CONSTRAINTS ON PROFESSIONAL POWER IN SOVIET-TYPE SOCIETY: INSIGHTS FROM THE SOLIDARITY PERIOD IN POLAND

Michael D. Kennedy and Konrad Sadkowski
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Michael D. Kennedy  Konrad Sadkowski

Department of Sociology  Department of History
The University of Michigan  Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1382

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One of the nightmares facing marxism is that socialist revolution might put a force other than a universal proletariat into power. One Polish participant in the Russian Revolution, Waclaw Machajski, thought that the Bolshevik-inspired transformation of society led to the rule of the East European intellectual stratum, the intelligentsia, rather than of the working class. Although few think the intelligentsia is in any sense presently the ruling class in Soviet-type societies, this prospect continues to haunt contemporary analysts. Ivan Szelenyi (1982, 1986-87 and with Gyorgy Konrad, 1979) offers the most sophisticated argument along these lines when he argues an alternative future facing East European societies to be one where the intelligentsia becomes such a ruling class. But this is a future, not the present. For the intelligentsia to wield such power, some kind of social transformation is necessary. The tutelage of the political elite over the intelligentsia must be ended. But of what does this tutelage consist? What are the barriers to the class power of the intelligentsia? That depends on the part of the intelligentsia one considers.

One of the main problems facing such class analysis is the considerable differentiation of the intelligentsia into various occupations and organizations. Both the constraints on and prospects for power vary across occupations and organizations. Analysis of separate occupations can limit the complications accompanying this heterogeneity. At the same time, it need not eliminate class from the analytical framework. Class analysis is a level of analysis more abstract than that of occupations, but one to which the analysis of occupations or professions can contribute.

We propose to clarify the constraints on the class power of the intelligentsia in Soviet-type society through a comparison of the constraints on professional power of two occupations, engineers and physicians, in Poland in 1980-81. Professional power is a less general and empirically more accessible notion than class power. It refers to 1) the ability of the members of a highly educated occupation to control the conditions of their occupational practice and reproduction;
and 2) the ability of this group to shape other institutions, particularly of distribution, in its collective interest. Focusing on the constraints on and prospects for such professional power allows for differentiated treatment of members of the intelligentsia, while nevertheless allowing a subsequent move to the more abstract discussion of class and its relationship to social transformation.

The comparison of these two professions should be fruitful because the occupations are quite different. In capitalist societies, physicians are the prototypical profession. They have an authority built into their professional work which provides a foundation for considerable power (Starr, 1982). In Poland, physicians have considerably less professional power while presumably having similar cultural foundations for authority in doctor-patient relations. On the contrary, engineers are probably the most influential profession in Soviet-type society; they are at the very least numerically dominant, which is a situation quite different from that found in capitalist societies. A comparison of these two professions therefore ought to provide one of the more favorable pictures of the prospects for professional power. It also can suggest the differentiation inherent in this intelligentsia, operationally defined as those with higher educations (following Konrad and Szelenyi, 1979).

This analysis of physicians and engineers concentrates on the period from the summer of 1980 to December 13, 1981. The strikes of the summer of 1980 led to the formation of the independent trade union Solidarity. On December 13, 1981, martial law was declared by the Polish authorities and the experiment with self-organization in Soviet-type society was effectively ended. Due to the organizational pluralism and limitations on censorship in this period, the frustrations and aspirations of Polish citizens are more apparent at this time than in any other. This is also true for professionals, where their own perceptions of constraints and prospects for professional power can complement those interpretations based on a more etic model of professionalism. In this paper, "constraints" on professional power refers principally to the objects of critiques made by professionals during 1980-81. "Prospects" refers primarily to those possibilities for augmenting professional power embryonic in the reforms suggested in the period.
Hence, a study of the discourse and activities of Polish professionals in 1980-81 ought to improve considerably our understanding of the conditions of professional power in Soviet-type society.

Before we consider the main theme of the constraints on and prospects for professional power, we shall briefly consider Polish "professionals" in three contexts: 1) the relationship of professionals to the East European term "intelligentsia"; 2) the place of professionals in the class structure of Soviet-type society; and 3) the role played by professionals in the Solidarity period. The clarification of each of these problems facilitates the final discussion of the relevance of understanding professional power to class analysis and social transformation.

PROFESSIONALS AND INTELLIGENTSIA IN SOVIET-TYPE SOCIETY

To use the term "professional" when referring to the highly educated in Eastern Europe requires caution. The traditional term used to describe this Eastern European intellectual stratum is "intelligentsia". This is not an East European equivalent for western "professionals".

"Intelligentsia" is a word with East European origins connoting far more than people with a common type of occupation. In the early modern period, it was more of an estate with a certain lifestyle, a particular ethos, and even a special morality. Gella (1971) defined the old Polish intelligentsia as "a culturally homogenous social stratum of educated people united by charismatic feelings and a certain set of values." When the term came to be applied to post-revolutionary Eastern Europe, it was changed so that it represented a set of people with certain non-manual occupations (Szczepanski, 1962). Sometimes it referred to all those in non-manual occupations, and other times only those with higher educations. Polish sociologists have for the most part abandoned this term in their statistical research and refer to this group as "specialists with higher education" (specjalisz z wyższym wykształceniem). The typical translation of this term is "professionals".

The practical utility of such a translation is obvious. Many of the same occupations that constitute the professions in the West are those same occupations which constitute specialists with higher education in the East: engineers, physicians, lawyers and so on. They share a similar
base of technical knowledge and a common form of discourse, one Gouldner (1979) calls the "culture of critical discourse".

There are, of course, many ways in which professionals in Soviet-type society differ from professionals in market societies. East European professionals share few of the characteristics of organizational autonomy sociologists consider indicative of an occupation's professionalism (Wilensky, 1964). What is more, the rise of professionalism is linked to the development of an autonomous civil society within capitalism, while in East Central Europe, the growth of the intellectual and professional stratum was linked to the struggle by the intelligentsia to conquer the state apparatus (Bauman, 1987). Contemporary differences follow that historical pattern: western professions are characterized by the services they provide to others, minimizing the goal setting component of their activity; in contrast, the East European intelligentsia is defined in large part by this teleological component and thus represents a fundamentally different kind of intellectual (Szelenyi 1982). Although there are thus several reasons why the East European "intelligentsia" can be distinguished from the Western "professional" in capitalism, in other important ways these intellectuals are sufficiently similar to merit use of a common term. Perhaps one of the most significant is their own self-consciousness and discourse.

In the end of the 1970's in Poland, there was renewed interest in the proper role of the intelligentsia. A real intelligentsia, it was argued, should not be consumed with narrow self interested careerism, but rather should be committed to defend the interests of the Polish nation (Hirszowicz, 1980). The Workers Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotnikow or KOR) epitomized this traditional role of the intelligentsia, in that intellectuals from different fields were actively engaged in common political work in support of oppressed workers and their families (Lipski, 1985).

Alongside of this traditional intelligentsia model for the highly educated there is also a more "professional" model: the group, Experience and the Future (Doswiadzenie i Przyszlosc or DiP) (Bielaskak, 1981). Here, instead of a generalized political opposition, members of the intelligentsia used their particular professional expertise to suggest concrete reforms in order to
relieve specific problems facing Poland. There were groups specializing in social policy, economic policy, health policy, and so on. Here Szelenyi's model of professionalism is more relevant, since DiP's members emphasized technical expertise more than a general obligation of political leadership in their activities.2

Although both KOR and DiP were composed of intellectual elites, in 1980 there were approximately 937,700 employees in the state economy with higher educations (Rocznik Statystyczny, 1983:59). The masses of highly educated workers were not involved actively in these transformative groups, but they were a significant audience for their ideas. This became obvious in the Solidarity period, when all sectors of society contributed to the reconstruction of the institutions of Polish life. Professionals were involved in both general political (intelligentsia) and occupationally specialized (professional) forms.

It is important to recognize, therefore, that among the masses of the highly educated in Poland there is a kind of dual consciousness: an affinity with the historical intelligentsia combined with a professional ethos. Among those with some kind of technical expertise, the traditional intelligentsia commitment to the nation is likely to be played out within a specific realm of professional expertise. In the discourse of 1980-81, we find engineers talking about helping the nation to escape the crisis through economic reform and self management; physicians offer schemes to relieve the crisis in health care. Given this emphasis on technical expertise among the highly educated masses, especially among those with some form of technical or applied training, we think it legitimate to call some of the highly educated in Poland "professionals", even while noting that there are important differences between professionals in East and West.

PROFESSIONALS IN BETWEEN

Class analysis of Soviet-type society normally identifies the ruling class as those with control over the means of production through their control over the bureaucratic and planning apparatus (Djilas, 1957; Kuron and Modzelewski, 1966). The ruled or exploited class finds its
center in the traditional working class, but can sometimes incorporate all those who are employees of the state, including professionals. Some of the discourse of 1980-81 reinforces this image.

Representatives from several large enterprises formed an association called the Network (Sieć) to promote social ownership of the means of production, so as to end "state capitalism" and the class privilege of the "owners of the Polish Peoples Republic" ("Sieć", 1981). In this depiction of class relations, professionals and workers are equally dominated. The terminology of the period reflected this consciousness too: in the "we" and "they" division, the "we" evolved from membership in a particular factory, (my pracownicy zakładu X) to membership in a particular occupation (my gornicy) to "we workers" (my robotnicy) to "we authentic representatives of the class of employees" (my, autentycznym representantem klasy pracującej) to people of work (ludzie pracy) (Kuczynski, 1983:470-71) vs. them, or the authorities (oni, władzy), who were constituted in the institutions of the system (Lindenberg and Nowak, 1985:12).

Part of Solidarity's discourse was an emphasis on the absence of significant disagreements within the movement, leading some observers to complain that the union, through its "solidarism" (emphasizing the unity of society vs. the authorities), discouraged the airing of quite legitimate differences (Staniszkis, 1984:113-14). Indeed, the natural basis for a separate "professional" consciousness seems to have been discouraged to a considerable degree.

A "natural" basis for a separate professional consciousness is suggested by Ivan Szelenyi's (1982) analysis of the prospects for the class domination of the intelligentsia in Soviet-type society. There are two principal legitimating bases for the distribution of the surplus in socialism: one which is based on superior teleological knowledge, favoring the Communist Party or the intelligentsia, and one which is based on actual production of the surplus, favoring direct producers. Emphasis on the latter basis leads toward a greater democratization of the society, while the former facilitates a class domination based on expertise, either political or technocratic. In Szelenyi's scheme, professionals benefit under the former mode of legitimation, especially in a situation where the arbitrary power of the political elite is restrained. Their potential class rule is mitigated, however, by their continued domination by political elites. Professional power would be
enhanced by dismantling the tutelage of political elites, while at the same time maintaining the legitimization principle that the allocation of surplus should be based on what people know rather than who makes the surplus in the first place.

An examination of professionals during the Solidarity period is particularly useful for illuminating the problems of, and prospects for, such class power by professionals in Soviet-type society. While the demands of the Solidarity movement included an end to political domination of professionalism, at the same time parts of the movement recommended instituting new checks on the professional domination of the direct producers. This discourse reflected the position of professionals in Soviet-type society: in between the political elites who in normal periods exert political tutelage over professionalism, and the direct producers who are the power base for ending that tutelage. But professional activities during the Solidarity period should not be reduced to some simple reflection of occupational or class interests, since the Solidarity movement itself was more of a "total" movement encompassing several dimensions.

PROFESSIONALS IN THE SOLIDARITY PERIOD

Skilled workers in large factories were the leading group in the Solidarity movement, but professionals were certainly a close runner-up in terms of influence. According to public opinion surveys, approximately two thirds of those with higher educations were members of Solidarity in December 1981, about the same as other groups. There were proportionately fewer engineers and managerial personnel in the union, but even they were more often than not members of Solidarity (Adamski, 1982; see Kennedy, 1987). The influence of those with higher educations is most apparent in the constitution of the leadership.

The proportion of people with university or polytechnic degrees in the leadership far exceeds their representation in the labor force. Those with higher educations represented only 8 per cent of the labor force in 1980 (Rocznik Statystyczny, 1983:59). Of the 33 top activist-officials in the union, over one third (12) had higher educations from universities or technical institutes. Four of these leading figures were engineers (Pakulski, 1986:72). The highly educated were also
likely to be leaders in the regional bodies of Solidarity; approximately one third (21) of the 62 members of Upper Silesian Regional Commission were highly educated (15 were engineers, 4 physicians and 2 teachers). A significant number (13) of "semi-professional" technicians were also members of the council ("Wybory", 1981).

This broad participation by professionals in Solidarity, however, should not be reduced to a single interest based on occupation or class. The movement was simultaneously a trade union movement of employees, a movement for the democratization of society, and a national independence movement (Touraine, et al. 1983). A nationwide poll of Solidarity's members found the national dimension to be the most fundamental reason for membership although its status as an independent union was also important. However, these various qualities had an uneven appeal to different parts of the movement. National independence was relatively more important among delegates to Solidarity's Congress while the independent character of the trade union was relatively more important to the rank and file ("Czym Jest Solidarnosc?", 1981). The discussion groups in Touraine's research also showed different tendencies: the Upper Silesian region, including Katowice, tended to emphasize the union aspect; the Mazowsze-Warsaw region emphasized the democratic; in Wroclaw, the nationalism of the "true Poles" came out most forcefully. The more highly educated males were the most extreme in regard to nationalism (Touraine, 1983:167).

Thus, to the degree that the Solidarity movement was simultaneously a movement for trade union rights, democracy and national independence, professional support for Solidarity should not be reduced to some narrow occupational interest. Nor can their considerable influence in the movement be interpreted as some simple indication that Solidarity was a vehicle to professional class power. Their particular professional expertise or interests were probably less important for explaining their frequent leadership than the discursive abilities derived from their educational background. Jadwiga Staniszkis (1984:127) notes that non-workers gained a disproportionate share of leading positions because election procedures required short speeches, discouraging and disadvantaging those workers with more limited "linguistic codes". Thus, in this
sense, the participation of professionals as activists might be more in keeping with the historical legacy of the Polish intelligentsia, especially in so far as the highly educated led the membership to emphasize national goals. The relationship of Solidarity to the prospects for professional power can be found elsewhere.

Solidarity was not only a movement of activists, but a movement that inspired the renewal of the entire society. It was, as Andrew Arato (1981) notes, a movement to create a "civil society" in Poland, one where plurality, legality and publicity would reign over the state and not the state over them. It was also a movement to restore rationality to a society racked by economic, social and health crisis. As such, the highly educated were involved as professionals both inside and outside of Solidarity in efforts to resolve these problems and introduce reform. Discussions of these problems in various periodicals are of great value for giving us insight into the problems professionals consider most serious and the solutions they most favor. The discourse of 1980-81 can illuminate the constraints on, and prospects for, professional power in Poland specifically, and perhaps in Soviet-type societies generally.

OBSTACLES TO PROFESSIONAL POWER AND CONTROL OVER INVESTMENT

One of the principal professional complaints during the Solidarity period concerned the allocation of national resources. Both engineers and physicians decried the authorities' priorities and the mechanisms guiding investment decisions. This discourse was a departure from that which was heard a decade earlier.

1. PHYSICIANS

The health profession was generally optimistic at the beginning of the 1970's. During Wladyslaw Gomulka's tenure as First Party Secretary between 1956 and 1970, health care and social policy were generally not matters for public debate or discussion. In fact, according to Magdalena Sokolowska (1974:441), the very terms "social policy" and "social planning" only entered the government's vocabulary after Gierek took office. At the Sixth Party Congress in 1971, health care and reform became an important ingredient in Gierek's new social contract with
Polish society. Sokolowska’s (1974) remarks suggested a confidence in and optimism about what Gierek’s reforms could accomplish.

Gierek’s reform sought to reorganize the administration of health care, increase the ratio of doctors to population, expand hospital resources, widen public health care clientele to include private farmers, and institute an improved pay structure for health care employees (Russell-Hodgsons, 1982). In spite of this ambitious and expanded program, the real share of resources allocated to the health sector improved slightly if at all in Gierek’s tenure. This expansion of responsibilities without an adequate increase in resources was the principal theme in the Experience and the Future (DiP) health commission’s account of the origins of the health care problems.

The real share of resources allocated to the health sector improved slightly if at all in Gierek’s tenure. The share of total investment devoted to health and social care increased slightly in this period (Rocznik Statystyczny 1981:184), but it was still comparatively small to the proportion of the budget it enjoyed in 1960 (DiP, 1983:497). Total health care expenditures did increase in the period, although they increased at a lower rate than total expenditures (DiP, 1983:497). In vivid contrast to the optimism of the early 1970’s, by the end of the 1970’s and early 1980’s, medical professionals were extremely critical of governmental budgetary priorities, especially in light of the fact that mortality rates and other indicators of Poland’s health showed significant deterioration (DiP, 1983:490). Thus, DiP demanded that the government reconsider its budgetary priorities and allocate more funds to health care. The authorities also recognized the seriousness of the health crisis in this period, as the third plenum of the Central Committee of the PZPR on June 30, 1980 was devoted to a discussion of these matters (Kania, 1981).

The considerable attention to health care problems prior to the rise of Solidarity is reflected in the Gdansk Agreement of August 1980 which led to the union’s formation. Point 16 of the Agreement concerns the demands of the health sector. Although it begins with a plea for an increase in the resources given to the health sector, this point contains 30 specific demands, ranging from various kinds of wage demands to defining spinal diseases as occupational health
hazards for dentists (see Brumberg, 1983:291-92). Thus, not only were medical professionals pushing for an increase in the resources allocated their sector, from the very beginning of the Solidarity movement they were also quite specific about how those added resources should be used. Point 16 became the basis for subsequent medical sector organizing and negotiations between the Medical Section of Solidarity and the authorities (Kulerski, 1980).

Engineers were both more numerous than physicians and more widely dispersed throughout the economy. They were like physicians, however, in that they became part of the chorus of criticism in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. And also as with physicians, this criticism reflected a change from the beginning of the 1970’s.

2. ENGINEERS

Gierek’s assumption of power had prompted a grand optimism among engineers. Gierek fancied himself an expert manager and technocrat and his regime portrayed itself as providing competent technocratic leadership (Wesolowski, 1987). The regime concentrated its energies on bringing Western technology to Poland and assumed that through this import living standards in Poland would be improved. Gierek emphasized that the Party should stay out of the affairs of administration and leave matters to professionals (Kolankiewicz, 1973:230). Reflecting the fashion of professional titles, regime members went so far as to award themselves professional engineering titles in spite of questionable credentials ("Jak Edward Gierek Zostal Inzynierem?"; also Hirszowicz, 1980). The alliance between engineers and the Gierek regime was represented further in the appointment of Jan Kaczmarek as the Minister of Higher Education and the General Secretary of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Kaczmarek is one of Poland’s leading technocratic experts, and is now the elected president of the Supreme Technical Organization (Naczelna Organizacja Techniczna or NOT). As one Polish journalist put it, the 1970’s was a period of "fascination of technical progress, an opening to the West, great programs of investment, great careers..." (Baczynski, 1983). The economic crisis, which first became apparent in 1976 and later peaked in 1980-82, prompted many engineers to change their minds about the policies of the Gierek regime.
Unlike physicians, engineers were not able to develop a common position that their profession was shortchanged in the distribution of national resources. Some sectors in which engineers worked received considerable resources, while other engineers worked in relatively underprivileged settings. However, two alternative themes criticizing investment were relevant across sectors.

One theme was the irresponsibility of the authorities for relying on foreign licenses when in fact Poland had the human capital to develop Polish technologies. In one particularly strong manifestation of professional self-consciousness, Kazimierz Kloc (1981:11) accused the authorities of following this policy with the specific intention of limiting the independent bargaining power of professional groups. We shall return to this issue of autonomous professional groups in the next section. This criticism was, however, a relatively new development. Individual engineers profited personally from the reliance on foreign technologies, in that they gained foreign contacts and were able to travel abroad. This criticism, although it may have existed in the 1970's, was probably not very popular. It became more important in 1980-81 as it became useful in the redefinition of engineers' alliances.

The other major theme that runs through various critiques of investment policy concerns the "rationality" of the authorities' strategies for development. Because the nature of the irrationality varies according to industry, much of the engineering analysis of investment policies focused on specific industries and the actual form rather than level of investment. Przegląd Techniczny, the official technical journal of Polish engineers and technicians, carried reviews of investment policies in several different industries. In a way, their critiques resemble Thorstein Veblen's (1965) early thesis of revolutionary engineers struggling for rationality against the captains of industry. But instead of railing against captains of industry, Polish engineers usually challenged governmental officials.

For example, in the beginning of the 1980's, Poland faced severe shortages in several items, including white paper. Wieczorkowska and Wozniak (1981) documented one reason for this shortage: an investment in Kwidzyn that has produced no paper but has absorbed most of the
investment funds allocated to the paper industry. The origins of this investment catastrophe lay in the ignorance by a governmental ministry of the advice of experts from a research bureau and local agency.

The Ministry of Forestry and Wood Industries and the State Presidium opted for a plan which required the purchase of a huge paper production plant "lock, stock and barrel" from capitalist countries. The Presidium chose this most expensive option despite 1) advice from experts at the Bureau for Paper Industry Products calling for a combination of foreign and domestic technologies and contractors and 2) a subsequent recommendation by the Lodz Bureau for Paper Industry Products that domestic sources be the primary contractors. This foreign contract was made on the grounds that it would be completed the quickest, in a matter of only four years after starting up in 1973. The project was fraught with delays, however.

After one year, no foreign contractor had been established. Finally, a Canadian firm was contracted for consultation in 1975. After one year of work on the project, the Association of Paper Manufacturers (Zjednoczenie Przemyslu Paperniczego or ZPP) charged that the plant could not be profitable. In reply, the Council of Ministers argued that the plant was indispensible. In 1977, the Lodz Bureau and ZPP argued that the Canadians were being paid too much, and advocated that the Canadians be cut out of the project. The Ministry and Polish paper firm struggled to maintain the foreign connection and made a deal where the Canadians received even more money for their startup costs. By the time this article appeared, the plant was still not producing paper and was not expected to do so until at least 1985.

Those engineers interviewed for the article could point to other lower level reasons for delays too, but the blame usually began with the upper levels. One engineer, a Director of Investments for the ZPP, said, "many people can be blamed for this, beginning with two vice premiers, the ZPP, the Planning Commission and the builders". The director of the Kwidzyn works focused his blame higher: "People from the Central Committee often came to inspect the site. They would make decisions and leave. At conferences, the completion of plans was not noted, only new ones undertaken. It's much easier to make decisions than check and account for
unfulfilled duties". Ultimately, however, it was tough to fix blame on any one person or body; the Kwidzyn debacle was the consequence of systemic failures. But certainly, one of the most important systemic failures concerned the power of governmental authorities to override expert opinions.

Another investment boondoggle occurred in the mining areas of Silesia. On a visit to West Germany, Gierek and his associates arranged a contract with a firm to produce gasoline from low quality coal (Mejro, 1981). Gierek made this initial deal without counsel from chemical industry experts. The deal was reviewed subsequently by an expert commission which offered a negative assessment and recommended against pursuing it. This review managed to delay the project for a while, but Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz was able to revive it by camouflaging it. As the commission advised, this investment proved to be a completely irrational use of funds, since the gasoline produced from this coal would cost more than buying it on the international market, would be unsuitable for many of its proposed uses in Poland, and the money used to produce it could be better spent establishing a new coal mine.

Besides indicting these top political figures, Mejro was critical of their advisors: "It's difficult to imagine that the advisors to Prime Minister Jaroszewicz, who legitimated themselves through high academic titles, did not know about this future gas production." Leading political figures normally had professionals supporting their policies of course. For some critics, however, these very links led the politicians' professional advisors to adopt questionable expert positions.

Despite Gierek's fall in 1980, some professionals continued to support his strategy of borrowing from the West and building huge expensive plants. This was illustrated in a discussion with three engineers who serve as vice chairmen in the Central Union of Milk Cooperatives (Karwicka-Rychlewicz and Nakielski, 1981). In the beginning of the 1980's, milk and milk products were in short supply. The Przegląd Techniczny interviewer challenged the milk industry engineers to admit that this was a consequence of the investment strategies of the 1970's, where huge dairies were constructed using foreign technologies. The engineers defended the investments, arguing that the huge plants were necessary for the increased demand for milk, especially in the
large cities. Besides, these new plants were more productive than the old small dairies. Further, Poland had to purchase machinery from abroad since there was no satisfactory domestic machinery for bottling, and butter and cheese products. Finally, the engineers argued, production capacity had grown dramatically over the decade; the main problem was that consumption has grown faster.

The interviewer, in his commentary, disagreed with the engineers' proposals, arguing that old solutions based on more money and investments were no solutions. Interviews with two research engineers supported the interviewer's skepticism. Both engineers advocated a greater decentralization of production and establishment of true cooperatives, not top down state run enterprises. The research engineers were also critical of the extensive bureaucracy and advocated greater support for the small farmer, the direct producer. The implication of the research engineers' critique was that the first three engineers failed to find fault with the overcentralized and overbureaucratized organization of production because they were at the top of that organization.

These investigations illustrate the nature of engineers' discourse in 1980-81. They were mainly concerned with improving the "rationality" of investments and national resources. As with most of these other industries, these engineer critics believe that national resources are sufficient, but that they require a more rational form of distribution. Rationality comes from two major changes: a stronger role for independent professional bodies in determining governmental policy and freeing up the economy from political domination.

OBSTACLES TO PROFESSIONAL POWER AND SELF-ORGANIZATION

One of the most general themes of the Solidarity movement was the emphasis on self-organization. In fact, it can be considered the main principle defining conflict during the legal existence of Solidarity (Kennedy, 1985:122-46). Autonomous professional organizations are instrumental to establishing professional power.
In general, professionals have the greatest power when their own profession is unified by a single organization which controls the reproduction of their ranks and the market for their services. When non-professional organizations interfere in such professional control, professional authority is undermined and the chances for its translation into other desired social values reduced. According to Johnson (1972:43), producers of services have the best chance to define the character of the producer-consumer relationship when two conditions are fulfilled: 1) the occupational group has power resources in addition to its professional authority that enable it to impose its view of how the sale of services should be organized; and 2) when the consumers are themselves unorganized and heterogeneous. Comparisons between professions (Larson, 1977) and of one profession over time (Starr, 1982) support this contention. Professionals in Soviet-type societies are limited in their power precisely because they do not have autonomous organizations they control themselves, and their client, the state, is itself highly organized.

1. PHYSICIANS

Before World War II, Polish professions were organized into autonomous organizations. After Poland regained independence in 1918, the medical profession was organized formally in 1921. The Polish parliament, the Sejm, legislated 49 articles on the medical profession and established the Izba Lekarska, or Physicians’ Council, a professional body with control over the practice of medicine. Each province had its own Izba Lekarska and a central Izba Lekarska negotiated with the government ministries. This body was an autonomous self governing association and was the only body that could grant or withdraw the right to practice medicine (Hornowski, 1981; Labanowska, 1978).

After World War II and the establishment of political hegemony by the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza or PZPR), professional organizations lost their autonomy. In 1946, the Trade Union of Health Care Employees (Związek Zawodowy Pracowników Sluży Zdrowia or ZZPSZ) was founded. ‘Campaigns were initiated against the Izba Lekarska and other physicians’ associations, indicting them as class enemies and as being incompatible with socialism. The Izba Lekarska was disbanded and health care was placed under
the control of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. Physicians were organized within the union. In 1952, an association, the Polish Physicians’ Association, (Polskie Towarzystwo Lekarskie), was formed as a scientific society. When Polish Stalinism was being dismantled in 1956, physicians sought renewed organizational autonomy, but to no avail. It was not until the founding of Solidarity that a medical organization independent of the authorities would appear: the Medical Section of Solidarity.

Nurses and physicians had been active in the free trade union movement preceding Solidarity. Alina Pienkowska, a Gdansk nurse, was one of three women on the original eighteen member Gdansk Interfactory Strike Committee and later became the chair of the Medical Section of Solidarity. She along with Barbara Przedwojska, a Gdansk physician, composed Point 16 in the Gdansk agreement. The Medical Section of Solidarity thus grew out of this larger self-organizing movement.

Efforts to organize an independent health section spread widely after the signing of the Gdansk agreement. The authorities tried to undermine these activities by introducing a medical reform bill (Resolution 81/80 in the Council of Ministers) without negotiating with any representatives of the new self-organizing movement. The authorities also encouraged the old Trade Union of Health Care Employees (ZZPSZ) to adopt new statutes suggesting independence from the authorities in order to attract health care employees away from the new self-organizing movement. The Solidarity health care activists pointed out that this "old union in new clothing" was not really independent, since it pursued its autonomy on direction from the top (Gmaj, 1980). Thus, they argued, affiliation with Solidarity is the only way to achieve real autonomy. And they were in large part successful, since according to one of its leading activists, about 70 to 80 per cent of the former members of ZZPSZ quit to join Solidarity (Kulerski, 1980). But was this professional organizational autonomy? This new medical section of Solidarity was not, after all, an exclusively "professional" organization. It included nurses, porters, ambulance drivers and other health care employees too.
Highly educated state employees in some areas did fear that their occupational concerns would be swallowed up by the larger union (Krzeminski, 1983:347-48). Government affiliated branch unions tried to play on these fears among health care employees too. However, Solidarity activists had a simple reply: Solidarity got more for health care workers through the Gdansk agreement than these branch unions accomplished during 36 years of work (NTO, October 26, 1980). Independent struggles had to take place through a solidary front of working people, they argued. They could not accomplish their aims separately.

There were, however, independent organizations of professionals too. Most notable is the Trade Union of Polish Physicians (Związek Zawodowy Lekarzy Polskich or ZZLP). In an article in Polityka in 1980, representatives of the ZZPSZ and of Solidarity offered their views on the health situation. Their comments on the ZZLP are revealing for the place of independent professional organizations in 1980 Poland. Both spokesmen emphasized the good relations their organizations had with the professional union, but it was Biernacki (1980), the spokesman for the ZZPSZ, who emphasized the success of the professional union having about 9,000 physicians as members or about 12 per cent of those who were eligible. Marek Kulerski (1980), a physician who represented Solidarity, instead emphasized, "In the field of health service, we are the only one that counts." Subsequent consultations clarify this divergence.

Zofia Kuratowska (1987b), a physician activist, claims that such autonomous trade unions as the ZZLP were supported by the government with a goal of undermining Solidarity. Most who belonged to these autonomous unions belonged out of allegiance to the authorities. The motivations for the few "honest" people who belonged to the ZZLP, she supposed, was the belief that the business of physicians was very different from the business of others. But the power of Solidarity, she argued, was that everyone was together. Only workers had the power to influence the authorities. "To be together with workers was real important," she said.

One might find a touch of irony in the alliances drawn in 1980 and in 1946. The authorities found independent professional organizations anti-socialist in the earlier period, while in the latter, found them a useful bulwark against the challenge posed by the working class.
Most physicians were content to organize through the multi-occupational Medical Section of Solidarity. According to leading activists in the Section, about 90 per cent of physicians belonged, and about 20 per cent were activists in the Medical Section. Thus, while self-organization was an important goal among physicians, the power relations of the conflict were such that independence had first to be assured from the authorities, and that could only be achieved through Solidarity. This is especially true when one considers the power to strike.

Physicians and nurses would not strike during this period. According to Sokolowska (1982:99), health care is a humanitarian public service in the Polish social consciousness and a strike would be anathema to that ideal. Beyond that service ideal, such a strike would probably be suicidal for the health section anyway, since it would only hurt and alienate the health care patients who are the medical sector’s allies. Most (77 per cent) of the Mazowsze region of Solidarity felt that health care workers directly caring for the sick should not have the right to strike ("Z Prac OBSu", 1981).

Since the health sector could not strike, it could not pressure the authorities to negotiate fairly. On two occasions, the government representatives refused to reach reasonable compromises with the medical section. It was only after the Solidarity negotiators occupied a government building in Gdansk, medical students staged sit-in’s throughout the country, and (especially) when workers from several large factories threatened to go out on a solidarity strike with the health sector, that the authorities made a reasonable compromise (Kennedy, 1985:348-58). Physicians, thus, were highly dependent on the Medical Section of Solidarity, which in turn was dependent on the larger union for pressing its aims.

2. ENGINEERS

The situation among engineers is analogous to that found among physicians. Engineers were also organized into a multi-occupational body with limited autonomy. With technicians, they formed the Supreme Technical Organization (Naczelna Organizacja Techniczna or NOT), the main goals of which were:
1. active cooperation in the construction of socialism in Poland;
2. the development of technology and Polish technical thought;
3. the defense of the occupation and interests of engineers and technicians;
4. cooperation of the scientific-technological associations and members of NOT;
5. representation of the Polish technical world in Poland and abroad at meetings and congresses;
6. the popularization of technical and techno-economic principles in society (see Hoser, 1974:283).

NOT, as with trade unions in Soviet-type society, thus has two goals: first the promotion of the welfare of the whole, and only secondly the self-defense of its members. One way for NOT to promote social welfare is to encourage responsible behavior among its members. During 1980-81, the leaders of NOT were encouraging engineers to work more diligently for the salvation of the economy ("Do Inżynierów i Techników Polskich", 1981). They raised the issue of engineering ethics ("Dyskusje i Decyzje", 1981), a theme raised many times before (Tymowski, 1971). NOT leaders proudly noted that engineers were engaged in societal renewal in all sectors of society, in the Extraordinary Congress of the PZPR, in the branch unions and were even among the authorities of Solidarity ("W Nowa Kadencja", 1981). However, NOT itself was an object of renewal and challenge in this period too.

Criticism came from within the authorities. Witold Ochremiak (1981, nr 29-30:10-11), a Party representative working at Przegląd Techniczny, discussed NOT's internal turmoil at considerable length. NOT was made up of various more specialized associations, but members of these associations charged NOT with becoming too centralized and bureaucratic and therefore unresponsive to the needs of its associations. Ochremiak recommended that the organization follow the general wave of democratization in the society and decentralize.

This kind of criticism by the authorities, however, missed the main challenge of 1980-81. The authorities focused on conflicts within the association rather than on the relationship between the association and the authorities and between the association and the mass of engineers. It
failed to ask whether engineers needed an independent association that would have as a higher priority the defense of engineers' interests.

Engineers associated with Solidarity emphasized precisely these themes. In an article in Tygodnik Solidarnosc, Stanislaw Klimaszewski (1981) described the horrendous state of affairs in working conditions and living standards for engineers (see Kennedy, 1987). He linked this engineering crisis to the overall economic crisis, for which he blamed the investment policies of the early 1970's. NOT did nothing to discourage those policies which created an unhealthy dependence on foreign technologies, despite being consulted about the policies. One solution, he thought, lay in an independent association of engineers and technicians.

In August 1981 an appeal did in fact appear in Tygodnik Solidarnosc and Przeglad Techniczny for the formation of a new NOT, but this time the Independent Technical Organization (Niezalezn Organizacja Techniczna). The text of the appeal emphasizes that an organization needs to be formed that would defend the interests of engineers and technicians at both national and individual levels. The old NOT was not up to the task because it was "owned" by the authorities (Apel, 1981).

This organization apparently had neither the time nor the support to become a dominant organization among engineers. Engineers were more likely to be active in, and organized around, their workplace. This is not surprising since engineering interests were so diverse, and occupational interests were so closely tied to individual plants and ministries. As a consequence, engineers were more active in the form of self organization most relevant to their interests: self-management.

OBSTACLES TO PROFESSIONAL POWER AND SELF-MANAGEMENT

1. ENGINEERS

That engineers were engaged in the reforms surrounding self-management should not be surprising since one of the principal complaints of engineers before this period was the political domination of production. Already in 1956, NOT submitted a document to the Council of Ministers
providing the necessary professional qualifications for various positions in the economy, suggesting the role of political qualifications be reduced (Kolankiewicz, 1973:195-98). Ultimately the government rejected NOT's advice, but the tension between political loyalty and competence did not go away. It reappeared as a major theme in 1980-81 in the struggle for self-management and the end of the "negative" selection of management through nomenklatura.

In April of 1981 the Network of Enterprise Organizations of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity (Siec) was founded. Representatives of initially seventeen but eventually more than fifty of Poland's largest enterprises sought a way to reconstruct the failing economy that was combined with the organization of workers' councils. The Network based its plan on the "democratization" of the factories by creating "social enterprises". The enterprise would be run by democratically elected employee councils (rady pracownicze) which would be responsible for appointing the factory manager and negotiating with trade unions. The state would exert control over the enterprise through various economic instruments like taxes, customs duties, and credits, but not through direct political control.

The "social enterprise" concept, initially conceived as a way of sharing management with the authorities, was eventually transformed into a focus on getting the Party out of the enterprise and the economy (Touraine, et al 1983:163). Activists believed that central planning was the "main source of this country's economic crisis" (Persky and Flam, 1982:179). The Network attacked in this fashion the authorities' control over the economy and indeed the dependency of professionals on the good will of the authorities. Given the combination of councils and the union, managers eventually found that it was more important to maintain good relations with enterprise employees than it was with the authorities (Staniszkis, 1984:207, 216). In some cases, managers went so far as to suggest that Solidarity form an alliance with management against the central apparatus in the name of efficiency (Touraine, et al. 1983:109; Rychard, forthcoming).

Self-management and economic reform (for the two were by and large inseparable) were the dominant themes of the union between April and November 1981. They were also prominent in Przegląd Techniczny in 1980-81. Engineers, especially those in managerial positions, or
aspiring to them, would be affected directly. A relaxation of political controls over advancement
would, according to the professional discourse, lead to a personnel policy based more on
qualifications. Stanislaw Karas (1981), writing in the Warsaw daily Zycie Warszawy, complained
about the "negative selection" of managerial personnel that led to underemployment of the highly
educated and the managerial ranks being filled with those with less than higher educations.
Solidarity's reforms would, on the contrary, emphasize managerial expertise in the election of
managers from an open competitive pool. In fact, one self-management team from Wroclaw
(Kozinski et al, pp. 1, 6) wrote an article in Tygodnik Solidarnosc about how to choose the most
competent director. In order to qualify for their competition, all of the candidates had to have
higher educations. Of the 23 who competed, 19 were engineers.

The self-management movement in 1981 was the principal means by which engineers
envisioned an end to their political tutelage by the authorities. The Party would presumably still
have some influence on managerial selection, but only as one representative on a factory council in
which representatives of the unions in the enterprise were also representatives.

2. PHYSICIANS

Physicians were involved in the self management movement in a different way than were
engineers. The functionally analogous movement for professional control over occupational
practice among physicians was probably the effort to reconstruct the Izba Lekarska. This
physicians' body was not as actively supported as self-management, for several reasons.

The Izba Lekarska was an exclusively professional body whose reestablishment would lead
to an absolute increase in professional privilege. It would lead to increased professional control
over the conditions of physicians' practice and reproduction of their ranks through its control over
the licensing of physicians. It did not have the same democratic potential as self management,
since non-physicians did not have influence over the body, as workers had over engineers in self-
management. Thus, the Izba Lekarska did not enjoy the support of nurses and other medical
personnel, who argued that if physicians could have such a body, why shouldn't they?
Some physicians were also opposed to the establishment of the Izba Lekarska, especially those physicians outside the Medical Academies. One of the regional physicians interviewed by Kennedy in 1984 claimed that its reestablishment would lead to the further domination of medicine by the elites of the profession. There was resistance to the Izba Lekarska from within the profession and in the larger medical field, although attitudes towards it may have changed since 1981 among health care activists.

In 1983, the Polskie Towarszystwo Lekarskie submitted to the Sejm Commission on Health Care the prospectus for the restoration of the Izba Lekarska. Health care activists seem to be in favor of its reestablishment if it is to be an independent organization. Magdalena Sokolowska (1987) sees it as a progressive move in so far as it represents a "decolonization" of the system through the creation of more autonomous groups. Kuratowska (1987a) argues that a new independent democratically elected Izba Lekarska should be formed to oversee ethical standards in the medical profession, given the real deterioration of those standards in recent years. Kuratowska (1987b) argues, however, that it must be completely independent. It would be too dangerous otherwise, since one can always say somebody is acting unethically and end their practice for political reasons. The Izba must also have real democratic elections, in order for it to have real moral authority. Otherwise, it will become just another boring institution in which no one wants to participate. She is in favor of the draft on the Izba Lekarska proposed by the Polskie Towarzystwo Lekarskie, although there are two major drawbacks. First of all, physicians belonging to the military service, secret service and prison system are not subject to the Izba (which is horrible, since there is where the system of medical ethics is worst, she argues). This is probably a necessary compromise, however, because the authorities would lose too much power in these sensitive sectors. The second limitation refers to the continuing influence of the Ministry of Health which could change the head of the Izba under "special conditions". It is, she argues, nevertheless good that it can't affect elections.
OBSTACLES TO PROFESSIONAL POWER AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM

One of the principal means by which professionals established their power in western capitalism is through the establishment of control over the reproduction of their ranks in higher education (Noble, 1977; Larson, 1977; Starr, 1982). During 1980-81, there was considerable discussion about reforming Polish higher education. The Independent Student Union (Niezalezny Zwiazek Studentow) in particular worked for the elimination of obligatory courses in Russian, Marxist-Leninist ideology and military training and for the establishment of a more autonomous and internally democratic university structure (Persky, 1982:177-80). Most institutions of higher education seemed to be pushing for the same things: autonomy, pluralism, better pay for the staff and better organization and financing of institutions ("Zalozenia programowe OZ NSZZ Solidarnosc we PW", 1981). However, the relationship of these and other prospective reforms to professionals and the broader Solidarity movement is a complicated matter, deserving full treatment elsewhere. Nevertheless, we shall try to illustrate the complexity of this relationship, by considering the higher education of engineers.

World War II had devastating consequences for the Polish engineering profession. In 1938, there were some 12,000 to 14,000 engineers in Poland; after Poland was liberated from Nazi occupation, there were only about 7,000 engineers left. With the reconstruction of Poland's infrastructure and industry the top priority, higher education gave precedence to the training of engineers. The number of polytechnical schools and of technical students increased. In 1938, there were only 7,593 students enrolled in 3 polytechnical schools, but already by 1945/46, there were 9 higher technical schools with 12,465 students enrolled. Opportunities for becoming engineers were expanded and the expectations for completing a degree were lowered (Hoser, 1970). In 1937/38, only 15.3 per cent of the students in higher education were in technical studies; by 1950/51, 28.4 per cent were in technical studies, with the increase in engineering students coming largely at the expense of students of law and the humanities (Tymowski, 1980:48-56). As a consequence of these early educational reforms, Poland now has relatively more engineers than developed capitalist societies: in the late 1970's, France had 11.2
engineers/thousand persons employed, West Germany, 15.4, Great Britain, 8.7, the United States, 12.3 but Poland had 22.5 engineers/thousand persons employed (Tymowski, 1982a).

The "success" of this engineering educational reform has led to the overproduction of engineers and the inflation of the instrumental value of their degrees. Consequently, Janusz Tymowski (1982), Poland's leading engineer-scholar, has argued that the current number of engineers needs to be reduced by about 20 to 25 per cent. Such a reduction could be approached most directly by reducing the number of people being trained as engineers. One plan offered in 1980-81 sought to drastically reduce the number of slots in evening studies (mainly for older workers) and to eliminate from day studies (college age students) the lower degree in engineering studies, and to offer only a master's degree in engineering (inżynier magister). One Solidarity activist participating in an educational reform commission argued against this policy, however, on the basis that it was an "elitist" reform, which would restrict opportunities for the children of peasants who already suffer educational discrimination (Jacek, 1981).

The obstacles to professional power we have so far considered (relating to control over investment, self-organization and self-management) were generally matters where the interests of Solidarity and professionals coincided. Educational reform is another matter. Although most of Solidarity would support democratization and other reforms of higher education, educational reforms designed to increase professional power are generally "elitist" in that they would restrict the number of degrees offered and increase the standards of training provided. As a consequence, those Solidarity members who were not already professionals, or whose children were not already assured of professional education and status, are loathe to restrict educational opportunities. Thus, it seems that at least in this instance, professional power is unlikely to be enhanced by reforms inspired by pressure from below. In fact, although opposition to the authorities by the working class might restrict political tutelage over professionals, this opposition introduces its own new constraints on professional power.
LIMITS TO PROFESSIONAL POWER IN REFORM

Even in the case of a transformed Soviet-type society, where the Party-state's organizational control is reduced and the state itself becomes subject to control by a civil society, professional power does not necessarily gain hegemony. It does not necessarily face a disorganized mass of clients. On the contrary, in a transformation based on struggle from below, professionals face several constraints. In 1980-81, Polish professionals faced a highly organized society which was capable of ending their political tutelage. This is evident in self-management.

While the director is no longer subject to political tutelage, s/he now becomes accountable to the employee council of the enterprise. Accountability varied in the several versions of self-management reforms being promoted and the government's program for reform offered, not surprisingly, the least accountability. But even within Solidarity, there was some disagreement about the scope of accountability. For some, the reform should merely assure the appointment of a competent manager and stay out of policy formation. For others, the employees' council should actually formulate broad enterprise policy, and leave it to the manager to implement. For those who emphasized the workers control element of this reform, these councils were to be first and foremost democratic institutions, as opposed to the boards of trustees (rady nadzorcze) which some professionals favored. One writer for Tygodnik Solidarnosc (Jakubowicz, 1981:6-7) believed that the latter scheme would lead to the domination of representatives of industry (perhaps professionals?) and not to genuine democracy. He advised Solidarity members to remain vigilant in their struggle for democratic economic reform.

The self-management reform advocated by the authorities would have limited the influence of these employee councils far more, but then again this reform retained greater measures of political tutelage in both theory and practice. Economic reform in the last several years has had very limited success. It appears that in Poland, self-management faces insurmountable resistance without massive support from below.

Professionals, in particular engineers, are "in between" once again. While a successful self-management reform would eliminate political tutelage, it would replace that with a democratic
control that might (depending on the nature of the accompanying economic reform) be more respectful of professional expertise. A self-management reform that limits democratic control from below faces little chance of success in the Polish context, and even if successful, retains some measures of political tutelage.

Physicians' professional power also would likely be constrained by popular organization in a Soviet-type society reformed on the basis of the Solidarity model. As we saw, physicians could not achieve much influence by themselves, and in fact were dependent at two levels: 1) they were forced to ally with other health care workers in the Medical Section of Solidarity; and 2) since the majority of employees in that Section would not strike, they were forced to rely on solidarity strikes of other organizations to pressure the authorities to negotiate in good faith. There is also no evidence that physicians were dominant within the Medical Section itself; nurses, in particular, were quite influential.

All of these anticipations of contraints on professional power in a reformed society rely on the model of social transformation prompted from below. If the social transformation of Soviet-type society occurs under such a pressure, workers, nurses, and other non-professional or semi-professional organizations might be well enough organized in civil society to defend their interests against the domination of a new ruling class of professionals. But if social transformation occurs from the top down, as we might be seeing under Gorbachev, professional class domination becomes more possible as they take over the instruments of domination which afforded the political elites so much power before social transformation.

A social transformation controlled from above would seem to reflect professional interests more than one driven from below. The fact that Gorbachev receives his greatest amount of support from the intelligentsia (Brown, 1987:793) is consistant with this hypothesis. In this sense, professionals might take the same route to power as American engineers, where the definition of professionalism came to be identical with corporate managerial success (Noble 1977). Professional power, rather than taking the classical route of American lawyers and physicians, might take the bureaucratic route to hegemony. While this reform prospect offers considerably more power than a
reform based on pressure from below, professional power will nevertheless remain circumscribed for those with little access to bureaucratic power, i.e. physicians.

The health sector, along with education and other "non-productive" sectors in the economy, is in a structurally weak position in contemporary Soviet-type societies. Heavy industry and other favored sectors benefit from the national resources disproportionately. Even in a transformed society, especially one that is transformed from the top down, there is no obvious reason why the health sector and its physicians would gain considerably more power or privilege at the macro level than they already have. If reform involved the restoration of private practice on a wide scale, physicians might benefit at the micro level, in terms of control over their relations with patients and their personal compensation therefrom. But that in no way guarantees a larger share of national resources.

To the degree that medical clientele can pressure for health care reform, i.e. through a Solidarity-type transformation, we can envision more resources going to the health sector than go now. But physicians by themselves do not have sufficient bureaucratic power to redistribute national resources to the medical sector. Thus, Daniel Bell’s (1973) admonition to consider the different institutional situses of professionals in assessments of their potential for power becomes as important in considering professionals in a transformed Soviet-type society as it is in its current form.

CONCLUSIONS

The Solidarity period in Poland is particularly useful for clarifying constraints on professional power in Soviet-type society, and by extension, the possibilities for the intelligentsia as a whole to assume the position of a ruling class. Professional critiques showed us in greater detail problematic limitations professionals themselves note. This is particularly useful as a complement to those limitations that might be noted by some formal model of professionalism. These analyses are also useful in so far as they show us the variations on common themes within the class of the highly educated.
Physicians and engineers cast their critiques in three broad spheres: control over investment, self-organization and self-management. Physicians and engineers are different in the specifics of their indictments. Given the concentration of physicians in the health sector, they could unify in a call for greater resources. Engineers could not make such a call, since they are in so many different places in the economy, some of which were supported quite well. Instead, engineers could unite in a call for a greater rationality of investment and the development of Polish technology. To assure this rationality, engineers argued that their association had to be more independent and their opinions more respected by the authorities.

For physicians, self-organization was less important for the independent advice it could render than for its role in pressuring the authorities to relinquish more resources to the health sector. But this independence in self-organization was not completely realized, since the medical section depended on an alliance with other parts of society, particularly with skilled workers in large factories. The Medical Section of Solidarity had too little power by itself.

Self-management was a less important and more controversial goal for physicians. Its manifestation for physicians would have been a vital Izba Lekarska, but this body could have denied the very solidarism which empowered society against the authorities. This same solidarism probably discouraged professional support for elitist educational reforms that might have increased professional power but would have gone against popular sentiment in Solidarity.

The idea of self-management among engineers, however, was less controversial, since it could be embraced by that ideology of societal solidarism. The idea of self-management in fact broadened the solidary front. Instead of workers vs. the authorities, the alliance under the guise of self-management could have pitted the entire world of work -- managers and workers -- against political elites. There was some controversy about the form that this self-management would take, but this was considered secondary to the struggle for freeing the enterprise and the economy from direct political control.

The Solidarity period also suggested how the power of the highly educated might be constrained in a transformed Soviet-type society, especially one transformed on the basis of a
challenge from below. A socialist civil society contains its own democratic constraints on professional power. A state dominated by civil society does not become an instrument for professional manipulation to establish professional privilege. On the contrary, professional power based on technical expertise might be balanced by the considerable organizational power of the masses in a Soviet-type society transformed on the basis of initiative from below. It is useful to keep in mind here that the power and privilege of classical professionalism, exemplified by American physicians, was achieved in a period when non-professionals were very poorly, if at all, organized. The Solidarity period was quite the opposite, with skilled workers leading all, including professionals, in the struggle for self organization.

While the class power of the intelligentsia might be circumscribed in a Solidarity-powered transformation, professional domination in Soviet-type society has greater prospects when reform is initiated from above, as in Gorbachev's plan. But Soviet experts have raised considerable doubt as to whether such a reform can succeed without mobilization from below. Repeated attempts at, and repeated failures in, economic reform in Poland reinforce that skepticism. Even if Gorbachev manages to succeed where Polish leaders have failed, a plan to unleash the "professional middle classes" might also spill over to self-organization and the social transformation of the rest of society, as in the Prague Spring. It might thus increase the likelihood of reform only by increasing the likelihood of reaction by conservative forces. But these are questions we cannot yet answer. Here, we only hope to have shown what Polish professionals perceived to be constraints on their power, and what new constraints were embryonic in a society transformed by Solidarity.

NOTES

1 We use the term "Soviet-type society" to refer to those societies whose political economic structure is modeled on the Soviet Union. These are industrial societies with state ownership of the major means of production and an economy directed to some degree by a plan formulated under the leadership of a hegemonic marxist-leninist party.

2 To the Poland specialist, the distinction we draw between intelligentsia and professional models might resemble the distinction between romanticism and positivism in the Polish political tradition. The romantic tradition is based
on an almost reckless disregard for the costs of complete defiance of occupying powers; the positivist approach advocates a greater reconciliation with those powers, trading compromise for stability. The professional and positivist political models are similar in so far as they both surrender some of their capacities to others: positivists to occupying powers and professionals to their clients or employers. The romantic political and intelligentsia identification are similar, in so far as both demand a more complete identification with the national cause, with little room for complicity or compromise.

3 In 1984, NOT's former chairman, Janusz Tymowski, acknowledged in an interview with Kennedy that NOT did not defend engineers' interests, especially in terms of personal living standards, although he thought it ought to move in that direction (Kennedy, 1985:270).
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