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The Center for Research on Social Organization is a facility of the Department of Sociology, The University of Michigan. Its primary mission is to support the research of faculty and students in the department's Social Organization graduate program. CRSO Working Papers report current research and reflection by affiliates of the center; many of them are published later elsewhere after revision. Working papers which are still in print are available from the center for a fee of $2.00 for any paper under 100 pages and $4.00 for papers over 100 pages. The center will photocopy out-of-print working papers at cost (approximately five cents per page). Request copies of working papers, the list of other center reprints, or further information about center activities from: Center for Research on Social Organization, The University of Michigan, 4501 LSA, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48109-1382: (313)764-7487.

332 "Implications of Families' Struggles with Childhood Cancer," by Mark A. Chesler and Oscar A. Barbarin, March 1986, 29 pages.


BEYOND AGREEMENT: Value Judgements in Conflict Resolution and Cooperative Conflict in the Classroom

by Alfie Kohn

PCMA WORKING PAPER #6
CRSO WORKING PAPER #343
April 1987

The Program on Conflict Management Alternatives at The University of Michigan
THE PROGRAM ON CONFLICT MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES

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Elizabeth Douvan, Professor of Psychology
Barbara Israel, Associate Professor, School of Public Health
Edith Lewis, Co-Director, PCMA and Associate Professor, School of Social Work
David Schoem, Assistant Dean for the Freshmen and Sophomore Years and Lecturer in Sociology, College of LS&A
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