1981; Gamson, 1975; McCarthy and Zald, 1973). In explaining the process by which movement activity spreads from one location or occurrence to another, the arguments offered by classical theorists -- contagion (Lang and Lang, 1961), imitation (Tarde, 1903), suggestion (Le Bon, 1960), circular reaction (Blumer, 1951), and emergent norms (Turner, 1964) -- have been challenged by collective behaviorists (McPhail, 1973; and McPhail and Wohlstein, 1983) and theorists employing a resource mobilization perspective (Freeman, 1973; Morris, 1981; and Molotch, 1979). Numerous studies have documented the centrality of leadership, skills, "know-how", and strategizing and planning. All of these factors are consistent with resource mobilization explanations of movement dynamics. The resource mobilization approach, then, in contrast to the classical approach has made significant, empirically verifiable contributions to understanding the dynamics of social movements.

Role of Organization

Generally, the notion that organization is an after-the-fact outcome of prior movement stages has not been supported, and the available evidence clearly suggests that organization facilitates rather than hinders the efforts of social movements. Numerous studies have pointed to preexisting organizations as crucial in mobilizing participants for protest activities (e.g., Morris, 1981; Gamson, 1980; Freeman, 1973; Gerlach and Hine, 1970; and Aveni, 1978). For the most part, debates about organization have changed from whether organization to what
kind of organization. The emerging consensus suggests a conditional relationship; that is, it depends on the goals pursued, the strategies employed, the nature of membership, the tactics that social control agents employ, and other factors. In short, findings on the role of organization in movements are counter to what classical approaches predict; therefore, future debates about the role of organization will center around issues well within the domain of the resource mobilization perspective.

Determinants of Movement Outcomes

Research on movement outcomes has shown that the life cycle approach is at best incomplete. In fact, there is now general agreement that organization, resources, strategic choices, and political context affect movement outcomes; however, there has been little empirical research to confirm or refute most formulations. Notable exceptions include Gamson (1975), Snyder and Kelly (1976), Isaac and Kelly (1981), and Gamson et al (1982). Gamson (1975) for example, found that several factors are associated with movement success — the attainment of tangible goal-related benefits and formal acceptance by movement antagonists: reliance on bureaucratic organization, use of selective incentives, pursuit of narrowly defined goals, and use of "unruly" tactics. However, Goldstone (1980) challenged these findings by arguing that Gamson's analysis involved simple (bivariate) relationships, and that by controlling for the political context and the nature of goals, these relationships disappear. Also, Piven and Cloward (1977) argue directly counter to Gamson by claiming that poor people's movements realize gains from mass defiance, not organization. Moreover, organizations in the Piven-Cloward view are antithetical to gains for the poor because they de-radicalize movement demands, channel mass insurgency, and thereby limit the gains of movements. Their argument that mass insurgency itself produces gains has received empirical support (e.g., Isaac and Kelley, 1981); however, contrary to their thesis, organization facilitated the gains of the Civil Rights movement
(Morris, 1981; 1984; and McAdam, 1982) and the worker's movement (Gamson and Schmeidler, forthcoming).

Other factors also influence movement outcomes. Gamson et al. (1982) provided experimental evidence showing that available leadership skills, know-how, and other resources have positive effects on mobilization of collective action and thus on outcomes. Others (e.g., Marx, 1974, 1979; Oberschall, 1978b; and Tilly, 1978) have argued that the nature of repression/facilitation by authorities affect outcomes. And a number of tactics and strategies have proven to promote successful outcomes. In sum, it is clear that organization, resources, strategies, and the nature of repression/facilitation affect movement outcomes depending on the nature of goals pursued. What is not clear, however, is how these factors affect outcomes and what their relative importance is in determining outcomes.

**Assessments:**

Collective Behavior. In light of the empirical findings where do collective behavior explanations of social movement stand? In general, they lack support for many of their fundamental arguments including the notion that structural breakdowns and subsequent strains give rise to movements. Fewer collective behaviorists now argue that there are inherent, clear-cut distinctions between collective behavior and conventional behavior. The life cycle and natural history formulations have been found lacking in explanatory power. And some collective behaviorists concede that their formulations underestimated the positive, facilitative role that preexisting organization plays in the genesis of movements. In short, while there is not sufficient reason to reject collective behavior explanations of social movements, there is definite need for major reformulation of this basic approach. Indeed promising reformulations are underway (see McPhail, 1973; Snow et al., 1981; and Pinard, 1983).

Mass Society. The mass society approach has, for the most part, been
disconfirmed by scholars because of the overwhelming negative evidence against its basic tenents. Its claim that movement participants are psychopathological, irrational, malintegrated, etc. has been shown false and research repeatedly shows that the argument that organizations impede social movements is untenable. Mass society formulations also share some of the same limitations as the collective behavior approach: lack of support for the notion that breakdown leads to movements; lack of evidence for the claim of discontinuities between conventional and non-institutional behavior; and problems with using the life cycle approach to account for movement dynamics and outcomes. Clearly, the evidence does not support the central claims of mass society approaches.

Relative Deprivation. Though relative deprivation fares better than the mass society approach, it too needs convincing evidence for many of its fundamental premises. For example, research using individual level data (as an accurate test of the theory requires) has demonstrated that relative deprivation, is neither a necessary nor sufficient precondition for the genesis of movements and protest. Moreover, the approach is ineffective in explaining how group behaviors result from psychological and individual tendencies; in other words, relative deprivation theorists have not sufficiently accounted for movement dynamics nor group activities within movements. In terms of organizations and the determination of movement outcomes relative deprivation theorists have offered little meaningful theory, and thus, their analyses are also lacking in this regard. Unlike other classical models (especially mass society theories), however, this approach does not necessarily preclude the role of organization or tactics, nor does it require life cycle explanations to account for movement dynamics or outcomes. Nevertheless, because of theoretical gaps and contradictory empirical findings, the relative deprivation approach, like the other classical theories, is in need of major reformulation and correction.

Rational Action. The rational action perspective lacks hard evidence for
many of its central claims. For example, there has been no rigorous test of (and thus no support for) Granovetter's threshold explanation of the origins of collective action and participation. Nor has there been a test of the McCarthy-Zald claim that grievances can be manufactured by movement entrepreneurs, nor the general claim that participation is a function of strict, cost-benefit calculations. Marwell and Ames (1979) provided experimental evidence which contradicted Olson's claim that selective incentives are necessary to overcome the "free-rider" problem, and thus challenged his portrayal of collection action participants. There are no data to support the "suprarational" model of participants posited by extreme versions of this perspective. However, findings about other aspects of movements -- distinctions between social movements and other phenomena, dynamics of movement activity, the role of organization, and the determinants of movement outcomes -- are not incompatible with rational action formulations, but neither are they central to many of these formulations (especially Granovetter's and Olson's). In short, there is a lack of evidence concerning rational action formulations about the emergence of movements, disconfirming evidence about the nature of participants, and compatible evidence about other aspects of social movements.

Organizational-Entrepreneurial. Research investigating the central formulations of the organizational entrepreneurial perspective has produced mixed results. For example, research has shown both support for and evidence against the McCarthy-Zald contention that movements among underdog groups no longer rely on indigenous participation and support. Other unresolved issues which directly involve organizational-entrepreneurial perspectives include controversies over the nature of participants (e.g., suprarational vs. intendedly rational, indigenous vs. "conscience constituents", and self-interested vs. group interested), and the type of organization which facilitates movement success (centralized bureaucracy vs. loosely structured, informal networks vs. no
There is also continued debate over how movements are mobilized (through bloc recruitment vs. through selective incentives vs. through solidarity and/or loyalty to causes). Most of these debates are occurring within the resource mobilization framework, and thus will not undermine the resource mobilization approach.

Political Process. Research on social movements has provided support for the political process perspective; nevertheless, there have been critics. Critics have raised questions about the model's tendency to focus on organization, resources, and strategies to the neglect of grievances and deprivations (Gurr and Duvall, 1973; Zimmerman, 1980; and Pinard, 1983) and the occurrence of crises (Goldstone, 1980). Citing evidence from a number of empirical studies (e.g., Legget, 1964; Pinard and Hamilton, 1977; and Isaac et al., 1980), Pinard (1983) claims that political process proponents have prematurely dismissed the effects of socioeconomic deprivations on movement participation and support for collective action. He argues that because political process theorists concluded that deprivations do not give rise to movements, they wrongly rejected the argument that the relatively deprived are more likely to support and participate in non-routine collective action. Pinard's criticism of this perspective's tendency to blur distinctions between "emergence" issues and "participation/support" issues is valid. However, the characterizations of movement participants offered by political process theorists are, for the most part, consistent with the existing evidence.

As pointed out earlier, Goldstone's (1980) claim that organizational and strategic matters are insignificant in determining outcomes does question the fundamental premises of the political process perspective. Gamson (1980), however, has questioned the validity of Goldstone's findings on the grounds that they are based on faulty definitions, operationalizations, and codings of key concepts. Thus, Gamson's (1975) analysis of organization, strategies, and
resources is still a major statement providing empirical support for key arguments of the political process model.

Has a Paradigmatic Shift Occurred?

This section attempts to determine whether a "paradigmatic shift" in how social scientists theorize about social movements and non-routine collective action has occurred. More specifically, it investigates whether the resource mobilization perspective has become dominant in the study of social movements and collective action. In doing so, it compares how frequently articles published in major social science journals since 1949 have employed the resource mobilization approach versus the classical model's and others over the last four decades.

Method

The first task is to determine whether most movement analyses have shifted from the classical approach to the resource mobilization approach when explaining the causes, dynamics, and outcomes of social movements and other non-routine collective action within the period. To address this issue, articles concerning social movements and related phenomena in the 1949-1983 volumes of the American Sociological Review, the American Journal of Sociology, the American Political Science Review, and Social Forces were reviewed and categorized according to the theoretical approaches they used. Though our method has the limitation of excluding other measures of change in theoretical emphasis such as dissertations, books, social movement course syllabi, and other media outside of the major social science journals, we, nevertheless, believe that our indicator is a reliable one because journal publications reflect the work of many of those who actively contribute to the literature on movements.

To classify journal articles, ideal types for the classical approach and the resource mobilization approach were constructed. Table 1 summarizes these ideal types by illustrating how "pure type" articles would address questions about the properties of social movements and non-routine collective action. Using these
ideal types as the standards, articles were classified as "classical approach" if the majority of their explanations were consistent with classical responses, "resource mobilization" if they were predominantly consistent with resource mobilization explanations, and "other" if a majority of their explanations were consistent with neither the classical nor the resource mobilization approach.

(Table 1 About Here)

Articles included in the analysis are those which discuss aspects of the following subject matter: social movements, strikes, riots, revolutions, crowds, rebellions, protests, political violence, civil conflict, and various forms of demonstration (e.g., sit-ins, marches, boycotts). The greatest difficulty involved deciding which activities traditionally studied by collective behaviorists (e.g., panics, fads, crazes, revolutions, riots, religious cults) to include. Such activities were included only when the case was made that they share with social movements similar causes, dynamics, and consequences. This decision is arbitrary; however, results are biased toward finding that the resource mobilization approach has gained dominance only if there has been an increase in the proportion of studies which investigate such "collective behavior" from a non-resource mobilization perspective. There is little reason to believe this is the case (see, for example, Weller and Quarantelli, 1973; and Marx and Wood, 1975).

Results

Table 2 presents the percentage distribution of social movements and non-routine collective action articles appearing in major social science journals by theoretical approach and period of publication. This table shows that in recent years, there has been a major increase in the percentage of journal articles using the resource mobilization approach, and a parallel decrease in the percentage of articles which have employed the classical approach. By the 1970's, over half of the social movement and collective action articles in the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Classical Approach</th>
<th>Resource Mobilization</th>
<th>Ideal Types</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Are movements discussed as infrequent unusual, unusual phenomena?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the causes of movements?</td>
<td>Crises; breakdowns; rapid changes</td>
<td>Pursuit of interests unattainable through legitimate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Is movement behavior more similar to or different from 'conventional' behavior?</td>
<td>Very different, guided by cognitive definitions that emerge in unusual situations</td>
<td>Very similar; guided by the institutional and organizational factors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What is the nature of participants?</td>
<td>Under psychological stress; irrational; alienated</td>
<td>Rational well-integrated members of organizations and communities (sometimes ideologically committed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Why do people participate?</td>
<td>To relieve stress or frustration; to reconstitute a new social order</td>
<td>To realize group or individual interests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. How is it that movements grow and spread?</td>
<td>Contagion; circular reaction; diffusion; emergent norm</td>
<td>Thru mobilization, networks; accumulation of resources and strategic use of tactics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. What role does organization play in social movements?</td>
<td>Not central, but may hinder movement gains. Comes after the initial stages of activities</td>
<td>Central to realization of gains. Exists prior to and during movements activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Is there attention to strategies and resources?</td>
<td>Limited to nonexistant</td>
<td>Yes, attention to these is central in terms of hypothesis and propositions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. What accounts for the outcomes of movement activities?</td>
<td>Natural history of movements or unpredictable occurrences</td>
<td>Nature of goals, organizations, strategies, repression, power, and opportunities to act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2

Social Movement And Collective Action Articles Appearing In Major Social Science Journals By Theoretical Approach, 1949-1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Theoretical Approach Used</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Classical Theory</td>
<td>Resource Mobilization</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-1959</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1969</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1979</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1983</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(85)</td>
<td>(53)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(146)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 34.01 \quad \text{df} = 6 \quad p < .001 \]

*Major journals include the American Sociological Review, the American Journal of Sociology, Social Forces, and the American Political Science Review.
major journals (56%) used the resource mobilization approach. In the 1980s, more than 2 out of 3 of these articles (68%) used the resource mobilization approach. This is in sharp contrast to the 1950s when over 80% of these articles used some variant of the classical approach, and fewer than 6 out 100 used the resource mobilization approach. A chi-square statistic of 34.01 with 6 degrees of freedom suggests that these differences are statistically significant at p<.001. The remainder of this section will discuss the major social and intellectual factors which facilitated this theoretical shift in particular, and the optimal conditions for theoretical innovations in general.

(Table 2 About Here)

Social Factors

The 1960's movements were critical in the shift from classical models to the resource mobilization approach. The civil rights movement, student movement, and women's movement rocked America with such force that they attracted the attention of movement scholars. Moreover, these movements had major campus components which enabled scholars to become sympathizer/participants and attain a close-up view of movements not possible through secondary sources.

Movement participation led future resource mobilization proponents to sharpen their criticisms of existing theories and to accentuate their specific limitations. For example, Oberschall maintained that his participation resulted in a better understanding of movements and "even if I read other people's descriptions of them, I understand a lot better what they were describing and in fact not describing." Referring to prior theories and his participation, McCarthy stated "they weren't wrong as much as they didn't "resonate". I read it and I didn't know more about what I participated in than I knew before I read it." The view that participation allowed one to observe movement phenomena usually ignored by prior theories was a common theme of the interviews.

Second, participation by collective behaviorists and resource mobilization
theorists generated greater appreciation for the complexity of movements. Participation alerted scholars to the significant ideological, tactical, and goal divisions within movements and the necessity of coalition building. Thus Tilly relates that "one thing that I learned was how phony that most notions of a unified movement are." He continued, "this notion that you begin with a unified population and then some people mobilize that population on behalf of a set of beliefs they already have and that this group is a social movement...I became skeptical about that way of portraying the whole thing." Tilly's participation in part, led him to a line of reasoning that says "look for organizing groups, look for recruiters, look for the making of coalitions, look for people deciding that the enemy of my enemy is my friend." It is these kinds of dynamics that occupy a central place in resource mobilization theory and direct participation was crucial in revealing their significance.

Third, participation and sympathy with the 1960s movements led resource mobilization theorists to reject ideological biases often inherent in classical models. Gamson explained, "when you are participating, you inevitably look at it from the standpoint of participants in social movements." Additionally, "collective behavior theories engaged in a slightly insulting or put down quality by denigrating the motives of the participants." They emphasized "psychological motives rather than the collective goals of the movement. The natural tendency is to look around for some theoretical explanation that really reflects the experiences that one is having, addresses the problems that ones experiencing as a participant." Again, this theme was prevalent among resource mobilization theorists interviewed, and reflect, in part, their inclination to analyze movement goals, organizations and outcomes.

This discussion suggests that the movements of the 1960s were crucial to the paradigm shift. Gamson summed it up: "if there hadn't been a civil rights movement there might not have been an anti-war movement, if there hadn't been
these movements there might not have been an environmental movement. Without these movements there wouldn't have been people coming into the field who were receptive to a new orientation."

**Intellectual Factors**

The 1960s movements highlighted the limitations of previous theories but subsequent intellectual activity pushed the field in new directions. Specifically, intellectual criticism and the incorporation of ideas from other fields were important in the formulation of resource mobilization theory.

Intellectual criticism of dominant orientations is crucial to breakthroughs. In the 1950s and 60s structural functionalism and related frameworks were attacked by conflict theorists (Mills, 1956; Coser, 1956; Dohrendorf, 1959; and Pilisuk and Hayden, 1965) who argue that conflict and change were endemic to societies rather than abnormal or marginal. Future proponents of resource mobilization absorbed and contributed to the conflict literature. However, that literature as Tilly argued, "so clearly took on the lineaments of the theories they were criticising...It is useful polemically but what is the alternative structure that they give you that can then organize reality?" Conflict theory provided the critical mood conducive to formulating an alternative perspective.

Our data strongly suggest that alternative theories emerge slowly from a series of polemical statements and internal criticisms. In terms of resource mobilization theory, Tilly's experience was fairly typical: "What I was trying to do is play this negative game of showing that the standard notions about marginalization, mass society, and so forth were wrong...for a long time I found myself getting somewhere, but not very far, mainly by attacking existing ideas." The period of negative statements and groping is only the first step toward providing an alternative theory. Tilly recalled, "I am saying, look I can't settle for that. Other people are saying, alright put up or shut up. What is your alternative? But I am saying to myself the same thing." Thus, the stage is
set for further theorizing." Tilly continued: "In that process of struggle with my own schemes I started trying to map out the organization and the basis of collective action for the groups that I was looking at." These data suggest that theoretical breakthroughs result not from inspirational flashes but a long process of internal criticisms and reworking of ideas.

The interview data revealed that the major formulators of resource mobilization borrowed and incorporated ideas from disciplines other than sociology. Even within sociology ideas were often borrowed from outside the social movement area, especially from organizational sociology. Similarly, ideas from anthropologists and historians of revolutions (e.g., Rude, 1964; Hobsbawn, 1959; Soboul, 1958; Wolf, 1966) were crucial in the formulation of resource mobilization. According to Oberschall, "what greatly helped intellectually was that very prominent historians like George Rude and a whole bunch of historians were rewriting history of popular uprising in Britain and France and Western Europe. It wasn't just something happening in sociology intellectually. It was being sustained at the edges of sociology." We have already seen how public choice theories (e.g. Olson, 1965) in economic and entrepreneueral theories in political science (e.g. Salisbury) played a central role in the development of resource mobilization.

In short, related or parallel ideas developed in other disciplines facilitate the formulation of an alternative perspective within a given field. As McCarthy put it, "you are in this intellectual environment and you are picking what you can find and trying to stir it together." Thus both external and internal criticisms coupled with the borrowing of ideas from other disciplines were the intellectual soil from which resource mobilization emerged.

**Institutional Factors**

An alternative set of ideas do not take root in a field simply because of intellectual merit. Institutional factors including the prestige and resources of
universities, informal networks of scholars, and the academic reward system are central to paradigmatic shifts.

Innovative scholars are in a good position to trigger a paradigmatic shift if they hold appointments in prestigious universities. Tilly maintained that "there is a tremendous advantage of being at the big, rich, prestigious university." He explained:

I spent my first six years at the University of Delaware, wishing I were somewhere else and having no opportunity to go anywhere else. I felt acutely what it was like to think that you have pretty good ideas and get no recognition for it. Moving to Princeton and then to Harvard as I did, gave me a sounding board that I didn't have before that time. It was astounding how much difference that made in contacts.

Other resource mobilization theorists (e.g., Gamson and Oberschall) also concluded that a prestige effect is usually central to paradigmatic shifts.

Second, prestigious universities provide well prepared students and faculty who facilitate paradigmatic shifts. Oberschall explained that "you get students who understand you and can work for you and you don't have to explain everything to them. And you get support from faculty who recognize what you are doing." Gamson maintained that at a university like Michigan you "can attract good students who will start writing and citing that work. Tilly is on something like 48 dissertations. These are people who start writing hooks and become visible using the new orientation." Finally, Tilly underscored the centrality of faculty at prestigious universities, "you tend to be surrounded by people who know how to work the system. That is how they got there. They are often wiling to tell you how to work the system."

Informal networks within a scholarly community facilitate paradigmatic shifts. The majority of the original formulators of resource mobilization were only vaguely aware of each others work before the orientation took root. Oberschall stated, "it wasn't people getting together in a smoke-filled room and saying this is the party line and we are going to push it. We got to know each
Other really afterwards and we discovered that we had some common interest and views." Tilly pointed out how informal contacts solidified the new orientation, "these people have means of making contact with each other. They send each other papers, they introduce each other, they form conferences and so forth. These are network building events that establish the credibility of a person for the next round of contacts."

Finally, the academic reward system facilitate paradigmatic shifts especially among scholars who are dissatisfied with the dominant orientation. Tilly explained that academicians, "are very sensitive to a demonstration of originality. All it takes is a relatively small number of people getting recognized as a tour de force for having done something original and coherent, bright and so forth, for other people to say, gee I want to be in on that too." Gamson pointed out that scholars who adopt the new orientation get socially rewarded because they get things published using it and so forth. In Smelser's view the academic reward system generates paradigmatic shifts in a cyclical fashion across generations:

The generation effect is not 20 years but of 5 to 10 years or variable. People have to make their own way in the world. They can't simply say that this is the given and received view of things. The new orientation has to be different. It has to provide some alternative and there has to be some rejection of what went before.

Thus a bandwagon effect whereby additional scholars join the original formulators and publish works that give the new orientation visibility is necessary for paradigmatic shifts to occur.

Drawing from the above discussion and from our interview data, we conclude: the rise of a school of thought occurs when scholars usually working independently, formulate a set of coherent premises capable of generating a theoretical shift and when scholars other than the original formulators label the original group as a distinct school and act accordingly by producing research that either supports or undermines the new orientation. In general, the optimal
conditions for a paradigmatic shift include 1) a social environment that provides a natural laboratory in which to observe theoretically problematic phenomena, 2) a field that is obviously deficient theoretically to critical and creative scholars who are aware of fruitful ideas in other fields and who occupy appointments in leading academic institutions and 3) the availability of ambitious scholars capable of triggering a bandwagon effect because of the compelling logic of a new orientation that clearly break from previous formulations.

Resource Mobilization: Fad or Substance?

Is resource mobilization a new theory of social movements that will endure over time? Or, is it an intellectual fad masquerading under new labels? Collective behaviorists whom we interviewed (e.g., Turner, Killian, Lang, and Smelser) maintained that resource mobilization is not a theory but a re-emphasis because it fails to incorporate ideology, the social construction of reality, deprivation and grievances and causal factors all of which they believe important in explaining movements. Resource mobilization proponents concede that their approach is not a comprehensive theory but argued that it has provided verifiable theories concerning mobilization, nature of movement participants, social organization, and outcomes. Tilly agreed with this position but came down on the side of collective behaviorists by arguing that resource mobilization at this stage is not a theory. He stated:

What we have right now is some interesting concepts, some pretty good ways of matching observations with those concepts, some apprehensions about how the processes involved work, and an empirical program of a kind. That's not bad, alot of enterprises in social sciences operate for awhile on nothing much more than that.

Turner, Killian, and K. Lang maintain that much of the resource mobilization work is faddish behavior because it simply relables old ideas and concepts. This charge was directed toward those engaged in what we earlier called the bandwagon effect rather than the original formulators. Again resource mobilization
proponents argue that some faddish behavior is involved and reflected through labels. McCarthy stated, "part of why Zald and I get so much play is that we spend a whole lot of time generating terms. A lot of people just use those terms, so we get cited because we invented and coined some phrases." However, Gamson's response captured the overall reaction of resource mobilization proponents:

I'm admitting that there is a degree of faddishness in it, but I think that what happens with renaming is that it really puts it into a different overall organizing framework and gives it a different meaning. It's more than relabeling in the sense that it's a rethinking and a reconceptualization of some phenomena that they [collective behaviorists] have been concerned with.

Moreover, as Turner noted, theoretical shifts in general generate some faddish behavior. Indeed, faddishness facilitate paradigmatic shifts and provide them with visibility that assist in attracting scholars who make important substantive contributions.

Given that resource mobilization has generated some theoretical breakthroughs as well as faddish behavior, will it endure? Tilly addressed the issue: "If we want to keep this game together, we need two things desperately. We need some unifying theory, and we need some empirical demonstration. A school of thought that has neither isn't going to last very long. It is going to be a fad, a temporary coalition." Similarly Zald remarked, "I wouldn't make a lot of large claims for what the long term payoffs are. At this point, I think it's a little early to say that we are not just a fad and fashion." Zald concluded that the staying power of resource mobilization hinges on whether it is able to provide scholars with useful tools for their research on specific issues.

Our empirical analysis demonstrated that there are a vast number of scholars contributing to the resource mobilization literature. This paradigmatic shift whether permanent or short-lived, has changed the field of social movements by theoretically illuminating factors (e.g., tactics and strategies, organization,
rationality, mobilization, outcomes, etc.) undeveloped in classical approaches. Indeed, new perspectives on social movements will have to take these important contributions of resource mobilization into account if they are to be comprehensive and deal with the realities of real social movements.

Theoretical Problems and Conclusions

The field of social movements is divided between two theoretical streams. There is the classical approach which stresses social psychological variables including ideology, deprivation, strain, social construction of reality and structural breakdown. On the other side is resource mobilization with its stress on structural variables including social organization, interest, resources, group conflict, mobilization, tactics and strategies and rational utilitarian logic.

All of the theorists we interviewed on both sides of this theoretical divide maintain that both social psychological and structural variables are crucial to understanding social movements although they differ over how they should be combined into a comprehensive theory. The issue is whether it is possible to erase this bipolarity and combine the two approaches.

Our interview data reveal that the majority of the major formulators of collective behavior and resource mobilization theory will not work toward such a synthesis. Turner, who believes such a synthesis is possible, made the case for collective behavior:

I think we are going to move toward a better theory which takes a balance account. But to me collective behavior is the comprehensive term. Resource mobilization is a statement that narrows the field. It has to do with a part of it. But there is a stream to integrate it [resource mobilization] in. That stream [collective behavior] can't simply be wiped out and discarded.

Tilly, making the case for resource mobilization, rejected Turner's basis for synthesis:

First of all we don't want to. I mean as a matter of scientific strategy we don't want to integrate everything else into collective behavior theory because by and large, it rests on a premise that we ought to reject. That is the premise of a break in social structure and a
reconstruction. I think it is one of the most misleading notions that sociologists have propounded, and I think that is the 19th century heritage right there.

Gamson supported Tilly's view. He contended:

I don't see how a theory is very comprehensive if it doesn't tell you anything about the organization and strategy of movement organizations; how they go about doing it, what strategies are successful or not successful. Collective behavior has a selective focus. I favor integrating collective behavior into resource mobilization to make it a comprehensive theory rather than the other way around. I think resource mobilization has the potential for being a comprehensive theory. Maybe it would have a different name.

Thus, from a realistic standpoint it seems that the most to hope for is that this theoretical clash will generate additional insight from which a comprehensive theory can be formulated in the future. The remaining discussion is geared toward that end.

All the theorists we interviewed emphasized the crucial need for a theory that explains the role of ideology in movements. Turner concluded that we need to know "how certain world views become credible and vital at some times but not others." Similarly Tilly concluded, "a shared conception of what the world is about and of where a conflict group fits into the world underlies the whole process of collective action." To explain the role of ideology there are several directions research should take. First the connection between ideology and prior social organization needs to be explicated. Thus Smelser argued that movement groups are often situated in prior organizations but they are not necessarily organized in the name of social movement. He explained that, "you don't get mobilized just because you are in an organization. You get mobilized because your organization gets talked into believing that your organizational goals are important from the standpoint of the movement." Hence, "the link is between the particular social movement and the preexisting organization. My belief is that is an ideological link."

Preexisting social organization among oppressed groups often contain dormant
ideologies that can be activated to support social protest. Morris (forthcoming 1984) found that mobilization in the civil rights movement was often accomplished by ministers who activated the dormant revolutionary aspects of black religion already institutionalized within the black church. Blacks were pulled into the movement through the refocusing of the cultural content of the Bible, songs, prayers, and sermons in such a way that they facilitated the mobilization of protest. Moreover, changing attitudes by refocusing the cultural content of institutions is much more effective than changing the attitudes of separate individuals, because this procedure enables organizers to reach large numbers of people simultaneously. Thus research on institutional ideologies may shed light on what Turner refers to as the relationship between objective circumstances and the definition of the situation on which people actually act.

Second, Tilly maintains that an understanding of ideology and movements may be accomplished by investigating the process of struggle. That is, "a significant part of the definition and redefinition comes out of the process of struggle itself." Thus, "ideology is not something that people 'acquire individually and somehow bring to a struggle.'" If the struggle itself redefines the identities of the parties, "it means that the history of a struggle or series of struggles will contain at least proximate answers to the questions of where world views come from." Tilly's view implies that to understand how the ideologies of "black power" and "black is beautiful" emerged during the mid 1960s one would investigate prior confrontations between blacks, southern white power structures and the national government. Prior struggles might have revealed to blacks that the ideology of "black and white together" yielded few substantive gains and that an independent black power base could be more effective. By the same logic many whites recognized the implications of "black power" and thus generated the ideology of "white back lash". Therefore, examining the process of ongoing struggles may shed light on the link between ideology and movements.
Resource mobilization arguments pertaining to mobilization are often limited by a utilitarian bias. This can be overcome in part by returning to the central role that charisma often play in movements so well understood by Weber. However, Weber failed to link charisma with prior social organization and the mobilization of resources because his theory stressed an antithetical relationship between charisma and preexisting organization. To the contrary, Morris (forthcoming 1984) found that in the civil rights movement charisma and organization were cojoined from the very beginning and were mutually reinforcing. Moreover, he found that the movement did not create charismatic leaders out of a vacuum, charisma as a social form already existed in the black church long before the movement. The movement provided a large stage for the further development of preexisting charismatic relationships enabling charisma to become an additional powerful force in the mobilization process. Further research is needed on the link between charisma and the development of social movements.

The field of social movements needs a theory of what Tilly calls salience interests. By this he means an explanation of the potential advantages and disadvantages within a population that became repeatedly important to collective action. This sphere of theorizing is especially suitable to marxian analyses because they have illuminated the role of class interest in revolutionary movements (see Paige, 1975). However, Marxist have failed to provide potent theoretical analysis of the movements of the 1960s. We need a clearer understanding of the array of interests that fueled those movements as well as a general theory of salience interests.

Finally, as McCarthy-Zald pointed out, there is a need for a theory of the variable relationships between social movements and state structures. For example, do some state structures contain characteristics that are more likely to generate movements and revolutions? (see Skocpol, 1979). A related question is whether a national state should be conceptualized as a monolithic entity or
whether local contradictions within a state structure generate movement activity? (see James, 1981). This is ripe territory for both Marxian and Weberian schools of the state.

These are some of the important theoretical issues confronting movement scholars. Since the field has become so vibrant we may not have long to wait for answers.
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