"German History and the
Contradictions of Modernity"

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Modernization, Modernity

Perhaps surprisingly, in light of the bitterly conducted critiques of the 1960s and 1970s, "modernization theory" seems alive and well. Two decades ago, a generation of radical social scientists--mainly Marxist and often from a Third-World perspective--attacked the patent Eurocentric, unilinear, progressivist, and teleological assumptions on which the developmental modernization theories of the 1950s and 1960s tended to be based, while a related body of historical work questioned the adequacy of the "traditional" and "modern" dichotomy for analyzing the complexities of historical change, whether within or across particular societies. [1] Of course, it would be wrong to assume that modernization theorists and their models just disappeared. The more simplistic versions, it is true, fell into disrepute or entered a crisis of confidence, their assumptions and predictions in disarray. But a large body of policy-oriented work continued as before, while the more sophisticated practitioners retreated, somewhat bloodied, to more moderate and careful ground, often accompanied by reflections on history, to reconsider the originary cases from which the operative developmental models were derived. [2]

Moreover, in the meantime the original ground of the critique has itself become unsure. The superior virtues of the Marxist and related radical counter-positions have become less obvious than in the past. Since the mid-1970s Marxism has also come under attack for its teleological forms of reasoning, not least from a wide range of critics who began their rethinking from within the Marxist tradition's own political and intellectual domain. This Marxist ferment has also been characterized by a pronounced anti-reductionist turn, so that political and ideological changes can no longer be easily conceived as the logical and dependent consequences of underlying socio-economic causes in the classic "base-and-superstructure" sense. The main Marxist alternative to modernization-based models of the inter-relationship of industrialization and political change--namely, the framework of the transition from feudalism to capitalism--has been little more successful in specifying the causal relationship of particular political histories (like the English or French Revolutions) to structurally determining processes of capitalist developmental change. [3] Recent revisionisms have also deconstructed the organizing concept of the Industrial Revolution itself. [4] Given the uncertainty of the main alternative, therefore, the way has been clear for modernization theory's modest return.

If a less dogmatic, more agnostic understanding of modernization has been possible through a loosening of the older polemical fronts, the need to conceptualize modernity has been imposed by a different kind of intellectual challenge, namely, the philosophical and cultural discourse of postmodernism. By now the range of theory and commentary encompassed by the latter in the English-speaking world have become vast, and any full discussion goes beyond the bounds of this paper. For our purposes, we may briefly list three dimensions of critique, while noting their fuller elaboration in a more specifically post-structuralist theoretical context: (1) a critique of the universalist values and foundational categories of the Enlightenment philosophical tradition; (2) a critique of the familiar "grand narratives" of modern historical development, of progress and emancipation (the Industrial Revolution, the rise of democracy, the triumph of science over nature, the emancipation of the working class, the victory of socialism, the equality of women, and so on); and (3) a critique

of the idea of the coherently centered and rationally acting individual subject.

As such, the postmodernist perspective imples a conception of modernity now in dissolution or supersession, which <u>both</u> the modernization theorists <u>and</u> their Marxist critics have held in common--one constructued epistemologically around totalizing notions of transcendent truth and the universalizing meta-narrative of the rise of "Western civilization" and "Man's" mastery over nature, in a way which allowed the world and its future to be <u>known</u> in a scientific, historical, and predictive sense. Such an understanding of modernity implied a strongly centered notion of identity and agency, of directionality in history, of the power of knowledge to shape the environment, and of the progressive impact of the West in the rest of the world (even where such transformations have proceeded through immediately destructive and exploitative encounters). There is much diversity of perspectives among and within these intellectual traditions, of course--liberal, Marxist, and others. But some version of the above, which combines assumptions about the reasoning individual with the overarching logics of universal rationalization, economic progress, and the West's expansion in the world, has been constitutive for the main forms of social theory since the end of the last century. As Nelly Richard says:

> "With regard to its economic programme and its cultural
> organization, this concept of modernity represents an effort
> to synthesize its progressive and emancipatory ideals into
> a globalizing, integrative vision of the individual's place
> in history and society. It rests on the assumption that there
> exists a legitimate centre--a unique and superior position
> from which to establish control and to determine hierarchies".
> [5]

This critique of the Enlightenment tradition is a highly charged political project, and it is no accident that in the English-speaking world its impetus has come increasingly from feminists, African-Americans, other minorities, and the Third-World critics of colonial and post-colonial forms of power--that is, precisely the voices historically most effectively silenced by the progressive Enlightenment-derived cultural and political traditions. Of course, the liberal and conservative upholders of the values of the West are unlikely to be moved by such voices from the margins, as controversies currently raging over the university curriculum in the USA eloquently confirm. Such debates, which focus around the established conception of "Western Civilization" and its cultural authority, are the opposite of an abstract or academic discussion, but grow from political demands for a fresh review of discriminatory structures and practices, typically precipitated by some incident or revelation of racist and/or sexist excess. At the same time, calls for non-sexist and anti-racist education, "diversity" and the validation of difference have entailed a radical and wide-ranging philosophical and theoretical debate, which elicit increasingly aggressive reassertions of the old truths, as in the current charges in the USA that the advocates of "diversity" are seeking to impose a single standard of politically correct ("PC") attitudes. The Salman Rushdie affair has been particularly interesting in this respect. While Rushdie himself speaks from within the post-colonial discourse of indeterminacy, his sentence to death by Ayatollah Khomeini (February 14, 1990) has ironically produced an outpouring of Eurocentric moralizing. Aside from the purer civil libertarian positions and a large amount of more nuanced commentary, Rushdie's defence

has called forth some startling restatements of "Western" tradition, drawn
in sharp contradistinction to the irrational and dangerous Third World Other,
in this case the demonized forces of fundamentalist Islam. [6]

Once we turn to German intellectual life, we will find "western values"
much more strongly centered. The Enlightenment tradition has no shortage of
critics--both from a "Green" political and cultural discourse on the left,
and from the partisans of German "identity" on the right. But on the whole
it is still the strong orientation towards the values of the West--from the
market-oriented ideology of the Free Democrats and the CDU center to the welfare
statism of the SPD, and the obdurate rationalism and philosophical modernism
of most liberal and social democratic intellectuals--that will leave us most
impressed. Here, of course, the unavoidable context of such discussion--until
the annus mirabile of 1989, at least--has remained the experience and legacy
of the Third Reich. For Jürgen Habermas, especially, an explicit, systematic,
and continuously reaffirmed alliegiance to the "political theory of the Enlightenment"
has become the unavoidable antidote to Germany's baleful pre-1945 past. In this
case an abstract and normative constitutionalism deriving from the historic break
of 1945-49--the necessity of a "constitutional patriotism", or a post-conventional
identity based on rationalist adherence to an idealized construction of the
liberal political community of the West--has become for Habermas the only permissable
form of a German collective identity, because more traditional appeals to history
and nationality ("identity" and "meaning", as privileged in the discourse of the
intellectual right) have become morally forfeited due to the years 1933-45.
The sense of a new beginning, of strict demarcation against certain older
German continuities or traditions--political romanticism, decisionism, diverse
illiberalisms and anti-modernisms--has been crucial to Habermas's conception
of how post-war German democracy needs to be thought. As he insisted during
the recent Historikerstreit:

> "The only patriotism that will not alienate us from the West is
> constitutional patriotism. Unfortunately, a commitment to
> universal constitutional principles based in conviction has only
> been possible in German national culture since--and because of--
> Auschwitz. Anyone who wishes to expunge the shame of this fact
> with facile talk of 'guilt-obsession', anyone who wants to recall
> the Germans to more conventional forms of national identity,
> destroys the only reliable basis of our tie to the West". [7]

Thus for Habermas certain ideas are irredeemably contaminated by their
associations with the past, and this connotative chain precludes the opening
of the contemporary agenda towards the discourse of postmodernism. For him,
critiques of Enlightenment are inseparably linked--logically and historically--
to politically destructive and reactionary agendas. His worst fear is that the
late-twentieth-century crisis of modernity, rightly defined by the catastrophe
of scientific domination over nature, will open the door for irrationalism
and a rehabilitated tradition of the anti-democratic right. And, of course,
such voices have certainly been heard. At one intellectual retreat organized
by the CDU soon after returning to government in 1983, on the theme of "German
Identity Today", the conservative philosopher Günther Rohrmoser counterposed
to the Enlightenment what he called a specifically German "answer to...modern
society and the problems of human alienation connected with it". In the late
twentieth century, Rohrmoser argued, the Enlightenment tradition's moral
hegemony could no longer persuade. The "project of modernity" was in crisis,

and a certain heritage of critique should now come into play: "Is it really the
case that the answers of an ideologically exhausted liberalism and a socialism
that has failed in all its variants are better than those we can derive from
the memory of the greatest philosophical and cultural achievements of the Germans?"
In fact, the post-1945 determination to treat "the difference between the
Germans and all the ahistorical-abstract traditions of the West founded on
natural law" as "nothing but an error" has produced only "the neuroticization
of our national self-understanding". [8] Here the seamless unity of political
romanticism, appeals to identity, and historical apologetics feared by Habermas
--the harmful consequences of departing from the Enlightenment tradition--seems
to be clearly at work.

In this respect Habermas speaks for a substantial body of German historical
opinion, basically those responsible for the main innovations of the 1960s
and 1970s, including Hans Mommsen and other so-called "structuralist" historians
of Nazism, Wolfgang Mommsen, labor historians, and Hans-Ulrich Wehler,
Jürgen Kocka, and other members of the so-called Bielefeld network. But is
that really all there is to say? Can we really lump together all the present
hesitancies and reservations about the Enlightenment tradition in all its
dimensions and mark them negatively as danger, a re-emergence of tainted German
traditions from before 1945, so that "precisely in [Germany] a 'grand coalition'
of critics of enlightenment has formed, a coalition in which the brown, black,
and green fringes meet?", as Habermas has put it? [9] Quite apart from the
merits of current philosophical and theoretical critiques themselves (which,
after all, many on the left have found compelling), enthroning the Enlightenment
so intransigently also leads to a highly synthetic historical account of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in which the complexity of the processes
which actually moved progressive or democratic change is flattened. Moreover,
as feminist and post-colonial critics have taught us, "the political theory
of the Enlightenment" also involved silences and suppressions, so that the
founding moments of modern democratic advance became predicated on the gendering
of political capacities, the social qualification and limitation of citizenship,
and the exploitative domination of some peoples by others. Social improvement
and cultural goods involved similar privilegings and exclusions, in which
certain constructions of value, agency, and interest were centered at the
expense of others. The great movements of modern reform since the French Revolution
were constituted from fields of contradiction in this way.

If that is so, then Habermas's connections look less automatic. Once
we accept that the story of the Enlightenment tradition is one of contradictory
movement and effects, so that the ideals of progress, rationalism, and science
may be treated problematically as well as affirmatively, then the issue of
negative continuities (which Habermas locates in political romanticism and
right-wing anti-Enlightenment oppositions) can be very differently posed. Such
dangers can be found not only in the various forms of conservatism and right-wing
anti-Enlightenment critique, but also--and more insidiously--working away
at the heart of the Enlightenment ideas themselves. It is this point--which
destabilizes the rationalist unity of economic and cultural progress Habermas
wishes to hold together, and problematizes the post-war "anti-totalitarian
consensus" on which he believes West German political culture to have been
based--that Habermas's affirmative centering of "Western values" tends to obscure.

How, then, are we to judge the category of "the modern"? A full-scale
conceptual review would outgrow the terms of this essay, and instead I want
to indicate briefly some of the salient present meanings before moving, eclectically
and agnostically, to a consideration of some current historiographical issues

of the <u>Kaiserreich</u>.

(1) The simplest meaning is the one embodied in the following quotation
by Lawrence Stone, inscribed by his pupils at the head of his recent Festschrift:

> "...how and why did Western Europe change itself during the
> sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries so as to lay the
> social, economic, scientific, political, ideological and
> ethical foundations for the rationalist, democratic, individual-
> istic, technological industrialized society in which we now live?
> England was the first country to travel along this road..." [10]

Or, as Anthony Giddens puts it in his most recent work: "'modernity' refers
to modes of social life or organization which emerged in Europe from about
the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less
worldwide in their influence". [11] This is also the approach of Thomas Nipperdey
and Hans-Ulrich Wehler. After beginning his account with an exhaustive catalogue
of particular changes signified by the progressive transition from the "traditional"
to the "modern", Nipperdey locates the latter in an epochal conjuncture of
underlying conditions: Weber's "disenchantment of the world" [<u>Entzauberung</u>],
where modernization appears as "systematische, zweckgerichtete und konsequente
["purposeful and sustained"] Rationalisierung", originating in the universalism
permitted by the monotheism of Judeo-Christian religion; the universalistic
rationality and anti-particularism of Roman law; and the territorial pluralism
of the European state-system, which interacted with the consequences of the
Protestant Reformation to promote bureaucratic processes of state formation and
key institutional autonomies around both towns and universities. Together
these processes constituted "modernization" as a "Schlüsselbegriff der Universal-
geschichte": "Er soll den einmaligen Prozess des ungeheuer schnellen ökonomischen,
sozialen, kulturellen, politischen Wandels beschreiben, der sich in den
letzten 200 Jahren, seit der Doppelrevolution des späten 18. Jahrhunderts,
der industriellen und der demokratischen Revolution, zuerst in der europäisch-
atlantischen Sphäre und dann in der ganzen Welt abgespielt hat". [12] Wehler
takes a similar approach, authorizing his account more explicitly from Weber,
and defining modernization by a distinctive set of West European peculiarities
("Dieses gesamte Ensemble okzidentaler Sonderbedingungen"). Wehler also follows
Weber in refusing a Marxist or similar materialist privileging of economic
and social determinations. But while he maintains political rule, economics,
and culture in a dynamic state of reciprocal interaction, as opposed to ordering
them around the primacy of, say, state formation or industrialization ("Vielmehr
bewährt es sich erneut, an der Trias von Wirtschaft, Herrschaft und Kultur
festzuhalten, denn diese drei relativ autonomen Dimensionen fügen sich zur
sozialen Lebenswelt zusammen, eine einzige von ihnen konstituiert sie nicht".),
the Weberian "rationalization" tends nonetheless to order the account as a
capacious portmanteau concept. [13]

What are we to make of such a usage? At one level it reflects a recent and
continuing genre of historical sociology focused on the dialectic of capitalism
and state-making, based particularly in early modern Europe, but also including
a range of global histories which are seeking in effect to rebuild social theory
via writing the history of the world. [14] In effect, this amounts to a more
careful disengagement of a more manageably specified question (the relationship
of capitalist development to processes of state formation) from the over-totalized
framework of modernization theory as it was presented in the 1950s and 1960s,
a specification assisted by a more open relationship to Marxist theory, and
given powerful impetus by the reception of Barrington Moore's <u>Social Origins of</u>

<u>Dictatorship and Democracy</u>. [15] On the other hand, the German discussion
seems more continuous with the earlier more totalizing moment of modernization
theory--Nipperdey more pragmatically, Wehler in explicitly theorized way. [16]
Moreover, Wehler retains modernization theory's normative ambition, both·
theoretically-comparatively and politically-ethically, as in the explication
of "erkenntnisleitende Interessen" in terms of "the historical origins of our
present" [die Entstehungsgeschichte unserer Gegenwart] and the "imagery of
a desirable future" [Vorstellungen über eine gewünschte Zukunft]. [17] In
Wehler's case, the normativity of the West German present (meaning more
specifically the consolidated reform values of the 1970s), and of an·allied·
conception of the Western community, is palpable.

   In other words, "modernity" here is not just a postulated relationship
between social change and institutional forms, but a set·of <u>philosophical</u>
positions about the contemporary world. Here the relations among contemporary
commentary, traditions of thought, and the specific histories through which
the··latter emerged (the historicity of ideas, as opposed to their universalized
abstraction) are much less clear and imply notions of origin, linked to··arguments
about the rise of bourgeois society or the importance of the French Revolution,
which historians would usually suspect. [18] At·a certain point, therefore,
discussions of modernization in the more controlled sense (capitalism and
state-making)·shade into more·encompassing claims about·modernity, whose
license is far less·dependent on historical argument and research. This is
true both of·the specifically German discussion, where Habermas has become
such a·leading·voice·in the reaffirming of Enlightenment traditions, · and in
the English-speaking world among those social theorists seeking to hold the
ground of classical sociology. Giddens, for example, has offered the concept
of "high modernity" against the claims of postmodernity, grounding his·discussion
of modernity in the themes of "security versus danger" and "trust versus risk".
Yet for Giddens the emergence of modernity is abstracted from multi-dimensional
processes of institutional development--relating to (a) the growth of capitalism
("Capital accumulation in the context of competitive·labour and·product markets"),
(b) industrialism ("Transformation of nature: development of the 'created
environment'"), (c) the growth of administrative power and surveillance ("Control
of information and social supervision"), and (d) military power ("Control
of the means of·violence in the context of the industrialization of war")--which
have a completely non-specific relationship to the historical contexts in which
such a modernity was allegedly produced. [19]

   (2) There is a second complex of meanings, as pervasive to late-twentieth-
century vocabulary as the "modernization/modernity" complex, and indeed inescapably
a part of our contemporary common sense, ·and that is the "modernism/modernity"
range of meanings in cultural theory and the arts. While notoriously hard
to pin down, modernism here is associated with a concentrated period of formal
innovation·in writing and the visual arts in the early twentieth century, which
experienced a dramatic process of politicized radicalization during and after
the First World War, before becoming extended to the new mass media of film,
radio, photography, and advertising and their technologies, and thereby
to a general sensibility of fashion, style, and design. Other arguments
relate this burst of creativity to the artist's changing place in society (that
is, structurally speaking in relation to the market, private patronage,
and the state) and the self-conscious emergence of a radical literary-artistic
intelligentsia claiming a distinctive social and political voice (the avant-garde).
The argument can be further extended--in both the understanding of the innovators

themselves and the theorizing of the subsequent commentators--to the aesthetic
and perceptual consequences of the new urban, industrial, and technological
conditions of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century social world.
And the most fruitful specifications of this sociological dimension have focused
on the metropolis as the crucible and inspiration of the new sensibility,
leading to a distinctive human condition of fragmentation and individual isolation,
which is both producer and product of the emergent modernist discourse. Georg
Simmel and Walter Benjamin become the classical theorizers of this metropolitan
moment, while the "modern predicament" becomes canonized into a now-familiar
line of artistic and literary achievements. How exactly this discourse of
modernism should be conceptualized in relation to the new one of postmodernism
remains an open question. [20]

In this cultural complex of meanings, it will be noticed, the origins
of "modernity" migrate from the late eighteenth to the late nineteenth century.
In the German context it is above all the Weimar Republic that defines our
perceptions of modernism in this sense. Detlev Peukert has made perhaps the
strongest argument for appropriating this Weimar moment of cultural experimentation,
characterized as "classical modernity", as the basis for a general analysis
of political and social-historical, as well as cultural, problems of the
early twentieth century. In this view, the transition to industrialism in
the 1890s created the conditions for "the socio-cultural penetration of modernity":
"Since the turn of the century modernity has classically shaped developments
in the fields of science and culture, in town planning, in technology, and
in medicine, in spiritual reflection, as well as in the everyday world--has
rehearsed our present-day way of life, so to speak". [21] Peukert framed
this as a specific proposal for the Weimar Republic, but his own broader work
reached back to the Kaiserreich, and an exploration of the argument could
be very fruitful. So far, the concept of "modernism" has mainly been engaged
in the historiography of the Kaiserreich as its opposite, namely, resistance
to modernity or "anti-modernism", either as a social history of the casualties
of industrialization or as a very conventional intellectual history (as in
the "politics of cultural despair"). The positive modernity of the Kaiserreich,
as opposed to various kinds of traditionalism, is waiting to be explored. [22]

(3) There is a third current of meaning associated with the category of
the "modern" in the English-speaking intellectual world, much less so in
the German, namely, the influence of Michel Foucault. [23] Since the early
1980s work in Britain and North America on sexuality (particularly the late-
nineteenth and twentieth-century constructions of sexual categories), on
prisons, hospitals, asylums, and other institutions of confinement, on
social policy and public health, and on the history of science and the academic
disciplines, has been shot through with Foucault's inspiration. [24] Aside
from helping to open up new areas of empirical research, Foucault's ideas
have had major theoretical effects. They have fundamentally redirected the
analysis of power away from traditional institutionally-centered conceptions
of government and the state, and from allied sociological conceptions of
class domination, towards a dispersed and decentered conception of power and its
"microphysics". They have sensitized us to the subtle and complex forms of
the inter-relationship between power and knowledge, particularly in the latter's
modes of disciplinary and administrative organization. They have delivered
the extraordinarily fruitful concept of discourse as a way of theorizing both
the internal rules and regularities of particular fields of knowledge (their
"regimes of truth") and the more general structures of ideas and assumptions

which delimit what can and cannot be thought and said in particular contexts
of place and time. They have radically challenged the historian's conventional
assumptions about individual and collective agency and their bases of interest
and rationality, forcing us to see instead how subjectivities are constructed
and produced within and through languages of identification that lie beyond
the volition and control of individuals in the classical Enlightenment sense.

     One of the major consequences of Foucault's impact has been to problematize
the very categories of modern understanding themselves--from the collective
goods of society and citizenship to the individual values of rationalism and
the self. It has done so by historicizing them, by specifying the terms
of their own social, political, and intellectual history, and of their
emergence and elaboration as the constitutive elements for ordering the material
and mental world. We can do this for the fundamental category of "society"
itself by looking at the terms under which "the social" first became abstracted
into thought and practice--as an object of theory-knowledge, a target of
policy, and a site of practice, so that the material context in which "society"
could be convincingly represented as an ultimately originating subject or
causality became gradually composed. [25] Thus "the social" refers not to
the global analytical category of "society" in some unproblematic social-science
sense, but to the historically located methods, techniques, and practices
that allowed such a category to become constructed--to be constituted as a
basic element of understanding for the world--in the first place. Foucault's
concept of the disciplinary society is concerned directly with this process.
At one level, it profoundly shifts our understanding of politics, carrying
the analysis of power away from the core institutions of the state in the
national-centralized sense towards the emergence of new individualizing strategies
"that function outside, below and alongside the State apparatuses, on a much
more minute and everyday level". [26] But at another level, it is precisely
through such individualizing strategies that society ("the social" or the
"social body") became recognized, constituted, and elaborated as the main
object of science, surveillance, policy, and power. Population (fertility,
age, mobility, health), economics, poverty, crime, education, welfare
became not only the main objects of government activity, but also the measure
of cohesion and solidarity in the emerging nineteenth-century social order.
If we are to understand the latter, it is to the new social-science and
medico-administrative discourses, their technologies, and effects (i.e.
ideas and practices, rhetorics and apparatuses, policies and processes)
that we must look--to the new knowledges "concerning society, its health
and sickness, its conditions of life, housing and habits, which served
as the basic core for the 'social economy' and sociology of the nineteenth
century". [27]

     For Foucault, "modernity" is to be characterized mainly by the third of
Giddens' four institutional dimensions, namely, the growth of administrative
power and surveillance, although Foucault's understanding of the latter involves
the more distinctive conception of disciplinary power linked to a fundamental
argument about epistemological change. At the same time, Foucault is no more
specific about the precise historical contexts in which this occurred (indeed,
behind his exposition seems to lurk an extremely classical argument about capitalist
development and the rise of the bourgeoisie), and his dating of the "modern"
with the late eighteenth century creates a major ambiguity in the light of
the actual rhythms and patterns of state-administrative innovation between
then and the end of the nineteenth/start of the twentieth century. On the

one hand, there clearly were fundamental transformations in the period between c.1770 and c.1850, as Foucault and many historians have claimed. But on the other hand, in the later time the repertoire of power-producing knowledges greatly·expands--through psychiatry and psychology, social work and the welfare state, youth policy, industrial relations, public health, social hygiene, eugenics, and so on. In the words of Scott Lash:

"The rationalization of management and the shopfloor, the
bureaucratization of the capitalist state, the rationalization
of extra-institution practices of social workers vis-à-vis the
mad, criminal, indigent, 'idle', and otherwise deviant were
phenomena contemporaneous with the birth of the Welfare State at
the :end of the nineteenth century. The beginnings of nationalism
--hence the priority of the social--as well as the centrality of
demographic concerns, and the ethos of social citizenship, as
well as the birth of the human sciences themselves, came by most
accounts (and even at points by Foucault's) rather at the end than
at the outset of the nineteenth century". [28]

As Donzelot and others have argued, the family becomes a particular object of such interventions and expertise, while sexuality provides an especially rich field in the twentieth century for showing such power relations under construction. [29]

Where do these alternative notations of "the modern" leave us? Most obviously, there is a·clear convergence between the second and third complexes of meaning outlined above--between·Peukert's particular formulation of the argument concerning cultural modernity in the period between the turn of the century and the crisis of the Weimar Republic, and Foucault's ideas about the relationship of knowledge, discipline, and power. Moreover, if we take the direction of the last paragraph concerning appropriate periodization, such a definition gains in historical specificity what the first of the three notations--the surviving version of modernization theory--sacrifices to a more normative philosophical conception of modernity. Given the relative exhaustion of a more conventional modernization theory perspective for generating new knowledge about modern German history--the most recent defence limits itself to measuring the Weimar polity against an ideal·type of stable parliamentary representation, an approach that owes nothing to modernization theory per se [30]--there are good grounds for exploring what alternative possibilities there might be. In particular, as I have argued elsewhere, it is important to separate the instabilities of the Weimar Republic and their effects--the obstacles to stable governing consensus and a politics of successful parliamentary integration--from the political dynamics of the Imperial period that came before, not because the question of continuity should now·be dropped, but because it needs to be much better conceptualized in non-linear and non-teleological ways. 'In what follows I shall offer some thoughts on the capacity of the political institutions of the Kaiserreich for stability and viable development. Implicitly, these will engage the underlying theoretical question alluded to above, namely, of what does "modern" political rule really consist? And in the process a Foucauldian understanding of modernity's darker side--the importance of disciplinary power--will certainly be in play.

Backwardness and Modernity in the Kaiserreich

Since the 1960s, a set of organizing interpretations have dominated perceptions of the Kaiserreich, some of them anticipated by Anglo-American scholarship

of post-1945, some going back to older pre-Nazi critical traditions. These
include: belief in direct continuities between Bismarck and Hitler; the idea
of a fundamental contradiction between economic modernity and political
backwardness leading to the Empire's structural instability; the view that
Germany lacked the progressive emancipatory experience of a successful bourgeois
revolution, falling prey instead to the continued dominance of old-style
"pre-industrial élites" in the political system; the notion that these élites
exerised their power by repressive means of social control and manipulative
techniques of rule; and the belief that German history was the site of
exceptional "mis-development" by comparison with the healthier trajectories
of "the West". Revisionist historians of the 1960s developed a powerful
deep-structural perspective on the origins of Nazism in this way, stressing
how backward political interests--traditional élites and their pre-industrial,
pre-modern mentalities--prevented any democratic modernizing of the political
system and instead allowed what Ralf Dahrendorf called "authoritarian and anti-
democratic structures in state and society" to endure. [31]

    On the one hand, the Kaiserreich is categorized as "authoritarian" within
the generally agreed typology of nineteenth-century regimes. On the other
hand, the victory of authoritarianism in the formation of the Imperial-German
state is thought to be an aberrant and abnormal interruption of the "process
of democratization" that otherwise and in the long run inevitably "accompanies
economic growth". In Germany a "truly realistic" appreciation of what a lasting
and consistent modernization would require in this respect was precluded after
the 1870s by a profound shift in ideological orientations, resulting from
the liberals' changed access to government influence once Bismarck turned strongly
to the right, from the discrediting of liberal economics and the general
"deliberalizing of public and political life" [Entliberalisierung des öffentlichen
und politischen Lebens] in the post-1873 depression, from the growing aggression
and conservatism of German nationalism as a new integrative ideology for the
Empire, and from the degeneration of the ideal of Bildung into a culture of
careerism and advancement. This key ideological watershed amounted to a new
structure of political values for the German bourgeoisie--"diesen fundamentalen
Konstellationswandel", in Wehler's words--which displaced liberalism from
its previous integrative role, what Wehler calls the "Dreierkonstellation von
'Bildung', Liberalismus und liberalen Nationalismus" that dominated the 1860s.
The new bourgeois consciousness (or perhaps "false consciousness") responded
to a powerful combination of factors: anxieties produced by the irregularities
of economic growth and the fears of social unrest, but also the manipulation
of those fears by the political managers of the "old élite" (Bismarck, later
Bülow and Tirpitz). [32]

    It is hard not to be impressed by the powerful teleology running through
this account. "Modernization" in this discourse is avowedly abstracted from
the present-day forms of pluralist democracy. As such, it is thought to be
built into the structures of economic growth, and to explain why German history
diverges from this model until after 1945 German historians have logically
been thrown back onto a vocabulary of "wrong turnings", "failures", "blockages",
and "mistaken development". As Wehler has baldly put it, "any modern society
attempting to be equal to the demands of constant social change" logically
requires a constitutional framework of parliamentary democracy. [33] Conversely,
the authoritarianism of the Imperial state becomes the institutional expression
of the "pre-industrial traditions" and their modernization-obstructing dominance
in the pre-1914 political culture. Thus a radical disjunction is postulated

between "wealth" and "power", between the "modern" basis of the industrial-capitalist economy and the "traditional" political arrangements which the bourgeoisie in Germany proved incapable of sweeping away. In the long run, stability could only be assured by the development of more "modern" institutional arrangements for containing social conflicts--that is, by "welfare-statist" and parliamentary-democratic replacements for "the rule of an authoritarian leadership and of privileged social groups centering around the pre-industrial élites of the aristocracy". [34] Otherwise, the inescapable dictates of power legitimation in the developed industrial economy could be satisfied only by artificial forms of "secondary integration", which Wehler has argued may be conceptualized as "social imperialism", or the diversion of tensions outwards into expansionist drives for imperialist accumulation. Thus between the modern economy and the backward state there arose destabilizing contradictions, which could only be artificially bridged by manipulative techniques of rule, so long as the "real" solution of "modernizing" democratic reform was not embraced. In this view, the unreformed Imperial state was incapable of reproducing itself other than by an escalating procession of crises, culminating eventually in the miscalculated risk of July 1914. [35]

This approach constructs an extraordinarily powerful structural frame for interpreting the history of the Kaiserreich, which severely restricts the latitude for analyzing particular problems or events within this fifty-year block of time. Moreover, this "permanent structural crisis" [strukturelle Dauerkrise] itself provides the framing for a larger story, the specifically German "master narrative" of the origins of Nazism, which are thought to be deeply inscribed in the flaws of the Kaiserreich:

> "Modernisierung scheint ohne Transformation der Sozialstruktur
> und der traditionalen Machtverhältnisse, ohne soziale und politische
> Emanzipation, nicht möglich, wenn der innere und äussere Friede
> erhalten werden soll. Die fatalen Folgen der Regierungspolitik,
> durch welche die politische Vorherrschaft der vorindustriellen Eliten
> in der Periode der Hochindustrialisierung erhalten werden sollte,
> zeigte sich ganz klar zwischen 1914 und 1929, als diese Strukturen
> zerbröckelten. Bis dahin hatte die Politik gefährliche Bedingungen
> mitgeschaffen, die den Weg für den Nationalsozialismus ebneten". [36]

As many readers will be familiar, this is the master narrative of German exceptionalism, of the German Sonderweg, which performed such an important function in the intellectual politics of the 1960s and early 1970s, and authorized many of the key historiographical breakthroughs of that time. As readers will also remember, this Sonderweg thesis also became the object of wide-ranging critical debate in the early 1980s, a discussion which the present author played some modest part in helping to begin. Now that those polemics have somewhat settled down, it is worth asking what may have changed, with a particular eye to the issues of backwardness and modernity this essay is seeking to raise. [37]

A.   Re-Judging the Bourgeoisie

In the meantime--during the 1980s--views of the German bourgeoisie have been considerably rethought. In particular, the older ideas of bourgeois weakness and self-abnegation, the so-called Defizit an Bürgerlichkeit or lack of bourgeois virtues (where the latter implies an elusive and ambiguous blend of socio-cultural self-assertion and civil courage) have been called into doubt. [38] There is now a much greater readiness to see the extent to which bourgeois values were in the ascendant after the 1860s--in everything from taste, fashion, and the

everyday conduct of affairs, to the main lines of the German Empire's public
culture, including the ethos of local administration; the prevailing views
of law, morality, and the social order; the notions of private property
and social obligation; and the general principles of public life. Thus Wehler
distinguishes two areas of bourgeois success or collective self-realization
under the Kaiserreich, in the sense of values that originated sociologically
in a specifically bourgeois milieu in the eighteenth and earlier nineteenth
centuries, but expanded in the course of the nineteenth century to become
universal social and cultural goods: on the one hand, "bestimmte bürgerliche
Organisationsformen"--a particular model of the family, and the Verein or
voluntary association as the all-purpose medium of sociability, cultural exchange,
and public political activity--showed themselves "als sehr verallgemeinerungsfähig"
and acquired normative validity; while on the other hand, "bourgeois norms
and values" [bürgerliche Normen und Werte] became culturally dominant--most
decisively in the "system of law" [Rechtssystem], but also "das revolutionäre
Leistungsprinzip, die Arbeitsorientierung, die Säkularisierung, die Rationalis-
ierung des Denkens und Handelns, die Autonomie des Individuums, überhaupt der
Individualismus, aber auch die Vereinigung der Individuen zur Klärung ihrer
Probleme in öffentlicher Diskussion". [39] Moreover, a case can be made for
seeing the Kaiserreich institutionally as the classical embodiment of bourgeois
values as these have usually been understood: in the constitutionalizing of
public authority via parliamentary institutions; in the recodifications of
commercial, civil, and criminal law; in the models of administrative efficiency,
particularly at the level of the city; and in the growth and elaboration of
public opinion in the form of an institutionally complex and legally guaranteed
public sphere. In the structures of the capitalist economy, the strength
of bourgeois achievements goes without saying. [40]

Of course, it is in the political domain in the stricter sense that the
weakness of the German bourgeois was always thought to most clearly revealed:
in the economy and civil society, even in the public sphere in the broader
sense, bourgeois achievements can be shown, but in the state and the political
system (so the argument runs) the power of the traditional élites remained
as strong as before. Now, recently Wehler has gone some way towards acknowledging
the "bourgeois" character of the Imperial polity: "Das Reich als Verfassungsstaat
verkörpert trotz seines Kompromisscharakters auch den Triumph bürgerlicher
Liberaler"; and, despite the moderation and non-combativity of parliamentarian
culture before 1914, "wirkt doch eine starke, vielleicht unwiderstehliche
Kraft zugunsten einer kontinuierlichen Aufwertung des Reichstags". Furthermore,
other "Erfahrungen auf Politikfeldern", such as the progressive expansion
of the rule of law, municipal self-government, and public opinion, "müssen
eigentlich das Gefühl genährt haben, dass das Kaiserreich doch noch modernisierungs-
fähig, im Sinne bürgerliche Ziele mit viel Geduld weiter reformierbar sei". [41]
These are major concessions to the critique. But at the same time, what these
revisions leave intact is the central argument regarding the backwardness of
the Kaiserreich's core political structures (to do with the monarchy, the
military, aristocratic privilege, Prussian predominance, more ambivalently
the bureaucracy, but in general the institutionally secured primacy of pre-industrial
interests and élites), which have always been counterposed to the ideal of
modernity that was not attained. After the recession of "kraftvolle bürgerliche
Politik" since the 1870s, the bourgeoisie accommodated itself to a subordinate
political position, or at most to co-partnership with the traditional élites,
above all due to the rising pressure of the labor movement from below. Even
the most acute "bourgeois observers" [bürgerlichen Beobachtern] made this accommod-

ation--that is, "akzeptieren die konstitutionelle Monarchie--nicht einmal
das parlamentarische System wollen alle--, akzeptieren eine öffentliche Rolle
des Adels, den 'Militärstaat', meist die Mitherrschaft der Bürokratie".
Of the necessary presence of a combative bourgeoisie--recognizable in "bürgerliches
Selbstbewusstsein, Siegeszuverzicht, Befreiung von Selbstzweifel, politische
Erfahrung, Resistenz gegen die neuen Gefahren von rechts"--there was not much
evidence, whether in the final decades before 1914 or in the new environment
of the Weimar Republic. To this extent, the master narrative of the Sonderweg,
the deep-structuralism of the account of the origins of Nazism, is still intact.
The advance of the bourgeoisie stopped at the gates of the political system.
This was what distinguished German history in the nineteenth century from the
successful modernizations of the West. The long-term consequences were immense.
Nazism was

> "die Quittung für bürgerlichen Konservatismus und Nationalismus, für
> bürgerliche Scheu vor der riskanten Machtprobe, für das Defizit an
> liberal-bürgerlicher politische Kultur, an erfolgreicher bürgerlicher
> Politik, an bürgerlicher Prägung von Staat und Gesellschaft überhaupt".
> [42]

There is, however, a noteworthy shift in the terms of definition between
the beginning and end of Wehler's discussion: if at the start of his essay his
concern is quite properly to distinguish the constituent elements in the social
category "Bürgertum" qua bourgeoisie--that is, the "traditionale Stadtbürgertum",
the "Bildungsbürgertum", and the economic "Bourgeoisie" ("der freien industrie-
kapitalistischen, verkehrswirtschaftlichen, marktbedingten Besitzklasse der
Unternehmer") in their various regional manifestations, whose tendential unific-
ation during the later nineteenth century allows us to use the category in the
first place--then by the end he is talking more about the weakness of a particular
political tradition, namely, liberalism. This change of registers occurs
in the course of the opening definitional discussion itself, as Wehler moves
from the three social constituents mentioned above, through the question of
the bourgeoisie's demarcation against the petty bourgeoisie (Kleinbürgertum,
including "old" and "new" Mittelstand), to a reflection on the idea of citizenship
("Begriff und Wirklichkeit des Staatsbürgers), and a more open-ended discussion
of the term "bürgerliche Gesellschaft", which incorporates precisely the confusing
German dualism affirmed by Dahrendorf in Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland,
namely, a "society of citizens" and a society "dominated by a confident bourgeoisie".
[43] Moreover, when Wehler sets out to explain the transition from bourgeois
self-confidence to bourgeois abnegation--what he calls "den Beginn der fatalen
Pathogenese des Bürgertums"[44]--it is not the economic, social, and cultural
strength of the bourgeoisie as a social force, which unfolded much as before,
but the difficulties and transformations of political liberalism that he addresses.
In fact, Wehler himself concedes this, commenting that the new political
"constellation" that emerged from the 1870s was perfectly capable "die heterogenen
Soziallagen der bürgerlichen Sozialformationen zu überwölben", particularly
the emergent forms of nationalism, and acknowledging in effect that the political
ideas capable of harnessing allegiances within the bourgeoisie were changing,
rather than bases of bourgeois power and interest themselves. [45]

I have commented on the consequences of this conceptual slippage from the
bourgeoisie as a social category to liberalism as a political tradition extensively
elsewhere. [46] For one thing, the understanding of liberalism tends to be
abstracted inappropriately from the strong forms of liberal democracy (including
the latter's welfare-statism) in the late twentieth century, whose possibility

is then projected quite unhistorically onto the collective agency of the
bourgeoisie a hundred years before. [47] In the process, the more appropriate
context for judging German liberalism, the "modernity" of the time--the
Europeanwide conjuncture of constitutional revision, nation-forming, and
state-making in the 1860s, together with the culture of progress and the
general remaking of the social environment for capitalism--gets confused.
The demonstrable affinities between a liberal political outlook and a specific
configuration of bourgeois interests and aspirations at this particular time
is also allowed to license harder assumptions about the conceptual unity of
bourgeois and liberal identities in general, whereas really these are separable
phenomena. The common equation of "liberalism" and "democracy" compounds the
conceptual elision of "liberal" into "bourgeois" still further, making the
connotative continuum of "bourgeosie=liberalism=democracy" into an implied
causal chain. But specifically democratic impulses originated elsewhere, in
the labor movement and other popular traditions. Indeed, the articulation of
bourgeois aspirations in the later nineteenth century, including their liberal
forms, usually took an exclusionary anti-democratic turn (as Wehler also
sees), and were no less bourgeois for that.

     So in other words, we should perhaps be willing to consider the possibility
that bourgeois interests/aspirations were becoming dominant in the political as
well as in the socio-economic and cultural realms, because at present the main
argument against this is the failure of the Imperial state to acquire a liberal
or even a liberal-democratic form. If we can free ourselves from the assumption
that the achievement of bourgeois hegemony (in the sense of the political
dominance of bourgeois values) can only be conceptualized via the organization
of the bourgeoisie's collective political agency within a specifically liberal
movement or party, then the way would be clear to consider other, non-liberal
forms of political articulation; and the social coding of "authoritarianism" in
the pre-1914 state as "artistocratic", "pre-industrial", and "traditional"
rather than "bourgeois" and "modern" would start to look more questionable. [48]
In other words, "bourgeois" interests and values could be at work, and "modern"
political forms be in play, even if "liberal" ones were not. Why is Wehler
unable to see (or unwilling to admit) this possibility?

     The anwer lies with the avowedly political and prescriptive aspects of
Wehler's work. For quite beyond the specificity of the Kaiserreich discussion,
Wehler wishes to retain the notion of "bürgerliche Gesellschaft" (as an untranslatable
cross between "bourgeois society"/"civil society") as an enduring good--as "die
Zielutopie einer Gesellschaft rechtlich gleicher, durch Besitz und Bildung
ausgezeichneter, wirtschaftlich frei konkurriender, besitzindividualistischer,
politisch handlungsfähiger, das 'vernünftige' Gemeinwohl ermittelnder und
verwirklichender Bürger". [49] "Viel von dieser Utopie einer wahrhaft bürgerlichen
Gesellschaft ist in den westlichen Ländern in den vergangenen 200 Jahren, zuerst
in den Vereinigten Staaten, dann nach der Französischen Revolution in Europa in
unterschiedlichem Tempo, mit unterschiedlicher Intensität und Reichweite, Schritt
für Schritt verwirklicht worden"; and to the extent that it remains unrealized,
it may be regarded "als eine unvollendete Aufgabe der westlichen Gesellschaften".
It is precisely when measured against this ideal, in Wehler's view, that
German history proves to be a site of omissions and failures, of "Verfallsersch-
einungen und pathologische Entwicklungen", of "vernichtenden Niederlagen, and
ultimately of the "Verrat der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft". [50] The normative
relationship to a highly presentist version of modernization theory could hardly
be more clearly stated:

"Man kann 'bürgerliche Gesellschaft'--wie wir das schon oft
mit 'okzidentaler Modernisierung' getan haben--als idealtypisch
definiertes, hochgradig normativ besetztes, evolutionstheor-
etisches Richtungskriterium verstehen. Bestimmte, aufgrund
einer weit zurückreichendes Gesamtkonstellation gerichtete
Prozesse der okzidentalen Modernisierung laufen auf die
Ermöglichung dieses Gesellschaftstypus zu. Wo sie es nicht
tun--und quasi-automatisch, ohne harte Konflikte setzt er
sich ohnehin nie durch--, sollte man für die normative
Vorentscheidung zugunsten der besten Zielvision, die der Westen
hervorgebracht hat, mit guten Argumenten streiten und politisch
für eine Richtungskorrektur sorgen". [51]

In fact, Wehler constructs a highly idealized version of "bürgerliche
Gesellschaft". He is unable to move from elucidating the abstract principles
of emancipation within the Enlightenment tradition to specifying the equally
important privilegings and exclusions which that tradition always entailed.
The crucial elision in Wehler's argument comes with the transition from the
universalizing claims of bourgeois values as abstract desiderata (whether
to do with voluntary association and the family, or with the franchise and
the rule of law) to the practical exclusiveness of bourgeois ideals in their
actual realization--in the transition, that is, from "bürgerlich" qua
citizenship and the universals of progress, to "bürgerlich" qua the bourgeoisie
as a specific class sociology. Where the one was theoretically open to all,
the other was constituted by principles and practices of exclusion. Moreover,
this discrepancy between the ideal and its forms of realization was bound
to become more acute after the 1860s, because the suppressions and silencings
required by the pursuit of bourgeois values mattered far more once those ideals
had become institutionalized as a set of cultural and societal norms. At
one level Wehler also sees the exclusions. He mentions the peasantry, petty
bourgeoisie, and working class in this respect, though interestingly he
passes by the exclusions of nationality and gender. Yet he largely dismisses
their importance. On the one hand, such excluded social groups had no viable
counter-utopias to offer; on the other hand, their futures were also bound
up in the specifically bourgeois achievements, and they wanted nothing better
than to join the ranks of the bourgeoisie themselves. For Wehler, "embourgeois-
ement" [Verbürgerlichung] was, and remains, an unqualified social good.

In some respects Wehler can be veritably starry-eyed. Thus he celebrates
the bourgeois capacity for self-criticism ("Die Chance zur Selbstkorrektur
ist dank der Hochschätzung kritischer Vernunft fest verankert"), which he
finds inscribed in the structures of the Bildung tradition itself, and which
could function as a constant resource for ethical consistency and reformist
self-correction. [52] Here Wehler's argument, with its stress on the back
and forth of public exchange and the "critical reasoning" [kritisches Räsonnieren]
of an "enlightened public opinion" [aufgeklärten öffentlichen Meinung], derives
from Habermas's theory of the public sphere [Oeffentlichkeit]. Yet, as I
have argued elsewhere, the latter is an extremely idealized abstraction from
the political cultures that actually took shape at the end of the eighteenth
century. Habermas both idealizes the public sphere's bourgeois character
by neglecting the ways in which its élitism blocked and consciously repressed
possibilities of broader participation and emancipation, and ignores alternative
sources of an emancipatory impulse in popular radical traditions. The rise
of a bourgeois public sphere was never defined solely by the struggle against

absolutism and traditional authority, but always addressed the problem of
popular containment as well. The classical model of the public sphere was
always already being subverted at the very point of its formation, as the
actions of subordinate classes threatened to redefine the meaning and extent
of the "citizenry", whether in France during the Revolution, in Britain between
the Wilkite agitations and the Jacobinism of the 1790s, or in Germany between
the 1840s and 1870s. Moreover, feminist critiques have shown how far modern
political thought is highly gendered in its basic structures, and how the
public sphere was shaped at its inception by a new exclusionary ideology directed
against women, a dimension on which Wehler remains largely silent. [53]

In all of these ways, "civil society" [bürgerliche Gesellschaft] was
very far from the neutral site of rational political discourse in Habermas/Wehler's
sense. Instead, it was an arena of contested meanings, where different--and
oppositing--publics maneuvered for space, and from which some "publics" (women,
subordinate nationalities, the urban poor, the working class, the peasantry)
may have been excluded altogether. Moreover, this element of contest was
not simply a matter of coexistence, in which such alternative publics participated
in a tolerant pluralism of tendencies and groupings. Such competition also
occurred in class-divided societies structured by inequality, and consequently
questions of domination and subordination--of power, in its economic, social,
cultural, and political dimensions--were also involved. This ambivalence,
which cannot be easily dealt with in Wehler's idealizing of "bürgerliche Gesellschaft"
as a utopian project, returns us to the critique of the Enlightenment tradition
discussed at the start of this essay. For the Enlightenment project was partial
and narrowly based in the above sense, constituted from a field of conflict,
contested meanings, and exclusion. In particular, the claim to <u>rational</u>
discourse, certainly in the social and gendered exclusiveness of <u>its historical</u>
manifestations between the late eighteenth century and the First World War,
was simultaneously a claim to <u>power</u> in Foucault's sense.

B. Defining the Imperial State

When we turn to the state as such, we find some ambiguity in the prevailing
literature. In particular, if the Imperial state was <u>not</u> a "liberal" state on
the "Western" model, then what kind of state was it? <u>As</u> we have seen, Wehler
goes quite far in the modernizing political changes between 1871 and 1914 he is
now prepared to allow, but he still stops his catalogue of bourgeois achievements
at what he takes to be the core institutions of the political system--the monarchy,
the military, and the apparatus of aristocratic privilege in Prussia. Now,
as I will argue briefly in my conclusion, it is far from clear whether these
actually <u>are</u> to be deemed the <u>Kaiserreich</u>'s core political institutions, or
whether by 1900 the main site <u>of state</u> activity begins to lie elsewhere, particularly
if we take a Foucauldian understanding of power into account. For the moment,
however, I want to explore some of the inconsistencies in Wehler's and others'
own approach to the definition of the state by questioning the conventional
identifications of: authoritarian=aristocratic, and liberal=bourgeois. Instead,
I want to argue that a state with authoritarian features should not be assumed
automatically to express the political dominance of a landowning aristocracy
and other pre-industrial élites. On the contrary, it might also articulate
the interests of the bourgeoisie, and might even provide a framework for the
latter's social and political hegemony.

In recent writing the Imperial state seems to have been given at least four
distinct definitions, which cohabit in the work of the two most influential
commentators, Wehler and Kocka:

(1) The first definition attributes a dominant role to the Junkers as a "pre-
industrial" ruling group whose unbroken influence explains the political
system's specific "backwardness", as that is usually understood. The
twin characteristics of backwardness and aristocratic dominance are thought
to have had a number of institutional expressions: the executive power
of the King-Kaiser; the autonomy of the military; the preferential
recruitment of the bureaucracy and the officer corps from the aristocracy;
the limited powers of the Reichstag; the transmuted seugneurialism of
local government east of the Elbe; the effective immunites of the landowners
from certain kinds of taxation in the same region; and, of course, the
special qualities of the Prussian, as opposed to the Reich, Constitution.
Now, at one level such factors might amply justify an "aristocratic"
description of the state. But in most discussions the nature of the
state/society relationship (that is, the relationship of the aristocracy
as a social class to the state as an ensemble of political institutions)
is left under-theorized. Sometimes that relationship is conceptualized
as direct political control, which subordinated state apparatuses and
their direction to Junker interests; at other times the apparatuses appear
to be given equivalent autonomy in a manner reminiscent of C. Wright Mills'
theory of the "power élite", so that "Junkers, bureaucracy, military"
appear collectively as "pre-capitalist ruling strata". [54] In effect,
such writing oscillates between two different conceptions of the state,
both equally inadequate--an instrumentalist one which sees the state as
a passive tool available for manipulation by ruling interests, and a
"subjectivist" one where it appears as itself the primary agency, arbitrating
the conflicts of classes and social interests and apparently autonomous of
their control. There is much theoretical uncertainty here, and talk of
"pre-industrial traditions", an "autocratic, semi-absolutist sham-constitut-
ionalism", and the "feudalization of the bourgeoisie" has even suggested
notions of a state that was primarily feudal. [55]

(2) A more sophisticated variation along these lines is the concept of "Bonapartism"
adapted by Wehler from Marx and Engels, where the state's autonomy is
constituted from the political equilibrium of dominant socio-economic interests
(the alliance of "iron and rye"), originally beneath the directive genius
of Bismarck, but then achieving an unstable existence of its own. [56]
In the Critique of the Gotha Program Marx called the resultant state "nothing
but a military despotism, embellished with parliamentary forms, alloyed
with a feudal admixture, already influenced by the bourgeoisie, furnished
by the bureaucracy, and protected by the police", and this ultimately
unsatisfactory "agglutination of epithets" (as Perry Anderson calls it)
seems consonant with Wehler's similarly eclectic version. Anderson's own
formula places the accent rather differently, arguing that "the German
state was now a capitalist apparatus, over-determined by its feudal ancestry,
but fundamentally homologous with a social formation which by the twentieth
century was massively dominated by the capitalist mode of production". [57]
In Wehler's case the main effect of this "Bonapartist" definition is certainly
to acknowledge the new salience of industrial capital within the German
social formation after unification. But this is expressed in such a way
as to leave the first "aristocratic" or "Junkerist" definition intact.
Industrial capital may have arrived, but its interests are accommodated
within a "traditional" power structure of a basically unreformed kind.

(3) At some variance with these first two approaches is a third definition
of the state, stressing the changing forms of economic intervention.

Here Wehler proposes a notion of the modern interventionist state, which
rests on a particular appropriation of Habermas's concept of legitimation.
In terms of the latter, "politische Macht vor allem durch wohlüberlegte
staatliche Intervention legitimiert wird, die Dysfunktionen der Wirtschaft,
besonders Störungen im wirtschaftlichen Wachstum, auszugleichen sucht,
um die Stabilität des soziopolitischen Systems zu sichern". The new
interventionist ideology (which replaces the "diskreditierten Ideologie
der liberalkapitalistischen Marktwirtschaft") is meant both to re-establish
conditions favorable for economic growth and to secure the acquiescence
of the wage-earning masses by suitable "Kompensationen". Government
increasingly has no choice but to pursue these aims as the organizing priority
of its activity, for otherwise "die herrschenden Eliten" would be unable
"das System und ihre eigenen Interessen zu erhalten". [58] Wehler dates
the start of these processes in the so-called Great Depression of 1873-96,
but others associate them with the stronger appearance of "organized capitalism"
after that time. [59]

(4) The fourth definition of the Imperial state is advanced especially by Kocka
in his analysis of the First World War, and concerns its "relative autonomy"
from direct control by the dominant socio-economic interests. In this
view, the capitalist state's autonomy arises logically from the dictates
of legitimation, because government now needs a certain latitude both
for the purposes of general economic management and for satisfying certain
demands of the subordinate classes. Kocka sees such tendencies towards
relative autonomy being strengthened during the First World War by the
well-known processes of corporative interest negotiation. [60]

Taken together, these four perspectives reflect an oddly bifurcated approach
to the pre-1914 German state. They maintain a powerful discrepancy between:
(a) the state as a system of political domination (its constitutional "backwardness",
the Junkers' controlling power and institutional privileges, and the general
primacy of "pre-industrial traditions"); and (b) its role in the economy (namely,
its "modern" interventionist character). For example, Wehler's work contains
both a strong view of the needs of capital deriving from the logic of industrial
growth (as expressed through the concepts of interventionism, organized capitalism,
and legitimation), and yet an equally powerful insistence on the ultimate
efficacy of specific political traditions: "It was not the industrial economy
as such that by itself established the conditions of societal development,
because the latter had to unfold in an institutional framework preformed and
codetermined by political culture, the system of political domination, and
the political interests of pre- and non-industrial social forces". [61] As should
be clear from quotations such as this, the political factors are also conceived
mainly as linear continuities from an earlier era--that is, inherited structures,
rather than ones directly generated, produced, or determined by the Bismarckian
of Wilhelmine conjunctures themselves. Moreover, it is more than anything
else in the contradiction between these two levels of the "social system"--a
non-correspondence between the political and the economic--that the Imperial
state's structural instability and ultimate collapse are thought to be inscribed,
on the grounds that the inherited syndrome of "traditional" authoritarianism
consistently worked against the needs of "modern" legitimation.

This dualism has been a defining feature of recent German historiography.
It implies that a genuinely "modern" state would be one in which the progressive
social predominance of the bourgeoisie was formally consummated in a constitutional
liberalization of the state. That would have brought the Imperial state into

proper alignment with the modern economy, whereas the disjunction that actually persisted (of "modern" economy/"backward" state) proved to be irrational, dysfunctional, and crisis-producing, historians like Wehler would argue. But why must the authoritarian features of the Imperial state be equated automatically with archaism, backwardness, or political inefficiency? Neither the exclusivist, executive, nor aristocratic features of the German polity before 1914--that is, the checks on popular participation, the relative weakness of parliamentary controls, and the privileges of the titular nobility--were at all unusual by the contemporary European standards of the time. Indeed, the Kaiserreich was more frequently regarded as an exemplary "modern" state--in the technocratic efficiency of its bureaucratic and military machines, in its more interventionist relationship to the economy and society, in the vaunted excellence of its municipal government, in its system of social administration, and (from a different point of view) in the existence of universal manhood suffrage and the extent of popular political mobilization. Paradoxically, as we saw, Wehler has gone far in his recent writings to acknowledging the force of precisely these points, conceding the bourgeois transformation and permeation of the political culture in the broadest sense, and retaining the "traditionalist" argument mainly for the visible core of the state-institutional complex (monarchy/army/Prussia).

If that is so, one might argue, then why not go further and question the meaning currently given to the core institutions themselves? Perhaps the answer is to rethink the basis on which "the state" per se is currently being conceptualized in the German discussion--not just by changing the valency of authoritarianism and accepting its compatibility with bourgeois values (its potential "modernity") in the specific circumstances of the Kaiserreich, but by specifying what was most important in what the state actually did between the 1870s and 1914, by reflecting on the changing boundaries between state and civil society, and by exploring the larger field of state/society relations. If we undertake this rethinking, in my view, the following recognitions become crucial:

(a) After two decades of searching state-theoretical discussion, we need to begin from the state's autonomy ("relative" or otherwise), as opposed to its dependence on class or other socio-economic interests in a directly instrumental or expressive way. State policies cannot be reduced to a reflection of dominant social forces or an effect of ruling interests in an epiphenomenal way. We can be very precise about the sociology of the recruitment and behavior of the state managers (the personnel directly in charge of the state), but this is not the same as defining the social character of the state in the sense of its relationship to society. The autonomy of the state has two dimensions: in its character as a particular institutional complex it becomes a source of independent bureaucratic, military, and judicial initiative, but at the same time a permeable arena in which contending social and political forces interact. As Göran Therborn puts it, the state is both a relatively unified and independently organized system of apparatuses (whose staff can therefore have independent effects), and "an institution where social power is concentrated and exercised" (and which therefore becomes subject to external intervention). [62]

(b) In a complex social formation, state power cannot be structured in a straightforwardly pyramidal way or around a protected core of "traditional" institutions which somehow retained their immunity to change and their primacy over the state complex as a whole, least of all in the dynamically

expanding capitalist society Imperial Germany was in the process of becoming. State power was constituted not just in the actions and intentions of a set of visible rulers, or in the collectively willed domination of a ruling class or an aggregate of ruling élites, but in a much broader field of socio-economic and politico-cultural intervention encompassing a complex repertoire of tasks: economic management and social administration in the stricter technical sense; organizing the cooperation of the dominant classes at the national political level, and mediating the economic interests of their various fractions into a workable general policy; regulating the relations of dominant and subordinate classes; maintaining the basis of cohesion in society as a whole through a broadly constructed popular consent; integrating the relations between state institutions in the narrower sense and a richly textured civil society.

(c) Consequently, even in a fully "bourgeois" society (taking Dahrendorf's double sense of a "society of citizens" and a society "dominated by a confident bourgeoisie", or perhaps the more minimalist definition of a society in which the bourgeoisie as the owners and controllers of means of production are the dominant class), we would not expect to find the bourgeoisie directly controlling the state in any straightforward instrumentalist sense. Its status as a dominant class derives less from any capacity for backstage string-pulling (though this obviously takes place), than from a capacity to ensure that the sum of state interventions (or "the societal content of the actions of the state", in Therborn's words) works predominantly in its favor. If we define the state with Therborn as an institutional complex "which concentrates the supreme rule-making, rule-applying, rule-adjudicating, rule-enforcing, and rule-defending functions" in a society, then the power of a dominant class resides in the capacity "to bring about a particular mode of intervention" of that "special body", in order to secure the conditions in which "the economic, political, and ideological conditions of its domination" in society may be reproduced. [63] In that case, the bourgeoisie "rules" less by the direct wielding or disposal of state power than by restructuring and maintaining the social, institutional, and ideological arena in which politics and governance have to take place--that is, by exercising "hegemony" in the Gramscian and frequently misunderstood sense. [64]

In light of the above, I would argue that the authoritarian parameters of the Imperial Constitution allowed much latitude for maneuver, negotiation, and compromise before the inner limits of the Bismarckian settlement from Wehler's point of view (the prerogatives of the monarchy, the survival of the landowning aristocracy, and so on) began to be breached. Within the same limits, the Imperial state showed itself adaptable to the tasks which a "modern" state is called upon to perform--securing the conditions of capitalist reproduction, doing the work of legitimation (in the Wehler/Habermas sense), organizing the unity of the dominant classes, mobilizing the consent of the people. Indeed, I would suggest that the strictly reactionary elements were more isolated in the political system, that the Constitution was more flexible, and that the "modernizing" forces had achieved more penetration--in fact, that the "traditional" elements were less "traditional"--than recent historians have been willing to allow.

C.   Modernity's Dark Side

Thus perhaps we should think again about what exactly the categories of the "traditional" and the "modern" mean, both in general and in the specific context of the Kaiserreich. In particular, I have been trying to suggest, the common equation between authoritarianism, right-wing politics, and imperialist foreign policies on the one side, and "backwardness", archaism, and "pre-industrial traditions" on the other side, is highly misleading. It may be, in fact, that precisely the most vigorous "modernizing" tendencies in the Kaiserreich, rather than the recalcitrantly "anti-modern" ones, were the most pugnacious and consistent in their pursuit of imperialist and anti-democratic policies at home and abroad. What I want to argue is that Wehler's recent revisions--which abandon the extreme "feudalization" thesis for a picture of bourgeois values reshaping the cultural and institutional world of the Empire--should be pushed still further. The complexity Wehler now sees in the Imperial polity and its relationship to the expanding dominance of bourgeois influences should lead us to give up the conceptual framework of the primacy of "pre-industrial traditions" altogether. For if we accept the irreducible contingency of political forms, and reject the premise that the dominance of a particular social class has a logical or lawlike requirement for one type of state and political culture over another, then we are free to think through the specificity of the Imperial state more critically.

In concluding, I wish to propose five areas in which these possibilities might be explored, areas in which political life disobeyed the binary distinction between modernizing liberalism and backward authoritarianism that Wehler and others are trying so hard to maintain. The first two of these I have already presented extensively elsewhere; the last three are proposals for the future.

(1) The first of these concerns radical nationalism, the distinct politics generated by the nationale Verbände (especially the Flottenverein and Alldeutscher Verband between the late-1890s and 1914), which crystallized as an extra-parliamentary "national opposition" to the moderate governmentalism of the conservative party-political establishment before exploding into an open confrontation with the Imperial government itself during 1907-08. There were many complexities to radical nationalism as a political formation. But here I want to present its central paradox from Wehler's point of view. On the one hand, radical nationalists were clearly on the right of the political spectrum--despite the populism of their ideology, they were profoundly anti-socialist and anti-democratic in the core of their political being, and on the face of it corresponded closely to the type of anti-modernizing authoritarianism that preserved the Kaiserreich in the backwardness of its illiberalism before the First World War. But on the other hand, radical nationalists do not fit with this interpretative framework. Sociologically, they were not the casualties or opponents of modernization, but mainly the self-confident beneficiaries of Imperial Germany's new industrial civilization. Politically, they committed themselves to the powerful modernity of the new German national state, which they constructed through the discursive novelty of a "German-national" [deutsch-national] rhetoric. Most obviously, this new deutschnational ideology was focused on Weltpolitik and the naval arms drive, which were thought to be both the logical correlate of German industrial strength in the world market and the condition of the latter's future growth. But it also embraced a range of additional concerns, including an anti-clericalism originating in the Kulturkampf, and a relentless hostility to all particularisms (especially that of Catholic

Bavaria), both of which expressed a positive desire for a unitary state. The political drive for a strengthening of the centralized state fabric, produced a range of specific reformist commitments, including the demand for an Imperial system of taxation which could more effectively harness the nation's material resources, and the pressure to "nationalize" the school curriculum, which was also linked to the call for a general ideological program of "civic education" [staatsbürgerliche Erziehung]. At the height of the tensions with the government in 1907-08, radical nationalists also assumed positions which were potentially anti-monarchist. In all of these ways, radical nationalism amounted to a modernizing ideology of "national efficiency" (to adapt a British political phrase of the same time), which was extremely subversive of a traditional conservative standpoint. It opened a crucial ideological fracture in the established discourse of right-wing political legitimacy. How the radical nationalist political formation could be fitted into Wehler's framework is just not clear. [65]

(2) The second area concerns industrial relations and the political and ideological status of the industrial paternalism that dominated heavy industry in the Ruhr, Saar, and Silesia, and other sectors of large-scale industry before 1914, including shipbuilding, and heavy machinery. Briefly, the issue here is whether the industrial paternalism concerned is to be best seen as a "pre-industrial" type of authoritarianism (the "Herr-im-Haus" outlook), which involved the taking-over of older pre-liberal and aristocratic cultural patterns inappropriate to a modern society; or whether it expressed specific forms of capitalist rationality, in the sense that it presupposed and was determined by certain conditions of large-scale and well-organized capitalist production. I have discussed this question at some length elsewhere. The point I wish to make here is that there are other ways of interpreting the repressive industrial relations described by the paternalist model than by seeing them as a backward impediment to the evolution of the forms of labor conciliation which Wehler identifies with modernity in this respect. In fact, it makes more sense to see company unions, company housing, black-lists, and company welfare schemes as both illiberal and modern. It was no accident that such practices were adopted by all the most advanced industrial sectors in Germany before 1914, regardless of the employers' particular political affiliations--that is, a self-consciously liberal employer such as Siemens in the more dynamic electro-technical sector, as well as a reactionary heavy industrialist such as Krupp. How this question fits with the recent discussion of Bürgerlichkeit would be interesting to work out. [66]

(3) Thirdly, it is worth returning to Wehler's grand-interpretative framework of social imperialism in order to recast it--partly again to deconstruct the relationship to conservative politics and manipulative "system-stabilizing" strategies in which he locates it, and partly to broaden our understanding of the ideological and cultural consequences of the new relationship between the colonial and metropolitan worlds. On the one hand, Wehler argues that Germany's later nineteenth-century imperialism had a conservative function and effect (in terms both of the "ideological consensus" for overseas expansion in the context of the so-called Great Depression, and of Bismarck's manipulative intentions), and draws an explicit contrast between the authoritarian system which social imperialism successfully guaranteed and the alternative developmental possibility of "welfare-statist mass democracy" [sozialstaatlichen Massendemokratien] which remained blocked in German history until after 1945. [67] Yet, historically speaking, it would be very hard to deny the positive relationship between

liberal and social democratic reform politics and imperialism in most periods
since the Enlightenment, whether we consider (just to take the British example)
the forms of free-trading imperialism, the new liberalism before 1914, or
Fabian views of the empire between and after the two world wars. In fact,
the most compelling voices of liberal renewal in Germany before 1914 elaborated
their reformist projects (in relation to social legislation and political
reform) precisely through an engagement with the possibilities of imperialist
expansion. In this respect, as in others, neither liberalism nor Wehler's
abstract utopia of "bürgerliche Gesellschaft" can be protected against the
contamination of imperialism, because imperialism/colonialism as a set of
exploitative power relations with the extra-European world were inscribed
in the Enlightenment tradition from the beginning. On the other hand, therefore,
it is important to begin exploring the ways in which forms of social relations,
patterns of culture, and increasingly racialized discourses of national
superiority developed in the colonies were powerfully reinserted within the
metropolitan society. "Colonial knowledge" in this sense should be a rich
field of inquiry, for it has become clear from recent work on British and
French colonialism how far metropolitan understandings of nationality have been
constructed since the eighteenth century via an elaborate encounter with the
colonial "Other". Forms of colonial representation through literature, museums
and exhibitions, entertainment, and popular culture have been especially
fruitful in this regard. The gendering of national identity, whether in militarist
activities and warfare per se or in the more general ordering of nationalist
representations around conceptions of masculinity and femininity, also had key
colonialist roots: for example, intensive discussions of colonial intermarriage
generated a complex discourse around gender inequalities, sexual privilege,
class priorities, and racial superiority, which then became powerfully rearticulated
into nationalist discourse at home. This was the _real_ ground of social imperialism,
arguably--that is, not so much the conscious manipulations by governing élites
focused on by Wehler, but the more insidious processes of ideological structuration.
At all events, this implies a much richer field of relations between empire
and domestic politics. The consequences of imperialism certainly cannot be
bracketed from the "modernization" project by identifying social imperialism
so unidemensionally with conservative anti-modern strategies. [68]

(4) Next, we need to recognize the importance of gender, not just as the
kind of formality that acknowledges the previous neglect of women, but as the
complex and variable construction of sexual difference that affects both women
and men, and whose recognition therefore changes our understanding of the
world as a whole. On the one hand, feminist theory has now shown how fundamentally
the terms of modern social and political identity--of class, citizenship, "race",
nationhood, religion, the very category of the self--have been constituted from
dichotomous assumptions about what it meant to be a woman or a man. Those
assumptions were ordered during the nineteenth century into a pervasive dualism
that aligned men with the worlds of work and the public domain of politics
and women with the home and the private realm of domesticity, the one a site
of control, agency, and reason, the other a site of quiescence, passivity,
and emotion. Inscribed in the language of identity have been definite notions
of masculinity and femininity which limited "women's access to knowledge,
skill, and independent political subjectivity". [69] Thus the basic category
of "civil society" [bürgerliche Gesellschaft] presumed the exclusion of women
via the construction and naturalizing of claims about sexual difference, and
to include women as full citizens consequently makes it "necessary to deconstruct
and reassemble our understanding of the body politic". [70] Similarly, this

"gendering of the public sphere" was matched by the gendered construction of class identities. Thus Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall have stressed both the constitutive role of gender (that is, the historically specific structuring of sexual difference) in the ordering of the bourgeois social world (via particular structures of family and domesticity, and particular styles of consumption) and the reciprocal interactions between this private sphere and the public sphere of associational activity and politics, in which the latter both reflected and actively reproduced the gendered distinctions of class identity generated between home and work. [71] Likewise, the importance of gender, sexuality, and the family cannot be bracketed from the processes of working-class formation either, because notions of physical labor, skill, the wage, respectability, and political voice were all completely shot through with assumptions about masculinity. [72] In the light of this accumulating authority of scholarship and argument, it seems to me naive and at best an unacceptably partial truth to present the possibility of the women's movement as being inscribed in "einige Grundprinzipien der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft", so that "die Emanzipation der Frauen [erscheint] als späte Konsequenz der Dynamik, die mit dem Uebergang zur bürgerlichen Gesellschaft in Gang gesetzt wurde" [73] Such Whiggishness takes no account of the critiques mentioned above. Nineteenth-century conceptions of progress were, on the contrary, inscribed with powerful assumptions that worked consistently against women's emancipation and assigned women to dependent positions and a disempowered subjectivity.

On the other hand, as a "useful category of historical analysis" gender can change and enrich our understanding of particular questions. I have already alluded to some general examples--the gendering of citizenship and the public sphere, and the gendered discourse of class, together with the relationship between masculinity/femininity and nationalist ideology--which can be explored in a specifically German context. But some established questions of German history can also be illuminated by a gender perspective. One of these could be the "social question". Thus whereas the late-nineteenth-century apparatus of poor relief, charity, and social insurance may have been formally based on a mixture of arguments (Christian responsibility, capitalist rationality, political calculation, national efficiency), these were also predicated upon gendered assumptions in the manner indicated above, particularly regarding the social importance of the family. This was true both of national and local state provision, charitable work, and company-provided welfare, all of which reflected definite assumptions about what constituted orderly domestic living arrangements. Moreover, from the 1890s, with changing bases of women's work (waged/unwaged, domestic/industrial, blue-collar/white-collar), the growth of urban living, the rising industrial and parliamentary strength of labor, and the manifold concerns regarding German national efficiency, the discourse of social reform became charged with new meanings, not least through the involvement of new forms of professional expertise in social policy and the pressure of the emergent women's movement. When we add certain other issues, including child and maternal welfare, public health, policies for the control of youth, and the general regulation of morality and sexuality, we have an especially promising field for gender-sensitive analysis. Of course, the First World War, the Weimar discourse of the "new woman", and the Nazi counter-revolution produced a series of radicalizations around these issues, and the valuable contribution of women's history to our grasp of these later moments should re-emphasize the need for similar analysis of the Kaiserreich. [74] My point is that none of these areas unambiguously involved an enlargement of women's rights or political capacities in the liberal sense, but that the

meaning was none the less "modern" for that.

(5) The ambivalence of reform, and the difficulties of assimilating the actual "modernizing" initiatives of the turn of the century to the progressive or liberal-democratic normativity against which Wehler insists on measuring the German past, brings me to the last of my proposals, concerning the dynamics of disciplinary power in Foucault's sense--that is, the framing and application to the "social body" of new knowledges of science and ambitions of control. Here we connect back to the question of Imperial continuities with Nazism, though not in the sense claimed by Wehler of deficits of modernity producing pathologies that were the condition of Nazi success. On the contrary, I would argue, it was precisely the most striking manifestations of modern scientific and technocratic ambition in the sphere of social policy that laid the way for Nazi excess. For example, there is a growing literature on the eugenicist consensus that formed the disquieting background to Nazi racism between the late nineteenth century and the 1920s, and in whose light Nazi anti-semitism has increasingly appeared as the most virulent form of a much more extensive biological politics that systematically naturalized and essentialized social, cultural, and political phenomena under the sign of race. In Robert Proctor's view, "the ideological structure we associate with National Socialism was deeply embedded in the philosophy and institutional structure of German biomedical science". Consequently, if we take a broad view of the biomedical sciences as an ideological field, in which the Nazis' racial programs (from genocide to the anticipatory treatment of the Gypsies and the 1939 euthanasia program, back through population policies aimed at women and the 1933 sterilization law) were authorized by much longer traditions of racial hygiene from before 1914, then the Judeocide appears as the most vicious part "of a larger attempt ...to medicalize or biologize various forms of social, sexual, political, or racial deviance". [75] Moreover, we know from the work of Paul Weindling and others on the origins, rise, and mature elaboration of the eugenicist complex between the 1870s and 1945 that this was a restlessly aggrandizing ideological field. It convened biomedical knowledge, public health, and racial thought on the ground of social policy, and it was there that not only the politics of the family and motherhood, but also the most progressive achievements of the Weimar welfare state were completely embedded. [76]

Perhaps the key point to emerge from this recent literature concerns the "normality" of racial science in the Kuhnian sense. So far from corrupting "true" science by the intrusion of irrational and anti-intellectual pressures from the outside, Nazism worked within an established eugenicist paradigm by appealing to the existing "imagery, results, and authority of science". [77] Rather than politicizing science in some illegitimate sense, Nazism worked upon traditions of discourse that had articulated science to politics since the Kaiserreich. On the one hand, not just entire nationalities (Jews, Gypsies, Poles, and other Slav groups), but also entire social categories (gays, the handicapped and mentally ill, various groups of the socially incompetent and incurably ill, and then Polish intellectuals, Soviet prisoners of war, "political commissars", and so forth) became slated for racist and eugenicist attack. On the other hand, this was possible because of the prior diffusion of eugenicist and related ideologies of social engineering, which to a great extent had permeated the thinking of the social-policy and health-care professions long before the Nazis arrived. In both respects the ground for Nazi racism was discursively laid--not in the limited sense of "linguistic" preparation, but by an entire institutional apparatus and system of practice aimed at defining

deviant or "worthless" categories of people and at restructuring popular
assumptions about what an acceptable social policy could be.   This is where
my two earlier points concerning colonial knowledges and the importance of
gender also converge.   Work by Michael Burleigh and Woodruff Smith has shown
how the disciplines of anthropology and ethnology also helped compose the
ideological context from which the specifically Nazi project was to emerge. [78]
Likewise, Gisela Bock pioneered our understanding of the race/gender connection
in her study of Nazi sterilization policy; Claudia Koonz saw the Third Reich
doubly ordered around the naturalized poles of biological distinction, male/female
and aryan/non-aryan, in a "social order founded on race and gender"; and the
programmatic essay-volume, When Biology Became Destiny, successfully made
the case for seeing "biological politics" as a unifying principle of Nazi practice.
The logical imbrication of these two sets is perhaps clear enough--centering
one's understanding of society around a biologically constructed concept of
race had immediate consequences for how one understood the place of women,
given the key importance of sexuality, family, and reproduction to both--and
the Nazis' racial policies do seem to have been prefigured very strongly in
a complex of policies affecting reproduction (population, welfare, family,
motherhood, euthanasia, sterilization) that go back to the late Kaiserreich.
[79] Consequently, we need to recognize once again that Wehler's understanding
of modernizing reform as a set of abstract liberal-democratic desiderata and
the discourse of modernizing reform as we actually encounter it in the early
twentieth century simply do not fit.   Instead, the Nazis' racialized policies
were continuous with what passed as the ruling knowledge of the time, and were
less an eruption of the irrational than an extreme form of technocratic reason
in that sense.   If we are to understand the origins of Nazism, therefore,
it is not to the Kaiserreich's deficient modernization that we must look,
but to early twentieth-century modernity's dark side--to "the genesis of the
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    bis zu den frühmittelalterlichen Grundlagen europäischer Politik zurückgreift,
    wenn Lipset, Lepsius, Zapf, Flora u.a. diese Wendung zu einer historischen
    Makrosoziologie bzw. Modernisierunsforschung nachhaltig unterstützen und
    sie mit tragen, dann wird der Trend deutlich. Mit ihm hängt eine unübersehbare
    Rückkehr zur Analyse der Modernisierungsprozesse in denjenigen Regionen zusammen,
    in denen sie entstanden sind und von denen sie ihren Ausgang genommen haben:
    Europa und Nordamerika sind erneut zu Forschungsbereichen geworden, die
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      politischen "Deutschen Doppelrevolution" 1815-1845-49 (Munich, 1987), esp.
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      On the one hand, Wehler maintains a schematic fourfold separation (he adds
      a fourth sphere, social inequality, to the Weberian trinity); but on the
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      Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley,
      1991); Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London, 1974).
      For the new genre of global histories: Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary
      Critique of Historical Materialism, vol. 1: Power, Property and the State

(London, 1981), and vol. 2: The Nation-State and Violence (Cambridge, 1985); Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, I: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760 (Cambridge, 1986); John A. Hall, Powers and Liberties. The Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the West (Oxford, 1985). There is an excellent critical summary of this genre in Perry Anderson, "A Culture in Contraflow--I", New Left Review, 180 (March-April 1990), 41-78, where the work of W. G. Runciman, Ernest Gellner, and Jack Goody is also added.

15.   (Harmondsworth, 1966).

16.   To a great extent this is also a stylistic difference: Nipperdey eschews footnotes; Wehler saturates his text with the citations and their authority.

17.   Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, I, 13.

18.   For interesting attempts to ground this view historically, see Ferenc Feher (ed.), The French Revolution and the Birth of Modernity (Berkeley, 1990); Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge, 1990). One classic study is still Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Oeffentlichkeit (Neuwied, 1962). For some reflections on the latter, see Craig Calhoun (ed.), Jürgen Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, Mass., forthcoming 1991), including my own contribution, "Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century".

19.   See Giddens, Consequences of Modernity, 1-54, 55-59. Also: Jörn Rüsen, Eberhard Lämmert, Peter Glotz (eds.), Die Zukunft der Aufklärung (Frankfurt a.M., 1988).

20.   I am most indebted here to the ideas of Raymond Williams, John Berger, and Roy Pascal. See Raymond Williams, The Politics of Modernism. Against the New Conformists (London, 1989); John Berger, Selected Essays and Articles. The Look of Things (Harmondsworth, 1972), esp. "The Moment of Cubism", 133-62; Roy Pascal, From Naturalism to Expressionism. German Literature and Society 1880-1918 (London, 1973), esp. 152ff. For an important attempt to specify the social and political context of modernism, see also Perry Anderson, "Modernity and Revolution", New Left Review, 144 (March-April 1984), 96-113.

21.   Detlev J. K. Peukert, "The Weimar Republic--Old and New Perspectives", German History, 6 (1988), 138.

22.   For "anti-modernism", see Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair (Berkeley, 1961); Shulamit Volkov, The Rise of Popular Antimodernism in Germany. The Urban Master Artisans 1873-1896 (Princeton, 1978).

23.   The reception of Foucault in the English-speaking world occurred originally along the margins of official academic life, in journals like Telos and Partisan Review in the USA, by a self-conscious avant-garde of post-New Left journals like Economy and Society, Radical Philosophy, Ideology & Consciousness, and m/f, in Britain. It was only in the 1980s that his influence extended to historians more generally. In Germany the reception was pioneered in the same way--outside the mainstream of recognized scholarly discussion, in the so-called alternative scene. But by contrast Foucault's German influence has yet to extend very far into historical discussion. See the fascinating article by Uta Liebmann Schaub, "Foucault, Alternative

Presses, and Alternative Ideology in West Germany: A Report", German Studies Review, XII (1989), 139-53. Wehler certainly sees no reason to dwell on the potential interest of Foucault's ideas: "Von M. Foucaults Monomanie kann man hier ohnehin absehen". See Wehler, Aus der Geschichte lernen? Essays (Munich, 1988), 314.

24. Two reflections on Foucault's significance in the early 1980s--Michael Ignatieff, "State, Civil Society and Total Institutions: A Critique of Recent Social Histories of Punishment", and David Ingleby, "Mental Health and Social Order", in Stanley Cohen and Andrew Scull (eds.), Social Control and the State. Historical and Comparative Essays (Oxford, 1983), 75-105, and 141-88--afford a pivotal insight into this inspiration: before this time, Foucault's impact was surprisingly absent from the remarkable flourishing of social history in areas like crime, law, and punishment in the 1970s (including Michael Ignatieff's own A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution, London, 1978); after, it becomes hard to imagine such work without it. For excellent commentaries, see Jeffrey Weeks, "Foucault for Historians", History Workshop Journal, 14 (Autumn 1982), 106-19; and Patricia O'Brien, "Michel Foucault's History of Culture", in Lynn Hunt (ed.), The New Cultural History (Berkeley, 1989), 25-46.

25. Whereas this approach derives strongly from Foucault himself, it also has affinities with the "keywords" method of Raymond Williams and with the work of Reinhart Koselleck and the West German tradition of Begriffsgeschichte. See Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (2nd ed., London, 1983); Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, 5 vols. (Stuttgart, 1972-1989).

26. Michel Foucault, "Body/Power", in Colin Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 by Michel Foucault (Brighton, 1980), 60.

27. Michel Foucault, "The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century", ibid., 176.

28. Scott Lash, Sociology of Postmodernism (London, 1990), 133.

29. Jacques Donzelot, The Policing of Families (New York, 1979); Jeffrey Weeks, Sexuality and its Discontents. Meanings, Myths and Modern Sexualities (London, 1985); Frank Mort, Dangerous Sexualities: Medico-Moral Politics in England since 1830 (London, 1987); Antony Copley, Sexual Moralities in France, 1780-1980. New Ideas on the Family, Divorce, and Homosexuality. An Essay on Moral Change (London, 1989); Denise Riley, War in the Nursery. Theories of the Child and the Mother (London, 1983); Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul. The Shaping of the Private Self (London, 1990).

30. Gerald D. Feldman, "The Weimar Republic: A Problem of Modernization?", Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, XXVI (1986), 1-26.

31. Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (London, 1968), 15.

32. The quoted phrases are taken from two essays of Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Industrielles Wachstum und früher deutscher Imperialismus", and "Wie 'bürgerlich' war das Deutsche Kaiserreich?", in Wehler, Aus der Geschichte lernen?, 269, 213, 215, 212 respectively.

33. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Industrial Growth and Early German Imperialism", in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds.), Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London, 1972), 84. I have left this quotation in the original English, because in the recently published translated version cited in footnote 32 above, "Industrielles Wachstum und früher deutscher Imperialismus", Wehler revealingly substitutes "liberaldemokratischen Industriegesellschaft" for "modern industrial society". The full statement reads: "Bismarck und die seine Politik unterstützenden Kräfte hatten es versäumt, Möglichkeiten für eine legitime parlamentarische Opposition zu institutionalisieren, wie sie die Verfassungsstruktur einer liberaldemokratischen Industriegesellschaft verlangt, die den Anforderungen des ständigen sozialen Wandels gerecht zu werden versucht". A clearer illustration of the identity in Wehler's mind between "modernity" and "liberal democracy" could hardly be wished for. See Wehler, Aus der Geschichte lernen?, 266.

34. Wehler, "Industrial Growth", 78 ["Industrielles Wachstum", 261].

35. Wehler links this argument explicitly to Jürgen Habermas's theory of legitimation. See esp. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus (Cologne, 1969), 500; Jürgen Habermas, Technik und Wissenschaft als 'Ideologie' (Frankfurt a. M., 1968), esp. 74-80, 83f., 92, 99; Habermas, Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus (Frankfurt a. M., 1973).

36. Wehler, "Industrielles Wachstum", 269.

37. This debate was initiated by David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Oxford, 1984), and its earlier German edition, Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung. Die gescheiterte bürgerliche Revolution von 1848 (Frankfurt a. M., 1980). For an excellent introduction to the wider literature, see now David Blackbourn, "The German Bourgeoisie: An Introduction", in Blackbourn and Richard J. Evans (eds.), The German Bourgeoisie. Essays on the Social History of the German Middle Class from the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Century (London, 1991), 1-45. Compare also Jürgen Kocka's introductory survey, "Bürgertum und bürgerliche Gesellschaft im 19. Jahrhundert. Europäische Entwicklungen und deutsche Eigenarten", in Kocka (ed.), Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert. Deutschland im europäischen Vergleich, 3 vols. (Munich, 1988), 11-76, which pretends that Blackbourn and Eley did not exist.

38. This doubled meaning of bürgerlich--as a "society of citizens", and a society "dominated by a confident bourgeoisie" (Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy, 397)--is more central to the German etymology of the term than it is to the anglicized use of "bourgeois". It is a particular problem in the German term "bürgerliche Gesellschaft". Kocka, "Bürgertum und bürgerliche Gesellschaft", is very good on the definitional complexities of nineteenth-century usage.

39. Wehler, "Wie 'bürgerlich' war das Deutsche Kaiserreich?", 204f.

40. In addition to Kocka (ed.), Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert, and Blackbourn and Evans (eds.), German Bourgeoisie, see Jürgen Kocka (ed.), Bürger und Bürgerlichkeit im 19. Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 1987); Kocka (ed.), Arbeiter und Bürger im 19. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1986); Ute Frevert (ed.), Bürgerinnen und Bürger. Geschlechterverhältnisse im 19. Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 1988);

Hannes Siegrist (ed.), Bürgerliche Berufe. Zur Sozialgeschichte der freien und akademischen Berufe im internationalen Vergleich (Göttingen, 1988); Geoffrey Cocks and Konrad H. Jarausch (eds.), German Professions, 1800-1950 (New York, 1988); Werner Conze and Jürgen Kocka (eds.), Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert, Teil I: Bildungssystem und Professionalisierung im internationalen Vergleich (Stuttgart, 1985); Kocka (ed.), Das Bildungsbürgertum in Gesellschaft und Politik (Stuttgart, 1989).

41. Wehler, "Wie 'bürgerlich' war das Deutsche Kaiserreich?", 206, 208.

42. Ibid., 216f.

43. Wehler's definitional discussion in this respect is in ibid., 192-202.

44. Ibid., 214.

45. Ibid.

46. Esp. Geoff Eley, "The British Model and the German Road: Rethinking the Course of German History before 1914", in Blackbourn and Eley, Peculiarities, 75-90; Eley, "Liberalism, Europe, and the Bourgeoisie 1860-1914", in Blackbourn and Evans (eds.), German Bourgeoisie, 293-317.

47. The problems here are manifold. On the one hand, it is conceptually and empirically extremely doubtful whether the bourgeoisie may be treated as a collective class agent in this fashion, possessing a corporate political consciousness of a unified kind. On the other hand, specifically democratic demands in the nineteenth century came largely from popular movements which the bourgeoisie sought to suppress.

48. The tendency to speak of the bourgeoisie as a collective acting subject (whether its political orientation be liberal or not) is a large part of the problem. As Blackbourn says: "Stellt man das Bürgertum als eine Boxhandschuhe tragende Klasse dar, die mit ihren Gegnern kämpft, dann lässt sich leicht beweisen, dass sie keinen unumstrittenen Sieg gewonnen hat". See Blackbourn's "Kommentar" on the original version of Wehler's "Wie 'bürgerlich' war das Deutsche Kaiserreich", in Kocka (ed.), Bürger und Bürgerlichkeit, 283.

49. Wehler, "Wie 'bürgerlich' war das Deutsche Kaiserreich?", 199.

50. Wehler, "Geschichte und Zielutopie der deutschen 'bürgerlichen Gesellschaft'", in Aus der Geschichte lernen?, 251, 255, 252.

51. Wehler, "Wie 'bürgerlich' war das Deutsche Kaiserreich?", 202.

52. Ibid., 201.

53. See esp. Carol Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge, 1988); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, 1981); Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus (eds.), Women in Western Political Philosophy: Kant to Nietzsche (New York, 1987); Joan B. Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (Ithaca, 1988); Dorinda Outram, The Body and the French Revolution. Sex, Class and Political Culture (London and New Haven, 1989); Catherine Hall, "Private Persons versus Public Someones: Class, Gender and Politics in England, 1780-1850", in Carolyn Steedman, Cathy Urwin, Valerie Walkerdine (eds.),

<u>Language; Gender and Childhood</u> (London, 1985), 10-33. I have discussed the difficulties with Habermas's public sphere concept in general in Eley, "Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures".

54. C. Wright Mills, <u>The Power Elite</u> (Oxford, 1956).

55. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, <u>Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918</u> (Göttingen, 1973), 60-63. On the evidence of "Wie 'bürgerlich' was das Deutsche Kaiserreich", Wehler has now backed away from the "feudalization" thesis, though without yet putting a coherent alternative in its place.

56. See Wehler, <u>Bismarck</u>, 455ff.; Michael Stürmer, "Konservatismus und Revolution in Bismarcks Politik", in Stürmer (ed.), <u>Das kaiserliche Deutschland. Politik und Gesellschaft 1870-1918</u> (Düsseldorf, 1970), 143ff. In my view, Wehler's arguments withstand the critiques in Lothar Gall, "Bismarck und Bonapartismus", <u>Historische Zeitschrift</u>, 223 (1976), 618-37; and Alan Mitchell, "Bonapartism as a Model for Bismarckian Politics", <u>Journal of Modern History</u>, 49 (1977), 181-209 (with comments by Otto Pflanze, C. Fohlen, and Michael Stürmer). The concept also resembles Antonio Gramsci's concept of "caesarism", but Gramsci's exposition is ultimately too attenuated and schematic, and his description of Bismarck as an example of a "reactionary Caesarism" does not correspond to the concept advocated here. See Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (eds.), <u>Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci</u> (London, 1971), 219.

57. Anderson, <u>Lineages</u>, 277f.

58. Wehler, "Industrielles Wachstum", 260f., and Wehler, <u>Bismarck</u>, 500. The quotations are from Wehler's paraphrase of Habermas. See footnote 35 above.

59. See Jürgen Kocka, "Organisierter Kapitalismus oder Staatsmonopolistischer Kapitalismus? Begriffliche Vorbemerkungen", in Heinrich August Winkler (ed.), <u>Organisierter Kapitalismus. Voraussetzungen und Anfänge</u> (Göttingen, 1973), 19-35. See also my critical discussion in Geoff Eley, "Kapitalismus und wilhelminischer Staat: Industrielles Wachstum und politische Rückständigkeit, 1890-1918", in Eley, <u>Wilhelminismus, Nationalismus, Faschismus. Zur historischen Kontinuität</u> (Münster, 1991), 80-96.

60. Jürgen Kocka, <u>Klassengesellschaft im Krieg. Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1914-1918</u> (Göttingen, 1973).

61. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Der Aufstieg des Organisierten Kapitalismus und Interventionsstaates in Deutschland", in Winkler (ed.), <u>Organisierter Kapitalismus</u>, 49.

62. Göran Therborn, <u>What Does the Ruling Class Do When it Rules? State Apparatuses and State Power under Feudalism, Capitalism, and Socialism</u> (London, 1978), 153, 132. See also Bob Jessop, <u>The Capitalist State</u> (London, 1982); John Urry, <u>The Anatomy of Capitalist Societies: The Economy, Civil Society and the State</u> (London, 1981); Ann Showstack Sassoon (ed.), <u>Approaches to Gramsci</u> (London, 1982).

63. Therborn, _What Does the Ruling Class Do When it Rules?_, 145, 161.

64. See esp. Stuart Hall, Bob Lumley, Gregor McLennan, "Politics and Ideology: Gramsci", in Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (ed.), _On Ideology_ (London, 1978), 45-76; Ann Showstack Sassoon, "Hegemony, War of Position and Political Intervention", and Christine Buci-Glucksmann, "Hegemony and Consent", both in Sassoon (ed.), _Approaches to Gramsci_, 94-115, 116-26; Raymond Williams, _Marxism and Literature_ (Oxford, 1977), 108-14; Geoff Eley and Keith Nield, "Why Does Social History Ignore Politics?", _Social History_, 5 (1980), 249-72; Geoff Eley, "Reading Gramsci in English: Observations on the Reception of Antonio Gramsci in the English-Speaking World, 1957-1982", _European History Quarterly_, 14 (1984), 441-77.

65. See Geoff Eley, _Reshaping the German Right. Radical Nationalism and Political Change After Bismarck_ (2nd ed., Ann Arbor, 1991) (with a new Introduction); Eley, "Die Umformierung der Rechten: Der radikale Nationalismus und der Deutsche Flottenverein 1898-1908", in Eley, _Wilhelminismus, Nationalismus, Faschismus_, 144-73; Eley, "Some Thoughts on the Nationalist Pressure Groups in Imperial Germany", in Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls (eds.), _Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany before 1914_ (London, 1981), 40-67.

66. Eley, "British Model and the German Road", 98-126; David F. Crew, _Town in the Ruhr. A Social History of Bochum 1860-1914_ (New York, 1979), esp. 1ff., 119ff., 145-57, 221-4; Dick Geary, "The Industrial Bourgeoisie and Labour Relations in Germany 1871-1933", in Blackbourn and Evans (eds.), _German Bourgeoisie_, 140-61. Dennis Sweeney's forthcoming University of Michigan PhD dissertation (1992) will also shed much light on this question: "The Social Question, Social Reform, and the German Bourgeoisie: Industry and Politics in the Saar, 1877-1914".

67. E.g. Wehler, _Bismarck_, 19.

68. See Geoff Eley, "Social Imperialism in Germany: Reformist Synthesis or Reactionary Sleight of Hand?", in Eley, _From Unification to Nazism. Reinterpreting the German Past_ (London, 1986), 154-67. Otherwise, the most suggestive work has been done outside the German field: e.g. Ann L. Stoler, "Making Empire Respectable: Race and Sexual Morality in 20th Century Colonial Cultures", _American Ethnologist_, 16 (1989), 26-51, and "Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: The Politics of Race and Sexual Morality in Colonial Asia", in Micaela di Leonardo (ed.), _Gender at the Crossroads: Feminist Anthropology in the Post-Modern Era_ (Berkeley, forthcoming); Tony Bennett, "The Exhibitionary Complex", _New Formations_, 4 (Spring 1988), 73-102; Anna Davin, "Imperialism and Motherhood", _History Workshop Journal_, 5 (Spring 1978), 9-57; John M. MacKenzie (ed.), _Imperialism and Popular Culture_ (Manchester, 1989); J. A. Mangan (ed.), _Making Imperial Mentalities. Socialization and British Imperialism_ (Manchester, 1990); Susan Thorne, "Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Imperialism: Liberal Nonconformity and the Making of an Imperial Political Culture in Nineteenth-Century Britain" (University of Michigan PhD dissertation, Ann Arbor, 1990). Lora Wildenthal's University of Michigan PhD dissertation-in-progress on women and German colonialism will be an important contribution.

69. Sally Alexander, "Women, Class and Sexual Differences in the 1830s and 1840s: Some Reflections on the Writing of a Feminist History", History Workshop Journal, 17 (Spring 1984), 137.

70. Carole Pateman, "The Fraternal Social Contract", in John Keane (ed.), Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives (London, 1988), 123.

71. Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, Family Fortunes. Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780-1850 (London, 1987). For Germany, see Karin Hausen, "Family and Role-Division: The Polarization of Sexual Sterotypes in the Nineteenth Century--An Aspect of the Dissociation of Work and Family Life", in Richard J. Evans and W. R. Lee (eds.), The German Family. Essays on the Social History of the Family in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century (London, 1981), 51-83; Ute Frevert, "Bürgerliche Familie und Geschlechterrollen: Modell und Wirklichkeit", in Lutz Niethammer et al. (eds.), Bürgerliche Gesellschaft in Deutschland. Historische Einblicke, Fragen, Perspektiven (Frankfurt a. M., 1990), 90-100; Frevert (ed.), Bürgerinnen und Bürger.

72. Alexander, "Women, Class and Sexual Differences"; Sonya O. Rose, "'Gender at Work': Sex, Class and Industrial Capitalism", History Workshop Journal, 21 (Spring 1986), 113-31; Kathleen M. Canning, "Rethinking German Labor History: Gender and the Politics of Class Formation", forthcoming; Jean Quataert, "The Shaping of Women's Work in Manufacturing: Guilds, Households, and the State in Central Europe, 1648-1870", American Historical Review, 90 (1985), 1122-48.

73. Kocka, "Bürgertum und bürgerliche Gesellschaft", 46f. Significantly--and by contrast with the rest of his generously footnoted essay--the bibliographical citations dry up at this point in Kocka's survey of research and discussion on the bourgeoisie (that is, no references to Davidoff and Hall, Family Fortunes, to the works cited in footnote 53 above, or to the extremely large literature in US women's history in this area).

74. See the following: Renate Bridenthal, Atina Grossmann, Marion Kaplan (eds.), When Biology Became Destiny. Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany (New York, 1984); Gisela Bock, Zwangssterilsation im Nationalsozialismus: Studien zur Rassenpolitik und Frauenpolitik (Opladen, 1986); Ute Daniel, Arbeiterfrauen in der Kriegsgesellschaft. Beruf, Familie und Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Göttingen, 1989); Carola Sachse, Siemens, der National-sozialismus und die moderne Familie. Eine Untersuchung zur sozialen Rationalisierung in Deutschland im 20. Jahrhundert (Hamburg, 1990); Detlev J. K. Peukert, Grenzen der Sozialdisziplinierung. Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Jugendfürsorge 1878 bis 1932 (Cologne, 1986), and Jugend zwischen Krieg und Krise. Lebenswelten von Arbeiterjungen in der Weimarer Republik (Cologne, 1987); Derek S. Linton, "Who Has the Youth, Has the Future": The Campaign to Save Young Workers in Imperial Germany (Cambridge, 1991); Richard Wall and Jay Winter (eds.), The Upheaval of War. Family, Work and Welfare in Europe, 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 1988); David F. Crew, "German Socialism, the State and Family Policy, 1918-33", Continuity and Change, 1 (1986), 235-63; Young Sun Hong, "The Politics of Welfare Reform and the Dynamics of the Public Sphere: Church, Society, and the State in the Making of the Social-Welfare System in Germany, 1830-1930" (University of Michigan PhD dissertation, Ann Arbor, 1989); Cornelie Usborne, The Politics of the Body in Weimar

Germany (London, 1992); Atina Grossmann, <u>Women, Family, and the</u>
<u>Rationalization of Sexuality: German Sex Reform 1925-1935</u> (New York,
1992); Klaus Theweleit, <u>Männerphantasien</u>, 2 vols. (Frankfurt a. M.,
1978). The phrase at the start of this paragraph is taken from Joan
Scott's crucial essay, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis",
in Scott, <u>Gender and the Politics of History</u> (New York, 1988), 28-50.

75. Robert Proctor, <u>Racial Hygiene. Medicine Under the Nazis</u> (Cambridge,
Mass., 1988), 6f.

76. Paul Weindling, <u>Health, Race and German Politics between National</u>
<u>Unification and Nazism 1870-1945</u> (Cambridge, 1989); Gerhard Baader
and Ulrich Schultz (eds.), <u>Medizin und Nationalsozialismus: Tabuisierte</u>
<u>Vergangenheit--Ungebrochene Tradition?</u> (Berlin, 1980); Benno Müller-Hill,
<u>Tödliche Wissenschaft: Die Aussonderung von Juden, Zigeunern und</u>
<u>Geisteskranken 1933-1945</u> (Reinbek, 1984); Götz Aly and Karl Heinz Roth,
<u>Die restlose Erfassung: Volkszählen, Identifizieren, Aussondern im</u>
<u>Nationalsozialismus</u> (Berlin, 1984); Ernst Klee, <u>"Euthanasie" im NS-Staat:</u>
<u>Die "Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens"</u> (Frankfurt a. M., 1983); Hans-Walter
Schmuhl, <u>Rassenhygiene, Nationalsozialismus, Euthanasie: Von der</u>
<u>Verhütung zur Vernichtung "lebensunwerten Lebens", 1890-1945</u> (Göttingen,
1987).

77. Proctor, <u>Racial Hygiene</u>, 283.

78. Michael Burleigh, <u>Germany Turns Eastwards: A Study of Ostforschung</u>
<u>in the Third Reich</u> (Cambridge, 1988); Woodruff D. Smith, <u>The Ideological</u>
<u>Origins of Nazi Imperialism</u> (New York, 1986), and <u>Politics and the</u>
<u>Sciences of Culture in Germany</u> (New York, 1991).

79. Bock, <u>Zwangssterisation</u>; Claudia Koonz, <u>Mothers in the Fatherland:</u>
<u>Women, the Family, and Nazi Politics</u> (New York, 1987); Bridenthal,
Grossmann, Kaplan (eds.), <u>When Biology Became Destiny</u>.

80. Detlev J. K. Peukert, "The Genesis of the 'Final Solution' from the
Spirit of Science", paper presented to the conference "Re-Evaluating
the Third Reich: Interpretations and Debates", University of Pennsylvania,
April 8-10, 1988.

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