"Proletarian Dictator in a Peasant Land: Stalin as Ruler"

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Any revolution from above is inevitably revolution by dictatorship and despotism. (Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, 1849)

Western historiography on Stalin and Stalinism has been driven in recent years by fundamental disagreements on the role of the dictator, the scale and purpose of the Great Purges, and the nature of the Stalinist state. Just as the imagery of totalitarianism obscured important sources of resistance and autonomy within Soviet society and homogenized the differences between fascism and Stalinism, so the "revisionist" diminution of the central figure of Stalin has cast discussion in unfruitful directions. An apolitical social history has at times confronted older historians still committed to a largely political interpretation and anxious that the moral indictment of Stalin not be softened. The enormity of the human losses in the collectivization drives, the subsequent famine, and the purges have made cooler, detached assessments suspect, and the battles have moved to the slippery grounds of sources where one side decries the heavy reliance on memoirs, rumor, and hearsay, and the other condemns naive readings of official statements.

Where normal conventions of historical writing are sometimes suspended because of the frustration with adequate evidence, a powerful tendency has emerged that weaves a relatively consistent, organic narrative emphasizing the intentionality and constancy of the programs and policies of the 1930s. Here the particular psychopathology of Stalin and his project to create a personal, autocratic regime and expand state power throughout society provides a unifying theme. This interpretation, most eloquently restated in the second volume of Robert C. Tucker's biography of Stalin,¹

has been challenged by a number of monographs and articles that have
tended to deconstruct the explanation derived from a single purpose by a
single mind and elaborate a picture of unrelieved confusion, contradiction,
false starts, improvisation, and swings from policies of negotiation and
reconciliation to desperate resorts to repression, violence, and terror.²

Though there is general agreement that Stalin intended to create a powerful
state able to carry out a radical program of social transformation, the
revisionists hold that there were no blueprints pre-existing in Stalin's mind,
that other players had significant even if subordinate roles, and that Stalin's
personal power was not as great as usually imagined. Here the imperatives
of governing and the deep structures of Russian/Soviet society limited what
the state could do and forced it to shift gears, turn back, at times accelerate
or resort to ever more radical methods. State actors had to respond to the
chaos to which their own policies gave rise.³ These discussions, as Geoff
Eley has noted, "bear an uncanny resemblance" to the debates in the 1960s-
1970s between the "intentionalists" and the "structuralists" among German
historians of Nazism.⁴

². For a discussion of the "new cohort" of revisionist historians, see the
Cohen, Geoff Eley, Peter Kenez, and Alfred G. Meyer, with a reply by
Fitzpatrick, in ibid., pp. 375-413; and by Daniel Field, Daniel R. Brower,
William Chase, Robert Conquest, J. Arch Getty, Jerry F. Hough, Hiroaki
Kuromiya, Roberta T. Manning, Alec Nove, Gabor Tamas Rittersporn,
Robert C. Tucker, and Lynne Viola, ibid., XLVI, 4 (October 1987), pp. 375-
431.

³. "Evidence of high-level confusion, counterproductive initiatives, and lack
of control over events has not supported the notion of a grand design." [J.
Arch Getty, Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party
Reconsidered, 1933-1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985),
p. 203] See also, Gabor T. Rittersporn.

⁴. Geoff Eley, "History with the Politics Left Out -- Again?" The Russian
Review, XLV, 4 (October 1986), p. 387. For a review of the German
historiography, see Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and
Perspectives of Interpretation (London: Edward Arnold, 1985).
One of the pioneers of Soviet social history of the Stalin period, Moshe Lewin, has managed to sit out much of the infighting between the Stalin-centered and Stalin-reducing historians while shifting the state-centered focus of the Cold War consensus and simultaneously engaging social structures and developments, traditional and revolutionary cultures, political interventions, and their mutual determination. A radical break with the totalitarian model's nearly exclusive concern with the political sphere, Lewin's work opened the field to social history and placed political actors within a larger, limiting context. From his *Lenin's Last Struggle* through the essays collected in *The Making of the Soviet System*, he emphasized the dynamic shifts in Soviet history that belied the fatalism of continuity theories linking Leninism forward with Stalinism and backward to an unproblematicized Russian political culture. Here there were different Leninisms, various potential outcomes of the New Economic Policy, and contradictions and unforeseen complexities within the Stalinist system.

The deceptively simple question to be answered in this paper is: how did Stalin rule? How did he maintain his authority while establishing a personal autocracy? His extraordinary and brutal political achievement was to act in the name of the Communist party and its central committee against that party and central committee, while remaining the unchallenged head of party and state and, evidently, a vastly popular leader. At the end of the process his absolute grip on power allowed him to declare black white and completely reverse the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the line of the Comintern by embracing Nazi Germany in a non-aggression pact. The colossal and costly destruction he brought upon the country on the eve and in the early days of the Second World War gave rise to no organized opposition, and the centralized apparatus of control that he had created was
not only able to weather the Nazi invasion but to organize a victory that would preserve the essence of the system he forged for another half century.

The simplest, though inadequate, answer to the question, would be that Stalin's power was maintained through the exercise of terror and monopolistic control of the means of communication throughout society. Though certainly an important part of the answer, a focus on terror and propaganda does not explain how Stalin won his authority within the party and maintained it among his own supporters who never attempted to free themselves from the source of their fears. Terror operated through collaboration. It was supported by many within and outside the party who believed that extraordinary means against vicious and hidden enemies were required. To the end of his life Stalin was regarded by tens of millions as the indispensable leader of the "socialist" camp, perhaps someone to be feared as was Ivan groznyi, a leader who put fear in the hearts of enemies.

Stalin came to power in the absence of a broad consensus on the legitimacy and necessity of his personal rule. Indeed the ruling party did not yet enjoy a firm ideological or cultural hegemony among the population, and repression and even mass terror had been periodically used, as in the Civil War and the collectivization of agriculture, to enforce the power of the state and remove potential sources of opposition. Yet at the same time the regime confidently conceived of itself as possessing a popular and historically-sanctioned mandate and worked assiduously to create real support for itself -- through education and propaganda, leadership cults, election campaigns, broad national discussions (e.g., on the constitution), public celebrations (like the Pushkin centennial of 1937), show trials, and political rituals. Most importantly, the regime made real concessions to the populace and satisfied the ambitions and aspirations of many (certainly not
all) for social mobility and an improved living standard. Peasants who became workers and workers who became managers and party bosses were moving up, while many of their envied social "betters" of the past were experiencing an enforced downward mobility.

By ending NEP and almost all private production and trade, Stalin created the first modern non-market, state-run economy, one that simultaneously eliminated rival sources of power and resistance to the will of the central authorities. "Industrialists" no longer held property in the means of production. Workers could no longer effectively organize in order to raise the price of labor. Farmers could no longer withhold grain to effect market prices. Yet all of these groups devised ways within the command economy to exercise limited degrees of power, autonomy, and resistance. Much of Soviet history has been about raising output and productivity, and successive state strategies required accommodations and concessions as often as additional pressure and repression. Thus, while power was actively being concentrated at the top by Stalin, it was being diffused downward and outward throughout the economic and political systems by thousands of vintiki (little screws) who had their own requirements for survival and "making out." The state grew; in Lewin's sense, it "swallowed" society; but at the same time it was unable to realize the vision presented by totalitarian theory of complete atomization of society. The limits of state power were met when people refused to work efficiently, or migrated from place to place, or informally worked out ways to resist pressure from above.

Stalinism was at one and the same time a revolutionizing system, unwilling to accept backward Russia as it was (and here it differs from

5. Much of the work of Lewis Siegelbaum has explored the various strategies by which the regime attempted to raise productivity. See, for example, his "Soviet Norm Determination in Theory and Practice, 1917-1941," Soviet Studies, XXXVI, (1984), pp. 48-67.
many traditionally authoritarian dictatorships), and a restorative one, anxious to re-establish hierarchies, certain traditional values like patriotism and patriarchy, and political legitimacy based on more than victorious revolution. The ideological props of the Stalin dictatorship were both a seriously-revised Marxism and a pro-Russian nationalism and etatism. Class warfare was seen as inevitable and increasing rather than diminishing as the country approached socialism. The country was surrounded by hostile capitalist states that made the increase of state power necessary. When the Soviet Union was declared to be socialist by Stalin in 1936, the positive achievement of reaching a stage of history higher than the rest of the world was tempered by the constant reminders that the enemies of socialism exist both within and outside the country, that they are deceptive and concealed, and must be "unmasked." Repeated references to dangers and insecurity justified the enormous reliance on the "steel gauntlets of Ezhov."

The paradox of the October Revolution had been that the Bolsheviks possessed the physical power to overthrow the Provisional Government and disband the Constituent Assembly but had neither a popular mandate to rule all of Russia (let alone the non-Russian peripheries) nor an unassailable legitimizing myth to sanction their claim to govern. Even as they successfully built a new state during the years of Civil War, the Bolsheviks were (as Lenin usually admitted), and remained until at least the Second World War, a minority party that needed to justify its hold on power. As George Breslauer has written about a later period in Soviet history, "Authority is legitimized power," and Soviet leaders had to legitimize their power and policies by demonstrating their competence or indispensability as
rulers.\textsuperscript{6} One of the central dilemmas of the Communists in the first two decades of their rule was to move from an exercise of power through force toward creating a base of support through the construction of a widely-accepted, hegemonic understanding of the historical moment. Whatever benefits a practice of state terror might bring a regime in the short term, "authority-building is necessary to protect and expand one's base of political support."\textsuperscript{7} Yet at the same time as they attempted to construct a legitimizing cultural and political hegemony, the Communists steadily narrowed the political field. One of the most "democratic" (in the sense of grassroots popular participation) polities in the world (that of the revolutionary years 1917-1918) rapidly turned step-by-step into a dictatorship. First the establishment of Soviet power and the dissolution of \textit{zemstva}, dumas, and the Constituent Assembly eliminated the upper and middle classes, as well as the clergy, from the \textit{pays legal}. Then when in the months before the Civil War began the coalition partners of the Bolsheviks, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, resigned from the Sovnarkom, a one-party government was created. During the Civil War the vitality and autonomy of local soviets declined, as the working class of 1917 itself fragmented and dissolved. Central government agents, Red Army units, the police and the party gained influence. Manipulation of elections, coercive practices, indifference and apathy, all in the context of vicious fratricidal warfare steadily weakened the power and legitimacy of the soviets and eroded the rival political parties. At the same time state, party, and military institutions were constructed that effectively created a new state power under the control of the Communists. By 1922 interparty politics were an


\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., p. 10.
historical memory, and the only arena for political discussion and infighting was within the Communist party. The ban on factions in 1921, the progressive elimination of political oppositions through the 1920s, and the steady accumulation of power by a single faction reduced the political arena even further, until a handful of influential figures decided the course for the rest of the party. Within the party political manipulation, Machiavellian intrigues, and a willingness to resort to ruthlessness were certainly part of Stalin's repertoire, but he also managed to position himself in the post-Lenin years as a pragmatic centrist supportive of the compromises and concessions of the New Economic Policy and unwilling to risk Soviet power in efforts to promote elusive revolutions abroad.

In his prerevolutionary career Stalin had been the komitet-chik (committee man) extraordinarily, a skillful political infighter able to gather about him loyal comrades with whom he could then take on Menshevik or dissident Bolshevik opponents. Whatever his personal predilections for unchallenged power, his inability to accept frustration or criticism, and his visceral suspiciousness directed even at those close to him, Stalin was also the product of the particular political culture and internal party practices of Bolshevism. Truth was singular, objective, knowable to those trained in Marxism-Leninism. Force and repression were available to be used in the service of socialism, which was defined in Stalin's mind as identical to his own policies and preservation of his personal position. Once he had reached his exalted position as chief oligarch, he spoke in the name of the party and the Central Committee without consulting anyone else. And he molded his own version of Leninism as an effective weapon against pretenders.

The ultimate "man of the machine," Stalin was one of the least likely candidates for charismatic hero. Short in stature, reticent in meetings and
on public occasions, neither a talented orator like Hitler or Trotsky, nor an attractive and engaging personality, like Lenin or Bukharin, Stalin did not himself project an image of a leader -- until it was created for him (and by him) through the cult. First the promotion of a cult of Lenin, which Stalin actively encouraged, then his identification as a loyal Leninist, and eventually his merger with and substitution for the image of Lenin were important props for Stalin's authority both within the party and in society. 

All this was accomplished in a political culture based on the prerevolutionary Bolshevik traditions in which emphasis on personality, the exaggerated importance of the leader, and the attendant sacral notions of infallibility were all alien.

Overall his policies were aimed at monopolization of decision-making at the highest possible levels. Yet centralization and the reduction of local power, in fact, often had the opposite effect, fostering local centers of power, family circles, atamanshchina, and low-level disorganization. "Little Stalins" were created throughout the country, and in the national republics ethnopolitical machines threatened the reach of the central government.

Early in the 1930s he pushed hard for the end of any duality between party and state, urging Molotov in a series of private letters to end Prime Minister Rykov's tenure and take the job himself.

The top (verkhushka) of our central soviet [apparatus] (STO [Council of Labor and Defense]; SNK [Council of People's Commissars], the conference of deputy commissars) is sick with a fatal disease. STO has turned from a business-like and fighting organ into an empty parliament. SNK is paralyzed by the wishy-

washy and, essentially, anti-party speeches of Rykov. The conference of deputy commissars, which was earlier the staff of Rykov, As, and Sheiman, now has the tendency to turn into the staff of Rykov, Piatakov, Kviring or Bogolepov (I see no great difference between the latter and the former), setting itself up against the Central Committee of the party. It is clear that this can continue no further. Fundamental measures are needed. I will discuss what kind when I return to Moscow.

A week later he urged the dismissal of Rykov and Schmidt and the dissolution of "their entire bureaucratic consultative, secretarial apparatus." By securing the premiership for Molotov, one of the few he seems to have trusted through the 1930s, Stalin sought to prevent any razryv (schism) between party and state, to end discussion in the Sovnarkom that delayed the carrying out of his policies, and to concentrate all decision-making within a loyal Politburo. "With this combination we will have full unity of the soviet and party summits (verkhuski) that will undoubtedly double our strength."

The naked exercise of unrestrained power was key to Stalin's victory. Yet simultaneously his regime worked to create authority and legitimacy, borrowing from and supplementing the repertoire of justifications from Lenin's day. In the post-October scramble to hold on to the reins of government, Lenin and the Bolsheviks justified their actions by reference to a variety of historic claims -- that they represented the vanguard of the proletariat organized in the soviets; that they were the only party able to bring peace and order to the country and willing to give the land to the peasants; that the transition to socialism was at hand and the weakest link in the capitalist chain had been broken. Russia's second revolution would receive its ultimate sanction in the rising of the European working class, and all talk of the prematurity of the Bolshevik seizure of power would

11. Ibid., p. 105.
cease. The Civil War provided a new justification for holding power -- the fight against enemies domestic and foreign, the preservation of the victories of 1917 and the prevention of a restoration. As unpopular as the Communists were in many parts of the country, they were accepted as the lesser of evils, and acquiescence to, if not positive acceptance of, Lenin's government spread through different social strata and groups -- workers, many peasants, intellectuals, certain nationalities like the Jews, who were particular victims of White anti-Semitism. "As long as the peasants feared the whites, they would go along, feet dragging, with the demands of the Soviet regime.... Thus the Bolshevik dictatorship climbed up on the back of the peasant revolution."  

Without a proletarian victory in the West (without which, according to Lenin, socialism was impossible in Russia), millenarian rhetoric was supplemented with a hardnosed reliance on force, terror, armed might, organization and new kinds of propaganda.

The development of a cult around Lenin and the formulation of a relatively coherent doctrine called Leninism were part of a more general effort to take over the ideological space formerly occupied by religion. Both Nina Tumarkin and Richard Stites have shown how new symbols and rituals were insinuated into the new cultural sphere opened by the iconoclastic practices of the early Bolsheviks. Red flags replaced tricolors; statues of Marx and Engels were hastily erected in place of tsars and generals; and images of America and modern life were used to inspire a faith in a future to which the Bolsheviks would lead the Soviet Union.

best, the creation of a new Soviet culture and popular acceptance of the political and economic projects of the Communists was a partial success, largely confined to the cities, to the elites and to significant numbers of urban workers. Though the relative peace, stability, and economic improvement of the NEP years, in contrast to the preceding seven years of war, revolution, and civil war, gave the Leninist state a degree of acceptance, even legitimacy, in the eyes of many, that acceptance was fragile and based on the compromises and limits of what the Communists almost invariably saw as a transitional period, a temporary retreat from socialism.

In the Stalinist formulation the "revolution from above" of the 1930s, though initiated by the state, was supported from below by millions of peasants and workers struggling to create a new society based on collective farms and socialist industry. But in fact the launching of the Stalin revolution, first in the countryside and then in industry, destroyed the basis of the regime's relationship with the great majority of the population (the smychka) and created a new crisis of legitimacy and authority. The enormous difficulties that the breakthrough into "socialism" entailed -- resistance from farmers, famine, economic bottlenecks and breakdowns -- were seen as the work of enemies and saboteurs, rather than inherent in the party's policies or a by-product of popular recalcitrance and massive coercion. The disjuncture between these forced images of imagined harmony and purpose and the chasm that divided the party/state from large parts of the population created unease among many as they attempted to govern a vast country and transform it according to a vision that only a minority within a minority shared.

The open resistance to collectivization among the peasants was reflected in less dramatic form by quiet forms of opposition within the party. The oligarchy that carried out the Stalin revolution was a very narrow political elite but not one that had effectively closed the party to debate and consideration of alternatives. Between the fall of Bukharin in 1928-1929 and the death of Kirov in December 1934, Stalin-faction rule produced and reproduced oppositions and potential oppositions. The real disagreements with the General Line of rapid industrialization and full collectivization and depolarization were fueled by the evident failures and costs of implementing these policies. In his own statements Stalin refused to accept any blame for the economic chaos or the famine. They were the work of saboteurs, "the last remnants of moribund classes," some of whom had "even managed to worm their way into the party." More repression was needed, for "the abolition of classes is not achieved by the extinction of the class struggle, but its intensification.... We must bear in mind that the growth of the power of the Soviet state will intensify the resistance of the last remnants of the dying classes." In a letter replying to the Cossack writer Mikhail Sholokhov's protests against the systematic brutality of the grain collection, Stalin took a hard line:

One must take into account...the other side. And that other side amounts to the fact that the respected corn-growers of your region (and not only your region) have gone on a sit-down strike (sabotage!) and shown no concern about leaving the workers, the Red Army, without grain. The fact that the sabotage was peaceful and outwardly bloodless in no way alters the realities--that the respected grain-growers have in essence carried out a 'peaceful' war with Soviet power. A war by starvation [voina na izmor], dear Comrade Sholokhov."

14. I. V. Stalin, "Itogi pervoi piatiletki: Doklad 7 ianvaria 1933 g.," Sochineniia, XII, pp. 211-212.
15. Quoted by Khrushchev, March 8, 1963; Pravda, March 10, 1963; Jonathan Haslam, "Political Opposition to Stalin and the origins of the
The growing gap between the public statements and images put forth by the state, on the one hand, and the real destruction in the countryside and the "Potemkin village" factories produced prominent party members unwilling to participate in the cover-up of the failures. Already in late 1930 some in the leadership of the RSFSR and the Transcaucasian federation expressed misgivings, which in turn were interpreted by the Stalin center as a widespread and united oppositional tendency (the Syrtsov-Lominadze Right-Left Bloc). Swift retribution (demotion in these cases) did not deter a number of other critical foci to emerge, notably the Riutin platform (1930) and Appeal (1932) and the Smirnov, Tolmachev, and Eismont opposition (1932). Within the Central Committee and the Politburo more moderate elements opposed the rapid tempos in industry and proposed a more conciliatory attitude toward society, particularly the peasantry.

Riutin's appeal of 1932 is symptomatic of the views of those opposed to Stalin's emerging dictatorship, who saw it as the negation of Leninism and the collective leadership of the Central Committee, and the principal cause of the growing disillusionment of the people with socialism.


16. R. W. Davies, "The Syrtsov-Lominadze Affair, Soviet Studies, XXXIII, 1 (January 1981), pp. 29-50. Indicative of the mood in the party is a conversation with Lominadze reported by a friend: "When I saw him, with another of his friends, in 1931, he was boldly critical of Stalin's leadership. Now that opposition from both Left and Right had been suppressed, he thought the next logical step was a radical reform of the Party and its personnel.

'What about the General Secretary?' asked his friend. 'If there is a spring cleaning, every piece of furniture has to be removed, including the biggest one.'

'But who could replace him?'

'That's up to the Congress.' It was time for younger men to take a share of the responsibility -- men who had some practical experience but had been less involved in the struggle between the factions.

around Riutin, who formed a Union of Marxist-Leninists, believed that the only way to save Bolshevism was to remove Stalin and his clique by force. If Riutin was right that "the faith of the masses in socialism has been broken, its readiness to defend selflessly the proletarian revolution from all enemies weakens each year," then the regime had either to move immediately toward conciliation and the rebuilding of confidence or turn to even more radical and repressive measures.17

Riutin's circle is an unusual instance of coherence and organization among those who opposed Stalin.18 Much more evident was a broad, inchoate discontent with Stalin's rule that permeated political and intellectual circles. Several loyal Stalinists, like Kaminskii, Kosior, Vareikis, and Bauman, harbored serious doubts about Stalin's agricultural policies. Others, like Mykola Skrypnyk, a co-founder of the Ukrainian Communist Party who had sided with Stalin in the 1920s and early 1930s, were critical of the growing centrism in the party and state and the evident pro-Russianness of Stalin's nationality policies.19 Perhaps most ominously, tensions arose between the Red Army commander, Mikhail Tukhachevskii, who called in 1930 for expansion of the armed forces, particularly aviation

18. Riutin and seventeen associates were expelled from the party by the Central Control Commission on October 9, 1932, for "having attempted to set up a bourgeois, kulak organization to re-establish capitalism and, in particular, the kulak system in the USSR by means of underground activity under the fraudulent banner of 'Marxism-Leninism'." A number of accounts hold that Stalin demanded the death penalty for Riutin but was thwarted by Kirov and other moderates. [Boris I. Nicolaevsky, Power and the Soviet Elite: "The Letter of an Old Bolshevik" and Other Essays (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 3-65; Arkadii Vaksberg, "Kak zhivoi s zhivymi," Literaturnaia gazeta, June 29, 1988; Lev Razgon, "Nakonets!" Moskovskie novosti, June 26, 1988; Dmitrii Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediiia: Politicheskii portret I. V. Stalina, 1, part 2 (Moscow: Novosti, 1989), pp. 85-86]
19. Skrypnyk committed suicide in 1933, as Ukrainian national communists were systematically being purged.
and tank armies, and Stalin and Voroshilov, who opposed what they called "Red militarism." During the famine in Ukraine high military officers, like Iakir, angered Stalin by reporting their upset at peasant resistance, which, they felt, could spread to the troops, and demanding that more grain be kept in the region.

Even among Stalin's closest supporters there were fractures, though their precise nature remains mysterious. Many surmise that moderate forces coalesced around Sergei Kirov and Sergo Orjonikidze, who opposed using the death penalty against Riutin. The open disagreement at the Seventeenth Party Congress (January - February 1934) between Orjonikidze and Molotov over industrial targets was a rare public sign of a deeper split between moderates and radicals. The popular Kirov, the only real rival left to Stalin by 1932, was in all his public and political appearances completely loyal to the General Secretary, though he often emphasized the need for "revolutionary legality," which was understood to be a lessening of repressive measures. Stalin still represented for the majority of party members the militant turn toward socialism -- collectivization, rapid industrialization, the destruction of organized political opposition. However, his personal proclivity toward the use of force seemed to some to have gone beyond the broad bounds of Bolshevik practice.

21. Eventually some grain was sent to Ukraine in January 1933 along with the new party boss, Postyshev.
23. S. Kirov, Stati i rechi, 1934 (Moscow, 1934).
Neither a consistent moderate nor radical, Stalin himself shifted from center-right (during his alliance with Bukharin in the mid-1920s) to left (during the so-called "cultural revolution") and then back to a more moderate position around 1931-1932. Responding to a growing mood among party leaders concerned with industry, Stalin announced in June 1931 a major change in the party's wage policy (the end of uravnilovka, leveling of wages, and the introduction of greater differentials between skilled and unskilled workers in order to end labor migration) and a much more tolerant and supportive policy toward the technical intelligentsia. Whether or not this policy shift was imposed on Stalin or corresponded to a genuine re-evaluation of his position, during the next half decade he steadily began to reverse the more radical policies of the 1920s and the early 1930s and pull back from egalitarianism and collectivism toward a promotion of hierarchy, cultural traditionalism, and social conservatism that has come to be known as the "Great Retreat."

On a variety of fronts the Stalinists retreated from their forward positions of just a few years earlier. Though the collective farms remained firmly under the tutelage of the state and continued to operate essentially as grain-collection apparatuses, a series of decisions allowed the collective-farm peasants to possess some livestock, to sell their surpluses on the

24. I. V. Stalin, "Novaia obstanovka -- novye zadachi khoziaistvennogo stroitel'stve," Sochineniia, XIII (Moscow: Gosudarstvenoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1951), pp. 51-80. Bailes shows how this conciliatory move was initiated by Orjonikidze and others involved in industrial production [Technology and Society, pp. 144-155].
25. Moshe Lewin, "'Taking Grain': Soviet Policies of Agricultural Procurements Before the War," The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History of Intervar Russia (New York: Pantheon, 1985), pp. 142-177. "Peasants in Stalin's times were indeed legally bound to their place of work, submitted to a special legal regimen, and -- through the kolkhoz -- to a form of collective responsibility with regard to state duties. They were transformed, not unlike as in pre-emancipation times, into an estate placed at the very bottom of the social ladder." (p. 176)
market, and to own their houses and work household plots. While workers were increasingly restricted in their movements through the 1930s, an essentially "bourgeois" system of remuneration was created: "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work." Workers were encouraged to compete with one another in order, not only to maximize output, but to win material rewards, and various collective forms of organizing work and payment were eliminated.26 Progressive piece work was introduced in the spring of 1934, and while real wages fell for most workers a significant number of udarniki (shock workers) and stakhanovtsy participated in the more "joyous" life that Stalin had promised.27 Worker power declined and that of managers and technicians increased.28 "The Party wanted the bosses to be efficient, powerful, harsh, impetuous, and capable of exerting pressure crudely and ruthlessly and getting results 'whatever the cost'. The formation of the despotic manager was actually a process in which not leaders but rulers were made."29 In the words of Moishe Kaganovich, "The ground must shake when the factory director enters the plant."

The severe economic crisis of the winter of 1932-1933, as well as the coming to power of Hitler in Germany, helped accelerate the swing toward state policies that favored the educated and ambitious and eased the pressure on others. By the middle of the year arrests and deportations

declined, and production targets for the Second Five-Year Plan were reduced and consumer goods given higher priority. In his public rhetoric of these years Stalin maintained his severity and toughness, qualities that had long been part of Bolshevik culture, but showed that under pressure he could be more flexible and accommodating. He seemed, not only a competent commander to many but indeed an indispensable leader in a time of political stress and economic crisis. A high party official, Barmin, wrote about this period (1932): "Loyalty to Stalin was based principally on the conviction that there was no one to take his place, that any change of leadership would be extremely dangerous, and that the country must continue in its present course, since to stop now or attempt a retreat would mean the loss of everything."30 Rumors that Stalin had suggested that he resign (probably after the suicide of his second wife, Nadezhda Allilueva, in November 1932) were embellished by reports of his associates rallying around him.

The private letters from the vacationing Stalin to his closest comrade Molotov (from 1930 and 1933) reveal in a striking way the less public characteristics of the dictator and his methods of rule. He wrote short, terse memoranda to Molotov on the important matters that were before the Politburo, and apparently did the same with Kaganovich, Orjonikidze, and others. "From the boss (khoziain) we are receiving regular and frequent directives," Kaganovich wrote Orjonikidze in 1932."31 While he preferred to work through his own narrow circle of friends -- Molotov, who was his principal executor,32 Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Orjonikidze, Kaganovich --

30. A. Barmine, One Who Survived (New York: 1945), p. 31. "Pis'ma Stalina Molotovu," p. 94. 32. "Molotov was the only member of the Politburo whom Stalin addressed with the familiar pronoun ty.... Molotov, though impotent without Stalin's leadership, was indispensable to Stalin in many ways. Though both were unscrupulous in their methods, it seems to me that Stalin selected these methods carefully and fitted them to circumstances, while Molotov regarded them in advance as being incidental and unimportant. I maintain that he
Stalin was quick to turn on any of them if he felt challenged. In 1933 he severely criticized Orjonikidze for objecting to remarks by Vyshinskii that attacked those working in the industrial and agricultural ministries: "The behavior of Sergo (and Iakovlev) in the story of the "completeness of production" is impossible to call anything else but anti-party, because it has as its objective goal the defense of reactionary elements of the party against the CC VKP(b)."33 Because Kaganovich had sided with Orjonikidze, he too fell under Stalin's wrath. Nothing came of this dispute at the time, nor of the more serious accusations made against Mikhail Kalinin.

The OGPU was carrying out investigations in 1930 into a series of anti-Soviet "parties" made up of former Mensheviks, industrial specialists, and Ukrainian activists.34 Stalin received regular reports from Iagoda and insisted that Molotov circulate them among the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, as well as among "the more active of our xoziaistvenniki (economic specialists)." He told Molotov that he was convinced that these conspiratorial elements were linked with the Rightists within the party. "It is absolutely essential to shoot Kondrat'ev, Groman and a pair of the other bastards (merzavtsy).... It is absolutely essential to shoot the whole group of wreckers in meat production and to publish this information in the press."35 He personally demanded the arrests of the former Menshevik Sukhanov, his Communist wife (who must have known what was going on in their home), Bazarov, Ramzin, and others. The concocted stories of anti-Soviet conspiracies were fed

not only incited Stalin into doing many things, but that he also sustained him and dispelled his doubts... it would be wrong to underestimate Molotov's role, especially as the practical executive." [Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962), pp. 62, 70-71]

33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., pp. 103.
35. Ibid., p. 103.
throughout the top bureaucracy and created an atmosphere of suspicion that justified the use of precisely the kinds of harsh measures that Stalin advocated.

Fear and the need for vigilance, which were created both by the police findings and the real weaknesses and insecurities of the Soviet Union, bound the beleaguered Communists together around the leader who projected an image of Bolshevik toughness. At the same time the Stalinist settlement involved the creation of a highly hierarchical system of rewards and privileges, of access to information and influence, that effectively disenfranchised the great mass of the population and privileged a small number of party and state officials, intellectuals, and managers. The end of rationing in 1934-1935 forced everyone below the privileged upper levels of society to forage in government stores and peasant markets for what they could afford. Social inequalities grew in an economy of permanent shortages where money talked less effectively than one's position and personal connections. A "ruling class without tenure," in Lewin's phrase, grew increasingly dependent on being in favor with those even higher up. They were under a constant threat of demotion, expulsion from the party, arrest and even death. Their success required absolute and unquestioning obedience, enforcement of the decisions from the top with determination, even ruthlessness, on those below, and a willingness to acquiesce and participate in what can only be considered criminal activity (denunciations of the innocent, approval of lawlessness, collaboration with a regime based on deception). Their dilemma was that it was dangerous for them to be

anything but responsive to the top, and yet their position and requirements
to increase production and satisfy the demands of the top and the center
pulled them toward making arrangements with the bottom and the
periphery.

The years of upheaval and uncertainty of the early 1930s were
clearly coming to an end by the opening of the Seventeenth Party Congress
in late January 1934. Though the full story has yet to be told, there
appears to have been a movement at the Congress to replace Stalin with
Kirov, but Kirov's differences with Stalin were not great enough for the
Leningrad leader to repudiate the General Secretary as many others
wished. Though many still feared the trend toward personal autocracy by
Stalin, the oligarchic bureaucratic system seemed more secure than ever;
oppositions had been rendered impotent; and a new emphasis on
"revolutionary legality" seemed to promise a more orderly, procedural, less
disruptive mode of governance. But, as Lewin notes:

Stalin was not ready to accept the role of just a
cog, however powerful, in his own machine. A top
bureaucrat is a chief executive, in the framework of a
constraining committee.... But Stalin had had the power,
and the taste for it -- for ever more of it -- since he had
led the early stage of the shattering breakthrough and
gotten full control over the state in the process. At this
point, the traits of his gloomy personality, with clear
paranoid tendencies become crucial. Once at the top and
in full control, he was not a man to accept changes in the
pattern of his personal power.... He therefore took the
road of shaking up, of destabilizing the machinery and its
upper layers, in order to block the process fatally
working against his personal predilection for
autocracy.38

The period before the murder of Kirov (December 1934) might be
seen as the prehistory of Stalinism, the period of formation of the political
structures and social conditions that created the possibility for a regime of

extreme centralization of power, overwhelming dominance of a weakened society, and particular ferocity. The unlimited despotism of Stalinism was the product of the Great Purges, which simultaneously eliminated all possible resistance and created a new and more loyal elite with which the tyrant could rule. Several different interpretations have been offered by analysts as to the causes and effects of the Purges. For some, like Zbigniew Brzezinski who proposed that purging was a permanent and necessary component of totalitarianism in lieu of elections, or Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who sees the purges as simply the most extreme manifestation of the amorality of the Marxist vision, the Ezhovshchina was an inherent and inevitable part of the Soviet system. Others have explained the Purges as a more extreme form of political infighting. "The existence of high-level personal rivalries, disputes over development or modernization plans, powerful and conflicting centrifugal and centripetal forces, and local conflicts," writes J. Arch Getty, "made large-scale political violence possible and even likely." 39 Dissatisfaction with Stalin's rule and with the harsh material conditions was palpable in the mid-1930s, and, writes Gabor T. Rittersporn, "In all probability, the struggles of 1936-1937 were unleashed by popular discontent with the arbitrariness, corruption and inefficiency of the ruling strata." 40 "The purge was not a punitive enterprise inflicted victoriously from above, but primarily an intense internal struggle within the state apparatus resulting from the need to ensure the functioning of the uncontrollable administrative, economic and political machinery." 41 The vastness of the bloodletting crushed for a time the family circles and local

feudatories (particularly in the union republics), but by 1938 the mass arrests and executions brought in their wake, not only concentration of power at the top and center, but even greater disorder and insecurity. "Nothing seems to warrant the traditional image of Soviet politics in the 1930s with its omnipotent dictator and his totally controlled instruments of unlimited power. Everything points to the assumption that, far from being an autocrat's successful offensive against a whole society, the central political phenomenon of the decade resembled much more a kind of feudal anarchy or institutionalized civil war."42

Several writers have focused on the effects of the Purges rather than its causes, though it is implied that intentions may be read into the results. A. L. Unger, Kendall E. Bailes, and Sheila Fitzpatrick have shown how a new "leading stratum" of Soviet-educated "specialists" replaced the Old Bolsheviks and "bourgeois specialists."43 The largest number were promoted workers and party rank-and-file, young technicians, who would make up the Soviet elite through the post-Stalin period until the early 1980s.44 "Stalin -- and, for that matter, the majority of Soviet citizens --,"

42. Gabor T. Rittersporn, "Rethinking Stalinism," Russian History/Histoire Russe, XI, 4 (Winter 1984), pp. 357-358. Whereas Getty and Sheila Fitzpatrick see Stalin as moving between or "standing above" the moderate and radical camps in the higher-circles of the party, Rittersporn believes that Stalin was always in the radical camp and suffered a kind of defeat in 1938. Sheila Fitzpatrick, for example, writes: "Soviet politics of the 1930s should be viewed as a conflict between policemen (those like Molotov whose primary concern was internal security and control) and industrializers (the Ordzhonikidze type), with Stalin normally standing above the conflict but combining characteristics of both groups." ["Stalin and the Making of a New Elite, 1928-1939," Slavic Review, XXXVIII, 3 (September 1979), p. 402.]


44. Bailes criticizes Fitzpatrick for not distinguishing between those who rose into the intelligentsia through formal education, many of whom were workers (the vydvizhentsy), and the praktiki, who were elevated through
writes Sheila Fitzpatrick, "saw the cadres of the mid 1930s less in their old role as revolutionaries than in the current role as bosses. There is even some evidence that Stalin saw them as Soviet boyars (feudal lords) and himself as a latter-day Ivan the Terrible, who had to destroy the boyars to build a modern nation state and a new service nobility." 45

More traditionally, the Great Purges have been seen as an effort "to achieve an unrestricted personal dictatorship with a totality of power that [Stalin] did not yet possess in 1934." 46 Initiation of the Purges came from Stalin, who guided and prodded the arrests, show trials, and executions forward, aided by the closest members of his entourage: Molotov, Kaganovich, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Mikoyan, and, of course, Ezhov. Here personality and politics merge, and the degree of excess repression is dictated by the peculiar demands of Stalin himself, who could not tolerate limits on his will set by the very ruling elite that he had brought to power.

"It is one of the mysteries of Stalinism," Lewin summarizes, that it turned much of the fury of its bloody purges against this very real mainstay of the regime. There were among the apparatus, probably, still too many former members of other parties or of the original Leninist party, too many participants and victors of the civil war who remembered who had done what during those days of glory. Too many thus could feel the right to be considered founders of the regime and base on it part of the claims to a say in decisions and to security in their positions. Probably, also letting the new and sprawling administration settle and get encrusted in


their chairs and habits could also encourage them to try and curtail the power of the very top and the personalized ruling style of the chief of the state -- and this was probably a real prospect the paranoid leader did not relish.47

The debates will continue, even after the archives are completely opened, but already one might tentatively conclude that Stalin’s initiation and personal direction of the Purges was the catalyst to thousands of smaller settlings of scores. In the context of deep and recurring social tensions the state gave the green light to resentments against the privileged, the intelligentsia, other ethnicities, outsiders. The requirement to find enemies, to blame and punish worked together with self-protection and self-promotion (and plain sadism) to expand the Purges into a political holocaust. At the end the Soviet Union resembled a ruined landscape, seriously weakened economically, intellectually, and militarily, but at the same time dominated by a towering state apparatus made up of new loyal apparatchiki, disciplined by the police, and presided over by a single will.

By the outbreak of the Second World War the central government, the military, the republics and local governments, the economic infrastructure had all been brutally disciplined. Obedience and conformity had eliminated most initiative or originality. Ruling through his like-minded lieutenants, Stalin relied on specialists whenever he needed expertise or greater competence. After decimating the high command of the armed forces, his control over his military was greater than Hitler over his, at least at the beginning of the war. He intervened and interfered in both minute and major decisions, and was often abrupt and threatening, yet he was more willing to rely on his generals than was Hitler, who became progressively more involved with operational command and more

contemptuous of the military leaders. "Hitler's generals, writes Severyn Bialer, "exercised less influence on the decisions of their High Command at the moment they were most able to act effectively; Stalin's generals exercised more."48 Stalin stood at the center of all strategic, logistical, and political decisions. He was chairman of the State Defense Committee, which included the highest party officials (Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, and later Voznesenskii and Mikoyan); the chairman of Stavka, the supreme military headquarters; General Secretary of the party and chairman of the Politburo; chairman of the Council of Ministers and People's Commissar of Defense. Real business often took place in late-night meetings at Stalin's apartment or dacha, and the exigencies of total war reinforced and accelerated the centralization of power.49

The victory over Nazism, which was at one and the same time convincingly identified with the superiority of the Soviet system, its organic link with rodina (the motherland), and the personal genius of Stalin, provided the Communists with the kind of legitimacy and popular authority that had eluded them in the prewar period. Russia and the Soviet Union melded in a single image. Patriotism and accommodation with established religious and national traditions, along with the toning down of revolutionary radicalism, contributed to a powerful ideological amalgam that outlasted Stalin himself. The war became the central moment of Soviet history for generations to come, eclipsing the revolution and the velikii

48. Severyn Bialer, Stalin and His Generals, p. 43. "As supreme head of army command, Hitler was centrally involved in the formulation of day-to-day tactics in a way which occupied no other head of state during the Second World War. For the German army, this was catastrophic. The command structure which he had devised placed him in charge of both the general management of military campaigns and its detailed tactics." (Ian Kershaw, Hitler [London and New York: Longman, 1991], p. 175)
perelom of the early 1930s. And though there would be sporadic uses of repression and terror against individuals or groups (the "Leningrad Affair" of 1947, the "Doctors’ Plot" of 1953), as well as a pervasive fear that disciplined people into obedient silence, no massive terror on the scale of 1937 was employed after the war.

Whatever benefits accrued to the Soviet system from the unity of decision-making at the top must be weighed against the costs of overcentralization and the resultant paralysis lower down in the apparatus. In the years of the Cold War, as Stalin deteriorated physically and mentally, the entire country -- its foreign policy, internal politics, cultural life, and economic slowdown -- reflected the moods of its leader and was affected by his growing isolation, arbitrariness, and inactivity. No one could feel secure. The ruling elite was concerned with plots, intrigues, the rivalries within Stalin’s closest associates, the rise and fall of clients and patrons. "All of us around Stalin," writes Khrushchev, "were temporary people. As long as he trusted us to a certain degree, we were allowed to go on living and working. But the moment he stopped trusting you, Stalin would start to scrutinize you until the cup of his distrust overflowed."50 In his last years Stalin turned against Molotov and Mikoyan, grew suspicious of Beria, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov. Khrushchev overheard him say, "I’m finished. I trust no one, not even myself."51

Both Western and Soviet historians wrestle with the vexing question of the source of the degeneration of the Soviet system, and in the years of Perestroika and glasnost’ the dating of its origins has steadily been pushed back from the Stalin Revolution to the earliest years of Soviet Power.

51. Ibid.
Bolsheviks were cavalier in the revolutionary period about Western notions of democracy and confident that they had discovered a higher form. The revolution had, in a sense, been a struggle between two distinct, and not necessarily incompatible, understandings of democracy--one the conventional liberal idea of representative government based on periodic elections, guaranteed civil rights, and protection of minorities; the other, a sociological category encompassing the lower classes. In Russian "the democracy" [demokratiia] usually referred, not to the idea of limited representative government, but to those classes of the population that existed outside the propertied classes (tsentsovoe obshchestvo) that had had the direct vote (tsenz) in the last two tsarist dumas. The democracy was the constituency of the socialist parties, that part of the population represented in soviets and factory committees, and "democracy" was understood as a government representative of the lower classes. The Bolshevik project after the seizure of power was to empower these classes, particularly workers, to promote them socially and politically, to the disadvantage of the old ruling elites. Though the replacement of party and bureaucratic power for Soviet power, along with the institution of managerial control instead of workers' control in the factories, limited the actual input of much of the demokratiia, the entry of workers, soldiers, and peasants into the ruling institutions empowered significant numbers. At the same time the expansion and democratization of education, the privileging of the proletariat, the insistence that culture be accessible to the masses all worked to "democratize" the social and cultural order. Ultimately, the socially democratizing tendencies came up against the countervailing movements of centralizing state power, ending local autonomies, creating new hierarchies based less on class than on skill, education, position, and
political loyalty. Stalinism contained within it both of these contradictory
tendencies with all the resulting tensions, and the periodic explosions of the
newly-arrived against the "former people" and intellectuals are testimony to
their incomplete resolution. By the time Stalin declared the advent of
socialism in the USSR and the promulgation of the world's "most
democratic" constitution, both democracy as representation and democracy
as the empowering of the disenfranchised had become casualties of his
unlimited authoritarianism.
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