"What Social Theory Needs from History Now: Culture and Action as Problems for Historical Sociology"

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WHAT SOCIAL THEORY NEEDS FROM HISTORY NOW:
CULTURE AND ACTION AS PROBLEMS FOR HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY

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This paper has been prepared for presentation to the conference on "The Historical Turn in the Social Sciences," sponsored by the University of Michigan Center for the Study of Social Transformation. It is a very rough draft, and both charity and prudence suggest that it not be cited in any very specific way.
Arms, they say, are always getting ready to fight the last war. Something of the same thing may be true of scholarly combatants. Comparative and historical sociologists, for example, enjoyed glory days in the 1970s and 1980s while waging war on an old sort of functionalism, especially modernization theory, and its counterpart, a spuriously universalistic but in fact ethnocentric positivism. Classical modernization theory had given widespread credence to a universalistic, unilineal account of social and cultural change, one which led harmoniously to modern Western liberalism. Historical sociologists spoke out for greater variability in processes of social change, for the impact of earlier developmental patterns on later development efforts, and for basic tensions and contradictions in the processes of historical change which made it a matter of active struggle rather than automatic unfolding. Where modernization theorists emphasized transformations of cultural values and "becoming individually modern," the new historical sociologists often bent over backward to avoid cultural interpretation and socio-psychological accounts. With the bathwater of untenable assumptions, however, historical sociologists were often ready to throw out the babies of meaningful human action and concern for just what amounts to a basic historical change, especially an epochal transformation of cultural categories and forms of social relationship.  

This was not the first time sociologists found themselves constructing an exaggerated dichotomy between culture and society. This time as before, many complemented it with a further split between action and structure. Previous historical writing, especially "old-fashioned" narrative, was accused of suggesting that individuals and groups were able somehow to translate their ideologies directly into historical outcomes, that we could understand what happened in the Russian revolution, for example, by understanding what was in Lenin's head. It was not that analysts saw no role for action. The social structures which made actions possible and the strategies which made it rational were both important concerns. It was attempts to interpret what made action meaningful which were portrayed as lapses into naive voluntarism or impressionistic fuzziness. And, of course, there was enough naive voluntarism about to make this plausible, just as there were enough culturalists who were prepared to present culture as an autonomous and free-floating system, independent of any social organization or creative action. It was this, for example, which diminished the effectiveness of calls like Geertz's (1958) for taking culture more seriously and avoiding the pitfalls of sociologism and psychologism. In sociology, professional biases and powers were stacked against any interpretative account of culture or action. Phenomenology was as much the victim of this as cultural studies.

1. This was certainly not true for all, though few approaches combined both attention to epochal transformation and to culture. An account of what makes the modern world categorically distinctive is central to Wallerstein's world systems theory. Not coincidentally, perhaps, his work is in one sense among the most historical of historical sociologies. That is, it works by studying a process of change in all its phases rather than by abstracting several events--e.g. revolutions--from their historical contexts in order to look for general features of revolutions. Similarly, historical transformations in cultural and socio-psychological processes have been addressed importantly by Sennett (1976) and others. More typical, however, are accounts which reduce culture to ideology, and social psychology to rational interests. Various other babies also got thrown out with the bathwater of modernization theory--for example attention to the built environment or physical infrastructure--e.g. transportation and communications facilities--on social life.

2. Geertz, in "Ideology as a Cultural System," was writing with the basic Parsonsian conception of three subsystems of action--social, personality and cultural--and calling for a renewed appreciation of the relative autonomy of the last.
In the last twenty years, a good deal has been done to join action and structure
in a less dualistic account of structuration. Culture and society are still widely op-
posed, and for every sociologist stressing the primacy of social relations, there is a his-
torian, literary critic or symbolic anthropologist prepared to grant culture an utter
autonomy. Yet, this failure to join cultural and social analysis together makes it much
harder to grapple with "structuration," and throws enormous impediments in the way of
grasping basic qualitative transformations in human life. Think, for example, of how
social as well as cultural factors are needed to understand and substantiate George
Steiner's comment on qualitative change in 1789:

In ways which no preceding historical phenomenon had accomplished, the
French Revolution mobilized historicity itself, seeing itself as historical, as
transformative of the basic conditions of human possibility, as invasive of the
individual person. (1988: 150)

The French Revolution both reflected and furthered a fundamental categorial transfor-
mation in human self-understanding, a remaking of the person and an expansion of the
 Capacities of social action. Yet this was not an event in culture alone, or a cultural out-
come imaginable separately from the social struggles and material conditions which
made it possible. To begin to speak not just of "cultural systems" but of communications
media, literary markets and patronage, shifting relations between public and
private spaces and identities is to enter a discourse where the cultural cannot be
separated from the social. It is within this discourse that we can see the constitution
and transformation of basic categories of human life.

The search for a sociology which can take human action seriously without laps-
ing into a naive voluntarism or a naturalistic rationalism depends upon a complex, his-
torical understanding of culture. It requires, for example, an understanding of how
what it means to be a human actor can vary, an understanding which can only be
gained as part of a culturally and historically specific inquiry into the constitution of the
person. At the same time, an actorless account of culture, such as that characteristic
of most anthropology, and more recently of poststructuralism, cannot provide the neces-
sary dynamism or normative purchase for either good history or critical theory. Finally,
an account of the most basic transformations in history must appeal to action of some
sort if it is to offer an endogenous account of crucial changes, and one which avoids
either mechanistic determinism or the imputation that change is just an unfolding of
potentials structurally inherent in a cultural or social relational starting point. And it
must work in terms of the transformation of cultural categories, not only to avoid a
simple voluntarism, but to be able to identify what should count as qualitatively new
rather than merely quantitatively different. Capitalism, thus, is not merely different
from feudalism on a range of variables such as tendency to expand productivity or
reliance on money-mediated markets, it is incommensurable with feudalism because
basic categories and practices, like labor, either exist only in one, or have sharply dis-
tinct meanings in each, and cannot be carried on in both senses at once.

In the present paper, I want first to discuss the early orientations and legitima-
tion struggles of historical sociology, as these have shaped the field's relative inatten-
tion to the basic problems of culture, action and categorial transformation. Then I will
turn to look at possible approaches to culture, stressing the poverty of approaches

3. This term arises much earlier in Pierre Bourdieu's work, but has become more widely associated in
English with Anthony Giddens.

4. This is a problem charted early on for sociology in Marcel Mauss's classic--and all but forgotten--essay
on the category of the person (reprinted with commentary in Carrithers, Collins and Lukes, 1985). The
major contemporary exploration of this problem is Charles Taylor's The Sources of the Self (1989).
which either undercut attention to action, or render culture mere instrumental resource, or both, and the importance of historical constitution and transformation of categories for social theory.

**THE DOMESTICATION OF HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY**

Conventional approaches to historical sociology generally involve description of its methods and/or levels of analysis. Skocpol and Somers (1980; see also Skocpol, 1984), for example, mobilize Mill to distinguish between parallel demonstration of theory, contrast of contexts, and their favored combination of the two: macro-causal analysis. There is much good sense in Skocpol and Somers analysis, and reflection of our methods is important. But in this and other similar arguments there is also a curious tendency to try to describe historical sociology in terms of method or approach rather than substance. Skocpol and Somers, for example, ask at the outset of their article "What purposes are pursued--and how--through the specific modalities of comparative history?" Though they use a variety of substantive studies as examples, however, by "purposes pursued" they mean generic categories of methodological purposes. Does one pursue parallel demonstration of a theory, for example, or does one seek to contrast contexts? They do not mean what substantive theoretical or empirical problems does one aim to solve.

This methodological emphasis is part of a strategy of disciplinary legitimation. Its protagonists seek, implicitly or explicitly, to convince mainstream sociologists of the utility of what they do by playing into the penchant of mainstream sociologists for formal analytic techniques. They seek, in other words, to give historical sociology a status analogous to statistical research methods. There is some ambiguity as to whether this portrayal of historical analysis as a method is meant to call attention to the data gathering process--i.e. historical sociology is like survey methods--or to the data analysis process--i.e. historical sociology is like Lisrel. Either way, the substantive importance of historical work is underemphasized. Too often, this version of historical sociology can also be surprisingly ahistorical. It problematizes neither temporal processes nor the specificities of time and place, but rather amounts to doing conventional sociology with data drawn from the past. Similarly, sociologists doing longitudinal analyses with...
data plucked out of historical context now jump on the bandwagon of historical sociology—at least when there appear to be benefits. Finally, this account of historical work as a method obscures its methodological diversity. Historians and historical sociologists may use an enormously wide variety of techniques to gather and analyze data. Though they confront certain particular problems, and have certain advantages, these are not what set them apart from other sociologists most crucially. Rather, we need to emphasize the substantive reasons for doing historical sociology.

At a minimum, this involves recognizing four sorts of social phenomena which cannot be dealt with adequately through purely contemporaneous data sources:

1. Some important sociological phenomena, like revolutions (Skocpol, 1979) or settler societies (McMichael, 1984) occur only in a small number of cases. This makes it impossible to study them by most statistical techniques, and often difficult or impossible to use interviews, experiments or other contemporary research techniques to good effect because the rarity of the events means that a researcher might have to wait decades for the chance and/or it might be difficult to be on the scene at the right time.

2. Some particular events or cases of a broader phenomenon are theoretically important or have an intrinsic interest. For example, the case of Japan is crucial to all arguments about whether the origins of capitalist economic development depended on some specific cultural features of Western civilization (i.e. Europe and societies settled by Europeans). Could capitalism have developed elsewhere had Europeans not gotten to it first (Anderson, 1974)?

3. Some phenomena simply happen over an extended period of time. Many sociological research topics focus on fairly brief events, like marriages and divorces, adolescence, or the creation of new businesses. Other phenomena of great importance, however, happen on longer time scales. For example, industrialization, state formation, the creation of the modern form of family, and the spread of popular democracy all took centuries. Simply to look at present-day cases would be to examine only specific points in a long trajectory or course of development. This could lead not only to faulty generalizations but to a failure to grasp the essential historical pattern of the phenomenon in question.

4. For some phenomena changing historical context is a major set of explanatory variables. For example, changes in the structure of international trade opportunities, political pressures, technologies and the like all shape the conditions for economic development. The world context in which any one country tries to advance in economic terms will be an important determinant of what strategies work, which ones fail, and how far development will get (Wallerstein, 1974-88). When Britain became the world’s first industrial capitalist country in the late 18th and

7. In general, case studies are important supplements to statistical research because they allow detailed knowledge of specific instances of a more general phenomenon, as well as statements about the average or the overall pattern. Case studies are often misunderstood by those who ask whether cases are “typical” or “representative.” Case studies are often especially illuminating when focused on non-typical examples where they point up the limits to theoretical generalizations.
early 19th centuries, it did not have to compete with any other such powerful economic producer. When Japan became an industrial capitalist power, there were already many such, and there are even more to compete with new capitalist producers today.

Even an emphasis on the holes which must be left in a sociology which neglects history doesn't fully bring out the importance of historical sociology. The rest of that importance lies in the challenge which historical sociology poses, ideally, to (a) the canonical histories (and anthropologies) which have been incorporated into classical social theory and its successors, (b) the attempt to apply concepts and develop generalizations without attention to their cultural and historical specificity, and (c) the neglect of the historicity of all of social life. It is for these reasons that all sociologists need to be historical, at least in some part. A strategy of disciplinary legitimation which results in a historical sociology compartmentalized as a subfield, especially one defined vaguely by methodological approach, greatly impoverishes its potential contributions.

It would be hard in any case to find the methodological principle which unifies the major "classics" of the resurgence of historical sociology in the 1970s. Is it a method (or set of methods) which joins The Modern World System (Wallerstein, 1974), The Rebellious Century (Tilly, Tilly and Tilly, 1974), Lineages of the Absolutist State (Anderson, 1975), and States and Modern Revolutions (Skocpol, 1978) in a common discourse or makes them exemplars to generations of graduate students? One might at least as well point to their common bias in favor of broadly "structural" accounts and against either voluntaristic approaches to action or cultural interpretation. Surely, however, the importance of the works just mentioned derives primarily from their contributions to addressing important substantive theoretical or empirical problems or questions. But it is worth noting that nearly all the "classics" of the resurgence of historical sociology were works of political economy or political sociology (by a broad definition that includes work on class and collective action), and none took cultural analysis to be an important part of their project.

This emphasis on political and political economic topics reflects both the academic struggle against functionalism and modernization theory, and the broader struggles for participatory democracy and various forms of emancipation which shaped the resurgence of historical sociology twenty years ago. Since the battles of our youth, however, we historical sociologists have grown a bit fat with middle age, and widespread tenure has muted the agonistic character of our social movement. Struggle is something we recall, rather than encourage. It is easy to forget how much the resurgence of historical sociology owed to the politics of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Though an emphasis on political research topics remains, the connection between academic concerns and broader social struggles seems to have faded. This connection never existed for many younger scholars.

In the 1960s and 1970s, when modernization research was still a formidable antagonist, historical sociologists often took up a marxist standard in their theoretical polemics. Sociologists as different as Wallerstein, Tilly and Skocpol all paid obeisances of various sorts to marxist theory, though this seems to have mattered deeply only in Wallerstein's case. Perhaps more basically, marxist and marxist-influenced historiography exerted a wide influence through the work of Thompson, Hobsbawm, Braudel and many others. Even for non-marxist scholars, marxism framed

8. Here historical sociology is sharply distinct from "the new social history." The latter was also often political or political economic, but no so biased towards the "macro." Indeed, family history was important to social history in a way it never was to historical sociology (despite several good historical works by sociologists).
many of the key research questions. As time went on, however, the specific influence of Marxism waned in most versions of historical sociology. Not only did Weber loom increasingly large, but the links of historical sociology to any general theoretical discourse were attenuated.

Historical sociologists are still producing important scholarly work, but it has been surprisingly contained within the bounds of an academic specialization. The legitimation of this specialization through methodological claims has allowed substantive biases—like those against the interpretation of culture and meaningful action—to remain imprinted on the field without being subjected to much examination. Take the work of Robert Wuthnow, probably America’s foremost sociologist of culture, and one who has recent bracted into historical work with a monumental study of the Protestant Reformation, the Enlightenment and European socialism (Wuthnow, 1989). A guiding principle of Wuthnow’s work is that it is important for sociologists to approach culture as object, and correspondingly to avoid the interpretation of meaning. His historical study attempts to examine its three socio-cultural movements solely through attention to the social factors affecting the production, selection and institutionalization of dominant or enduring ideologies. Wuthnow debunks arguments that these complex ideologies are mere reflections of specific groups like rising bourgeoisie or specific material forces like markets. "Ideas are shaped but their social situations and yet manage to disengage from these situations" (1989: 5). More positively, he shows how economic expansion provided resources which had their main cultural effect by facilitating the growth of state agencies. These agencies transferred resources to cultural producers (patronage remaining a more important source of support than markets for cultural commodities). They enlarged the size of potential audiences by providing education and employment of many of those educated. They provided the focal point for new public spheres focused on issues raised by state policy, and called forth contention among cultural producers for state favors and attention. New state elites, moreover, weakened the ideological grip of longer established, especially landed, elites. This is all important. But note what factors Wuthnow feels constrained not to consider by virtue of his calling as sociologist: The intentions of individual actors, the force of ideas themselves, the fit between innovative ideas and existing cultural traditions, the practical problems which made people open to shifting from one way of thinking to another. Wuthnow’s approach to culture without action or meaning keeps it well within the sociological mainstream. The fact that the study is of historical movements (or that they form a chronological series) becomes coincidental. These are just cases for exploring the more general phenomenon of how movements of ideas reach critical take-off points (reason #1 above for historical sociology). 9 In fact, of course, the three cases are all fascinating and much of the interest of the book inheres in the historical

9. In a strong sense, in fact, Wuthnow’s case studies are really examples:

It seems most useful, therefore, to specify the range of relevant considerations at a relatively abstract level of generality, and then with the benefit of empirical examples to suggest at a more concrete level the particular manifestations of those abstractions that are most likely to become operative. (1989: 543)

Though the book comes with effusive dust-jacket praise from Skocpol, it is worth noting that in this respect Wuthnow violates Skocpol’s methodological strictures. He produces something very much like Smelser’s (1959) “black box” theory of social change—i.e. a general account into which specific cases are fitted. And though he does develop substantial case studies for comparison and contrast, this does not take the form of systematically comparing specific variables among the cases. One must take each case as a whole, within Wuthnow’s classification of cases; he does not present the evidence on, say the relationship between economic growth and voting patterns, in a systematically comparative form.
importance of the Reformation, Enlightenment and socialism. But Wuthnow cannot admit this, for it places the stress on the interpretation of the substance of the cases rather than on his methodological principles for general theoretical development.

In the early years of the resurgence of historical sociology, methodological claims had not been so predominant. At least as important was a re-engagement with classical social theory, a challenge to the Parsonsian construction of the canon. Most glaringly, Parsons had written Marx out of sociology's canon; Simmel and others were similarly excluded. Parsons had also produced skewed and somewhat impoverished readings of the main thinkers he did include. Last but not least, functionalist orthodoxy had subscribed to a notion of disciplinary division of labor which served to separate sociological discourse from that of anthropology (the proper domain of cultural analysis) and psychology (personality). Political science and economics fell into the properly sociological realm, Parsons claimed, and so closer relationships with those fields were inevitable. The behavioral revolution in political science so devalued normative political theory, however, that many political scientists, as well as sociologists, lost connection with it.

One of the losses in this construction of the canon was the idea of basic historical transformations. Sociologists, political scientists and economists were primarily concerned with the operation of the existing institutions of modern societies. They did not focus on the historical transformations which brought those societies into being or on the idea that they might be fundamentally transformed. Modernization theorists looked outside this terrain, but for the most part dropped the idea of basic historical transformations for a notion of evolutionary continuum. One of the most important impacts of marxism, when it was revitalized in the 1960s, was that it introduced such a notion of basic transformations into social science discourse. Marxism was also a very interdisciplinary discursive field, which played an important role in overcoming at least some of the blinders imposed by disciplinary boundaries.

The important role of marxism in the resurgence of historical sociology did not keep culture or the interpretation of meaningful human action in the foreground, but it did help to maintain a central place for the problematic of basic historical change. Marxism is one of the theories most attuned to the need to specify clear breaks between epochs, and to develop historical specific conceptual tools for understanding each.10 This is part, for example, of what Hobsbawm (1971) meant by distinguishing the history of society from social history in general. Social historians may study innumerable ways in which people are social; they may identify a host of commonalities or divergences in the routines of daily life. Simply looking at these specifics, however, does not give us a grip on basic transformations in fundamental forms of social arrangements. Consider, for example, the notion of "everyday forms of resistance," made popular recently by the "subaltern studies" group. There are indeed innumerable ways in which subalterns may resist the will of those who dominate them, or at least may resist submerging their identities in the hegemonic culture imposed on them. By means of dialect and the outright refusal of discourse, they insulate their worlds from the scrutiny of those from dominant groups. They move slowly, instill distrust in their children and develop a range of other "weapons of the weak" (Scott, 1984). This is an important fact of social life. But noting it, or distinguishing tactics of manoeuvre from

10. It should not be thought that all marxists are equally attuned to this need. It has been common for many to turn marxism into a more or less evolutionary theory, and/or to treat the basic concepts of Marx's account of capitalism as transhistorical. A category like labor, however, gains its full theoretical meaning only in terms of the whole categorial structure of capitalism, however; its meaning is fundamentally altered if it is reduced to "work," in the sense in which productive activity is characteristic of all historical periods. See Postone (forthcoming) for a sophisticated reading of Marx's mature theory as historically specific to capitalism.
position, does not take away from the observation that organized, sustained and cumulative political action by such subalterns has been historically exceptional, restricted primarily to the modern era, and effective in securing changes in ways which everyday resistance could never rival. As Hobsbawm put it elsewhere:

"The poor," or indeed any subaltern group, become a subject rather than an object of history only through formalized collectivities, however structured. Everybody always has families, social relations, attitudes towards sexuality, childhood and death, and all the other things that keep social historians usefully employed. But, until the past two centuries, as traditional historiography shows, "the poor" could be neglected most of the time by their "betters," and therefore remained largely invisible to them, precisely because their active impact on events was occasional, scattered and impermanent. (1978: 48)

This capacity to organize, to create institutionalized forces for change, of course depended on other social changes, including the growth of the state and capitalist industry. Changes like these help to define categorial breaks in history, as distinct from mere differences and fluctuations.

Marxism is not unique in stressing such breaks. Foucault, unquestionably influenced by Marx (and Hegel) though equally unquestionably no marxist in his mature work, laid great stress on the discovery of historical "ruptures." Modernization theory itself proposed at least one set of changes so basic as to amount to a fundamental transformation, the defining "before" and "after" of tradition and modernity (though after this one historical break all further change was seen in terms of an evolutionary continuum). For the most part, however, historians and sociologists have rejected, or at least abandoned, consideration of such breaks. Even the fate of Foucault's emphasis on ruptures is instructive. Foucault has become enormously influential, in part precisely because historians are prepared to take a search of the power/knowledge link and other fundamental categories of Foucauldian analysis into virtually any and every conceivable historical context. Indeed, Foucault himself did this in the latter volumes of his History of Sexuality, abandoning the argument about the distinctiveness of modernity which was so central to his earlier work. So used, Foucault's categories become, ironically, as universalist as rational choice theory or any other product of the Enlightenment discourses he began by criticizing.

This use of Foucault is particularly American and fits with a more general tendency to turn French structuralist discourse into a normalized academic doctrine. Where the French structuralists and "poststructuralists" argued in a strong polemical relationship to marxism, phenomenology and other analytic strategies, their American disciples have tended, ironically, to reproduce "deconstructionism" and "postmodernism" as monological discourses of truth, losing sight of the agonistic dimension of their origins (see Weber, 1987, for a perceptive discussion focused on literary criticism). Of course the poststructuralists (to take a single name for this tendency) argue about the importance of difference and conflict, they do not ignore them. But what they do is to universalize these features of discourse and culture, making it impossible to grasp differences in the production and character of difference, for example, and obscuring attention to other dimensions of culture and social life.

At its best, one of the points which Foucault's work might have made, was that we need an understanding of the historical constitution of basic categories of understanding, and we need to see the costs entailed in their construction. Foucault's work was not very widely read among historical sociologists, though, and at least partly for an instructive reason. Foucault appeared in the guise of a student of culture, and historical sociology was still locked in a reaction formation against the cultural analysis of modernization theory. Yet, this failure to take culture seriously not only impeded addressing basic categorical breaks in history, it hindered historical sociology's shift of attention to the emerging central issue of the constitution of actors. Or, put another way, even though many historical sociologists wanted to study collective action, they
adopted a kind of objectivism and failed to give adequate attention to culture. This objectivism could be equally manifest in rational choice theory or structuralism, which were two sides of the same coin in mainstream sociology. In the work of Tilly, for example, collective action is the product of interests (in an analysis not far from rational choice theory) and structure, but seldom of culture. More precisely, Tilly does not pursue a cultural analysis of the constitution of interests or structures.

Though one of the early strengths of historical sociology was to reopen a discourse with and about classical social theory, this engagement with large scale theory did not remain central. Historical sociologists focused on a set of putatively empirical objects--states, revolutions, class formation, welfare policies, families, the world economy--and shied away from participation in theoretical discourse. They made relatively little effort to situate these objects in broader theories of the whole of social life, or contrasts with very different socio-cultural formations. Most historical sociology remained within the classical sociological traditions insofar as it took its basic topics and questions from the attempt to understand the change processes, major events and international impacts of Western modernity. Very few historical sociologists studied earlier epochs or parts of the histories of non-western societies which had little to do with the impact of the West or the modern world system (Mann, 1986, is an exception). Though the new wave of historical sociologists emphasized variation and comparison more, they actually did less work in Third World settings than their predecessors among modernization researchers. Historical sociology of the last twenty years has spared itself important challenges by focusing overwhelmingly on the modern West, especially on the more industrial countries. Like its predominantly empiricist character, this helped to keep it in or near the sociological mainstream.

The same is true of social history, of course, despite Hobsbawm's anticipation twenty years ago that "social history can never be another specialization like economic or other hyphenated histories because its subject matter cannot be isolated" (1971: 5). Social history has indeed been compartmentalized. It too has lost its insurgent, cutting edge character. To many historians, cultural history appears to have taken that place (Hunt, 1989). Feminist scholarship is another, overlapping, candidate, and recently feminist historians have in fact debated whether or not they ought to throw in their lot with social history or maintain a broader engagement with the discipline as a whole (Scott, 1988; Tilly, 1989; Bennett, 1989). Both social history and historical sociology have ceased to be intellectual movements and become mere subfields. They have senior gatekeepers and junior aspirants, contending schools of thought and prominent professors promoting the careers of their students. Their protagonists fight not for their academic lives, or for radical social or political movements, but for the next departmental appointment. In both cases, this is unfortunate in several ways, although good for graduate students seeking jobs.

None of this is to say that the old enemies should become heroes. Modernization theory deserved the attack it received. And in this age of collapsing communism, it is still important to challenge theories of unilinear progress. Nor have the old virtues lost all their lustre. Finding a middle path between overly abstract grand theory and the overly grand pretensions of abstracted empiricism is still one of the important accomplishments of historical sociology (following Mills, 1958). But the old fights between marxists and functionalists, dependistas and modernization theorists have gone the way of decks of punched computer cards and the double-knit leisure suits once all too common at ASA meetings. Key debates are now more apt to concern modernism and postmodernism, cultural interpretation and rational action models. Historical sociology (whether practiced by sociologists or historians or others) has important, indeed crucial, contributions to make to these discourses. Reflection on the project of historical sociology, however, tends to neglect the way in which it can shape
such basic discourses, and help to make them more than idle academic competitions, and to emphasize rather a view of the field which reflects its struggle for acceptance fifteen years ago.

HUNTING IS NOT THOSE HEADS OF THE WALL

By the 1980s, cultural analysis was enjoying a renewed vogue in history, if not so clearly in historical sociology.11 The influence of structuralism was important (and in some cases also interpretative cultural anthropology, such as the work of Geertz). Historical sociology and social theory were informing the work of historians less, and conversely, historical sociologists were neglecting the new cultural discourse in history, just as they had the advent of poststructuralism and other cultural discourses before it.

History may seem an odd place for sociologists to look for an adequate approach to culture, especially since historians have been busying themselves for a decade with appropriating ideas about culture from anthropology, literary criticism and the interdisciplinary discourse of poststructuralism. Certainly sociologists will gain also by looking directly to these other sources, but history is essential. It is essential because the approach to culture which is needed is one which stresses the specificity of time and place, the embeddedness of all thought in social relations and processes of becoming, the construction of culture through human action, and its institution in forms of social practice. I do not mean to suggest, in other words, that historians have a ready-made account of culture which, like a mongoose, will kill our theoretical snakes for us. In fact, I think the "new cultural history" has in many ways committed itself to a poststructuralist, postmodernist conceptualization which is flawed first of all by cutting culture apart from sociality rather than overcoming the dichotomy between culture and society, and secondly by so universalizing the category of difference that it becomes pseudohistorical (Calhoun, 1990). The reason to look for an approach to culture in history is that the approach to culture we need is one which is intrinsically historical.12 Getting some purchase on culture--as meaningful activity, not mere objective products--must be among the next tasks of a comparative historical sociology which has avoided this dimension of human life as part of its reaction formation against modernization theory.

Culture is a complex topic, of course, and a troubling one. Lately some anthropologists have proposed doing without it altogether (Abu-Lughod, 1990).13 Two criticisms have particular merit: that culture is too often made into all-encompassing (and therefore meaningless) category, and that scholars too readily assume that culture has some sort of internal systematicity. Despite these criticisms, and despite the fact that I cannot to justice to the complexity of culture, I will retain it as the best signifier I know of the range of concerns I want to talk about. My intention is to explore three "professional deformations" which shape historical sociologists' efforts in this arena. The first is the idea that one can or should avoid culture. The second is the notion that culture is simply a topical area referring to certain objective products of human

11. Cultural analysis was growing in sociology, though more modestly than in history, and overwhelmingly through studies of the production, selection and dissemination processes of cultural objects, not through partially interpretive studies of cultural phenomena themselves.

12. In this sense, I take my call--or search--to be similar to that Sherry Ortner (1984) describes and advocates for an anthropology focussed on practices. I too think that taking practice seriously entails a historical sensibility--though I think attention to practices cannot be the whole of this sensibility.

13. The attempt to do away with concepts is a recurrent theme in anthropology, an attempt to pursue purity of relations with The Other by a kind of theoretical prophylaxis. I would prefer more historically informed critique of concepts and less belief in the possibility of doing away with them.
The third is the idea that culture should be addressed only in subjectless, actorless, "structuralist" guise. Each of these last two makes culture into the heads on the wall, as it were, rather than the hunt.

We can get an idea of the issues from examining an exchange between William Sewell, a leading cultural historian, and Theda Skocpol, one of the most influential historical sociologists and a staunch structuralist.

Sewell opened the exchange with a critique of Skocpol's widely influential States and Social Revolutions, in which he sought to position himself as the advocate of a more sophisticated and complex analytic approach which allows for a better grasp of culturally and historically concrete phenomena. Recognizing that culture has been dismissed by historical sociologists (and most other sociologists) as too closely linked to a voluntarist account of agency, he argues that attention to culture need not involve theories which take the conscious intentions of agents to be historically or sociologically decisive.

Sewell begins by declaring his appreciation for Skocpol's book, particularly for her approach to the problem of multiple causation. He praises her for avoiding both the Scylla of a "hierarchical" strategy which claims the predominance of some single causal factor (e.g. class struggle) over all others and the Charybdis of a "narrative" strategy which simply tries to recount the course of a revolution in some approximation to its concrete complexity. Both these approaches, Sewell agrees with Skocpol, are insufficiently analytic. The narrative strategy treats causes only as they make themselves felt in the development of the story, which makes it hard to grasp their autonomous dynamics, while the hierarchical strategy only examines fully the causal dynamics of one factor. Skocpol, by contrast, approached causation as a matter of "conjunctural, unfolding interactions of originally separately determined processes" (1979: 320, n. 16). In particular, Skocpol stressed the independent but interrelated causal importance of class struggle (which she argued had been exaggerated by many previous analysts), state formations, and international relations (the latter two of which she argues need to figure much more prominently in analyses of revolutions). Sewell's complaint is that Skocpol failed to recognize ideology as an important autonomous causal factor.

Skocpol ruled out the autonomous power of ideology on the basis of a rather simplistic test; she showed that "any line of reasoning that treats revolutionary ideologies as blueprints for revolutionary outcomes cannot sustain scrutiny" (1979: 170). In other words, the outcome of the French revolution, for example, cannot be understood as the product of ideology of any particular group of revolutionary participants or leaders--Jacobins, Girondins, sans-culottes, etc. On this basis, she concludes that the cognitive content of ideology has no predictive power as an independent variable in explaining revolutions. Her error, Sewell suggests, lies in assuming that the only way ideology could be important is through the predictive power of the ideology of some particular group or set of actors. But ideology need not be identified with any actors in particular. He claims authority from Althusser, Foucault, Geertz and Williams for an alternative view of ideology as the anonymous and impersonal operation of ideological state apparatuses, epistemes, cultural systems or structures of feeling. This view of ideology is structural, he suggests, just as are the forces of class, state and international relations which form the basis of Skocpol's analysis. Skocpol, therefore, dealt with only a "naive voluntarist conception of ideology" (Sewell, 1985: 61). Sewell agrees that this can be dismissed, but argued that in the more structuralist (Althusserian) sense, ideology must be understood as constitutive of the social order.

14. "Hunting is not those heads on the wall," is the title of a brilliant essay on writing by Leroi Jones (Amiru Baraka).
Sewell goes on to try to demonstrate the importance of ideology through a summary account of the French Revolution of 1789. His account turns on an understanding of ideology as the overall structure of discursive and cognitive arrangements affecting action. Thus the prerevolutionary situation which was shaped by the conflicts between traditional monarchical ideology and the Enlightenment, both of which were working parts of the Old Regime. The difficulties of traditional monarchical ideology were brought into relief by the growing influence of Enlightenment, but it was not until the revolutionary crisis that the fundamental opposition between the two became clear. The revolution smashed the traditional monarchical ideology, replacing it with that of the Enlightenment, but simultaneously opened up the potential political significance of ideological fissures within the Enlightenment. Sewell tries to show several crucial moments of the revolution which can only be understood in terms of an autonomous ideological dynamic. For example, he suggests that the Estates General, having not been called since 1614, had a solely ideological existence in 1788; the necessity of reviving it, which provided much of the occasion for the revolution, was an ideological necessity. Sewell places considerable emphasis on the night of August 4th, in which he sees the National Assembly first forced to destroy seigneurial privileges by the pressure of peasant class struggle, and then, "moved forward by an overwhelming urge for ideological consistency" to destroy the entire existing system of privilege (1985: 69). Where Skocpol sees the night of August 4th as simply an outcome of the peasant revolt, Sewell insists that "it was a crucial turning point in two quite distinct revolutionary processes: a class process of peasant revolt and an ideological process of conceptual transformation" (1985: 70). August 4 brought closure to the peasants' class struggle by assenting to the destruction of the seigneurial system. And it brought an end to the ideological dynamic of tension between Enlightenment and corporate monarchical principles. But it began another ideological dynamic: the elaboration of Enlightenment metaphysical principles into a new revolutionary social and political structure. Echoes of this process continued to be felt for years. Some of those which Sewell cites as essentially ideological were the Revolution's treatment of the Church, and the attempt to reform measurement and experience of time and space by use of a combination of decimal calculations, natural facts and reference to revolutionary virtues. The ideological revolution thus "changed drastically when the Enlightenment idiom became the dominant idiom of government" (1985: 71). For example, Sewell generally supports and deploys against Skocpol the recent claims of Francois Furet that the Terror was an inevitable product of the ideology of the Revolution, not a response to national peril or the product of class struggle. This Revolutionary ideology was not, according to Furet and Sewell, the ideology of any particular group contending for power, but rather it was collective and anonymous. Robespierre became a central figure only because he became its embodiment, not because he had special skills or represented a distinct set of class interests. Sewell criticizes Furet only for exaggeration leading him to make ideology the sole cause of radicalization in the revolution, rather than a complement to class struggle and the exigencies of war. The ideological consequences of the Revolution include, Sewell suggests, the modern notion of nationalism and the very idea of revolution itself as the overthrow of one government by the people and its replacement by another government. Indeed, Sewell would go even further than this and argue that the definition of "social revolution" include the ideological presence of a totalitarian ambition to restructure all of social life, from top to bottom and across the board. In reply, Skocpol accepts Sewell's criticism of her earlier treatment of ideology, but challenges his argument that the concept of ideology should be used in an entirely impersonal, anonymous and structuralist sense. Ironically, given her reputation as an extreme proponent of structural analysis and the frequent criticism of her neglect of both culture and intentional action, Skocpol argues for these notions against Sewell's ideological structuralism. The central difficulty with Sewell's argument, Skocpol contends, is his failure to distinguish between a notion of culture which is "transpersonal"
and anonymous, and ideology and cultural idioms as these are brought into use by specific actors in revolutionary transformations. Skocpol suggests that the "structuralism" of States and Social Revolution has often been misunderstood. She did not mean "to read intentional group action out of revolutions, only to situate it theoretically for the explanatory purposes at hand" (1985: 87). It is in this sense that she maintained the notion that ideology (understood as the orientation and intentions of any particular group) cannot predict the outcomes of revolutionary struggles. The struggles are real, and are active creations of people action with ideologies, but their outcomes are predicted largely by the "structural" factors of class power, state formation and international relations. In her reply to Sewell (as in a recent article on the Iranian revolution, 1982), Skocpol acknowledges that she might profitably have paid more attention to the ideological struggles of the revolutions she examined. But she is at pains to distinguish her understanding of ideological struggles—clashes between groups of people putting forward different political programs or ways of understanding current situations—from Sewell's understanding of ideology as more or less synonymous with "cultural system" in general.

Skocpol identifies Sewell's argument essentially with cultural anthropology, and particularly with the work of Clifford Geertz, who indeed has been a major influence on Sewell. But Sewell's arguments are part of a broader current of thought which links a variety of theoretical constructs and interpretative approaches. Michel Foucault is perhaps the foremost representative of this line of understanding which stresses that culture is never neutral, but always a structure of domination. In this, there is considerable unity between the "structuralism" of Althusser and the "post-structuralism" of Foucault and a wide variety of contemporary theorists and interpreters of culture. It is an indication of how little this line of thought had, in 1985, entered into mainstream American sociological discourse that Skocpol fails to notice it as the background to Sewell's approach to ideology. Recognizing it, however, gives greater significance to the dispute between Skocpol and Sewell, for it points up that among the issues at stake is the status of action in socio-cultural theory and analysis.

Taken to an extreme (which Sewell does not do) the "decentered" analyses of the structuralists and poststructuralists remove so completely the active role of agents that they eliminate the possibility of most sorts of normative critique, and most understandings of how history might have been otherwise. Skocpol, thus, points out that in her understanding, structures are certainly not actors; Sewell implicitly adopts an approach in which cultural structures are the independent source of their own transformation, a sort of unfolding. Ideology thus acts through agents (cf., e.g. Furet's account of Robespierre) rather than being made and put forward by agents. One is reminded of Althusser's treatment of human subjects as "supports" of the more fundamentally real structural formations. This account would doubtless make Sewell uncomfortable, for although his primary thrust in the article under examination is structuralist-poststructuralist, he does distance himself from the more complete opposition to voluntarism espoused by others swimming in that stream. He writes, for example, that "ideological utterances, like all other forms of social action, require the exercise of human will. To say that an ideology "is structured" or "is a structure" is not to say that it is inaccessible to human volition, but that ideological action is shaped by preexisting ideological (and other) realities" (1985: 60). Here Sewell associates himself with Giddens' notion of the "dual" character of all social structures—at once constraining and enabling. Nonetheless, in his critique of Skocpol, Sewell goes out of his way to stress the anonymous character of ideologies and processes of historical change; he is happy

15. This issue is widely debated with regard to Foucault and poststructuralist thought; the critiques are generally consonant with E.P. Thompson's (1978) attack on Althusserian structuralism.
to see these as "unintended consequences of purposive social action" (in Merton's phrase) and to stress that the number of actors is so large as to make the contributions of particular individuals or groups more or less negligible.

Writing elsewhere, Sewell (1986) has made a similar argument a key basis for challenging James Coleman's (1986) argument that historical (and more generally cultural) explanation typically neglects the crucial sociological problem of relating individual courses of action to large scale collective results (see Wacquant and Calhoun, 1989). Sewell argues, against Coleman, that historical explanation is, par excellence, explanation of the unintended patterns by which the actions of individuals have large scale collective consequences. However, the discussion of the French revolution which Sewell offers to illustrate his case against Skocpol seems precisely to be a case of the argument from collective phenomenon to collective phenomenon which Coleman condemns, and of which he charges modern historians are frequently guilty. This, for example, is at least a very plausible reading (and it seems to be Skocpol's reading) of Sewell's claim that "ideology must ... be understood as constitutive of social order" (1985: 61). In other words, Sewell does not say that ideology (or culture) is partially constitutive of actors whose actions make or change social arrangements (which, in turn, may be more or less orderly)--as we might, for example, expect Pierre Bourdieu to say. On the contrary, in his critique of Skocpol, Sewell comes very near to making ideology (or culture) the kind of holistic category which bypasses the role of human actors (individual or collective) in making history. That this is presumably not Sewell's intention does not make it any less the result of his analytic categories (perhaps an instance of the unintended consequences of ideology).

Against this, Skocpol argues that one should adopt a narrower definition of ideology as "idea systems deployed as self-conscious political arguments by identifiable political actors" (1985: 91). And, she suggests, we should add a third analytic concept, "cultural idioms" which "have a longer-term, more anonymous, and less partisan existence than ideologies" (ibid.). Actors use cultural idioms in constructing ideologies. On this basis, Skocpol hopes to be able to attend to the interplay of intentional and nonintentional aspects of ideas in the course of revolutions. Neither ideology nor cultural idioms, in her usage, constitute the sort of holistic, integrated system which Sewell's usage seems (at least at points) to suggest. Thus, for example, she sees no basis for attributing "nationalism" to "some Enlightenment-inspired cultural code" but instead points out how deliberately Napoleon and associated actors amalgamated "nationalism with contradictory strands of revolutionary political symbolism in order to stabilize a bureaucratic-authoritarian state without the aid of an hegemonic political party" (1985: 93). Analysis of the role of ideology and cultural idioms "requires that we examine very concretely the consciousness and talk of particularly situated acting groups, and that we take seriously the essentially political tasks they were trying to accomplish during the Revolution" (1985: 94; see discussion of such Revolutionary discourse in Hunt, 1984). Skocpol's reading of the political purposes is still very state-centered, which leads her to underestimate the force of Sewell's point about the very large amount of revolutionary effort which went into tasks such as reforming measurement and categorization of time and space. Nonetheless, she raises a crucial analytic issue.16

16. It is ironic that Skocpol, whose work in general has downplayed both culture and intentional activity, should provide in her reply the occasion for noting how of Sewell's implicit theory of culture underplays intergroup contestation. It is also appropriate, however, in two senses. First, if Coleman and rational choice theory represent one major and central force within mainstream American sociology, Skocpol and other "structural" macrosociologists represent another such force (albeit more internally heterogeneous). Although there have always been individuals doing sociological research on culture, it is only within the last three or four years that it has become a significant collective enterprise within the mainstream of the discipline. As sociological attention to culture grows, however, it becomes apparent that what sort of cultural
Much of the force of Sewell’s (1986) critique of Coleman derives from the latter’s neglect of culture, including such problems as establishing the comparability of interests across cultural contexts and understanding cultural differences in the constitution of individuals and collective actors. At the same time, however, Sewell’s critique of Skocpol suggests weaknesses in the possibility of attending to these very concerns within his own theory of culture. The structuralist/poststructuralist perspective adopted by Sewell is notorious for making cross-cultural translation and comparison virtually impossible (see Calhoun, forthcoming b) though again, Sewell’s empirical intention is in part to encourage comparative research. The approach Sewell advocates is useful for drawing attention to the nonneutral way in which broad cultural patterns shape discourse and action. But by emphasizing the internal systematicity of such cultural patterns—ideologies, in his term—over the role of human action, he at least implicitly downplays the creative and contestative significance of action itself. In this way, his analysis comes to look more like the structuralist anthropological history practiced by Sahlins (1985) than like the dual approach to the interplay of structure and action advocated by Giddens (1985) or the attempt to overcome this dichotomy put forward by Bourdieu (1990).

With regard to Sewell’s specific discussion of the French Revolution, for example, we might ask where the “overwhelming urge for ideological consistency” (1985: 69) came from. It seems odd to give it the status of prime mover, especially since such urges seem to have been rare in history. Sewell’s structuralism offers purchase on certain constitutive tensions in the Revolution, but cannot address the sense in which basic transformations of culture and social relations were involved (see the quote from Steiner above). Conversely, Skocpol’s response to Sewell shows her complementing her structural account with a remarkably voluntarist position. But she is equally unable to grapple with qualitative historical change. No doubt Napoleon manipulated nationalism, but did he invent it? Can we understand a phenomenon like nationalism any better as a merely instrumental ploy than as a reflection of the Enlightenment’s cultural code? For Skocpol to give more substance to her account of action, she (like rational choice theorists) need to show how interests are constituted: for example, why Frenchmen can be moved by Napoleonic appeals to nationalism. Such an account will turn in part on the cultural construction of identity, though this process must be seen as part and parcel of social relationships and social action not free-floating in a separate realm of ideas. As Sewell suggests, it is hard to imagine an account of narrowly interested action (i.e. interests simply in power or profit) doing justice to the question of why French revolutionaries devoted so much energy and emotion to trying to remake French culture. But though their activity can only be interpreted in relation to a broader web of meanings, it should not be seen merely as the occasion for working out those meanings. Actions are not just instantiations of cultural codes, nor is culture so clearly systemic that we can tell what actions to expect solely from an internal analysis of it. Phenomena like nationalism are social and cultural at the same time; they are constituted as a meaningful categories and significant and effective practices through a concrete historical process.

THE HISTORICAL CONSTITUTION OF CATEGORIES

theory sociologists use makes a great deal of difference. Many American sociologists of culture are essentially “structuralist” in the sense that they seek to explain cultural patterns by reference to external, putatively extra-cultural social factors (e.g. Judith Blau, 1989; Wuthnow, 1989). Others are “structuralist” in more the sense of Sewell, stressing the internal structure or systematicity of culture; they are apt to treat culture as an explanation (perhaps only partial) for social action. Still others, however, are attempting to overcome this dualism between ‘culture’ and ‘society’. For most, this would seem to be something which can only be done through a theory of action, but a theory of action which does not (like rational choice theory) make untenable assumptions about the preculural universal individualistic constitution of actors.
Poststructuralism is today's preferred approach to culture. But, more generally than just in Sewell's work, we need to see three closely linked weaknesses to poststructuralism. The first is that it works within and perpetuates the separation of culture and society. The second is that it grants little if any role to action. These both stem from an internal approach to culture, one which stresses its unity and closure as a system, even if that is only for the purpose of deconstructing it. As Weber (1987) has argued, the very claim to deconstruct a text is a move which holds that text within an interpretative framework or community, which fixes it within a context. Poststructuralism, in its reliance on texts and textual metaphors and in its general anti-subjectivist analytic strategies, constructs culture as a system of objects. It is in this sense sharply opposed to a view of culture and society alike as matters of practice. Bourdieu's work, for example, (though arguably in many ways an instance of "poststructuralism," insofar as that creation of English language analysts has any purchase on actual French schools of thought) shows not only how action participates in the reproduction as well as creation or change of structure, but also how the categories of social and cultural analysis merge in an account of the forms of practice. The forms are that part--usually the vast majority--of action which can be theorized and properly analyzed; beyond them lies the particularity or singularity of action which can only be described.

Even Bourdieu, however, does not offer all the strength we need to counter the third weakness of poststructuralism. This is its universalizing of difference. When difference is universalized it is, ironically, trivialized. When any grouping of commonalities is simply the normalizing discourse of power, we lose our capacity to distinguish greater or lesser differences. This is linked to the notorious incapacity of poststructuralist work to ground its own (or any other) normative orientations (see Calhoun, forthcoming b). Shifting to a theory of practice helps. It reveals, first of all, that as activity culture has a temporal direction, a history. Shifts from one position to another are not made from among the choices in an abstract field of possibilities (as both logical positivists and poststructuralists often imply). Rather, they are practical moves from weaker to stronger positions, they are made to solve practical problems. In the realm of knowledge, Charles Taylor (1989) has called this "epistemic gain." But outside epistemology a similar process is also at work, obligating us to understand the meaning of ideas, or political actions, or institutions at least partially in terms of their creation. We need to grasp them not just as they are, in a static sense, but as they could have been arrived at in a historical process. "It is essential to an adequate understanding of certain problems, questions, issues, that one understand them genetically" (Taylor, 1984: 17). In other words, we understand a position by knowing why and from where or what one might have moved to it.

In addition, working in a theory of practice points up that not all differences necessitate clashes or resolutions. We can and do allow many happily to coexist. But for at least a few this is impossible. These differences involve incommensurable practices, courses of action which cannot be pursued simultaneously any more than one can play rugby and basketball by making the same moves (see Calhoun, forthcoming a; Taylor, 1985). An analysis of practices, and more particularly of the various habituses

17. Curiously, the poststructuralism which informs so much of today's "new cultural history" is of about the same late 1960s vintage as the revival of historical sociology.

18. This kind of historical understanding, with its emphasis on practice, shows the insufficiency of the familiar division posed by speech-act theory between constative and performative utterances. Poststructuralists are often keen to show how putative constatives (e.g. neutral truth claims) are really performatives (grabs for power). On Taylor's account we see that demonstrating performativity need not be the end of analysis, and that performativity is not antithetical to a discourse of at least proximate truth or rightness.
and implicit strategies which they reveal, is basic to establishing where the truly important lines of social conflict lie. But such an analysis of practices and strategies is not enough. It is still internal to a socio-cultural formation. It does not give us purchase, any more than typical poststructuralist approaches do, on the source and nature of categorial transformations in history. Bourdieu's account of the various forms of capital, for example, generalizes the idea of capital for the analysis of any and all strategizing in any historical or cultural setting (see Calhoun, forthcoming b). In this way, its undercuts even Bourdieu's own earlier analyses of the tensions between Kabyle society and the incursions of French society and economic practices in Algeria (Bourdieu, 1962, 1976). Bourdieu's scheme does not elucidate what, if anything, might be distinctive to modern capitalism, for example, or how the various individual and collective strategic pursuits which are the source of constant quantitative changes in social arrangements ever are reorganized by more basic qualitative changes. Bourdieu's work is similar, in this connection, to Foucault's. Both begin with analyses which make a good deal of contrasts between modernity and pre-or non-modern social forms. Yet each is led to universalize his critical analytic tools, the bodily inscription and discourse of power, and the convertible forms of capital.

This is not just a question of where particular concepts or generations apply, a matter of scope statements (Walker and Cohen, 1985). The notion of historical constitution of categories is more basic. Durkheim, in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, took on the challenge of giving a sociological account of the origins of the basic categories of thought. This sociologization of the Kantian categories is fascinating, and a neglected feature of Durkheim's thought. But it is crucial to note that Durkheim operates primarily in static terms. His idea of "elementary forms" is not simply an idea of origins, but rather of universals which are more visible in their earlier and simpler appearances. His account of the categories--time and space, for example--makes the experience of living in society their basis. It does not focus on how variations in social organization or processes of historical transformation might reconstitute such basic categories. If this is an issue (within the neoKantian framework) for categories like space and time, it is at least as much so for "rationality," "individual," "nation," or "society." These and a host of other basic terms of analysis derive their specific meanings from processes of historical change (within specific cultural traditions and often refracted through highly developed intellectual frameworks), not from abstract definition.

One of the key differences of critical theory from traditional social theory is that the former demands a reflexive and historical grounding of its own categories, while the latter typically adopts transhistorical, putatively neutral and universally available categories. In other words, the critical theorists takes on the obligation to ask in strong senses why do I use these categories, and what are their implications, while the traditional theorist asks simply have I defined my categories clearly. The division is evident even within the marxist tradition. Many marxists, thus, treat labor as a transhistorical, universal category rather than one specific to capitalism. Reducing labor to work, however, deculturalizes and dehistoricizes Marx's analysis of capitalism. It negates the effort of Capital to show how a categorical break distinguishes earlier accumulation of wealth from capitalism, and demands the new analytic categories and changed relationships among terms established in the opening chapter.19 Similarly, other theorists, recognizing cultural and historical diversity, have attempted to overcome its more serious implications by subsuming it into a common, often teleological, evolutionary framework. Unlike biological evolutionary theories, which stress the enormous qualitative diversity within the common processes of speciation, inheritance, mutation, selection and so forth, sociological theories have generally relied on claimed universal fea-

19. See Postone, forthcoming, for a discussion of this.
tures of all societies--like technology, held by Lenski, Lenski and Nolan (1990) to be the prime mover of evolutionary change--to act as basic, transhistorical variables. Such theories do indeed pay attention to the problem of establishing qualitative changes in patterns of social organization, but rather than showing the historical constitution and particularity of their own categories and analytical approach, they position themselves outside of history as neutral observers of the whole.

As the foremost contemporary critical theorist, Habermas has been ambivalent on the issue of historical grounding of categories. His early work, especially *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, works in exemplary historical fashion. It develops its concept as specific to a stage of capitalist development and state formation, as varying among national histories, and as transformed by transitions within capitalism and state organization. In Habermas’s later work, however, especially in his magnum opus, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, he sheds this historical constitution of categories for an evolutionary construct. Although he wants to stress the special importance of the opposition between instrumental and communicative reason in the contemporary era, for example, he locates the distinction in a primordial split, a sort of communicative expulsion from the Garden of Eden. His theory becomes more Rousseauian and less Marxian. It also becomes much less historically specific, with the result that he is no longer able within its terms to locate basic qualitative transformations within history (such as the rise of capitalism). This has the effect of laying his theory open to the common poststructuralist (or postmodernist) charge of unjust universalization more basically even than the normative content on which most debate has focused.

In his early work, Foucault did offer analyses of the historical constitution of categories, though as I suggested above; his later work abandoned this and few of his followers have kept it up. In general, the poststructuralist emphasis on difference (in itself salutary because modern discourse is so predominantly universalistic) is unable to ground itself. It is impossible within its strong claims as to the incommensurability of language games to construct a conclusive argument as to why we should in fact be tolerant or encouraging of other language games, or why other than by chance we should participate in any one. This then has the ironic result of granting "the other" legitimacy comparable to ourselves, but denying the possibility of meaningful discourse across the cultural gulf which separates us.

What is needed to resolve this dilemma is the recognition that processes of communication and cross-cultural relations are themselves historical and part of materially consequential social practices. Translation is an inapt metaphor for what most important cross-cultural communication must mean. Any account of the confrontation of, say, aboriginal Australians with Europeans, must go beyond an attempt to translate cultural contents to a recognition that all communication was a part of relations which transformed each party, though asymmetrically; which were conducted by means of material power as well as cultural signification; and which focused on social practices not abstract discourse. To say such communication--or less extreme and less violent communication across basic cultural divides--is historical is to say that arriving at mutual understanding is not primarily a process of translation but rather of transformation. Both parties must change into the sort of people who can understand each other (and a good deal else is likely to change in the same process). 20

If it is be able to deal effectively with either basic cross-cultural comparisons or fundamental historical transformations, social theory needs the capacity to ground its categories historically. This is something which historical sociology (and history) should provide. The category of the person is a good example. Inquiries of the kind begun by Marcel Mauss (cf. fn. above) need to be continued. Perhaps the most impor-

20. I have discussed this at much greater length in Calhoun (forthcoming b).
tant contemporary exemplar of such work is Charles Taylor's recent *The Sources of the Self*. We could read this work as, among other things, an almost diametric opposition to Foucault on a crucial point. Foucault used historical studies to uncover the construction of selves (and "the self") and then took this as the basis for an account of the unreality of such constructed selves. He remained, ironically, caught within a "jargon of authenticity" (Adorno, 1973). Historicity was taken as a rebuttal of claimed authenticity which would have had to be "original" to be accepted (see discussion in Berman, 1989). Taylor, by contrast, shows a whole series of subtle stations through which the modern notion of the self passes as it is constituted and reconstituted. Each of these, he suggests, must be treated as authentic.

Taylor's inquiry, however, remains within the realm of (a rather philosophical) intellectual history. Taylor focuses conceptual attention on practices, but does not try to concretize and substantiate his account of the transformations of the self through a broader socio-cultural history. This is a problem with intellectual history more generally, though current trends are in a positive direction. Recent intellectual history has branched out beyond semi-biographical attention to "great thinkers," placing their work not just in the context of "their times," or their intellectual influences and adversaries, but in that of a more theoretically serious analysis of systems of signification and discourse (see, e.g., White, 1978, 1987; LaCapra, 1983). But signification and discourse are still typically treated as though they existed independently of broader social and material processes.21

**BY WAY OF CONCLUSION**

Social theory needs not just an historical approach to culture and action as objects of analysis, then, but an approach which opens up inquiry into the historical constitution of basic theoretical categories. This is especially important for any theorist who aspires to be reflexively aware of the conditions of her or his own thought. A reflexivity limited to the here and now, or to a positive recognition of one's own interpretative tradition, cannot suffice as grounding for a truly critical theory. Historical sociology played a major role in reopening serious theoretical discourse about large scale social transformations. If it is to continue to push this forward, rather than being altogether domesticated within the positivity of contemporary sociological research, it needs to bring a much richer sense of culture and action to bear. These need to be conceived as part and parcel of social relations, not separate topics of inquiry, and still less as the turf of other disciplines.

21. Intellectual history, in fact, has been a particularly active and productive field of late, fruitfully transcending its boundaries to as part of the new cultural history (see discussion in Kramer, 1989). Poststructuralist thought has played an important role in this.
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