RETHINKING LABOR HISTORY: TOWARD A
POST-MATERALIST RHETORIC

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Is There Anything Wrong With Labor History?

Labor history is not in crisis. Good work is being done in large quantity, not only by historians, but by sociologists, economists, and political scientists as well. Such specialized journals as *International Labor and Working Class History* and *Labor History* are thriving, and articles on labor history are featured prominently in major journals of the various fields. Yet it is hard to argue that labor history is a major site of historiographical innovation, as it unquestionably was in the 1960s or the 1970s. Here I think it is useful to compare labor history to women's history. Although both fields began their rapid expansion in the same historiographical and political era -- labor history in the later 1960s and the 1970s with women's history perhaps a half decade behind -- women's history has retained an intellectual vitality that labor history has lost.

I can see two reasons for this difference. The most important, I suspect, is that the political project of the women's movement, for all its setbacks and hesitations during the last decade, remains far more lively, self-confident, and aggressive than the contemporary labor movement. As the organized working class seems less and less likely to perform the liberating role assigned to it in both revolutionary and reformist discourses about labor, the study of the history of the working class has lost some of its urgency. But there is also a difference of a more strictly intellectual kind. Women's history, and feminist studies more generally, have been a major site
of theoretical struggles in the human sciences. Advocates of cultural, neo-
Freudian, deconstructionist, and materialist approaches are locked in intense
and so far inconclusive battle in feminist studies. In labor studies, by
comparison, a broadly materialist perspective continues to dominate the field.
There have been some challenges -- for example Gareth Stedman-Jones' (1983) and
Joan Scott's (1988) mutually hostile arguments for the primacy of language
over class in the determination of labor politics -- but Stedman-Jones and
Scott have so far recruited few followers among labor historians, who have
tended to dismiss them for lapsing into "mere" intellectual history. I
believe that labor history is destined to suffer from continuing intellectual
doldrums unless its largely unexamined materialist common sense is more widely
and vigorously contested. This paper is intended as a contribution to that
contestation.

Since I see labor history's problem as theoretical, this paper will
operate at a strictly theoretical level. I will in fact have very little to
say about recent or not-so-recent contributions to labor history or about
significant empirical problems that I think need more work. Instead, I will
be examining and criticizing certain fundamental theoretical constructs that
many labor historians -- along with other social scientists -- use in their
studies.

What we usually call theory may be thought of as containing two
complementary but distinguishable dimensions: the logical and the rhetorical.
The logical task of theory is to elaborate and specify logical relations
between theoretical propositions. The rhetorical task, on which I will
concentrate in this paper, is the provision of figurative and linguistic
frameworks or paradigms by means of which we select research problems and
evaluate the relevance, appropriateness, or completeness of researchers'
truth-claims (see Nelson, et. al, 1987). I would argue that most labor historians have based their judgements on an implicit or explicit reductive materialist rhetorical paradigm. What this means in practice is that those features of the historical situation regarded as "material" are assumed to have greater causal power than features regarded as cultural or political or ideological. In my experience, labor historians are too easily satisfied by explanations that identify a "material" cause -- say declining control over the process of production -- but are highly skeptical about explanations that identify cultural causes -- say shifts in political or religious discourse -- no matter how well documented or tightly argued the cultural explanation may be. The normal response of labor historians to cultural explanations is to argue that the supposed cultural cause is either less important than some alternative "material" cause or that the proposed cultural cause is itself the effect of "deeper-lying" material factors. In this way the rhetorical common sense of labor history privileges "material" over cultural or political or ideological phenomena.

The extraordinary role played by the concept of proletarianization in recent labor history is a perfect example of the operation of this materialist common sense. Proletarianization, a preeminently "material" phenomenon, has tended to become the omnibus all-purpose causal force in labor history. The term "proletarianization" actually combines under a single aegis a large number of empirically distinct processes that have occurred in Europe and North America since the late eighteenth century: the movement of populations from agriculture to industry, the separation of producers from ownership of the means of production, a decline of producers' control over the process of production, and the making obsolete of producers' skills. It is demonstrably the case that at least the first three of these processes underwent a global
progression over the course of the nineteenth century. (The third, deskilling, had a more ambiguous history, since both deskilling and reskilling go on constantly and simultaneously in any society undergoing technological change. In my experience, labor historians have typically emphasized the deskilling and ignored the reskilling.) The problem, as I see it, is that labor historians have tended to combine all these diverse processes under a single covering term, tending to see any example of, say, declining control of production or deskilling as a manifestation of the underlying master process of "proletarianization." Thus, a few well-documented examples of deskilling or declining control in a trade or a class are taken as evidence that the trade or the class as a whole is experiencing the underlying process, and consequently that workers' actions, such as strikes, insurrections, or political movements, can be explained as responses to "proletarianization." Labor historians' materialist predilections, I would argue, have made them willing to accept "proletarianization" as a sort of universally valid "material" explanation, and has consequently blunted their analyses of the role of both discourse and politics in labor history.

But my goal in this talk is not to criticize the concept of "proletarianization," so much as to contest the materialist rhetorical common sense on which it depends. I shall try to do so in two steps. First I shall attempt an historical deconstruction of the idea that the economy is "material." My object will be to demonstrate not only that the equation of the economy with the material is arbitrary and misleading, but that the genealogy of this idea is suspicious as well. Second, I shall attempt to provide a more appropriate figuration of the object of labor history, and of social history in general, than that offered by the reductive materialist model. I shall do so by pushing to their logical conclusions tendencies
already present in contemporary labor studies -- and in the contemporary human sciences more generally. I should warn you that what I offer here is not a fully developed and sequentially laid-out logical argument. It might be more accurate to characterize it as a series of unequal and nonparallel skits linked by Monty-Pythonesque transitions.

First Skit: A Historical Deconstruction of the "Materiality" of the Economy

The founding metaphor of the materialist paradigm is the notion that "the economy" is "material." But on close examination, the idea that economic life is particularly or uniformly "material" is quite arbitrary. Much of what goes on in the sphere of production and exchange looks awfully "ideal" or "cultural" or "symbolic" to me. Let me offer a few examples.

1) Let's start from the top with money. In ordinary speech the "material" is more or less equated with "money-making." Yet money is nothing if not a symbol system -- and a very complicated symbol system at that. Money is not useful in itself, but is only a conventional sign of value that is used to trade for commodities. As labor specialists from Karl Marx to William Reddy have argued, the fact that exchange relations are mediated by money commonly deludes people into thinking that such relations are "free" rather than coerced (Reddy, 1987). Like any symbol, in other words, money is defined by its relation to other symbols and has the power to fix the meanings, to shape the possible interpretations, of human action. Money, a symbol if ever there was one, stands at the center of and designates the very boundaries of that sphere of life that we designate as material in capitalist society.

2) A second aspect of economic activity that is hard to characterize as "material" is, of course, advertising. Since the late nineteenth century, a higher and higher proportion of the work and investment of capitalist firms
has gone into advertizing, that is, into symbolic representations of commodities to potential consumers. Advertizing is the production of pictorial, musical, and verbal images for billboards, magazines, radio, television, and other media. These images are designed to incite potential consumers to desire specific symbolically marked commodities -- to desire not bread or fountain pens, but Wonder Bread and Parker Pens. Moreover, the symbolic definition of commodities is not restricted to their packaging or their mediated imaging; it is also embodied in their production. Industrial designers must make sure that a Mont Blanc fountain pen is distinguishable in its actual material form from a Parker fountain pen, or a Braun electric coffee pot from a Mister Coffee. Armies of designers and advertizers, employed both by major corporations and by specialized agencies, engage in the sculpting of metal and plastic, the composition of tunes, the crafting of evocative word sequences or photographic images. The actual work they do is not distinguishable in kind from the lofty creative activities of artists. But their activities are "economic" and are therefore assigned to the material sphere, while the empirically indistinguishable activities of painters, sculptors, musicians, or poets are not.

3) It might be objected that the seemingly "immaterial" aspects of economic life discussed thus far -- money and advertizing -- concern only the circulation or exchange of commodities, and not their production. But in fact, the "ideal" or the "symbolic" also intrudes into production itself. The complex of machines that makes up an assembly line is not just a series of material objects, but the result an elaborately thought-out design -- one that is developed on sketch-pads and blue prints, or nowadays on computers, long before it assumes a material form in the factory. And much production work is only ambiguously material: in contemporary production, workers may not
actually manipulate the goods they are manufacturing, but rather program computerized tools and monitor their performance by means of computer generated signals. And the productivity of machines is not simply a function of their design and scientific efficiency; it also depends fundamentally on the knowledge and the morale of the labor force. Quality circles, in which workers develop means of improving the quality or efficiency of production through intensive discursive interchange, may have contributed more to the superiority of Japanese consumer goods than any advantage in purely mechanical technique. Nor is the intrusion of the "ideal" into production a peculiarity of very recent and highly technologized means of producing goods. Before the introduction of assembly lines, as David Montgomery (a materialist if ever there was one) reminds us, "the boss's brains were under the cap of the worker;" it was the workers' skill and organizational know-how that made possible the sustained and effective production of quality goods (Montgomery, 1979). Or to step back even farther, guild apprentices were to be taught "the mysteries of the trade," the secret skills and formulae and the finesse and taste that would assure their ability to maintain the guild's reputation for quality and style. Aesthetic, symbolic, and organizational knowledge -- all of which could as easily be classified "ideal" as "material" -- have always been part and parcel of the production process.

In short, when economic life is looked at closely, there turns out to be a lot that is immaterial about production and exchange. Like activities that go on in other spheres -- say government, learning, religion, or warfare -- production and exchange entails a complex mixture of what we would usually call the ideal and the material. The closer we look, the clearer it becomes that labeling economic activities as "material" and distinguishing them from "non-material" spheres is utterly arbitrary.
Where, then, did the bizarre notion that production and exchange were uniquely material come from? The answer, I think, is highly paradoxical. It actually derives from traditional European Christian and aristocratic metaphysics, which were subsequently stood on their head by the Enlightenment.

The notion of a distinct material realm comes ultimately from the Christian division of the cosmos into two radically different substances: spirit, which was lofty, orderly, and powerful, and matter, which was base, disorderly, and inert. The hierarchy of spirit and matter was also used metaphorically to make distinctions between different categories or orders of human beings. Although all pre-modern European countries had analogous distinctions, we might as well take the well-known case of old-regime France, where the population was divided into three estates. The clergy were of course the First Estate because their activities -- spiritual affairs -- were the loftiest. The the nobles were the Second Estate because they magnanimously sacrificed their lives in defense of the realm. The Third Estate, by contrast, was vile and ignoble, soiled by its labor and its base pursuit of worldly material goods. So the clichés went. But on close inspection, it is hard to see how the actual activities of commoners were more material than those of nobles. The nobles normally spent their time either making war or practicing for it -- riding horses, handling weapons, and developing their physical prowess through bodily exercise. Peasants' activities were actually quite analogous -- leading teams of oxen, handling plows, axes, and pitchforks, and exhausting themselves with physical labor. Rather than the producers of goods being classified as base because their activity was uniquely material, production of goods was classified as material because those who produced them were regarded as base. The characterization of production and exchange as material was thus logically arbitrary. It had
nothing to do with the factual extent to which the different orders or estates' activities were material. Rather, the designation of production and exchange as material was a metaphor; it resulted from an effort to align the hierarchies of social status in Medieval and Early Modern Europe with contemporary cosmological theories.

The Enlightenment challenged both the cosmology and the assumptions about social status. The Enlightenment was inspired, of course, by the astonishing advances made in natural philosophy in the seventeenth century. The discoveries of Newton and others had demonstrated that the world of matter, far from being gross and disorderly, was ordered by sublime and invariant natural laws. And simultaneously, the realm of spirit, at least as manifested in the various versions of the Christian religion, had proved in the seventeenth century to be an endless source of tumult, warfare, slaughter, and discord. Enlightenment thinkers therefore eschewed theological disputation and attempted to apply the methods of science -- or more exactly, its rhetoric -- to the study of human society.

The philosophy of the Enlightenment was, broadly speaking, materialist. This materialism was manifested, for example, in Montesquieu's climatic determinism or in Lockean epistemology, which held that the mind was furnished with ideas by sense impressions taken directly from the material world. In this intellectual climate, the conventional metaphorical operation that coded production and exchange as material represented an inviting opportunity, one that was seized by the economic thinkers of the Enlightenment, both the French Physiocrats and the Scottish moralists. If production and exchange were material, they should be governed by invariant laws analogous to those that governed physical matter. Over the course of the eighteenth century the economists duly discovered such laws. It is highly significant that the first
coherent school of economic thinkers actually dubbed themselves the "Physiocrats." The title "physiocracy," which of course means "the rule of the physical," makes clear the overall thrust of the economists' project: to find the essential ordering principles of human life in the "material" sphere of production and exchange, the very sphere that had for so long been disdained by philosophers, theologians, and rulers as vile and lowly. The fact that the activities they saw as determining the wealth, power, and happiness of nations could be characterized as material or physical, and therefore as analogous to the physical nature studied by the natural philosophers, subtly but powerfully fortified their claim to have discovered a genuine science of human government. The early economists, in other words, took over intact the traditional equation of production and exchange with the material, but they inverted the traditional valuation of the material, which for them implied order and reason rather than vileness and turpitude.

Both the materialist bias of the Enlightenment and the conventional coding of production and exchange as material were carried over into the nineteenth century by the political economists, whence they were appropriated by Marx in his famous attempt to turn Hegel's idealism on its head. From Marx they have saturated the discourse of the left and have become the unquestioned conventions of labor history. But notice the irony: Marxists proudly proclaim their radicalism by employing an arbitrary identification of the economic as material, never realizing that they have inherited this idea intact and uncriticized from traditional Christian and aristocratic discourse. Hence would-be friends of the proletariat believe they are being progressive when they denounce as "idealists" historians who actually take seriously what past proletarians thought. The claim that the economy is uniquely "material" always was arbitrary, misleading, and tendentious; that it continues to be
clung to by purportedly leftist scholars is an embarrassing anachronism. In my opinion it is time to abandon the notion that the economy is "material" altogether and to jetison the entire panoply of historical and social-scientific rhetoric it supports.

And now for something completely different....

Second Skit: Reflections on Oxymoronic Book Titles

I have been struck by the proliferation of oxymorons in the titles of recent books in labor studies. Let me offer five examples: Manufacturing Consent (1979) and The Politics of Production (1985), both by the Berkeley sociologist Michael Burawoy, The Managed Heart (1983) by his colleague Arlie Hochschild, The Rise of Market Culture (1984) by William Reddy, and The Language of Labor (Sewell, 1980) by yours truly. I shall argue that these oxymoronic titles, properly understood, point toward a new rhetorical paradigm for labor history.

What makes these titles oxymoronic? Oxymorons are figures of speech whose evocative power arises from their uniting of opposites, as in "murky brilliance," "gentle terrors," "deep play," or the unintentional classic "military intelligence." The labor studies titles cited above are all oxymoronic because they unite realms that are conventionally regarded as not only distinct, but opposing -- the realms of politics, the economy, and culture. "Language of labor," "market culture," "managed heart" and "manufacturing consent" all unite the realm of culture (language, culture, heart, consent) with realm of the economy (labor, market, managed, manufacturing); similarly, "politics of production" unites the realms of economy and politics. The titles are all tantalizing, and they tantalize
because they suggest that the supposedly distinct sphere of production and exchange is in fact interlaced with culture and politics.

The books in fact deliver more or less what they promise. All of them challenge, explicitly or implicitly, the notion that production and exchange constitute a distinct sphere of "material" relations. They show how labor movements arise from semantic transformations, how market culture predates the formation of market institutions, how emotion can be managed in order to create profits, how ideological consent is as important a product of factories as physical goods, and how relations of production arise less out of technology than out of "factory regimes." All the books demonstrate that relations of production are not only affected, but actually constituted, by politics and/or culture. And they do this by applying to the supposedly "material" realm theoretical approaches and methods originally developed to study other realms -- think, for example, of Burawoy's formal typology of what he calls "factory regimes" or of Reddy's and Sewell's semantic histories of such crucial terms as "gr|ve" and "cor|poration."

The oxymoronic titles, then, point toward a rhetorical paradigm for labor history quite different from the standard reductive materialism. They refuse, by implication, to recognize a distinct "material" realm and they insist that production and exchange be understood as no less susceptible to shaping by politics and culture than are the art world, religion, or the state. And they sustain powerful and empirically rich nonreductive accounts of the political and cultural constitution of labor relations. I think these books are valuable examples and are on the right rhetorical track; however, none of them attempts to spell out explicitly an appropriate paradigm to replace the materialist reductionism that both their titles and their
arguments have effectively dissolved. The message of the oxymoronic titles is there for all to read, but it clearly needs both exegesis and publicity.

And now for something completely different....

Third Skit: Blurred Genres, Interdisciplinarity, and Imperialist Claims in the Human Sciences

Clifford Geertz observed a decade ago that the genres of the human sciences have become increasingly "blurred." Although his observations came principally from a particular territory -- the ambiguous borderlands between the social sciences and the humanities -- I think the condition he describes is quite general and has become more general over the ensuing decade. The pervasive use of oxymoronic titles, both inside and outside of labor studies, is in fact one marker of the blurring of genres. (It might be pointed out in passing that Geertz is something of a virtuoso in the oxymoronic genre, having contributed "thick description," "deep play," and "the theater state." ) (Geertz, 1973a, 1980, 1983) One sign of generalized genre blurring is a growing rage for interdisciplinarity. The proliferation of interdisciplinary scholarly journals, which has been going on for some time now, shows no signs of slackening. It is probably now the case that more genuinely path-breaking articles are published in such journals as Comparative Studies in Society and History, Critical Inquiry, Signs, Politics and Society, or Representations than in the leading disciplinary journals -- for example, Modern Language Notes, The Journal of Political Economy, or The Journal of Modern History. A particularly striking contemporary development is the proliferation of interdisciplinary programs and research centers in major universities -- for example, the Committee on Historical Studies at the New School for Social Research, the Program on Rhetoric of Inquiry at the University of Iowa, the
History and Society Program at the University of Minnesota, the Committee on Critical Practice at the University of Chicago, the Center for Social Theory and Comparative History at UCLA, and the Program on the Comparative Study of Social Transformations at the University of Michigan.

Although disciplines continue to control graduate training, hiring, and promotions, they have effectively ceased to control the intellectual life of the human sciences in major American universities. The intellectual map is no longer characterized by distinct disciplinary territories with heavily fortified boundaries, but by amorphous disciplines with porous and distended boundaries that are criss-crossed by overlapping, often tentatively defined, interdisciplinary projects. I welcome this ill-defined landscape because it makes possible much greater intellectual variety than in the old discipline-dominated landscape. Yet it could also be argued that the very indefiniteness of intellectual boundaries also endangers variety by making possible the formulation of grand imperial schemes -- ambitious attempts to sweep across the whole of the human sciences and impose a new and uniform order on all branches of knowledge.

The classical map of the human sciences regarded culture, the economy, and politics as distinct institutional spheres, each of which was governed by principles elaborated in a distinct analytical vocabulary and assigned to a distinct discipline: the economy to economics departments, politics to political science, and culture to anthropology and literature. But the interdisciplinary explosion of recent years has liberated the analytical vocabularies from their disciplinary enclosures and from their exclusive concern with any narrowly defined institutional sphere. In the open and amorphous landscape of the contemporary human sciences, cultural theories,
economic theories, and political theories have all claimed the capacity to encompass by themselves the full range of social relations.

Theories claiming that all social relations are cultural or discursive are perhaps the most common, and often argue in a deconstructionist mode. Prominent examples would be Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (1985), or, to return to the territory of labor history, Joan Scott's *Gender and the Politics of History* (1988). The claim that all social relations are economic, or, more precisely, are determined by choice under conditions of scarcity, is characteristic of works in the rational choice mode, by, for example, Gary Becker (1981), Michael Hechter (1987), or James Coleman (1989). The claim that all social relations are fundamentally political is perhaps best represented by the later works of Michel Foucault, especially *Discipline and Punish* (1977) and *The History of Sexuality* (1978).

My own position on these claims is paradoxical. I would argue that all of these imperialist claims are right, and therefore that they are also all wrong. Let me explain what I mean by taking up the claims in turn.

1. All of social life is cultural or discursive. In other words, every aspect of every institutional sphere of human life is determined by questions of meaning. Cultural anthropologists have shown that all of our activities, from the most elaborate to the simplest, from the most abstract learned disquisitions to the most concrete bodily functions, are shaped by linguistic and para-linguistic processes of meaning formation, by symbols and their manipulation -- by discourse, in the very broad sense in which this term is used by Scott (1988) or Laclau and Mouffe (1985). This means that there is no sphere of human life that cannot be analyzed profitably by means of literary, semiotic, or rhetorical techniques to discover and interrelate the meanings that it instantiates and displays.
(2) **All of social life is economic.** In other words, every aspect of every sphere of human life is determined by questions of choice under scarcity. Not only contemporary "rational action" theorists, but philosophers and economists as far back as Jeremy Bentham, have insisted that choices among alternative means to attain scarce ends beset not only workers or entrepreneurs concerned with how best to produce goods, or merchants concerned with what to sell and what to buy, but all sorts of people faced with all sorts of decisions, from major policy issues to the conduct of daily life. For example Gary Becker's "new home economics" shows that decisions to have a baby or to get married can plausibly be treated as instances of investment, consumption, or the formation of commercial contracts (1981). Most labor historians would belittle Becker's claims, in part because he is a conservative neo-classical economist of the Chicago school. But in practice we ourselves commonly, and quite properly, treat workers' decisions as results of calculations about advantage, personal or collective. In truth, there is nothing humans do that is not shaped by ends-means considerations under conditions of scarcity. Rational actor theorists are attempting to clarify and systematize these considerations, and to extend them formally to situations outside the sphere of production and exchange.

(3) **All of social life is political.** In other words, every aspect of every sphere of human life involves questions of power or domination. The sinews of power relations, backed up by coercion and sometimes by the threat of violence, extend everywhere -- they are "capillary," in Foucault's metaphor. This is true even -- perhaps especially, as Foucault's later work implies (Foucault, 1977, 1978) -- of the seemingly anonymous pursuit of scientific knowledge, which both produces the authority of those who know and is based on the authority that empowers them to observe, experiment, and
pronounce truth or falsity. And it is certainly true, as Michael Burawoy's studies demonstrate, of labor at the point of production (1985). Everything we do produces, reproduces, challenges, or is limited by relations of power among persons and groups.

I would argue that we must accept all of these imperialist claims — cultural, economic, and political. But from this it also follows that the imperialism of each claim systematically undermines the imperialism of the others. Each imperialist theory is right to insist that the analytical vocabulary originally developed for its "home" institutional sphere can in fact be extended to any and all of society's institutional spheres. But nowhere, even in the "home" institutional sphere, can any of the theories claim a monopoly of explanatory power. In short, I don't think we can accept the classical disciplinary map of the social world as constituted by more or less autonomous spheres of politics, culture, and economics. Nor do I think we can accept the "imperialist" picture of the social world as constituted by a range of diverse institutions and practices all of which can be explained sufficiently either by meaning, or by power, or by scarcity. Instead, I would argue that we must imagine a world in which every social relationship is simultaneously and irreducibly constituted by meaning, by scarcity, and by power. This would imply, for example, that all social relations are discursive, but that that social relations are never exhausted by their discursivity. Indeed, it implies something much more radical: that the discursive features of the social relationship are themselves always constitutively shaped by power relations and by conditions of choice under scarcity. It further implies that this constitutive shaping is entirely reciprocal — just as meanings are always shaped by scarcity and power, so
scarcity is always shaped by power and meaning, and power is always shaped by meaning and scarcity.

Conclusion: Toward a New Rhetoric?

What do these reflections imply for the rhetoric of labor history? First, they imply that we should abandon not only the base and superstructure model that has been under attack ever since E. P. Thompson published *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963), but the more fundamental rhetorical assumption that production and exchange can legitimately be characterized as "material" -- a notion still espoused in practice by most professed Thompsonians. Instead, I think we must accept in their most radical form the implicit messages of the oxymoronic titles and the imperialist theoretical claims that are proliferating in the contemporary human sciences. We need, in other words, to hypothesize a world in which work is simultaneously "ideal" and "material" and in which everything workers do must be understood as simultaneously structured by discourse, by choice under conditions of scarcity, and by power relations. So whenever we find ourselves arguing that something workers do follows an economic logic, we must ask ourselves "How is that economic logic shaped by power and discourse?" If we find ourselves arguing that workers' actions can be explained by power relations, we must ask "How are those power relations constituted by scarcity and discourse?" And if we find ourselves arguing that workers' actions are a consequence of discursive constraints, we must ask "How do these discursive constraints result from the operations of power and scarcity."
References


The Program on the Comparative Study of Social Transformations is an inter-disciplinary research program at the University of Michigan. Its faculty associates are drawn primarily from the departments of Anthropology, History, and Sociology, but also include members of several other programs in the humanities and social sciences. Its mission is to stimulate new inter-disciplinary thinking and research about all kinds of social transformations in a wide range of present and past societies. CSST Working Papers report current research by faculty and graduate student associates of the program; many will be published elsewhere after revision. Working Papers are available for a fee of $1.00 for papers under 40 pages and for $2.00 for longer papers. The program will photocopy out-of-print Working Papers at cost ($0.05 per page). To request copies of Working Papers, write to Comparative Study of Social Transformations, 4010 LSA Building, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1382 or call (313) 936-1595.


3 "Coffee, Copper, and Class Conflict in Central America and Chile: A Critique of Zeitlin's Civil Wars in Chile and Zeitlin and Ratcliff's Landlords and Capitalists," by Jeffery M. Paige, September 1987, 10 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper #347.


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