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OF CIVIL SOCIETIES AND POST COMMUNIST
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CSST Working Paper #45
CRSO Working Paper #425

July 1990

This paper first appeared in July 1990 as part of the CRSO/CSST Working Papers series. This revised version will appear in an upcoming issue of Theory and Society.
THE INTELLIGENTSIA IN THE CONSTITUTION OF CIVIL SOCIETIES AND POST-COMMUNIST REGIMES IN HUNGARY AND POLAND

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The most prominent actor in the 1989 transformations of Eastern Europe has been the intelligentsia. In the wake of revolution they have in most places replaced the communist party and won political authority. The intelligentsia's ascension depended on the possibilities of a negotiated settlement between it and reformers in the communist party as well as the acceptance by the popular classes of the intelligentsia's representation. The intelligentsia won this authority by becoming spokespersons for a new universalism, civil society. But this civil society contained several possible meanings, and excluded many significant questions from its conceptualization. The future of post-communist systems and of the intelligentsia in them depends on how civil society's contradictions and exclusions are worked out.

In this paper, I propose to clarify the contingency of this historical process by which the intelligentsia has apparently come to power. I further suggest how the future might also be contingent by examining some of the factors which have led to the particular character of the intelligentsia's hegemony in Poland and in Hungary. Because this story continues to unfold in ways too difficult to anticipate with any confidence, I focus this essay on the period leading up to the formation of post-communist regimes. I discuss how the Polish intelligentsia's immersion in civil society contributed to the emergence of Solidarity in 1980-81 as a cross-class movement identifying with pluralism, equality and self-management. I then turn to the difference between Poland and Hungary, emphasizing not only social conditions but also the different legacies of opposition to the Soviet-type system in these two societies. I subsequently discuss how the Hungarian intelligentsia created its own civil society, and illustrate that with reference to two forms of self-organization based on the intelligentsia itself. Next I compare both countries' transition to post-communism, emphasizing above all the negotiations that occurred in both countries between communist reformers and the intelligentsia as representatives of civil society.
In both countries, I discuss how the intelligentsia appears to have come to power, but in fact transformed its role to one of professional expert for the authority of markets. Finally, I consider the alternative futures of these post-communist regimes and consider the conditions under which the democratic civil society for which so many struggled might become most likely. But before I turn to the question of the intelligentsia and these specific comparisons, I discuss the variations in East European transitions in order to situate my discussion of Poland and Hungary and to suggest why they deserve analytical priority.

EAST EUROPEAN PATTERNS

The intelligentsia is of considerable, even if variable importance in all of the East European transformations. The intelligentsia appears least significant in Bulgaria and Romania where an independent intelligentsia had less room to form and to become nationally recognized given the measures of repression and the Party’s organizational hegemony in the old system. In one sense, an independent intelligentsia and civil society there are still forming, as students and others continue demonstrations against "communists" in power, even if these new authorities are claiming to have broken with their party’s past, either as individuals as in the case of Romania, or as a party, as in the case of Bulgaria. Albania is similar to these two other Balkan countries in the measure of repression its civil society has suffered, but unlike Romania and Bulgaria, it has had a significant civil society outside its state boundaries in Yugoslavia’s Kosovo, where an Albanian intelligentsia is developing further its identity and national consciousness.

The rest of Yugoslavia defies single description. On the one hand, Croatia and especially Slovenia have developed civil societies, independent social movements and independent intellectuals. These regions also are the most economically developed in the federation, and are seeking national independence much as the Baltic republics in the USSR are. In Serbia, Vojvodina, Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Party-state has survived workers strikes and
even won authority by using nationalist rhetoric and police action against the Albanian minority in
order to appeal to the most base instincts of the Serbian majority.

Yugoslavia’s ethnic tensions are the most severe in the region, but Czechoslovakia has the
second most heterogenous population. Unlike Yugoslavia, there seems to be little likelihood of
separatist movements gaining much appeal there, however. Where in Yugoslavia, political power
and economic power are differently located, in Czechoslovakia, the economically developed region
is simultaneously the more populous and more politically influential. One of the main efforts of
Slovak intellectuals has been the struggle for a more equal federation, symbolized by the
incorporation of a hyphen between Czecho and Slovak in the state’s post-communist title.

In one sense, Czechoslovakia appears to be the finest example of intellectual prominence in the
political authority of the post-communist state. Playwright Vaclav Havel not only emerged from
roundtable negotiations as president of the new republic, but he also won the presidential elections
handily in the spring. Demonstrations in the streets of Prague, Bratislava and elsewhere helped
to bring the government to negotiation, but it was the prior existence of a group of independent
intellectuals with sufficient national authority in the “parallel polis”\(^3\) to conduct the negotiations
that enabled the transition to proceed so smoothly. The demonstrations were themselves not
sufficient conditions for the movement of intellectuals to power, however. The Czechoslovak
communist party had been among the most hardline in the region, and least inclined to negotiate
away its power. Recently it was suggested that the Soviet KGB provoked the escalation of
demonstrations by staging a student’s death. Whatever the merit of this rumour, it was the case
that dynamics of protest elsewhere, especially in East Germany, set the stage for Havel and his
colleagues to acquire political authority.

The intelligentsia was also prominent in the development of the opposition which led to the
downfall of the East German regime, but their ultimate significance has been undermined by the
proximity of the other Germany. Parts of the intelligentsia and some Protestant Churches did
provide the initial organizing efforts for the demonstrations which contributed to the regime’s
downfall, but the ultimate collapse of Honecker and his colleagues was occasioned by the
population hemorrhage made by mass emigration to West Germany through Hungary. What is more, the East German intelligentsia quickly lost power in the post-communist system as West German political parties and capital overwhelmed domestic initiatives in shaping transition. In this, East Germany could show one future for the other countries of Eastern Europe, where domestic civil societies are overwhelmed by foreign capital and political forces.

It would be misleading to present these transformations as independent cases for comparison. Clearly, events in one region were shaping changes in others. The Romanian and Bulgarian changes were influenced by their isolation as Communist holdovers, much as Albania and to some extent Yugoslavia are today. The Czechoslovak changes were inspired by the East German, and those changes were moved by the Hungarians cutting their barbed wire boundary with Austria. And to some degree, of course, all of these changes were dependent on the USSR's own transformation. But perestroika in the USSR is not the only story central to the transformation of Soviet-type society.

Perestroika was itself moved by the experiences of Poland and Hungary. Hungary was observed closely by Soviet authorities as a model for communism's economic transformation. Poland was also being watched, but with a less admiring eye. The failure to restore economic and political order without Solidarity meant that the Soviets were facing few options in Poland at the end of the 1980's other than invasion or emancipation. The relative costs of the invasion and withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan probably suggested to many Soviet leaders that emancipation would cost the USSR far less than occupation.

No one anticipated how quickly the transformation of Eastern Europe would take place. But it is now important to analyze how that transformation did occur so that we can better anticipate the alternative futures facing the region. Each place deserves its own analysis, but Poland and Hungary might deserve analytical priority, for several reasons.

First, the dynamics which have established their post-communist regimes are the most internally derived. External intervention and imitation has been least important for the Polish and Hungarian transitions. Second, these societies initiated the transitions and were the
pathbreakers for post-communist transformation. Finally, they imply two alternatives in post-communist transition, with the Polish transformation having been based on a cross-class alliance in civil society against the authorities, and the Hungarian transition depending more on a negotiated alliance between Party reformers and opposition intellectuals. They offer the opportunity for neat comparison, especially so as to explain why intellectuals can be so prominent in case of either transition motivated first by negotiation at the top or pressure from the bottom. But before I turn to this comparison, I discuss briefly the general situation of the intelligentsia in the communist system.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA IN THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM

In the absence of a strong bourgeoisie and given the centrality of nationalism, East European intellectuals were moved to prominence in practical politics before World War II. In several senses, the Soviet-type system continued that practice. The Party pretended to be the collective intellectual, realizing for society and universal classes their interests. It also claimed managerial expertise, expressed through centralized planning and organizational hegemony. The intelligentsia and the Party both shared an interest in elevating their capacity for teleological knowledge to a superior position in the legitimation of surplus's distribution. But intellectuals were nonetheless an anachronism in such a system, especially when that system was forced on a resistant culture and intellectuals struggled to retain their distinction.

The distinction of intellectuals resides in their capacity to redefine their distinction. Even while the Soviet-type system elevated the intellectual by eliminating class rivals and promoting a knowledge-based class order, it also sought to take away from intellectuals their distinction in the name of a supra-individual rationality. Where in other social orders, intellectuals were privileged not only by rank but also by a qualitatively separate status based on their distinction, in the new order they were placed on top of a hierarchy that denied their qualitative difference.
Most obviously, state censorship denies intellectuals the capacity to define their product. Imposed styles, as socialist realism, reduce intellectual distinction. Even in more subtle ways, the Soviet-type system oppresses this distinction. The idea that intellectuals, as others, should serve some common interest means that intellectuals are denied the privilege of defining their master. Collectivism, even one based on some order favorable to the material interests of intellectuals, works to deny the individualistic foundation that makes the intellectual as actor distinctive. As Bahro argued, the Soviet-type system produced "surplus consciousness", where bureaucratic domination supressed the creative capacity of individuals, especially of intellectuals.

Revisionism offered one means by which communist principles could be transformed to make intellectuality and the Soviet-type system compatible, but by 1968 revisionism was defeated as an East European project. Intellectuals remaining within the system were left without an independent transformative identity aside from their domestic national one. As such, many of those formerly engaged in the transformation of the marxian project were led to search for what their own national tradition meant, and to reconstruct it. This became especially important as they sought to distinguish their nationalism from those who from communism's imposition rested on traditional nationalism to define their opposition. Nationalism had been, after all, the natural opponent to the form of communism characterizing the Soviet-type system.

These traditional themes in nationalist politics and identity formation generally rely on some kind of reaction rather than a positive project of identity formation. That also means that nationalist projects will mean something different in each East European setting. In Poland, where Polish ethnicity is claimed by over 95% of the population, nationalism was most obviously expressed in a continuation of the struggles from before World War I with the demand for a truly independent state, this time free of Soviet/Russian/Communist domination. Other nationalisms also focused on this state project, but generally not in the same way as the Poles whose numerical preponderance and geographical spread in Eastern Europe encouraged their vision of another great state, as they had centuries earlier. The struggles for statehood by Croatia and Slovenia are not on the same scale, but they do express something similar: that if only our nation could have its
own state, it could be great, or even normal, again. Slovakia is different as its nationalism focuses mainly on the assurance of equality in the federation given its comparative economic under-development and less glorious national heritage than its Czech partner.

Like Poland, Hungary also has a strong historical memory of its great power status, but unlike Poland, its nationalism does not focus on state power. Former Hungarian dissident Mihaly Vajda describes the difference: "The independence of the great Polish nation is very important to the Poles. It is absolutely unimportant to the Hungarians. National consciousness does exist in a lot of respects, but a big and independent Hungarian country is not an issue for Hungarians at all." This Hungarian difference is a consequence of the twentieth century's lessons.

The costs of the Soviet invasion of 1956 crushed the appeal of a nationalist discourse that focused on the militant struggle for an independent Hungarian state. But even earlier, expansionist and statist nationalism was undermined by the results of World War I, when Hungarian territory was radically circumscribed, leaving many Hungarians in other states: in Slovakia, in Yugoslavia's Vojvodina, and especially in Romania. The results of World War II only reinforced that sense of national dismemberment. With the distribution of the means of violence as they are, redrawn state borders and great power status are less feasible as a focus for Hungarian nationalism's main aspiration. Concern over those Hungarian minorities in border states does, however, provide nationalism its main theme.

These nationalisms seem mostly defensive, or at least non-offensive, as they are directed primarily against nationalities with greater resources. Many of the other East European nationalisms have as a dominant theme some kind of threat to minority populations, however. The Serbs express their nationalism in the struggle to retain control over their historic homeland in Kosovo, with the consequent threat against Albanians. The Romanians and Bulgarians express their nationalism with the repression of the cultural rights of their Hungarian and Turkish minorities in particular. German nationalism, given its twentieth century experience, tends to be far more cautious. Instead of longing for the reacquisition of now Polish lands, it is much safer to
insist upon the "naturally" united Germany, even while the rest of Eastern Europe most fears this national identity.

Nevertheless, all of these East European nationalisms contain the potential for combining the defensive with the offensive. Although there has been an effort within East European civil societies to oppose intolerance and especially anti-Semitism, its potential continues to exist and only conscious struggle against it seems to assure its repression. This conflict, between an chauvinistic nationalism and a universalistic one is, in fact, one of the principal struggles defining the post-communist epoch, and was one of the tensions the struggle for civil society could cover over.

In the communist system, the struggle for national independence and state power could easily define the first kind of opposition. But such a nationalism also could be translated into the suppression of others' rights, much as its promoters struggled to realize their own. A new "universalistic" kind of nationalism, based on the development of civil society, was developed under communism in opposition to this older form. Rather than assert the rights of one's own nationality over those of others, this new kind of nationalism had two key themes: European identity and national equality, with each reinforcing the other.

National equality not only meant that the Soviet empire had no right to determine the national futures of the various East European societies, namely that states are of equal stature, but also that state forming nationalities had no right to assert their needs over the needs of other nationalities in their own states. Janos Kis, for instance, asserted that for Hungarians to demand better treatment for their minorities abroad, they must also assure the rights of their own minorities, most notably Gypsies.¹²

The European identity was also part of this liberal redefinition of national consciousness. To emphasize a nation's European heritage was to do two things at once: first, to emphasize the distinction of this people from the "Western Asian" Russians, for whom the Soviet-type of communism might seem natural or appropriate.¹³ Second, it was to give the nation a broader identity which would allow it to avoid the glorification of its own singular identity, and rather
escalate the principles of a liberal and civil society to an element of the national heritage. Indeed, rather than cultural peculiarity, this version of nationalist consciousness emphasized the European, albeit universal virtues of human rights and civil society.

Former Polish dissident and present parliamentarian Adam Michnik, who certainly would number among proponents of the latter vision, named Sakharov in the USSR, Kis in Hungary, and Havel in Czechoslovakia also as representatives of this tradition. These men were promoting this vision long before they were vying for national political authority. But when they were dissidents, their reconstructions of national identity were mostly important for those intellectuals normally engaged in the project of cultural debate: political dissidents and humanistic intellectuals. The mass intelligentsia had only a limited identification with this East European legacy. Indeed, the Soviet-type system intentionally recreated the region’s intelligentsia so as to move such questions outside their professional competence and personal province.

In higher education, the system moved away from the broadly educated to the narrowly trained, reducing the numbers of humanists and lawyers trained and increasing dramatically the number of engineers. The system tried to generate an intelligentsia which shared no cultural identity, and rather was a stratum of highly educated narrowly trained specialists, whose professionalism would be promoted so long as they avoided the kinds of questions that had preoccupied the East European intelligentsia in the past, namely national identity and social justice.

As such, the cultural struggle to promote nationalism, or to transform national identity into one of a liberal civil society, also was a struggle to transform the Soviet-type system’s intelligentsia into one more like its traditional East European form. In a sense, one could think of this as a struggle of the East European life world against the Soviet-type system. But in fact, this cultural struggle could draw upon the system’s own internal contradictions when it came to professionalism. An anti-systemic identity born in the subordination of professionalism to illegitimate political standards and incompetent managerial practices actually served to make the civil society argument appealing even to the apolitical but professionally minded. To rid
themselves of the incompetent politically appointed bureaucrats would allow for professional qualifications to rule the day.

The only problem, of course, was that these same political appointees were the ones who decided professional careers. So, even if sympathetic, the idea of civil society emerging from within East European communism had to await social struggles which would make this framework for opposition sensible for the mass of professionals to support actively. Given this dependence on social struggles, the construction of civil society as Eastern Europe's emancipatory alternative took different courses in different societies given the variety of struggles which might yield this new form. Thus, it is best now to turn to specifics, and begin with Poland to see how a civil society based on a national cross-class alliance was constructed.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA'S IMMERSION IN POLISH CIVIL SOCIETY

After the debacle of 1968, in which intellectuals and students were isolated in protest and submitted to anti-intellectual and anti-semitic exhortations, imprisonment and exile, workers became Poland's central transformative actors. In late 1970 and early 1971, workers took to the streets in mass demonstrations, but this time they were isolated, as intellectuals remained quiescent, being both exhausted and resentful of their treatment by the working class two and one half years earlier. But the workers’ isolation did not prove so disastrous as the intellectuals’, as they were able to turn out the old Party leadership around Gomulka, and replace him with Edward Gierek, a technocratic Party leader from Silesia. When Gierek would ask workers for help in constructing a new Poland, in the beginning workers would respond enthusiastically.

Gierek’s Poland was based on a new model of growing consumerism, greater professionalism and technocratic ideology. Some intellectuals were thus drawn into the Gierek program with promises that their expertise would be employed in the construction of the new order. Although the communist regime continued to be "alien" to the Polish nation, the demands of ideology receded. Few took it seriously, and loyalty to the regime came to consist in ritualistic practices and an
absence of oppositional activity. Much as in Hungary, where Party leader Janos Kadar had said a
decade earlier those who are not against us are with us, in Poland the politics of intellectuals came
to resemble more and more the tradition of "organic work" (praca u postaw), where
professionalism could take the place of overt political activity. The obviousness of this political
response began to disappear in the mid-1970's, however.

In 1975, Gierek sought to demonstrate his loyalty to the Soviet Union by introducing changes
to the Constitution. He sought to add two particularly offensive phrases, one concerning the leading
role of Poland's communist party in all spheres of social life (rather than the leading role of the
working class) and the other about unshakeable and fraternal bonds between the USSR and
Poland. This generated a not only a considerable intellectual backlash but also a sharp reaction by
the Catholic Church hierarchy in the persons of Primate Stefan Wyszynski and Cardinal Karol
Wojtyla. With this development, the Catholic Church began to move away from its cautious
relationship to the authorities, and to support the political opposition more and more.  
By 1977, one of the leaders of the 1968 student demonstrations, Adam Michnik, began to argue that the
Church and those in the tradition of the anti-clerical left have reason for dialogue and common
opposition to the Polish authorities. Although his Kosciol, Dialog, Lewica (The Church, Dialogue,
the Left) produced considerable interest within Poland, a shorter essay was more consequential.
"The New Evolutionism" was one of the first programmatic statements to suggest the course
Solidarity followed later.

Michnik argued against the prevailing political legacies of 1956. Both revisionism and
neopositivism depended on the activities of elites, not on mass public pressure. The dependence
of both strategies on initiation from above thus led them to choose the wrong sides in periods of
open conflict. The only political strategy that might consistently lead to the right choice is that
which is based on "an unceasing struggle for reform and evolution that seeks an expansion of civil
liberties and human rights." Michnik concludes, "In searching for truth, or, to quote Leszek
Kolakowski, 'by living in dignity', opposition intellectuals are striving not so much for a better
tomorrow as for a better today. Every act of defiance helps us to build the framework of
democratic socialism, which should not be merely or primarily a legal institutional structure but a real day-to-day community of free people."24

Michnik's essay helped to lay an intellectual foundation for the Solidarity movement in Poland. It constructed a program that was unambiguously on the side of society against the authorities, and without possibility for compromise with them. It therefore represented a form of national identification, while not demanding that the rights of Polish nationhood be elevated over other peoples. It could not easily be attacked from any ideological position, especially since most political groups at least pay lip service to the idea of human rights. And it promised a new universality, one that could eclipse the claims of marxism. Here, human rights were in everyone's interests, serving equally well workers, peasants and intellectuals. But perhaps even more significant than the essay, Michnik and other intellectuals formed a group that demonstrated in practice what the essay suggested.

The Committee in Defense of Workers (Komitet Obrony Robotnikow or KOR) was formed to help those workers and their families victimized by the authorities after the 1976 strikes and demonstrations. These were above all traditional creative intellectuals25 who put their capacities at the service of workers. Not only did they try to raise money to help them, but also tried to facilitate directly the self-organization of society by advocating independent trade unions through the Charter of Workers' Rights.26 The Solidarity movement, although not a product of these intellectuals' efforts alone,27 was certainly influenced by this new image of opposition: civil society against the state.28

This civil society was tied closely, although not entirely, to the Catholic Church. Lay Catholic intellectuals, organized in Clubs of Catholic Intellectuals, were frequent advisors and contributors to the movement. Church premises could be used as meeting places. Religious clerical networks connecting pulpits, and therefore congregations, could provide a means for communicating a coherent message to a significant proportion of Poles. The elevation of Krakow Archbishop Karol Wojtyla to Pope also gave Poles a new charismatic figure with whom to identify. His visit to Poland in 1979 was organized by civil society itself, without state assistance, thereby providing an
important lesson in self-organization. Perhaps equally important, the Pope's language provided to Polish citizens a new vocabulary for expressing their resistance to the regime.

The traditional language of liberation had been appropriated by the authorities. Words like "socialism", "self-management", and "class struggle" compromised those who uttered them. The Pope provided instead a language that expressed emancipation in terms of human dignity, truth and solidarity. These were words that could be used without compromise to express the common interests of civil society against the authorities. Pope John Paul II's invectives against the language of class struggle in liberation theology reflect this background of struggle against Poland's communist authorities. This opposition to marxist language also had an important function in Polish politics, as class antagonisms were one of the foundations for the reproduction of the communist order.

In Soviet-type systems as elsewhere, workers typically resent intellectuals' arrogance and privilege, while intellectuals often distrust workers' fundamentalist or populist politics. The communist authorities have exploited this distrust in their effort to quell any kind of unified opposition to them. The idea of civil society, and the terminology of dignity and solidarity, allowed an escape from this principal barrier to an organized civil society.

The civil society project was also successful because it contained no substantive politics. It said nothing about the distribution of wealth, ownership of the means of production, or division of labor. Strategically, it offered a means for the construction of cross-class alliances, as intellectuals could offer their support in the defense of the civil liberties and human rights of those with weaker ties to the media and poorer skills at publicizing their oppression. In return, the collective strength of self-organized workers could build public pressure on the authorities to respect the rights and liberties the intellectuals moved to the public sphere. On this foundation, Solidarity was formed.
Solidarity was an alliance of all classes in Polish civil society against the state. It was, therefore, more than an alliance of disgruntled workers and dissident intellectuals. The majority of the broader class of intelligentsia also belonged to the union. Although workers were far and away the numerical majority of this union, the highly educated were overrepresented in the leadership of the movement. And even where workers were in the leadership, as Lech Walesa and Zbigniew Bujak, they depended heavily on intellectual advisors like Michnik, Jacek Kuron, Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Bronislaw Geremek. This was, of course, a workers’ movement based on the experiences of the working class in Gdansk, Szczecin, Silesia and other industrial centers, but it also was heavily influenced by the dissident intellectuals who promoted the idea of civil society’s struggle against the state, and by the broader intelligentsia that promoted professionalism over politics.

The two principal classes of urban Solidarity in 1980-81 had different emphases in their politics. Workers were above all interested in a kind of radical trade unionism, from a militant defense of local issues to a kind of self-managing economic reform based on workers’ councils. All sectors of society had to be interested in such a trade unionism in the beginning because that was the foundation for social transformation. But later, as the conflict between authorities and self-organized society intensified and economic crisis grew, it became apparent to more and more people that some institutional transformation would have to be initiated to lead Poland out of the crisis. The intelligentsia was more active in promoting this institutional reform of economy and politics than workers. For instance, the self-management movement called Siec, or the Network, was above all led by engineers and other professionals, even if in alliance with workers. Too, the Solidarity Congress in the fall of 1981 was devoted most of all to political issues, and most of the delegates were themselves from the intelligentsia.

Although internal politics may have grown more divisive over time, Solidarity was characterized by an internal discourse that reproduced the unity of the movement. Realizing
the importance of the working class base, intellectuals would rarely formulate plans that contradicted the workers' egalitarian orientations. For example, the formulation of the self-management project was not justified solely in terms of economic necessity or efficiency, as in isolation engineers may have done, but also in terms of democracy. In this sense, self-government as a democratic ethos was extended downward to that of the enterprise, as intellectuals had moved it upward to the national level. Pluralism also remained one of the movement's fundamental values, in terms of the alternative order for which Solidarity struggled, but also in terms of the struggle itself as each social group was encouraged to form its own identity to represent its own interests. Pluralism was thus understood as social self-organization. Fundamental disagreements were suppressed in the attempt to preserve the solidarity of civil society against the state. An internal pragmatism based on the values of self-organization, equality and self-government enabled Solidarity's activists to continue the construction of a cross-class movement.

This pragmatic cross-class movement had its systemic foundations too. By itself, the intelligentsia did not have the social power to effect the institutional transformations they sought. They could not end nomenklatura, promote greater professionalism or open the public sphere without the pressure brought by the threat of collective action by workers in Poland's largest factories. In this sense, the intelligentsia was dependent on workers to effect social reconstruction. Thus, the discursive reproduction of Solidarity's unity was premised on the dependency of intellectuals on working class power.34

This reproduction of movement unity was, admittedly, becoming more difficult to realize over the fall of 1981, but it had by no means yet failed. Nevertheless, the imposition of martial law on December 13, 1981 prevented Solidarity's politics from moving in any direction generated by the movement's original form. Solidarity's cross-class unity had been reproduced pragmatically in an open public sphere. Once that sphere was closed, Solidarity became but a symbol, and an ambiguous one at that.
The experience of an open public sphere in 1980-81 demonstrated to most that the defense of civil rights and self-organization could not serve as an adequate frame for systemic transformation (as in the economy or polity) even if it could generate a marked social transformation (as in the formation of new groups to defend civil liberties). When debate over institutional change moved to the center, this of necessity led to the construction of a more pluralistic Polish opposition, and a more pluralistic Polish politics. I shall return to the Polish case later in this essay, but I should turn now to the opposition which, by contrast, began as a pluralistic body, even if more exclusively intellectual.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN POLAND AND HUNGARY

The arguments of independent intellectuals in Eastern Europe reflect both the social conditions in which they are constructed as well as the legacy of oppositional activity upon which they draw. The difference between Hungary and Poland can, perhaps, be most clearly drawn by considering why one such argument, Konrad and Szelenyi's thesis of the intelligentsia as a ruling class in statu nascendi, could be considered appropriate to Hungary while unsuitable for Poland.

At the very time Konrad and Szelenyi were writing of the likelihood of the political authorities and intelligentsia finding common ground for class rule, the Polish intelligentsia was beginning to reconstruct a moral/cultural basis for opposition to the communist authorities. Indeed, Frentzel-Zagorska and Zagorski's critique of Szelenyi rests on such an account that finds no reason to elevate imputed class interests above cultural self definition in the explanation of class alliances and social conflicts.35 In Hungary, the constitution of social groups prohibited the same kind of dichotomous politics of morality as that created in Poland. There are three basic social reasons for this.

First, and most obvious, Polish workers have been more militant and more organized than any other working class in Soviet-type societies. When Michnik could write in 1976 that open social conflict proves both revisionists and neo-positivists wrong, intellectuals in other East
European countries had no basis for expecting such open or protracted social conflict. Before 1989, revisionism and especially neo-positivism were not strategies that could be thrown on the ash heap of history in these other countries. Indeed, while Michnik in 1976 was speaking of the importance of a program that could avoid compromise with the authorities, over a decade later Janos Kis was writing that “the resolution of the country’s crisis is conceivable only in the form of compromise.”

Second, and not unrelated to this first point, the disparity between public facade and private disposition among intellectuals has likely been greater in Poland than in Hungary, though perhaps not greater than that experienced in the early 1960’s in Czechoslovakia. The cultural gulf between communist authorities and independent intellectuals is greater where intellectuals do not practice the politics of revisionism or of neopositivism. It is also greater where nationalist traditions are posed in opposition to the communist regime.

In the mid to late 1970’s in Hungary, some of the most prominent independent intellectuals were students of Lukacs, and were still working out their relationship to the marxist tradition. By contrast in Poland, few if any independent intellectuals accepted marxism as a primary tradition by the late 1960’s. Where in Poland, nationalism was situated in revolutionary opposition to the regime, in Hungary, the populist tradition worked relatively comfortably with the communists through the mid 1980’s. Indeed, it was not until the mid 1980’s in Hungary that a group of reformers broke with the establishment to address society rather than only official decision makers, whereas in Poland, that break had perhaps taken place in 1968 and certainly by 1976. For the Hungarian intelligentsia, the field of intellectual politics was not so antagonistic as in Poland, and compromise involved in working for the regime was not so problematic.

Third, the Hungarian authorities have been much more skilled at dealing with intellectuals, especially those in Budapest. They assured more space for intellectual independence than the Polish authorities, and even when they censored their intellectual opposition, the Hungarian authorities were more limited than their Polish comrades. Their attack in the early to mid 1970’s on independent intellectuals was more selective and careful than the broad attack on intelligentsia
and students that the Polish authorities engaged in 1968, and certainly not so severe as that repression which Jaruzelski's martial law represented. And since the 1974-75 trial of Miklos Haraszti, intellectuals had not been subject to any criminal proceedings, although in the late 1970's several leading independent Budapest intellectuals were pressured to emigrate and in the early 1980's, independent intellectuals were harassed with administrative fines. While in the early 1980's people were in jail for political reasons, they were not the Budapest opposition intellectuals.

These three social conditions distinguishing Hungary from Poland (the demobilization of the working class, the legitimacy of compromise, and the manipulative skill of the authorities) were fully developed in the 1980's, even though they were already apparent in 1968 when the regional planners' project inspired Konrad and Szelenyi's new class thesis. Although Polish sociologists would have been unlikely to entertain such a thesis in the beginning of the 1970's given working class mobilization, Gierek's technocratic consumerist socialism might have made it an appealing thesis had the Polish communist succeeded. But his initial failure in the middle of the decade and Solidarity's emergence in 1980 made the new class thesis seem inappropriate to Poland given workers' mobilization and the regime repression and the illegitimacy of compromise that followed. Szelenyi himself began to back off from such a thesis in the mid 1980's (1986-87), but by decade's end he found ample justification in the new Hungarian politics to argue that the intelligentsia might just have won class power, if the discourse of the day was any indication.

These three social conditions differentiating Poland from Hungary are themselves associated with the opposed experiences these societies had in the revolutionary year 1956. For Poland, 1956 was initially a year of triumph, a time when Polish party authorities defied Soviet authorities, opened new cultural boundaries, ended experiments with agricultural collectivization, established better relations with the Catholic Church, and legalized greater workplace democracy through workers' councils. Even if this "Polish October" led to disappointment a few years later, and outright rejection by 1968, it was a far cry from the total defeat that 1956 signified for
Hungary's opposition. Even more significant than the outcome of 1956, however, was its relationship to the 1980's in these two countries.

By 1980 in Poland, 1956 barely figured into the opposition's consciousness. The legacy of workers' councils and revisionist Party politics was far less important to consider than the issues raised by the 1968, 1970 and 1976 events which included independent trade unions, the role of the opposition intellectual and the making of civil society. These were the decisive generation making events for the opposition of 1980, and it was their legacies Polish intellectuals were obliged to discuss. But in Hungary the legacy of the 1956 revolution continued to shape the politics of opposition intellectuals and of civil society through the end of the 1980’s. Janos Kis, one of Hungary’s leading democratic oppositionists, wrote of 1956-57 in 1987:

Hungarian society has yet to come to terms with the total defeat it suffered at that time, and those in power have yet to overcome the burdens of their victory. The economic crisis which in the 80's overwhelms Hungary is the crisis of the restoration regime which came into existence thirty years ago..... Today we must remember the restoration not just in order to regain moral integrity, but in order to understand the present political crisis of the regime. We have to analyze former (failed) proposals of conciliation in order to find a more effective compromise to our present and future (perhaps less hopeless situation). The events of 1956-57 developed from a moral issue into a political one.47

Kis’s analysis of that period clearly informs, and reflects, the political strategy of the 1980’s. He follows a form of historical explanation based on radical contingency rather than deterministic logic. He emphasizes how various "accidents" shaped subsequent events in 1956-57. For instance, had there been no Soviet tanks introduced to Budapest on October 23, a new government under the aegis of the People’s Patriotic Front may have been formed and a multi-party system not become inevitable.48 Or when the Kadar government took power with the aid of Soviet tanks, Kadarism (understood as three planks: the public display of party unity, the political neutralization of society and the refusal to recognize any extra-Party negotiating partner49), could have been replaced by the retrieval of Stalinists or by a negotiated compromise with Imre Nagy.50

This kind of historical explanation encourages the adoption of a political strategy based on compromise rather than fundamentalist politics. In particular, Kis studies the strategies of the
workers' council movement as examples, especially significant given that they survived the formal restoration of the Kadar government in Budapest on November 7. The peaceful resistance by the Greater Budapest Central Workers' Council, formed on November 14, was the first exemplar of sophisticated compromise politics, where they gradually dropped their demands for the restoration of the Nagy government and multiparty system as well as the departure of Soviet troops in favor of promoting the self-organization of workers' councils as well as council access to an open public sphere.\textsuperscript{51} The Stalinist wing of the Party had grown increasingly strong toward the end of November, and provoked enough violent conflict to end the possibility of negotiations with politically minded workers councils. The second phase of council resistance was dominated by the Csepel Iron and Metal Works workers council, which had advocated a less political function for councils, and took the restored Kadarist regime as its point of departure, not the ideals of the Hungarian revolution. But by January 8-11, the possibility of even this kind of compromise was ruined by the increasing hard line of the Kadarist government, and the violent suppression of a strike by that factory's workers. These compromise strategies may have worked, he thinks, had the international scene and internal party conflicts been different.

Nevertheless, the sophistication of these council activities suggests to him that "modern society possesses the political capacity for the practice of an effective democracy" given that these councils were led by workers and engineers.\textsuperscript{52} But the legacy of 1956 has destroyed that democratic capacity already proven. To cope with the demand Kadar made, that society "forget" its experience in return for material compensation,\textsuperscript{53} society had to withdraw into private life. Under these circumstances, Kis writes,\textsuperscript{54}

Whether a privatized society identifies with its defeated struggles or tries to forget them depends decisively on what its spiritual leaders -- writers, journalists, artists, historians, priests, teachers -- articulate. They, after all, are in the position that, by virtue of their profession, their words and silences constitute a public statement. It depends on them to decide if they will provide symbols of loyalty and models of endurance to be emulated. In Hungary, this stratum did not supply society with the instruments to enable it to remain loyal to its revolution while making peace with reality. Indeed, the selfsame intelligentsia evolved into the source and foundation of the consensus that insists that the cultivation of intellectual opposition is a 19th century romantic pose and inappropriate to Realpolitik.
Indeed, even Kis, himself an important part of that intellectual opposition, was too Realpolitik for the events that would soon transpire. In a sense, while the social conditions continued to inform the 1989 revolution, the lessons of 1956 soon became quite irrelevant. Compromise gave way to revolution. But while the strategy of compromise in social transformation proved outdated, his identification of principal actors remained accurate.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA'S CREATION OF HUNGARIAN CIVIL SOCIETY

Although the 1956 revolution was a genuinely popular uprising, its brutal suppression left the popular classes demobilized and depoliticized. For over two decades, one even could not speak of an "opposition" in any significant sense, in which time Poland had already gone through two major working class rebellions and several protests by intellectuals. There certainly were independent dissident intellectuals, as the layoffs and forced emigrations suggest. But an organized opposition politics only returned to Hungary in 1977.

In January of that year, 34 intellectuals signed a letter, published in the western press, indicating their solidarity with the principles of the Czechoslovak group, Charter 77. Human rights and civil liberties, as in Poland the previous year, had become the language of opposition in Czechoslovakia, and now in Hungary too. Pierre Kende describes the Hungarian signatories as "critical" marxists, students of Lukacs, who were young and "highly intellectual but not very political." What is more, a significant number of them belonged to the Budapest Jewish intelligentsia and had been dismissed from their university posts earlier in the decade. While the Polish regime launched a selective and relatively brutal campaign against the working class and intellectual opposition after 1976, in Hungary the authorities decided to ignore the January action by this small group of intellectuals.

In the succeeding years, opposition activities remained largely the province of intellectuals. There were the publication and distribution of samizdat materials as well as "private" conferences on taboo subjects. The line between opposition and official activities was sometimes quite blurred,
given the use of public facilities for activities that themselves could have merited oppositional status. 57 A group of populist poets raised the most significant cultural issue of this long decade of Hungarian dissent: the fate of Hungarians living in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and especially Romania.

The activities of intellectuals did not just involve talk, however. One group, students of the exiled sociologist Istvan Kemeny, also initiated an innovative campaign in 1979. They established a private charity called SZETA to help the poor. This was oppositional only in the sense that official rhetoric recognized no poverty in the system, and provided no particular relief for them. The authorities finally dealt with this strategy by acknowledging poverty and introducing a policy to help the poor. Independent political action took new forms too.

In 1983, the election law was changed so as to require multiple lists for candidates to the Parliament. In 1985, in the first elections to be affected by this law, only two independent candidates were finally elected, a journalist named Zoltan Kiraly and Laszlo Czoma, director of the Keszthely local museum. A few Party sponsored deputies, most notably physician Erika Tomsits, asserted their independence too, however, and together with Kiraly formed an informal but independent caucus within the Assembly. In general, Janos Kis found most of the Assembly mentally impoverished, unable to form a "comprehensive understanding of the issues." 58 But Kiraly and Tomsits represented the kind of people necessary for Hungary’s public revitalization: "politically-able legislators who have not yet been elevated into the official hierarchy of positions, ranks, and titles", those who had the political vision that could enhance the National Assembly’s position so as to gradually transfer national affairs from behind Party doors to the public arena.59 But they could not do that alone, and certainly not without help from independent social movements, he argued.

At that time, it appeared that Hungarians had the compromise politics that might enable negotiation, unlike Poland. But they did not have the social movements like Solidarity that could force negotiations. Nevertheless, over the decade, a growing number of movements did become
rather significant, even if they remained the province of the intelligentsia and those who anticipated joining its ranks.

Spontaneous demonstrations led by students took place with growing intensity over the 1980’s, with the anniversary of the 1848 revolution, March 15, serving as a regular spark. An independent peace movement called Dialogue also was formed by students in 1983 in order to challenge the official peace movement. Although its members also tried to remain distinct from the opposition, it was finally repressed by the government in August 1984. Perhaps the largest and most significant independent movement was formed later that year, led by members of the scientific intelligentsia. The environmentalist group called the Danube Circle was established to oppose the construction of a dam by Czechoslovak and Hungarian authorities on the Danube River. The long decade of Hungarian dissent, from 1977 to 1988, thus saw a proliferation of a new independent politics, even if they were restricted mainly to the intelligentsia and students. The political revolution of 1988-89 was also carried out mainly by the intelligentsia, in two dominant currents.

The populists were numerically the largest group, and hardest to define formally. Five of its nine founding members were poets and writers. They identified their movement with the needs of the Hungarian nation, defined ethnically or racially. They generally spoke of the "third road" between capitalism and communism. The authorities had cultivated them as an ally, especially since the 1956 revolution, although in the mid 1980’s the populists began to identify with some projects of the democratic opposition. The populists formed the Hungarian Democratic Forum in 1987 and generally avoided technical programs in favor of literary emotional politics. They preferred "intuition to analysis, and literature to social science." Until the November referendum on the timing of the Presidential election, they were the most successful in Hungarian transition politics, having won each of the four by elections in the summer of 1989. They finally won the spring elections in 1990 and together with the Smallholders and Christian Democrats form the governing coalition in mid-1990. But in the beginning of the revolution, they were the most closely allied with the reformist Party leader, Imre Poszgay.
The other significant group of intellectuals in the 1988-89 revolution was called pro-western, democratic, liberal, and urban. Many came from the Budapest School of critical marxism, and many were of Jewish descent. From 1981, their main efforts were directed toward the independent journal Beszelo, but in 1988 they formed the Alliance of Free Democrats. Their program for institutional reform was generally considered the most elaborate and formally specified of all the opposition. They were often allied informally with reformers within the authorities, especially the reformist legal experts and economists. Many other political parties and social groups have formed since 1988, but these two represented the significant intellectual tendencies in the politics of the 1988-89 Hungarian revolution. That was reflected in the spring 1990 elections as these two parties received the most votes.

The populism of the Hungarian Democratic Forum reproduced the traditional form of Hungarian twentieth century nationalism. Above all, they were concerned with the fate of the Hungarian minorities living abroad. They also promoted the idea of Hungary being somehow special and in between the west and the east, deserving its own unique identity based on an independent small holding peasantry. But by 1989, their emotive program did not suggest as radical a transformation of the Soviet-type system as the Free Democrats, for the main question of institutional transformation was not based on cultural questions or even agriculture’s ownership. The Soviet-type system’s main antagonist had become the institutionalization of civil society, and it was the Alliance of Free Democrats which promoted this as an alternative to the Forum’s populism, and as the means for the transformation of the Soviet-type system.

This group had already begun to move down that liberal road in the beginning of the 1980’s. Much as in Poland, civil society became the principal alternative politics of emancipation to that of nationalism. To struggle in the Soviet-type system for the rule of law rather than of the Party, for free associations instead of Party sponsored organizations, for freedom from censorship and a multi-party system provided Hungarians like Poles with a coherent transformative strategy that did not have to elevate one’s nation above others. Gyorgy Konrad expressed this simply: 63

We want that internal process with which East Central Europe is already pregnant; we want bourgeois civil liberties and an embourgeoisment that is not
hedged about with prohibatory decrees. We don't want the authorities to have
discretionary rights over us. We want constitutional guarantees; we want it clear
that semifreedom is not freedom, half-truth is not truth, liberalization is not
liberalism, democratization is not democracy. We want no less than what the most
advanced democracies already have.

Unlike the Polish, however, this Hungarian project was not very successful in providing a
program that mobilizes those who are not from the intelligentsia. The groupings discussed above
were mainly from that class, and if not, as in the Populists, they were nevertheless led by
intellectuals. Two illustrations can further illustrate the intelligentsia's hegemony in the creation
of Hungarian civil society.

THE CHARACTER OF SELF-ORGANIZATION IN HUNGARIAN CIVIL SOCIETY

On March 30, 1988, thirty two young intellectuals, students and workers (although mainly
law students) established FIDESZ, or the League of Young Democrats. The Hungarian acronym
was designed intentionally to resemble the Latin fidelite, to symbolize the group's aim and
character. FIDESZ was designed as an independent youth organization that would fill the gap left
unfilled by the Party's youth organization. It was formed on the basis of an imagined civil society,
in order to make civil society more real. Following Hungarian postwar political theorist Istvan
Bibo, they argued that the law should be made to control the state and its rulers, rather than
made to control the people. It argued that the opposition should take rights guaranteed by the
constitution seriously, and thus treat the law as if it, rather than the Party, ruled. On that basis,
FIDESZ used the constitutional guarantee of association to defend their formation. Their leaders
were arrested, and legal proceedings were begun against them. But in the three months of trial,
the group grew to more than two thousand members nationwide. They lost the trial, but they
ultimately won. In January 1989 legislation was passed in the Hungarian parliament that
guaranteed their rights of assembly.64

As a movement of students and young intellectuals, FIDESZ did not claim to represent other
classes. The group was mainly symbolic and exemplary, hoping that through their own civil
disobedience and pressure for the rule of law others might learn how to exercise their own rights. These activists believed that civil society and the rule of law would represent the interests of everyone, so long as people could learn to exercise their rights. FIDESZ activists ultimately would not only seek election to Parliament but also try to promote a broader awareness of legal rights and possibilities to workers and especially peasants. FIDESZ thus represents the new "classless" universalism suggested by civil society. For these young lawyers, the emancipatory alternative is a law-based society in which individuals understand their legal rights and are ready to engage them.65

This self-organization and transformational praxis represent the hegemony of the intelligentsia. Formal equality before the law carries, of course, many of the limitations on democracy Marx noted long ago,66 but that is not the only problem. Because peasants and workers were not engaged in the creation of this civil society project, they have left a weak imprint in the constitution of the new Hungary. In particular, the economic foundations for this civil society will have represented the compromise reached between the Hungarian intelligentsia and international capital more than between classes within Hungarian civil society.

Furthermore, although activists claimed that they would enter the lifeworld of peasants and workers to explain to them their rights, their preeminent struggle has been to assure this legal state and their place in it. Given that struggles for power in this new state have taken precedence, popular movements were not engaged except as voting masses to be swayed, rather than as program making actors in their own right. Indeed, as the media campaigns for the elections showed, the "public arena" created by the 1988-89 revolution resembled more the public relations market of US capitalism rather than the civil society idealized by the Hungarian democratic opposition.

Given the experience of Polish Solidarity, independent trade unions might have suggested an alternative future for Hungary, but even they were overwhelmingly from the intelligentsia. On May 16, 1988, the first trade union, the Democratic Union of Scientific Workers, representing those who work in the nation's research institutes, was founded. They followed a similar strategy
as FIDESZ in their founding, by acting as if a legal state existed. Because the Hungarian
Constitution and labor code had no guidelines about the registration of unions, and because
Hungary accepted the International Labor Organization’s statements on freedom of association,
the Union argued that it had the legal right to form. Other unions of the intelligentsia were
formed in its wake, including those of filmmakers and teachers. The principal affiliates of the
federative Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions, founded on December 20, 1988, also
were white collar unions. Urban speculated that blue collar workers resisted this independent
union organization because a) they still feared the government; b) they were divided by
opportunities in the second economy; c) they feared the generation of Polish economic conditions;
and d) they could not unify behind any ideology, positive (Catholicism) or negative (anti-Party), as
Polish workers could. One should add that the old communist unions, in alliance with the "red
barons" or large enterprise managers, continue to exert influence over the distribution of
resources, and therefore proved more sensible organizations for workers from the largest
enterprises.

Although the personnel of the trade unions further illustrated the hegemony of the Hungarian
intelligentsia in the making of its civil society, the union movement could have had different
consequences than other organizations of the intelligentsia. Their unionization reflected the
homogenization of intellectuals in the Soviet-type system. The intelligentsia was not organizing on
the basis of its distinction, nor on behalf of some universal principle of civil rights or national
interest. Instead, it organized on behalf of its own self-defense, much as any other group in
Hungarian civil society would have. And in order to assure its self-defense, it would have been
obliged to act more like state "employees" than independent intellectuals, establishing alliances
with other employees. If that had occurred, they might have served a functionally analogous role
as organic intellectuals in capitalist society, or professionals in Solidarity. But without other
independent unions having been established, and because peasants and workers were not well
represented in such a federation, this union of members of the Hungarian intelligentsia
represented only the continuation of the intelligentsia’s hegemony in civil society rather than the popularization of civil society itself.

This union strategy may have led to the creation of a more popular civil society had the authorities not followed the strategy they did, however. Instead, of forcing the hand of the popular classes, the authorities prevented their mobilization by negotiating the post-communist transition with the intelligentsia who made civil society.

HUNGARY’S POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITION

The hegemony of the intelligentsia in the construction of Hungarian civil society was not only apparent in the personnel of its associations or in the philosophies of its proponents. Hungary’s political revolution was itself derived from the interactions of this intelligentsia with Party officials, in typically intellectual forms: conferences and publications.

The most proximate foundation for the political revolution was Hungary’s economic crisis. Although not so obvious as that in Poland or Romania, by the early 1980’s Hungary was in a dangerous economic situation with the highest debt per capita level in Eastern Europe. But this crisis need not have laid the foundations for dramatic change. Tamas Bauer, one of Hungary’s leading reform economists, argued that Hungary’s economic reform depended on three conditions: 1) a crisis so profound as to convince both ruling elites and intellectuals that the command economy was failing, and 2) the existence of a "more or less free intellectual community of economists"; and 3) "the readiness of both scholars and government experts to cooperate and make the necessary compromises." Economic reform in 1968-1972 had been shelved in Hungary, even if the reform economists themselves remained in their positions. Economic reform therefore depended on the autonomy of economists and the willingness of political authorities to respect their independent expertise. It depended on the restoration of the intelligentsia’s traditional position of autonomy and authority. But the intelligentsia won this
authority not because of tradition or because of their special talent but because of the dynamics of change in the Party itself.

In the spring of 1986, Imre Poszgay, then General Secretary of the Patriotic People's Front, requested that reform economists produce a report on the economic crisis. Published in 1987, this report, entitled "Turnabout and Reform", documented the economic crisis and proposed solutions that were heretofore only discussed in samizdat form. This report was used later by Karoly Grosz to oust longtime leader Janos Kadar. Thus, intellectuals were still perceived as instruments to be used by the authorities in their own struggles. But this political opening enabled intellectuals to move more toward the establishment of a more autonomous politics too.

In June of the same year, the democratic opposition published in the samizdat journal Beszelo an article called "The Social Contract", in which they called for political pluralism with an independent parliament and freedom of the press, although not yet a multi-party system. Later that fall, the populists held a meeting where they established the Hungarian Democratic Forum. Significantly, Poszgay was there attempting to establish his base outside the party. In effect, a small group of Party reformers had intended to use this mobilization of reformist economists, populists and democratic opposition to change the Party leadership and they finally succeeded.

By May, 1988 Kadar was ousted from his position. Karoly Grosz was but an interim leader, however, as his indecisiveness and inability to win significant improvements for Hungarian minorities living in Romania undercut his position. Between the fall of 1988 and winter of 1989 the Party reformers steadily improved their position within the Party. Simultaneously, Party rhetoric came to accept more and more the prospects of a multiparty system, even if still incorporating Communist Party leadership. But the opposition organized itself into a new body that spring that effectively undermined even this radical reformist strategy.

The Opposition Round Table was formed on March 22, 1989 in order to assure that negotiations with the authorities would not be manipulated to allow the Party unfair influence over the structure of the talks and their outcomes. Thus the foundation on which the Party reformers thought to extend their influence, independent associations of the intelligentsia, became
instead the vehicle of an autonomous civil society that would negotiate the establishment of a multi-party political system and inspire the dissolution of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party itself.\textsuperscript{77}

In contrast to the popular perception of negotiations in Poland, the Hungarian roundtable could claim to represent formally less than 1 percent of the Hungarian population.\textsuperscript{78} Nevertheless, the Hungarians negotiated a more complete revision of the Soviet-type system than the Poles. Although this could have appeared as a paradox,\textsuperscript{79} it remained quite sensible if the class bases for civil society were kept in view. The Hungarian political revolution of 1989 engaged only the intelligentsia, and there in a tacit alliance with Party reformers. Hungarian civil society was restored because the transformation was wrought from within the incipient ruling class of former Party bureaucrats and intelligentsia. The Polish case seemed to have promised something different with the struggle of Solidarity, even if it ultimately became a variation on the Hungarian theme too.

POLAND’S POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITION

Solidarity’s very size and heterogeneity meant that it could have represented different things to different people. Certainly once it evolved beyond a defensive strategy for self-organization, and toward a program for institutional reconstruction, a lively politics within the movement was essential. But for the movement to survive as a total movement of civil society against the state, debate had to respect the anchorpoints of Solidarity’s self understanding in self-organization, equality, and self-government. In 1980-81, dialogue, both explicit and implicit, reproduced these values within this cross-class movement.

The imposition of martial law destroyed the possibility for that continuing dialogue, however, and with it the cross-class quality of the movement. The public sphere shrunk, as most people retreated from politics. This sphere retreated unevenly, as the intelligentsia was more likely to remain actively engaged in politics than were workers. The distinction of the Solidarity movement
thus faded. The pragmatic construction of a political movement that embraces equality, pluralism and self-management as a condition of cross-class unity depends on an open public sphere with broad cross-class participation. This breadth could not be preserved under conditions of martial law and its aftermath. This new, uneven participation has several social foundations.80

The Polish authorities treated workers and the intelligentsia differently during martial law. On the one hand, the authorities established new unions which promised to realize many of the employees’ demands for which Solidarity struggled. Although these new unions never won the support, especially among skilled workers in larger factories, that Solidarity did, the new unions were especially uninfluential among the intelligentsia and the fields they dominated, as the health sector, cultural establishment and universities.81

On the other, the authorities treated workers more harshly than the intelligentsia for oppositional politics. When interned, members of the intelligentsia were generally housed separately from workers, and treated better. The oppositional activities of workers also were more strictly curtailed. Strikes in enterprises were treated more harshly than the actors’ and writers’ boycotts. Efforts by physicians, teachers, academics and artists to establish a more open field of information and culture went relatively unhampered. The Minister of Culture even said that while they do not support it, they don’t go out of their way to persecute the underground press either.82 It is not surprising, therefore, that workers’ oppositional politics would have declined more dramatically than that of intellectuals. This unevenness has had devastating consequences on the class character of the opposition.

The social distance between classes grew in this period. Many in the intelligentsia were angry with workers for having failed to mount greater resistance to the regime. Negative stereotypes of workers became more common.83 Solidarity also began to be criticized for having been too socialist, too workerist.84 The response of workers to this criticism was ambivalent. On the one hand, they again began to identify the intelligentsia with their supervisors rather than with themselves. On the other, they began to rely on intellectuals more for maintaining the opposition.85
The intelligentsia realized this responsibility, but also assumed greater autonomy from the existing factory-based movements among workers. The anchorpoints of Solidarity's self-understanding, in social self-organization, equality and self-management, were no longer decisive in defining the programs of the opposition, as the intelligentsia was no longer dependent on workers. Drawing upon the symbolism of Solidarity if not its organization, intellectuals could now claim to represent workers, as they represented the Polish nation.

The opposition fragmented into several currents. Smolar identified the mainstream opposition with Walesa, Solidarity and the Temporary Coordinating Commission. Smolar called the realists those who considered it ineffective to continue to press for Solidarity's relegalization, and advocated coming to terms with the system. Smolar recognized another wave as radical for its greater demands than that of the mainstream, pressing for some kind of political revolution in Poland. Finally, another tendency noted by Smolar was that characterized by the politics of youth, who rejected old formulations and sought a new politics resembling more anarchism than socialist or labor politics. Intellectuals could be found constructing all of these currents.

The regime itself clearly tried to shape oppositional politics. It treated most harshly those like Kornel Morawiecki of Fighting Solidarity, Leszek Moczulski of the Confederation for an Independent Poland and others who advocated some kind of revolutionary, even if non-violent, politics. It lambasted the youth based independent peace movement WiP as traitorous to Polish society. It imprisoned those unionists who advocated more confrontational politics, while allowing those, like Bujak, who advocated dialogue, to continue their underground existence. It also encouraged the realists by offering selective inducements for cooperation.

For those most willing to cooperate with the regime, Jaruzelski established a "consultative council", with about one third of its members from the the regime, one third from Catholic circles and one third independent intellectuals. This council, established in 1986, did not gain widespread social support and only a few prominent intellectuals, including lawyer Wladyslaw Sila-Nowicki and writer Andrzej Swiecicki, joined it. The authorities also sought to promote a more independent opposition, so long as they remained "pragmatic", or respectful of Poland's system.
and geopolitical realities. The best example of this is their permission for the establishment in 1987 of the first independent, non-religious periodical in the Warsaw Pact, Res Publica. Although still subject to censorship, the publication pursued its liberal democratic themes vigorously.

The regime also encouraged another kind of realism attractive to members of the intelligentsia among others. It facilitated the promotion of a new patriotic politics, based on the spirit of entrepreneurialism. Although its promotors included several former worker activists, this agenda was also anti-worker, arguing that the solution for Poland's dilemmas lies in the promotion of a liberal economy and private enterprise based on the multiplication of wealth, not in the continuation of workerist politics based on redistribution. 88

In effect, with these activities, the Polish authorities were trying to establish a new modus vivendi between them and civil society. But this new agreement was not based on broad public participation, as Solidarity had been. Instead, it was to be based on a skewed participation, with workers returned to narrow union concerns, and the intelligentsia once again established as the representatives of the nation. One might say that the Polish authorities tried to reconstruct the Polish opposition in the Hungarian image. In so doing, the anachronistic status of intellectuals in communist politics was completely abandoned in the hope that the realism of intellectuals could restore some measure of public consensus for the Polish communist order.

Although it has become new common wisdom that this strategy could not have succeeded, its failure does not have its main roots in intellectual politics. The main reason this strategy failed was that a new class of militant workers emerged to destroy this modus vivendi in the making. In May and August 1988, workers in Gdansk and several other places initiated a wave of occupation strikes demanding, among other things, increases in wages and Solidarity's restoration. This movement was not, however, initiated by old Solidarity activists. This was a new generation of workers, who trusted few outside their immediate milieu.

The authorities were extremely apprehensive with this new wave of strikes, fearing they could not contain them. As such, the authorities had to abandon their strategy for promoting a new realism, and turn to another realism represented by the old Solidarity leadership. This leadership
was, by now, relatively trustworthy in comparison to these new anarchistic youth. The
authorities' only hope was that these former opponents could restrain workers from further
strikes. In return, the Solidarity leadership demanded negotiations for Solidarity's legalization.
This exchange resulted in roundtable negotiations that were organized in February 1989, and
concluded in April.

The principal distinction of this mainstream Solidarity leadership from the realist opposition
was that it insisted on Solidarity's legalization. In this sense, the "realists" were left behind in the
roundtable negotiations leading to Solidarity's legalization. But aside from the question of whether
independent trade unions were realistic or not, the realists and the mainstream of Solidarity
shared a great deal in their vision of an alternative Poland. In this sense, both realists and
mainstream Solidarity respected the authority of the intelligentsia, and ultimately the authority of
markets.

THE AUTHORITY OF MARKETS AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA

The Polish roundtable agreements were considerable accomplishments. Intellectuals from both
Solidarity and the regime agreed to put the past behind them and to negotiate on the basis of
Poland's alternative future. It was, after all, the past which most divided them. Both sides had
come to recognize that some political compromise would have to be reached, with communists and
Solidarity in government. Both sides too had come to recognize the necessity of fundamental
market reforms in the economy. And by the time of the negotiations, the cultural sphere already
had opened up such that there were small differences on matters of the present and future
between underground publications from the Solidarity mainstream and those published officially.

There were, of course, important differences expressed within the negotiations. They were
divided over what proportion of seats in the Sejm were to be allocated to the Communists and
their allies. There also were sharp differences in the economic reform, over the degree to which
wage increases would be pegged to increases in prices. But here, the official communist union
associated with Alfred Miodowicz demanded greater wage compensation than either the Party or Solidarity. Miodowicz’s group also demanded more egalitarian wage increases than Solidarity. Nevertheless, an agreement was reached that allowed open elections for all Senate seats and for 161 out of 460 seats in the Sejm.

The June elections turned out to be a landslide. To everyone’s surprise, the Solidarity Civic Committee, associated with Lech Walesa and the mainstream Solidarity leadership, won every seat but one available to it. This new Sejm and Senate were then obliged to elect a President, who roundtable negotiators agreed would be Wojciech Jaruzelski. But those elected by Solidarity found themselves in a difficult position, for their electorate did not want the man who imposed martial law to be their new President. Nevertheless, by managing to be absent, a number of Solidarity legislators allowed the Communist-led coalition to elect Jaruzelski president. The Peasant delegation of this bloc, however, bolted in the next election as they refused to support Jaruzelski’s nominee, Interior Minister Czeslaw Kiszczak, as Prime Minister. The defection of the Peasant Party activists to Solidarity’s side allowed the election of Solidarity advisor and Tygodnik Solidarnosc editor Tadeusz Mazowiecki as Prime Minister.

As in Hungary in 1988-89, there was a political revolution in Poland. In the roundtable negotiations, the Polish United Workers Party effectively ceded its monopoly of power to a government that they anticipated would still be Communist led, even if with a legal opposition in Solidarity. Due to the unexpected failure of the Party at the polls, the Party was obliged to establish a new political formation, with the Party as the leading partner in a coalition with Solidarity. But due to the unexpected assertion of independence by the formerly subservient Peasant Party, the only option left for this new government was to establish a Solidarity-led coalition, with Solidarity responsible for the economy and the Party holding cabinet positions overseeing the military, internal affairs, transportation and foreign trade.

This political revolution appears to be quite different from the Hungarian one in that the opposition that has come to power in Poland is more homogenous in their claim to a single organizational allegiance in Solidarity, which purports to be an organization rooted in the working
class. Neither claim is entirely true, for the period of martial law transformed Solidarity. It broke apart the solidaristic movement into a fragmented opposition united largely on symbolic grounds and national commitments. And the discourse with which Poles understand Solidarity also has changed dramatically. No longer is it understood, as Touraine et al. described it, as a trade union and movement for democratic and national independence.\textsuperscript{90} In particular, Solidarity's identity as trade union and political movement have split apart.

The union has not had the same success in organizing workers as it had in 1980-81. While in the beginning of the decade some 9.5 million people belonged to the union, by June of 1989 less than 2 million were paying union dues.\textsuperscript{91} What is more, Miodowicz claims that his Party linked unions have not been hurt significantly by Solidarity's relegalization.\textsuperscript{92} By December, 1989 he claimed the movement still had over 6.5 million members. While these numbers are of dubious quality given that his members need not pay any dues to belong, Miodowicz's position does represent something potentially significant in post-communist politics, a point to which I shall return.

Solidarity's main energies are being devoted to government, and these efforts are not rooted in union politics. The June election campaign was organized by Solidarity Civic Committees which were not elected by any grassroots body, much less by Solidarity's remaining trade union base. These committees were most closely associated with Lech Walesa, and it was on his authority and those of his associates that they realized their influence. They were, in addition, composed primarily of representatives of the intelligentsia.\textsuperscript{93}

The hegemony of the intelligentsia in Solidarity politics' is suggested even more dramatically by their slate of candidates for the Sejm and Senate. Of 261 nominations, only 10 were of workers and 35 of individual farmers. In contrast, there were 22 professors, 50 engineers, 35 lawyers, 20 journalists or columnists, 16 economists, 14 teachers, 13 health care employees and 1 religion teacher.\textsuperscript{94} This slate lost only one seat in the contested elections, and it was to a millionaire private entrepreneur, Henryk Stoklosa. Given that their power now comes from their positions in government rather than their dependence on working class power, it is more than fair to say that
Poland's intelligentsia is no longer dependent on workers as they were in 1980-81. Indeed, Poland and Hungary have reached some kind of convergence in the composition of their new parliaments, for in Hungary only about 10% of the 386 parliamentary deputies are from outside the highly educated intelligentsia.95

Given this independent power base in the state, the Polish intelligentsia can now join the Hungarian intelligentsia in the articulation of themes that need not reflect a cross-class alliance. For instance, instead of themes like self-management, Solidarity leaders speak of company partnerships (spolki) and "joint ventures" (even rendered by Poles in English); instead of social self-organization they speak of the breakup of state monopolies in the economy. In general, instead of solidarity amongst people there is social disintegration, where speculation and the privatization of state property into the hands of the old nomenklatura characterize the new themes of "cooperation".96

To some degree, this new base of Solidarity in state power suggests a new split in Solidarity as a social movement. It has become increasingly difficult for Solidarity to assume simultaneously the responsibilities of state power and to represent workers. Strikes by railway workers on the coast in the spring of 1990 were not supported by Solidarity or by Walesa, and rather Miodowicz and Marian Jurczyk, a representative of the Solidarity '80 group, sought to represent the wildcat strike. Walesa, nevertheless, is not positioning himself as the Mazowiecki government's ally, and instead is trying to portray himself still as the representative of workers against a government run by indecisive overcautious intellectuals. What he has proposed, instead, is a government no longer tainted by compromise with communists, and one sufficiently strong to bring Poland through the crisis facing it.

The conflicts within the Solidarity movement are themselves too new for sustained analysis and they are much too difficult to predict. But it is apparent that the position of the Mazowiecki government reflects the transformation of Solidarity that took place already in the 1980's. Instead of relying on working class power, most of Solidarity's intelligentsia shifted its identity to one based on pragmatic geopolitics, which includes an alliance with foreign capital.
Already at the negotiations, both communist and Solidarity economists agreed that market reform was essential. Social democratic and classical liberal economists were on both sides of the negotiations in fact. There is no alternative, they believe, for a fundamental marketization of the Polish economy with massive foreign investment. There were disagreements over how radical the shock to the economy had to be, but there were no major differences about the direction of the economic reform. Finally, in January 1990 the plan of the Solidarity Finance Minister, Leszek Balcerowicz, was implemented. It established free prices and wage freezes so radical that they exceeded even the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund. There is of course considerable disagreement in Poland over whether such a radical marketization of the economy can realize its desired economic effects. But the debate takes place within parameters that recognize as legitimate the basic power relations of such a market economy. And in this acceptance, the intelligentsia has submitted its authority to markets.

Unlike their reaction to communism, which the East European intelligentsia always treated as an unnatural Soviet imposition on their lifeworlds, the intelligentsia by and large has come to accept actually existing capitalism as the only alternative for Eastern Europe. They are tired of utopias and want, as Konrad wrote about civil society, only that which the West already has. And for that they look to their own intellectual representatives of Westernization: the economist.

The role of the intelligentsia, while remaining considerable in the transition to a post-communist order, is transformed. Professionals, rather than intellectuals, will become more prominent. In particular, those with legal and economic expertise will assume a new importance in designing the framework within which the alternative will be constructed. They also will staff the new state and economic bureaucracies that replace the Party dominated organizations. But it is important to keep in mind here that this new task for the East European intelligentsia will not mean the establishment of their own authority, for they will have subordinated their authority to that of international capital. The intelligentsia's new task thus is different from their old aim.

Formerly, dependent on their own and their country's resources, they designed and executed a politics suitable to social and systemic transformation. In the future, they no longer establish the
aim or the design. Rather, they must now adapt their system to a larger system constructed by others. In this, therefore, intellectuals may have realized national authority, but a new dependency too. This dependency on the world system and its leading actors will occur regardless of the political form that emerges in Eastern Europe, even though the political form of Eastern Europe in this decade will be the greatest uncertainty.

THE ALTERNATIVE FUTURES OF THE POST-COMMUNIST SYSTEM

Those in East Central Europe point to their common culture and history with the democracies of west central Europe for evidence of their potential for a democratic civil society. They may acknowledge that the Balkan states run a risk of a military authoritarian regime, given their more limited historical experience with civil society, but East Central Europe, they say, is different. Although the culture and politics of East Central Europe may link them to the West European experience, I believe their economic situations could move their culture and politics to resemble more the third world than the first. It seems at least possible if not likely that instead of a democratic civil society becoming the political form of the post-communist order in Eastern Europe, a militarized authoritarianism in the style of Pinochet's Chile will become the region's new distinction.

The alternative of civil society to communism expressly avoided the details of political economy, and tended simply to argue that market reforms are essential to the free society. Faced with the responsibility for institutional transformation, the intelligentsia in power has had to go beyond the rhetoric of markets to construct an economic environment not only more rational for domestic actors, but also more attractive to foreign investors. That means, then, not only free floating prices, bankruptcies and unemployment, but also the creation of a technical and legal infrastructure that makes foreign investors confident. It also means assuring a labor force that will accept the rules of the market, and not demand the security of the old system along with the purchasing power they thought markets would bring. Already, by the spring of 1990 the
difficulties of that kind of transition are apparent. And the social conditions distinguishing Hungary from Poland become relevant again.

In both countries, the old trade unions associated with communists could become centrally important. In both countries, the traditional communist criticisms of market rationalities will ring increasingly true for popular classes as both their security and their purchasing power decline. Even the most optimistic economists don't believe the economy will improve significantly for years. That is enough time for a new kind of militance to emerge among those workers whose livelihoods in the old unprofitable but large industrial complexes are under attack, and among peasants whose living standards improved in the 1980's under communist rule.

Conditions for the rise of anti-market movements in Hungary rather than Poland are advantaged by two factors. First, the leftist tradition is in a much stronger position. Indeed, while in the spring the Polish post-communist left won less than 1% of seats nationwide in local elections, the Hungarian left won nearly 10% in its national contest. Second, the old trade union apparatus does not have the problem of an "independent" and "patriotic" union movement with which to compete. Nevertheless, Hungary's poorer record in workers' organization and militance suggests that Hungary's popular classes may take the same road to survival that they have in the past: working in the second economy even harder than they have in the past. It seems then that the Hungarian situation may be more conducive to the preservation of democratic governance, given that the government will be less likely to have to use force to repress popular unrest in order to preserve the country's attractiveness for foreign investment. Hungary's legacy of popular class demobilization may thus contribute to the preservation of a democracy even if one quite skewed by class.

Although Poland's transition has been marked also by the hegemony of its intelligentsia, the legacy of popular protest increases the likelihood of popular resistance to particulars of the transition. Also increasing that likelihood is the intensity and rapidity of market transformation, with the consequential plummet of the average standard of living. It is truly astounding that protest has been so limited as it has through the early summer of 1990, largely limited to wildcat
strikes by workers, most notably the railway workers of the Baltic coast, and to roadblocks by peasants. In large part, the popularity of the government and especially of the Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, has remained very high. Although no longer dependent on the working class for power, clearly the intelligentsia’s alliance with it in the beginning of the decade has left a well of trust that has not gone dry. How long that will last is hard to tell.

Already, the appearance of unity that once was Solidarity’s distinction is fading. The principal contest in the summer of 1990 is between the Mazowiecki government and the group associated with Lech Walesa. Walesa and his supporters, including those in Tygodnik Solidarnosc and in the Center Alliance organized by Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski, argue that the Mazowiecki government is "leftist" given its overly long association with the communists in coalition government. At the same time, it is also insufficiently strong in pursuing its transition, implying that it is the indecisiveness of the intellectuals which hold back Poland’s rejuvenation. Consequently, the government is not so democratic as it should be. At the same, however, Walesa is fully prepared to "rule by decree" as president.99

Right wing nationalists also suggest that the problem lies with those prominent in Solidarity’s government. But in addition to being leftist and intellectuals, they, Bronislaw Geremek, Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuron in particular, are also identified as not truly Polish. Indeed, graffiti scrawled on some Solidarity posters in Warsaw in the spring attached the prefix "Jew" to the Citizen’s Parliamentary Group (OKP) name.

The danger of right wing nationalist sentiment drawing upon a militant working class movement is one of the greatest dangers facing the Polish democratic transition. Solidarity’s working class legacy was so democratic in part because it accepted the liberal vision of civil society promoted by the democratic opposition. But while that liberal vision provided the foundation for an emancipatory alliance of professionals and workers in the struggle against the Soviet-type system, it does little for that alliance in the institutional construction of the alternative to it. Indeed, because the liberal intelligentsia now presides over the most difficult part of the transition, there is considerable danger that the liberal and tolerant nationalism the democratic intelligentsia
worked so hard to cultivate in the days of dissidence may lose out to a more chauvinistic nationalism that finds in the introduction of foreign capital onto Polish soil confirmation that European identification is a poor substitute for old style nationalism.

Such a revival is less likely to occur given that Lech Walesa has positioned himself to be the workers' representative against the Mazowiecki government, while he simultaneously siphons off the appeal of the more militant workers' resistance associated with Miodowicz or Jurczyk. But predicting Walesa's future politics is most difficult, as not only do social forces determine Poland's political alternatives, but interpersonal politics also decide alliances and oppositions.

Nevertheless, the liberal intelligentsia responsible for the creation of democratic civil society as communism's alternative faces a major dilemma. The culture of tolerance they managed to promote in the Solidarity movement could become impossible as the economics of poverty promote a politics of desparation. Their alternative might, however, be a return to the theme of European identity once again.

To the extent Eastern Europe can rejoin Europe not just on the basis of market or heritage but also on the basis of political ties, the democracy associated with Solidarity of 1980-81 has a better chance of survival. The East-West alliances bred in the European peace movement, between the German Greens and END on the one hand, and the Polish Freedom and Peace movement on the other, for instance, suggest the possibility for a new emancipatory political imagination when East and West unite in common purpose. But to the extent Eastern Europe remains outside of the political and cultural Europe, and is integrated only economically, Eastern Europe will be encouraged to return to its old nationalisms of intolerance and exclusions. In this sense, it appears, the Soviet-type system's emancipatory alternative of civil society depends not only on East European identification with the European heritage, but also on its political integration into the European Community. Not only would the East benefit from the West's wealth, but both could benefit from the common purpose that might be constructed in their collaboration. Simply, European political integration might give to the civil societies of Eastern Europe new potential allies that make democracy, and not only capitalism, a greater certainty.
NOTES

1. I am indebted to the Working Group in Social Theory at the Center for Psychosocial Studies in Chicago for discussions which have contributed significantly to the construction of this paper. Thanks are also due Roman Szporluk, Akos Rona-Tas, David McQuaid, Charles Lemert, Krzysztof Jasiwicz, Geoff Eley and Craig Calhoun for comments on previous versions of this text and for general discussions which have helped frame this paper's arguments.

2. "Intellectual" and "intelligentsia" in social scientific discourse have meant many different things. Sometimes the former is a subset of the latter and other times the latter is of the former. In the first most general case, (#1) intellectuals are distinguished from the larger category by their creative powers and capacity for self definition. In the second, (#2) the intelligentsia is distinguished from the larger category by their inclination for teleological reasoning or their distinctive cultural identity. In this framework, the intelligentsia is also distinguished from another kind of intellectual, professionals, whose technical knowhow and occupational distinction mark their distinctive identification, not their teleological reasoning or their culture. See Ivan Szelenyi, "The Intelligentsia in the Class Structure of State-Socialist Societies," in M. Burawoy and T. Skocpol (eds.), Marxist Inquiries (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 287-326. Even within these two general categories, the intelligentsia is a controversial term in Eastern European discourse.

The intelligentsia can refer to (#3) a statistical category (as all those with higher education in Eastern Europe) (e.g. Jan Szczepanski, "The Polish Intelligentsia: Past and Present," World Politics 14(1962):406-20); (#4) a social group with a special ethos of morality and responsibility (as the old Polish intelligentsia claimed to be the moral government of the nation) (see Aleksander Gella, "The Life and Death of the Old Polish Intelligentsia," Slavic Review 30(1971):1-27); or (#5) a class with particular consciousness or interests, possibly en route to domination, as Jan Waclaw Machajski through Ivan Szelenyi have suggested.

The intellectual also can become an object of controversy, for it can become (#6) a category of relative exclusiveness based on some special responsibility, experience or achievement, as Stanislaw Baranczak suggests in "The Polish Intellectual," Salmagundi 70-71(1986-87):217-28, or it can refer to (#7) a capacity of all men and women that is exaggerated or repressed under various social circumstances as Antonio Gramsci would emphasize ("The Intellectuals," in Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 5-23 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971)). In this paper, I use the words intelligentsia and intellectual in sense #2. This seems especially appropriate for a paper on intellectuals in power, as political authority can be held only by those intellectuals who believe that their mandate, individually or collectively, extends beyond some narrow technical authority professional competence implies, to a more general vision of what ought to be.


22. Neopositivism was the strategy of Stanislaw Stomma and others around the Catholic group Znak who believed that participation in existing institutions, even if one rejects decisively their lasting value, is the best means for assuring progressive change.
Michnik, 1976, 142.

Michnik, 1976, 148.

Of the 37 people mentioned by Jan Jozef Lipski in *KOR: Workers Defense Committee in Poland* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 9 were men and women of letters and 6 were historians.


Laba, forthcoming.

Kennedy, *Professionals, Power and Solidarity*.


Kennedy, *Professionals, Power and Solidarity*.


Kis, 1988, 95.

Kende, 1989, 68.

They include Agnes Heller, Ferenc Feher, Gyorgy and Maria Markus, Istvan Kemeny, Ivan Szelenyi and Mihaly Vajda. Vajda returned to Hungary shortly thereafter, however.

44. Vajda in Gorlice, 1986, 151.


51. Ibid., 47.

52. Ibid., 75.


56. Kende, 55-56.


58. Kis, "After the Fall Session."

59. Ibid., 169-70.

60. There is limited information about workers' militance, although there have been some strikes and other independent actions taken by industrial workers. These actions have rarely proceeded beyond immediate locales given the efforts by enterprise managers and political authorities to appease demands and thus contain their opposition. Catholic grassroots communities also have been formed, but even less has been written about them.

61. This account of actors draws on several sources: Kende; Nigel Swain, "Hungary's Socialist Project in Crisis," New Left Review 176(1989):3-31; Laszlo Bruszt, "The Roundtable Negotiations in Hungary and Poland: A Comparison" (Lecture at The University of Michigan, November 10 1989); George Schopflin, Lecture on Hungary at The University of Michigan, November 6, 1989; Laszlo Urban, "Hungary in Transition:

62. Schopflin.


65. Szajer, Interview.


68. Some blue collar unions formed, as the transport workers and ambulance workers. Swain anticipates growth in independent blue collar unions.

69. Urban.

70. Bruszt.


72. Gorlice.

73. Swain, 17.

74. Urban.

75. Schopflin.

76. The Opposition Round Table included two populist groups, Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Fraternal Society, several liberal urban groups, FIDESZ, the Alliance of Free Democrats and the League of Democratic Trade Unions, and three "nostalgia" parties, the Social Democrats, the Hungarian People's Party, and the Smallholders Party (Swain).

77. In October, 1989 Poszgy attempted to take over the Party, but he discovered that the reformist wing had only 2/5 of the votes. It was instead dissolved, with the reformists constituting the Hungarian Socialist Party (Schopflin).

78. Bruszt.

79. In his comment on Schopflin's talk, Akos Rona-Tas suggested this paradox: a weak Hungarian opposition could establish an easy victory over communists, while a strong Polish opposition produced a bitter struggle. Schopflin responded that this was because the recurrent defeats of the Polish party hardened it, while the Hungarian authorities were soft. They avoided imprisoning the opposition and could allow the transition because there

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were no strong divisions between authorities and society. This answer, in fact, understates the significance of class, as I attempt to establish in the conclusion.


82. Smolar, 19.

83. Smolar, 14.


85. Smolar.

86. Smolar.


88. Walicki; Ost; Smolar.


90. Touraine et al.


93. Ash, 10.


97. Ost, 84.


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