EASTERN EUROPE'S LESSONS FOR CRITICAL INTELLECTUALS

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Eastern Europe's Lessons for Critical Intellectuals

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If the hope of the world lies in human consciousness, then it is obvious that intellectuals cannot go on forever avoiding their share of responsibility for the world, hiding their distaste for politics under the alleged need to be independent (Vaclav Havel, in his address to the Joint Session of Congress of the United States, February 21, 1990).

In Eastern Europe, the political engagement of intellectuals has been the rule rather than the exception. Before the reign of communist parties, they were often the spokespersons for nations and the leaders of governments. Under the rule of communist parties, intellectuals were also prominent, but initially as an anachronism. Their inclination toward self definition was discouraged in favor of political incorporation or narrow specialization. This moved some intellectuals to a variety of opposition politics based on national traditions or marxism's revision, but it was not until the articulation by intellectuals of an ideology of civil society and human rights that an alternative for Eastern Europe was realized. Although this intellectual contribution by itself did not cause the revolutions of 1989, intellectuals have been restored to authority in the wake of these transformations, and this framework of civil society has guided their new political practices. But the authority of intellectuals is limited, for new structures of dependency ultimately restrict their capacity for action. Alternative structures and practices might, however, facilitate the emergence of an alternative intellectual politics that are not so visible in the present.

Any analysis of intellectuals and politics in Eastern Europe is likely to be immediately outdated by events, but the foundations for future intellectual politics in Eastern Europe have been established by a peculiar evolution of intellectuals in East European communism, from anachronism to opposition to authority. Nonetheless, the events taking place in the early 1990s can serve as a frame of reference for the broader history of intellectuals in Eastern Europe, and thus, of its unique contributions to our understanding of critical intellectuality, or that inclination
and capacity to understand personal situations as reflections of the public condition, and the recognition that such a condition is constituted through potentially transformed power relations.

EASTERN EUROPE, NATIONALISM AND INTELLECTUALS

The weakness of the East European bourgeoisie in the emergent capitalist world system is well known, and is important to the history of intellectuals in the area. In the long sixteenth century, the region was incorporated as a periphery into the capitalist world system (Wallerstein, 1976). The power of an agrarian aristocracy was augmented, a second serfdom introduced, and the development of a capitalist class structure distorted. Ethnicity also shaped these relationships made in production. Politically dominant nationalities formed class cultures in their own languages and practices, reinforcing the barriers of class experienced by subordinate populations (Gella, 1989).

The East European periphery began to decline as the core turned its attention more to its colonies across the ocean. The consequences of economic decline in Eastern Europe were, however, mitigated by the region's imperial politics. By the end of the eighteenth century, Eastern Europe was dominated by the great powers in the Austrian, Prussian, Russian and Ottoman empires who used their imperial apparatuses to shape the development of some peripheralized areas (Kennedy and Smith, 1989; Spechler, 1989). In turn, this development facilitated the growth of nationalist ideologies. Children of the privileged obtained higher educations in national centers marked by imperial constraints, but these centers also educated their students in the politics of nationalism, especially when official curricula were supplemented by lessons in underground "flying universities" (Gella, 1989).

The politics of nationalism dominated Polish discourse from the time of the Partitions in the end of the eighteenth century, but became more generally prominent in Eastern Europe after the revolutions of 1848. Intellectuals in turn dominated these politics. Not only did they often provide leadership in political struggles, but perhaps even more significantly, intellectuals helped to fashion politically conscious nations out of ethnic groups by constructing national histories and
sensibilities. The romantic verse of Polish-Lithuanian Adam Mickiewicz and the reconstructed history of the Czech nation by Frantisek Palacky, to name but two of the most obvious, contributed more to nationalist politics than letters could in virtually any other part of the world. But the significance of intellectuals was not the only thing distinctive.

The politics of East European intellectuals in this period was fundamentally different from that of intellectuals in the metropolitan countries. In the latter, intellectuals would construct opposition programs based on securing space free from the state, as in England, or distributing power among actors to limit absolutist power, as in France. By contrast, East Europeans would construct programs that would discuss how state power could be won so as to empower their oppressed nations (Bauman, 1987). In many senses, then, the East European intellectual of the nineteenth and early twentieth century would have found much in common with the anti-imperialist intellectual in the colonized periphery of the latter twentieth century (Szporluk, 1988).

Although there has always been a great deal of variation in the politics of East European intellectuals, some variety of nationalism has figured prominently in most of their political projects. For the suppressed "historic nations," to use terminology favored by Marx and Engels, nationalism was most obvious. But even among the non-historic nations, those whose peoples were not privy to previous kingdoms or states as Slovaks were not, nationalism became increasingly central. Polish Jewish intellectuals too found assimilation more difficult, which in turn increased the appeal of their own nationalism in the years before World War I (Hertz, 1961). But it was in the states formed after the 1919 Versailles Settlement that intellectuals were transformed into figures with more than moral or charismatic authority.

The highly educated frequently returned from abroad to help construct the new nation state. The premiere example of this was the first president of inter-war Czechoslovakia, Thomas Masaryk (1850-1937), a philosophy professor of considerable accomplishment in matters of political theory (Szporluk, 1981). The Czechoslovak experience was unusual in Eastern Europe for in its democratic accomplishments, however. Military governments were the more likely
Outcomes of post-imperial politics in Eastern Europe. But even in this project, intellectuals remained central.

In Poland, although the military ruled for most of the inter-war period, intellectuals were placed in leading positions of formal government. Mathematician Kazimierz Bartel and chemistry professor Ignacy Moscicki were appointed premier and president in the wake of the 1926 military coup, for example. The military tradition also was highly influenced by the broad intelligentsia from which many of its officers came. Of course, some intellectuals served as organic intellectuals for the popular classes, and most intellectuals in this Polish state practiced less political lives. The unity occasioned by the common struggle of intelligentsia and nation against an occupying power ended with the winning of state power, and the class united by sociopolitical aims fragmented into occupationally structured sub-groups (Gella, 1989:159-61). Nevertheless, the responsibility of intellectuals to practice politics became an important legacy in Eastern Europe, inspired by the struggle of the intelligentsia to help construct nations and win for them state power before World War I, and by their prominence in the post-imperial governments.

Intellectual hegemony in movements or states dominated by nationalist discourse is less problematic than in those movements or states whose legitimacy is tied to the discourse of class. In these latter discourses, intellectuals are always potentially suspect for they cannot claim to be completely of the class for whom they speak. This ambiguity facilitates challenge to intellectual claims of representation. Nationalist intellectuals, by contrast, do not have the same problem given the "vertical integration" constructed through their discourse. Intellectuals can be the "natural" leaders of nations or peoples, even when it is the popular or folk traditions that are revered. They merely "discover" or "articulate" the sentiment of that nationalism.

It is not therefore surprising that the post-communist projects of many East European intellectuals are rooted in a politics of nationalism rather than that of class. This tradition of intellectual politics is particularly strong in Eastern Europe, and it is comparatively effective in assuring intellectuals political authority in the construction of national agendas. It remains appealing in the 1990's because nationalist politics did not have the possibility of shedding,
through domestic democratic struggles, its early twentieth century form. World War II and its aftermath in the rule of communist parties transformed nationalist politics either by pushing it abroad or underground, or by forcing it into a new communist framework, which in either case undermined the previous status of intellectuals as national spokespersons.

Not only did the Nazis aim to exterminate peoples like Jews and Gypsies, but they also sought to destroy the intellectual leadership of the nations they intended to enslave, as Poles. The Soviet invasion of Poland also destroyed an important part of its national intelligentsia, exemplified by the murders in the Katyn Forest of its elite officer corp, most of whom were members of the intelligentsia. By war’s end, about 45 per cent of Poland’s physicians and dentists, 15 per cent of teachers, 18 per cent of clergy, 40 per cent of professors, 57 per cent of lawyers and 50 per cent of engineers had died (Lukas, 1985; Hoser, 1970).

When communists came to power after World War II, it is not therefore surprising that dealing with a national intelligentsia would figure significant in their programs. The communists had to construct a post-war generation of intellectuals suitable to the new order. They also had to deal with those intellectuals who survived the war, and those who sought to bring forward old traditions into the new era.

THE INTELLECTUAL ENGAGEMENT WITH COMMUNISM

The considerable social injustices of the inter-war period, and the destructiveness of the war itself, led many East European intellectuals to increasingly radical positions. In the first years after the war, before it became obvious that national roads to communism would be forced into stalinist molds, the new superpower spheres of influence in the world did not seem so disastrous, especially in comparison to the codified inhumanity of the Nazi "master race." Coalition governments in Eastern Europe were the rule. Jan Masaryk, the son of the pre-war leader, could even be Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Czechoslovak, communist-led government. But between 1948 and 1949 optimism became less tenable.
Czeslaw Milosz, the Polish-Lithuanian Nobel prize winner for literature, bore an awkward, but typical, relationship to the regime. He finally broke with the Polish government in 1951 after serving as cultural attache in its US and French embassies. *The Captive Mind* was written within the next year as a challenge to French intellectuals sympathetic to Stalin. In it, he portrays several responses by Polish writers to communism, responses based on contemporary authors: Jerzy Andrzejewski was the basis for Alpha the Moralist; Tadeusz Borowski for Beta the Disappointed Lover; Jerzy Putrament for Gamma, the Slave of History; and Konstanty Galczyński for Delta the Troubador. This work is especially useful for suggesting the initial East European intellectual engagement with communism, not only for the case studies it offers, but also for Milosz himself as among the most influential East European intellectuals of the post-war world.  

Communism offers much to the intellectual, writes Milosz. Intellectuals long to belong to the masses and this New Faith offers them such an association. Membership even can be based on scientific foundations. Thus intellectuals gain new significance, for this scientific faith elevates their function to a new height, simultaneously destroying their old rivals in business and aristocracy. But this philosophy also casts the intellectual role into an ambiguous position.

While intellectuals were once distinguished by their ability to think independently, in the new philosophy intellectuals were to be a part of the stream of history, moved by its own dialectical laws, which were in turn supported by a new state machinery that guaranteed the success, or failure, of an intellectual career. Thus, while the intellectual was guaranteed prominence in the new order, and the prospects of becoming a full time intellectual improved, the distinction of the intellectual was undermined. Eastern intellectuals may have accepted in 1951/52, that "the basic means of production should belong to the State, that it should be regulated according to a planned economy, and that their proceeds should be used for hygienic, cultural, scientific and artistic ends," but they also wanted to create outside the binds of the official philosophy (Milosz, 1953:40). They could not, however, because of their dependence on the state. Intellectuals therefore practiced Ketman.
Ketman is a political strategy of dualism, where individuals avow in public what the powerful want to hear, while in private they maintain a different, more genuine, perhaps creative intellectual life. Although Ketman had become regular practice for intellectuals by 1950, the intellectual engagement with communism did not begin so, Milosz writes. After World War II, the Party sought to establish some kind of better link with the society, by, among other means, inviting the cultural elite to join the communist movement.

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Intellectuals of different kinds joined the movement for a variety of reasons, but their survival as intellectuals was endangered by their very entry. Formerly Catholic writer Alpha joined the movement reluctantly, making small compromises at first in order to realize a greater good, but his small compromises eventually avalanched into a complete derelection of personal morality. By contrast, moralist Beta found in communism the ideal vehicle for his critique of injustice, but Beta also was destroyed by communism's insistence on intellectual and personal compromise, with suicide as his only moral response. Troubador Delta suffered a variety of communist impositions so that he might reach a larger audience, but could continue to do so only so long as his considerable cleverness enabled him to continue dancing that difficult step between censorship and art. Political careerists like Gamma thrived under these conditions, but at the cost of losing their intellectuality.

Milosz escaped these dilemmas through exile. He nevertheless gained worldwide prominence for the Nobel Prize, and retained a considerable following in Polonia, the emigre community. Milosz also was read in the underground in Poland itself, but it was not until after Solidarity was formed in 1980 that he could return to Poland and receive the honors national poets normally enjoy. Thus by emigration, Milosz managed to become Poland's leading writer, influencing not only the country's arts, but also its politics. His emigre intellectual life enabled him to defy the obligatory Ketman and its violation of intellectuality faced by those who remained in Poland. By so doing, Milosz helped to construct the vision of communism that so many adopted by 1980: communism was something that could not be reformed from within, and it was something that could not be made Polish.
This was not the image all Polish intellectuals had in the beginning of communist rule. Despite
the internal turmoil Milosz paints, other intellectuals, formed more by the system than adapting to
it, were comparatively optimistic. If Stalinism were but an aberrant feature of the system's
personnel, and not a consequence of the system itself, another leadership free of the old's errors
could make socialism as it should be. Then Stalinism, not communism as such, would be the
source of intellectuality's destruction and communism could then be fulfilled by unleashing
intellectuality (Kolakowski, 1968). Intellectuals would thus reconstruct communist leadership
with their own superior sensibilities. Such a revisionist program could become the call of
intellectuals and so it became in Hungary with Lukacs and those in the Petofi Circle, in
Czechoslovakia among philosophers like Karol Kosik and economists like Ota Sik, and in Poland
especially among economists, sociologists and philosophers. Leszek Kolakowski was in fact one of
the leading East European revisionists to emerge in the wake of Stalin's death.

Kolakowski's career exemplifies a current of Polish intellectuality separate from Milosz. When
Milosz rejected communism and left Poland in the early 1950's, Kolakowski taught at the Polish
United Workers Party Central Committee's Institute for Training of Scientific Workers. Between
1955 and 1957 he edited a weekly paper called Po Prostu, one of the leading periodicals associated
with the 1956 "Polish October" when a new more democratic and Polish road to socialism was
proclaimed. He became a lecturer in 1954 then professor in 1959 of the history of modern
philosophy at Warsaw University where he remained until 1968. In that time, he became a
leading voice of "marxist humanism" not only in Poland but throughout the world. In 1968,
Kolakowski and several other leading Polish intellectuals were forced into exile in the wake of anti-
Semitic and anti-intellectual Party politics. In exile, with posts at the University of Chicago and
Oxford University, Kolakowski has drifted away from the marxist humanism of his youth toward
a fundamental critique of marxism, claiming that within it are the seeds of totalitarianism. Given
that he was a leading revisionist, and that leading Polish intellectuals, including Jacek Kuron and
Adam Michnik, consider him their principal teacher, his reflections on revisionism acquire special
significance.
Kolakowski (1981:456-78) writes that revisionism promoted, in the language of marxism and socialism: 1) the democratization of public life, with broader civil liberties based on independent workers councils and trade unions, even if the existing autonomous institution, the Church, figured nowhere in their arguments; 2) sovereignty and equality among socialist countries; 3) an end to the extra-legal privileges bureaucrats enjoyed; and 4) economic changes, including more markets and profit incentives and less coercion, but without the promotion of private ownership of property. In these revisions, Kolakowski finds the reinvigoration of marxism and intellectual life generally. Further, he writes that the revisionism maintained that marxism should be based more on its intellectual power than on the power of the state. In revisionism, leninist-stalinist marxism was considered intellectually sterile, especially when approached from the vantage point of a marxism based on human subjectivity. In this alternative viewpoint, cognition did not simply reflect the material, but rather was the consequence of the interaction between social and biological. Determinism was likewise criticized, for being at best a useful mythology. Morality especially could not be deduced from laws of history. The politics of revisionism faced different chances in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, however.

The Hungarian revisionist movement was more orthodox than the Polish, finding in particular that freedom could be realized within the one party system. As such, revisionism ultimately was left behind in the 1956 revolution that was crushed by Soviet invasion. Polish revisionism, on the other hand, died from its own power. The revisionist critique led the Party authorities to abandon ideological commitments and adopt a narrow careerist mentality that made it impervious to an intellectual opposition from within. The intellectual movement itself came to treat marxism as but one of many currents useful to critical intellectuality. In conditions where marxism survives by maintaining its isolation from other traditions, as in Poland, exposure to the novel leads to marxism's extinction from relevant political discourse, Kolakowski argues. After 1968 and the Warsaw Pact extermination of the Prague Spring, marxism had become virtually irrelevant to the Polish opposition and to intellectual life in Poland. But precisely because revisionism was
destroyed by force, and not by its own bankruptcy, Czechoslovak revisionism retained for the future some political possibilities.

Kolakowski’s discussion of revisionism stands up relatively well in the light of the revolutions of 1989-90. The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party dissolved itself, with its leading politicians moving to embrace a social democratic identity which still left them far behind in the 1990 spring elections. The Hungarian revisionists in the democratic opposition abandoned their old marxism in favor of liberal democratic politics, but their Alliance of Free Democrats lost the elections to the nationalist Hungarian Democratic Forum. Because of the deal worked out in the spring 1989 Roundtable Agreements, the Polish United Workers’ Party was able to retain influence in the post-communist Solidarity-led government. In less than a year after those agreements, the Polish communists dissolved their party in favor of new social democratic parties, but these parties face even dimmer electoral hopes in future free elections than the former Hungarian communists found in theirs.

In general, the discourse of communism’s opposition in all of these countries finds revisionism, if a theme at all, one of the weakest threads in alternative politics. It is perhaps strongest in the German Democratic Republic. The transformed communist party, now called the Party of Democratic Socialism, fared the best of all "native" East German groups in the March elections, but the politics of post-communist transition are now being called by West German political parties. In Czechoslovakia, the political leader of the Prague Spring, Alexander Dubcek, returned from enforced obscurity to become the speaker of parliament, and other former communists turned Charter 77 activists, notably Jaroslav Sabata, have played important roles in the transition. This does not mean that revisionism will regain hegemonic status, for anti-communist forces have sought to destroy politically even those proven democrats like Sabata, considering their distant past sufficient grounds for exclusion from Czechoslovakia’s post-communist parliament. But Czechoslovakia’s relatively successful experience with revisionism might leave a legacy without parallel in Poland, Hungary or East Germany.
The post-communist discourse of Havel and Civic Forum is much closer to the themes of revisionism than any other national discourse in post-communist Eastern Europe. Both discourses emphasize the importance of individual responsibility and the centrality of consciousness over material being. And both have treated nationalist politics and matters of political economy as secondary to the cultivation of critical intellectualty and emancipatory political practice. Indeed, the emphasis on individual dignity and disdain for political economy have been common themes of the opposition intellectual politics that laid the intellectual foundations for the revolutions of 1989. But nationalism could be its successor, as these liberal politics of civil society prove difficult to practice in authority.

THE INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF POST-COMMUNIST POLITICS

The distinction of intellectuals resides in their capacity to redefine their distinction. Even while the Soviet-type system elevated the intellectual by eliminating class rivals and promoting a knowledge-based class order (Szelenyi, 1982), it also sought to take away from intellectuals their distinction in the name of a supra-individual rationality. Where in other social orders, intellectuals were privileged not only by rank but also by a qualitatively separate status based on their distinction, in the new order they were placed on top of a hierarchy that denied their qualitative difference.

Most obviously, state censorship denies intellectuals the capacity to define their product. Imposed styles, as socialist realism, reduce intellectual distinction. Even in more subtle ways, the Soviet-type system oppresses this distinction. The idea that intellectuals, as others, should serve some common interest means that intellectuals are denied the privilege of defining their master. Collectivism, even based on some order favorable to the material interests of intellectuals, works to deny the individualistic foundation that makes the intellectual as actor distinctive. As Bahro (1978) argued, the Soviet-type system produced "surplus consciousness," where bureaucratic domination suppressed the creative capacity of individuals, especially of intellectuals.
Communists need not have made intellectuality an anachronism in their alternative society. While a dominant discourse based on class justice may challenge intellectual privilege more than other discourses, it need not undermine intellectuality. Indeed, the burst of revisionism in Eastern Europe in the 1950's and 1960's suggested that the Soviet-type system could spawn a considerable measure of intellectual creativity within, or compatible with, the marxist tradition. But to the extent political authorities reified socialism by defining the essence of the system according to substantive rather than procedural features (as in centralized planning or in the leading role of the Party rather than on the basis of the expansion of democracy and of human rights or the end to alienation), an explosion of intellectuality could only have undermined the system by attacking its sacred prescriptions.

Formal traits defining the good society can be defended as essential only if they themselves are sacred, something intellectual criticism cannot touch. If the formal features of the system cannot be changed, revisionism as such must die. In other words, the system must be transformable for revisionism to be meaningful. But once the system became available for transformation in the end of the 1980's, revisionism was no longer available to become the soul of change. Intellectuality came to be defined in opposition to marxism. The evolution of Polish discourse on opposition and transformation illustrates better than any other discourse the logic of revisionism's decline in Eastern Europe.

Adam Michnik's "The New Evolutionism" (1976) was one of the first programmatic statements to suggest the course the Solidarity movement followed later. Michnik argued against revisionism and neopositivism, the prevailing political strategies for opposition. Neopositivism, represented by the Catholic group Znak whose ranks had included Tadeusz Mazowiecki, argued that participation in existing institutions, even if one rejects decisively their lasting value, was the best means for assuring progressive change. Both strategies depended, however, on the activities of elites, not on mass public pressure. This dependence on initiation from above thus led them to choose the wrong sides in periods of open conflict. The only political strategy that might consistantly lead to the right choice is that which is based on "an unceasing struggle for reform
and evolution that seeks an expansion of civil liberties and human rights" (Michnik, 1976:142). Michnik (1976:148) concludes, "In searching for truth, or, to quote Leszek Kolakowski, 'by living in dignity', opposition intellectuals are striving not so much for a better tomorrow as for a better today. Every act of defiance helps us to build the framework of democratic socialism, which should not be merely or primarily a legal institutional structure but a real day-to-day community of free people."

Michnik's essay helped to lay an intellectual foundation for the Solidarity movement in Poland. It constructed a program that was unambiguously on the side of society against the authorities, and without possibility for compromise with them. It could not easily be attacked from any ideological position, especially since most political groups at least pay lip service to the idea of human rights. And it promised a new universality, one that could eclipse the claims of marxism. Here, human rights were in everyone's interests, serving equally well workers, peasants and intellectuals. But perhaps even more significant than the essay, Michnik and other intellectuals formed a group that demonstrated in practice what the essay suggested.

The Committee in Defense of Workers (Komitet Obrony Robotnikow or KOR) was formed to help those workers and their families victimized by the authorities after the 1976 strikes and demonstrations. Not only did they try to raise money to help them, but also tried to facilitate directly the self-organization of society by advocating independent trade unions through the Charter of Workers' Rights (Lipski, 1985). The Solidarity movement, although not a product of these intellectuals' efforts alone (Laba, forthcoming), was certainly influenced by this new image of opposition: civil society against the state (Arato, 1981).

This civil society was tied closely, although not entirely, to the Catholic Church. Lay Catholic intellectuals, organized in Clubs of Catholic Intellectuals, were frequent advisors and contributors to the movement. Church premises could be used as meeting places. Religious clerical networks connecting pulpits, and therefore congregations, could provide a means for communicating a coherent message to a significant proportion of Poles. The elevation of Krakow Archbishop Karol Wojtyla to Pope also gave Poles a new charismatic figure with whom to identify. His visit to
Poland in 1979 was organized by civil society itself, without state assistance, thereby providing an important lesson in self-organization. Perhaps equally important, the Pope's language provided to Polish citizens a new vocabulary for expressing their resistance to the regime.

The traditional language of liberation had been appropriated by the authorities. Words like "socialism," "self-management," and "class struggle" compromised those who uttered them (Staniszkis, 1979). The Pope provided instead a language that expressed emancipation in terms of human dignity, truth and solidarity. These were words that could be used without compromise to express the common interests of civil society against the authorities. Pope John Paul II's invectives against the language of class struggle in liberation theology reflect this background of struggle against Poland's communist authorities. This opposition to marxist language also had an important function in Polish politics, as class antagonisms were one of the foundations for the reproduction of the communist order.

In Soviet-type systems as elsewhere, workers typically resent intellectuals' arrogance and privilege, while intellectuals often distrust workers' fundamentalist or populist politics. The communist authorities have exploited this distrust in their effort to quell any kind of unified opposition to them (Kostecki and Mrela, 1984). The idea of civil society, and the terminology of dignity and solidarity, allowed an escape from this principal barrier to an organized civil society.

The civil society project was also successful because it contained no substantive politics. It said nothing about the distribution of wealth, ownership of the means of production, or division of labor. Strategically, it offered a means for the construction of cross-class alliances, as intellectuals could offer their support in the defense of the civil liberties and human rights of those with weaker ties to the media and poorer skills at publicizing their oppression. In return, the collective strength of self-organized workers could build public pressure on the authorities to respect the rights and liberties the intellectuals moved to the public sphere. This was the alliance that made Solidarity ultimately so potent.

The civil society project also could incorporate, however, both nationalist and democratic discourses. Civil society was defined in opposition to the communists, not only in terms of human
rights, but also in terms of national identities. As such, liberals like Adam Michnik and nationalists like Leszek Moczulski in Poland, or liberal Janos Kis and nationalist Jozsef Antall in Hungary, could define one another as allies in the common struggle of civil society against the state. But in the aftermath of revolution, they become the principal contestants for power.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF EASTERN EUROPE FOR CRITICAL INTELLECTUALITY

The relationship between intellectuals in Eastern Europe and critical intellectuals elsewhere has been problematic. Milosz's *The Captive Mind*, is one early example of the attempt by East European intellectuals to explain their politics to Western critical intellectuals. Kolakowski's contributions to discussions of marxism and socialism (1974, 1981) also communicate, on a more philosophical level, the East European intellectual lifeworld. Feher and Heller's (1987) contributions on the relationship between Eastern Left and Western Left are also noteworthy in this regard. In these explanations and in others, the motivation for explaining East European intellectual politics was not mainly political. Of course western intellectuals could influence, in a limited way, the repressive practices of communist regimes by direct protest and participation in human rights groups. But emancipatory politics depended mostly on domestic initiatives. Post-communist Eastern Europe faces different challenges, however, and demands an even more international intellectual politics.

The projects for civil society's reconstruction in the face of communist rule are showing the fault lines around which they were constructed. Nationalists and liberals are vying for power, with the former more likely to foster a climate in which there will be inter-state war and repression of national minorities. At the same time, however, the liberals appear less sensitive to the dangers of capitalist transformations, and more likely to provoke militant working class oppositions. It is the nationalists who are more likely to speak of a "third way" and identify with the legacy of inter-war Europe, whereas the liberals seek full integration with Western Europe and assert a common "European" identity. Indeed, the extent of East-West European integration might establish the basic alternatives for intellectual politics in the coming decade. To the extent
the East Europeans struggle to find a "third way," their politics will likely resemble increasingly those of Latin America, with alterations between military dictatorship and tentative electoral democracies.

If the East Europeans are not included in the European Community in the near future, their civil societies will come to resemble more those of the semiperiphery in Latin America than any core country. Whether underdevelopment results from solely economic integration with the core, or from an attempt to construct a third way without the resources to do it, it is likely that similar problems that have confronted Latin American politics will find expression in Eastern Europe. Militaristic authoritarian regimes are likely responses to problems of developing economies, and they have a legacy in Eastern Europe upon which they can draw. Under these conditions, working class needs and interests will probably be hidden in a coopted Mexican-style corporatism, with additional integration provided by nationalist passions. Under these conditions, dialogue between East European and Latin American critical intellectuals may become increasingly helpful to each.

It will be too easy for the core to pit one region against the other in the emerging world order. Already, Latin America and Africa are suffering losses of US financial aid as Poland and Hungary receive increases. Latin American representatives have been critical of the favorable treatment on debt repayment which East European regimes receive at the expense of Latin America. As the weak alternative offered by the Soviet-led economic association disappears, and the world capitalist system grows more dominant, it will become ever more important for the semi-peripheries and peripheries of the world system to establish new alliances in order to defend their interests. There are several barriers that stand in the way, however, the most prominent of which may be marxism.

In the third world, marxism remains a legitimate and important tradition for the construction of an emancipatory alternative. Upon his release from prison on February 12, 1990, Nelson Mandela saluted the South African Communist Party "for its steady contribution to the struggle for democracy." The Sandinista experience also suggests that pluralism, egalitarianism and self-
management, the value frame of Solidarity, might be derived from marxism, instead of opposed to it. But East Europeans are unlikely to accept the association of marxism, and especially of communism, with democracy. Pope John Paul II’s hostility to Latin American liberation theology is illustrative of the tension that an East European-Latin American dialogue will generate. When an associate of the Pope, the Polish priest and "theologian of Solidarity," Jozef Tischner (1987), was asked about liberation theology he could only say that it was hopelessly naive about marxism and communism. As the Soviet-type system reified marxism, so too have its opponents.

Marxism, socialism and communism have been constructed in particular historical conjunctures with various cultural legacies. One of the greatest barriers to an internationalization of emancipatory politics has been the divergent, often diametrically opposed, experiences of various regions with this construction. It is a remarkable, for instance, to note the compatibility between contemporary Chinese and East European intellectual politics, and to note the difficulties faced by dialogue between Chinese and Indian intellectuals, or East Europeans and Latin Americans. As the Soviet Union loses its own systemic distinction, a new opportunity for emancipatory politics might emerge within Europe, however. The new period may be characterized by a different attitude toward marxism, much as the East European revisionists suggested, one by which it is viewed as but one of many potential emancipatory traditions. Once marxism is thus demoted from either its sacred or demonic status, the possibilities for East European dialogue with the third world will increase. But until that time, divergent understandings of the marxist legacy may hamper international emancipatory alliances.

The impetus for such a link between critical intellectuals in Eastern Europe and in the third world will decline, however, to the extent Eastern Europe’s position in the world economy is mitigated by its integration into the European Community. But such integration will likely open up East European politics and encourage democratic possibilities far more than will the isolation of Eastern Europe as new European dependencies. As such, the position of the European liberals might offer greater opportunities for a new East European politics, even if at the expense of dialogues between north and south.
Before the revolutions of 1989, networks connecting new social movements in the west with activists in the east helped to establish new politics in the latter. For instance, contacts of European peace activists and West German Greens with Polish activists helped to establish a discourse about peace never before heard in Polish society (Tymowski, 1984; Kennedy, 1990a). While the end of the Cold War may make peace movements with a European focus a theme of the past, the environmentalist project can only become more important given the destruction of the biophysical environment. Already, some of the most vital and innovative East European movements are ecologically informed. Once better ties are established with greens in the west, environmentalism might become a dominant theme of opposition in East European, or even pan-European, politics. The growth of new social movements thus will become more likely in Eastern Europe to the degree these movements have ties to those similarly inclined in Western Europe. And as that occurs, the possibilities for a new critical intellectuality will grow.

One form of critical intellectuality has been noticeably absent in the dominant discourses of oppositional intellectual politics in Eastern Europe. Although there are feminist circles in Russia (Noonan, 1988) and Yugoslavia (Jancar, 1988), they have generally fared even more poorly in countries with Soviet-imposed communist regimes. Feminism has suffered in all these countries from prohibitions on self-organization and from the importance of traditional family roles given limited consumer goods and services. One of the most significant barriers to feminist politics, however, has been its association with the authorities and its incompatibility with strategies of social self-organization. To the extent that feminism was identified as "leftist" and in opposition to national traditions, and to the extent that the struggle for self-organization required the maintenance of traditional family roles to ensure domestic tranquility while public conflict raged, feminism stood hardly a chance. But as civil society is reconstructed with an especially patriarchal face, both the tolerance for and the necessity of feminist politics have become much greater.

Warsaw feminist Hanna Jankowska (1989) has noted the virtual ignorance of women's politics in the Polish roundtable agreements. Even women's participation in the new politics is extremely
limited; only 12 per cent of delegates to the National Assembly are women. Henzler (1989) notes that even fewer, only 8 per cent, of the Solidarity nominees for Senate and Sejm were women. As women were especially active in Solidarity’s grass roots politics, even if not at the regional or national levels in 1981, women might be prepared to initiate a feminist politics, especially as the Catholic Church tries to limit reproductive rights in the post-communist order. But these politics will have to construct a new feminism that is not identified so closely with the communist politics against which most Poles have struggled for decades. This project ought to become easier, too, as the intellectual political field loses its convenient dichotomies based on civil society and communism.

Finally, the end to the dichotomy between communism and civil society might open a new forum for class politics, especially if these systems are not incorporated into the European Community and are integrated with Western Europe only economically, for instance through membership in the European Free Trade Association. Under these conditions, it is likely that a new working class militance will emerge. In Poland, it is possible that an alliance between the old communist trade union associated with Alfred Miodowicz and disgruntled Solidarity militants associated with the Workers’ Group (including Andrzej Gwiazda) and Fighting Solidarity (Kornel Morawiecki) could be formed. But it is unlikely that Polish intellectuals in authority will point to, much less facilitate, the development of such militance, given that they now have the responsibility for making Poland attractive to foreign investors.

It is too easy to understand such reluctance on the part of Polish intellectuals as confirmation of the thesis that once one abandons marxism and socialism one also abandons critical intellectuality. On the contrary, I believe that one of the lessons of Eastern Europe is that critical intellectuality cannot depend solely on the critique of capitalism, or any other single, even if "basic," form of domination. Instead, the practice of a critical hermeneutics, where readings of other world experiences help the reconstruction of both analytical and normative foundations for emancipatory praxis, is as fundamental to emancipatory praxis as the analysis of any systemic tendency. And while East Europeans currently are not particularly inclined to understand the
politics of dependency in the capitalist world system, critical intellectuals from without their lifeworld are not well prepared either to contribute to the challenges facing East European intellectuals.

The tasks facing these intellectuals are not entirely unlike those facing the Bolsheviks through Lenin's death. The Bolsheviks were not prepared to construct an entirely new system, especially one limited to a single country. They retained and imported many elements from the dominant sectors of the capitalist economy, even if they adopted them believing that they were beginning to construct a new kind of society. East European intellectuals in authority have no such grand dreams, and many of them want to import wholesale that which the West already has. But others retain a critical spirit, even in authority. This is especially evident in their attempts to introduce an ecologically sound element to their economic transitions. The dilemma for these critical intellectuals, however, is that alternative visions are weak and alternative resources are even more limited. Unlike the Bolsheviks who at least had the vision of socialism to inspire them, contemporary East European intellectuals are limited not only by their economic dependence but also by the tendency of contemporary western critical intellectuals to theorize only the politics of opposition, and not of authority. East European intellectuals do not have that option.

One of the principal challenges before critical intellectuals today is to make the revolutions of 1989, and the histories which moved them, central to the reconstruction of the emancipatory project. That begins with being able to read intellectual politics in their own context, for by so doing, one establishes the possibility for real dialogue across radically different lifeworlds. In the 1980's, such a dialogue emerged between Eastern and Western Europe over the meanings and politics of peace and disarmament. That dialogue is by no means over in the 1990's, but it must be extended to other places and to new themes so that the transformations of Eastern Europe facilitate the generation of emancipatory alternatives instead of helping to bury them.
NOTES

1. I am indebted to the Working Group in Social Theory at the Center for Psychosocial Studies in Chicago for discussions which have contributed significantly to this paper. Thanks are also due Roman Szporluk, David McQuaid, Geoff Eley and Craig Calhoun for comments on previous versions of this text.

2. "Intellectual" and "intelligentsia" in social scientific discourse have had as many as seven different meanings. Sometimes the former is a subset of the latter, and other times, the latter is of the former. In the first, most general case (#1), intellectuals are distinguished from the larger category by their creative powers and capacity for self definition. In the second (#2), the intelligentsia is distinguished from the larger category by their inclination for teleological reasoning or their distinctive cultural identity. In this framework, the intelligentsia is also distinguished from another kind of intellectual, professionals, whose technical knowhow and occupational distinction mark their distinctive identification, not their teleological reasoning or their culture (Szelenyi, 1982). Even within these two general categories, the intelligentsia is a controversial term in Eastern European discourse.

So understood, the intelligentsia can also refer to (#3) a statistical category (as all those with higher educations in Eastern Europe) (Szczepanski, 1962); (#4) a social group with a special ethos of morality and responsibility (as the old Polish intelligentsia claimed to be the moral government of the nation) (Gella, 1971); or (#5), a class with particular consciousness or interests, possibly en route to domination, as Waclaw Machajski through Ivan Szelenyi have suggested.

Intellectual, the concept, also can become an object of controversy, for it can become (#6) a category of relative exclusiveness based on some special responsibility, experience or achievement, as Baranczak (1986-87) suggests; or it can refer to (#7) a capacity of all men and women that is exaggerated or repressed under various social circumstances as Gramsci (1971) would emphasize. Each of these understandings of intellectual and intelligentsia must be kept in mind when
discussing Eastern Europe, even though I will usually use these terms in general sense (#2),
unless otherwise indicated.

3. Recent discussions in the Program on the Comparative Study of Social Transformations at The
University of Michigan have addressed these relationships between nation and class. Especially
important to my own thoughts on the subject is a recent discussion paper by Ronald Grigor Suny
(1990) on class and nation during the Bolshevik Revolution and Civil War, wherein he discusses
the patterns of horizontal and vertical integration of classes and nations in this period.

4. Milosz’s (1968) “autobiography” is also useful for this purpose, although he is less literal in the
treatment of his engagement with communism than one would expect. Nevertheless, the same
"Ketman" comes through there.

5. Milosz uses the term intellectual, as I do when explicating The Captive Mind, in general sense
#1 and particular sense #6. See note 2.

6. Charles Lemert suggested an interesting parallel between this East European Ketman and the

7. Here, I use intellectual more in particular sense #7. See note 2.
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The Program on the Comparative Study of Social Transformations is an interdisciplinary research program at the University of Michigan. Its faculty associates are drawn primarily from the departments of Anthropology, History, and Sociology, but also include members of several other programs in the humanities and social sciences. Its mission is to stimulate new interdisciplinary thinking and research about all kinds of social transformations in a wide range of present and past societies. CSST Working Papers report current research by faculty and graduate student associates of the program; many will be published elsewhere after revision. Working Papers are available for a fee of $2.00 for papers under 40 pages and for $3.00 for longer papers. To request copies of Working Papers, write to Comparative Study of Social Transformations, 4010 LSA Building, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1382 or call (313) 936-1595.


3 "Coffee, Copper, and Class Conflict in Central America and Chile: A Critique of Zeitlin's Civil Wars in Chile and Zeitlin and Ratcliff's Landlords and Capitalists," by Jeffery M. Paige, September 1987, 10 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper #347.


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