REVIEWING THE SOCIALIST TRADITION

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We are in a remarkable moment of historical change—the most remarkable since the mid-1940s, in fact. Like that earlier moment—which I’ll call the moment of anti-fascist unity—the present is marked by the radical openness of its politics—dramatic events have completely overturned existing structures, dislodging previously entrenched assumptions of the possible, and calling into question apparently reliable certainties. Moreover, as in the 1940s, change has come from the East. It is worth remembering (because the organized forgetting of the last forty years has so successfully removed it from mind) that the war against Nazism was fought and won on the Eastern Front, that the anti-fascist resistance in continental occupied Europe imparted a dynamic of reconstruction that briefly effaced many of the pre-war distinctions of left and right, and that this dynamic brought the unprecedented emergence of national Communist Parties as popular and legitimate participants—and sometimes the leaders—in broadly-based reform-oriented coalitions. By contrast with the mid-1940s, however, the main logic of international alignment is working powerfully in favor of such openness rather than against it. Whereas the Cold War brutally re-polarized the political imagination by 1947-48 and destroyed the autonomy of national roads, the end of the Cold War in the later-1980s has restored the claims of national history. Indeed, Gorbachev has continuously radicalized the openness of the East-Central European, and tendentially of the Western European, situation. And, of course, Western European politics has been experiencing its own kind of flux since the mid-1970s, in some countries (e.g. Britain) more dramatically than in others, as the effects of recession, resurgent social and political conflict, and capitalist restructuring brought the terms of the post-war settlement into crisis.

Given the triumphal anti-socialism with which events in East-Central Europe have been greeted in the West, and the laundering of their significance through the well-tried categories of Cold War discourse, particularly in the USA—given the imaginative rigidifying of most Western political commentary within the closed circle of democracy and the market, it is important to uphold the radical openness of this present situation. For the "end of Communism" also means the end of anti-Communism, in the sense that the imaginative possibilities for politics in Europe as a whole are being redrawn. The transformation-in-progress in the Soviet Union and the democratic revolutions to its west remove the purchase of anti-Communist injunctions in Western political discourse, particularly as substantial majorities in Western European societies seem to appreciate that in the international dismantlement of Cold War militarism it is precisely Gorbachev who has been setting the pace. As Western political cultures were constituted between the late-1940s and the 1960s, anti-Communism has been a powerful internalized constraint, and once the latter is taken away new things can begin to happen. At least, we can begin to think more plausibly in new ways.

Now, it is not my brief to reflect extensively on the coordinates of the present situation, but if we’re to bring "historical perspectives" fruitfully to bear, certain aspects of the present conjuncture’s specificity need to be upheld. Briefly, I’d like to draw attention to the following:
(1) It's important to remember that "new times" are arriving not just in the East, but also in the West of the continent, marked not only by the democratic revolutions against Stalinism, but also by the crisis of social democracy in its Keynesian/welfare-statist form, capitalist restructuring, and a stronger move towards Western European economic integration. The terms of the conference invitation explicitly acknowledge this trans-European quality, but it's worth underlining the full European context of the changes we are currently observing. Together the Eastern European processes of democratization and the strengthening of the EC through 1992 make the years 1989-92 one of the few times when fundamental political and constitutional changes are occurring on a genuinely European-wide scale. I would describe 1989-92 as one of the several great constitution-making moments of modern European history, in a sequence including 1789-1815, the 1860s, 1917-23, and 1945-49. That is, a moment of concentrated political and constitutional upheaval, through which the entire legal and institutional landscape of the continent is redrawn, and one framework of practice and belief replaced by another. During the last few months 1992 has tended to recede somewhat from public view, given the dramatic events to the East, but over the longer term the single market legislation may well have just as much significance for the possible bases on which political (and not just economic) life can take place. Moreover, the two processes are not completely unconnected, because the loosening of Soviet political control in the East and simultaneous liberalizing of the Eastern economies has placed the question of East-West economic relations urgently on the agenda, both as the question of economic aid and in relation to the possible forms of Eastern European integration within the EC. In other words: how far will the existing forms of commercial interpenetration of the GDR and Hungarian economies with those of West Germany and other Western economies now be strengthened; and how far will the EC now be extended to incorporate the East of the continent too? It's hard to see how the existing project of 1992 can simply proceed in its present form without some further extension of its terms to the East. The apparently unstoppable logic of German unification presents the strongest and most obvious challenge to 1992 in this respect. But however this question works itself out in the first half of the 1990s, the general point still stands: in 1989-92 we are experiencing one of the five great constitution-making moments of modern European history, through which the basic context of political action is being fundamentally reshaped, in the West no less than in the East.

(2) An important question arising is: what kind of political vision will guide the process of European integration? The tendency in the USA is to see 1992 mainly as a technical event with major implications for the behavior and access to markets of US business, whereas in reality there's also a very active discussion in Europe itself of the so-called social dimension and the type of social policies that should also be incorporated into the 1992 package, or at least into the future agenda. At its simplest, any restructuring of markets has enormous implications for labor, and one thing we may expect in the 1990s is a much stronger focusing of national labor movements on the trans-national European level of policy-making and action. Moreover, if European socialist movements are going to be pulled increasingly into a European arena of policy-making, in practice that will mean trying to strengthen the powers of the European Parliament. Given the emergence of the socialists as the largest single grouping in the latter during the 1989 Euro-elections, and the simultaneous appearance of a significant Green electorate in all parts of Europe, this creates a very interesting potential.
Again, this is not irrelevant to the situation in Eastern Europe, given
the likely emergence of strong social democratic currents from elections in
GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria (not to speak of the Soviet
Union itself, particularly on the Baltic and Ukrainian periphery, providing
the move to democratic pluralism is maintained in reasonable equilibrium).
A return of social democratic parties to government in countries such as
the FRG/Germany and Britain, left-tending coalitions in the Low Countries
and Scandinavia, modification of the rampant PCOE technocracy in Spain,
and a refocusing of the Left in Italy which finally brought a social-democratized
PCI into government--an aggregation of these national developments would make
the pressure for strong social policies in the 1992 framework together with
a strengthening of the European Parliament into a genuine legislature very
great. Then it would be easier to imagine stronger forms of trans-national
European cooperation on the part of the Left. This scenario becomes critical
for the future of Eastern Europe, given the structural vulnerability of the
region's economies to exploitative forms of integration with the West.

(3) I began by calling present events the most remarkable concentration
of change since the mid-1940s. But there are a couple of intermediate points
that also deserve mention, not least for the ways in which they mark the
decaying hold of the extreme Cold-War polarization on the political imagination:
I am thinking of 1956 and 1968. In both years combinations of events occurred
that undermined the credibility and legitimacy of both sides of the Cold War
contfrontation: in the former, the Twentieth Congress and the Soviet invasion
of Hungary were matched by the debacle of Suez; in the latter, the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia was matched by the Tet Offensive, the May events,
and the Chicago Democratic Convention. To them might be added 1981, when
the declaration of martial law in Poland finally laid to rest the possibility
of Communist self-reform. It is important to make this point because the
politics of 1989 is in a very real sense the resumption of an agenda strongly
articulated in 1968, with anticipations in 1956 (and, one should add, also
in the mid-1940s) --although it's an agenda from which the Communist political
tradition is now authoritatively excluded, and in which the socialist tradition
has to fight harder than one might ever have anticipated for its place. In
other words: the crude polarity of "actually existing socialism" versus the
triumph of market capitalism into which we are being encouraged by the vast
weight of official and media commentary in the West ("the West has won"/"death
of socialism" kind of rhetoric) is not the only legitimate framework for
viewing the events in Eastern Europe. In fact, the dual crisis of 1956
demarcated an independent space--a "third space", as Stuart Hall has called
it--from which a dual critique of established forms (stalinism and the terms
of the post-war settlement in the capitalist West) could be developed. In
the politics of the "first new left" a series of positions were developed
that are fully continuous with the discourse of democratic revolution in
1989:

"A deep suspicion of the all-encompassing state, without
entrenched protection for minorities and indeed majorities,
no matter in whose name it was established. A scepticism about
the capacity of the centralized, command economy to meet the
rapidly diversifying and expanding needs of modern societies.
A fear of the collapse of politics and the economy, of state
and class, class and party. A reappraisal of certain features
which, in the revolutionary scenario, were always scorned as
'bougeois liberties'. Above all, a conviction that 'actually
existing socialism' had got the relationship between socialism and democracy dead wrong. And that, in the second half of the 20th century--in the First, Second and Third Worlds--democracy would turn out to be the really revolutionary—not the 'reformist' element in the socialist tradition".

As Hall insists, this part of the Left should have no embarrassment or hesitation about the collapse of the Eastern Communist tradition because it "has, for decades, been trying to define a socialist alternative which was rooted in a profound and unequivocal repudiation of 'the state socialist model'". Justified forebodings about the successor situations there may be, for, as the earlier departures of the mid-1940s and 1917-23 have taught us, there are no revolutionary transitions without risks and outcomes that can't be ordained. But over the question of principle there should be no doubt: "We should not be alarmed by the collapse of 'actually existing socialism' since, as socialists, we have been waiting for it to happen for three decades". [1]

Before turning to the past, therefore, it is important to keep the history of the present in view. But at the same time, current events take their meaning not just from the ways they're shaping the possible future, but from how they relate to the given past, and the construction of the latter relationship is this paper's main concern. In what follows I'll proceed in two steps: first, by saying something about the specific significance of the Bolshevik Revolution and the Communist tradition, now that the latter may be said to have run its European course; and second, by returning more broadly to the deep context of the socialist tradition in the 19th and 20th centuries. To anticipate the main line of argument—or, rather, to state my implicit assumption—I see no reason to accept the political invitation of the "death of socialism" rhetoric. To do so would be profoundly un-historical. Such a verdict persuades only if we accept the sufficiency of the crude Cold-War opposition between East European state socialism and West European Keynesian/welfare statist social democracy, as if "between them, stalinism and Neil Kinnock exhaust the whole of human history". [2] In fact, the most exciting aspect of current events is the final destruction of that straightjacket of understanding, although it will doubtless be some time before we get used to the unaccustomed freedom of the imagination. "Socialism" may be in "crisis". But for many of us this is old news. Indeed, it was already in crisis when I came of age politically. As then, the point is to broaden the space for experiment, diversity, and a genuine pluralism of understanding. In 1956, and then more hopefully in 1968, such opportunities were briefly opened, before the fronts were brutally clamped shut. As we enter the 1990s, the space is back. Taken as a whole, the socialist tradition is a rich source of possibilities, and the purpose of my paper is to bring this back to our attention.

Bolshevism, National Revolution, and the Meaning of October

The Bolshevik Revolution and the launching of the Third International in 1919 are usually considered in their relationship to the broader revolutionary turbulence engulfing Central and Southern Europe in the immediate aftermath of the First World War. It would be foolish to contest the basic sovereignty of this context. But from a vantage-point late in the 20th century, the revolutionary confrontationism of the years 1914-23 appears increasingly as an exceptional—perhaps the exceptional—moment of left-wing politics in Europe in relation to the periods before and since—certainly produced by powerful
social and political determinations, and leaving powerful legacies for the future, but with surprisingly little subsequent recurrence of a mass-based phenomenon in Europe itself. There are many localized flashpoints of popular revolutionary politics after the 1920s—witness the French and Spanish Popular Fronts, the aspirations accompanying the anti-fascist resistance in various parts of Europe, the radicalism of 1968, and so forth. But the much commoner experience of radical or socialist politics has been one stressing change from within the existing institutional framework of European society. At the same time, the extra-European world has provided major examples of revolutionary success, if we define the latter as military or insurrectionary seizures of power linked to mass-based social and political mobilization. Moreover, in this latter context it has become conventional to stress the national parameters and determinants of Communist politics and popular mobilization. Thus within this longer global perspective, the element of 1917 that has proved most relevant and inspirational has been less the Bolshevik call for confrontation with "bourgeois democracy" than the affirmation of the rights of peoples to national self-determination. This was true in 1917-19 itself not only of the immediate context of the Russian Empire and the wider extra-European world (especially Asia), but also of the East-Central European region of Europe.

In other words, I'm arguing for a shift of perspective in the meaning of October. I'm asking the question: how should we view the significance of the Russian Revolution in general political and comparative international terms from a vantage-point at the end of the 20th century, particularly in the light of current events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, now that the dominance of the Communist tradition has been dislodged in the very societies where its legacy was most powerfully institutionalized? How do we historicize the place of 1917? How do we delimit the context it helps to define, but which simultaneously specifies and limits the resonance/effectivity of the ideas the Bolshevik experience bequeathes to the Left elsewhere? How do we begin to relativize the significance of the Bolshevik model within the history and outlook of the Communist Left, now that the actuality of that model has increasingly run its course? Even before the events of 1985-89, it was clear that we were in a major transition in that respect, which began dramatically in 1956, proceeded gradually and unevenly for the next decade, became propelled even more dramatically forward in 1968, and then worked itself out during the subsequent two decades, generating fresh constructive potentials and reaching a major point of negative resolution, for which December 13, 1981 is as good a date as any. As the PCI said in its response to the Jaruzelski coup, thereby drawing the conclusion from the experiences of 1968, 1956, and 1947-48:

"...we must accept that this phase of socialist development (which began with the October Revolution) has exhausted its driving force, just as the phase that saw the birth and development of socialist parties and trade union movements mustered around the Second International also ran out of steam. The world has moved on, it has changed, thanks, also, to this turn that history took. The point is to overcome the present by looking ahead". [3]

How, then, do we construct the meaning of October? For our purposes, I want to concentrate on three main points, each of which concerns an aspect of the international revolutionary conjuncture that subsequent developments (and retroactive Communist and social democratic orthodoxies) have tended to erase, but which connect very importantly to dimensions of the now-emerging new times:
(1) Between the decomposition of the united parties of the pre-1914 Second International and the consolidation of new Communist Parties in the Third (which didn't really happen until the aftermath of the Second Congress of Comintern in July 1920, in a process driven by the implementation of the Twenty-One Points during the autumn and winter of 1920-21), was an important but indeterminate space for left-wing socialisms of various kinds. In fact, a substantial body of organized socialism—essentially the old Zimmerwald majority, greatly expanded in popular support and national resonance once legal politics in individual countries had been resumed—was strongly aligned with neither the Second nor Third Internationals. Such parties had not yet affiliated with the new Communist International. But nor had they resumed a place in the Second. When the latter was relaunched at Berne in February 1919, such parties either boycotted the meeting (the large parties of the Italians and the Swiss), or else went to Berne and then withdrew. Between the First and Second Congresses of Comintern (March 1919-July 1920) a chain of secessions converted the Second International into a mainly North European affair, carried by the majority parties of Britain, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The first to leave was the Italian party (March 1919), followed by the parties in Norway (May), Greece (June), Hungary (June), when the Social Democrats merged with the Communists in the Hungarian Soviet, Switzerland (August) and Spain (December), the German USPD (December), the French SFIO (February 1920), the British ILP (April), and the Social Democrats of Austria (May).

While some of these parties moved toward Moscow, the breakup of the Second International didn't redound immediately to the advantage of Third. It was only the Twenty-One Points that produced the Communist Parties as really distinct formations affiliated with the Third International, and even then the splits left substantial national groupings with nowhere to go in international terms. Thus a third international body emerged in early 1921, the International Working Union of Socialist Parties, also known as the Vienna Union or "Two-and-a-Half International". This brought together the socialist rumps left by the Twenty-One Points (USPD, Czech Social Democrats, SFIO, the Balkan Social Democratic groups), the Swiss Social Democrats (who first affiliated and then disaffiliated with the Third International in summer 1919), the anti-Bolshevik Russians (Mensheviks and Left SRs), and the ILP, under the effective leadership of the Austrian Social Democrats, who had consistently kept an independent stance between the two main camps during 1919-20. Friedrich Adler, its Secretary and moving spirit, saw the Vienna Union as a bridge to socialist re-unification, to the kind of international umbrella in which the opposing tendencies of the workers' movement (parliamentary and sovietist) could agree to differ, but within the kind of all-encompassing unity that had characterized the Second International before 1914. But despite a unity conference in Berlin in April 1922, this possibility soon dissolved amidst the violent recriminations that had become such a familiar feature of left political exchange. By May 1923 the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals had merged in the anti-Communist Labor and Socialist International.

This universalizing of the socialist split was now to dominate Left politics (with a major exception in the mid-1940s and to a lesser extent during the Popular Front ten years before) right up to the flux of 1956-68 and beyond. Two camps—Communist and socialist/social democratic—faced each other cross a minefield of polemical difference. But nonetheless, we should not forget the importance of the non-aligned center grouped in the Vienna Union, which far more than the infant CPs had carried the hopes of the Left in much of Europe
during 1917-23. There was, in fact, a large amount of generously disposed opinion, easily dismissed as ineffectual by the hard-nosed realists on the extreme left and right, but which in various ways sought to escape the polarized outcomes imposed by the Second and Third Internationals. This was the centrism reviled by Lenin, which bogged down the process of revolutionary clarification between Zimmerwald and the Twenty-One Points—that is, the moral voice and socialist conscience of pre-war social democracy, which provided so much of the original impetus for Zimmerwald, fueled the critique of the revived Second International, and affirmed its solidarity with the Russian Revolution while refusing the disciplined centralism increasingly required by the Third International. It was borne by a Central/Southern European core, as opposed to the North-Central European core of parliamentary socialism before 1914: the Zimmerwald bloc of Swiss Social Democrats, PSI and USPD, the admixture of Mensheviks and SFIO, and the major post-war accession of the SPÖ. Its leading voices—such as Friedrich Adler, Giancinto Serrati, Jean Longuet, and in a different way Karl Kautsky—could be infuriatingly wishy-washy when it came to acting on their revolutionary principles, and by Bolshevik standards parties like the USPD and SPÖ were definitely no advertisement for revolutionary decisiveness. But in the light of the intervening history—not just the degeneration of the Russian Revolution and the disfiguring stain of stalinism, but even more the return of the Left in the 1970s and 1980s to classical democratic perspectives—their scruples need to be taken seriously. However ineffectual its bearers on a plane of revolutionary success, the line from Zimmerwald to the Vienna Union/Two-and-a-Half International described a body of principle—of national diversity and classical democracy—that the Third International disregarded to its cost. [4]

(2) If the Third International deliberately repudiated a substantial body of left-socialist opinion inside Europe itself, it had an often neglected resonance outside the continent in the colonial and semi-colonial periphery, meaning especially the Middle East and Central Asia, China, India, and over the longer term Latin America, South-East Asia, South Africa, and so on. Here it was the fact that the Bolshevik Revolution had occurred in a backward and overwhelmingly agrarian society, combined with the Bolsheviks' emphasis in 1917-18 on the principle of national self-determination, that proved most inspirational for the various extra-European movements. Taking the longer view, we can see this as just as—perhaps even more—important as the resonance of the revolution in Europe itself. For the first time, between the February and October Revolutions, the delegations of the non-Russian nationalities and various extra-European peoples began appearing at the international gatherings of the Left as separately organized and distinctive groups. It is enormously significant that among the major categories of delegates to the founding Congress of the Communist International in March 1919 were those from (a) the non-Russian nationalities of the old Empire (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Belorussia, Poland, Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia; and (b) areas of Central Asia and the Far East (China, Korea, Persia, Turkestan, Azerbaijan, and the "United Group of the Eastern Peoples of Russia".

This opening to the extra-European world was a decided strength. One of the Russian Revolution's most powerful effects, in conjunction with the collapse of the multi-national empires and the triumph of national self-determination, was to bring anti-colonialism and national liberation right to the center of Left political discourse. When Eastern Europe's subordinate peoples were acquiring statehood with the help of the Allies, it was hard for colonial peoples outside Europe not to see this as a cue. Moreover, Lenin's "Theses
on the Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination" (March 1916) had preceded Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, and the Bolshevik stance of national self-determination at Brest-Litovsk in December 1917 had decisively upped the ante for the Western Allies in this respect. [5] The Bolshevik government's early international policy included an audacious attempt to revolutionize the extra-European and colonial world, and in this sense the Third International turned its sights deliberately "toward the Orient, Asia, Africa, the colonies, where this movement [for national self-determination] is not a thing of the past but of the present and the future". [6] Thus the large Asian contingent at the founding Congress--almost a quarter of the delegates (twelve out of fifty-two)--was a major departure from the Second International's pre-war record. As Bukharin observed, this was the first time such a gathering had heard a speech in Chinese. [7] In this respect, the Congress inaugurated a vital future tradition, to which the Baku "Congress of the Peoples of the East" in September 1920 was to become the bridge.

(3) It's important to recognize the limited success of the Bolshevik example elsewhere in Europe itself during the revolutionary period of 1917-23. As we know, a popular working-class revolution comparable to the one in Russia had not succeeded anywhere else in Europe--despite the dramatic breakthroughs in East-Central Europe in October-November 1918, the massive Central European and Italian radicalization of 1919, and the further turbulence of 1920. Even more, some national movements had gone down to crushing defeat, in a sequence of repressive stabilizations running through Hungary, Italy, Bulgaria, and Spain. Yet the plentiful incidence of insurrectionary outbreaks and their failures should not be allowed to exhaust the variety of revolutionary experience in the 1917-23 conjuncture. The Bolshevik model of social polarization and successful insurrection was not the only form in which a revolutionary politics could come to fruition in Europe as a whole. In fact, the commoner pattern was one in which insurrectionary turbulence (or just the chance that it might develop) elicited a major reformist departure, either by forcing the hand of a nervous government or by encouraging far-sighted non-socialist governments into a large-scale pre-emptive gesture. Even where the revolutionary Left was at its weakest and socialist parties recorded relatively few gains in the post-war elections, this effect could be clearly seen--as in France (with a law on collective agreements, the eight-hour day, and an electoral reform between March and July 1919); in Belgium (the eight-hour day, a progressive tax reform, social insurance legislation, and an electoral reform during 1918-21); and the Netherlands (eight-hour day and forty-five-hour week, social insurance legislation, public housing, corporative involvement of trade unions in the new Ministry of Social Affairs, and votes for women during 1918-20). Similar effects could be seen in Britain and Scandinavia. In all these cases a local chemistry of shopfloor militancy, union growth, and government anxiety combined with anti-revolutionary paranoia fed by Bolshevik efforts at spreading the international revolution and the real explosions in Germany and Italy, to produce packages of significant reform. The strength of the desire to accommodate labor movements and appease the workers was also to do with the unusually favorable labor market between spring 1919 and summer 1920 (longer in Central Europe), which gave organized workers a transitory political strength. Neither the reform-proneness of governments, nor the scale of militancy, nor the massive trade-union expansions were possible outside this economic context of short-lived boom. And when it abruptly passed, unemployment quickly rose to quite alarming levels, and workers were cast unceremoniously on the defensive.
However, the net effect of the political interaction among militancy, union growth, and government anxiety was a major increment of reform, and the interesting question is the degree to which a coherent socialist political strategy was at work. Arguably the strongest reformisms in this respect—the ones capable of further incremental growth in the 1920s and 1930s—were precisely the ones with some guiding social democratic vision or intelligence, in which the parties involved could build on a pre-war parliamentary position of some strength, and where the socialist leadership could act in effect as brokers between government and mass. The weakest or most fragile reformisms, on the other hand, were those without this coherent mediating intelligence, where the foundations of a corporative settlement were built more exclusively from the transitory salience of a trade-union bloc. Examples of the former would be especially Sweden, and more ambiguously (if only because they ran violently aground during 1928-34) Germany and Austria; a main example of the latter would be Britain. A further major category of reform involved land reform, of which there were key instances in Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland (Hungary is a special case due to the rapid succession of liberal, soviet, and counter-revolutionary regimes). But here both the socialist and Communist Left were notable for their disastrous indifference to this regional priority, thereby denying themselves a major political constituency in the peasantry (by contrast, interestingly, with the openness of the Left to the farming interest in Sweden and elsewhere in Scandinavia).

Leaving aside the question of the land, the significance of this reformist increment was that in a large part of Europe—essentially the pre-war Central and North European "social democratic core" (Austria, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Scandinavia), together with France, the Low Countries, and Britain—the position of the Left had become much stronger than before. The strengthening took a specific form. Though in some cases (Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia) improvement came from the collapse of the old imperial regimes amidst popular revolutionary upheaval, and in all the others from the application of large-scale popular pressures, nonetheless it did not amount to any specifically socialist advance. Specifically socialist demands were certainly at the forefront of activity in the labor movements themselves. But with very few exceptions these weren't incorporated into any lasting settlement. Instead, the reformist advance took the form of a strengthening of parliamentary democracy, the expansion of workers' rights under the law, further recognition of trade unions, growth of civil liberties, and significant social legislation, which in some cases amounted to the beginnings of a welfare state. In particular, the enhancement of the public sphere—in parliamentary, publicistic, and cultural terms—was a major strategic gain, especially in countries where public freedoms had been cramped and harassed before 1914.

Such gains were not the direct expression of successful socialist revolution, but they were the outcomes of revolutionary situations, and a single-minded concentration on the Bolshevik experience as the main measure of revolutionary authenticity disables us from appreciating this more complex configuration of revolutionary possibility. Moreover, there was a further pattern of revolutionary politics in 1917-23, which is likewise inadequately grasped by focusing on the Bolshevik model, and that was a type of transformation in which new states were formed (or postulated) and popular aspirations were mainly canalized by a process of "national revolution". There were perhaps four senses in which this was so. (a) On the Western and Southern peripheries
of the old Russian Empire--Finland, the Baltic, Ukraine, Transcaucasia, even Belorussia--we should think in terms of distinct regional experiences apart from the main Moscow-Petrograd axis of the Bolshevik Revolution, that is, separate processes of revolutionary upheaval, which were certainly articulated with the central Russian one in complicated ways, but which also possessed their own dynamism and integrity (and outcomes, if the international conjuncture of the Russian Civil War had ever allowed them the chance).

(b) Between 28 October and 9 November 1918, there was a distinct East-Central European sequence of revolution that was collectively scarcely less significant than the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia. These events basically erected new republican sovereignties on the ruins of the Habsburg and Hohenzollern Empires, in a chain which included: Czechoslovakia (28 October); Yugoslavia (29 October); "German-Austria" (30 October); Hungary (31 October); Poland (between 28 October and 14 November); West Ukraine (31 October); and Germany (8 and 9 November). The socialist Left were major actors in each of these cases, and the predominant pattern of the "successor states" during the immediate founding period of 1918-20 was one of parliamentary states with a strong Left presence. (c) We should also remember the resonance of the Bolshevik Revolution in the extra-European world mentioned in (2) above, which became manifest in the first stirrings of national-revolutionary oppositions in the colonial world. (d) Lastly, the toughening of civil society through the enhancement of the public sphere was also an aspect of national revolution, for in the newly created sovereignties of East-Central Europe the legal constitution of the public sphere was a vital process in the overall project of nation-forming.

If we focus on these three points--on the independent space for a third "left-socialist" force between Bolshevism and right-wing social democracy in the years 1918-20; on the Bolshevik Revolution as the inspiration for revolutionary nationalism among Third-World peoples; and on wider range of revolutionary experiences in the European-wide conjuncture of 1917-23--if we focus on these three points, we can see just how limiting the subsuming of revolutionary possibilities into the reified version of the "Bolshevik model" (and the later Moscow-dominated Communist tradition) actually is. In fact, to understand both the specificity of the Bolshevik Revolution/model and the real political tasks facing an international Communist strategy in the 1920s, it's vital to broaden the perspective to take in the much richer configuration of revolutionary possibilities of the European-wide scale. Once we do that, whether in the context of the East-Central European national revolutions of in the parts of North-Western Europe which already possessed parliamentary systems, we're dealing not with social polarization and insurrectionary confrontation as the exclusive logic of socialist politics, but with histories in which the impact of the Left on much broader social and political coalitions becomes the defining thing. In other words, we're dealing with more prosaic but extraordinarily important institutional gains of the kind conventionally dismissed until recently by the Marxist tradition as reformism--the full array of democratic gains in the franchise, trade-union rights and labor legislation, welfare measures, the strengthening of the public sphere, and so on. Given the national and democratic qualities of the current revolutionary events on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, this richer context of socialist politics during the 1917-23 conjuncture speaks very eloquently to character of the present, whether or not the more specifically Communist or state-socialist tradition of the post-1947 era is dead.
Social Democracy and the Alternatives

If we differentiate the "meaning of October" in this way, and step back from the dichotomous framework of Marxism-Leninism versus right-wing social democracy (or Stalin versus Neil Kinnock), what can we say more specifically about the alternative strands of the socialist tradition? To do this, it's necessary to say something first about the character of the classical social democratic tradition in the period before the First World War, when democracy as we have come to know it in the West since the defeat of fascism was largely pioneered in the oppositional culture of the labor movements and their demands for reform. In this respect, I'll be keeping three dimensions of the organizational question in mind: (a) the constitutional question in the conventional sense (the regulation of democracy at the level of the state and its system of law); (b) the Left's own internal organization (democracy within movements); and (c) the forms of popular political mobilization (democracy in motion).

Social democratic politics, as it emerged between the 1860s and 1914, was a reckoning with two earlier traditions of popular activity, namely, radical democracy focused on the franchise, frequently articulated through liberal coalitions; and the various forms of utopian socialism and other early 19th-century communitarian traditions. Beginning in the 1860s, a distinct form of socialist parliamentarianism sharply separated itself from both liberalism and the utopian pioneers. It substituted popular sovereignty for the free and sovereign individual, and simultaneously turned its back on the locally organized cooperative utopia. On the one hand, social democrats pursued a program of maximum parliamentary democracy, on a basis usually resembling the six points of the 1838 People's Charter in Britain; on the other hand, this shaped their overall approach to the problem of democratizing the state, producing a socialist constitutionalism that kept little in common with the local projects of cooperative and communal self-administration that gave birth to socialist thinking earlier in the 19th century. The contrast with the earlier period is clear. Either socialists had functioned as junior elements in broadly liberal coalitions, occasionally rising to separate prominence in the radicalizing circumstances of a revolutionary crisis, as in 1848-49; or else they lobbied for intermediate forms of producer cooperation backed by a reforming government (e.g. through national workshops or a people's credit bank), bordering on the more ambitious schemes of Proudhon, Cabet, and other utopians.

In both respects, the 1860s were a decisive departure. In most of Europe the dominant left politics henceforth became the centrally directed party of parliamentary social democracy in close combination with a nationally federated trade-union movement. This new political model was centralist, because it stressed national rather than local forms of action; parliamentarian, because it privileged the parliamentary arena as the source of sovereignty; and constitutionalist in the given meaning of the term, because it preferred representative to direct forms of democracy. This preference for strongly centralized forms of organization over the looser federated modes prevalent between the 1820s and 1860s, brought a new motif into the discourse of the Left, viz. the centrality of the party. The case for the latter—or at least, for systems of priority that made the idea of the party seem unavoidable—was argued through in a series of bitterly contested debates that dominated the European left from the early-1860s to mid-1870s. The main forum was the First International, a new coordinating agency created in 1864 and eventually wound
up in 1876. The general setting was the European-wide process of constitutional upheaval extending from the emancipation of the serfs in Russia to the foundation of the Third Republic in France, and given most dramatic shape in the German and Italian unifications and the rising of the Paris Commune. It was during these debates that Karl Marx rose to European prominence as a central authority of socialist thinking.

Throughout these debates, the arguments for different types of state organization (the constitution of the future socialist government) and for different types of movement (the preferred mode of the Left's own internal organization) were basically homologous. Again, the contrast with what came before is instructive. The locally-based associational activity of radical democrats and early socialists had tended to achieve regional and national resonance mainly through the unifying effects of certain common aspirations, focused by the work of newspapers, pamphlets, itinerant lecturers, and a few national parliamentarians and other charismatic figures, which coalesced into a national movement mainly through the impetus of particular campaigns that left little permanent framework of central organization. Correspondingly, the envisaged democratic state presupposed similar principles of decentralized organization, usually expressed through an ideal of loosely federated, self-governing units of cooperatively organized small producers. An analogous continuity of action and organization characterized the social democratic tradition after the 1860s, with the form of the future socialist constitution being basically abstracted from the social democrats' organizational experience under capitalism. First, the preference for representative forms of national organization in both the social democratic parties and their affiliated trade unions, as opposed to direct-democratic models of decision-making that left greater authority with the rank and file at the branch level of the movement, on the shop-floor and in the localities, was replicated in the preference for a parliamentary type of constitution. Second, the strong commitment to a central bureaucratic form of organization for both party and unions, both to concentrate the movement's strengths and to equalize resources among its stronger and weaker sections, was reflected in the support for central institutions of economic planning which would allow the future state maximum potential for socialist construction.

In other words, there was little interest in the official counsels of the pre-1914 socialist parties in de-centralized forms, whether in the shape of cooperative and communitarian self-management schemes pioneered by their early-socialist predecessors, or in that of the soviets and workers' councils that emerged in 1917-21. Indeed, Kautsky and other leading voices were highly sceptical of demands for industrial democracy and workers' control, arguing that the advanced industrial economy and the complexities of the modern enterprise precluded the introduction of democratic procedures directly into the economy itself. Instead, only a strong parliament could act as an effective democratic watchdog on the managerial bureaucracies of the economy as well as on the civil bureaucracy of the state. In this way, the model of democratic responsibility fashioned by the labor movement for the conduct of its own affairs--of a permanent officialdom held accountable to the constitutional authority of an elected assembly of trade-union or party delegates--was basically transposed to the broader arena of government, in the form of a socialist parliamentary state.

This, then, was the main pattern between the 1860s and the First World War--one of centralized national organization aimed at influencing the state
in the parliamentary arena, or in the case of the trade unions at securing the best deal from the employers on a trade or industry-wide basis. However, we should be aware of the exceptions. Socialist parliamentarianism flourished best, not surprisingly, with a relatively free public life, where the parliamentary framework was fairly well established: Britain, German-speaking Central Europe, Scandinavia, the Low Countries. [8] It proved much weaker, equally obviously, where the political system remained repressive: pre-eminently Imperial Russia, together with the Slavic regions of the Habsburg Empire, and the independent states of South-East Europe (apart from Bulgaria); in these cases there was understandably a strong pull toward extra-parliamentary forms of action. We should also mention the widespread popularity of anarcho-syndicalist ideas in Southern Europe—not only in Spain, where they are usually held to have constituted the dominant force in the labor movement, but also in Switzerland, Italy, and France, where they contested the leading claims of social democracy right into the revolutionary years of 1917-21. Anarchist ideas provided the major alternative vision of the Left in the founding period of the social democratic tradition under the First International. In a transmuted form, they resurfaced in the syndicalist agitation between the 1890s and 1914, which raised the next significant challenge to the established mode of socialist politics represented by the parties of the Second International (1889-1914) mainly founded between 1875 and the 1890s. Moreover, in this phase syndicalist ideas migrated from the Southern European baselands to Britain, parts of the Low Countries, and even Germany. Finally, democratic nationalism provides a further continuity with the earlier 19th century, which doesn't fit exactly into the dominant social democratic typology distinguished above. The networks of migrant artisans and political exiles linking Paris, London, and Brussels in the 1840s and 1850s were fertile ground for the early activity of Marx and Engels, and linked the causes of Polish, Hungarian, and Italian self-determination to those of Chartism and the French republicans. An older kind of radical democracy continued to resonate through the international popularity of Lajos Kossuth and Giuseppe Mazzini, and remained current in Southern and Eastern Europe well into the 1880s and beyond. The subterranean influence of Rousseau, with its celebration of direct participatory democracy and local self-government, should also be noted, although its concrete lines may be traced less easily through the popular radicalism of the West than in the democratic projects of mid-century Southern and Eastern European nationalist intelligentsias, where the image of the citizen-democrat became subtly displaced onto the collective idea of the oppressed patriot people, struggling for national liberation.

Thus, having distinguished the main pattern before 1914 as being one of centrally organized parliamentarian social democracy, it is also possible to write the history of the socialist tradition in terms of these other—that is, alternative or suppressed—traditions. The dominant social democratic model was stronger in the Center and North-West of the continent (allowing us to speak reasonably of a German-speaking and Scandinavian social democratic "core"), weaker for varying reasons in the South and East, with French-speaking Europe somewhere in between. The other side of the story can be supplied only partially by relating the major alternative traditions—populism of various kinds in Tsarist Russia, anarcho-syndicalism in the Mediterranean South. Differences of context played a key part, from repressive illegality under Tsarism to the narrowly oligarchic liberal polities of Italy and Spain. The size and backwardness of the agricultural sector in those three countries, with glaring inequalities in the rural social structure and the existence of a land-hungry peasantry and an unusually badly-exploited agricultural working
class, also determined a different pattern of left-wing politics from the industrial North-West. Yet the sources of an alternative vision to the centralizing political socialism that dominated the Second International should not be displaced to the geographical margins, to Europe's economically backward periphery. If the last three decades of social history have taught us anything in this respect, it is the nigh-universal origins of socialist activity among workers of a particular type: skilled workmen in small to medium-sized workshops, with a strong sense of identity in their craft or trade, and a finely developed pride in its culture, who became radicalized through defending their skill and affirming their dignity against proletarianization. In this sense, we can speak of certain patterns of practical socialism among such workers, who may certainly have been familiar with formal socialist ideas at varying levels of sophistication, but who formed their basic commitments from a definite set of experiences in production. While this oppositional culture was clearly hospitable to the various intellectual projects of utopian socialist and others, it did not owe its existence to them. In fact, to see the origins of socialism as an intellectual problem—as ideas seeking a constituency—is to put the cart before the horse. Early socialist activity—as a body of thought focused on the changing economy and its social relations, and as a practical discourse of popular radicalism—crystallized from the material circumstances and aspirations of skilled workers themselves.

As an alternative set of impulses to the ones that cohered into the centralist social democratic model—that is, as a vision of socialism stressing various kinds of locally grounded mutualism and cooperation, and "an economy run not by a collectivist state but by autonomous units of producers" [9]—this popular oppositional culture achieved its greatest historical staying-power in Spanish anarcho-syndicalism, in a period extending from the 1860s to the Spanish Civil War. Mutualist ideals also showed great resilience in countries with strong movements of producer cooperation up to 1914, such as the Low Countries and Switzerland. [10] They also provided vital rallying-points for the local clusters of working-class associational activity in the 1860s and 1870s that formed the basic building-blocks of the earliest phase of socialist party-building in Germany and the Habsburg Empire. Moreover, as socialist ideas sank roots further to the East in the last third of the 19th century, notions of consumer cooperation invariably gave people their first encounter with this new tradition. [11] But the most striking case appears not on the Iberian or Slavic peripheries, but in the metropolitan center of 19th-century European political culture, namely, France. Bernard Moss argues that for the whole pre-1914 period the French labor movement remained basically wedded to an ideal of "federalist trade socialism", in which collective ownership in the means of production was to be organized through a democratic federation of self-governing skilled trades and communes. William Sewell goes further to argue that "the socialism of skilled workers" was inscribed in a larger "idiom of association", through which older meanings of mutual aid were appropriated and reshaped during the radicalizing moments of 1830-34 and 1848-51. Similarly, we know from Aguilhon that the idiom of association also articulated social circumstances beyond the economic processes of proletarianization—viz. distinct patterns of popular sociability, through which workers fashioned their own public sphere for social, cultural, and political exchange, grounded not just in the formal fabric of the trade and mutual aid associations, but in the cultural world of the choral societies and social clubs, and in the everyday life of the workshops, lodging houses, taverns, and cafés. [12]
What these regionally specific alternatives had in common was a stronger emphasis on the local sovereignty of popular democratic action, whether based on the communal organization of the Russian peasant village, on the local syndication of trade-union and cultural activity through the workers' centro and bourse du travail, or on one version or another of the more general cooperative ideals mentioned above. In this sense, there was a larger heritage of popular radicalism that was only partially captured by the formal traditions of the Left. One form of this was the practical or "home-grown" socialism so attractive to artisans and skilled workers under pressure of proletarianization, and of which the theories of Proudhon, Cabet, and the rest should be seen as only a particularly elaborate formulation. Beyond this, we should also note the salience of certain popular democratic experiences of the mid-19th century, that registered quite unusual degrees of politicization across a wide spectrum of social and cultural issues, and carried the Left's momentum beyond the normal boundaries of political and economic agitation. In local settings ordinary militants contested with the dominant culture on matters of schooling, recreation, religion, and much else besides (though stopping short at the family and the established patterns of sex-gender relations). British Chartism was the most impressive fund of experience in this regard, closely followed by the popular radicalism of 1848-51 in France, where the political clubs and workers' corporations achieved an impressive peak of associational activism in Paris and other towns, and the "democ-socs" or democratic-socialists managed a remarkable penetration of the villages. Smaller scale equivalents of these experiences could be found elsewhere too between the 1840s and 1860s. [13]

Thus the model of socialist politics consolidated in the parties of the Second International did not exhaust the range of socialist practice and belief available in the 19th century. Past discussion has been thickly encrusted with teleological and normative assumptions, which see the dichotomous contest of socialist parliamentarianism and proto-Bolshevik revolutionary purism as the logical form of the search for an effective left-wing strategy. Other options (like populism or anarcho-syndicalism) can then be dismissed as symptoms of backwardness and/or national peculiarity. Out of phase with the main logic of political development, they would soon disappear, condemned by their own contradictions to marginality. Likewise, the various precursors--utopians, communitarians, mutualists, cooperators--may be safely disregarded as confused but interesting eccentrics, transitory symptoms of an immaturity already being overcome (as in the "socialism--utopian and scientific" framework bequeathed by Engels). In most accounts they form an exotic preamble to the main story, before the serious work of building the party gets under way. This hegemony of the classic social democratic model in most perceptions of the pre-1914 Left was hardened by the splits after 1917, because most social democrats and Communists proceeded to dig themselves in behind variants of centralism, the one focused on parliament, the other on the extra-parliamentary apparatus of the party, which renewed their indifference to local participatory forms. After the first flush of enthusiasm for the soviets and workers' councils in 1917-20, for instance, the 1920s saw a continuous displacement of priority in Communist thinking away from these public arenas of popular decision-making toward the private arena of the party. Workers' councils became increasingly demoted into secondary media for mobilizations initiated elsewhere. Social democrats, of course, had always treated them with suspicion.

How, then, are we to conceptualize the alternative tradition of locally based participatory forms, given this long-term hegemony of the centralist
mode? At one level, there'll always be a tension in activist movements between the assertion of sovereignty by the rank and file and the leadership's desire for careful or "responsible" direction. In particular situations of intense mobilization, ranging from strikes and community struggles to general revolutionary crises such as the one between 1917 and 1921, we would usually expect to see the popular creativity breaking through, outgrowing the institutionalized framework of established politics, and outpacing the directive capacity of leaders. Depending on the strength of the popular challenge, the imagination of the leadership, and the resilience of the existing socio-political order, some new institutional framework will eventually be negotiated. The range of outcomes can be very great—for example, incremental advances of popular sovereignty, reactionary blockages of the latter, and very occasionally a revolutionary opening toward more fundamental change. In other words, the tension between participatory and centralist modes is partly inherent and structural, built into the very process of popular mobilization. Even during the long hegemony of centralist organizational forms, forms of local self-management remained an important dimension of left-wing politics. Though latent for long periods, any raising of the political temperature was likely to reactivate such aspirations. The most impressive movements combine both impulses, lending the stability of centrally directed permanent organization to the maximum scope for rank-and-file resurgence. [14]

With this in mind, and allowing for regional unevenness in Europe as a whole, I would suggest the following periodization:

(1) First, an initial period of flux and indeterminacy, mainly characterized by locally based associational initiatives for various kinds of self-governing cooperative living and working arrangements as the cellular bases for a new type of federated democratic state. Such activity coalesced only occasionally into a national movement (e.g. Chartism, or democratic-socialism between 1849 and 1851 in France), and produced little in the way or durable political structures.

(2) Secondly, from the 1860s this amorphous activity became steadily supplanted by the new idea of the socialist party, usually oriented toward a parliamentary arena, accompanied by a corresponding form of trade unionism, and stressing the value of a centrally organized permanent presence at the heart of the national polity. As noted, a version of the earlier associational socialism persisted in Southern Europe as anarcho-syndicalism, while the politically backward societies to the East followed a pattern of their own. But by 1900 even these other movements were striving for stronger forms of national federation.

(3) Next, the conjuncture of war and revolution in 1914-23 amounted to a massive interruption of this continuity, which fractured the existing party structures and produced a huge explosion of locally based direct-democratic mobilization. However, this resurgence of grass-roots participatory forms, this time articulated around the soviets and workers' councils, proved transitory, and by 1923 the political stabilizations were bringing a restoration of centralist norms, whether in the Soviet Union or elsewhere. In this particular respect (though not, obviously, in general), the great watershed of 1917 made no lasting difference.
Consequently, the centralist model basically persisted until the mid-1950s, and the intervening moment of general European radicalization, the anti-fascist high point of the mid-1940s, had brought no equivalent resurgence of direct democracy. In fact, the post-liberation circumstances had brought a remarkably speedy dispossession of such local initiatives as promised to materialize into a potential of that kind. There had been many smaller cases of such direct-democratic resurgence in particular countries after 1923 (e.g. Britain in 1926, France in 1936, Spain during 1931-37, Italy in 1943-45, and so on). But as a general alternative to the national-centralist mode, direct democracy was kept off the agenda. The challenge raised by the experience of the workers' councils in 1917-23 was left hanging by the general counter-revolutionary outcome, as other more defensive priorities moved in to occupy the Left's attention.

It is only really since 1956, as first Communist and then the latter-day social democratic traditions entered a period of long-term decay, that this challenge has been properly resumed. A series of dramatic political moments—precisely the type of breakthrough mentioned above, when popular creativity breaks the mould of existing politics—helped reawaken interest in alternative political forms. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the Czechoslovak reform Communism of 1968, the French events of 1968, and those in Italy in 1969 provided the principal occasions of renewal, galvanizing a long-term reorientation. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the first New Left in Britain (1956-64), the student movements in Europe as a whole (c.1967-c.1970), feminism in Western Europe (c.1970 to the present), the various movements for workers' control and industrial democracy since the late-1960s, the various forms of community politics since the same time, the broader-based sexual politics since the mid-1970s, and the peace movements of the 1980s—these have been the vehicles of renewal. The German Greens and Solidarity in Poland have been the major cases of national movements incorporating the new perspectives. In fact, the contemporary Left problematic of democracy has involved a full-scale confrontation with the continuous centralist tradition, so that certain themes of earlier periods (1917-23, before the 1860s) have been recognizably reappropriated—direct democracy, industrial self-management, community politics, and local forms of democracy, together with new ones like the politics of sexuality and subjectivity. It is no accident that these shifts have been accompanied by a conscious revival of historical interest in the utopian socialists and other earlier movements. [15]

Socialism and Democracy

The most powerful ideological motif in the Eastern European revolutions of 1989 has been the claim that liberalism and democracy are an inseparable politico-economic unity—not just that the breakthrough to democracy is simultaneously the freeing of the market and the recognition of the principle of private property, but that the two are functionally and symbiotically connected, and were historically mutually constituted as such. From the earliest moments of perestroika and the build-up of Polish, Hungarian, and Czechoslovakian
opposition in the 1980s, it is true, economic reform (i.e. liberalizing decentralization of the economy and the wager on market forces) has been tied to democratization, if only as a kind of grandiose "moral incentive". But the grander theoretical and historical claims--the equation of democracy and the market in some maximal liberal sense--are another matter. In fact, for most of the 19th century liberalism and democracy were antithetical forces, and the hey-day of free-trading liberal economics in Europe (the 1850s and 1860s) was also a time of democratic defeat, from 1848-49 and the ebbing of Chartism to the repression of the 1850s on continental Europe and the bloody suppression of the Paris Commune. In the last third of the 19th century, such popular coalitions as liberals created provided mainly a context for early social democratic secessions out of the liberal community, as radical workingmen became aware of just how resistant most liberals were to forms of genuine democratic participation, certainly on the continent where such separations occurred earlier than they did in Britain. Support of liberal radicals for the democratic franchise continued to be hedged by key qualifications, and it was rare to find consistent advocacy of democratic principles unblemished by elitist misgivings or tactical calculations (such as the desire to avoid alienating the conservative elements of one's own party). On the whole, the great constitutional battles of the 1860s, which frequently hinged on questions of popular enfranchisement, drove a wedge between socialists and liberals that lasted till the First World War, and whose importance was only disguised by the small size of socialist movements until closer to 1914. By any strict definition of democracy--e.g. popular representation on the basis of free, universal, secret, adult, and equal suffrage, backed by legal freedoms of speech, assembly, association, and press--the coupling of "liberalism" and "democracy" makes no sense for most of the 19th century, because liberals showed themselves consistently wedded to highly restricted and exclusionary systems of political representation. When democratic reforms were introduced, they came through broad popular mobilizations outside the framework of normal liberal politics, even though the more flexible liberal leaderships may sometimes have taken them up.

Indeed, it was the agency of the nationally organized labor movements of the later-19th century that properly introduced what we now recognize as "liberal democracy" (a combination of parliamentary government, welfare statism, and national economic management) into European political discourse; and if there is a historical lineage to the democratizations currently under way in Eastern Europe, then this can be just as appropriately located in the democratic agendas of the pre-1914 socialist parties as in the classical heritage of 19th century liberalism. But what of the other features of that older socialist tradition, such as the centralized state, the planned economy, or the primacy of an economistic notion of class, which are also the features of the post-1947/48 Eastern European regimes against which the democratic movements are in full-scale revolt? Again, I want to argue that the record and structure of the overall socialist tradition are much more complicated than the simple equation of the latter with statist socialism tout court would suggest. We can see this, perhaps, if we look at the form of politics with which the Stalinist forms of Communism are most easily associated, namely, a "vanguardist" conception of their relationship to the working class and the corresponding centralism of such parties' internal organization. I'll do this by beginning again in the 19th century, this time with the conspiratorial tradition of insurrectionary politics usually associated with the indefatigable revolutionism of Auguste Blanqui.
Abstracting from the most dramatic feature of the French Revolution in its most radical phase--the dynamic but unstable relationship between the Jacobin dictatorship and the mass acts of popular insurrection--Blanquism stressed the necessity of a secret revolutionary brotherhood, the character of the revolution as an exemplary act triggering a general uprising of the people, and the need for a centralized form of popular dictatorship. It originated with Gracchus Babeuf and the "Conspiracy of the Equals" in 1796, and was transmitted through the career of Babeuf's surviving comrade, Filippo Buonarroti. It worked best during the most overbearing phase of the post-1815 reactionary restoration in Europe, which produced a climate of censorship and repression especially conducive to conspiratorial styles on the Left. Blanqui learned the "art of insurrection" from Buonarroti in this period, and came to personify an ideal of selfless revolutionary heroism (or egocentric, subversive fanaticism, depending on one's point of view) that formed the commonest popular image of the revolutionary in the 19th century. His politics were a form of optimistic adventurism--the masses were always available for revolution, if only the right moment could be seized--which seemed vindicated in the great revolutionary crises of 1830 and 1848, which exploded so unexpectedly and owed so little to formal organizational preparation by the Left. The last act of the Blanquist drama was the 1871 Paris Commune in this respect, although the fiasco of the 1839 uprising was its most fitting scene.

The point about Blanquism was its profoundly undemocratic character. The conspiratorial ideal of a small secretive élite on behalf of a popular mass whose consent was to be organized essentially after the revolution by a program of systematic re-education, but whom in the meantime could not be trusted, is powerful evidence to this effect. Logically enough, Blanqui was opposed to universal suffrage until after the revolution, and showed little interest in the popular democratic politics that actually emerged in Britain and France between the 1830s and 1870s, when the conditions of extreme repression that originally justified the conspiratorial mode no longer applied. As well as being a departure from liberal and associational political forms, therefore, the social democratic tradition inaugurated in the 1860s was also a decisive repudiation of the Blanquist insurrectionary temptation. This was true above all of Marx. [16] The possible need for an armed mobilization to defend the revolution against the counter-revolutionary violence of the ruling class was left open, but between 1871 and 1917 the dominant model of revolutionary politics for the parties of the Second International became one which hinged on the achievement of an irresistible parliamentary majority. The Paris Commune, which displayed both the heroism and the tragic limitations of the pure insurrectionary tradition--and the need for forms of popular democratic action beyond the Blanquist horizon--was the crucial watershed in this respect.

Henceforth, the pure insurrectionary mode became the property of the anarchists, for whom Michael Bakunin was in this respect the major spokesman. But after the decisive debates in the First International (1868-72), which secured the general hegemony of a party-political and parliamentarist approach within the Left (with the regional exceptions noted above), the earlier unity of the Blanquist tradition divided into a series of discrete orientations. Conspiratorial forms of organization were one of these. But they now became theoretically separable from insurrectionism as such, on the grounds that a genuine rising of the people had no need of any directive leadership (as in the "strong-men-need-no-leaders" strain of anarchism). This applied to a large part of Spanish anarchism between the 1900s and 1930s, in both industrial
Catalonia and rural Andalusia. On the other hand, it was hard to stop conspiratorial tendencies emerging within the anarchist movement as a whole. Thus in Spain the libertarian anarcho-syndicalist federation formed in 1910, the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT), which was the very opposite of a centrally managed trade-union bureaucracy or party-political machine, was matched by the clandestine Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI) formed in 1927, which was the quintessence of elitist and conspiratorial revolutioneering. The same contradiction had been present at the very center of the career of Bakunin himself. Moreover, such activity easily spilled over into simple terrorism. The conspiratorial and terrorist temptations were strongest in conditions of repression or defeat, when the chances for public activity were narrowly reduced: in Tsarist Russia in the later-1870s and early-1880s, and then again in the early-1900s; in Spain, France, and Italy in the 1890s. (The terrorism and "armed-struggle" scenarios of sections of the Western European ultra-left in the 1970s were a different phenomenon).

But the most troubling of the Blanquist legacies was vanguardism—the idea that small minorities of disciplined revolutionaries, equipped with sophisticated theories and superior virtue, can anticipate the direction of popular aspirations, act decisively in their name, and in the process radicalize the popular consciousness. At one level, that of the imperfections of democracy in practice and the complex reciprocities of leaders and led, this is an inescapable problem of political organization in general, because even in the most perfect of procedural democracies a certain latitude and initiative necessarily fall to the leadership's discretion, beyond the sovereign people's practical reach. But in the Blanquist tradition this practical condition was elaborated into a positive theory of action. Moreover, it has been commonly suggested that this is also a basic feature of the Marxist tradition, and in particular of Lenin's politics in the Bolshevik Party, which as such became transmitted both to the Soviet state and to the Communist political tradition after 1917, including to the official cultures of most post-revolutionary socialist states since the Second World War. Given the forthright critiques developed by Marx and Engels in the 1860s and 1870s of both Blanqui and Bakunin in this respect, and the frequently stated support of the Second International parties for democratic principles—indeed, the constitutive importance for the social democratic tradition of a bitter political struggle against precisely that kind of vanguardism—this accusation seems manifestly misplaced. As a sufficient description of Lenin's politics, it also seems too crude. [17] But at the same time, vanguardism is too salient a feature of "leninism" as the official ideology of Communist political practice since the mid-1920s for this aspect of the charge to be easily dismissed.

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Here it is worth considering the forms of restriction socialists and Communists have admitted on the exercise of democracy. Earlier on I referred to the anti-democratic dispositions of 19th-century liberalism, but of course left-wing theory and practice have also not been free of such restrictiveness. On the contrary, sometimes whole categories of the population have been excluded from the moral-political community of "the people" in the popular democratic sense. After all, the first means of cementing the popular legitimacy of revolutionary governments tends to be the focusing of hostility against the ancien regime—the monarch or despotic head of state, the agents of repression under the old system, the ruling class, or simply "the oppressors". This may range from the spontaneous wreaking of popular revenge—against priests (classically in Spain in 1931-36, and earlier in 1909 and 1868), against army officers (e.g. the events of 18 March 1871 that precipitated the Paris Commune), against landlords (Russia in 1905 and 1917), or against the secret
police (Hungary in 1956; Portugal in 1974, Iran in 1979, Romania in 1989)--to the more systematic campaigns of the revolutionary authorities themselves against the "enemies of the revolution". The more fragile the revolution's survival, due to international isolation or civil war, the more violent such campaigns may be. Consolidating the revolution's social base may produce a similar effect. The great Soviet purges of the 1930s and the Stalinist repression of 1949-51 in Eastern Europe may be seen in this light.

In each case, definite categories of people were not only excluded from participating in the revolution, but were specifically targeted as its foes, becoming legitimate objects of legal and police attack. Both principles were institutionalized during the Russian Revolution in the Constitution adopted in July 1918 by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets in the name of "the Toiling and Exploited People". The franchise for soviet elections was both restricted and unequal, but, by contrast with the liberal constitutional practice of the 19th-century, the restrictions were turned against inequalities of property rather than in their favor. On the one hand, the franchise was limited to those who "earn their living by production or socially useful labor", together with soldiers and the disabled; while the dominant classes in industry and agriculture, together with their agents--the employers of hired labor, rentiers, private traders, monks and priests, and agents and officials of the former police (but not the professions, who were functionally too crucial to the new order)--were specifically excluded. In addition, the towns (and therefore the working class) were given more representation relative to population than the countryside (and the peasantry). On the other hand, the Constitution also made it clear that the power of the new state was to be turned directly at the disenfranchised class enemy, as was hardly surprising at a time when the dominant classes were mobilizing for a counter-revolutionary civil war against the Bolshevik government. It spoke of the transitional need for a strong state power if "the exploitation of man by man" [sic] was to be ended, socialist construction put in train, and the state ultimately abolished. Consequently, it temporarily instituted a popular dictatorship of workers and peasants, internally democratic but externally combative and if necessary repressive, "for the purpose of the complete crushing of the bourgeoisie".

This discriminatory franchise remained in force under the amended Constitution of 1923, before being dropped in the new Constitution of 1936. Moreover, it was supplemented by a battery of related restrictions in other areas of civil freedom, as the Soviet state gradually criminalized forms of oppositional activity in the context and aftermath of the Civil War. Furthermore, a debilitating logic of international, social, and domestic political isolation drove the Bolshevik leadership into growing disrespect even for the internal democracy of the soviet structure itself, so that the latter became inexorably transformed into a narrowing command apparatus, substituting for popular democratic initiatives rather than responding to them. This situation became radicalized under the industrialization and collectivization drives of the 1930s, so that the paper democracy of Stalin's 1936 Constitution masked an apparatus of discrimination and terror, which practically negated any operative democratic category of the sovereign people.

This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the Russian Revolution and its degeneration. The point I want to make is that the revolutionary Left's preferred formula for the seizure of power and the building of a new society between the French Revolution and the 1970s--the idea, that is, of a
temporary democratic dictatorship of the insurgent people, empowered to act decisively in the interests of securing the revolution and its programmatic objectives, if necessary over the resistance of the former dominant classes by means of coercion—explicitly delimits the category of "the people". Moreover, this limitation is a necessary function of the class-based analysis of the revolutionary process: if the realistic prospect of genuine democratic advance is socially and politically stymied by class inequalities of access to power, and if in addition the logic of capitalist accumulation and crisis is bound to make those inequalities ever-more obstructive, then some form of class confrontation, organized through the medium of a popular revolutionary challenge to the status quo, becomes unavoidable. And if that is the case, then the boundaries of popular sovereignty have to be drawn reluctantly but securely against the counter-revolutionary vested interests. "The people" then becomes less a descriptive term for the whole population, and more a kind of moral-political category, that can be either more or less sociologically specific.

This model of the democratic vanguard placed into power by massed insurrection, which then proceeds to enact a program of revolutionary transformation, was pioneered by the extreme left in the Jacobin dictatorship, before being transmitted through Babeuf and Buonarroti to Blanqui. It was taken up by Marx and Engels, who attached it to the class analysis of the historically determined revolutionary confrontation of proletariat and bourgeoisie. It was vital to the thought of Lenin and the Bolsheviks in the Russian Revolution, whence it became transmitted to the orthodox Communist tradition. On the other hand, it has been specifically rejected by the other main tradition of the Left since 1917, that of non-Communist and reformist social democracy. Indeed, pinned to the arresting formula of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", with its implications of coercion, police powers, and the ruthless suppression of the proletariat's enemies (positively fueled, one might add, by many statements and actions of the Bolsheviks in the revolution), it has been one of the principal dividing lines between the revolutionary and reformist Left in the 20th century, already inscribed in some major debates of the pre-1914 Second International. On the whole, the latter's theorists gave little attention to matters of immediate revolutionary transition. But the prevailing parliamentary perspectives disposed them to be suspicious of the Bolsheviks' anti-parliamentary soviet route. Kautsky, for one, roundly denounced the latter as the undemocratic dictatorship of an unrepresentative political minority.

Since 1917, often quite radical socialists have been reluctant to embrace a revolutionary course from fear lest a confrontationist strategy necessarily lead to an authoritarian dictatorship of this kind. If the Left were to find themselves in control of the state, the advantages to the working class of more aggressively implementing a socialist transition would be heavily outweighed by the costs to democracy of having to suppress other social interests and coerce the opposition. On that basis, most non-Communist socialists (aside from the smaller Trotskyist and other revolutionary sects and the anarchists) have opted for gradualist routes through the existing parliamentary and related institutional frameworks. This does not have to spell the abandonment of socialism. But it does mean reducing the latter to a series of intermediate and essentially socialist objectives attainable within the given parameters of capitalist society, it has been argued; or else hoping that the cumulative effect of such reforms will eventually facilitate a democratically managed transition to socialism, on a broadly constructed foundation of popular legitimacy, and without having to abandon the continuing parliamentary representation of plural viewpoints and social interests.
The interesting thing is that since the mid-1970s at the latest many CPs have been pursuing this kind of strategy too. In some cases, such as the PCI, this shift goes back to the mid-1940s and more ambivalently to the Popular Front campaigns after 1935; in others. In others, such as the left-socialist formations in Scandinavia, it grew from the ferment after 1956; as a general phenomenon, it accompanied the emergence of Eurocommunism between 1968 and 1974. For our present purposes, we may note that from the mid-1970s a number of CPs increasingly abandoned terms like the dictatorship of the proletariat and other essential phraseology of the Leninist tradition. In so doing, they opted unambiguously for a non-insurrectionary and non-vanguardist mode of politics predicated on the realistic possibility of a parliamentary road to socialism. While such CPs retained an interest in complementary forms of democratic mobilization outside the immediate parliamentary arena, this has brought them recognizably onto the ground of left-wing social democracy, as represented by Kautsky's thinking earlier in the century and the left-socialist discourse of 1919-21, or (for example) certain aspects of Austrian and German Social Democratic politics in the 1920s, or the strategy of Swedish Social Democrats since 1945, or certain tendencies of the British Labour Party between 1970 and the mid-1980s. The incipient passage of the PCI into the socialist camp is a formal ratification of this change, as in a smaller way is the politics of the British CP and Marxism Today since the mid-1970s.

This shift is the result of long-term processes of de-stalinization—of continuing disillusionment with the Soviet model of socialist construction under Brezhnev, provoked by the tragic suppression of successive reform movements in Eastern Europe (1956--1968--1981), and aided by the infusion into some CPs of new social and political forces since 1968. Such processes have gradually encouraged a more critical attitude towards the legacy of the Russian Revolution itself, so that the more independent CPs have come to share much of the social democratic critique of Leninism. There are many sides to that critique, but what interests me here is the withdrawal from a politics of class confrontation based on the unqualified primacy of the working class. For as soon as the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat (in this sense as well as in the coercive one) is given up—i.e. the idea of the insurgent working class moving coercively through its party to destroy the power of the bourgeoisie and erect the scaffolding of socialism in its place, through a pitched and violent confrontation—it becomes necessary to think more creatively and less schematically about winning the cooperation and consent of other social forces to the process of socialist construction.

For social democrats before 1914, this tended not to be a problem: eventually the working class was to become an overwhelming majority of society, as capitalist development ran its course and other popular groups became proletarianized, in which case the question of democratic alliances didn't need to be posed, and the working class could come to power by the force of its own numbers alone. Communists inherited much of this thinking after 1917—that is, the working class as the subject of world history, borne necessarily toward the socialist future by the objective circumstances of capitalist accumulation, contradiction, and crisis, and concentrating in its consciousness and agency the progressive potentialities of humankind. But they conceived a far more active role for the working-class party as the interpreter of working-class consciousness and the executor of working-class interests. But what socialists and Communists shared in common, perhaps, was a belief in the proletariat as a new "general" or "universal" class, whose
progressive dynamism represented the general interest of society as a whole, just as the liberal bourgeoisie had represented the general interest of society in the earlier transition from feudalism to capitalism. The teleology of this idea, implying as it did such confidence in the direction and outcome of history, desensitized its exponents to the legitimate rights and interests of non-proletarian classes (like the peasantry, small-business and white-collar strata, the professions, the intelligentsia), which were doomed in any case to disappear with industrialization into the ranks of the working class, either before the revolution or after. "The people" were identified uncritically with the actual or anticipated working-class majority. Marxists have not been alone in this tendency. Liberal celebration of the "middle class" is another example, as is Russian and Eastern European idealization of the peasantry earlier in the century. In each case a particular social category is made the repository of society's general interest--the authentic people, the real source of virtue, the true bearer of social progress. Privileged in this way, its interests easily override the legitimacy of other social and political claims.

On the other hand, once the automatic primacy of the working class becomes questioned as a basis for socialist politics, the category of "the people" has to be filled with a more complex democratic content. In their different ways, both social democrats and Communists have made efforts in this direction, without exactly abandoning the historic attachment to their core working-class support. Since 1945, social democrats have increasingly opted for the "classless" ideal of the electoral "people's party", in the sense of a general appeal across social categories, involving de-emphasis of the party's working-class and specifically socialist history, and a conscious play for the votes of the "middle class" in particular. More recently, some CPs have also developed a broader "popular democratic" strategy, on a similar basis of constructive unity between working-class and other interests. In the more sophisticated versions, this amounts to something more than the mere aggregation of social interests or a mechanical grouping of the latter around the central value of the working class. Rather, the "popular democratic" becomes a dimension of political strategy in its own right, upholding the importance of democratic values for themselves, and making possible the integration into left-wing politics of a range of issues that were previously devalued due to their seeming remoteness from the primary materialist concerns of the working class: so-called "non-class" issues, concerning gender and sexuality, race and nationality, youth, peace, ecology, and so forth.

At one level, this willingness to step back from the traditional socialist stress on the primacy of the working class reflects the entry into left-wing consciousness of certain long-term tendencies in the composition of capital and the sociology of the working class. In the discursive order of the socialist tradition "working class" has a definite connotation--essentially manual workers in classic extractive, transportation, and manufacturing industry, from the miner, steelworker, and skilled machinist to the lineworker, unskilled or semi-skilled machine-minder, and general factory laborer. Yet in the process of working-class formation, the simple category of the worker (someone selling labor power for a wage) encompasses a far more complex sociology than this, and includes people working in a much wider variety of social and physical settings than the archetype of the (male) proletarian usually implies. Moreover, contrary to the predictions of Marx and Engels, and the assumptions of most socialists and Communists of the Second and Third Internationals, the working class in the traditional sense has not become the overwhelming majority of the population. Almost without exception in the developed capitalist economies,
manual workers in manufacturing industry have accounted for an ever-diminishing proportion of the employed population, in a trend that was already discernable early in the 20th century.

Now, if that is true, the old vision of the conquering proletariat makes no practical sense, quite apart from the larger questions of democratic principle discussed above. In fact, it imposes a double priority on left-wing strategy, partly sociological, partly political. The Left needs both to think again about how else the working class is to be constituted, so that neglected categories of workers can be brought more clearly into focus, and to work for the kind of alliances that would allow working-class interests in this stricter sense to be effectively pursued. It is important to appreciate just how restrictive a notion of working-class interests most socialist and Communist politics have tended to reflect. Particular parties have launched quite imaginative campaigns to organize various categories of more "marginal" workers at different times. In particular localities and under the pressure of particular issues and events, such parties have stumbled willy-nilly into a "non-class" politics. But on the whole, working-class parties have remained strongly oriented toward only a specific section of the working class in the strict sociological sense--namely, skilled, manual, male workers of respectable culture, majority religion, and dominant nationality. Historically speaking, the disregarding of women workers has been the most egregious of these possible neglects. But more generally, the culture of the working class has been finely structured by sectional divisions among workers in different grades and occupations, and by complex hierarchies of race, nationality, age, skill, and so on. Re-evaluating traditional notions of the primacy of the working class has begun to make the Left more sensitive to these matters as well.

Thus in left-wing discussion a number of revisions are hanging together: deep scepticism about forms of confrontationist revolutionary strategy based on the unqualified primacy of working-class interests, usually deriving from the Bolshevik experience of 1917; associated doubts about the traditional slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat, with its hard-faced intimations of coercion, command centralism, and suspensions of democracy, however temporary and transitional these are claimed to be; a new interest in parliamentary routes to socialism based on broad strategies of democratic alliance; a critical awareness of changes in the composition of the working class, combined with a greater sensitivity to issues and interests that can't be subsumed in a notion of working-class politics as traditionally defined; and the reappropriation of participatory and direct-democratic forms. Together, these add up to an important range of discussion about the meaning of "the popular" in popular sovereignty. Clearly, "the people" can never be a totally inclusive category for any movement stressing the limitation of democracy by class inequalities of access to power and ownership and control in the economy. Such disparities of access to effective power in state and society will always render significant democratic advance problematic. The latter can only proceed through dynamic processes of political conflict that are necessarily highly divisive, ranging some coalitions of interest against others. There will always be some exclusions from "the people", because there will always be powerful interests ranged against democracy. But a genuine politics of popular democracy will try to isolate such interests--the "power bloc"--by the broadest possible coalition of society.
Conclusion

In this paper I've tried to suggest that the socialist tradition encompasses a richer set of histories and a wider repertoire of possibilities than the "crisis of socialism" formula easily allows. This is true whether we look at the actual gains registered by the Left in the revolutionary conjuncture of 1917-23, as opposed to the political model which became abstracted from the Bolshevik experience into the main measure of what a successful revolutionary outcome would have been; or whether we look at the earlier 19th-century history of the socialist tradition as it emerged from the constitutive debates of the 1860s, with its primary focus on questions of national democracy conceptualized in parliamentary terms. On the one hand, these two contexts of formation (1860s-1914, 1914-23) reveal the salience of themes such as parliamentary democracy, civil liberties, the importance of a democratic public sphere, and the rights of peoples to national self-determination within an overall framework of peace and international cooperation; on the other hand, they involved the suppression/marginalization of a valuable counter-tradition of participatory direct-democratic forms, which flourished explosively in 1917-23, before returning sporadically in particular national crises since; and in both cases these histories speak eloquently to the concerns of the present--that is, the 1980s and 1990s in East and West--where questions of parliamentary democracy, local accountability, decentralization of control in state and economy, human rights and personal freedoms, civil society and the opening of the public sphere, and national self-determination are (among other things) powerfully structuring the Left's agenda. Socialism is certainly in "crisis", if by "socialism" we mean the unimaginative statis traditions consolidated on either side of the Iron Curtain since the late-1940s and the economistically derived teleology centered on the progressive political agency of the working class. However, the critique of Stalinism, the crisis of the Keynesian-welfare-state synthesis, and the late 20th-century processes of trans-national capitalist restructuring have all forced sections of the Left to think hard about how else socialism might be understood, whether through the "Forward March of Labour Halted"/"Farewell to the Working Class" type of analysis, the challenge of feminism, the rise of the new social movements, the success of popular conservatisms such as Thatcherism, or emergent "post-Fordist" analyses of the structural setting. [20] My point is that the rethinking is as important as the crisis, and that the deeper history of the tradition contains rich resources for this purpose. Finally, my paper has concentrated exclusively on the history of the tradition, and necessarily reproduces some of the limitations I haven't discussed, whereas in the present the strongest impetus toward renewal has come from the outside--namely, from the new social movements and especially from feminism. The final part of my discussion, on the difficulties with the received notion of the working class and the importance of "non-class" issues, gestured in this direction. But the disastrous neglects of the post-1860s tradition in this respect (rather than its positive resources), the feminist reappropriating of the earlier utopian moment of the 1820s and 1830s, and the external pressure of the post-1960s women's movement would have to be central to a discussion of the current re-thinking as such. However, that was not the specific purpose of my paper. I am sure that the papers addressing the present will be dealing with gender and the impact of feminism, and in a certain sense it would have been presumptuous of me to steal that task.

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NOTES


2. Ibid.


5. This point was originally made by Arno J. Mayer, Wilson vs Lenin: Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (New York, 1984), pp. 293-312.


8. Britain is an odd case in this respect, because until the 1890s and the formation of the Labour Representation Committee (LRC) in 1900, the relative effectiveness of channelling labor representation through the popular Liberal Party tended to inhibit moves for the independent representation of working-class interests through a separate socialist party. But allowing for this, and for the weakness of specifically socialist beliefs among British trade unionists until after the socialist revival of the 1880s and the post-1889 rise of the New Unionism, the main European pattern of post-1860s socialist activity basically holds. France is also an ambiguous case. On the one hand, the strength of the radical republican tradition encouraged one tendency of French socialists to direct their energies either through the left wing of the republican coalitions after 1871 or through a separate socialist party of the classic parliamentarian kind. But on the other hand, cooperative and mutualist traditions dating from the 1830s and 1840s remained very strong among French labor, and in some opinions amounted to the paramount strain of French socialism until after 1914.


10. See Jürg K. Siegenthaler, "Producers' Cooperatives in Switzerland", in International Labor and Working-Class History, 11 (May 1977), p. 21. Siegenthaler summarizes the bases for the strength of producer cooperation in Switzerland as: "a comparatively small scale of enterprise in all sectors of industry; considerable influence of Latin socialist programs in the labor movement; and the long-term, pre-industrial agrarian-cooperative and political-cooperative tradition of the country".

11. See, for example, the excellent analysis in John-Paul Himka, Socialism in Galicia. The Emergence of Polish Social Democracy and Ukrainian Radicalism (1860-1890) (Cambridge, Mass., 1983).


14. Of course, this is easier said than done and rarely achieved for more than brief moments. As possible examples of such a creative unity of centralist and participatory impulses I would suggest: the Bolsheviks in 1917; the Yugoslav and other anti-fascist partisan movements during 1943-45; some anti-colonial national liberation movements from the mid-1940s to the present; the PCI in many dimensions of its history since 1943; Polish Solidarity in 1980-82. The ideal is more easily achieved within local communities. See for instance, Stuart Macintyre, Little Moscows. Communism and Working-Class Militancy in Inter-War Britain (London, 1980).

15. A sense of the new developments can be gained from: Sheila Rowbotham, Lynne Segal and Hilary Wainwright, Beyond the Fragments: Feminism and the Making of Socialism (London, 1979); John Minnion and Philip Bolsover (eds.), The CND Story: The First 25 Years of CND in the Words of the People Involved (London, 1983).


19. Concurrent with the impoverishment of popular democracy in the soviets was the overriding of the rights of the non-Russian nationalities to self-determination, which had also been guaranteed by the 1918 Constitution. The transforming of the popular dictatorship into a dictatorship of the party was replicated in the emergence of a greater Russian centralism, as opposed to the federalism of self-governing peoples originally envisaged.

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