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AND THE SUBJECTIVITY OF POWER
IN EDUCATION

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"Individuality," John Dewey wrote in *Individualism Old and New* (1962), "is at first spontaneous and unshaped, it is a potentiality, a capacity of development." (p. 168) The form individualism takes is dependent on preexisting patterns of behavior and habits of mind that characterize the society into which one is born. For Dewey, individuality reflects a community orientation; it is not merely self-shaping or autonomous:

The argument that individuality is shaped and formed only through interaction with actual conditions could be substantiated by considering the influence of membership in a language community on thought and disposition, the social nature of experience, and the stake that everybody has in solving the ongoing problems that threaten the well-being of the larger community. (Bowers, 1987, on Dewey, p. 35)

Dewey challenged the idea of an autonomous individual by highlighting its erroneous implications for the nature of (individual) freedom. He transformed the problem of individual freedom from one of alternative mechanisms for escaping social control (in order to exercise greater inner self-direction, be a self-determining individual) into one concerned with the acquisition of a form of power that involves an increased capacity to reorganize experience.

The recognition of the social nature of the individual led to an appreciation of the need for understanding how the fostering of interdependence increases the effective power of individuals.

Another giant of twentieth-century education Paulo Friere, has also maintained a crucial focus on individual empowerment through a (critical) reorganization of experience, and the fundamental importance of the social:

Men [sic]...because they are aware of themselves and thus of the world—because they are conscious beings—exist in a dialectical relationship between the determination of limits and their own freedom. As they separate themselves (through critical reflection) from the world, which they objectify, as they separate themselves from their own activity, as they locate the seat of their decisions in themselves and in their relations with the world and others, men [sic] overcome the situations which limit them. As critical perception is embodied in action, a climate of
hope and confidence develops which leads men [sic] to attempt to
overcome the limit-situation. (Friere, 1971, p. 89)

Because Dewey and Friere have each had a tremendous impact on
contemporary educational discourse, they are particularly good illustrations
of how this discourse has problematically maintained liberal philosophical
separations between the individual (or unitary subject) and society (culture,
social structure, etc.), even though they themselves are critics of
traditional liberalism. In effect, liberal visions reflect their own failure
to adequately grasp that individualism, emancipation, and change--the
prominent liberal source of empowerment--are metaphors which themselves mirror
earlier conventions of thought that segmented reality into distinct entities
abstracted from context. As Bowers (1987) expresses it, focusing on the
empowerment of the individual, and hence inadequately addressing the ways in
which and individual is embedded in tradition, results in a distorted view of
an individual's power of origination, and of the emancipatory potential of the
rational process:

A fuller understanding of the nature of tradition, as well as the
complexity of the individual's embeddedness, would have perhaps
led to a more qualified interpretation of education as an
emancipatory activity and to greater sensitivity toward those
traditions that education should help to preserve. (p. 51)

The persistence of the individual/society dualism has made it virtually
impossible to fathom education without resorting to purely social analyses
that neglect individual agency, or to purely localized notions of individual
subjects that preclude reasonable recognition of the roles of cultural,
material forces. In what seem to be parallel
discourses, we have, on the one hand, Antonio Gramsci's (1971) realization
that "every relationship is an educational relationship." (In order to receive
the passive or active assent of the general population, he adds, nations,
dominant classes and ruling groups must generate a 'common sense' that is
broadly disseminated in everyday life or private life, as distinct from economic or political life.) While, on the one hand, we can phrase the task of education, as did Martin Buber (1948), as entailing the very question of social change through the individual: each child is born with the impress of history stamped upon it by the heritage of past generations; and each child is the potential begetter of unborn generations, having an indisputable portion in the act of Creation itself. Indeed, each child is a latent source of renewal. (Buber argues that the problem faced by education concerns the means by which the power to generate the new can itself be renewed.)

That is, we tend to understand statements like those above in standard dualistic ways, especially when we hear only pieces of the authors' work taken out of context. This tendency has led notable historians of education to interpret its intellectual history as the question of "the individual, society and education" (e.g., Karier, 1986) while philosophers of education begin required courses for doctoral students with the provocative rhetorical question, "should/can/does education lead society, or should/can/does society lead education?" followed by an examination of the (liberal) paradox of equity for all (as a social distribution issue) versus the excellence of individuals.

Actually, this is not surprising. Education as a discipline in the twentieth century has been virtually identified with psychology, and psychology itself has unfortunately had the propensity to collapse subjectivity into the notion of the individual. (Henriques et al., 1984) However, recent methodological critiques and conceptual repair of individual and social psychology discuss the meaning and role of psychology without performing the necessary analyses of the immediate socially organized production, and the explanatory insufficiency of its conceptual products:

In this limited self-diagnosis...psychology repeats its characteristic mode of thought: a dissociation of mind from
historically patterned social relations and an insistence on the explanatory priority of the most visible surface immediacies. It avoids what is less evident, but causally more potent—the organization of a collective social life. (Wexler, 1983, p. xv)

We need to view educative experiences in ways that allow the recognition that they are always not only produced, but also regulated and legitimated. Moreover, such production must be understood as constructed within the social forms that regulate and limit both what people are and can be. (Simon, 1987) This notion implicitly acknowledges the theoretical centrality of power, and stresses that power must be appreciated not as a property that can be traded for liberty, but as a feature of a relationship. Power does not act directly and immediately on people; rather, it acts on their actions, working through discursive and material practices that, in the moment of concretization, already delimit and condition action. (Foucault, 1983)

It may initially be difficult for many in education, raised on a diet of classical liberal thought, from Plato through Rousseau to Dewey and beyond, to accept the theoretical power of "power." Our notions of the "power perspective" are built on the arguments of Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic, who articulated the canonical representation of power as a scarce resource. He declared that the strong, the rulers, decide the norms of how people behave; they even determine the content of "justice," even if its form in the abstract is "doing the good of another." (Lycos, 1987) The epistemic advantage of this point of view is exemplified by the tyrant. Only someone capable of fully adopting the perspective of power in his or her life can see clearly how concepts like justice actually serve the powerful. Only they can assess precisely how people's actions "justly" motivated turn them into obedient servants, that is, people who can be relied on to do the advantage of the stronger because they consistently neglect their own interests and remain blind to the true effects of their actions. Plato's point, toward which he so
carefully manipulated this section of his dialogue, was that such an attitude was a symptom of the deterioration of the Athenian democracy. He feared, as a more current polemicist echoed in *The Closing of the American Mind* (Bloom, 1987), that many of his contemporaries really thought this way about life and conduct in the *polis*. He wanted to convert people to another way of talking about justice, which conceived of the concept as a central feature of moral excellence of the individual.

Thrasymachus represented one possible denial of the separation of moral authority from political hegemony. But Plato likely thought that the failure to distinguish between moral authority and political supremacy was precisely the essence of tyranny. Hence, his argument lends credence to mainstream American discourse based on Puritan notions of self-government and individual self-control developed through the cultivation of rationality. (Kaestle, 1983) *The Republic* tried to show that it is only when power is seen as flowing from knowledge—reason, as Plato understood it—that the desire for it will incorporate the desire for virtue and justice. Centuries later, many of us are still convinced that it is only under this condition that it would be "natural" to entrust the fulfillment of desire for virtue and justice to the desire for power, whereas under traditional political arrangements this seems ludicrous. Thrasymachus did mistakenly confine the desire for power to "pleonexia," that is, to the want of "more than others." His belief that the value of mastery, control and freedom is obtained through such a desire has notable weaknesses. But his is not the only conceptualization of power available to us. Foucault (1979, 1983) turns Thrasymachus' "economics of power" (power as exchange value) into a "physics of power" in which power is understood as a force which works through the actions of people in such a way that it structures the field of possible actions of the actor and others.
This conception of power effectively decenters the individual and vastly increases the importance of the question of the origin and nature of relationships among "individuals."

Thus, to employ a dangerous metaphor which I suspect we will have to abandon, we need to "free ourselves of our desire" for a unitary subjectivity. This we must do in favor of theorizations that are prepared to accept the subject's "[division'] both by the repression of that which cannot and refuses to be expressed and [by] the constant processes of reorganization that construct a fragmented, contradictory consciousness." (Simon, 1987, p. 157)

Subjectivity includes both conceptually-organized, articulated knowledge and elements that move us without being consciously expressed:

These elements include both pre-conscious taken-for-granted knowledge and the radical and sedimented needs and desires that are expressed in our demands on ourselves and others. As an active ongoing construction, subjectivity is always a material and discursive rendering of these forms of knowledge....In its manifestations in practice, subjectivity expresses a non-unitary social identity accomplished through the historically produced social forms through which people live. Hence, subjectivity reflects both objective conditions and a socially constructed representation of everyday life. (Simon, 1987, p. 157)

This is easier said than done. Our research questions, coming as they do out of our own subjectivities, and formed in part by the strong legacy of liberal discourse (Gintis, 1980), do not always comply with the theorized requirements outlined above. Reflecting divergences from them, what I will do in this paper is begin with two inchoate pedagogical dilemmas, and reflect on their refinement. As will be shown, what they have in common is their articulation of the need for links between the problem of empowerment and the need for a culture held in ecological balance.

The first dilemma is concerned with responsibility for the use of one's knowledge, interpreted as the authority of knowledge across time. In its most global conception, the pedagogical dilemma has to do with social recognition
of the long-term implications and ramifications of our actions. Continual creation and haphazard dumping of toxic waste, and upscaled and irreversible destruction of tropical rain forests, are symptoms of difficulties ordinarily inherent in even the most effective mass educative movements. In its more localized conception, the dilemma addresses the fragility of individual autonomy and authority ever present in efforts to cultivate responsible agents. The traditional confusion on this matter arises out of problematic pedagogical moments such as that in the split second before a three-year-old reaches out to touch a hot stove. We can imagine a reasonable discussion of how to handle this situation, with arguments that range from "a kid'll never get burned twice" to "never ever let a kid get near a stove, and you'll never have to assert external authority from above and disengage the kid's own rational decision-making." People tend to sit somewhere between these two extremes, depending on whether they believe, like the early American Puritans, that children are naturally evil and need to have the devil whipped out of them, or whether they believe, like Rousseau, that children are naturally good, merely corrupted by the evils of society. But the discussion becomes radically skewed when the situation becomes a young child about to plunge into a highly toxic river on a hot, sunny day or, a teenager conscientiously working on what will be a severe case of skin cancer within a decade while developing a perfect tan. And the confusion increases as people introduce situations where adults are "by right" left to choose whether or not the pay for working in a Hormel factory or a nuclear power plant is worth the risk of a machine slicing of digits or limbs, or the expectation of serious cancer and future mutant progeny. Finally, the dilemma is best revealed by instances in which individual actions (e.g., using disposable diapers or making nuclear or chemical weapons) actually destroy the probability of others' lives, in which
actions are removed from their biological embeddedness within the place in which they occur.

The second dilemma, very much overlapping the first, arises out of teachers' reflections on the degree to which their own actions do not in any way serve the interests of their students. Much of what we do as teachers is done to make us feel better, or for our own benefit. Upon reflection, we become increasingly horrified by actions of our students that can only be directed at the teacher's needs. We recoil as they nod their heads in a promise that they are listening. And we fall back in disgust as they beg to understand what is expected of them. Claims that the pupils themselves should determine how their needs can best be met by a course are often viewed as an even more insipid form of restriction in which their efforts will be judged by secret instead of overt criteria. They believe that the teacher knows in advance what is best, and so they resent it when a progressive facilitator of learning seemingly withdraws from the responsibility of telling them what this is. Furthermore, attempts to include forms and types of knowledge that conflict with those that students have been taught to expect may serve only to delegitimize these forms and types as contrasted with "real" knowledge.

The assumption underlying both dilemmas is that the individual, freed from coercion, will naturally choose freedom, democracy and other forms of "correct" thinking. Focusing on the individual in such a way came into its own, according to Valerie Walkerdine (1983), in the period after World War I, when setting children free was seen as a political and moral imperative. German militarism was taken to be founded in "discipline" and the "grotesque tragedy of German subserviency." If German education had been an instrument that ingrained such notions in the soul of an entire people, then an individualism founded in child-centeredness appeared to offer a democratic
alternative. An education based on freedom would produce the democratic, free individual--free not only from fascism but from the threat of any political totalitarianism or extremism as well:

In the name of those who have died for the freedom of Europe, let us go forward to claim for this land of ours that spread of true education which shall be the chief guarantee of the freedom for our children forever. (paraphrased British educational literature, Walkerdine, 1983)

We need to leave behind a simple, dichotomous view of a liberatory pedagogy which frees the individual, on the one hand, and a repressive one which contains and stifles freedom and individuality, on the other. What we might reflect on instead is that set of assumptions which is shared by the considerable range of positions in which the nature of the individual (child) is unquestioningly taken to be the natural starting-point for thinking about education. (Walkerdine, 1983) The charisma of "the nature of the child" as the only sound basis for educational decisions--at least for decisions made in the classroom, outside and beyond the trappings of political parties and ideologies--is due to its status as incontrovertible fact. Indeed, the defense of progressive education and child-centeredness against the backlash of the conservative restoration (Shor, 1986) has used that individually formed nature in arguments that "the other side" is wrong about children and learning. Unfortunately, this has meant that it has been politically difficult to raise questions about that nature which do not seem to collapse back into agreement with traditional pedagogy. When we speak about individual freedom in education, we need to reflect on the meaning of "freedom for our children forever" and to rethink what "the individual" who makes his or her choices actually is:

The modern, bourgeois individual is not a natural being, which can be cultivated in freedom or stifled in regimentation. It is a particular historical product, brought into being by those modern
forms of social organization which proclaim it to be natural and normal. (Walkerdine, 1983, p. 81)

That is, modern educational ideas about the normal are not self-evident but are linked to a particular "brand" of psychological explanation:

The psychological theories and practice become mutually confirming. Let us take one of the most important propositions—that reasoning is a natural process which children develop in a particular sequence of stages. In relation to this idea, teachers have developed formal and informal techniques for observing children's development, assessing their "readiness" for particular materials and topics, and for judging whether learning has actually taken place. But as what they are looking for, as well as the evidences and theories, their own evidence is either bound to confirm it or be explained by recourse to some other explanation within child-centredness. It would be difficult for a teacher to step outside the very assumptions which made her or his practice possible at all. (Walkerdine, 1983, p. 81)

Again, what seems to be the origin of pedagogy—the nature of the child—is actually the outcome of the everyday techniques and practices of teachers.

For many teachers interested in social change, child-centered progressivism seems to be the basis of a revolutionary promise. The teacher's job, central to the struggle for liberation, is to scorn stifling norms, grades, and labels, in favor of developing a revolutionary consciousness; eschewing group class lessons, such teachers can allow children to be individuals in their own right. The aim of such practices is to help children throw off the chains of society and to discover their true selves. But of course that "true" self possesses certain characteristics that are assumed to be naturally given, yet are actually historically produced through pedagogic practices:

The alternative is not between a schooling which represses the "true self" and the watchful, "enabling" teacher who nurtures the child to realize its full creative potential. Education acts positively to define and construct that "nature." (Walkerdine, 1983, p. 86)

Hence, it would make more sense to shift the discussion from a "reactionary.radical seesaw" to an analysis which places power, not simply
with "the system" which oppresses, or with the children who are to be set free, but in contexts in which it is implicated in the very form of theories and practices which constitute and fix the natural-normal and its exclusion.

Meanwhile, there has been an ongoing critique of those practices which produce and form the modern "child." We know, for example, that "childhood today" is a rather recent phenomenon which emerged out of the practices and discourses of the rising middle class in Europe (Ariès, 1962; Demause, 1974; Polakow, 1982; Hold, 1974). By naming certain people "children" we distinguish them from others as different, other, or special in some way. We study the characteristics of childness and determine special actions we must take to deal with their specialness. Parallel insights can be found in Michel Foucault's *Madness and Civilization* (1965), in which the history of mental illness and the development of special institutions to serve the needs of the merging "ill"--who are deemed to have special needs--is traced. Most provocatively, this work can inform our interests in children by providing a discourse for understanding how their demarcation as special people leads to a growing body of knowledge about the limits of what these people are capable of doing, and about the dangers they pose. But more importantly, Foucault can provide insight into the role this knowledge plays in establishing "normality" by delineating the abnormal. That is, our definition of "adult" is defined to a great extent in terms of what we ascribe to a child.

In this sense, the discourse of education can be seen to demarcate what a child is and is not. Valerie Walkerdine (1988) has taken this approach, studying teachers' records, including references to teachers' guides and future lesson plans, as well as evaluative comments on individual students. Her work reveals fascinating "truths" which are translated through the "scientific" codification of these truths as "fact." In a Lévi-Straussian
manner, she unravels classificatory adult/child references in the ways teachers subtextually define dualities of work/play, rote/real learning, knowing/understanding, passivity/activity, etc., through their practice. Her work points out that we cannot separate action from the discourse that describes, proscribes, or prescribes action.

We might also interpret much of developmental psychology in terms of its negative knowledge for educators (specifying what children at certain ages cannot do), and the subsequently harmful exercise of power attached to that knowledge. (Sarason, 1981). Now, this is not to say that psychology as a project should be abandoned; much of the kind of knowledge it produces can be beneficial. But we should be concerned that what initially appears positive and empowering may be mostly harmful in the long run. For example, Walden and Walkerdine (1982) undertook a study of existing explanations for why girls tend not to perform as well as boys in mathematics. They found that discussions of the importance of spatial ability and socialization into stereotypical sex-roles have more to do with informing the teachers' actions than does student performance. At the same time, they found that the way in which the students read their own and the teacher's actions was crucial. It is generally agreed that spatial ability is fundamental to mathematical "skills," particularly in terms of its importance within the Piagetian approach, and the more recent Van Hiele approach to mathematics, as the development of concepts through actions on objects. But, despite the teachers' skepticism regarding girls' interests or abilities with construction materials, there were no differences in interest or types of constructions by gender. And, when girls did play with such materials on their own, instead of at the request of the two researchers, the teachers often did not notice. Walden and Walkerdine also found socialization arguments to be weak. Rather,
it was the construction of gender identities in the classroom by the children themselves, as one of the ways in which they made sense of what they were doing, that seemed most significant. For example, girls tended to switch the ongoing discourse into one of domesticity in order to exercise power over boys (Walkerdine, 1981). This latter action is particularly ironic, since such a facility in discourse would be an indication of mathematical aptitude were mathematics defined as a process more akin to language than to the internalization of action, as it is quite possible to do (See, e.g., the entire issue of Visible Language, 1982; Boomer, 1986; Corran and Walkerdine, 1981).

At a recent conference, one of the researchers involved in the above study (Walkerdine, 1988) posited that one of the important links for facilitating the translation from "truth" to "fact" through practice is the collection of fantasies, or imagined possibilities, that are embodied in the discursive and non-discursive actions of the teacher. This is similar to Foucault's (1965) "field of possibilities," which is indicative of power and its exercise, and has the potential to help us understand how variant productions of "childhood" might be possible. For example, Tice (1981) has discussed common perceptions of children as "treasures," "possessions," or "the governed." He advocates the construction of a new discourse in which children are seen as junior partners in an enterprise, and sets out four "natural" conditions of moral rights: an acknowledgment of children's worth as human beings, or as individuals in their own right; a concern to facilitate their growth and, as an extension of parental love, an independence that will enable their fruitfully independent life in society; an acceptance of the responsibility for fostering an equal distribution of certain rights among all children within society; and a belief that those who can do so are obligated
to support efforts to fulfill equal rights for all children everywhere. For Tice, rights accorded to "normal" adults—of free speech, of fair and honest treatment, of free inquiry, of due process, etc.—emerge as part of the effort to fulfill common goals and ideals. Similarly, Cohen (1980) suggests that, since our notion of a complete (adult) person includes certain capacities that children simply do not have, we could culturally intervene by establishing a system of children's advocates that provide precisely these capabilities; as long as these capacities are provided, there can be no noticeable difference between, or treatment of, individuals, regardless of age. Holt (1974), however, argues that an articulation of the differences in capacities which are relevant to rights debates merely helps construct our very modern form of childhood. He points out that, in fact, there are numerous alternative ways in which to categorize people in terms of capacities or abilities that have little to do with age, and that for each particular capacity we are likely to find a "more appropriate" demarcation than age. Indeed, if we wished, we could allow ourselves to be perpetually surprised at instances of very young children acting responsibly in ways ordinarily assumed as in accordance with rights given only to adults. In the end, Holt finds our adult uses of children as people on which to practice the exercise of power, as badges of prestige, love objects, etc. to be the more honest justifications for reproducing the modern construction of childhood.

So we might, following Walkerdine and Holt, take the fantasies (and fears) behind the discourse very seriously. They certainly seem significant when we think of Foucault's work with "mental illness," and compare the ways in which we as educators construct the pathologies of school performance. Yet, they become even more frightening when we recognize, as Foucault did (1980), that it is through the expansion of the methods of science and
knowledge that the individual has become an object of knowledge, both to him or her self and others--an object that tells the truth about him or her self in order to know him or her self and be known. This "technology of the self" requires the belief that one can, through the help of experts, tell the truth about oneself:

The conviction that truth can be discovered through the self-examination of consciousness and the confession of one's thoughts and acts now appears so natural, so compelling, indeed so self-evident, that it seems unreasonable to posit that such self-examination is a central component in a strategy of power. (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. 175)

Thus, even beyond the problematic nature of, say, teachers assessing students, as we try to understand both teachers and students as interpreters of meaning—and even more importantly, ourselves as researchers endeavoring to interpret—we must question the implicit authority wielded in the act of interpretation. Interpretation and the modern "subject" imply each other. It would be an important and rewarding task to analyze the growth of interpretive practices and to show their relations with and differences from those Foucault has discussed (e.g., participant observation). Nonetheless, part of the very power of these "sciences" is that they claim to be able to reveal "truths" about our psyches, our culture and our society--truths that can only be understood by expert interpreters. This can certainly bewilder those educators interested in social change. As Foucault concludes at the end of his History of Sexuality, "The irony of this deployment is in having us believe that our liberation is in the balance."

Thus, recognizing our own reading of "truth" as regulative—at least in terms of their role in the formation of policies and practices, it becomes imperative that we reflect on our fears and fantasies, and how they impact upon the "truth" we speak. This may be just as well, since we determine in our own research what we see as normative or pathological, we can only end up
as surveillants. The only way I can see to get around this is to incorporate collaborative research methodologies in which the "subject" of the research is as much a "subject" in the philosophical sense as the researcher. If we can be facilitators of people's own reflections on their situational perceptions and fantasies, then we might be able to empower them as well as contribute to a "body of knowledge." Otherwise, we will at best pat ourselves on the back for giving these people a "voice."

Equally significant at this historical moment is the relevant extension of the metaphorical image of childhood produced through the deskilling of teachers in the proliferation of pre-packaged curricula and the paternalistic management of schools. Here, teachers are considered to lack capacities requisite for successful learning to occur. Recent influential reports (Holmes Group, 1986; Carnegie Foundation) call for a professionalization of teaching. Such proposals devalue regular day-to-day interaction with students in favor of theorizing and policy-making distanced from practice. As "good teachers" rise in status, they will no longer be teaching, but telling teachers what to implement. This is certainly a predictable response to the age-ist ideology that ascribes status to a profession according to the age of the client (pediatricians get less money and esteem than internists, day-care workers less than elementary school teachers, "professional" status teachers whose clients are other teachers get more than "assistant" teachers, etc.). But, as Sara Freedman (1988) has argued, such reports are an attempt, not necessarily to improve the status of teaching, but more likely to lure back into teaching middle-class, white women who have in the last few decades found it possible to enter male-dominated occupations. As well, demographics suggest that the implementation of such programs is most likely to perpetuate
gender biases in favor of male master teachers and administrations and against female, "ordinary" teachers (Freedman, 1985; Apple, 1986).

This link of "teacher as child," lacking professional skills, and "teaching as women's work" is crucial, for women have historically been grouped with children as the treasures and possessions of men. Much of the initial progress in our recognition of gender-demarcated oppression was, in fact, accomplished through the reclassification of women as non-children. We have much to gain from our experience in working for equal rights for women, especially in the relatively recent realization that equal rights do not mean male-ifying women. That is, equality means more than equal opportunities for women to do the same things as men. We must continue to find strategies that enable women to remain women as well as "equal." Likewise, we must enable youth to remain youth as well as people. Yet I want to argue that we have retained the most insipid forms of domination in our practices of "child-rearing," and that no real progress can be made unless we can reconstruct the teacher-student relationship, in combination with and distinct from its ageist cloak. But such a reconstruction can only take place if our power is exercised through our actions such that a different "subject" is produced. Perpetuation of both dualisms puts our focus on those aspects of teaching which are simultaneously learning, and vice-versa, zooming in on conceptual constructs that rationalize existing power structures.

Easier said than done. The literature is rampant with discussions of how and why educational institutions work to promote the production of traditional relationships. While philosophical and psychological research has focused on theory, the sociology and anthropology of education have consistently presented us with a picture of schools as, to employ Michael Katz' terms (Katz, 1975), particularly good sites of bureaucratic reproduction.
(Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977; Bowles & Gintis, 1976), complete with rigid hierarchies of control and authority. Furthermore, approaches to education that incorporate an awareness of resistance to the mechanisms of social, cultural, and institutional reproduction (e.g. Apple, 1982; Willis, 1981) tend to recycle and reproduce the dualism between individual agency and social structure. Consequently, it is difficult for them to develop a theory of pedagogy that links structures and institutions to human agency and action in a dialectical manner (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1985). Such work has the propensity to neglect oppositional behaviors which are produced amidst contradictory discourses and values. A given "act" of resistance may be linked to class, gender, ethnic or race interests, or it may express repressive moments inscribed in such behavior by the dominant culture rather than a message of protest. This literature also typically ignores issues of gender and race, preferring instead to focus on class and clashing ethnicities. And only recently has such research begun to explore less overt acts of resistance among students and teachers, following a legacy of romanticizing student rebellion that often misconstrued the political value of this resistance. That is, it failed to adequately develop the ways in which the actions of teachers and students served to produce the very field of possible ways in which such actions "signify" resistance, thereby surrepetitiously confirming notions of appropriate conformity. For example, uses of humor and purposely ignoring another person have been identified as important actions (McClaren, 1985; Everhart, 1983).

I suggest that such shortcomings are due to the fact that theories of resistance have not given enough attention to the issue of how domination and dominating reaches into the structure of the personality itself. The often contradictory relation between action and understanding has not been
elaborated very well. But it would be difficult to successfully undertake this task without a reasonable sense of the subject, Göran Therborn's (1980) use of ideology may be helpful here. What he means by ideology is the constitution and patterning of how people live their lives as conscious, reflecting initiators of acts in a structured, meaningful world (p. 15). He suggests that social, cultural and institutional structures "qualify" people by certifying them--implicitly or explicitly--as "qualified" to perform certain actions, and by "qualifying" the very actions and ideas that are possible or deviant (note the double meaning of "qualify."). And, borrowing a concept from Louis Althusser, he proposes that we perceive subjects as "interpellating" themselves as acting subjects along two dimensions of "being-in-the-world": the subjectivities of "being," and the subjectivities of "in the world." A subjectivity of "being" is always existential in that a subject is a particular (i.e. gendered) individual at a particular point in his or her life cycle, related to other (gendered) individuals of different generations at certain places in their life cycles. Similarly, a subjectivity of being is also always historical, since a subject exists in a certain human society at a particular moment of human history (e.g., a teacher in a junior high, a shaman, a blacksmith, etc.). Subjectivities of "in-the-world" are both inclusive, in that a human being is a member of a meaningful world, and positional, since a person has a particular place in the world in relation to other things and people in the world. What this sort of theorizing allows us to do is accept the fact that people "are not unitary subjects uniquely positioned but produced as a nexus of subjectivities in relations of power which are constantly shifting, rendering them at one moment powerful and at another powerless" (Walkerdine, 1981, p. 14).
This identifies certain contradictions for traditional Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches to the relations of power in educational institutions. For example, in adapting Therborn's scheme, we can no longer view education as a bourgeois institution that places teachers in a position of power from which they can oppress children who are institutionally powerless. A teacher, powerful in a bourgeois institution, is in a position to oppress those children whose resistance to that power—like all resistance—is understood as ultimately progressive rather than contradictory. Similar modifications need to be made as well as to the discourse of children's movements that consider resistance in terms of "rights" or "liberation," and feminist accounts that use concepts of "role" and "stereotype" to understand women and girls as unitary subjects whose economic dependence, powerlessness and physical weakness is reflected in their production as "passive," "weak," and "dependent" individuals (Walkerdine, 1981). These discourses have been important in helping to develop emancipatory practices. But the analyses they promote may not be as helpful as we might suppose.

Nevertheless, most literature on schooling reads like a compendium of empirical support for Richard Rorty's (1985) attempt to dichotomize people as "naturally" falling into one of two ways of approaching the world:

There are two principal ways in which human beings, by placing their lives in a larger context, give sense to those lives. The first is by telling the story of their contribution to a community...The second...is to describe themselves as standing in immediate relation to a non-human reality...I shall say that the stories of the former kind exemplify the desire for solidarity, and that stories of the latter kind exemplify the desire for objectivity. (p. 4)

For Everhart (1983), the distinction is between the dominant "cognitive interests" (Habermas, 1971) of teachers and students. That is, teachers and students have different orientations and basic assumptions about what constitutes knowledge. These interests serve as basic discriminators between
types of knowledge, and help to define knowledge and the nature of assumptions about the cognitive processes that are part of coming to "know" something. Associated with these interests are modes of inquiry, or knowledge systems, that establish the procedures by which one comes to "know." Focusing on the use to which knowledge is put, we can then identify how what "counts" as knowledge affects the type of social activity engaged in as a result of the existing knowledge. The emphasis in schools on technical interests and reified knowledge, exemplified by Habermas' empirical-analytical mode of understanding, leads to instrumental, or purposive-rational action ("...the ordering of technical interests to instrumental action is best typified by the required action of students to solve dilemmas posed for them in advance by teachers, and for the purpose of "succeeding," "passing," "getting by," etc.," p. 240). But students create interactional networks reflecting practical cognitive interests, in which knowledge grows out of collective interaction, rather than preceding it or serving as a base for action, and out of which knowledge is generated contextually.

In contrast, McClaren (1985) uses a ritual approach (based on the work of Victor Turner (1967, 1969) to distinguish between the "raw" "streetcorner state" and the "cooked" "student state." Outside of school, the individual acts out her or his drama of apotheosis, revenge, resistance and revitalization in an atmosphere in which time is relatively unstructured or polychromatic, and in which the body is in a subjunctive mood. This is a liminal or liminoidal dimension with a ludic ethos. In school, the student is socialized offstage; body rhythms switch from loping gaits and swaggers, accompanied by shouts, to regimented control of movement with associated groans, sighs and cynical laughter. It is an indicative mood in which the
metaphors of the street corner are replaced by a metonymy that helps produce predictable, restrictive cultural forms.

Everhart and McClaren provide fine examples of how far one can go with resistance theory, using two seemingly divergent theoretical backgrounds. Everhart concludes that student resistance is not emancipatory because the discourse established by the generative knowledge of the students does not enable critical reflection of their own situation. Interestingly, the discourse produced is dependent on the students' class background, thus explaining to some degree the mechanisms of social reproduction. McClaren uses Turner's ritual theory to point out that, while actions and material "things" have fluid, symbolic power, in the case of the street corner and student states, there simply is no symbolic carryover from one to the other because of the class and ethnic differences between them.

These writers also do a marvelous job of updating the canonical theorization of sociological and anthropological studies of education which demarcated the world of the school, its expectations and "hidden curriculum," from that of the student and his or her peer group (Waller, 1965; Cusick, 1972; Jackson, 1968; Larkin, 1979). Quite simply, when we look at schools, we see the teachers and administrators with agendas that have nothing whatsoever to do with the social agenda that the students bring with them. Jackson tried to explain this in terms of crowd theory. The students, grouped daily, get to know each other well and are bound by their common experience; because they are forced to be in school and concentrate on things that they do not choose themselves, the pull to communicate is stronger in the classroom than many other crowd situations. Cusick noted the enormous portions of time that students spend watching and waiting. By adapting to the role of a spectator, they form a complex social and cultural system representative of their
perspective about their place in school and the meaning derived from it. (Wexler's (1987) metaphor of learning as television watching is an apt rephrasing of this theory.) The meaning of school for students, which grows from the organizational role defined for and by the pupils, makes social interaction very important. Larkin observed this phenomenon in terms of authority and autonomy, concluding that even attempts by teachers to involve students in decisions about school activities were destined to fail because to participate in such activities was to accept the premise that the school fostered events that were worth the student's time in the first place.

Dialogical philosophy parallels this theorization. For example, Buber (1948) makes a distinction between I-It relationships, in which the subject treats another person like an object, and I-Thou dialogues, effected when two subjects address and respond to each other. Students can be read as "its" because they are viewed as part of the world and caught in its causal chain. The "I" of a student only appears and is shaped in the I-Thou context of immediate peer group (Habermas' generative knowledge). Yet, if either party in a potential dialogue treats the other as an it, then both become "its" without the I-creating activity of an I-Thou relationship. Hence, we can understand that the very nature of a practice founded on pre-theorizing action (such as pedagogy) is psychologically harmful to both participants, teacher and student. A Buberian approach to education might then be forced to explore the sorts of educative structures that would allow for dialogic encounters to take place, encounters in which both the teacher and the student were genuinely interested in addressing and being addressed by each other---learning networks, computer conferences, etc.

In the early eighties, Willis (1981) shifted the terrain of discussion by layering a neo-Marxist in class and production on top of the
teacher/student dichotomy, drawing a distinction between the middle-class school and the working-class lads. The separation became manifest in the ways that class delineated orientations to a mind/body dualism. For example, the lads, already rejecting the intended continuity between work and mental labor built into the formalized dimensions of school, were attracted to a world of manual labor which permitted the working-class patterns they were most accustomed to. Everhart echoes this theme, linking it with a "natural" (liberal) desire for self-control: student labor is mostly estranged, and, because of this, the pupils attempt to reappropriate relevant portions of their lives in school. In this way, rather than others, they have power over their lives. The subsequent knowledge is regenerative in nature due to its grounding in the context of action and the collective interpretations generated by the sharing of similar experiences. Likewise, McClaren speaks of class hegemony as "shrouding the body" and "dampening the will" through an intricate web of symbols and root paradigms mediated by capitalist relations of power and privilege, and of human agency as "always alive," "rupturing the unitary pervasiveness of structural, sedimented oppression." But in his study, class was overlayed with the issues of ethnicity and religion (Portuguese immigrant children versus white middle-class Toronto teachers, with contrasting orientations towards Catholicism.) More recently, Ashendon, Connell, Dowsett and Kessler (1987) collaborated on research which identified two main patterns of hegemony in schools: teachers over kids and different groups of students over each other. The correspondence (or lack thereof) between these two patterns had a great deal to do with the way a particular school functioned, and the way teachers did and experienced their work. (For example, the private school full of "ruling-class" kids differed significantly from the working class public schools studied.) Deem (1978) had linked class
with gender, emphasizing that the structural organization of capitalist societies leads to a division of labor and resulting personal and psychological traits assumed natural to men and women. The particular gender division of labor may not be inevitable, nor does education necessarily create a sexual division of labor. But, in the present organization of capitalism, the division is central to the reproduction of the work force, and education rarely does anything to undermine the process.

The result of this work has been a grasping at additional dimensions—class, race, ethnicity, gender, etc.—which, as Philip Wexler (1983, 1987) has reluctantly whined, ends up virtually indistinguishable from the old-fashioned variable-identifying sociology of education it was striving to subsume. The image is of Ptolemysts, furiously defending anthropocentrism by accumulating ever-more-subtle epicycles, like squirrels gathering nuts for the winter. But these dimensions do appear important, especially as they intersect with the ways in which teaching and schooling forces technical interests (Everhart, Ashendon, et al.), and the ways in which the "schooling culture" is made and remade continually through the dynamics of ritual (McClaren; also Giddens, 1984) without revealing the source of its legitimating power. Teachers need to develop "variety-reducing outlooks" in order to deal with large numbers of students and, to the extent that teachers come to view the schooling of students through the assumptions of simple, reified schemes of knowledge, the ideology of teachers regarding students reflects a materialist-based cultural form (Everhart, p. 253). Likewise, schooling is founded on providing a standardized array of experiences predetermined for students who are conceptualized in a predefined manner (Everhart, p. 255). Hence, teachers become great categorizers (Ashendon, et al.) because their labeling and streaming of students combines with thinking
in binary oppositions and with a heavy use of talk as an "autonomic tuning device" (McClaren). This enables the school to be a hegemonic system both at the level of schools as distributors of knowledge controlled by the capitalist state (Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Spring, 1972; Apple, 1979) and, at the level of human agency, through our "styles" of engaging the world and the ways in which we ritualize our daily lives—gestural embodiments, rhythmic practices, and lived forms of resistance (McClaren, 1985; Giddens, 1984).

However, the trick to dealing with these seemingly endless dimensions for determining the location of individuals and their actions is to reverse the line of determination, thus dissolving the individual/society dichotomy and allowing the recognition of the individual as a social construction. The new Copernicans of social analysis find conceptual strength in their willingness to abandon a personal centrality in favor of relational forces, a de-centering "physics" of power. Teachers, for example, should not be seen as instruments of the middle-class versus the working-class, new petit-bourgeois versus proletarians, Canadians versus Portuguese immigrants, etc. They themselves often come from the same community as their students (Everhart, Ashendon, et al.). And relationships identified as elucidating class, gender, sexual politics, ethnic relationships, etc. are often interwoven with each other. Moreover, teaching is contradictory in itself; it is in some ways like a (middle-class) profession, in others like a skilled trade (unionization, wage labor); it is work within a bureaucracy (career structure, tenure, job definitions) but not like a bureaucracy (typically unsupervised daily work). We must not work out the "location" of teachers and deduce their potential for the exercise of power from this location. Such a geometrical/geographical image, belonging to a categorical mode of thought, neglects the complexity of the "place" teachers occupy, and forgets that the
"place" does not stand still, thus obliterating what teachers actually do.

"Teachers don't occupy a location; they act in a situation" (Ashendon, et al., p. 256).

Ashendon and his colleagues make this point well with "class." Instead of asking "in which class location are teachers?" they suggest "into which class relations do teachers enter? How far are these relations being formed by the person's activity?" Walkerdine (1981) gives us an excellent example of how such questions would work when dealing directly with gender and power. Her analysis of interchanges between a nursery school teacher and children who are making constructions from Lego reveals that, although the teacher has an institutional position she is not uniquely a teacher; nor are the boys just small boys. By focusing on discourse as action and signification, she is able to demonstrate the strength of Therborn's approach to the individual and to confirm the lack of any one "most fundamental" ground:

The particular individuals are produced as subjects within a variety of discursive practices. A particular individual has the potential to be "read" within a variety of discourses. We cannot say that the limit of the variety is determined in any direct or simple case by the economic. However, the "materiality" of the individual does have particular effects, though those effects are not solely determined by that materiality, but by the discourse in which it is "read." (Walkerdine, 1981, p. 15)

Because of who we are, and the way in which relations of power are produced through our actions, only certain discourses are available to us, either because of the way in which we read others' actions or because of the ways in which our own actions are read by others. This is the fundamental importance of Therborn's dimensions of "being" and "in the world" as constraining forces in the construction of power.

In Walkerdine's case, the teacher is a woman, and while that itself is crucial, it is only because of the ways in which "woman" signifies that we can understand the specific nature of the event. The boys resist her both by
asserting their difference from her and by seizing power through constituting her as the powerless object of sexist discourse. Their power is gained by refusing to be the powerless objects of her discourse and recasting her as the powerless object of theirs. She has not ceased to be a teacher; but what is important is that she no longer "signifies" as one. She is now a "woman-as-sex-object."

Of course, both the boys and the teacher have the potential to be produced as subjects or objects. But inherent in the discursive positionings are different positions of power:

Individuals, constituted as subjects and objects within a particular framework, are produced by that process into relations of power. An individual can become powerful or powerless depending on the terms in which her or his subjectivity is constituted. (p. 16)

To reiterate, the material and economic are not unique or linear causes of the productive power relations in Walkerdine's example, although gender and age have important effects. Since the boys are both children and male, and the teacher is both teacher and female, they can enter as subjects into specific variety of discourses, some of which are empowering, others not. When the boys call a female student a "cunt," they immediately "bring the teacher down to size;" she and the small girl are the same thing in discourse. Meanwhile, the teacher "reads" the children's actions as a harmless expression of a sexuality both normal and natural. "It was not by accident that she waited so long to stop the boys, nor that she did so with a gentle rebuke which did not take issue with the content of their talk." (p. 17) Her actions are pedagogical practices that aim to produce individuals who are controlled but not regimeted. The purpose of such a pedagogy is to produce "better" (rational) control through self-control; ironically, this is precisely what helps to open the space for the practice of the children to be powerful.
The production of rational, self-choosing individuals comes from psychoanalytic theories that assume such an individual will develop if left alone and that sexuality and aggression will otherwise be pushed down to fester in the unconscious (Walkerdine, p. 19). This pedagogy expects to produce agents responsible for their own actions and whose interactions are based on rationality alone, leaving behind the irrational. Education following these goals serves to produce unitary subjects making logical, rational choices. But Walkerdine's illustration points out that the rational ideal is doomed to failure, both in asserting rationality and in picturing a unitary subject. The very discourse which aims to "set children free" from over-regulation permits any activity as a "natural" expression of "something." We might go so far as to say that children in such classrooms cannot be understood as produced in discourses which have oppressive effects; they simply have experiences which are transparent in incidental contexts.

Marshall Sahlins (1985) describes this interaction of social structure and human agency by emphasizing the degree to which actions throw open the field of possible transformation or reproduction. Like Sahlins' Hawaiian natives and European pirates, the children and the teacher in Walkerdine's classroom, left to their own devices, act so as to reproduce those positions in those discourses with which they are familiar. Yet the constellation of their very efforts at reproduction is simultaneously an important transformation in the social structures of power. The individuals in Walkerdine's example are not just produced in static, unitary reflections of social forces; nor are they given power as a function of their institutional position. The discursive forces which shape the pedagogy of the classroom produce a space that promotes the childrens' power and also asserts the naturalness and harmlessness of their actions. The contradictions are
produced by the way in which the "material" of the individual provides the potential to be the subject and object of a variety of discourses and accompanying practices. Note that this interpretation avoids both the unitary, rational subject, as well as the individual as a "real," essential kernel whose outer skins are a multiplicity of roles that can be shed to reveal the true, revolutionary self.

Teachers feel guilty about oppressing children. But this is not the whole story. Nor can we expect liberal pedagogy to free children to explore their own experience without understanding precisely how that experience is understood and how that understanding produces the children as subjects. "The next task" is to formulate a post-liberal education which, in the words of C.A. Bowers (1987), "decenters individualism" by embracing "the nature of embeddeness and tradition." This is of course quite a challenge. As Bowers has demonstrated, the hegemony of liberal discourse is very strong, encompassing virtually all twentieth-century models of pedagogy, ranging from John Dewey to Paulo Friere and Carl Rogers, on the one hand, and B.F. Skinner, on the other.

But, as long as we're blasting dichotomies, we should mention Wexler's (1987) concern that we avoid the traditional split of theory and practice in favor of supporting larger educative social movements. Critical social analyses of schooling have until now ignored important ways in which schools interact with the public sphere (e.g., the educative aspects of the media) and generally fail to articulate a contextual, institutional, educational politics:

...classifying and romanticizing cultural emanations as "resistances" was a diversion from asking what contemporary forms might replace the clubs, societies, and coffee-houses that once served as the public social places and occasions for educations. (Wexler, 1987, p. 182)
The danger is that a critical pedagogy, as currently conceptualized, may be appropriating the place and voice of existing, practically-inspired educational movements as well as more informal critical education discourse within far broader social movements. (Ibid., p. 227)

The presence of these movements--Wexler mentions French feminism, life history studies, New York graffitti gangs--belies that a critical pedagogy could be theorized in the academy and successfully handed down to the classroom with more than token effect. In the end, people focusing on schools replace politics by ignoring these popular movements.

Weiler (1988) bypasses such an interjection by investigating precisely the interaction of educational institutions and the women's movement. Following Bakhtin's (1981) social construction of voice, she focuses on how the actions of feminist teachers and administrators open up opportunities for an emerging discourse of gender and power, and how the discourse of contemporary feminism helps them reflect on how their own actions structure the actions of both themselves and their students.

Likewise, Bowers (1987) explores the possibilities for using education to work within the larger educative movement of bioregionalism. Indeed, bioregional issues should be of particular interest for future exploration of the concerns of this paper because of the direct denial of the persistent nature/culture dualism. As discourse, bioregionalism also builds upon those uses of children's rights arguments intended to support a unified view of the rights status of all human beings (Allen 1980), expanding the discourse to include the moral rights of all things, living and non-living, for all contribute to the existence of life.

Modern interpretations of alienation and empowerment have so far obscured the importance of place or biological context, preferring an unrealistic anthropocentrism. In contrast, bioregionalists conceive of the
individual and his or her place as integral to each other. The discourse of bioregionalism replaces the fundamental binary separation, in which an abstract deity disrupts the experience of the sacred as a form of geography organizing space, into the binary logic of humanity and God, which has led to our estrangement from the environment. By emphasizing the interdependence of place and person, or nature and culture, a bioregional pedagogy offers possible links between empowerment and a culture in ecological balance. In dissolving this more insipid dichotomy, we have shifted from Ursula LeGuin's fictional account of freedom, autonomy and individuality in The Dispossessed to her more recent Always Coming Home, which focuses on the abandonment of the myth of purposive-rationality as a source of power and the maintenance of a subsistence culture attuned to the rhythms of the environment.

One example of the production of subjectivity and power that cuts through gender, biology and both the individual/society and nature/culture dichotomies is offered by Henriques et al. (1984, pp. 21-2). Hundreds of girls in Puerto Rico have started to experience an accelerated sexual maturation from the age of six months; indeed, some four-year-olds show full breast development and menstruation. It is hypothesized that this is due to estrogen in chicken feed since chicken is the staple diet of many Americanized Puerto Ricans. The biological changes, which place the children in the limbo of "child/woman" have caused serious confusion. Yet, these changes have not unilaterally altered the childrens' view of themselves or their social relations: it is because of the ways that adult women's sexuality signifies that the effects are as they are. Not denying the very real effects of the estrogen (politically or theoretically), the "problem" is both biological and social. Moreover, the changes are possibly reversable with a chicken-free diet. But the call for such a change is resisted by the corporations that
control Puerto Rican agribusiness, which introduce economic and political concerns. Henriques et al. suggest reconceptualizing "nature" and "culture" in such a way that the implicit dualism is dissolved in favor of a stress on the relational character of their mutual effects.

What the above example illustrates is that many of our dilemmas are productions of a dualistic discourse that promotes the acceptance of assumptions about the "normal" and "natural" as "fact." An individual/society dualism maintains an erroneous distinction between a unitary subject and social structure, thus producing the unitary subject. This subject is embodied in a discourse which does not recognize power as an important conceptual tool. Yet a deconstruction of the unitary subject leads to the necessity of power-perspectives in the production of subjectivities. As Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) has noted, rational thought emanating from such an individual gives the appearance of elevating moral decision-making but actually serves to strengthen a cultural tendency toward the emotivism of "subjective judgment." The relativism that characterizes this discourse makes a central problem out of how to reconcile individual self-direction with the more complex demands associated with membership in a community (Bowers, 1987). Likewise, the nature/culture dualism makes a fundamental dilemma out of how to reconcile individual (or cultural) self-direction with the more complex demands associated with immersion in a bioregion.

In any form, these entrenched dualism are expressions of what Sahlins (1985, p. 154) calls "the twin anthropological (or historical) errors" of materialism and idealism. "They consist in attempts to link the meaningful significance and the worldly happening in some mechanical or physicalist relation of cause and effect." For materialism, the significance is the direct effect of the objective properties of the happening. This ignores the
relative value or meaning given to the happening by society. For idealism, the happening is merely an effect of its significance which ignores the burden of "reality"—the forces that have real effects, if always in terms of some cultural scheme. The same goes for theory and practice (untrue in practice, absurd as theory; all praxis is theoretical, etc.), the individual and the collective, the real and the ideological, and so on. "Culture functions as a synthesis of stability and change, past and present, diachrony and synchrony." (p. 144) Schools are sites of action within more global contexts: the interaction of varying and conflicting productions of subjectivities that "happens" in these "places" can help us understand how action works to structure power and how the exercise of power structures action. In what ways do "teachers" and "students" negotiate the structuration in their classroom? How does this reproduce and transform the culture of the classroom? How do "knowledge" and "learning" differ across varying structurations of power and how do the socially-constructed definitions of knowledge and learning contribute to this structuration of power? The "symbolic" dialogue of history implicit in these questions—a dialogue between the received categories and the perceived contexts, between cultural sense and practical reference—crumbles "a whole series of ossified oppositions by which we habitually understand both history and the cultural order." (p. 145) Here we begin to fight the typically "ameliorist" stance of education theory (Kliebard, 1975) by embracing "the risk of cultural action" (Sahlins, p. 149):

Action is a risk of categories in reference. In action, people put their concepts and categories into ostensible relations to the world. Such referential uses bring into play other determinations of the signs, besides their received sense, namely the actual world and the people concerned. Praxis is, then, a risk to the sense of signs in the culture-as-constituted, precisely as the sense is arbitrary in its capacity as reference. ...The gamble is that referential action, by placing a priori concepts in correspondence with external objects, will imply some unforeseen effects that cannot be ignored...The 'objective' gamble lies in
the disproportions between words and things... The 'subjective' risk consists in the possible revisions of signs by acting subjects in their personal projects. (Sahlins, pp. 149-50)

...The truer issue lies in the dialogue of sense and reference, inasmuch as reference puts the system at the risk of other systems: the intelligent subject in the intransient world. And the truth of this larger dialogue consists of the indissoluble synthesis of such as past and present, system and event, structure and history. (p. 156)

Thus, despite his faith in the purposive reorganization of experience leading to an escalator of social improvement founded on the scientific method, Dewey (1916) indubitably hit the mark. Social ruptures of continuity have their intellectual formulation in various dualisms such as labor/leisure, practical/intellectual activity, humanity/nature, individuality/association, and culture/vocation which have their counterparts in traditional dualism of classical philosophical systems, such as mind/matter, body/mind, mind/world, individual/social relationships. Underlying these various separations are fundamental assumptions about the isolation of mind from activity involving physical conditions, bodily organs, material appliances, and natural objects. Consequently, there is an indicated philosophy which recognizes the origin, place and function of mind in an activity which controls the environment. (p. 323) This is the power of individual subjectivity to produce a unitary subject. Where he went astray was to assume that this was a consistent, circular argument that implied an investigation of the biological continuity of human impulses and instincts with natural energies, etc. In the end, he "recycled and reproduced" the implicit dualism. The question is, can we avoid doing so?

I think we can, if we accept the premise that Therborn's contraining dimensions of "interpellation" do not locate individuals in predictable, pre-defined ways. This is the stuff of power: if action were not a gamble, then power would be reduced to manipulation. Power is exercised only over "free"
subjects and only insofar as they are free. It is always a way of action upon acting subjects by virtue of their own potential or actual actions—a structuration of power. This is the subjectivity of power.
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