The Future of Social Movements in America: The Transformation of Ends and Means*

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In our preoccupation with the social movements of the day, or of a particular movement, it is easy to miss the grand sweeping changes in the organization, tactics and goals of social movement-like phenomena. Indeed, except for the writings of Charles Tilly, discussing the historical transformation of forms of collective action and, in a different vein, Garner and Zald (chapter 12), the topic is rarely discussed. Here we briefly sketch the historical transformation of movements in America. We then use the recent past to project the future of social movement organizations, tactics, orientation and sites. Our general theme is that in an organizational society the shape of social movements is closely tied to the technologies, forms, opportunities, and targets created by that society.

Historical Transformation

How to describe the transformation of movements? Think for a moment about the parallel transformation of large scale organizations, both the profit making firm and public bureaucracy. Some fairly clear lines of development can be sketched. Organizations have gotten larger in size; they have developed new modes of internal management, moving from patrimonial and personal modes of control to bureaucratic systems with well developed rule systems (Edwards, 1979). Firms changed their formal structures from those based on functional principles of delegation to divisional- profit-center structures (Chandler, 1963; Chandler 1977). Moreover, corporations have become increasingly multi-national—although capital has always found ways to cross national borders, the growth of multi-national firms that manage the combination of capital, labor, and facilities in many nations is a phenomenon of the last half century.

How would we sketch a parallel history of the transformation of social movements? One major trend in social movement transformation is represented by
the growth of limited purpose associations as formal organizations that are carriers of social movements. In the early part of American history, most social movements articulated with the major cleavages of society. Either loose networks of local notables (as in the Committees of Correspondence) interlinked to discuss grievances and to petition the authorities, or pamphleteers communicated with their constituencies. Of course, leaders emerged from their local communities, as in Shay's and Bacon's rebellion, to generate substantial collective actions.

In the early nineteenth century social movement activity links directly to party politics. Although the abolitionist movement was tied to associations stemming from an evangelical tradition, it also penetrated party debate. The two-party system was not as well institutionalized, and new parties and splinter parties, especially at the local level, had a greater chance of success (Hesseltine, 1962). By way of contrast, modern SMOs and leaders maintain an independence from the established parties and find the third party alternative risky. Although modern movement constituencies participate in politics, their related SMOs maintain a fair amount of institutional separation. Stated somewhat differently, sentiments for change are mobilized to support a social movement sector of many industries; at the same time, the sentiments for change penetrate ongoing political parties and structures.

It would be a mistake to argue that there was a sudden change in the associational capacity of the United States. After all, De Tocqueville had early seen the U. S. as the associational society. And Rosenthal, et.al. (1985) have recently documented the complexity of the associational field in which women reform leaders participated from 1840-1914. Yet, as urbanization and industrialization proceeded, the ability of social movement entrepreneurs to capture resources for social movement purposes stands out. And, by the turn of the century, the associational possibility had become a flood. Any examination
of the organizational infra-structure in the Progressive Movement quickly reveals the growth of limited purpose, middle class based SMOs (Wiebe, 1967).

I suspect that the Progressive Movement also ushers in another aspect of organizational change that is a hallmark of later developments—full-time reformers, professionals of social change, if you will, make their appearance. There were two main threads of the progressive movement—the reform of urban government and the alleviation of the negative effects of poverty—child labor, housing and health and safety codes. The reform of urban government leads to civil service, urban planning, and the use of expertise in assessing urban needs. The latter, aimed at alleviating the effects of poverty, led to the growth of social work as a reform agent—the settlement house movement, legislative lobbying, and the mobilization around specific legislative targets.

It is worth noting that two major types of social movements base that are theoretically important can already be distinguished in the nineteenth century. On the one hand, movements based upon a beneficiary constituency can be seen in such movements as the early feminist movement and the labor movement. On the other hand, the abolitionist movement, the temperance movement, and the set of organizations and movements aimed at poverty alleviation in the first part of the nineteenth century, represent movements largely based upon conscience constituencies.

Not only do we see the growth of middle class based "professional" movement organizations in the first part of the century, but we also see an enlarged role for the press, the growth of journalistic moral entrepreneurs. Such muckrakers as Lincoln Steffens and Ida Tarbell become key figures in defining issues. Their position is dependent upon the expansion of the mass circulation newspapers and weeklies and the growth of a national audience.

There is one other aspect of the long-range transformation that deserves
comment. In Gamson and Tilly's terms, some of the early movements are to gain access to the polity, to gain standing (e.g., voting rights, standing as legitimate members of the polity). But it is already the case for the movements based in the middle class that the issue is not polity membership, but policy influence and preferences. That is, individuals and groups have standing as citizens and right of access even when the issues they are concerned with have little credibility or legitimacy. Later I am going to argue that for modern social movements, the early issues of membership in the polity have largely receded.\(^1\) The extension of the franchise to women, the elimination of racial barriers to citizenship, eliminate some of the historic issues of social movement mobilization. Moreover, the existence of discretionary resources and the growth of technologies that aid in their aggregation, means that diverse interests are easily and continuously represented. As more groups are represented in the polity, on the one hand, and as groups that are well represented in the polity increase their tactical repertoire to include mobilizing the grass roots, on the other hand, the line between social movement analysis and pressure group analysis becomes increasingly blurred.

These broad trends, the growth of a relatively continuous social movement sector, the development of SMOs as enduring features of the society, the professionalization of movement leadership, and the transition from a search for membership in the polity, to the search for specific policy outcomes, are broad historical trends that shape the way in which social movements manifest themselves in modern society. What will be the specific and short range trends of the next several decades? There would appear to be changes in the orientation of the social movement sector as the issues of an industrializing society transform into those of a post-industrial society. There are also changes in the technology of mobilization and representation. Finally, the organizational
society creates the potential for social movement like phenomena within organizations and professions.

Social Movement Orientation and Targets in a Post-Industrial Society.

As we have seen, over the decades the orientation of the social movement sector has changed, either as society changed, eliminating the social base and problems of the movement, or as the social movement and political process achieved changes, reducing the demands for potential social movements. The abolitionist movement, including the Civil War, led to the end of slavery. The labor unrest of the 30's and first half of the century have given way to a somewhat institutionalized labor-management bargaining system. In both cases, although the social movements led to a transformation of the challenged institutions, underlying racial and class structures and antagonisms were by no means fully transformed. Class and racial balances were changed, "progress" was made, surely, the new institutions eliminated the gross injustices of the prior scene. Yet, underlying class and racial antagonisms remained and surfaced in new forms.

To predict the orientation of the social movement sector, the major goals of social movements, requires a juxtaposition of emerging social cleavage lines of class, race, religion, age, sex and culture, as they relate to the definition of actionable issues in the political system. Here I highlight the set of social movement potentials created by the changing nature of industrial society and changing demographic patterns that we are likely to see in the decades ahead.

Post-Industrial Movements.

We have already seen the growth of a cluster of movements that are reactive to the negative externalities of economic growth and the industrial production system. The environmental movement, the anti-nuclear power movement, local
movements to control toxic wastes, movements to regulate truck weights, are all aspects of a set of reactions to the spin-offs of the complexities and conflicts over technical decisions (Nelkin, 1984). They are likely to be with us for a long time.

One might argue that the government has already responded to the threat through the creation of regulatory mechanisms at Federal and State levels, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and others. Haven't we institutionalized mechanisms for assessing risk and limiting dangers?

Two features of the underlying set of problems suggest that new outcroppings of the negative externalities of industrial society, and new groups and movements that no longer accept the costs will be part of the social movement landscape. First, negative externalities are created as unknown by-products of industrial processes and products (Mitchell, 1979). Only by preemptive and prohibitive research can the effects of all industrial processes and products be known before the damage occurs (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). At what point could the effect of acid rain be known? How does one control for long-term negative side effects of new drugs? Thus, the creation of issues for action is inevitable, though some risks can be avoided.

Second, the burden of costs of different negative externalities fall on different groups at different times. Catastrophes occur in specific instances as concatenations of normal processes that were designed to avoid catastrophe. Systems are not foolproof (Perrow, 1984). There is no way that the residents of the Love Canal area or of Three Mile Island can take steps beforehand to minimize the risk. Mobilization and community organization to cope with the fallout from these failures represents a movement entrepreneurial opportunity that will come often. (See Walsh, 1981 and Walsh and Warland, 1983.) As new problems emerge,
affecting new groups and communities, local movements, linked to circles of experts and professions, are likely to result.

One feature of these post, or late, industrial movements is that their definition and resolution call for a heavy dose of expert opinion. Analysis of the interplay of causes, costs, consequences and options requires extensive knowledge of esoteric subjects, unavailable to even relatively well educated laymen. In modern society experts play a role in defining facts and issues for many movements—from issues of tax redistribution to the impact of pornography on behavior. Yet, issues of technological fallout are peculiarly vulnerable to battles over technical definitions and complex, but often ill-defined, systems of causation and long-term effects. In this situation movements become battles over expert definitions, and the ability of parties to command expertise becomes an important part of the power equation (Molotch, 1970).

Many of the post-industrial social movements are "consumer" movements. They stem not just from the impact of specific products, but from the intersection of government policy, regulations and law, as they bear on specific client-age-category groups. As the purview of the state has enlarged and penetrated a greater range of activities, the implications of state policy for discrete categories of users and producers carves up the political space. Each arena of state action—the labelling and testing of specific products (e.g., tobacco), the provision of specific services (e.g., remedial education), creates the opportunity for political mobilization.

Client-consumer movements are likely to be a continuing feature of the landscape for two reasons. On the one hand, the penetration of state action into many areas of life seems to be ineluctable. (A regime may attempt to cut back its overreach, but in the United States, at least, citizens, politicians and organizations will search out new venues in the decentralized system.) On the
other hand, client-consumer movements are likely to be a continuing part of the social movement scene because of the transformation of social movement technology. Many, if not most, client-consumer groups are made up of individuals affected by state action who are not members of solidary communities, usually a weak condition for mobilization. However, given that institutions often have a stake in creating groups for cooptation and support, given the possibilities of contingency fees in class action suits, given the linkage of consumer issues to professional careers, given the rise of PMOs, client-consumer groups no longer have a large deficit of mobilization potential (McFarland, 1976).

Socio-Demographic Bases.

Changes in the structure of the labor force, in the structure of families, in the categorization and life opportunities of segments of the population do not automatically translate into social movement goals. Nevertheless, the existence of "at-risk" populations, those which, because of changing social relations and structures, experience major value deficits vis-a-vis other parts of the population, become grist for the social movement machine. Moreover, the mere growth in numbers of people in a social category at risk represents targets of opportunities for movements.

There are at least three major changes in socio-demographics of the American population that might have bearing on the development of political social movements - the growing proportion of the population that are aged, the changing racial-ethnic composition of the population, and the growth of female-headed households combined with the high level of female participation in the labor force. These changes in socio-demographics and in social relations will vary in their impact on politics and social movements.

The growth of the aged population poses continuing policy and programmatic problems for our legislative bodies. Yet, these problems are on the continuing
political agenda. The aged vote, there are a well developed set of institutional programs and legislative committees that cope with the changing needs of the elderly, and mere sets of programs have been enacted to deal with facets of the concerns of the elderly. Writers on the welfare state (such as Harold Wilensky [1975]) suggest a set of backlash political movements that attack the welfare state. And these are clearly in place. But, in fact, these backlash movements are more likely to be aimed at taxation levels, not the aged per se. It is, however, entirely possible that a prolonged economic decline could be accompanied by a set of anti-tax, anti-welfare social movements. Since our legislative process encourages the enactment of benefits more than the cutting off, or cutting back, of old programs, and since the center of political gravity has been to maintain programs, extreme reactions to the welfare state may well develop on the fringe of the Republican Party and outside of it. But the main point is that the effects of a changing age distribution of the population are, I believe, well encapsulated in normal politics. Indeed, Samuel Preston (1984) has recently argued that the aged's income situation has been well protected as compared to children's in the period 1970–82. He attributes this income protection to the extensive political participation and influence of the aged. While there will be significant opportunities for policy change, as medical technology, mortality rates, and institutions create and cope with changes in the situation of the aged, the policy changes will work themselves out through normal politics.

The second aspect of demographic changes that might relate to social movements is the changing pattern of ethnicity and race in America. Demographic projections indicate a growth of the Hispanic population, and a continuing enlargement of the Asian-origin population. These changes in ethnic composition are already affecting the politics of Florida, New York, California, and Texas. They effect the politics of Chicago and Detroit as well. Here too, citizenship
rights are well established, the normal processes of political incorporation are already at work, and local and national party structures have begun to reflect the new constituencies.

The changing ethnic composition appears to me to have implications for social movements through two mechanisms, the creation of new coalitions and the redefinition of ethnicity and ethnicity at risk. The possibility of a "rainbow coalition" bringing together ethnic groups defined as "have nots" and other "have nots" as a significant entity could presage a significant shift in the control of party policy. It does not, I believe, portend a new left social movement, since its advocates tend to operate largely in the arena of electoral politics. But it could press the Democratic party to the left and could also press white supporters of the Democratic party to the right (Petrocik, 1981). Social movement action would depend, I think, on the linkage of social democratic-populist ideology to the rainbow coalition. (A hook-up between Jesse Jackson and Tom Hayden outside of the party.)

Here, again, the actionable issues and the potential for mobilization emerge from the intersection of state policy and the situation of groups in society. Ethnicity is to some extent created by state policy. The disparate indigenous groups that make up the category "Native Americans" and are impelled to act as a coalition and respond to similar policies would have no inherent unity without state policy. Similarly, Asian-Americans had (and have) little in common as Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, etc. But state policy may transform the utility of coalition and transformed identity (Nagel, 1982; Nielsen, 1985).

Although I am skeptical that trends in aging or in ethnicity will presage a new set of social movements, the prospects for social movements related to the feminist movement and the feminization of poverty are greater. First, the women's movement is in place and has not been incorporated into party alliances.
The movement may lean slightly to the Democrats, but there has been a systematic attempt on the part of SMOs and their leaders to maintain some distance. Second, there is a unique constellation of issues related to the movement and to the feminization of poverty that challenge the social system on fundamental issues. The established political parties have trouble coping with these issues. Finally, the structure of the movement lends to permanence.

The three issues around which the women's movement may generate a more active movement program are defense policy and the anti-nuclear movement, the issue of equal pay, and the potential issue of child support and child-care policy for middle-class women. It is very clear that women are more likely to support the anti-nuclear power movement and to resist defense policies which threaten war (Brody, 1984). Secondly, the issue of equal pay for equal work which has great moral claim and ideological resonance is a direct threat to a fundamental ideological assumption of a capitalist system - the notion of a market price for labor. Third, the changing structure of the family and the feminization of poverty represent a potential policy agenda, far beyond where our current welfare state policies have led us.

It is not the case that this set of issues is unsolvable in our usual muddling through, incrementalist manner; but they each represent significant policy issues which can be combined into a women's movement agenda with farreaching potential. None of them are easily accepted by major political parties. Each is costly. And the first two, the issue of equal pay and defense policy, represent direct threats to central postulates of entrenched elites.

Of the social movements on the current scene, a radicalized feminist movement represents the most likely candidate for domination of the movement sector. Since the movement has a number of single-issue items on the agenda with specialized organizations and constituencies (e.g., battered wives), the feminist
movement would appear to have the best chances for continued high levels of mobilization and activity.

Cultural Movements: The Transformation of Class and Status.

Aside from the socio-demographic trends discussed above, there are other changes in the distribution of the population by region, by class and occupation, and by religion that have implications for the social movement scene. The purported growth of "Yuppies" as a significant group, the growth of a new class of professionals and highly educated who are critical of established values, the movement to the sun-belt and the economic growth of the sun-belt, the emergence of a large and relatively prosperous Fundamentalist Protestantism, all have implications for the social movement sector and the politics of the next several decades.

Part of the problem in assessing the implications of these trends for future social movements stems from definitional ambiguity. What, for instance, do we mean by "new class"? B. Bruce Briggs (1979) has published a useful collection of essays in which authors present alternative definitions and the implications of their alternatives for politics. Is the new class represented by the growth of people with college degrees? With advanced degrees? With professional degrees? With occupations in the media and human services? With degrees in the arts and social sciences? Moreover, occupation, or occupational training does not make a social class. Steven Brint (1984) has attempted a systematic comparison of the definitions of a new class and an empirical test of differences in political attitudes of the groups identified under each definition. For the time period he studied (data sets collected from 1974-1980) there was a slight tendency for new entrants to the occupations and educational groups to be more critical of society than older members. More significantly for new class theory, only people with cultural and social science backgrounds tend to be consistently critical of
business when compared with other groups. Brint concludes that the strength and permanence of the new class has been exaggerated.

A somewhat different part of the problem in assessing the implications of these trends is that these groups do not represent classes or corporate groups with clear interests and organizational bases. For instance, the population of Houston, Texas is diverse. In a period in which the oil industry was booming, its population had some interests in common with the growing sun-belt. But in the period of economic retrenchment that occurred with the decline in oil prices in 1983 and 1984, their economic interests no longer coincided with that of the growing sun-belt. Moreover, Kevin Phillips (1982) argues convincingly, that the purported conservative drift of the sun-belt exaggerates its permanence and unity. The migration and growth of the sun-belt contributes to instability and change, but without clear direction. Phillips does show that some of the newly emerging occupational life-style communities have a distinctive political commitment. For instance, the high tech/libertarian communities of Marin County or Palo Alto, or Denver, or suburban Boston, do have a distinctive political style. In 1980, these were the lair of the supporters of John Anderson for President.

But, in general, because the new class is amorphous, because Yuppies are distinguished more by age and family income pattern than by anything else, it is hard to believe that they represent a base for any substantial social movement. Instead, they are likely to be a base for expressive styles, not systematic policy and ideological program. Vic Tannys and aerobic dancing are not a basis for organizational mobilization.

On the other hand, the growth of the fundamentalist Protestant churches, with their strong communal base, married to modern social movement technology does represent a trend that is likely to have deep social movement implications
(see chapters two and three). Movements such as the Moral Majority represent a political expression of a deep cultural split, a reaction to the trends of modernism, to secularism, to sexual and social libertarianism. Fundamentalism is not new. What is new is the size and wealth of the participants and the readiness of the denominational and church leaders to participate in political action (Harding, 1983 and 1985).

The orientation of the social movement sector responds to underlying trends in social structure as they relate to political process and actionable issues. We have located the future orientation of the sector in demographic trends and emerging issues of post-industrial society. But the volume or size of the sector is also influenced by the organizational and mobilization technologies available to the society. So the future of social movements in America is partly an organizational and technological question.

Organizational Changes and Resource Mobilization.

We have described in some detail the factors that eased the creation of social movement organizations. Briefly, affluence creates discretionary resources that can be allocated for social movement causes, even when discretionary time is in short supply. Moreover, large numbers of people, especially college students, have discretionary time to allocate. The existence of marginal resources, gathered from many middle class suppliers, or larger amounts of resources, gathered through churches, philanthropic organizations, government agencies, and labor unions, permits movement entrepreneurs to find an organizational niche even when a mass base of activists or mobilized marchers are difficult to find. Every cause can find an organizational vehicle—concern about air safety is quickly translated into "Aviation Consumer Action Project"—a Nader spin-off. The Children's Defense League, directed by Marian Wright
Edelman, employs sixty people and has a three million dollars a year budget.

**Fundraising and Organizational Development**

There have been great strides in the techniques of mass fund raising. Social movement organizations share with political parties and televangelism the advantage of the computer revolution and mass mail marketing techniques. These include computer personalized letters, carefully cleaned and targeted mailing lists, the ability to reshape letters and appeals to a variety of audiences. Hadden and Swann (1981) describe how evangelical ministers meld television mailing lists, viewers, and letters into a TV network based community. Social movements are at a disadvantage in this particular game, compared to evangelical religion, because they are less able to utilize television on a routine basis. Their audience is smaller and more episodic in its attention span.

On the other hand, social movements do have access to foundation and government agencies in a way that religious organizations do not. Craig Jenkins (forthcoming) traces the growth and shifts in philanthropic foundation support for social movement activity. Social movements are also aided by the general growth of voluntary association - community organization skills. The skills of networking, of meeting notification, of developing newsletters, have spread quite remarkably in the society. Networking, fundraising, organizational techniques for utilizing the media are all transformed from techniques learned on the job to formally transmitted skills. Professional fundraisers - pollsters, campaign managers - are guns for hire and it is extremely easy to learn the formal skills necessary for organizational development. Larry Sabato (1981; 340-343) lists more than fifty political consultants who provide polling, fundraising and campaign management skills to political candidates. Some of these restrict their services to candidates from one or the other party and to social issues that are ideologically compatible. Richard Viguerie (1981), a key figure in fundraising
on the right, has been unique in his role as an ideologue as well as a fundraiser.

The Representation of Groups.

Earlier, I asserted that the modern system of mobilization now permitted most groups to be easily represented. In a sense, this is an assertion that basic access to the polity of societal members is easily achieved. Such an observation does not square with the obvious fact that groups may have access, but not be on the public agenda. Groups without resources or large moral claims continue to be isolated from political action. Our earlier arguments about the professionalization of movement mobilization can be used to shed light on the problem.

There are two major routes to gaining access to the policy agenda. First, beneficiary based movements can draw upon the infrastructure of support in a large interest category. While their mobilization process may depend upon, in part, a wider moral discourse, perceived grievances within the group and a broader agenda of communal action may sustain the mobilization of social movements, regardless of the support in the larger society. Second, groups that do not have citizenship status, or have weak citizenship status (e.g., children, animals, prisoners), or that have few resources (e.g., welfare mothers), can draw upon the moral discourse of the larger society.

Modern society makes it possible for weak groups to be represented because of two major characteristics. The existence of multiple sub-cultures in modern society, created and sustained by the enormous institutionalization of professions and associations, maintains a continuous dialogue about the core values of those differentiated institutions. Most weak and underrepresented groups are represented by conscience constituents tied to institutions and associations. Children, whales, dogs, are the object of concern of foundations,
voluntary associations, professional groups, and professional schools. These groups carry on a continuous dialogue and debate about the state and potential improvement in the lot of their objects of concern. For instance, one of the more vigorous movements of 1984 and 1985 involved the attempt to stop or limit the use of animals for medical research. The movement and its followers used a wide variety of tactics (e.g., rallies, lobbying, and the bombing of medical laboratories) to attempt to achieve its ends. It was not merely a movement of pet lovers, but developed a full-blown ideology about the relation of homo sapiens to other species.

That such representation occurs should not be taken to imply a strong representation. PNOs representing weak groups may be peculiarly dependent upon attaching their causes to broad social movements or to exploring windows of opportunity that open in the policy arena. As long as they are isolated from the broader movements, or from opportunities created by larger political events, coalitions and processes, they may represent groups with little effect. But under the right conditions, PNOs can be major components of social change. Ronald Troyer and Gerald Markle (1983), for instance, have recently documented the extraordinary role of a PNO in changing American laws and regulations related to smoking tobacco. A PNO, ASH, acted as a fulcrum and campaign manager as the evidence of the negative effects of smoking mounted.

**Tactical Transformation.**

The organizational revolution represented by the growing ease of mobilization has also been accompanied by a tactical transformation. Over a decade ago, Michael Lipsky (1968) taught us that movement tactics must be seen as multi-valent. Tactics may impose economic and political costs on authorities; they have effects upon the sympathies or antagonisms of local bystanding publics and referent elites, and, through the media, upon less immediately incontact
bystanders and referent elites; finally, they have impact upon the sympathies, readiness to act, and enthusiasm of adherents and constituents.

The tactical repertoire of any movement is dependent in the first instance upon the cultural-technological stock available to cadre and adherents. Boycotts, petitions, guerilla theatre, sit-ins, mass mailings to legislatures, class action suits, voter registration drives, hi-jackings, assassinations, car bombings, marches, truck blockades, computer referenda, telethons, political action committees, are social inventions. They are mixtures of hard technology, legal constraints on behavior, and organizational resources. Each tactic is learned and can be transmitted. Each requires a particular combination of skills, personnel, and tools that may or may not be available to cadre. You cannot have a march with only five supporters. There is a production function for tactics.

Moreover, tactics occur in a stream of history. They take on meaning in specific situations and in relation to what has occurred before. Terrorism, for instance, is quite effective if the authorities are ambivalent about the legitimacy of their participation in a given setting, or if referent elites and mass publics are pressing for the withdrawal of authorities and their agents. Terrorism has opposite effects, in the short run at least, if authorities and referent elites are unified in opposition to the terrorists and their cause. Indeed, terrorist attacks on a unified authority and reference elite may only lead to the strengthening of authority response. Especially in the early stages of a movement, terrorism may signify to sympathizers the vitality and potential of suppressed movements. To bystanders it signifies the potential costs of not recognizing the legitimacy of the movement. Over time, however, repeated use of terror loses its shock-signifying value, and is assimilated to the flow of events.
When new tactics are introduced, cadre and adherents must gain experience in their use, so efficiency of deployment may increase over time. But tactics may decline in effectiveness as authorities and countermovements develop skills in responding or controlling them (see McAdams, 1984). If tactics are not followed by success constituents may grow weary and despondent.

It is difficult to discuss trends in tactics without discussing the components of specific movements. The legitimation of tactics is not only a function of technological availability, but also of the basic commitments of adherents. The more a movement rejects the fundamental social order as embodied in the state, the more likely the use of terror and violence. On the other hand, even if the movement has narrower goals, if the enemy is seen as evil incarnate, more extreme measures are justified to some members of the movement. Pro-life supporters can bomb a Planned Parenthood association, but, so far, retirees do not bomb the Social Security Administration. More abstractly stated, tactical choice is part of a moral economy - what seems legitimate and appropriate to constituents and what seems legitimate to external audiences may vary.

Two tactical trends seem to be apparent. First, social movements in America quickly learn how to link local and national venues. An organization such as Common Cause, that begins as a national PMO, with only a mail membership, quickly learns the value of local chapters and activity as a means of building constituencies and as developing a source for local pressure on legislators and authorities (McFarland, 1984). Conversely, the existence of local groups concerned with local problems creates an opportunity for entrepreneurs to coordinate their action and represent their local interest on the national scene (e.g., the Civil Rights Leadership Conference, the Federation of Neighborhood Organizations). Note that I am using as "tactical" the very structure of organizations; that is, organizational structure is chosen as a technique to
achieve social movement ends.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that established pressure groups and even corporations with local branches have adopted similar strategies. Thus, the coordinating associations for the electricity utilities developed local branches in order to support nuclear power. Firms like McDonald's and ARCO, have also mobilized constituents to bring pressure on legislators. But our major point should be clear. In modern society local groups can quickly develop a national presence, and groups that start at the national level can develop local arms.

A second tactical trend in America would seem to be a decrease in the use of violent methods over long periods of time. In part, I assume that large-scale conflict is prohibited both by the strength of the State and the ability of the State to repress conflict and by the extent to which society has developed techniques for co-opting and for incorporating groups and movements into the procedures. Writing on conflict and social movements from a world system's perspective, Edward Kick (1980) summarizes the matter nicely:

"In the core, several factors combine to reduce conflict intensity. Strong states more effectively institutionalize conflict among internal parties (e.g., labor and management) by initiating and, if necessary, enforcing rules of the game. The state itself is unlikely to become a party to intensely violent mass conflict because its very strength and capacity for repression when necessary inhibit efforts to seize the government. Moreover, that capacity rarely needs to be fully activated since politics in the core is not a zero-sum game. The polyarchic political system, coupled with an increasing pool of resources, generates a fairly high probability that groups seeking recognition and/or material benefits will actually acquire them. Also, the economic ability to institute broad social welfare programs may constitute a general, rather than group specific, mechanism for reducing conflict. This type of opportunity, or cost structure, greatly encourages the formation of conflict groups with limited goals... That is even more true from the perspective of the population at risk for recruitment into such groups. Given the class structure of core countries, there is a relatively large pool of persons who are unwilling to risk involvement in unlimited political conflict or in the governmental changes that such conflict may initiate."

What are the implications of these tactical and organizational trends for
the future of social movements in America? First, that movements easily develop national-local linkages implies that pure "grassroots" movements or national lobbying organizations can easily switch their forms. The availability of networks and organizations means that MOs are not restricted by their constituency bases. Although we may find pure "grassroots" movements or pure national lobbying organizations which for tactical reasons do not develop into the other, increasingly it is a tactical choice.

Second, since groups easily gain legitimate status, and since the political structures of America are tied to legal and ideological roots prescribing openness and consultation, movements are easily brought into a participatory mode—the combination of an open electoral system and bureaucratic representation coopts movements. Indeed, violent tactics are as likely to be used between movements and countermovements, between branches of sects, as they are between movements and authorities.

Third, we can expect a continued evolution and refinement of the computer-television-personalized solicitation-lobbying interface. This technological organizational approach to fundraising and mobilization is an American invention, now spreading to Western Europe. Leaders in the employment of this technology, such as Richard Viguerie, now have a European clientele, and political consultants such as Joseph Napolitan have clients in Latin America (Sabato, 1981).

Finally, the reformist character of modern American movements, coupled with the ease of organizing SMOs and the stability of the two-party system, implies the continuing pervasiveness of single-issue politics. SMOs in this electoral system focus on the marginal influence, rather than the seizure of power.

By no means does this analysis imply an end to large-scale conflict in which social movements mount major challenges to established institutions. Nor does it
imply an end to the destruction of lives and property as part of the interaction of movements and authorities. It would be possible to develop a scenario of systemic economic decline that led in this direction. Our analysis does imply that, short of a major change in the direction of the social system, reformist and melioristic movements and contained tactics are more likely to be the mode.

The Situs of Social Movements

Our analysis has largely focused upon movements that express themselves through demands on the central political system. But, in modern society much social movement activity in fact takes place in bureaucratic institutions and in the professions. For several decades, sociologists of the professions and organizations have recognized that social movement like phenomena occur in organizations and professions (Bucher and Strauss, 1961; Weinstein, 1979; Zald and Berger, 1978). The growth of complex bureaucratic institutions, intersecting with professions as special interest groups, suggests that much of social change and social movement phenomena occur not in political legislation but as reform and innovation movements connected to established agencies. It is impossible to evaluate the sheer quantity of such social movement-like activity, but let us give a few illustrations.

Over the last twenty years the hospice movement has spread rapidly (Paradis, 1985). It has been a social movement on the edge of the medical complex, led largely by medically related professionals. A prominent role has been taken by nurses and ministers related to medical settings. Although the institutionalization of the hospice movement has required changes in legislation and funding, a good part of the action has been involved in mobilizing local institutions. Another professional movement can be seen in the development of family therapy. It developed at the border of psychology, psychiatry, and
clinical social work. It was at first frowned upon by the orthodox, but has had charismatic leaders, separate training institutions, and spread like wild-fire before it became well institutionalized.

Other movements in professional settings include the transformation of city planning in the 1960s. The emphasis changed from formal physical planning to community development and organization. It developed a new recruitment base and led to conflict within agencies (Needleman and Needleman, 1974; Ross, 1975).

Our tools for the analysis of such movements are much weaker than our tools for the analysis of political movements. These movements often resemble "idea currents" carried by new generations of professionals. The events of the movements are less dramatic than police-demonstrator confrontations, or marches on Washington. And except in the case of organizational coup d'etats, the media are unlikely to pay much attention to them. But in some cases these movements massively transform the territory of institutional operation. They occur at the frontier of the intersection of technological change, professional and normative challenges to established practices, and organizational change. They are likely to become a dominant part of social change in an increasingly bureaucratized and professionalized society.

Conclusion

I have sketched the trends in the organization of SMOs, transformation of tactics, the orientation of the social movement sector, and situs. This is a risky business. Who knows, to-morrow some new movement may emerge, totally unrelated to the current scene. Speciism as a social movement may dominate the headlines. On the other hand, short of major depression, war, or ecological catastrophe, I doubt that we will see a major reconstitution of the SM sector in advanced industrial society. Aside from the potential movements and
counter-movements around the feminist issues and the movements around fundamentalism that I discussed, no other movements on the current scene have much potential for social movement action.

But it should be clear that large-scale economic depression is possible; that ecological catastrophe in regions, or in nations, may occur. Such large-scale events would clearly reshape the social movement sector. Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein (1982) have tried to sketch the mix of short-term and long-run considerations shaping working class mobilization that might be affected by a large-scale downward change in the economy. It is clear that a prolonged depression could change the mobilization of the working class, upset the well-institutionalized balance of management-labor conflict and bargaining, and transform allegiance to political parties and the ongoing system. Finally, our analysis has been internal. We have treated the social movement sector as if it were isolated from a world political economy and the world currents of change. For most purposes this is appropriate. But in a period in which the United States is losing its hegemonic position and in which social movements and political change in other nations reverberate on our own politics and social movements, attention to these linkages will become more important.
1. It may be that in T. H. Marshall's (1965) terms, issues of political rights have receded, but a range of economic and civil rights denied to specific groups continue to be sources of social movement attack. The issue of political rights, however, has been central to a perspective on social movements that sees them as arising, in a sense, by societal members outside of the polity. I believe this perspective on social movements to be misguided. It starts the analysis of movements from below. Political social movements involve contests for power in which partisans believe routine access and a legitimate place on the agenda is inadequate. People of the Right and the Left, above and below, can believe the directions of the polity to be inadequate. They can believe that authorities do not represent their interests.
References


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