COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE AND COLLECTIVE LOYALTIES IN FRANCE: WHY THE FRENCH REVOLUTION MADE A DIFFERENCE

William H. Sewell, Jr.

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It is impossible to pronounce the words "collective violence in France" without conjuring up the name of Charles Tilly. Ever since 1964, when he published a brilliant book on the Vendee rebellion against the French Revolution, Tilly has poured forth an endless stream of articles and books on the problem of collective violence. Most of this work deals with France, although more recently he has published on the English case as well. Given Tilly's well-earned hegemony over the field, my interpretation of the history of collective violence in France is inevitably also a critique of Tilly's interpretation. I therefore want to begin by making clear how much I owe to his work, both empirical and theoretical. To begin with, Tilly has gathered, analyzed, and published vast quantities of information about collective violence. One sign of the importance of his empirical work is that the critique I mount in this article is largely based on evidence that Tilly himself has collected.

Tilly's theoretical contributions are no less important. Before he began writing, most sociologists treated collective violence as a pathological phenomenon -- as the result of social dislocations, strain, anomie, breakdown of social control, and the like. They assumed that in a properly functioning social order all the groups or classes composing a population would be in harmony with each other and that conflict leading to violence could result only from some kind of malfunctioning of an essentially benign social system. This approach, besides leading to all sorts of empirically doubtful conclusions, also had what I and many of my contemporaries regarded as an unsavory political bias: it placed the social scientist on the side of law and order and the status quo. For those of us who balked when Neil Smelser characterized English factory workers agitating for the Ten Hour Day as suffering from "unjustified negative emotional reactions and unrealistic aspirations," Tilly's work was a breath of fresh air.
Tilly begins from a very different set of assumptions. He sees society as composed of 
groups with conflicting interests which are held together not by a value consensus or by the re-
equilibrating motions of a finely tuned social system but by the exercise of economic and political 
power. He treats conflicts between different groups as an inevitable feature of social life, and 
argues that collective violence typically arises when groups act to defend or extend their own 
interests -- however conceived -- against others. Hence collective violence, far from being an 
irrational outburst of anomic and disturbed social marginals, is usually the consequence of 
purposeful collective action of a constituted group of some kind. This theoretical perspective also 
has an important methodological implication. Incidents of collective violence -- riots, scuffles 
between crowds and police, violent demonstrations, brawls between rival groups -- are much more 
likely to find their way into the historical record than ordinary, non-violent collective activities. If 
it is true that collective violence grows out of day-to-day loyalties, habits, values, and patterns of 
organization, then the relatively well-recorded violent events can be used as a kind of tracer for 
collective action and collective loyalties in general. This makes the study of collective violence a 
far more important task of sociology and social history than it would seem if we accepted the 
"pathological" approach. Violent events, rather than being a series of curiosities occasionally 
thrown off by society in its basically orderly course of development, become indicators of the basic 
power struggles -- and, I would add, of the fundamental loyalties -- that determine the very shape 
of the social order. Tilly has demonstrated that the study of collective violence leads straight to 
the most basic processes of social change.

TILLY’S ACCOUNT OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

How, according to Tilly, has collective violence changed in France over the past three 
centuries? In his various writings, Tilly has attempted to specify different types of collective 
violece and to chart their rise or fall over time. Initially he distinguished three types, which he 
dubbed "primitive," "reactionary," and "modern" violence; later, perhaps nervous about the 
evolutionary and teleological overtones of these terms, he substituted the more neutral and clinical
"competitive," "reactive," and "proactive" violence -- without, however, significantly changing the definitions of the categories. In his most recent work on the subject, a massive tome entitled The Contentious French, he silently abandons all of these terms, but without, in my opinion, abandoning the fundamental theoretical framework of which they are a product or the narrative line that they summarize. (His summary table contrasting what he now labels the "parochial and patronized" forms of collective action that dominated the period 1650-1850 with the "national and autonomous" forms that predominated after 1850 essentially recapitulates, with a few elaborations, the familiar differences between "communal and reactive" collective action on the one hand and "proactive" collective action on the other.) I believe that Tilly's essential argument can still be explicated most economically by using his typology of competitive, reactive, and proactive violence.

**Competitive violence** includes feuds, brawls between the youth of neighboring villages, battles between rival groups of artisans, and charivaris -- raucous serenades, sometimes accompanied by assault or destruction of property, usually performed by the young men of the community against those who infringe local customs. According to Tilly, this kind of violence, a product of the constant contentions in local communities, was the most common sort before the intensive seventeenth century efforts at centralizing the French state which we associate with the names of Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV.

The exigencies of state-building resulted in a burgeoning of Tilly's second type, "reactive violence." By reactive, Tilly means "defensive, backward looking conflicts between...local people...and agents of the nation." As the state demanded ever greater tax resources, drew local grain supplies into the national market, and promoted capitalist development, local people responded with tax rebellions, food riots, invasion of enclosed lands and forests, and the like. These "reactive" forms of collective violence became dominant by the late seventeenth century and remained the most common form right down to the middle of the nineteenth century. There was a last great outburst of reactive violence in 1848, but the 1848 revolution and the intensified administrative centralization of the Second Empire seem finally to have wiped out overt resistance.
to the expansion of the state. There was virtually no "reactive" collective violence in France after 1851.

Tilly's third type, proactive violence, has been the predominant form of collective violence since the middle of the nineteenth century. In proactive violence, groups are no longer resisting the expansion of the state but are attempting to control or influence it. The groups that engage in such violence are formally organized special-purpose associations rather than communal groups, and they have highly articulated goals. Proactive forms of collective action -- such as the strike, the demonstration and the political meeting -- were developed progressively during the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, as people began to accept state intrusion as a fact of life and began to recognize the need to act on a national scale to influence the state's activities. But proactive collective violence -- that is, collective violence that arose out of associationally based, forward looking, and nationally oriented collective action -- did not become the predominant form until after the Revolution of 1848.

This account of the history of collective violence borrows from both Tocqueville and Marx, with much more of Tocqueville than Marx. The account is Tocquevillian because the chief determinant of changes in the forms of collective violence is not the advance of capitalism but the rise of the centralized, bureaucratic state. It was the rise of the state that displaced competitive violence by reactive violence in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and it was the final victory of the state over local resistance that caused reactive violence to be eclipsed by proactive violence after 1848. But the state whose gradual and inexorable rise is traced out by incidents of collective violence is a state that consistently favored capitalism. In Tilly's account, capitalism and the rise of the state, although distinct processes, are tightly intertwined. Many of the classic forms of Tilly's "reactive" violence are directed as much against capitalist intrusion favored or fostered by the state as against state control per se. Take, for example, the grain riot, probably the most important type of reactive violence in the eighteenth century and through much of the nineteenth. Grain riots typically took place at a time of high grain prices, when the sufficiency of local supplies was threatened by the shipment of grain to other areas -- particularly
to Paris -- where it could fetch a higher price. In grain riots, local people would seize grain being stored by local merchants and farmers or would block barges or wagons loaded with grain to be transported out of the area. Once the grain had been seized it was usually sold to local people at a "just price" -- in other words, at considerably below its market value. The grain riot was at once a protest against the local officials' unwillingness or inability to carry out their traditional role of assuring local people's access to local grain supplies and a protest against the extension of market principles into the realm of subsistence -- an extension fostered by the state in order to assure provisioning of grain-short regions, and above all of Paris.6

Anti-capitalist motives are no less apparent in protests against enclosures, another very common form of eighteenth and early nineteenth century collective violence. In this case the rural poor invaded meadows or forests that had been enclosed by landlords. In doing so, they were affirming traditional collective rights of the village community that were suppressed when landlords claimed formerly common land as their private property. Once again, this extension of capitalist claims had been fostered by the state, which hoped thereby to encourage innovations and increase agricultural production.7 In other words, long before the supposed "bourgeois revolution" of 1789, the state seems commonly to have acted in French villages as a promoter of capitalist development and as an enemy of the collective rights of the poor.

This account, centered around the rise of the state and state-fostered capitalism, leads Tilly to a novel periodization of French history. Where most historians see the French Revolution of 1789-94 as the great turning point of French history, Tilly sees it principally as an intensification of processes already well under way. In the Revolution, state centralization was accelerated and the victory of private property and the market over collective rights was consolidated -- and one consequence was a great burst of reactive violence as local people protested against these developments. According to Tilly's account, the extensive politicization of life during the Revolution also led to a major expansion of proactive collective action -- political meetings, demonstrations, and the like -- and therefore to many incidents of proactive violence. But the continuation of reactive violence indicates that the victory of state-building and capitalism
was still incomplete. The real turning point of modern French history, Tilly implies, was the Revolution of 1848. Like the Revolution of 1789, the Revolution of 1848 gave rise to a great burst of both reactive and proactive violence, one that continued sporadically until the fall of the Republic in 1851. But it also marked the final victory of the state over communal interests and therefore of proactive over reactive violence. After 1851, collective action in France definitively entered the world of political meetings, strikes, organized interest groups, demonstrations, political parties, and labor unions that is still with us today. Since then, the crucial issue for most French citizens has not been whether the state would intrude into their communities, but who would benefit from the state’s ubiquitous presence.8

Tilly’s account of the history of collective violence obviously has much to recommend it. It pulls a vast welter of information together into an admirably clear and economical interpretation. Moreover, it has significantly changed our understanding of French history. It confirms and extends the notion that the French monarchical state in the century before the Revolution was already acting largely as an ally of capitalist development. And it suggests a novel periodization of French history. According to Tilly’s interpretation, the French Revolution was not a great turning point in the history of collective violence. It merely accelerated changes that were already in process. By contrast, the Revolution of 1848, which historians have usually considered as far less important than the “great” revolution, was a great turning point, since it spelled the definitive victory of proactive over reactive collective violence.

It is this claim that the revolutionary episode of 1789-94 was less important than that of 1848-51 that I wish to dispute. I believe that Tilly’s own evidence indicates that the French Revolution of 1789 was in fact the more significant turning point, but that two important theoretical failings of his approach to collective violence have blinded him to its significance. I will argue first, that Tilly pays insufficient attention to the cultural dimension of historical processes, and second, that he virtually ignores the role of political events in historical change. I will proceed by elaborating these theoretical critiques and then by developing my own alternative interpretation of the history of collective violence. I will argue that the French Revolution, as an
event, fundamentally transformed French political culture, defining both new forms of collective loyalties and previously unimagined possibilities for collective action. The French Revolution, I shall argue, created the political and cultural space that made what Tilly calls “proactive” collective action possible.

THEORETICAL CRITIQUE

One sign of Tilly’s inattention to culture is the fact that his writings on collective violence give no more than passing attention to the nature of the collective loyalties manifested in incidents of collective violence. He frequently uses words like "communal" or "associative" to characterize different groups, but he never defines the terms, nor does he attempt to show what is communal or associative about the groups. This lack of interest in the content of group loyalties or identities is only one example of Tilly’s general indifference to the cultural or ideational life of the people he studies. Even in his study of the Vendée -- in my opinion his most successful book -- he managed to write some 350 pages about a rebellion ostensibly fought in defense of the Catholic religion without devoting a single page to the rebels’ religious beliefs. (There is plenty about the social organization of religion and about conflicts over the conduct of religion, but nothing about its content.) In my opinion, this indifference to the meanings that collective action had for the actors has kept Tilly from correctly understanding major changes in French collective violence in his period.

In the interpretation I shall elaborate in this article, I start from the assumption that all human action is shaped by and interpreted through cultural meanings. To understand why people join forces to beat up tax collectors, or to break down fences, or to march in a procession, or to engage in any kind of social action, collective or otherwise, requires understanding not only how these actions fit into large-scale patterns of social changes that the actors may understand only dimly, but also what the actors do understand by their actions. True, the actors do not generally leave detailed depositions preserving their motives for posterity. But much can be learned even from a relatively superficial examination of the nature of the collective actions themselves. For
the remainder of this paper, I shall try to show how an analysis of the culturally specific collective
loyalties that were expressed in violent actions can illuminate the general patterns of French
history since the late seventeenth century.

The second failing of Tilly's account is that it minimizes the significance of political events
in history. Although Tilly's interpretation focuses on the rise of the state, and on political
contention between the state and the various groups that compose society, it a political
interpretation only in a very limited sense. For Tilly, as for Tocqueville, the rise of the state is a
gradual, evolutionary, anonymous sociological process, analogous to industrialization,
modernization, urbanization, or the development of capitalism. Although wars, political crises, or
changes in regimes may accelerate or inhibit the rise of the state, the dynamics of the process are
not specific to regimes and therefore are not fundamentally altered by regime changes. This
means that, for Tilly, even the most spectacular outbursts of collective violence, such as those that
took place during the revolutions of 1789 and 1848, do not actually change the course of history.
The collective action is not itself a cause of change, but merely an effect or a symptom of deeper
lying causes. The course of history is determined by anonymous sociological processes operating
behind or beneath the frenetic struggles and contentions that Tilly actually describes in his articles
and books.

This has a rather disconcerting effect on Tilly's narrative, especially in his long and
detailed recent book The Contentious French. Tilly is a truly accomplished stylist, and in this book
he has related scores of dramatic incidents of collective violence with all the the considerable
rhetorical resources he can muster. Yet the book has a curiously flat quality that I initially found
puzzling -- until I realized that the incidents related in such loving detail were actually marginal to
the central argument of the book, merely secondary consequences of processes of state and
capitalist development that take place off stage, and that those central processes are actually
posited at the outset rather than revealed and analyzed in the course of the book. The
Contentious French consequently reads as a kind of extended and elaborate illustration of a
previously developed theory rather than as a voyage of discovery. It recounts hundreds of events, but the events it recounts are not consequential for the central story Tilly wishes to tell.

Once again, my alternative account of the history of French collective violence will depart sharply from Tilly's assumptions. I agree with Tilly that state development, in France and elsewhere, is typically characterized by certain trends that hold more or less irrespective of the regime in power -- such as increasing scale, complexity, and bureaucratization. I also am convinced by Tilly's research that these developments, together with the allied development of capitalism, have had significant effects on the nature and incidence of collective violence. But I also hold that changes in the form of collective violence -- which tend to be relatively abrupt -- cannot adequately be explained by changes in state capacity and capitalist development that by their nature are relatively gradual and incremental. I argue instead that forms of collective action, and therefore of collective violence, are profoundly affected by the changing forms of the state on whose territory they occur. Major political upheavals -- such as the French revolutions of 1789, 1830, and 1848 -- effect changes not only in states' institutions of government, coercion, and control, but in their cultural foundations as well. Such regime changes institute redefinitions of sovereignty, of legitimate forms of political action, and of the nature and identities of legal and social categories in civil society. Regime changes are crucial in the history of collective violence because they significantly reconstitute the bases of collective loyalties and collective action. Political events, then, are of central importance to explaining changing forms of collective violence. But it also is true that collective violence is centrally important in effecting changes in political regimes. Riots, revolts, strikes, and insurrections bring down old regimes and help to define the shape of new regimes. Far from being mere effects of anonymous sociological causes, incidents of collective violence contribute importantly to shaping the history of states and consequently to changing the shape of collective violence itself.
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN THE OLD REGIME

According to my reading of Tilly’s own evidence, virtually all acts of collective violence that took place between the late seventeenth century and the French Revolution were undertaken by or on behalf of a corporate community of some kind. Although the purpose of the actions and the specific identity of the groups varied enormously, the ways in which claims could be formulated and the kinds of groups that could be mobilized on behalf of these claims was constrained by the culturally available means of forming collective loyalties. In France of the old regime, these loyalties were necessarily corporate.

According to official representations of the social order, the entire realm of France was composed of corporate bodies. A remonstrance by the Parlement of Paris dating from 1776 states this view succinctly. 

Your subjects, Sire, are divided into as many different bodies as there are different estates in the Kingdom. The Clergy, the Nobility, the sovereign courts, the lower tribunals, the officers attached to these tribunals, the universities, the academies, the chartered companies...in every part of the State bodies exist which can be regarded as links in a great chain, the first link of which is in the hands of Your Majesty as head and sovereign administrator of all that constitutes the body of the Nation.10

The kingdom itself is a body, with the king as its head, and with a congeries of subordinate bodies as its members, or, employing the Parlement’s mixed metaphor, as links in a chain. It should be noted that the Parlement’s list of the corporate bodies composing the kingdom, while quite extensive, is far from complete. It does not, for example, list the countless additional bodies of magistrates and officials, or the provinces, or the cities, or the religious orders, or the trade guilds, let alone the more shadowy and contested corporate bodies of the rural and urban poor that were likely to get involved in violent incidents.

What was the nature of these corporations as communities? Their very existence and identity depended on their possession of privileges. Privileges were, literally, private laws. A corporation, according to the jurists, was a distinct legal person, and its privileges were the laws, rights, and exemptions that belonged to it privately. A corporation’s privileges were derived from grants or donations by the king, or from custom, or from "immemorial possession," as the phrase
went. But they depended, ultimately, upon the king, who, as God's vicar, was the font of all worldly honor. A corporation was, thus, a distinct, self-regulating community, whose members were bound to each other and divided from members of any other body by their common possession of a particular set of accumulated privileges.¹¹

Corporate bodies of the sort listed by the Parlement or described by the jurists could produce parchments or printed documents that stated their privileges in exhaustive detail. They actually had plenty of occasions to do so, since their claims were constantly being threatened by other bodies with overlapping claims or by agents of the state. A society composed of privileged corporations was rife with conflicts over jurisdiction, powers, and precedence. A revealing example is provided by Jean-Claude Perrot's study of the provincial city Caen in the eighteenth century. He shows how the trade guilds in Caen were involved in incessant lawsuits against each other: tanners against curriers, curriers against shoemakers, tailors against old-clothes dealers, grocers against apothecaries, blacksmiths against cutlers, and so on. These conflicts were serious business: the loser might be swallowed up by the winner, like the twelve different trades, ranging from cutlers to tapestry weavers, who were annexed by the mercers of Caen between 1700 and 1762.¹² Besides these internecine battles, the guilds also had to defend themselves against a state bent on reforms. In 1776, the royal administration formally abolished the guilds altogether, and even when the abolition was rescinded a few months later, the guilds were consolidated, streamlined and otherwise "reformed" by decree of the government.¹³ Finally, the guilds also had to defend themselves against private individuals who attempted to exercise the trade in violation of the guild's exclusive privilege. Officially recognized corporations such as the trade guilds were constantly in conflict either with one another, or with interlopers who sought to avoid their jurisdiction, or with that most powerful of all corporations, the state. Since they had official legal standing, their aggressive or defensive actions usually took the form of lawsuits -- or, alternatively, of using their connections to influence the actions of the king and his agents. Generally speaking, violent actions were the recourse of corporate bodies -- or of would-be corporate bodies -- whose privileges lacked clear legal standing.
The poor and powerless classes of pre-revolutionary France were rarely able to establish full-fledged, officially recognized corporate organizations. Yet when they organized themselves they did so in corporate forms, and when they acted in defense of their interests they understood and justified those interests in terms consistent with the overall corporate constitution of society. An extreme and extremely interesting case of unrecognized, illegal corporate organizations were compagnonnages, secret brotherhoods of young journeyman artisans that were the most important form of workers' organizations in France from the seventeenth century down to the 1830s. Compagnonnages were, in many respects, more corporate than the officially recognized corporations. If corporations based their privileges on venerable grants by French kings, the compagnonnages traced theirs all the way back to foundation by King Solomon in biblical times. If corporations had formal statutes to govern their activities, compagnonnages were governed by unbelievably elaborate rules, filled with the most exacting punctilio. If corporations enhanced their dignity and reaffirmed their collective loyalty by means of periodic rituals, the celebrations of the compagnonnages were both more frequent and more elaborate. And if corporations were constantly engaged in conflicts to defend their privileges, compagnonnages struggled not only against their employers and the employers' guilds, against state authorities who attempted to stamp them out, and against journeymen who refused to join their brotherhoods, but against rival sects of compagnonnages. There were in fact three sects of compagnonnages, which regarded the others as apostates and staged ambushes, raids, and bloody battles at every possible opportunity. These combats were a very common form of collective violence in urban France right down to the 1840s.14

But it was unusual for the poor and powerless to succeed in creating such elaborate corporate organizations as compagnonnages. In the villages of rural France, communities tended to lack either the elaborate secret organizations of the urban journeymen or the legally enforceable privileges of officially recognized corporations. There were corporate organizations in many villages, but their privileges generally depended almost exclusively on the strength of local custom. Important examples were "youth abbies" or "bachelors' companies" -- organizations of the young
bachelors of the village which often took the form of religious confraternities. These youth abbies had the customary function of maintaining surveillance over courting and marriage behavior, and it was they who performed charivaris outside the windows of an old widower who had just married a young woman, or sat a husband who had been beaten by his wife backwards on an ass and dragged him through the street whacking him with wooden spoons, or otherwise mocked and mistreated those who had outraged local standards of propriety. They were de facto corporations endowed with the customary privilege of punishing those who violated the standards of the village community.  

It is particularly important to recognize that the whole range of violent actions Tilly classifies as "reactive" were based on claims of a corporate type. This is true of the tax rebellion, the grain riot, and the invasion of enclosure. In the tax rebellion, the villagers' assaults on tax collectors were justified by the claim that the village was obliged to pay only the kinds and the level of taxation it had customarily paid in the past. In these riots the villagers invoked their particular established rights and privileges as a community and they resorted to violence to defend those rights. Their action was actually indistinguishable in its justifications from the nobility's long and much more successful resistance against the crown's attempts to force them to pay new taxes. The difference was that the nobility could defend its legally recognized privileges by legal and nonviolent means, while the peasants could defend theirs only by violent resistance -- resistance that was invariably overcome by the superior force of the state.  

Similarly, the grain riot was an attempt to defend the village community against those who violated its customary right to purchase locally produced grain. Here one common feature of the grain riot is particularly revealing. Grain rioters often demanded that local officials carry out the traditional but no longer enforced market regulations requiring all locally-produced grain to be put up for sale in the local market place. And the common practice of selling seized grain at a "just price" indicates that the rioters saw themselves as collectively filling the role abandoned by local officials. The grain riot, like the tax riot, was an assertion, through violent action, of the customary community privileges that public authorities would no longer recognize.
A similar pattern was repeated in invasions of enclosure. The men and women who broke down fences to gather firewood or to graze their cattle on enclosed land did so to enforce the villagers’ long-standing but recently denied communal rights to use the land. Again, they justified their actions in terms of the particular rights of the community, sometimes even citing the lord who had originally granted these rights. Thus Tilly describes the invasion of a wood by seventeenth-century winegrowers from Dijon. They cited their right to cut wood, which they said was the "result of concessions granted to the winegrowers by the Duke of Burgundy, as has often been practiced in the past when required by bad weather as in the present year when the need is great." Once again, the rural community had to enforce its customary rights and privileges by direct action because effective legal redress was denied.

This admittedly all-too-brief survey of collective violence under the old regime leads to important conclusions. An examination of the claims put forward by the perpetrators of violent acts makes it clear that the actors were exerting themselves on behalf of what they saw as a legitimate corporate community, defined, like any other corporate community, by its customary rights and privileges. In undertaking violent action, members of village communities were asserting their existence as corporations no less substantial than the other corporations that composed the state. If their claims were "backward-looking" it is because the only public claims that were recognized in a corporate society were claims to pre-existing privileges. (It should be noted in passing that all sorts of innovative and aggressive actions undertaken by corporations were formulated and justified in backward-looking terms.) If the scope of these actions rarely extended beyond the local community, it is because the corporate loyalties of pre-revolutionary France were defined by the specific privileges of a particular community. For ordinary French men and women before the Revolution of 1789, loyalties defined in terms of abstract rights, or voluntary associations, or a common relation to the means of production would have seemed absurd. They fought for the maintenance of their customary corporate privileges, and therefore for their very existence as recognized units of a corporate social order.
THE REVOLUTIONARY RUPTURE

For Tilly, the French Revolution of 1789 marked no rupture in the history of collective action. I believe that he is mistaken. The French Revolution was not, as Tilly implies, just another step in the long march of rising state power. It totally redefined the nature of the French state and society. By doing so, it also created entirely new possibilities for collective action. The revolutionaries annihilated all legally established corporations and set out to build a new state on the basis of natural rights, civil equality, individual liberty, and national sovereignty. The new social order began with what it took to be a given of nature -- independent, individual persons endowed with natural rights. The state was formed on this natural basis by a social contract, an act of voluntary agreement among hitherto independent individuals to associate with one another under common laws in pursuit of the common good. The nation or state formed by this act of association was a creation of the general will; as such it was to command the supreme loyalty of all its citizens.

I would argue that this redefinition of the state made possible for the first time the kind of collective action Tilly calls "proactive" -- that is, action based on formally organized voluntary associations attempting to influence national policies of the state. Even before the Revolution, the eighteenth century in France was a time of considerable experimentation in forms of social relations. A number of new types of organizations contributed importantly to one of the most potent novelties of the eighteenth century: the formation of a public sphere and "public opinion." But such associations were either informal (the salons) or privileged bodies under royal charter (the various royal and provincial academies) or secret and defined by elaborate oaths and ritual (freemasons). Openly organized voluntary associations that discussed public issues, and that consequently could engage in "proactive" collective action, were strictly illegal under the old regime. It was not until the heady days of the "prerevolution," when the state's monopoly on public affairs had utterly collapsed, that the first public voluntary associations appeared (for example the abolitionist organization "La Société des Amis des Noirs"). But it was above all the redefinition of the state itself in associational terms in 1789 that made the voluntary association
available as a basis of collective action by ordinary French men and women. All over the country, citizens joined together in associations to discuss the public good and to influence the course of the revolution. These associations differed sharply from corporate bodies. They claimed no privileges and their members were bound to one another only by their voluntary adherence to the association and their common vision of the public good. These political societies spawned a great deal of collective violence in the revolutionary years as they organized processions, demonstrations, and public meetings -- and sometimes punitive raids -- to promote their vision of the public welfare. 20

If the French Revolution effectively created the voluntary association as a basis for collective action, it also created a for the first time a national public sphere in which such groups could act. Under the old regime's corporate definition of the state, only the king and the Royal administration could claim to be truly public actors. Corporate bodies, by contrast, were private or particular rather than public. Corporations were expected to act in defense of their particular privileges, but they could not claim a positive role in shaping public policy -- that was a monopoly of the royal will. But when sovereignty was declared to inhere in a nation composed of free and equal individual citizens rather than in the person of the monarch, individuals, and freely formed associations of individuals, became legitimate public actors, fully capable of envisioning the national public good and of acting upon their visions. The revolution, in short, made possible not only a new associationally based form of collective action, but "forward-looking" or programatic action aimed at the nation state. It established for the first time the conditions for Tilly's "proactive" collective action.

It also followed from the French Revolution's redefinition of the state that neither collective action nor collective loyalties could be restricted to a particular community. Corporately defined communities were by nature highly particularistic. Their very existence was defined by the possession of particular privileges, and they lacked both the inclination and the right to band together to pursue goals that spanned more than one corporate community. But in the new national state, the citizens had to be empowered to act in concert with fellow citizens not only in their own village or trade, but all over the nation. Thus such associations as the Jacobin Club
could have affiliated chapters in dozens of cities and towns all across the country. Based on the
general category of citizen and on national rather than particular loyalties, the Jacobins formed a
coordinated, nation-wide movement of a kind that would have been impossible -- indeed
unthinkable -- for the corporate groups of the old regime.

Finally, the French Revolution also invented a new and supreme category of collective
violence: the popular insurrection. There were, of course, large scale uprisings against constituted
authority long before the French Revolution. These were more or less interchangeably called
insurrections, revolts, uprisings, mutinies, rebellions or seditions. But the meaning of insurrection
was transformed and elevated in the Revolution so that it was no longer a synonym for revolt,
mutiny, rebellion, or sedition. Whereas these terms continued to imply an illegitimate uprising of
some fraction of the population against state authority, insurrection became the name for an
uprising of the sovereign people, an uprising that, upon succeeding, formed the very basis of the
state's legitimacy. The first great popular insurrection of the Revolution, the storming of the
Bastille on July 14, 1789, was a relatively spontaneous uprising against a perceived threat of
Royal aggression; it was continuous with any number of old regime revolts or rebellions. But in
retrospect, it came to be interpreted as an insurrection in a new sense: a self-conscious attempt on
the part of the French people to overthrow the old regime and to establish a new governing power,
in this case the National Assembly. If the storming of the Bastille was essentially spontaneous
and was not experienced as an insurrection in the new sense at the time, later insurrections, such
as those of August 1792, May-June 1793, or the nineteenth century insurrections of 1830, 1834,
1839, 1848, 1870, and 1871 were specifically understood by their participants as uprisings in
which the people would impose their sovereign will on the state by overthrowing the existing
government and establishing another more to their liking. Insurrections, both failed and
successful, were of course rare events in a statistical sense, but they were obviously of enormous
importance to post-revolutionary French politics. And they could only exist in a the political
universe created by the revolution, one in which sovereignty was believed to rest in the people.
The French Revolution, in summary, created momentous new possibilities for collective action. It created and disseminated widely a new associational idiom of group organization and loyalty. It created a national public sphere in which ordinary citizens and their associations were legitimate public actors. And it created the popular insurrection as a legitimate and self-conscious means of changing political regimes. In all of these ways, it opened a new era in the history of French collective loyalties and collective action.

A LONG TRANSITION

The French Revolution was, then, an utterly crucial turning point in the history of French collective violence, one in which Tilly's "proactive" violence first emerged. But the revolution did not change everything. The traditional "competitive" and "reactive" forms of violence -- the food riot, the tax revolt, the invasion of enclosure, the charivari -- lived on for another six decades, flared up once again alongside massive incidence of "proactive" violence from 1848 to 1851, but then abruptly disappeared from the scene. From 1789 to 1851, two different forms of collective violence, based on two different forms of collective loyalties, flourished side by side. This poses two questions: why this long coexistence? and why the disappearance of the older forms after 1851? I will offer three reasons.

The first reason is Tilly's. State centralization and capitalist development were quite incomplete during the French Revolution, and both progressed only gradually during the ensuing sixty years. The Second Empire actually marked a distinct acceleration in both processes. In The Contentious French, Tilly prints a telling graph of the French state's police budget from 1825 to 1880, and it shows an remarkable leap in the 1850s. This form of state centralization, at least, was highly concentrated in the period when reactive violence disappeared. Moreover, the authoritarian political system installed by Napoleon III was based on an intrusive management of elections in villages all over France by means of patronage, threats, and inducements; it paradoxically had the effect of making even previously unpolticized rural populations far more aware than before of the importance of national political forces. The Second Empire also had a
particularly rapid rate of economic growth; of particular significance for the development of a national economy, this was the era when the basic French rail network was laid. But how, one might ask, could the sudden disappearance of a form of collective violence in 1852 be explained by an acceleration of capitalist development and state centralization that only began in that same year? In fact, the claim is far from absurd. The police state that was established at the beginning of the Second Empire was so repressive that all forms of collective violence -- competitive, reactive, and proactive -- essentially disappeared together from 1852 until 1867. But when the Empire was liberalized in the later 1860s and political life revived, only proactive forms of collective action and violence reemerged. It is reasonable to claim that the rapid pace of state formation and capitalist development in the intervening decade and a half could have contributed importantly to extinguishing corporate and local loyalties.

The second reason it took so long for associationally organized and nationally oriented forms of collective action to displace corporately organized and locally oriented forms was that it also took a long time for the revolutionary political culture to win out over the political culture of the old regime. The First Republic, declared in 1792, was wildly unstable and finally collapsed when faced with Napoleon's coup d'état in 1799. From then to 1848, France experimented with various hybrid forms of state and political culture: an Empire until 1815, a reactionary Legitimist but constitutional monarchy from then to 1830, and a liberal constitutional monarchy until 1848. During a period when France was suspended between revolutionary and monarchical or aristocratic forms of government, it is hardly surprising that collective action also was suspended between "reactive" and "proactive" forms. Moreover, some important "hybrid" forms of collective organization, which combined both corporate and associational principles, were developed during this period. But if the unstable stalemate between revolutionary and monarchical political cultures helps to explain why reactive collective violence survived down to the Second Republic, it certainly cannot explain why such forms of violence disappeared during the Second Empire, yet another hybrid regime that ruled from 1852 to 1870.
The third reason is perhaps not so much a separate reason as a specification of how the long struggle between revolutionary and monarchist political cultures affected forms of collective action. The development of associative organizational forms was not, as Tilly’s narrative implies, merely the outcome of the anonymous macro-social processes of capital formation and state building. It was, rather, the subject of sustained, self-conscious, and complex political struggles. In the remainder of this article, I will sketch out the crucial but little remarked history of the politics of association from the French Revolution to the Second Empire. This history helps to explain, I believe, both the intermingling of different forms of collective action for much of the nineteenth century and the triumph of proactive or associative collective actions and loyalties in the waning years of the Second Empire.

The French Revolution of 1789, by making the state itself into an association, certainly launched an associational organizational idiom in French politics and society. However, this idiom also had some important restrictions. Above all, revolutionary legislation recognized the legitimacy of only one kind of association, the association formed to act on behalf of "la chose publique," or the public good. In part because the Revolution had initially been made against the privileged and corporate order of the old regime, the revolutionaries were obsessed by the Rousseauean concept of the unitary general will. A nation or people, according to this doctrine, was a single and unified political body, and it could have only one will. Partial bodies could only fracture the general will, and hence could not be tolerated. Hence, when associationally constructed organizations such as the Jacobin clubs or the Parisian sections engaged in demonstrations or insurrections, they thought of themselves as acting on behalf of the people as a whole, not on behalf of their association or of any class or group whose interests their association might represent. Associations formed to further the interests of any particular group -- say a profession, a region, a class, or an ethnic or religious group -- were regarded as illegitimate, as surreptitious attempts to revive the selfish interests of the abolished corporations.

Revolutionary authorities could outlaw the formation of associations intermediate between the individual and the nation, but they could hardly keep people who lived and worked in specific
communities and occupational groups from developing common sentiments and interests. In the first years of the revolution, when the boundaries of the new social and political order were still hazy, some groups in fact attempted to redefine their formerly corporate group loyalties in terms of the new associational idiom. During 1790 and 1791, for example, journeymen in a number of Parisian trades formed associations -- such as "The Typographical and Philanthropic Club," or the "Fraternal Union of Workers in the Art of Carpentry" -- that attempted to represent the interests of workers in relations with their employers. I believe that the brief flowering of such associations represented an important but suppressed possibility of the Revolution -- a wholesale restructuring of selective old regime group loyalties into new associationally based loyalties, a restructuring that could have been undertaken by ordinary people rather than at the initiative of the revolutionary state. But the authorities choked off such possibilities quickly. As soon as the existence of such associations was brought to the attention of the National Assembly, it outlawed them in the famous Le Chapelier Law -- on the grounds, as the law's preamble put it, that there are no longer corporations in the State; there is no longer anything but the particular interest of each individual, and the general interest. It is permitted to no one to inspire an intermediary interest in citizens, to separate them from the public interest by a spirit of corporation.

Rather than embracing a possible proliferation of popularly constructed associations representing various "intermediate" interests, the revolutionary legislators branded such associations and interests as counter-revolutionary. The consequence was that the associative organizational vocabulary bequeathed by the revolution to the nineteenth century contained no legitimate means of expressing loyalty to groups intermediate between the individual and the nation as a whole. It should therefore hardly be surprising that peasants, artisans, and workers, who were denied the possibility of transforming their preexisting corporate loyalties into acceptable associational forms, continued to conceptualize their loyalties in familiar corporate terms. And this, of course, also implied that they continued to engage in "competitive" and "reactive" forms of collective violence.

Ordinary people had no strong motive for developing an associational vocabulary for organizing intermediary interests either under the highly repressive Imperial regime that snuffed
out the First French Republic in 1799, or under the vaguely corporatist and less repressive Bourbon Monarchy that replaced it in 1815 -- although, by the same token, neither regime restored pre-revolutionary corporate institutions either. But the Revolution of 1830 put the issue of associations back onto the political agenda. The Liberal monarchy established in 1830 greatly relaxed restrictions on the formation of associations, and workers, especially in Paris and Lyon, responded by transforming their existing corporate organizations into politically active "philanthropic" trade associations remarkably similar in language and form to those created in 1790 and 1791. By 1833, workers' associations, aided by the left wing of the republican opposition, began to claim that association was in fact the most important of all citizen rights, and at the same time began to use their associative organizations to impose collective regulations over conditions of labor by means of strikes. Faced by this proliferation of associationally based agitation, the government panicked: early in 1834 it passed a statute outlawing the associations that workers had established. This provocation resulted in an insurrection by workers both in Paris and Lyon -- who rose up against what they saw as the government's callous denial of the sacred right to associate.30

The insurrection was quickly put down, but the issue of association was not so easily repressed. In the course of the later 1830s and 1840s, the republican opposition to the monarchical regime became a firm advocate of freedom of association, largely in order to attract widespread working-class support.31 And when the republicans were put in power by a new insurrection in February of 1848, they immediately lifted all restrictions on associations. The consequence was an immediate proliferation of all kinds of associations in every corner of the country. The Revolution of 1848, in other words, finally legitimated associations of all types, including those that expressed the interests of some group intermediate between the state and the individual. Moreover, the associationally based political agitation of the Second Republic penetrated considerably deeper into the villages of rural France than had the comparable agitations of the First Republic.32
The Second Empire, of course, suppressed most of the associations that had flourished under the Second Republic. But when Napoleon III decided to liberalize the Empire in the mid-1860s, one of his key strategies was to coopt a major Republican issue by gradually easing restrictions on associations -- for example, by granting workers the right to strike in 1864, and by allowing public meetings and legalizing the formation of labor unions in 1868. Even combined, these measures failed to reinstat fully the right of association that had been suppressed at the time of Louis Napoleon's coup d'état in 1851, but they clearly moved in that direction. These measures, along with the general liberalization of the Empire -- the relaxation of state control over the press, the increasing authority and autonomy of the legislature, the restoration of reasonably free elections -- did not, as the Emperor had hoped, result in a wave of gratitude from the public. Rather, it touched off a series of public demonstrations, electoral rallies, and violent strikes in 1868-69, followed by a disastrous electoral defeat of the Bonapartists in 1869. These political catastrophes forced the Emperor to name Emile Ollivier, a staunch supporter of the liberty of association and other liberal measures, as Prime Minister in 1870. Had this "Liberal Empire" not been cut short by defeat in the Franco-Prussian War and the consequent Republican revolution of September 4, the Second Empire, rather than the Third Republic, would have made associations the normal, unproblematic means of organizing and expressing the interests and acting out the loyalties of all kinds of groups, political and otherwise.

In the long struggle between republican and monarchical political cultures, the question of the right to form associations played an increasingly central role. Initially neither republicans nor monarchists favored legalizing associations that would represent interests and loyalties intermediate between the individual and the state. But following the great burst of associational based working-class activity in the wake of the Revolution of 1830, the republican opposition embraced the right of association as a fundamental liberty. Thereafter, the founding of a republic necessarily entailed establishing freedom of association, and even the Second Empire was driven to the same measures as a desperate means of staving off a republican victory. It was in the crucible of political struggle that associative forms of organization and collective action were forged.
and reforged. The rise of the associative organizational idiom, and consequently of "proactive" collective action, was governed not by the relatively gradual and continuous rhythms of state and capital forimation, but by the highly punctual and syncopated rhythms of political struggle. The major turning points were moments -- the aftermath of the revolutions of 1789, 1830, 1848 and of the liberalization of the Second Empire in the late 1860s -- when deep political crises put the very categories of state and society up for grabs. "Proactive" collective action was not a natural and inevitable outgrowth of economic and political centralization. Otherwise it would have appeared long before 1789 and its post-revolutionary history would have been far less convoluted. It was, rather, a political and cultural invention with an autonomous (or at least relatively autonomous) political and cultural history.

CONCLUSIONS

Much of Tilly's account of the history of French collective violence survives the scrutiny to which I have subjected it in this article. His typology of collective violence gets at important differences and makes it possible to specify the nature and direction of long-term changes in the way ordinary French people envisaged and acted on their collective interests. He has convincingly argued that the centralization of the French state and the rise of a capitalist economy are major determinants of the nature of collective struggles. And he has identified and drawn attention to a crucial and previously underappreciated turning point -- the Revolution of 1848 and the ensuing political struggles -- that marked the end of a long epoch of "competitive" and "reactive" of collective violence.

But Tilly's account also has important limitations and confusions. First, because he is not interested in the cultural meaning embodied in forms of collective action, he does not recognize the full implications of his typological distinctions between "proactive" violence on the one hand and "reactive" and "competitive" violence on the other. Tilly apparently regards this distinction as purely instrumental, as merely a useful way of summarizing empirical differences that show up in cases of violent action. Hence he has blithely changed his terminology every few years, and has
come perilously close to dropping the distinction altogether in *The Contentious French*. He has labelled different types of collective violence by shifting and relatively superficial features -- by whether they are "backward looking" or "forward looking" (primitive vs. reactionary vs. modern), by what relation, if any, they have to state policies (competitive vs reactive vs proactive), or by how closely they are tied to local issues and social superiors (parochial and patronized vs national and autonomous). What Tilly has failed to recognize is that the forms of collective violence are linked to two successive cultural constitutions of the French state and society -- the first monarchical, Christian, and corporate and the second republican, secular, and associational.

This blindness to the cultural dimension of collective action is closely linked to his underestimation of the importance of the French Revolution. It was, after all, the French Revolution that accomplished the cultural reconstitution of political and social categories that is reflected in the contrast between reactive and proactive violence. By suppressing privileged corporations and creating a new state legitimated by the rhetoric of social contract, the French Revolution established a new public sphere and instituted a powerful new associative idiom in whose terms French men and women could now define and act out their social loyalties. These new forms of collective actions and collective loyalties gave rise to new types of collective violence, including the insurrection, a new category of public violence that stood at the very foundation of the revolutionary state. The French Revolution did not, of course, result in a sudden and complete change in forms of collective violence. The continuing social and cultural power of old regime collective loyalties, together with the uncertain legal status of the new associative organizational forms, gave competitive and reactive forms of collective violence a continuing lease on life down to the middle of the nineteenth century. The French Revolution, in other words, launched a new era of associatively based collective action. It was followed by a sixty year transitional period during which both associative and corporate forms of collective action and loyalties shared the stage, until, from the mid 1860s on, associative collective action finally gained the monopoly it has held ever since.
The French Revolution of 1789 must, consequently, be regarded as at least as important a turning point as the Revolution of 1848. 1789 marked the beginning of a long period of transition from corporate to associative forms of collective action -- a period also characterized by the development of hybrid quasi-corporate associations -- that 1848 brought to an end. But I think there are actually strong arguments for regarding 1789 as the more significant turning point. First, 1789 marked the creation of an entire new category of collective action, while 1848 saw no such fundamental cultural creativity. Moreover, the emergence of the new category of proactive collective violence in 1789 was relatively sudden and clear, whereas the disappearance of the old competitive and reactive forms took place over a longer period of time -- from 1851 to the middle 1860s -- and by a process that, in my account as in Tilly's, remains considerably more obscure. The period of transition that lasted from the French Revolution to the liberalization of the Second Empire began with a bang, but it ended with something of a whimper.

Tilly has greatly underestimated the significance of the French Revolution in the history of French collective violence. This failure of historical judgement is symptomatic, I believe, of a more fundamental theoretical problem, an "evolutionary" conceptualization of temporality that mars not only Tilly's work, but much writing in historical sociology generally. Rather than seeing history as composed of a series of largely contingent "events" that reconfigure existing social and cultural structures or forces, historical sociologists commonly assert the primacy of long-term, anonymous trends that underlie supposedly superficial events and provide the real meaning of history. In part this assertion has always been a means for sociologists to claim a distinctive and more scientific form of knowledge than that produced by their academic rivals the historians, who have traditionally emphasized the importance of accident, personality, and choice in shaping the course of history.

Because Tilly sees modern history as shaped by the underlying master processes of state centralization and capitalist development, he understands such events as the French revolutions of 1789 and 1848 only as accelerations of existing sociological processes rather than as deep political and cultural reconfigurations of existing forces and structures capable of changing the very
directions and dynamics of history. Here, Tilly is squarely within the great tradition of sociology, as represented not only by Tocqueville and Marx, but by Tönnies (Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft), Weber (rationalization), and Durkheim (mechanical to organic solidarity), and more recently by hordes of writers on modernization -- all of whom insist that it is the anonymous long-term evolutionary dynamics of societies, rather than such political events as wars, revolutions, liberalizations, conquests, monarchical successions, or reforms that give shape and meaning to history.33

I do not wish to dispute the essential truth of the sociologists’ argument against traditional historiography -- that, mesmerized by the play of political events, it ignored the operation of more anonymous social forces that shape the course of history. But most historians have long since conceded this point; the great revolution that has swept over historiographical practice during since the 1960s -- as exemplified by the French Annales school, the British Marxist historians, or the American new social history -- has been based on precisely this recognition. Indeed, the Annalistes, at least until recently, have been as explicitly and systematically hostile to what Braudel stigmatized as "l'histoire évenémentielle" (history of events) as any historical sociologist.34 The task facing the current generation of historical sociologists and social historians, as I see it, is to find means of simultaneously recognizing the importance of long-term and anonymous historical processes and the transformative power of events. I hope my analysis of the history of French collective violence contributes to this effort.

I have argued that as important as such anonymous sociological processes as state centralization and capitalist development are, they are far from sufficient to explain why, when, or how forms of collective action, and hence of collective violence, have changed through history. I have attempted to demonstrate that historical events -- preeminently, in this case, revolutions, but also restorations, failed insurrections, coups d'état, and liberalizations -- fundamentally shape people's collective loyalties and actions. I have also attempted to demonstrate that political events have a transformative power that goes beyond such obvious political effects as redistribution of power or reshaping of political strategies. Events, I argue, are powerful largely because they are
literally significant. They shape history by changing the cultural meanings or significations of political and social categories, consequently changing people’s possibilities for meaningful action. In the case at hand, the French Revolution, supplemented by the subsequent elaboration of a broader associational vocabulary in the Revolutions of 1830 and 1848, permanently transformed the way ordinary French men and women could conceptualize and act out their collective loyalties. In this case, and more generally, significant political events transformed the very dynamics of history.
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NOTES

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9. Tilly, The Vendée, especially chapters 6 and 11.


17. See note 6.


20. Tilly notes the invention of many new forms of collective action in the revolution, but does not note that this was the first time that formally organized special-purpose voluntary associations appeared on the French political scene. The Contentious French, pp.388-9, "Getting It Together in Burgundy," pp. 494-5.

21. "Insurrection" was a considerably less common term than the others prior to the revolution. It was not defined in Antoine Furetière’s Dictionnaire Universel, 3 vols (Paris, 1690), or in the Dictionnaire de l'Académie Française as late as the fourth edition, 2 vols. (Paris, 1762). It was defined, however, in the Dictionnaire de Trévoux, 5 vols. (Paris, 1771), as "the action of rising against someone, uprising." To judge from this definition, the term insurrection was considerably less pejorative in meaning than most of its synonyms. The definitions of comparable terms from the Dictionnaire de Trévoux all stress the illegitimate character of the uprising in a way that the definition of "insurrection" does not: "Rebellion. Uprising, revolt against the legitimate authority; open resistance to the orders of one’s Sovereign;" "Revolt. Uprising of a People, of the Subjects against the Sovereign, against the legitimate authority, or of an inferior against his superior;" "Sedition...uprising against the legitimate authority." And the verb "to mutiny" is defined as follows: "To refuse to obey, to revolt against one’s master, against one’s duty." The term "insurrection" could even have connotations of legitimacy. The entry under "insurrection" in the Encyclopédie notes that "such was the name given to the right of uprising accorded to the citizens of Crete, when the magistrates abused power and transgressed the laws. On such occasions the people were permitted to rise up, to expel the guilty magistrates, and to name others in their place." Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisoné des sciences, des arts, et des métiers, vol. 8 (Neuchâtel: Samuel Faulche, 1755), p. 804. The revolutionaries were surely attracted to the term "insurrection" both because it was less commonly used than the other terms and therefore less associated with illegitimate uprisings and because, thanks to its classical references, it alone among words for uprisings carried some implication of legitimacy. In the revolutionary period this association of "insurrection" with legitimacy became much more prominent. Hence, when the term finally entered the Dictionnaire de l’Académie Française, in the sixth edition (Paris: Firmin-Didier, 1835), it was defined as follows: "Insurrection. Uprising against the government. Those who employ this word ordinarily attach to it an idea of right or justice." See also Ferdinand Brunot's discussion of "insurrection" in Histoire de la Langue Française des Origines à 1900, vol. 9 La Révolution et l'Empire (Paris: Armand Colin, 1937), pp. 854-6.


26. See the graphs plotting the annual totals of violent events and of participants and arrests in such events in Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly, *Rebellious Century*, pp. 57-9. All of these totals were lower in the early years of the Second Empire than at any other time between 1832 and 1960.


33. The exception to this claim that the classical sociologists refuse to acknowledge the potentially formative power of events in modern history is Max Weber’s *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. by Talcott Parsons, introd. by Anthony Giddens, 2nd ed. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976). Weber’s notion of charisma, and the ever-present possibility of charismatic eruptions -- at least in pre-modern societies -- lies at the foundation of his interpretation of the Protestant Reformation. But once this particular charismatic eruption had (however perversely) launched the spirit of capitalism, the march of bureaucratic rationality, which locks us into an "iron cage," became inevitable.

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3 "Coffee, Copper, and Class Conflict in Central America and Chile: A Critique of Zeitlin's Civil Wars in Chile and Zeitlin and Ratcliff's Landlords and Capitalists," by Jeffery M. Paige, September 1987, 10 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper #347.


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