UNDERSTANDING STRIKES IN REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA*

William G. Rosenberg

* This paper is based on close collaboration with Diane Koenker, and reflects joint research and writing undertaken in conjunction with our volume Strikes and Revolution in Russia, 1917, Princeton University Press, forthcoming 1989. Our research was supported in part by the Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Michigan, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the International Research and Exchange Board (IREX), with funds provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities and the United States Information Agency. None of these organizations is responsible for the views expressed.
The Russian revolution of 1917 has justifiably commanded the attention of hundreds of scholars, political theorists, activists, novelists, and poets, as each generation struggles anew to comprehend its significance and deduce meaning from its kaleidoscopic images. Yet despite a truly prodigious number of books and articles, the essential task of understanding Russia's fluid social context in that pivotal year and analyzing its changing relation to unfolding politics remains largely to be done. This is so partly because analysts have lacked adequate data and methodologies, but also because of the difficulty in conceptualizing the problems involved in relating social forces to collective action, in connecting the social context or social matrix of the revolution to the ways in which power was exercised and ultimately distributed. However complex, these problems are arguably among the most important to our understanding of the entire revolutionary conjuncture.

They are complex because the relationships themselves are multiple ones, and because the system of political and social ties as they evolve in a time of revolution must ultimately be seen as a single whole, particularly if one is to ascribe meaning from their character to the very notion of "revolution." Conceptually these relationships must be seen as "fundamental" structural or systemic connections between the nature of society and the character of the new order. They need to be distinguished from more "incidental" or contingent explanations of the ways in which popular activism affected the fates of parties and political groupings, a view of the "mob" or the "accident" of Kornilov's bringing Lenin to power. These fundamental or systemic aspects of revolutionary interaction deserve attention as points of entry into an analysis of rural as well as urban Russia in 1917, although the present essay focuses on urban workers, and the form of popular activism to be explored is limited primarily to strikes -- only one aspect, albeit a central one, in the pattern of collective action as a whole.

By basic structural or systemic relationships I have in mind the correspondences between social values (broadly defined), political institutions, and social stability. Included among "social values" are such cultural attributes as popular attitudes toward authority, gender relations, notions of law and the state, shared ideas about appropriate social hierarchies, and common
principles of justice or civil liberties, among others. Political institutions include not only prominent government or state agencies, but more important for our purposes, those lesser known bodies created especially to resolve conflicts. By "social stability," I refer to some point along the heuristic continuum between conditions of order and those of upheaval. While a form of social stability can obviously be achieved by repressive actions of governments alone, no effective instruments of repressive control existed in revolutionary Russia during the months from February to October, and social order was thus dependent on the ways in which the objectives of the new regime itself were compatible with broader social and culture patterns. Central here, consequently, were the ways in which Russia's various political institutions and structures were or were not able to mediate the range of conflicts and antagonisms that were reflected in strikes and other forms of collective action during 1917, and which occur to some degree in every society, whether or not it finds itself in a revolutionary situation.

The conceptual framework I am trying to draw here is also related to the differential nature of power and authority. By "power" I have in mind both the "raw" ability of one set of actors to coerce others, and the much more complex coercion immanent in particular socio-economic systems and their attendant social relations. The first form was revealed quite clearly in the February revolution itself, whose historical importance at the time and afterwards had in no small measure to do with the ways in which it demonstrated the ability of mass collective action to overthrow an established regime. Petrograd workers and others also grasped an understanding of their power in this respect through action itself, undoubtedly carrying into subsequent months the belief that it could be exercised again. The second was apparent before February as well as after in several ways, but especially during 1917 in the manner in which the structures of Russia's deteriorating economy increasingly coerced workers of all sorts (as well as other social groups) into various patterns of deprivation over which they had no control. "Power" in both of these senses, however, needs to be distinguished from "authority," whose essential attribute has to do with some legitimizing system of values. These constitute a superordinate (or "constitutional") restraint on behavior, and underly quite a different set of political relationships
than those reflected either by the "raw" power of striking Petrograders in February, or the coercive attributes of a system of industrial production or commodity distribution on the verge of collapse.

As Leopold Haimson has argued, the importance of this before 1917 had to do with the ways in which authority and power both were related even to those social formations which, in his terms, were "out of joint" with soslovie and other categorical elements of old regime Russia. As the superordinate elements of tsarist authority were discarded, the principal political task of the new revolutionary order was to bring competing forms and uses of power in sufficient balance to allow stable socio-political relations and orderly change, and to do so at least in part, if elements of social and political democracy were to be preserved, through the creation of new superordinate (or "constitutional") restraints. This meant, in effect, pulling what I have labelled "fundamental" socio-political relationships back "into joint": assuring some degree of correlation, in other words, between systems of values, new political structures, and social order. At the same time, the application of "raw" power had to be contained by some generally accepted system of restraints.

As this essay will try to suggest, the changing nature of strikes themselves affected these fundamental socio-political relationships in 1917, but to understand how, one must further recognize some of the conceptual problems involved in this form of labor activism, and suggest ways in which its own interior dimensions need to be analyzed. For if the revolutionary process itself is a large and complicated matter, so, too, are strikes, involving along with other forms of collective action complex aspects of objective behavior and circumstance as well as subjective experience.

First among these latter dimensions is what Haimson has identified as the "problem of social identities": the ways in which an individual's sense of who he or she was in revolutionary Russia related to political outlooks and the nature of collective action in general. As Haimson has argued, all social actors clearly brought multiple identities into the revolutionary period, and those most involved in the struggle for change in the years leading up to 1917 are identifiable not by any single characteristic of social position, but by combinations of indices related in each case to
the inability of extant institutions and socio-economic relations to accommodate their needs.³ As we begin to analyze 1917, however, one central issue clearly has to do with the difficult question of social group or class coherence: the degree to which the patterns and pressures of aggregate identities may have come to dominate tendencies toward social differentiation. The revolutionary process as a whole, in fact, may well be correlated in some important ways to the moments when aggregate identities like "worker" or "bourgeois," "gentry" or "peasant" began to overwhelm the more particularistic identities of trade or profession, geography, or traditional social status. In terms of Russian labor, the question of how or why these unifying identities may have come to dominate particularistic ones cannot be separated from the changing nature and form of labor activism, and especially strikes, from the actual experience of conflict. Thus the nature of the strike movement and of labor activism more generally must be analyzed in terms of the ways in which diverse groups of workers were (and were not) pulled together into a class conscious of its identity. In others words, it is essential to determine the extent to which collective action in revolutionary Russia was consciously class-based action.

Second, one must also recognize the degree to which social interactions themselves lay at the heart of these complex processes of class formation and political choices. Most immediate in the experience of workers were those interactions between labor and management that emerged in the course of specific conflicts, but we must also consider triangular patterns of interaction between workers, employers, and both official and unofficial agencies of the regime (including, in some instances, the soviets). This dimension of the problem is very much complicated by variations among localities and industries, but everywhere in 1917, at the center or on the periphery, it was the nature of these interactions themselves which gave many workers (and others) a sense of who they were, or at least of who they were not, with equally significant consequences.

Finally, there are the closely related and extremely complex problems of "representation" and "perception": the ways in which various social groups and political formations presented themselves to others and were perceived by them, and the ways, further, in which activist
behavior actually signified values, consciousness, or other elements of sentiment and belief that may have underlay political inclinations. In 1917 the notion of "representation" has further meaning in the manner in which, on one hand, socio-economic and political structures themselves reflected values and commitments, and on the other, the ways in which collective action signified political mentalities and outlooks.

However complex, the problems of representations and perception are central to our understanding of the revolutionary period both in the ways they affected expectations and judgments, and in the manner they contributed to the formation of both class and political consciousness. Appearances and perceptions associated with the formation of the first and second coalitions, for example, very much affected what activist workers thought strikes could achieve in May and June, whatever the underlying economic and political realities. Similarly, the ways in which forms and relations of production, commodity distribution or even representative politics were also perceived to involve basic conceptions of property, law, or even civil rights necessarily affected the ways in which workers and others began to think about the links between such elements and their own social interests. To get at these important matters, and to understand in particular their relation to labor activism and to evaluate the degree of complementarity in outlook between different social groups and political contenders, we must consequently explore what might be called the "language" of strikes, expressed in both formal and informal demands, and determine as well as we can the ways in which it may have reflected underlying commitments.

Obviously none of these matters can be fully explored in a single essay. Nor can the conceptual issues we raise be neatly systematized into a model of social revolution. But they do constitute building blocks toward some future model that might better account for the explosive power of labor activism in 1917 than explanations based primarily on ideology and politics; and by examining strikes within this broader framework, we should be able to bring our understanding of labor activism as a whole into sharper relief. The questions we therefore ask are these: how are we to understand the nature of strikes in revolutionary Russia? How did the nature of strikes and other forms of labor activism relate to fundamental structural or systemic aspects of Russian
society and politics? And what, finally, can we suggest as the possible links between the strike process itself and the relations of power and authority underlying the Bolsheviks' coming to power?

Let us start by reviewing briefly the first phase of the revolutionary period, and by suggesting possible relationships between the nature of strikes and labor protests and the broader political milieu. As Diane Koenker and I have indicated elsewhere, strikes and other forms of labor protest declined sharply in frequency and scope in the immediate aftermath of the February upheaval, and only began to occur again with some regularity just before the formation of the first coalition in late April. From May until the July days, somewhat more than 4 strikes a day began on the average throughout Russia, forming what might be called a spring "cluster" or strike "wave" that extended until just after the July days, when frequencies again fell significantly. The period between March 3 and July 6 can thus conveniently be considered as a whole for our purposes, even if variations also occurred within this period, and even though close analysis can discern changes beginning to occur in overall patterns during the last weeks before the collapse of the government on July 2.

For most students of this period, politics has dominated the historical discourse. Relying heavily on perceptions of the time, the received wisdom emphasizes the relationship between the politically destabilizing nature of these strikes and the inability of the first two Provisional government cabinets to exercise a firm hand in the area of labor policy. The character of strikes is largely seen as a consequence of the continued activism of politically conscious metallists, especially among the Vyborg workers in Petrograd who had played such a crucial part in the overthrow of the tsar. The weakness of the regime is attributed overwhelmingly to the problematic nature of dual power, both before and after the formation of the first coalition at the end of April.

There are two difficulties with this perspective. One is related to the nature of strikes themselves, the other with the way in which "dual power" may or may not have reflected
competitive notions about the role of authority in Russia's new political system. In contrast to analyses of more impulsive types of labor activism, such as attacks on foremen or the "carting out" of factory administrators, an extensive literature on strikes generally contradicts the view of those who see this form of activism as reflecting similarly reactive or anarchic impulses, a blind and insatiable lashing out for revenge or selfish gains, as Russian strikes are often characterized. On the contrary, the evidence strongly suggests that strikes everywhere occur more often in times of economic prosperity than crisis (since workers understand the better opportunities for gain); and that few workers willingly risk their livelihood in conditions where strikes might shut plants permanently or where alternative employment is not readily available, as clearly became the case in revolutionary Russia. There are obviously exceptional cases, but particularly in conditions of political democracy, strikes are most often a consequence of rational calculus, a weapon and strategy adopted by workers in the expectation that their efforts will be rewarded and they will end up better off. And in these circumstances, contrary to the arguments of most Soviet historians, strikes can serve the purposes of social order as well as class conflict, relieving the conflictual pressures built into labor management relations. 6

Seen in this way, strikes in 1917 bore at least the potential of becoming a constructive part of the new order in revolutionary Russia, provided their goals, nature, and scope did not fundamentally contradict the basic principles and values underlying Russia's new political institutions and the formation of the new regime. To what extent, we must therefore ask, was there such a common set of values or principles among Soviet leaders, government figures, and other representatives of the new order? In the view of many, the very division of power between the government and the soviets precluded the emergence of anything of the sort, paving the way for ideologues like Lenin to capture popular imagination and support. The question is a difficult and important one, but its answer turns, we think, not so much on institutional forms as on perspectives of social order and concerns about mass power.

As Leopold Haimson has argued, one of the most important aspects of "dual power" had to do with the ways in which it represented and articulated "a sense of the deep divisions that
separated the upper and lower strata of urban and rural Russia, and of the inevitability of their reflection in the institutional framework that would have to be pieced together to defend the country and the revolution. As he further indicates, and as Ziva Galili so admirably demonstrates in her book, this division of power initially evoked substantial support among broad strata of the population. I would argue this was largely so, however, not simply, and probably not primarily, because of representations of class or a realistic appreciation of social cleavages, whatever the rhetoric, but because of what the February revolution itself revealed about the power of mass action exercised without reference to constraining authority. Insofar as the institutional divisions reflected by the network of soviets was accepted by such groups as, say, the Petrograd Society of Factory and Mill Owners (not to mention the new ministers themselves), it was largely as a means of keeping mass power in check.

Indeed, many Soviet Executive Committee members themselves saw one of their primary tasks to be the creation of socio-economic and political circumstances in which further upheavals of this sort would never again be needed. In creating factory-based arbitration boards (an important element of the March 10 agreement with the Petrograd Society of Factory and Mill Owners), and then in pressing workers to utilize these instruments as a means of resolving conflicts, the Soviet leadership’s primary objective was not simply to advance workers’ interests but also to reestablish conditions of social and political stability. The patterns of mutual restraint that Haimson suggests the soviet/regime partition temporarily induced in these groups’ mutual relations was conditioned by a shared recognition of common tasks, especially the construction of a new order in which superordinate and legitimizing authority correlated to real power relationships.

Thus "dual power" in important ways was a misnomer, since one overarching aim of at least a large component of the Soviet leadership in domestic matters, if not the social interests it represented, was fundamentally that of the Provisional Government itself: to mitigate (or channel) social conflict in the interests of democratic political stabilization, and more importantly, to restrain its contours within mutually acceptable limits, based on common assumptions about civil rights, the legitimate use of power to advance particularistic interests, and the superordinate
qualities of (constitutional) law, postol'ku poskol'ku notwithstanding. This perspective was challenged from the start in Petrograd by a more radical vision of potential social transformation, but it lay at the core of moderate Social Democratic and Social Revolutionary thinking in the capital and was especially strong in Moscow and the provinces. The resulting congruence was one of perspective, not policy, and only partly derived from underlying values. But it allowed broad acceptance, at least initially, of institutions like factory committees as a means of organizing workers; it facilitated efforts to improve wages and conditions generally in the workplace; and most important for our purposes, it necessarily legitimized strikes.

Here most important was the tension between these organized forms of protest and the far more impulsive types of action like samosudy, attacks on foremen, or the wheelbarrowing of factory administrators. As Koenker and I have detailed elsewhere, the latter obviously continued to some degree, and were clearly inimical to social order. But insofar as they were also highly particularized, occurring for various reasons with little if any forethought or organization, they reflected at worst a generalized disrespect for legal procedures or the efforts of the new regime to build a basis for power in constitutional authority, rather than a coherent rejection of the existing socio-political order itself. They were also in themselves a poor means now of effective worker mobilization, since they provided no ready way of articulating grievances or allowing their mediation. And most important, as the reports of the Factory Inspectorate itself indicate, they were also becoming increasingly less frequent in the spring, as "conscious workers," in the Inspectorate's own words, "succeeded in a number of instances [tselom riad] in instituting a degree of order and discipline among the workforce."  

Strikes on the other hand represented important opportunities for comparatively orderly mobilization, and were both a traditional and critical testing ground of essential interests once mediation efforts failed. Like other forms of protest, strikes invariably represented a contest of relative power, and in this sense were always political. But the contest itself required accommodation as well as concession, a mutual respect for outcomes and a willingness at the end to move forward, however great the accompanying tensions. Strikes were thus an essential means
of readjusting social and political relations within an industrial branch or enterprise without necessarily undermining the stability of the socio-political order as a whole; in contrast, attacks on foremen or other forms of assault in the workplace could only bring chaos or repression.

Ziva Galili has documented the particular concerns of Menshevik praktiki in this regard, and has shown brilliantly the fundamental tension underlying the Petrograd Soviet’s early efforts to keep attacks on foremen and similar acts in check while gains were negotiated with employers and the regime.\textsuperscript{11} The Soviet leadership also felt it was urgent to bring organization and "responsible" leadership to the shop floor.\textsuperscript{12} Such views were strongly held in the Provisional Government as well, particularly by the officials most closely responsible for labor, N. V. Nekrasov, the new minister of transport (a left Kadet), and A. I. Konovalov, the Moscow textile magnate who became minister of trade and industry. (The latter carried responsibility for labor affairs until an independent labor ministry was created in May.) Each man had strongly supported worker participation in the War Industry Committees before February and each now accepted the idea, as Nekrasov put it, that the revolution "dictated a basic transformation of all institutions," requiring popular participation at all levels.\textsuperscript{13} While activism in the workplace had to be organized and controlled by the soviets and their agents, it was clearly the state’s role to foster and regulate institutions for mediating social conflict, and to institutionalize traditional forms of protest common to "bourgeois democracies." For men like Nekrasov and Konovalov, this meant among other things finally recognizing strikes as legitimate, logical, and even a necessary part of the democratic process as a whole, however undesirable they might be from the standpoint of maintaining production.

In other words, while the institutions of "dual power" clearly represented the realities of social cleavage in revolutionary Russia, what was implicitly affirmed from above in early March on both sides of the dual-power divide was a new set of common values. At its core was not simply a formal commitment to legality and civil rights, but an implicit sense of social ethics and even social justice. Management-labor interests would be legally contested. Commitments made would be respected. Deep social inequities would be mitigated. Appropriate and legal protest activity
would become part and parcel of a functioning democratic system. Civil order would bring social betterment.

If we look at the most obvious manifestations of labor protest in the spring of 1917 it is easy to understand the perceptions of contemporary observers and historians alike. Leaving aside the continuing (if diminishing) acts of violence on the shop floor, the massive demonstrations provoked by Miliukov's note on Russia's war aims, the June protests against the offensive, or the often unruly political meetings that accompanied the first city duma election campaigns, there was much about strikes themselves that made them appear to be little more than a continuation of the February protests, especially in Moscow and Petrograd. For the period March 3 through July 6 some 511 strikes took place throughout Russia as a whole for which we have a reasonable amount of information. These involved at a minimum some 619,000 strikers, and frequently included more than one enterprise. Some 75 percent of all strikes took place in industrial enterprises, 18.8 percent in service establishments (restaurants, laundries, etc.), and only 6.2 percent on railroad or steamship lines, other transportation companies, or among other employment groups (including those that the sources do not specify clearly).  

It is hardly difficult to find out who these strikers were. As Table 1 indicates, the most strike-prone industrial group by far between March and early July remained the metal workers, the "vanguard," as Leopold Haimson has shown, of the pre-revolutionary strike movement as well. The strike propensity of metalists, a weighted ratio indicating the relative proportion of strikers to the work force by industrial branch, was more than three times that of the leather workers, the next most active group, and almost eight times that of textile workers (Table 1, column 3). In absolute terms, the metalists predominance seems even stronger. Metalists alone accounted for more than 56 percent of all industrial strikers even before the July days. With this massive strike included in the calculations, the metalists share of the industrial strike force
increases to approximately 80 percent, an extraordinary figure (Table 1, column 1). It also constitutes some 65 percent of strikers in all enterprises, industrial and non-industrial combined.

We also know from other calculations that these strikers remained concentrated in Petrograd and Moscow, just as they were earlier, and that the metalists’ tendency to strike here was shared by other strikers. Strike "intensities" for these two cities, the percentage of the total work force on strike, were 81.9 and 49.3 respectively between March 3 and July 6 (Table 2). In none of the other regions of the country did the level of strikers exceed 13 percent of the respective labor forces. Finally, as Table 3 indicates, the metalists alone were practically the only group to continue using strikes for overt political goals, as they did during the July days. The only other group involved significantly in political strikes were the textile workers, and most of their strikes occurred in early March, as the revolution spread into Vladimir and Kostroma provinces.

Thus the pervasive role of metalists in spring strikes appears confirmed, and so indeed it must have seemed to industrialists, manufacturers, and the verkhi in general from the sheer numbers of strikers from this branch in Petrograd and Moscow. In fact, if we look closely at the number of strikes in this period as opposed to strikers, the metalists’ dominance is less pronounced (Table 4). It was also also concentrated in Moscow rather than Petrograd (Table 2). Service sector workers, on the other hand, were quite active in the capital, even though most of their strikes were quite small. Nevertheless, the dominant perceptions of Russia’s revolutionary leadership on both sides of the dual power divide were logically ones which identified strikes overwhelmingly with the activities of metalists alone.

The implications of this were hardly unimportant to unfolding politics. The strong ties historically between metalists and the Bolsheviks were well known. Lenin’s return to Petrograd in early April had been greeted with enormous enthusiasm, particularly by workers from the Vyborg district, a metalists’ stronghold. Workers from Vyborg had participated overwhelmingly in the February strikes that toppled the old regime, and for years had dominated labor activism in the capital. It was here that the party centered its activities not only for Petrograd, but also to a large
extent for the country the party as a whole. Thus the very process of striking was widely
construed as an extension of the use of "raw" power reflected during February and before.

To what extent, however, was this sense of strikes and strikers an accurate reflection of
workers' goals and mentalities? And does the numerical dominance of metalists mean that the
metalworking "vanguard" stood apart from fellow workers in this period, either in terms of
political consciousness or class allegiance, and that one's identity as a carpenter or printer
continued to remain in this period a stronger element of consciousness than more aggregate class
identities like "worker" itself? If this were the case, one might imagine with General Kornilov and
others that political stability could be strengthened in urban Russia if metal plants were simply
seized by the state, assuming it had the means to do this, and metalists themselves forcefully
repressed.

To answer this difficult question we need to differentiate carefully between different
sectors of production, and examine as closely as we can what strikers in each sector wanted. This
in itself presents complex analytical problems. For all of the strikes throughout Russia in 1917 for
which we have a reasonable amount of information, we have recorded more than 250 different
strike demands. In the aggregate, workers demanded higher wages, better personal treatment,
and improved working conditions. In the particular, they demanded heated shops, boiling water for
tea, vacation pay, different types of accident insurance, playgrounds for their children, the right to
sit down in certain places during slack time, and more leisure, as well as the removal of
specifically named foremen or administrators. In their very richness and variety it can be said
that such demands reflected an authentic voice of proletarian discontent in 1917 and a common
language of protest. To evaluate them, however, and particularly to examine changes over time, it
is necessary to group them into more manageable and familiar categories, namely wages, factory
conditions (including hours), workers' dignity, and work rule (including factory control).
The problem is that such aggregations can represent both more and less than they appear. Strikes over wages may disguise other pressing demands which for reasons relating to strategy or tactics are not presented to employers; carefully enumerated demands for formal address by supervisors, for an end to the demeaning custom of tipping, or for some form of free time or vacation, surely describe real expectations more fully than the phrase "workers' struck over dignity issues." The language of protest, in other words -- the workers' stated demands and the ways in which they were represented to management -- may well include a multiplicity of additional meanings. The extent to which this is so can only be deduced from a careful analysis of content, and although this task is a difficult one when dealing with masses of historical data, it is crucial if we are to understand strikes in terms of the ways in which they both influenced and reflected social and political relations.

In our work on strikes Koenker and I have consequently formulated an additional, parallel aggregation of workers' demands, based partly on specific contexts, partly on what we know about what certain kinds of demands actually implied in revolutionary Russia. On this basis, each of the more than 250 specific demands in our data set has been regrouped into several additional categories, where appropriate, including one which identifies strikes challenging established managerial rights (like the power to set wage rates or to hire and fire workers) and another which shows that conflict was related to prior negotiations and agreement that management failed to honor. Each of these parallel aggregations allows us greater access to possible differences between what workers actually represented as their goals, and what they may also have actually been struggling for; and each may allow us to understand better as well the nature of management labor interactions and the strength of worker identities.

What do these various calculations suggest about what striking workers actually wanted in the spring of 1917? If we look first at overt or manifest demands, it seems quite clear that strikes generally reflected "traditional" and minimally confrontational labor aspirations during these weeks, despite the dominant role in aggregate terms played by Petrograd and Moscow metalists. The overwhelming number of strikes in the first half of 1917 concerned issues which were
manifestly "economic": wages, factory conditions, hours, leave time -- the familiar goals of strikes in other times and places. 71 percent of the strikes up to July 6 (involving at a minimum more than 300,000 strikers) dealt directly with wage rates, piece work schedules, bonuses, and such wage related issues as pay for lost work time; some 28.6 percent (118,000 plus strikers) concerned hours, vacations, tools, safety matters, child labor or other questions relating to workplace conditions. Of the remainder, a little more than 16 percent dealt with issues relating to workplace control, and 7.4 percent with questions concerning factory relations, tips for restaurant workers, or other matters associated with workers' dignity. (See Table 5.)

Strikes over wages increased in number especially as prices began to rise in May and June. Less frequently, but with extremely positive results, strikers also demanded respect, particularly those workers in the service sector like restaurant and hotel employees. Traditionally, supervisors had used the familiar form ofaddressing workers with serfs, children, and other social inferiors. Now workers expected to be addressed with the formal form of, and were willing to strike to assure the end of this and other forms of verbal abuse. The same holds true even for demands over issues directly related to workers' "control," a term which in the early period of the revolution had far more to do with increasing the rights and prerogatives of factory committees and trade unions than it did with running an enterprise. By late spring, workers had begun to assert their right to intervene in hiring and firing, a direct challenge to management rights, but in relatively few numbers. For the period between March and July, we find only 25 "control" strikes which included this demand, 23 of which involved a little less than 47,000 strikers, according to our estimates. Sixteen were in industrial enterprises, seven in the service sector. "Control" issues instead during these weeks, at least insofar as they were represented in formal demands, had far more to do with seeking representation in the industrial relations system rather than seeking to dominate the enterprise.

This is not to suggest, we repeat, that conflict over all these issues was not a struggle for power within the workplace. But assuming the language of protest reflected in this range of overt demands accurately represented worker mentalities between March and July, it would still seem
that the strike movement in this period was not fundamentally incompatible with the shared goals of the Soviet and Provisional government. In their manifest content, demands over wages, conditions, dignity and even control issues were almost entirely focused on achieving goals directly related to the workplace, corresponding in form to those sought by workers in more developed "bourgeois" democracies. The political contest reflected in strikes thus had little to do with with the "raw" or "impulsive" power associated with attacks on managerial personnel, but with the distribution or balance of rewards and prerogatives within the established socio-economic system. The authority of the new regime in this respect was neither threatened nor directly challenged.

This view is confirmed when we submit all of our strike data for the period between March 3 and July 6 to multiple regression analysis, a measure of the dominant forces underlying strikes. Here we find that the highest strike intensities occurred in areas with the highest nominal wages and also a decline in real wages (a characteristic, of course, of Petrograd itself and to a lesser extent of Moscow). These wage effects appear to dominate all other factors, so much so that once they are controlled for, factory size and even the element of urban concentration do not affect strike intensity levels. Past strike experience, however, measured by participation in the strike movement from 1913 to 1916, also turns out to be significantly correlated with strike intensities in this period. We can thus say with a high degree of certainty that the most strike-prone areas of Russia before July 7 were those that had struck most before the February revolution, had high wages, and a falling real wage. Thus "ordinary" rather than radical impulses seem to have largely underlay even the strike prone metalists, whose attributes of course included experience in labor activism and who were suffering in 1917 a strong relative degree of economic deprivation.

This is not, however, the whole story. When we utilize our second system of aggregating workers demands, and analyze spring and early summer strikes in terms of this underlying, "implicit," language of protest, we find rather different patterns. Whereas only some 16.6 percent of all strikes manifestly demanded some degree of workers' control (Table 5, column 2), some 39.3 percent indirectly challenged traditional management rights. These strikes tended to be small-
scale, and may have included only about 24 percent of all strikers in this period, but they still suggest a sizeable undercurrent of protest over issues of authority in these early months, much larger than is evident using conventional analysis of strike causes. Equally interesting, as we learn from additional calculations, is the fact that both implicit and explicit challenges to employer rights seemed to have involved predominantly skilled workers in the first half of the year, at least in industrial strikes, although variations among industries were substantial, as Table 6 further indicates.

In the wood, paper manufacturing, and printing industries, the percentage of strikers challenging the factory order was significantly higher than elsewhere. By contrast, metal workers ranked low (7.5 percent). In fact, in non-political strikes, metalists pressed almost exclusively for economic improvements, rather than a greater share of managerial power. Almost all metalists striking in non-political strikes demanded better wages. As far as can be determined, less than 1 percent made explicit demands about workers' control, easily the lowest share of any group of industrial workers.

What we have, then, is a most interesting if rather complicated picture: on one hand, the inclination to use strikes as overt political weapons concentrated almost exclusively among metalists in the late spring, and erupting in force in early July; on the other, an extensive use of "economic" or "non-political" strikes by other industrial sectors throughout the period to press the frontiers of factory control and contest traditional managerial prerogatives. In fact, the significance of this latter type of demand in the spring in terms of an aggregate class consciousness lies precisely in the identity of the groups which pressed them most intensely. They were not the skilled "vanguard" workers in the metal industry, but workers in small industries and factories, and in retail stores and service establishments, whom the tsarist legal system had placed at the greatest disadvantage vis a vis their employers. As Table 6 indicates, 85 percent of striking service sector employees made demands which implicitly challenged managerial authority; among retail workers, nine out of every ten strikers pressed such claims. In other words, these were groups of workers who had not had political influence before February, whose strikes were the most easily repressed, whose personal relationship to their employers the most closely
monitored. Thus while dominant picture in these weeks still suggests what might be called an "ordinary" paradigm of strike activism, one conforming in broad contours to "bourgeois democracies" in general and not fundamentally at odds with the mutual aspirations of soviet figures, employer associations, and the regime, a strong undercurrent of opposition to "bourgeois" values clearly existed, at least insofar as these values were reflected in the traditional prerogatives of management.

To a large extent, we can therefore say with some confidence that the freedom to strike in 1917 finally provided Russian workers with a way to negotiate forcefully but "legitimately" for an end to low wages, long hours, poorly lighted and unventilated work spaces, hazardous machinery, and such concerns as the use of child labor -- all notorious problems before the revolution, even relative to Western Europe and the United States -- and that they took great advantage of the opportunity. The dominant perceptions of the verkhi in this first period of the revolution were consequently ones which miscontrued the degree to which the overwhelming number of strikes themselves, in metals as well as in all other branches were not fundamentally incompatible with the shared goals of moderate soviet and government officials alike or necessarily undermining to the authority of the new order. At the same time, however, while strikes were used overtly as political weapons only on rare occasions, and at least until July 2, only by a relatively small number of workers in metals and textiles, workers in other branches were also clearly using strikes to press against the frontiers of managerial control and fundamentally change the balance of power in the workplace. Although the very dominance of metalists made it difficult to perceive, the cohering elements of a politically radical class consciousness among workers were thus emerging themselves in the course of "routine" management-labor interactions before July, even as strikes everywhere brought workers substantial economic gains.

Still, strike activism before July, although of large proportions, was not necessarily threatening to Russia's revolutionary order, despite ominous undercurrents. Acts of violence in conjunction with strikes continued, but infrequently, relative to the number of strikes themselves.23 Moderate Soviet leaders and especially their representatives in the first coalition
continued to stress the importance of organization and restraint, of keeping impulsive behavior in check in favor of cooperation or legitimate struggle, values shared with the verkhi as a whole. Workers struggled with the competitive identities of "nation" and "class," but as long as they believed their welfare was being served it was possible their activism could take place within the system both Soviet and government leaders were trying to create.

Early July proved a turning point in the development of labor activism in 1917, but not only in terms of the way the July Days gave voice to radical sentiments. Calm returned rather quickly to Petrograd streets and factories after the Bolshevik supported uprising. Lenin, Trotsky, and other Bolshevik leaders went into hiding or were arrested. While soviet and government figures wrestled with the implications of the massive protests and struggled after the Kadet resignations to form a new cabinet, workers everywhere temporarily laid the strike weapon aside. Between the end of the July days and the beginning of August, strikes averaged only a little more than 2 per day; strikers, fewer than 500 per day for the 70 percent whose size we can reasonably estimate, the lowest of the entire revolutionary period. Strike activity resumed during August, but again subsided at the end of the summer and during the early September harvest period, perhaps surprisingly considering the tensions surrounding the Kornilov affair.

In mid-September, however, a new period of intense strike activity began, lasting until the Bolsheviks came to power. New strikes broke out at an average of 4.8 per day between September 16 and October 25, involving by our minimum estimates more than 1,200,000 workers (which are here based on only 68 percent of the strikes in our file for these weeks); 200,000 to 300,000 additional workers remained off the job in strikes begun during August and earlier. From an average size of 236 strikers per strike in April and 480 in May, strikes rose to an average of almost 6400 in these weeks. The daily number of workers on strike now averaged more than 30,000, far and away the highest level of the entire revolutionary period, and an extraordinary figure under any circumstances.24
The magnitude of the fall strike wave in revolutionary Russia is impressive for several reasons, not least of which the fact that it occurred at a time of sharply deteriorating economic conditions, often not conducive to strikes.²⁵ Between February and July, at least 550 enterprises with upwards of 100,000 workers may have closed their doors. The greatest number of affected workers were in the textile industry, particularly cotton; the largest number of enterprises was in the food processing sector; and the highest number of enterprises per worker was in the production of wood and wood products.²⁶ Each of these branches had been facing substantial production problems since before the February revolution, but difficulties intensified in 1917, and spread as well to industries which previously had been fairly secure. More than 90 metal processing plants closed their doors at least temporarily in the June-August period, for example, largely due to a lack of fuel and raw materials (the result, in many minds, of inadequate state controls), but also because employers locked out potential strikers. Initially, these were almost entirely smaller plants and shops, located for the most part outside of Petrograd and Moscow. By the end of the summer, however, production even in favored defense plants had fallen dramatically, in some cases to as little as 60 percent of February levels. In the highly favored chemicals industry, the decline was almost 40 percent compared to 1916.²⁷ According to the journal Vestnik statistiki, more than 500,000 workers in European Russia were unemployed on the eve of the October revolution.²⁸

Under most circumstances, this "army of the unemployed" might have acted as a powerful brake on strike activity, particularly given inadequate unemployment relief. Employers had no hesitation in 1917 to employ scabs in place of strikers, and did so with a flourish in a number of highly publicized strikes, like that of the Petrograd laundry workers in May.²⁹ Strikes meant risking wages, and trade unions even in the well-organized metals industry had few resources available to support their members.³⁰ In many instances, they also played into the hands of employers eager for an excuse to shut down but reluctant to violate injunctions by government, soviet, and even employer association leaders against doing so. What began as strikes readily turned into lockouts in places where supplies were short, capital scarce, and owners alert to the
Why, then, did workers strike in the fall? And what were they striking for?

It should hardly surprise us that the primary manifest demand of striking workers continued to be for higher wages, as in the spring. "Control" issues had by now been largely settled by the legalization of institutions like factory committees, and as we know, such groups were now functioning in most industrial plants. The question of factory hours had also been temporarily resolved by a series of settlements earlier on, in many instances recognizing an eight hour day, at least in principle. In aggregate terms, measured particularly by the total number of strikers, the question of wages seems to have remained the primary impetus pressing workers into the streets, and so it appeared to industrialists, soviet leaders, and members of the government alike who increasingly regarded this form of protest as irrational and anarchistic given the difficulties of maintaining industrial production and any semblance of economic stability.

When we subject our data from July to October to multiple regression analysis, however, we find a very strong suggestion that these perceptions were wrong. None of the earlier correlations between wage levels and strike activity that characterized the strike process in the spring hold for the fall. Nor can the composition of the post-July strike force be explained by any of the conventional factors usually associated with this form of protest: not by wages, past strike experience, urban concentration, skill level, or factory size.

How can we understand the "failure" of these regressions? One explanation has to do with a change in the rates of strikers across regions, from areas of higher to lower wage rates (Table 2). In the period before July 7, the two cities of Petrograd and Moscow stood far above the other regions in the activism of their workers. In none of the other regions did the level of strikers exceed 13 percent of the respective labor forces. In the second half of the year, however, when the strike movement incorporated over 1.5 million workers across the country, Petrograd's activism is remarkably low in relative terms. Now workers of the Urals struck at a rate equal to two-and-a-half times the size of their industrial labor force; Moscow put more workers in the streets than were employed in industry; and one-third or more of the workers almost everywhere
went on strike. Yet only 13 percent of Petrograd's workers joined them. In every region except Petrograd and Odessa, in fact, the rate of strike participation more than doubled between the two periods, and in most regions was much higher.

A second, more interesting explanation also begins to emerge when we look more closely at the correlations between strikes and challenges to traditional managerial rights and power, both explicitly and implicitly. Now we find that in contrast to the spring, strikers overwhelmingly pressed the established boundaries of managerial prerogative even in strikes over wages and wage related issues. Whereas approximately 24 percent of all strikers between March 3 and July 6 used strikes to challenge managerial authority and secure a significant redistribution of power in the workplace (Table 5, column 4) more than 84 percent did so in the period between July 7 and October 25, as far as we can estimate from the available data (Table 7, column 4). In absolute terms, the increase in ratios was even more remarkable, a consequence of the dramatic change in the number of strikers: more than ten times as many strikers demanded rights and powers that had traditionally belonged in management in the fall as in the spring! (Tables 5 and 7, column 3.)

The manifest demand for wages, in other words, was a way of expressing in "legitimate" terms what striking workers really wanted, which was far greater control over the processes of production themselves.

Finally, and perhaps most important, the "failure" of our regressions seems to reflect dramatic changes in the propensity of different groups of workers to strike before and after July, as Table 1 indicates. The strike propensity of leather workers increased more than five fold, from .88 to 5.38; that of textile workers from .38 to 1.44; wood workers from .33 to 1.35; and that of chemical workers from .09 to .60 (Table 1, column 3). Among the two most strike-prone groups now were oil workers and miners, who had not been involved in any meaningful strike activity in the spring, but which in the fall had strike intensity and propensity levels second only to the leatherworkers. Strikers in every industrial branch save one, in fact, were more prone to strike after the July Days than before, and in significantly higher numbers. The sole exception was metals, the "vanguard" element in the spring. For these leading activists, the share of the
industrial strike force dropped from almost 80 percent to a little more than 16 percent (Table 1, column 1).

Strikes in the fall thus reflected a shift from those who were previously most active to those who were less so; from relatively well paid, and skilled groups to those less well paid and less skilled; and from those generally regarded as "politically conscious" to those whose political outlooks were less well formed or discrete. And it was these latter workers, now, who were using strikes, the legitimate weapons of protest, to challenge directly what had earlier been assumed to be the basic prerogatives of management, even if their manifest objectives were still, legitimately, for higher wages.

Why did these shifts occur? In what ways were they related to the fundamental or systemic aspects of society and politics in revolutionary Russia that we referred to at the start? And what do they suggest to us about the changing nature of social identities in 1917 and especially the development of something we can properly call class consciousness? In important and familiar ways, of course, each of these questions can be partly addressed in terms of forces exogenous to the workplace: growing dissatisfaction with the war; increasing activism in the countryside; the Kornilov mutiny; the obvious uncertainties of moderate socialists and liberals both as to the appropriate form of coalition government and even the timing of Constituent Assembly elections. Yet the processes of politicization and working class formation largely stem as well, in any circumstances, from workers’ day to day experiences, their immediate and most apparent realities, since what occurs in the workplace necessarily conditions and structures broader perceptions. Thus workplace interactions are as important a part of these processes as the familiar and dramatic elements of high politics, and arguably moreso.

In these terms, what was most important about the July Days is the extent to which what remained of conciliatory attitudes on the part of employers seemed everywhere to disappear, on the periphery as well as in Moscow and Petrograd. Contract negotiations were interrupted or
broken off between employers and metalists and leather workers in Petrograd and Moscow, oil
workers in Baku, among the textilists in Vladimir and Kostroma, and between management and
labor negotiators in other industries and places. Owners of restaurants and taverns reneged in
Petrograd on concessions they had offered earlier. Leather manufacturers in Moscow rejected a
settlement proposed by the government after three weeks of talks even though workers had
already returned to their benches and expected to resume work. Railroad workers waited with
increasing frustration for long promised bonuses and higher wage rates.\textsuperscript{34}

At the same time, employers clearly became much less willing to give in to strikers
demands. Although our data on the success rates for strikes are not comprehensive enough for us
to be confident in exact statistics, the number of wage strikes lost after July may have been three
times that of the spring, and in strikes concerned primarily with working conditions or workers’
control, as much as ten to twenty percent greater. Even more telling in terms of management-
labor relations was a dramatic reversal in strikes over issues of dignity, whose success rate may
have fallen by as much as fifty percent. While one might expect strikes over wages, conditions,
and workers’ control to be more difficult for workers to win in Russia’s deteriorating economic
circumstances and when notions of workers’ rights were rapidly expanding, dignity strikes were
essentially over cost-free issues, matters where one might expect to see improvements regardless
of broader political or economic conditions.

Workers in many places were clearly frustrated by these hardening attitudes and sought
ways to change them; activism and consciousness were integrally related. New strikes began to
occur with some frequency expressly because employers failed to honor previous commitments or
agreements, some formal and supposed to be legally binding, some only implied. Whereas strikes
of this sort involved less than 21,000 workers in the spring by our estimates, we know that a
minimum of 370,000 industrial workers struck for these reasons in the fall, and the actual
number was probably much higher. Our own figures expand to more than 1 million if we include
the approximately 700,000 railroaders who participated in a general strike in late September
because the wage increases promised by the much-heralded "Plekhanov Commission" were now considered fiscally irresponsible by the coalition regime.

 Appeals for state intervention also increased. Here, too, our data are not comprehensive, and we are certain only of broad trends. Nevertheless, almost three times as many strikes may have involved active government intervention in the fall, compared to the spring; and strikes negotiated as a direct result of pressure from local or regional soviets may have increased by a third, and possibly more. At a time of diminishing rewards and increasing worker frustration over the effectiveness of legitimate forms of protest, in other words, both the state and the soviet structure both emerged as an increasing important player in labor-management relations.

 Let us illustrate these trends with just one example, the experience of Baku oil workers. To many workers in this center of the Russian petroleum industry, the February revolution meant the long awaited opportunity to restore the industry-wide contract that workers had briefly enjoyed in 1904. The early accord had been a major victory for labor organizers, and brought equal treatment for a brief period to the various nationalities who worked the wells and refineries. Early in the spring, negotiations began with the oil "barons" from Nobel, Caspian Oil, "Neft," and other firms. Workers and their representatives hoped a new contract would prevent the companies in particular from keeping wages low through the discriminatory employment particularly of uneducated Azerbaidjani and Turkic workers. Despite expectations of an early and amicable settlement on the workers' part, negotiations broke off at the very end of June when the industrialists' association suddenly took a harder line. The draft contract negotiated by their own industry representatives was rejected, and by mid-July, the very notion of a contract itself was being challenged by a number of individual owners, despite the commitments of the industrialists' group. Not surprisingly, preparations began for a strike.35

 Because of its crucial importance to the national economy, the government itself soon became involved through minister of labor Skobelev. In late July, Skobelev travelled to Baku to participate directly in new talks, laying the government's prestige on the line. He announced that he expected "both sides to make concessions," but in fact, had difficulty moving the talks
Among other things, the industrialists now insisted that any wage increase be tied to an increase in the price of oil. This brought strenuous opposition from the Baku soviet, the workers' delegates at the talks, and the government itself. Seeking some indication that a strike could be avoided, Skobelev proposed that a two week "advance" be paid on August 25 at the higher levels proposed in the draft contract, to be charged against the contract itself once it was signed. When he and the government as a whole insisted on maintaining current oil prices, the industrialists refused to budge. Efforts at conciliation collapsed, and after a month's additional preparation, more than 55,000 workers left their jobs.

The oil workers could not help but experience this prolonged and unsuccessful process of negotiation with feelings of frustration and even contempt. There was ample evidence of real need, and the draft settlement of mid-June seemed to satisfy all parties. In the face of the industrialists' resistance, moreover, both soviet leaders like Skobelev and the government itself appeared powerless; and the industrialists' new hostility to the very idea of a collective contract challenged any thought that the regime could right what was deeply felt to be an historical injustice. It is impossible, in fact, to read reports of workers' meetings during September without appreciating the degree to which the strike itself now assumed a broader political and social meaning. As with the 700,000 railroaders who also struck in late September, the Baku oil workers won their struggle when the regime itself caved in on the matter of pricing.

In the process, however, the strike itself, even if over wages, had transcended its essentially economic content, and become an issue of class struggle and state power. Here and elsewhere, the very nature of strike related interactions cultivated broad class identities and a generalized class consciousness, as one's position in the system of production took on great importance in terms of immediate well-being. If the new regime's struggle to have "nation" supercede class as a source of identity was difficult enough from the start in revolutionary Russia, the changing nature of strikes now made it virtually impossible. And insofar as the Baku workers' experience was broadly shared by workers in other branches, both in and outside of industry, the
pressures toward broad class identities and consciousness readily overcame the particularistic attachments of enterprise, profession, geography, and as the Baku case suggests, ethnicity.

At the same time, moreover, Baku workers and others could not help but become increasingly conscious of the degree to which what was now commonly termed the "bourgeois capitalist system" held real power over their lives and livelihoods. And insofar as the values of moderate soviet figures like Skobelev, the powers of the state itself, and the interests of the industrialists all appeared to coincide, any appeal to law and legality as superordinate restraints on behavior were understandably compromised. In the perceptions of increasing numbers of workers, it was the "bourgeoisie" that refused to play by the rules of its own game.

None of this is to suggest that there were not understandable reasons in many cases for the hardening of owners' views, or that employers alone were responsible for the increasing inability of workers to achieve their goals. Nor was the obvious politicization of the Baku strike solely the consequence of employer-worker interactions. The well-known flashpoints of revolutionary politics -- the Moscow State Conference, the Kornilov mutiny, Bolshevik electoral victories in urban soviets and municipal dumas -- all infused industrial relations with the urgency of the political moment. But the oil workers' experience indicates rather clearly that by the fall, triangular interactions of this sort -- between workers, employers, and the state -- were of increasing importance in shaping workers' perceptions and identities; and in the process, those who continued to defend the shared principles and values on which soviet and government authority had initially been based found their arguments increasingly challenged by practical experience. It was not so much that Russia's workers had a different conception of law or justice than their trade union or soviet leaders (although some clearly did). Rather, the experience and outcome of activism itself pushed workers away from the moderates who had insisted that strikes in a "bourgeois" order were a legitimate and appropriate method of struggle, capable of achieving real gains.

Similarly, when strikes fail in social contexts where workers continue to identify elements of superordinate authority with a greater national interest, they temporarily lose their appeal as
weapons of struggle. In the circumstances Russian workers found themselves by the fall of 1917, where workers increasingly felt there was no superordinate authority worth respecting, it is easy to understand the logic of increasing violence and direct action, the "retreat," as it were, to the use of "raw" power on the part of workers and others inside the workplace and out. An extremely high concentration of such incidents in Moscow and Petrograd took place, for example, in the leather trades, where resistant owners' of unprofitable enterprises continued to frustrate the hopes and needs of workers ready to return to their jobs. And elsewhere, a much larger number of cases of direct action which earlier had occurred independently of strikes now took place in conjunction with strikes themselves, as strikers and their sympathizers no longer believed that shutting down production alone was a sufficient means to achieve their goals. As we have documented elsewhere, our data on incidents of this sort are limited to the capitals and are not complete. Still, the magnitude of changes spring to fall is startling. As many as 75 percent of the attacks on managerial personnel, the seizure of factories, the blockage of goods shipments and other forms of direct action by workers that took place in connection with strikes during all of 1917 in Moscow and Petrograd appear to have occurred between September 1 and October 25.\textsuperscript{38}

In these and other incidents of direct action as well, moreover, we can see again the powerful hand of the metalists. Although their involvement in strikes nearly disappeared, the available evidence suggests that approximately three in five cases of direct action in factories in Moscow and Petrograd occurred in metal plants in September and October, despite the existence in both places of signed collective contracts. Even the "peace" secured in this way was no longer here a basis for order.

The months between February and October were a period in which the appropriate nature of power and authority, the very concepts of democracy, legality, and justice, and indeed, the very nature of class identities themselves were in the process of formation and definition in revolutionary Russia. For tens of thousands of industrial and other workers, the crucible in which
these concepts and values were forged was not the electoral mechanism of the soviets, local dumas, or Constituent Assembly, preceded by public debate over diverse and competing ideologies, nor even less formal struggles over what were appropriate political alliances, although these remained important and had certainly dominated Russian politics (and political history) for years. It was instead the common daily practice of the factory or shop, the ordinary experience of work. It was here that the competitive notions of class and nation, of impulsive versus orderly struggle, did or did not take hold, depending on how ideas reflected (and were refracted through) daily realities and these realities perceived.

For workers and others to restrain the forms of power that had toppled the tsar, and begin to internalize some degree of respect for the superordinate authority of the new "democratic" state and its laws, as both soviet and government leaders hoped they could do, the logic and justice of "orderly conflict," of bargaining and strikes, had to be clear. And so it seemed to be in the "weeks of conciliation" before July. While strikes in these weeks continued to be led by workers bearing a strong resemblance to the "revolutionary vanguard" dominating earlier moments of labor activism, they focused overwhelmingly on labor-management issues considered by both sides to be appropriate to the new order. Strikes themselves were primarily an instrument of negotiation; strikers sought to achieve gains within the newly created system of labor-management conflict legitimated by the authority of the state and the soviets, or at most, to extend the frontier of workers' power within the system, but without overturning it.

In terms of what we might call the "bourgeois-democratic" paradigm of labor relations, the changing pattern of the social composition of the strike force followed a clear mobilizational-economic logic in the spring, as Diane Koenker and I have elaborated in detail elsewhere. The old revolutionary vanguard dominated the strike movement before July because these workers were the most capable of mobilizing resources and energy to take advantage of the new open climate in labor relations. Their past strike experience alone furnished them with valuable lessons in organization. Workers in Petrograd and to a lesser extent in Moscow also had the benefit of contacts with trade union organizations before the revolution, and were likely to have developed
networks that would facilitate the organization of strikes in 1917. Although well paid, they did not strike because of their high wages but because of their declining real wages: their higher wages gave them the economic resources to carry out further struggle.

The very process of striking could not help but broaden a sense of class identity for management and labor both in 1917, however, even if in the particular moment it was still typographers or Putilovtsy who took to the streets. Conflict in any form necessarily conveyed to those involved a clearer sense of who they were not, as well as who they were, strengthening aggregate identities even among very disparate groups. Leather workers in Kazan' learned quickly what metalists were doing in Petrograd; laundresses and restaurant workers knew at once that men and women from the factories sympathized with their struggle and were willing to give them support. The question in these circumstances was not whether class alliances and consciousness would strengthen, but whether stronger class formations would accept the legitimacy and authority of the new order, its rules of struggle.

This "bourgeois democratic" pattern of labor-management conflict and strike activism was, of course, a fragile one at best in Russia's political culture. Even in the spring, as we have seen, an underlying challenge to managerial authority and traditional management prerogatives appeared in the common discourse of strikes, the language of demands. The importance of this was not at first that it greatly threatened social stability or the new state order. To some degree, strikes and labor-management conflict everywhere are about the shifting frontiers of power, just as they form a basis for reordering social relations. The problem in revolutionary Russia was that challenges to managerial authority were simultaneously a test of the resiliency of the system. They also imbued the process of class formation and developing class consciousness with a tension over the use of power in the workplace, one which facilitated the efforts of Bolsheviks and others to associate class formation with the use of power in its mass or direct forms.

As Russia's economy progressively weakened in 1917, strikes became an increasingly dubious method of extracting concessions. As we have seen, however, the very nature of management-labor interactions in these weeks tended to reinforce rather than diminish the
impulse to strike. Workers found it more and more difficult to bargain by other means; management became increasingly convinced that concessions were unwarranted, unnecessary, and more dangerous politically than resistance. Strikes after July consequently became increasingly contentious over issues of control and workplace power, rather than simply of economic gains, even if the formal (manifest) language of protest remained largely as before. The logical relationships we can measure in statistical regressions between strikes and wages, between strikes and past experience at plant or enterprise mobilization, began to collapse.

Thus we would argue that the "bourgeois democratic" paradigm of strikes was joined by a new, revolutionary paradigm, in which hundreds of thousands of workers downed their tools even though a purely economic logic argued their chances for success were small. Increasing numbers of industrialists and enterprise owners became themselves class conscious in these weeks as workers behaved from their perspective with an ever greater degree of "irrationality." Even to many moderates in the soviets, strikes in particular came to reflect "anarchist" impulses. As we have suggested, however, the behavior of most strikers was only "irrational" under of the "old" rules of labor relations, which assumed all parties to labor-management conflict recognized the fundamental viability of the established socio-economic system, and hence the legitimacy of the political order that supported it. By the fall, as aggregate class identities became increasingly sharp, the system itself was working fitfully at best; and its rules, never firmly established in the first place, were changing. Its methods of struggle, consequently, and especially strikes, became ready instruments for quite different ends.

It is primarily in these terms finally, that one might best understand the "politicization" of labor activism generally in 1917, and certainly of strikes. In all of their forms, strikes were the central experience of more workers than any other activist form, and thus the principal conduit of mobilization and consciousness. Most important, strikes were the flashpoints of labor-management relations and hence of interactions between classes, or perhaps more precisely, of classes-in-formation, even if the elements of class consciousness and structure were established well before 1917. These interactions constituted the core of the process of struggle for power in the
revolutionary arena, far moreso, we would argue, than even the massive political demonstrations in April, June, July, and August, however important these latter protests also were to the course of events. The process of struggle in the workplace conditioned relations in all other areas, in the Provisional Government, in municipal dumas, in the streets. It structured perceptions and created a discourse on power quite removed from the language and of government ministers and moderate leaders of the soviets. And in the nature of strike activism itself one can perceive as well the depth of worker grievance, the formative elements of class consciousness, the strengthening elements of intractable social polarization, and the logic of revolutionary commitment.
### Table 1

Percent of Workforce on Strike and Strike Propensities  
March 3 - July 6 and July 7 - October 25*
(Single-Industry Strikes Only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metals</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather**</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>169.9</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>5.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood products</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper/Printing</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food products</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minerals</td>
<td>NM</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>NM</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NM = Not meaningful.

* Strike propensities show relative propensities among these industrial branches only. Mining (oil), mixed products, and other industrial sectors are excluded. The number of strikers is a **minimum** estimate based on approximations for 76.8 percent of all strikes.

** Includes all animal by-products workers.

### Table 2

Strikes and Strike Intensities by Region, Before and After July 6*
(Industrial Strikes Only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>March 3 - July 6</th>
<th>July 7 - October 25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strikes</td>
<td>Intensity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrograd city</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>81.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow city</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow region</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrograd region</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urals</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkov/Ekaterinoslav</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasus</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rostov</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caspian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Provinces grouped within these regions are listed in Koenker and Rosenberg, Strikes and Revolution, Appendix 1. Strike intensity measures the percent of workforce on strike.
Table 3
Distribution of Strikers by Demand Category
March 3 - July 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industrial Branch</th>
<th>Wages</th>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Dignity</th>
<th>Overt Political</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metals</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>66.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minerals</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>NM</td>
<td>NM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>NM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food products</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>NM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal products (Leather)</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>NM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>NM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper/Printing</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>NM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining (Oil)</td>
<td>NM</td>
<td>NM</td>
<td>NM</td>
<td>NM</td>
<td>NM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NM = Not meaningful.

* Includes building and construction workers, teachers, agricultural laborers, and others.

Table 4
Strikes by Branch, March 3 - July 6 and July 7 - October 25
(In Percents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industrial Branch</th>
<th>1 March 3 - July 6</th>
<th>2 July 7 - October 25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metals</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minerals</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food products</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal products (Leather)</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper/Printing</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining (Oil)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Industrial (all)                  | 75.0               | 69.9                  |
| Service Sector                    | 18.8               | 15.6                  |
| Transportation                    | 3.9                | 9.3                   |
| Other*                            | 2.3                | 5.2                   |
|                                  | (100.0)            | (100.0)               |

* Includes building and construction workers, teachers, agricultural laborers, and others.
Table 5
Strikes and Strikers by Demands, March 3 - July 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Strikes</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Minimum Estimated Number of Strikers</th>
<th>Percent of Strikers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>300,350</td>
<td>92.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditions</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>118,230</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>69,840</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dignity</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>57,012</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overtly Political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To July 1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>21,077</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July Days</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>275,300</td>
<td>92.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenge to Management Authority</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>147,590</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Percentages exceed 100 percent because most strikes involved more than one demand category.

Table 6
Distribution of Demands Challenging Authority
by Industrial Branch and Sector
(Strikers as Percent of the Group’s Total Number of Striking Workers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industrial Branch</th>
<th>1 March 3 - July 6</th>
<th>2 July 7 - October 25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metals</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal products (Leather)</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>98.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>93.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood products</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>88.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper/Printing</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>95.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food products</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>73.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>NM</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minerals</td>
<td>NM</td>
<td>NM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Industrial Workers</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>74.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>99.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>62.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>90.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NM = Not meaningful.

* Includes building and construction workers, teachers, agricultural laborers, and others.
Table 7
Strikes and Strikers by Demands, July 7-October 25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Minimum Estimated Number of Strikers</td>
<td>Percent of Strikers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>1,451,100</td>
<td>95.1**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditions</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>1,208,900</td>
<td>79.3**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>1,399,700</td>
<td>91.8**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dignity</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>508,150</td>
<td>33.3**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overtly Political</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>281,660</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges to Management Authority</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>1,521,500</td>
<td>84.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Percentages exceed 100 percent because most strikes involved more than one demand category.

** Non-political strikes only.
FOOTNOTES


2. By "strike" is meant a single collective action by workers with common goals, whether employed in one or more enterprises. This usage varies from that of tsarist Factory Inspectors, who counted each protesting enterprise as a single strike. For further discussion see Diane Koenker and William G. Rosenberg, * Strikes and Revolution in Russia, 1917* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), chap. 1.

3. Haimson, "Social Identities."


10. TsGIAL, f.23, op.27, d.360, l.56-59. Attacks on administrative personnel continued in many places, however, and from everywhere came reports of workers instituting the eight hour day on their own, *iavochnym poriakom*, or otherwise imposing changes. We have ourselves have recorded some forty such incidents in Petrograd and Moscow alone between March 7 and the April crisis, almost all in individual enterprises (rather than groups of plants). For all of May and June we record only 10 or so more. On March 25, the Petrograd Society of Engineers issued a formal protest against "harassment" by "unorganized" workers; and according to factory inspector reports, the wave of dismissals and expulsions that began in the capitals was now rippling through the country as a whole, forcing numerous changes in plant supervisory personnel, especially in the textile industry. (TsGIAL, f.23, op.27, d.360, l.5-14.) Women textile workers in Kostroma, Vladimir, Moscow province and elsewhere apparently struck out with particular vengeance during these weeks against foremen and others guilty of sexual molestation or harassment.

12. Other Soviet figures like Nicholas Sukhanov felt the same way; and both Rabochaia Gazeta and Den' gave strong editorial voice to similar concerns: "Our task is to aid [the government] in bringing the revolution to its completion, and to prevent attempts on its part to restrain or turn it back. But this second task will best be achieved not by shouts of betrayal or workers’ attempts to seize power, but by organized pressure on the government and a tireless propagation of our viewpoints among the backward sectors of the population. Organize yourselves, and take the ground from under the feet of counterrevolution." See Rabochaia Gazeta, March 12, 1917. See also Den', March 14, 1917, and passim.


14. We have data on the number of strikers for 384 of our 511 cases, or 75 percent. Our information is not sufficient for us to make estimates with confidence for the remainder, most of which, however, were probably quite small. As noted, define a strike as a work stoppage by employees with common goals, rather than as the closing of a single enterprise as is sometimes the convention (see note 2, above). Thus we consider the factory closings in Petrograd accompanying the July days as a single political strike.


16. Almost 40 percent of industrial strikes occurred in Moscow, while only some 7.5 took place in Petrograd. And while laundry workers, waiters, cooks, postal employees and others were involved in only about one fifth of all work stoppages in the country at large during these weeks, at least insofar as we have been able to record them, more than 27 percent of these took place in Petrograd.

17. See Koenker and Rosenberg Strikes and Revolution, chap. 6 and Appendix 1.

18. This division is essentially the same used by the Factory Inspectorate, with one modification: we categorize strikes over personal treatment as "dignity" strikes, rather than as strikes over factory order, which are closely related. We also refer to strikes over factory order, the Inspectorate’s terminology, as "control" strikes to better reflect the terminology and objectives of 1917; and we broaden the "hours" category to include strikes over other work conditions as well. In their analysis of strikes in France, Shorter and Tilly employ essentially two groups, wages and organization. See Strikes in France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). Other investigators rely in a similar way on the categories utilized by the data collectors. See, e.g., P. K. Edwards, Strikes in the United States, 1881-1974 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981).

19. The share of strikers making economic demands increased from 38 percent in March, for example, when the change in the price index was only 6 percent, to 96 percent in May and 91 percent in June, when the price index rose 18 percent and 28 percent respectively. See M. P. Kokhn, Russkie indekstsy tsen (Moscow, 1926), 10. The index is constructed from the market basket of goods consumed by an average unskilled worker as of 1918 (Kokhn, 23-26). These figures are for all industries in the USSR, but the rate of change follows closely the prices reported


21. The regression variables are based on aggregate data by province on (1) "strike intensity": the percent of the industrial labor force engaged in strikes, (2) nominal wage in 1916, (3) change in nominal wage between 1913 and 1916, (4) average plant size, (5) concentration of industrial population, (6) concentration of urban population, (7) sex ratio, (8) number strikes in each year since 1913 and also 1913-1916, and (9) number of strikes in January and February 1917. Because the data are aggregate, by province, there is a danger of the ecological fallacy: that we mistakenly ascribe to individual strikers characteristics of the province as a whole. We have weighed this possibility against the value and logic of the patterns demonstrated by this method, and on the whole, are satisfied our results are useful. They show, among other things, that factory size affects strike intensity only apart from wages; once wage levels and changing wage levels are allowed for, factory size has little additional effect on strike intensity.


23. See the discussion in "Limits of Formal Protest."

24. These estimates are, however, lower than those of A. M. Lisetskii. By his count, there were 1,168,449 strikers in September and 1,218,071 in October (including, presumably, the week of October 26-31, which is excluded from our analysis), or approximately 39,000 strikers per day for each month. See A. M. Lisetskii, *Bol'sheviki vo glave massovykh stachek (mart-oktiabr' 1917 g.*)* (Kishenev, 1974), 279, 286-89.


26. Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie [TsSU], *Trudy*, vol. 26 ("Fabrichno-zavodskaia promyshlennost' v period 1913-1918 gg.")., vyp. 1 (Moscow, 1926), 35-36.

27. N. Ia. Vorob'ev, "Izmeneniaia v russkoi promyshlennosti v period voyny i revoliutsii," *Vestnik Statistiki*, 14, no. 4-6 (1920): 115-54. See also the reports in *Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii nakanune velikoi oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoj revoliutsii*, pt. 1 (Moscow-Leningrad, 1957), 406-10. In textiles, supply shortages were relieved only by the annual industry holiday, which came in August, but reserves of fuel and other essential goods remained precarious, and no one thought the situation would soon improve. Similarly with food stuffs. According to a report pressed to the
Special Council on Transport early in August, goods shipments on the railroads were off more than 244,000 cars in July, compared to 1916; more than 25 percent of the country's locomotives were out of service, some 5,180 "undergoing repair," 1705 more in July than in 1916. In Moscow, somewhat better supplied than Petrograd, food prices increased on the average more than 20 percent between August and September, and were up 62 percent from May. The jump in Petrograd was steeper. See Ekonomicheskoе polozhenie, pt. 2, 74-79, 90, 163, 244-46; Statistika Truda, 1 (1918): 10-11. See also the discussion in Z. V. Stepanov, Rabochie Petrograda v period podgotovki i provedeniia oktiabr'skogo vooruzhennogo vosstaniia (Leningrad, 1965), 142-44, 182-206; S. A. Smith, Red Petrograd (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 168-71; and D. Koenker, Moscow Workers and the 1917 Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 251-52.

28. Vestnik Statistiki, 14, no. 4-6 (1923): 226.

29. Laundry workers in more than 600 Petrograd establishments left their jobs on the day the first coalition government was announced in May. From its beginning, the strike was closely followed in the press, partly because it soon caused such great inconvenience for residents of the affluent central districts, partly because it was the first major service sector strike in Petrograd that mobilized large numbers of previously passive workers. Laundry owners organized a "yellow" union with higher wages for members in their efforts to open their shops, and used a variety of intimidating tactics against the strikers, who were strongly supported by Petrograd industrial workers. See e.g., Rabochaia Gazeta, May 18, 1917; Rabochaia Gazeta, May 18, 1917; Russkiia Vedomosti, May 24, 1917; and Pravda, June 1, 1917.


31. See esp. the discussion in P.V. Volobuev, Proletariat i burzhuaziia Rossii v 1917 g. (Moscow, 1964), 148-90, 302-20.

32. Most prominent among these rights and powers were those relating to hiring and firing. In approximately 13 percent of all strikes between September 16 and October 25, strikes demanded to have their own representatives committees control determine who was hired or fired, an effort, clearly, to protect jobs and to stave off the real dangers involved in being unemployed. Equally important in terms of the strike process overall were demands that workers themselves be granted the right to set piece rates or other rate schedules, determine factory rules, and decide themselves on other issues of workplace routine, such as the tempo of production. In each of these instances strikes constituted a direct challenge to what had previously been assumed to be basic managerial prerogatives.

33. The strike intensity of mine and oil field workers in the fall was 147.5 (the ratio of strikers to workers, which includes workers striking more than once); strike propensity, 4.30. Strike propensity figures shown in Table 1 measure the relative inclination to strike only among the eight principal branches of industry subject before 1917 to factory inspection. If the propensities for these eight branches are recalculated to include miners and oil workers, they are as follows: leather workers (animal by-products): 4.94; mining (oil), 4.30; textiles, 1.34; wood and wood products, 1.26; metals, .63; paper and printing, .59; chemicals, .55; food and food processing, .08; and minerals, .06. Strike intensity figures stay the same since they are based on individual industry statistics rather than calculations involving the total industrial workforce (which changes if mine and oil field workers are included.

34. See, e.g., Rabochaia Gazeta, August 1, 1917. Golos Kozhevnika, 4-5 (December 1, 1917), cited in Koenker, Moscow Workers, 322.
35. A. N. Guliev, "Bor'ba bakinskogo proletariata za kollektivnyi dogovor vesnoi i letom 1917 g.," Velikii oktiabr' i bor'ba za Sovetskuiu vlast' v Azerbaidzhane (Baku, 1958), 83-91; Bakiinskii Rabochii, August 2, 1917.

36. Bakiinskii Rabochii, August 6, 1917.


38. See the discussion in "Limits of Formal Protest," 323-25.

The Program on the Comparative Study of Social Transformations is an inter-disciplinary research program at the University of Michigan. Its faculty associates are drawn primarily from the departments of Anthropology, History, and Sociology, but also include members of several other programs in the humanities and social sciences. Its mission is to stimulate new interdisciplinary thinking and research about all kinds of social transformations in a wide range of present and past societies. CSST Working Papers report current research by faculty and graduate student associates of the program; many will be published elsewhere after revision. Working Papers are available for a fee of $1.00 for papers under 40 pages and for $2.00 for longer papers. The program will photocopy out-of-print Working Papers at cost ($0.05 per page). To request copies of Working Papers, write to Comparative Study of Social Transformations, 4010 LSA Building, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1382 or call (313) 936-1595.


3 "Coffee, Copper, and Class Conflict in Central America and Chile: A Critique of Zeitlin's Civil Wars in Chile and Zeitlin and Ratcliff's Landlords and Capitalists," by Jeffery M. Paige, September 1987, 10 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper #347.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

