

Guns or Butter?:
War and the Making of the
Welfare State

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Abstract

War is a major determinant in both the rise of the welfare state and the implementation of welfare services. Progressive and social control perspectives are used as a framework for analyzing the impact of war on welfare state policy formulation. Progressive theorists link the formation of the welfare state to the social solidarity created by war: guns leads to butter. The social control theorists maintain that the need for healthy soldiers leads to welfare, guns elicit butter, or that both warfare and welfare are designed to control the poor: guns and butter are aimed at maintaining domestic social order among the lower classes. Both perspectives are criticized and the limitations of viewing war as the major causal variable in the rise of the welfare state are assessed.

Introduction

The welfare state, at the time of this writing, is under attack from the Reagan Administration. This is reflected in the severe cutbacks in welfare services since Reagan has assumed office. By the middle of 1981 Congress had approved cuts of more than \$130 billion for the years 1982-1984.¹ In 1985 even more severe cutbacks are being planned due to the large federal deficit. The thrust of this attack is aimed at income maintenance programs. Many of these programs are intended for the very poor. But, even such sacrosanct programs as social security may not be immune from federal cutbacks: at the very least it appears that the scope of social security will be reduced. In short, many welfare state programs that have grown since the Great Depression are in the process of being dismantled.²

Guns or Butter?

Although there have been differing interpretations of the value and meaning of these cutbacks, conservatives, liberals, and radicals agree on one point: the massive reduction in welfare services have been accompanied by dramatic increases in defense spending. Indeed, this conforms to the conventional wisdom that there is always a tradeoff between guns and butter. Because of this, the traditional guns or butter issue is becoming the focal point of a renewed policy debate as the defense and welfare budgets come under intensified scrutiny during the 99th Congress.

When turning to the affect of guns on the origins of the welfare state, however, the issues are far more complex than conventional wisdom would suggest.³ Indeed, welfare state theorists, from Titmuss to Janowitz, without necessarily eschewing other theories of welfare state formation, acknowledge the importance of war as another major independent variable in the rise of the welfare state. As Janowitz states:

For both nations [Great Britain and the United States] the impact of World War II supplied the threshold events that brought the welfare state into being. In Great Britain, World War II had a more visible and a more dramatic consequence symbolically than in the United States. However, the procedures of national wartime mobilization for both countries--and in essence for all of the Western parliamentary democracies--created the essential structure of the welfare state. Writers with diverse assumptions, such as Otto Kirchheimer, R.M. Titmuss, Arthur Marwick, and Derek Fraser, concur in this conclusion.⁴

As the aforementioned quote suggests, war is considered, by many researchers, to be a most important explanatory variable in understanding the origins of the welfare state. But in spite of the acknowledged importance of war, in the making of the welfare state, this issue has not received sufficient attention from students of social service policy formation. Indeed, at the time of this writing there is no exhaustive review that critically examines the theoretical and empirical studies that link war to the expansion, contraction, and continuity of welfare services. The purpose of this paper is to examine the ways in which war affected the rise of the early welfare state; to understand the underlying social scientific propositions linking war and welfare state formation; to examine war's influence on the modern system of social welfare; and to suggest areas for future research, all in a comparative historical context. What follows is an examination of progressive and social control perspectives linking war to welfare state formation.

The Progressive Perspective: From Guns to Butter

The theories that follow are termed progressive theories.⁵ These theories generally maintain that a latent function of war is to speed

progress.' Indeed, one benevolent function of war is the creation of the welfare state. These researchers argue that while war is undesirable and to be avoided, it does generate positive side effects such as the development of welfare policies and beneficial technologies that can be used by society at war's end. Figure 1 represents an ideal typical model of the progressive theory of war and the making of the welfare state.

- Figure 1 -

It must be recognized, however, that the notion of progressive theory is mainly a heuristic device. All of these theories are far more complex and subtle than the term "progressive" would indicate.

The Napoleonic wars, the Poor Laws, and the British welfare state. Rose, while warning against an overly deterministic appraisal of these events, links the origins of the welfare state in Great Britain to the strains put on the poor law system by the wars with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France:

As for Poor Law history, that had surely been "done," as the hefty volumes of Sidney and Beatrice Webb's works...testified. ... In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the social disruption caused by the long-drawn-out wars with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France placed intolerable strains upon the old parochial system... The welfare state is seen as developing from an increasing reaction to the cruelties of the Poor Law system.'

Thus, according to Rose, the social life of 18th and early 19th century England was characterized by massive social disorganization caused by the wars with France. This, Rose contends, placed intolerable strains on the locally administered poor law system. This social disorganization led to a realization that the poor law system was cruel and unjust. This recognition eventually led to the modern British welfare state.

Total war and the making of the welfare state. Where Rose examines the impact of war on the welfare systems of the 18th and 19th centuries, most other progressive researchers argue that the total wars of the 20th century had the greatest effect on the formation of the welfare state. Sleeman, for instance, argues that specific events during World War I and World War II led to a new universalism in Great Britain, particularly in the area of housing. In fact, according to Sleeman, World War I and World War II created decisive changes in the behavior of public authorities that enhanced the development of the welfare state in Great Britain. As Sleeman explicates:

It is not surprising that the second world war led to a profound rethinking and reorganization of Britain's social services. It has often been pointed out, notably by Lady Hicks and by Peacock and Wiseman, that public spending in Britain has not increased steadily over the past century, but rather that there have been two big jumps accompanying the two world wars.

Sleeman continues:

In the field of housing the first world war marked a decisive change in the role of the public authorities...

During the war it became obvious that uncontrolled rise of rents would cause hardship, and so in 1915 rents of all but the largest houses were frozen. Rent control in one form or another has continued ever since.⁶

So in 1915 rents of all houses, except those of the very wealthy, were frozen. Sleeman goes on to argue that through a process labeled "inspection, displacement, and concentration effects" the social distance, both economic and normative, between the wealthy and the poor was narrowed.⁷

Sleeman's argument, therefore, is that World War I sensitized society to the plight of the poor. Sleeman implies that war created a type of societal

consensus. One result of this consensus was an increased consciousness about housing payments. This led to the freezing of rents. The causal ordering implicit in Sleeman's argument is that societal norms changed state behavior. The recognition that increased suffering would result without rent control occurred on a society-wide level before it was translated into welfare policy. There is no evidence in this argument that the interests of the state or public authorities are in any way different from those of the larger society.

Wilensky, in a similar vein, maintains:

The persuasive studies of Titmuss (1958), Briggs (1961), and others have taught us that World War II was oddly egalitarian. First, it brought full employment and capacity production, which meant a greater equalization of income. World War II saw blacks in America acquiring a foothold as semi-skilled workers in urban industry. Many were upgraded in literacy and skill. The bars of discrimination began to weaken. Other minority groups, such as women, were integrated into the economy as they never had been before. Labor never had it so good.¹⁰

War, according to Wilensky, brought full employment and greater equality for blacks, other minorities, and women.

More specifically, Wilensky hypothesizes that "universalistic tendencies" resulted from both the United States' Civil War, and World War I. According to Wilensky:

That big wars can foster equality is further evident in the American Civil War...

Welfare developments of World War I in Britain (Hurwitz, 1949) and Germany (Feldman, 1966) confirm the general point: nations caught up in big wars, especially when they are losing battles and approaching total mobilization, find the political will to bring their official

pronouncements and their public action closer together. If equality is official doctrine, some of their people will be made more equal.

Wilensky's argument is considerably more complex than Sleeman's model. First, Wilensky's argument is transhistorical. Wilensky, unlike Sleeman, argues that wars, regardless of when or where they occur, tend to create societal cohesion. It matters little, according to Wilensky, whether the war occurs in the 18th, 19th, or 20th century, whether the war occurs in Europe, the United States, or Asia.¹¹

Likewise, Furniss and Tilton use the logic of the progressive perspective when hypothesizing about the effects of World War II on the welfare state. Furniss and Tilton hypothesize that World War II had a paradoxical effect upon the allied nations. In fact, two "countervailing forces" were at work. First, the war created the "aura and practice of social solidarity." In other words, people were joined in a cooperative effort in order to fight and win World War II. This process brought people together and forged a normative consensus within society. But, at the same time, war brought strain and anomie. The war effort meant the disruption of traditional work and consumption patterns. Men used to civilian work became soldiers, women used to domestic work became laborers. The welfare state grew as a "dynamizing force," in order to bring groups back into society; a bridge between the countervailing forces of social disorganization and collective effort caused by society's participation in total war.¹² This model is represented in Figure 2.

- Figure 2 -

Janowitz, on the other hand, contends that universalism is a key element in both the mobilization for total war, and the political arrangement known as the welfare state. Moreover, Janowitz argues that mobilization for total war

can help create the societal and normative dimensions that are conducive to welfare state development.¹³ The Janowitz model is represented in Figure 3.

- Figure 3 -

Janowitz argues that this collective participation in World War II, by both the military and civilian sectors, increased the sense of identity and assertiveness of low status groups. Furthermore, World War II strengthened the ideal of equality. Janowitz also recognizes the importance of other structural factors, as well as norms; the importance of state power upon society as well as society's impact upon the state. Specifically, Janowitz argues:

The trends toward the welfare state that evolve during total war are not merely the result of stronger norms of equalitarianism and the stimulation of popular demands for social and economic betterment. In Great Britain, the morale of the home front was sustained not only by Winston Churchill's eloquent propaganda of national survival but also by explicit promises of postwar social reform... Thus it was the actual performance of the central government during the war that was crucial in the thrust toward a welfare state. The achievements of wartime mobilization created cadres of administrators and administrative structures that could be adapted to large-scale societal innovation. This was in essence a kind of societal "breakthrough," in both the United States and Great Britain.¹⁴

In this way Janowitz expands upon the predominant progressive treatment of war and welfare.

Although there are other progressive theories of war and the making of the welfare state, the works just reviewed capture the gist of these arguments. All of the theorists assert that war is a crucial factor in the

formation of the welfare state. Another group of researchers, however, argues that the progressive scientists have not been successful in proving that the development of the welfare state is a latent function of war. Instead, both welfare and warfare represent the interests of the rich and powerful. This perspective, that will now be examined, is termed the social control perspective.

The Social Control Perspective

The theories that follow are termed social control theories.¹⁵ Many of these models have in common the notion that war and welfare result in the domination of the poor. This domination rests upon the monopoly of violence inherent in the state structure. The exercise of such power, or the threat to do so, is the foundation on which welfare policy is based. This argument stresses that the war-making apparatus exists not only to protect the state from foreign domination; but from internal threats as well. In this view welfare is, at best, a tenuous means of control. It is only effective if these policies are backed up by a violent coercive apparatus. In this sense the choice is not between guns or butter, but a recognition by the state of the need for both.

War, social control, and the welfare state. The social control researchers, like their progressive counterparts, argue that total war effects welfare services. But, in contrast to the progressive arguments, the social control theorists argue that total war works against the interest of the working class and welfare recipients.

Sorokin, Spencer, and Veblen present radically different hypotheses than progressive theories of total war and the making of the welfare state. As Sorokin contends:

The essentials of Spencer's theory are: first, that war and militarism

lead to an expansion of governmental control; second, to its centralization; third, to its despotism; fourth, to an increase of social stratification; and fifth, to a decrease of autonomy and self government of the people. In this way, war and militarism tend to transform a nation into an army, and an army into a nation.¹⁶

To be sure, Spencer, in most of his major theoretical work, is the quintessential laissez-faire progressive theorist. But clearly, as Sorokin illustrates in this example, Spencer's theory of war and society is a social control theory. The argument that war sharpens social stratification, as Spencer's social control argument maintains, will be evaluated later.

Veblen, in The Theory of Business Enterprise, argues that war, particularly total war, elicits autocratic rule. This rule results in state domination of society. This domination, instead of working to the advantage of welfare recipients, may actually cause the collapse of welfare benefits, and indeed even business enterprise, through the bankruptcy of the state.¹⁷

Moreover, Veblen, in direct opposition to progressive theory, argues:

Warlike and patriotic preoccupations fortify the barbarian virtues of subordination and prescriptive authority. Habituation to a warlike, predatory scheme of life is the strongest disciplinary factor that can be brought to counteract the vulgarization of modern life wrought by peaceful industry and the machine process, and to rehabilitate the decaying sense of status and differential dignity.

Veblen continues:

In this direction, evidently, lies the hope of a corrective for "social unrest" and similar disorders of civilized life. There can, indeed, be no serious question but that a consistent return to the ancient virtues of allegiance, piety, servility, graded dignity, class prerogative, and

prescriptive authority would greatly conduce to popular content and to the facile management of affairs. Such is the promise held out by a strenuous national policy.¹⁸

Veblen, therefore, argues against the progressive theory that war creates a new universalism. On the contrary, Veblen asserts that total war is a desirable state of affairs, for a portion of the upper or leisure class, for exactly the opposite reasons: first, war works against universalism and democracy; second, war reduces social unrest; and finally, war preserves and heightens class distinctions. From Veblen's perspective, as indicated by the quotation, real democracy, universalism, and growing equality, work against upper class interests, and are clearly not elicited by total war. Moreover, total war, and military expenditures, may bankrupt the state, and hence work against welfare allocations.

From butter to guns. Moreover, there is a different argument than the guns leads to butter, warfare leads to welfare, theory. Instead, from the viewpoint of other social control researchers, welfare can be used to develop healthy soldiers within the poor population: butter can support guns. From this perspective the guns or butter distinction, therefore, is almost nonexistent. On the contrary, a large poorly fed population is a threat to national security. Since the poor and working classes are disproportionately represented in the infantry and the front lines the success or failure of the war effort might well depend on the health of the poor. In this view welfare is an investment in a nation's future. In this way the state legitimizes this manipulation as an imperative of national survival.

According to this argument, welfare can sometimes be used as a form of manipulation of the poor; as a form of coercion in which the poor are given welfare benefits with the intent that, in return, the state will have well

fed, healthy conscripts when needed. Welfare services, from the perspective of this social control argument, are given not to lessen social inequality. Instead, welfare services are given only to insure that the poor are minimally healthy.

Venkatarangaiya argues that, due to the nature of modern war, butter proceeds guns.¹⁹ During the High Middle Ages war was the providence of the nobility. The very essence of feudalism, as Weber notes, is the domination of peasants by a military landed aristocracy.²⁰ The means of war was in the hands of the few land owning patricians. The general population was excluded from war. In the modern world, however, war can only be fought by armies numbering in the millions. There was an increasing need for recruits with higher physical, psychological and intellectual strength. Thus the well-being of the whole population was a military necessity. In particular, according to Venkatarangaiya, children belonging to all classes were carefully looked after by the state, even in peacetime, so that recruits could be secured during a mobilization for war. Venkatarangaiya argues that a minimum standard of living became a crucial part of social and military policy.²¹

Fraser, moreover, maintains that the making of the welfare state in Great Britain was the result of a conscious effort by the state to improve the quality of the Imperial Army. Prior to the late 19th and early 20th century the superiority of the British army and navy was undisputed. Indeed, the British Empire continued to expand, and there was little reason to suspect that the British troops were not the world's finest. The United States and Germany, of course, were beginning to challenge British hegemony. But Britain, at first, ignored these challenges, or at least was unable to prevent challenges, and became complacent about the actual condition of its armed forces. Fraser argues that a series of events brought a change in the way the

British state viewed the quality of the Imperial Army. This reevaluation of the Imperial Army, according to Fraser, also led to a reevaluation of British welfare services. The poor performance of the British soldiers in the Boer War, therefore, was blamed on the poor law policies of the laissez-faire state.²²

In sum, according to Fraser, the Boer War was the turning point in the way the British viewed the Imperial Army, and consequently the new poor law policies of the laissez-faire state. During the Boer War the Imperial Army performed miserably. This caused, according to Fraser, a general outrage in England.²³

Even interest in meals for needy children, which dated back to the 1860s, was given its real stimulus at the beginning of the 20th century by the relatively poor performance of the British troops in the Boer War. Fraser argues that in a bizarre way, imperialism and social reform were allies.²⁴

From Fraser's perspective, neither egalitarianism nor universalism was the major force behind the movement towards the welfare state in Great Britain. The main impetus was imperialism and the maintenance and expansion of the British world empire. Providing meals for needy children was one method by which healthy poor children could grow into healthy soldiers.

Thus, in order to "sustain its empire in the future," a new generation of poor children, "tomorrow's Imperial Army," had to be "properly nourished." This argument links the origins of the welfare state to the Royal Commission's study of 1903 which found evidence of national deterioration in the health of the poor. This study, along with the growing outrage in England, led to a reevaluation of the new 19th century poor law policies.²⁵

Welfare was given, according to Fraser, in order to insure state security. Fraser emphasizes the relationship between external threats to the

state and the making of the welfare state. This took the form of a massive centralization of welfare services. This centralization, which was reflected in a national standardization and coordination of welfare allocation, was dramatically different from the workhouse system of the new poor law laissez-faire state. Workhouses were destroyed, welfare payments and other services for the poor were established. This centralization, standardization and coordination of welfare services insured that the poor were well nourished and hence suitable fighting material for the maintenance and expansion of the British Empire.

Thus Fraser argue that the greatest single stimulus to the enlargement of the welfare state was national defense. This process intensified at the beginning of World War I. Fraser argues that the practical needs of the national efficiency were replaced by an even greater amount of state intervention. This intervention became so intensive that the Manchester Guardian called this wartime social structure "war socialism." As national defense changed to international war, the state enlarged and government intervention increased.²⁶

Guns and Butter

In the theory that follows structural domination entails the growth of the administrative apparatus of war: internal armies, militia, officer corp, police force, and standing army. This argument stresses that welfare is only a means the state uses to control the masses and promote social order. The administrative apparatus of war must always be available to crush protest if welfare fails to maintain social order. Moreover, if the police are ineffective in maintaining social order the state must be able to call upon other, more powerful, forms of coercion, such as a national guard or militia. If all else fails the state must rely upon its regular army to restore social

order. Even when protest is nonexistent they must be prepared to crush uprisings should they occur. This social control perspective, therefore, stresses that the instruments of war must be in place before a stable welfare state can emerge.

Dorwart's work can be used to clarify the nature of the relationship between the apparatus of war and the making of the welfare state. For Dorwart: "Fundamental to any welfare state is police power, the element of force or compulsion, the authority inherent in the office of government."²⁷

Thus the policies of the "Prussian Welfare State" were based upon political expediency stemming from a central problem. The Hobbesian state, as Dorwart conceives of it, exists in a context of threat. To exist a state must establish and maintain its autonomy, freeing itself from both external and internal threat. The external threats refer to hostile nations; the internal threat refers to potential revolutionary sections of the population, most probably, according to this view, the underclasses.

Thus, within the Hobbesian welfare state, according to Dorwart, the general welfare was the apparent goal; but the general welfare, in this Prussian welfare state, was contingent upon the state's ability to establish, through the formation of internal and external oriented armies, both internal and international security. Only when this security was achieved, in Dorwart's view, could the state make progress towards welfare.

Dorwart's argument, simply stated, is that both welfare and internal security forces are two means of coercion in which the state, under the guise of welfare, regulates the activities of its citizens. Dorwart distinguishes between two goals of the Prussian welfare state: 1) the regulation of activities for the welfare of the individual, and 2) the regulation of activities of its citizens for the common good. Unfortunately, according to

Dorwart, citizens and individuals do not always agree with the state as to what constitutes the common good, nor do they always agree with the state as to what constitutes the welfare of the individual. Internal security forces, according to Dorwart, insure, even if the disagreements between the state and its citizens erupt into violence, that the state has the final say.²⁸

In sum Dorwart argues that this Hobbesian regulative welfare state used both guns and butter in order to coerce the populace into obedience. Dorwart argues that police power is the fundamental ingredient in the formation of the welfare state. The power of compulsion is the power of the welfare state. The ability to order the lives of the poor not only rests upon the welfare payments or services, but, at least in the 15th and 16th century in the area that is now Germany, on guns.²⁹

In a similar vein, Furniss and Tilton, in opposition to their earlier progressive stance, argue that war can increase welfare expenditures.³⁰ Their hypothesis, however, is based upon pre-welfare state events. Furniss and Tilton contend that the Napoleonic War had a significant impact upon poor relief. They suggest that this war had a dual impact upon welfare allocations in England. First, there was a need for social peace during a time of intense national crisis. Social unrest against the state at home would tax the crown's ability to wage war against France. It was reasoned that welfare would subdue the masses and insure that England would only fight a war on one front. The English state would only have to deal with France; not with domestic enemies as well. Furniss and Tilton, in summary, argue (see Figure 4) that international political crises, and domestic situations, are both causally linked to the formation of welfare policies.

- Figure 4 -

Baran and Sweezy hypothesize, from a Marxist position, that the crisis of

capitalism effects both military and welfare state expenditures. The core idea behind Baran and Sweezy's theory is that the modern capitalist economy, dominated by a corporate monopolistic oligarchy, tends to generate an "unmanageable surplus." This surplus is, in fact, the major problem facing capital.¹¹ This "unmanageable surplus" creates a crisis within the capitalist economy. This crisis is caused, ironically, by the very success of the expropriation process.

A solution to this crisis, from Baran and Sweezy's position, entails some form of redistribution in order to end the economic stagnation caused by this surplus. But redistribution, particularly in the form of welfare, is against the "entrenched interests of capital." Indeed, the idea of economic redistribution, especially the idea of giving the poor a share of this surplus, is alien to the whole profit maximizing system of capitalism.

Redistribution in the form of defense expenditures, however, is far more in line with capitalist interests than redistribution to the poor. To be sure, defense spending, Baran and Sweezy argue, is also wasteful. Nevertheless, defense spending has at least two benefits: 1) the expansion of a new profit making armament industry, and 2) the potential for defense and expansion of business interests through force, both at home and abroad. Thus in choosing between guns and butter, from Baran and Sweezy's argument, the capitalist will choose guns.

O'Connor, another Marxist researcher, is in agreement with Baran and Sweezy in arguing that the roots of American militarism can be "traced directly to the tendency for the monopoly section to generate surplus capital." But, in contrast to Baran and Sweezy, O'Connor argues that the interests of monopoly capital are not entrenched in the way Baran and Sweezy's thesis would predict. Instead, O'Connor argues that it is in the interest of

capital to have both defense and welfare spending.³²

Specifically, O'Connor argues that state expenditures serve two purposes. The first purpose is to stabilize and expand the interests of monopoly capital. O'Connor calls this the "accumulation" function of the state. Moreover, O'Connor argues that welfare, by encouraging the pacification of the unemployed, also serves a function for monopoly capital. It seems unlikely, from O'Connor's perspective, that the poor will launch a revolutionary movement against the state as long as the welfare state provides them with food and shelter. O'Connor calls this the "legitimation" function of the state. Finally, welfare payments, by giving the poor money to spend in the marketplace, helps to expand consumer demand.

O'Connor reasons that the development of massive expenditures for both welfare and warfare represents the making of a new type of state: the warfare-welfare state (O'Connor, 1973: 151). O'Connor predicts, however, that the welfare-warfare state will not ease the contradictions that confront the capitalist system. On the contrary, O'Connor predicts that defense and welfare expenditures will continue to soar and thus exacerbate the fiscal crisis of the state. The capitalists may allay this crisis, at least temporarily, by the formation of what O'Connor terms a social-industrial complex. But even this formation will only postpone, not prevent, the collapse of the capitalist system. In sum, from O'Connor's perspective, the only solution to the fiscal crisis is socialism.³³

Likewise, Melman argues that the welfare state's failure to end the Great Depression led to a warfare state: a state dominated by a permanent war economy. The New Deal led to a decrease in unemployment. But even at the eve of World War II, Melman argues, millions were unemployed. World War II brought an end to the crisis of capitalism by ending the unemployment problem.

This structure, in keeping with Melman's discussion, led to a permanent war economy that resembles O'Connor's description of the welfare-warfare state.³⁴

Stavrianos, also arguing from a social control perspective, maintains that total war accelerated the growth of the welfare state in order to mitigate the organizationally based conflict between labor and business. Although Stavrianos is not precise about the causal order of his explanation, war, according to Stavrianos, accelerated the change from the laissez-faire state, or the "night-watchman state" of the 19th century, to the modern welfare state. The acceleration theme of this social control argument is similar to the progressive argument that total war was a catalyst hastening the growth of the welfare state.³⁵

But this social control argument, by emphasizing the way that war accelerated the growth of the welfare state, which acted as a buffer in the conflict between business and labor, is also diametrically opposed to the progressive perspective. The welfare state, according to the logic of Stavrianos' argument, froze existing class arrangements. Total war acted to promote the growth of the welfare state, and implicitly, may have spared the capitalist system from a potentially revolutionary situation. To be sure, again drawing inferences from Stavrianos' argument, workers were allowed to pressure big business, but only within the parameters set by the growing welfare state.

In sum, all of the social control theories reviewed suggest that war does not lead to progressive welfare reform. What often appears to be progress, according to social control researchers, is in reality some form of cajoling, manipulation, or outright repression of the poor. But both the social control and progressive perspectives agree that war, in one way or another, has influenced the making and development of the welfare state. What follows is a

discussion and critique of these perspectives and the theories just reviewed.

Discussion

In this section both the progressive and social control perspectives will be compared and criticized. This critique will pay particular attention to the effects of world war on the formation of welfare policy in the 20th century. This, of course, is a period of critical importance for both perspectives and hence is an ideal test case for assessing the strengths and weaknesses of each paradigm.

The studies just reviewed, from both the progressive and social control perspectives, display two qualities: 1) they are highly theoretical; and 2) there is little systematic evidence presented to substantiate the claims made by these perspectives. Obviously, this makes it difficult to settle the dispute between these two paradigms because it is hard to discern, from the almost anecdotal evidence presented in these studies, which perspective is accurate. This lack of precise research may result in what could be called a utopian, or evolutionary, bias within the progressive perspective, and a dystopian, or de-evolutionary bias within the social control perspective.”

An initial criticism of both perspectives is that these schools may oversimplify the role war played in the origins of the welfare state. Similarly, the argument that war is an independent variable in the rise of the welfare state applies to many, but not all, of the major western welfare states. This argument, that war elicited welfare state formation, works for Edwardian Great Britain, but it is less clear how this argument applies to the United States. In the United States the welfare state emerged during the depths of the Great Depression. Moreover, in the United States example, World War I probably had some centralizing effects, but the United States remained a laissez-faire state until the 1930s. This, of course, was before World War II

in the 1940s. Likewise the isolationist policies of the U.S. during the 1930s is evidence against any argument that the New Deal was an overt mobilization for war. The idea that the New Deal was a covert mobilization, however, has never been researched. In sum, war does not create all welfare states.

By the logic of the progressive arguments concerning the origins of the welfare state, one would predict a greater integration of minorities, women, and some decrease in social stratification during the war. This follows from the progressive argument that war elicits increased equality and social cohesion which in turn leads to welfare state expansion. This model is illustrated in Figure 1.

This means that equality, and social togetherness should increase during the war effort. This necessarily follows if the progressive causal chain, as indicated in Figure 1, is in fact valid.

In opposition to the progressive position, the social control perspective researchers maintain that war sharpens class and status group conflict; that war leads not to consensus but to increased structural domination, class conflict, and inequality.³⁷ The welfare state, according to the social control argument, is affected in different ways by this sharpened inequality.

In short, the social control argument is that during war the poor and the working classes follow the desires of the state and/or capital. War, in other words, tightens the control of the working class. According to the logic of the social control argument, if a state is a welfare state at the time of war it becomes more coercive as war progresses. In fact, war transforms the welfare state into what Veblen describes as a neo-dynastic system in which the state and the military dominate society. As Sorokin argues, a nation becomes an army and an army becomes a nation. Lasswell calls this form of state a garrison state.³⁸

The evidence for the progressive argument is the strongest when examining women's participation in the wartime work force. Between 1940 and 1945 the number of women in the work force rose from 12 million to 16.5 million. This was a change from 25.5 percent of the labor force to 36 percent, a change of over ten percent. Thus if women's employment is seen as evidence of a growing egalitarianism, this data strengthens the progressive argument.³⁹

The progressive perspective, therefore, is quite right in arguing that total war brought some minorities, particularly women, into defense industries in unprecedented numbers. Jobs normally reserved for men were being performed by women. Women participated in the construction of tanks, ships and aircraft as well as riveting these weapons. By the same token other so called male endeavors were also being done by women.⁴⁰

Moreover, it could be argued that since women's participation in the labor force never returned to postwar levels, a change in the norms of society caused by the war effort must have occurred. Indeed, about two-thirds of the women who did war work remained in the labor force. Thus the percentage of women in the labor force settled at about 29 percent. This, however, was only an increase of about 3.5 percent over the prewar years. Nevertheless, as the progressive perspective predicted, this may have represented a change in societal norms.⁴¹

But there is also evidence, more in line with the social control argument, that women were grossly underpaid during the war. Official government policy, as announced by the War Labor Board on November 25, 1942, favored equal pay for women. Unfortunately, this policy was rarely implemented. Employers evaded this policy. In fact, earnings among women production workers remained, on the average, about 40 percent below the salaries of men.⁴²

Moreover, at the end of World War II over two million women lost their jobs in order to make these jobs available to the returning male soldiers. This may indicate that women's participation in the work force during the war did not lead to permanent normative changes. If massive and permanent normative changes towards women had actually occurred then, more than likely, these women would not have been fired.

Marwick's evidence suggests, although the evidence is far from conclusive, that women's participation in war did not reflect a fundamental change in norms; it probably represented a solution to a structural problem of labor shortage due to the large number of males shipped overseas. Marwick's evidence weakens the progressive causal chain linking war, equality, and welfare. Since the middle link of this progressive model, equality, is weak it is possible that this model may be inaccurate. Nevertheless, this evidence, once again, is far from conclusive.

A social control interpretation would follow along more materialistic lines. The apparent lessening of inequality was only an illusion. The structural demands of the war effort forced women into the work force. With most males overseas, the only hope for victory was for women to enter the workplace. According to the social control perspective, after the war the structural demands for women in the work force lessened. Thus millions of women were fired. The social control perspective researchers, however, would argue that some women were able to mobilize sufficient resources to keep their jobs. This may have happened in at least two ways. Women may have accepted demotions to less challenging work. Moreover, social control theorists would argue that some women were able to form coalitions in order to protect their jobs upon the termination of the war. Either way, the social control perspective theorists would argue the fact that women's employment never

returned to prewar levels reflected the tenacity of women, not the growth of a consensus. Thus the social control perspective would follow a more materialistic argument.⁴³

Turning to the effects of war on the integration of blacks into society, the progressive argument appears to be inaccurate. It would be predicted, by the progressive arguments just reviewed, that war should lessen inequality and, integrate blacks back into society. Thus war would have a positive effect on black participation in the United States.

According to Polenberg, blacks were not as well integrated into society as progressive theory would predict. Although the United States did not enter World War II until after Pearl Harbor, industrial participation started earlier. Polenberg maintains that as late as 1940 blacks suffered from high unemployment and economic insecurity. In fact, during 1940 blacks lived with more insecurity than most whites had known during the Depression. The unemployment rate for blacks at the beginning of 1941 was 20 percent. The jobs that blacks could get usually involved hot, dirty work and offered little security or economic rewards. Moreover, there were few chances for upward mobility in these jobs.⁴⁴

In 1940, of 100,000 persons employed by the aircraft industry only 240 were blacks. Most of these blacks were janitors. Turning to the electrical machinery industry, another crucial part of the defense sector, less than one percent of these workers were black; in the rubber industry less than 3 percent were black. Polenberg argues that as the defense industry grew, whites, not blacks, were given the jobs. To be sure, some jobs did open up for blacks because of the war effort. In particular, dangerous infantry work went to blacks. Moreover, as Polenberg argues, on the home front blacks took over those jobs vacated by the poor whites such as hotel bellhops, short order

cooks, elevator operators, and car parkers at garages.⁴⁵

In fact, during the early days of the war effort, the proportion of blacks in manufacturing was less than the proportion of blacks working in manufacturing during the Great Depression. Almost two out of every three blacks, compared to one out of five blacks, were domestics, unskilled agricultural workers, industrial laborers, or in low status service jobs. Moreover, blacks also experienced discrimination in government employment. The few blacks that were able to get government jobs were hired as janitors rather than skilled workers or white collar workers.⁴⁶

Therefore, it appears, drawing from Polenberg's data, that blacks were not experiencing the benefits of any new universalism, in spite of the fact that by 1941 U.S. industry was booming as it had not boomed since the 1920s. During the early 1940s more cars were being built than ever before. The War Production Board called this process a new Industrial Revolution. The production that normally took months and years was condensed into days. Despite these developments, blacks did not seem to reap large benefits from this large collective effort.

Finally, contrary to the progressive perspective's contention that war creates solidarity, the World War II era was actually marked by intense racial conflict. In fact, during the week of June 20, 1943, more than thirty-four people died and more than one thousand others were wounded during a race riot in Detroit. This riot was more destructive than any previous similar conflict in American history. A riot of such intensity, occurring during a world war, is evidence against solidarity theory.⁴⁷

It might be argued, however, that the groups involved in this riot were suffering from anomie. War, according to this progressive argument, created rapid social change which led to a state of normlessness within these groups.

Recent research, from what is called the resource mobilization perspective, however, provides evidence against this theory. Groups involved in most forms of collective action, from the point of view of the resource mobilization perspective, are usually expressing real interests and grievances. Thus the groups involved in this riot, from the standpoint of the resource mobilization perspective, were, in all probability, not just responding irrationally due to a breakdown in norms, but were, in fact, expressing real grievances.⁴⁴

Moreover, anti-Semitism, as well as racial conflict, increased during World War II. This is reflected in various opinion polls taken at this time. This increase in anti-Semitism is contrary to the predictions of solidarity hypotheses.⁴⁵

Furthermore, many new anti-Semitic groups formed during the war years. One such group, the Gentile Cooperative Association, was formed in Chicago. The purpose of this association was to "halt growing Jewish power." An increase in anti-Semitic disturbances also occurred during the war. For instance, in the Boston suburbs of Roxbury and Dorchester, gangs of teenagers desecrated synagogues, smashed store windows of Jewish shop-owners, and fought with Jewish youth in the streets. Thus, anti-Semitism appears to have increased during the war.⁴⁶

There is evidence to suggest that other segments of the population during World War II suffered increased inequality within the United States. One particular group, the Japanese-Americans, even experienced direct oppression during the first part of World War II. The well-known case of the evacuation of Japanese-Americans from the west coast into concentration camps fits into the social control model, but not readily into the progressive model of war and the making of the welfare state. The imprisonment of Japanese-Americans resembles the process of social control that is predicted by the social

control perspective. Moreover, this evacuation was facilitated by a number of New Deal welfare agencies.⁵¹ Thus it appears, at least for this event, that the social control explanation that the welfare state is an apparatus for social control, is more viable than the progressive explanation that the welfare state increases equality. It might be argued that this event was the result of anomie brought about by the bombing of Pearl Harbor. But the fact that this evacuation was carried out by the New Deal agencies of the welfare state weakens this argument. By the reasoning of the progressive perspective, the Japanese-Americans should have been integrated into society by the welfare state, not imprisoned under the guidance of these agencies.

This evidence also conforms to Veblen's, Sorokin's, and Spencer's argument that social control by the state increases during war.⁵² Dorwart's argument about the interrelationship between welfare and coercion is also thrown into bold relief by this last example. Nevertheless, this issue requires more systematic research before any firm conclusions can be reached.⁵³

The empirical evidence just reviewed weakens the assertions of the progressive school and lends support to the social control arguments. Anti-Semitism, as these social control theorists hypothesized, appears to have increased during the war. Moreover, racial tensions, from the evidence reviewed, appear to have increased also during World War II. To be sure, the job prospects for blacks appear to have increased during the war; but these new jobs, comparatively speaking, were still the lower status jobs. The job opportunities for women increased; but women were underpaid and millions of women were fired after the war. Briefly, there is little evidence to suggest that a new universalism based upon normative change was formed during World War II. Instead, intense nationalism may have formed during the war. It

appears this intense nationalism may have exacerbated differences between class and status groups rather than eased group conflict. Secondly, conscription, housing shortages, food rationing, new demands on labor and other austerities that occurred during the war, may also have highlighted class, status, and ethnic differences.

This discussion, regarding nationalism and inequality, is of course highly speculative. More research is needed in order to determine the exact relationship between nationalism, warfare and welfare policies.

The empirical evidence just reviewed, however, does not prove the social control assertion that inequality increased during the war; nor does it prove that war transforms the welfare state into a garrison state nor a neo-dynastic state.⁵⁴ What the evidence does suggest, however, is that this may be the case. Moreover, it appears there are serious conceptual and empirical problems with the progressive model. Indeed, as noted earlier, this evidence weakens the causal argument of the progressive perspective. If war did not create a new universalism, it is doubtful that this could be responsible for the welfare boom at the end of the war. Systematic research is needed, however, before these issues can be totally resolved.

Conclusion

War has been shown to be a most important variable in the rise of the welfare state. It appears from the review of this literature that in-depth case studies and/or comparative analyses, along with a more precise measurement of the variables involved, would lead to a greater understanding of the relationship between war and the making of the welfare state. Different nations could be examined in order to determine if the key variables involved in the origins of welfare states apply to just a few or to many such states in western society.

In summary, the specific suggestions regarding future research on war and the making of the welfare state are threefold: 1) the development of new theories that incorporate multiple independent variables; 2) the use of more precise measurement techniques; and 3) the use of historical comparative analysis and intensive case studies in order to test and generate more accurate theories of war and the making of the welfare state. From the social control perspective studies of three state structures, the laissez-faire state, the welfare state, and the garrison state, may help researchers understand whose interests the state serves. From the progressive perspective these suggestions may help untangle the relationship between norms, welfare, bureaucratization and war. Finally, it is hoped these recommendations will lead to more tests of the social control and progressive perspectives of war and the making of the welfare state.

Notes

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Figure 1

An Ideal Type of the Progressive Theory
Concerning War and the Making of the Welfare State

Figure 2

Furniss and Tilton's Model


Figure 3


The Janowitz Model of War and
the Making of the Welfare State
(1976: 37-38)


Figure 4

Open Systems, Social Control, Model of War
and the Making of the Welfare State

War====+====> Increased equality====+====> Welfare
and normative State
consensus Expansion







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