"Intellectuals, Intellectuality, and the Restructuring of Power after Modernity and Communism"

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INTELLECTUALS, INTELLECTUALITY AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF POWER
AFTER MODERNITY AND COMMUNISM*

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In the discourse of modernity, intellectuals are distinguished by their possession of a certain kind of intellectuality, a superior form of knowledgeability. Intellectuals are defined by their attributes of knowledge: their higher education, their creative genius, their public wisdom, their access, based on superior knowledge, to the essence of a system. They are distinguished from non-intellectuals by their greater awareness of, and greater importance in, modernity. This awareness may give them a socially unattached, relatively classless status in society, as Mannheim (1936:153-64) discussed, but they are not without purpose. Exemplifying the modern perspective, Mannheim argues that intellectuality defines the intelligentsia's social mission.

Given this floating quality, it is not surprising that modern accounts of intellectuals' relationships to non-intellectuals have been various. In accounts which emphasize a system's cohesion, the superior knowledge of intellectuals serves particular functions, as the altruism of professionals enhances the general quality of life society enjoys, according to Parsons (1939) and his more direct intellectual descendents. Or the expansion of the intellectual class may indicate the movement of the modern world to a post-industrial condition, where information becomes the valued commodity, the central capital, as Bell (1973) suggests. Alternatively, knowledge may be more directly linked to power, where intellectuals use their intellectuality as a resource to establish certain privileges for themselves, and dominate others, as a whole series of new class theorists from Jan Waclaw Machajski in the beginning of the century (see Shatz, 1989; Kennedy, 1990a) through Gouldner (1979), Szelenyi (1982) and Derber et al. (1990) have argued.

Within the category of intellectual, there are various kinds of distinctions that have been considered important in modernity. Different groups of intellectuals contest one another for influence, based on different claims to competence organized around disciplines (Bourdieu, 1988) or professions (Abbott, 1988). One might also distinguish among intellectuals on the basis of their relationship to other social forces, as Marxists have done, Gramsci with the most original contribution. Organic intellectuals and traditional intellectuals represent emancipatory and conservative interests, respectively (Gramsci, 1971). Intellectuals also may diverge based on their relationship to social forces based on other than class, and rather based on national identities and cultural traditions (Shils, 1990).

But all of these perspectives on the intellectual identity operate within modernity. The post-modern world view suggests a different angle on intellectuals. Rather than consider intellectuals as owning a superior form of knowledgeability we might call "intellectuality", the post-modern view emphasizes the particularity and limitations of the intellectual claim. In this, the post-modern approximates the new class theory of intellectuals, particularly in their common emphasis on the link between knowledge and power. But the post-modern diverges from this modern account by refusing to recognize either the integrity of the
intellectual category, which class analysts must accept as essentially constituted in order to proceed with their interpretation. Post-modernists also tend to reject the alternative prospect of classlessness, a normative foundation on which class analysis typically rests. But why should I consider here the post-modern view of modernity rather than any of these other conflicts among and about intellectuals?

I might justify my post-modern interest with reference to their special claim: that the post-modern is more interested in and better able to account for the process of identity formation than are other perspectives. But this assumes that identity formation is the paramount concern of those who wish to develop the theory of intellectuals or to do critical social theory. Some would argue so (e.g., Lemert, 1991), but I do not take it as a given. My prejudice lies in elaborating the efficacy of the critical intellectual. And while understanding the constitution of subject might be important in the emancipatory project, so too is envisioning how power relations can be restructured to maximize self-regulation in social life.

In the twentieth century, (if we can assume that the century has ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union since it began with the October Revolution), the definition of the critical intellectual was simple. The critical intellectual was a socialist of some sort, for socialism was the dominant counterculture of capitalism (Bauman, 1976). That intellectual might also have been feminist, especially after the 1970's, been anti-racist, especially after the 1960's, and anti-imperialist for the entire century. But socialism was definitely the glue wedding a range of critical inquiries.

The twenty-first century, however, is a century of post-communism. This is not the end to socialism, of course, for its social democratic variants continue to try and manage the welfare state in some advanced capitalist societies. Some of socialism's revolutionary variants remain appealing in the third world. But with the collapse of communism, the revolutionary alternative to capitalism appears to have disappeared in the advanced countries. And it appears that we are left with only one rather more slippery counterculture, that of post-modernity. But is that our alternative? The struggle against communism in Soviet-type societies was not informed by the post-modern vision, even if it shared important attributes with it, notably in its theory of the intellectual.

Post-communism began as a rejection of the capitalist/socialist dichotomy. In fact, post-communism began long before communist regimes fell. It began with the abolition of revisionist strategies for remaking communist-led regimes. That abolition was followed by an embrace of civil society as the emancipatory actor and goal of intellectual praxis. Post-modernity, although of course primarily influenced by changes in the metropole, was itself profoundly influenced by the onset of post-communism. To read any post-modern treatise on the social, from Foucault to Laclau and Mouffe and especially to Lefort (e.g., 1991), one will find an occasional aside referencing the repression in Soviet-type societies, and the lie of Leninism. But while post-communist and post-modern share much in their emphasis on contingency and subject formation, and their embrace of democracy as normative foundation, and their skepticism of the intellectuals' claim to representation, there are important differences
whose counterposition might prove useful for developing a critical intellectual praxis for restructuring power in the 21st century.

In particular, can there be a post-modern praxis for intellectuals in authority? Post-modern social theory suggests to me that there cannot be, but this might be a consequence of the intellectuals' disempowerment and marginality in advanced capitalism. In post-communist society, however, intellectuals remain far more powerful, and might, therefore, provide a social foundation for the development of such a post-modern intellectual politics of authority. Or is this an entirely misconceived potential, for does not post-modernity reject the project of intellectual authority altogether for the intellectuals' arrogance in claiming to stand above the popular? I wish this paper to be one which allows us to explore the question of post-modern intellectuals in power. But to see this potential, one must begin with a consideration of the intellectuality of post-communist civil society.

THE INTELLECTUALITY OF POST-COMMUNIST CIVIL SOCIETY

Most of my previous work has been about the intellectual in the transformations of Soviet-type societies, especially of Poland. I cannot go into great detail in this paper on that matter, especially as my principal focus is the implications of the post-modern perspective for critical intellectual praxis. But several themes on post-communist intellectuality deserve mention here.

The intellectual in Soviet-type societies has origins in both historical/cultural tradition and in the determination of the Soviet-type system. Because Eastern Europe did not develop a strong bourgeoisie and its politics was dominated by the efforts of nations to win independent states; national intelligentsias acquired a particular prominence in the modern era as the organic representative of a "nation" (Kennedy, 1991a). This "intelligentsia" was not distinguished by its intellectuality, as much as by its lifestyle, values, and charismatic feelings (Gella, 1971; Bauman, 1987a).

In most but not all places, however, the Soviet-type system was at odds with the national/cultural identity embodied by this old intelligentsia. The intelligentsia formed by the Soviet-type system was directed at undermining the old intelligentsia identity. Intellectuals in that East European world of Soviet-type societies were faced with a double life, then: as a national (seemingly genuine and autonomous) intellectual, and as a highly educated but politically obedient employee (an "unnatural" condition for an intellectual) of the Soviet-type state. The mix was not conducive to system stability, but it did maintain the intellectual's prominence.

The intellectual continued to be important because mass higher education, employment as a highly educated worker, or the fact of tremendous upward social mobility, was one way of buying off and diluting opposition based on national cultural traditions. On a less instrumental level, communism too provided some motivation for intellectuals; Szelenyi (1982) argued correctly that the intelligentsia and the Party shared a common interest in elevating the role of teleological knowledge in
deciding the distribution of surplus. Indeed, the emphasis on the "rational planning" of economy and society certainly required the elevation of the intellectual role. The system thus generated a large intelligentsia aware of its important role in modernity, but at the same time aware that they were being "oppressed" by a system that denied them cultural freedom and intellectual autonomy. The freedom and prosperity of capitalism, especially for those of their class, loomed large in the western horizon.

The intellectuals could not transform communism by themselves, however. After all, this system was ostensibly designed with the working class in mind, for it overturned capitalism, the system which exploited workers for its existence. Intellectuals and workers had to ally in some fashion to break the back of the Soviet-type system, especially after revisionist strategies to free intellectualty but retain its elevated position in communist ideology failed (Kennedy, 1991a). Structural factors were certainly involved in the making of the cross-class alliance (see Kennedy, 1991), but new modes of intellectual praxis were also important.

Nationalist appeals might organize workers in opposition to communism, but not necessarily. Some communist regimes, noticeably Ceausescu's, mobilized nationalism and communism together to dominate society. And nationalism might serve to change the content, but little of the political structure of a society, as the rebellion against Georgia's post-communist president Zviad Gamsakhurdia suggests. Alternative workerist or syndicalist politics diminished the role of the cultured too much for the highly educated to find much appeal in it. Civil society soon became the ideal vehicle for transformation and intellectual empowerment.

The elevation of the autonomous self regulating society based on pluralism, legality and publicity, civil society, to the vehicle and goal of change, was ideal for several reasons. First, it appeared to be universal and inclusive. Everyone could be a full member of civil society to the extent they merely acted autonomously. Second, it could include within its vision the nationalist call, identifying its proponents as yet another independent social association. Third, it could incorporate workers, for independent trade unions would be one of the constitutive elements of a civil society of free associations, and this would given the movement the power base it needed to contest the authorities should they wish to use force. Fourth, it did not spell out political economic reforms; while a market of some kind was assumed, the property relations that were to be its base varied from an embrace of the private to that of self management. Fifth, the embrace of civil society would appeal to the West. It was based on the East Europeans' wish to become like the West, like a 'normal' society. And last, civil society was an ideal vehicle for elevating the intellectual's claim to importance: for if publicity and organization were the hallmarks of the system, intellectuals could act in their interest, with their competence, and contribute to the making of an emancipatory alternative. And the making of post-communist regimes suggests that some intellectuals retained their importance. They negotiated the transition in most places, and won political authority in free elections too (Kennedy, 1992).
While of course communism in Eastern Europe did not collapse solely because of this mode of intellectual praxis, it was an important ingredient in transforming those societies which led the post-communist charge, Hungary and Poland. I believe it also contributed to the making of the post-modern view. Before I explain how, allow me now to turn to that post-modern view, especially with its understanding of intellectuals.

THE "INTELLECTUAL" AFTER MODERNITY CONSTITUTING/INTERPRETING SUBJECTS

When we write of the "intellectual", to what do we refer? Our understanding of this identity depends on the larger theoretical framework we bring to our analysis. Perhaps more than other frameworks, the post-modern shift has altered our understanding of the intellectual, simultaneously exposing the intellectuals' dependence on power while diminishing the distinction of the category.

Zygmunt Bauman (1987) argues that the principal benefit of the post-modern vision is that it allows us to see more clearly what distinguished modernity, by looking at that era from an epistemological position from without. The post-modern view allows us to see modernity's directionality in history, its inclination to find a master narrative with which to interpret that direction, and its fixing of both society and agents as essential in their constitution. The modern world view also elevates the intellectual to a supremely important position in the making of modernity and the future. Whether socialist or bourgeois, Azeri or Armenian, physician or chiropractor, the contest is over which intellectual better accesses the truth. The post-modern world view enables us to see this common assumption. It also allows us to see the peculiarity of the identity, "intellectual".

According to Bauman, "intellectuals" is a social category of the modernity, having been coined only around the turn of the century in Western Europe. It was designed to apply to those whose political consequence came through their representation of Reason, through their dissemination of knowledge to the public and political leaders. The intriguing point, of course, was that the term was introduced only when the unity of Reason was falling apart in the division of intellectual labor. The timing of the term's introduction illustrates that this was not an easily defined category of pre-given identities, but rather a form of intellectual praxis. Constituting a new (because it unified otherwise different actors) subject was an accomplishment intended to elevate Reason in political affairs. It was an attempt to reconnect specialized intellectual discourses into a larger community of the well-educated in order to elevate the significance of Reason in the ordering of the social world. Drawing upon the myth of les philosophes from France in the decades before the Revolution,1 this project of self-definition by intellectuals was an exercise in power, the making of a category that cut against the movement of modernity's differentiation. But it was also a project designed to save the claim of modernity to progress, namely to salvage Reason as a guiding force (pp. 21-24). But while the post-modern view allows us to see the distinction of the modern intellectual, it also moves the post-modern intellectual to embrace a new role.
In modernity, the intellectual, according to Bauman, is rather the "legislator" of the new intrusive state. The intellectual provides the initial justification for state intervention, with a claim to a superior cultural disposition over the folk or masses.2 The intellectual embodied Reason; ideology was the metatheory that would organize society in a better way, in a "conscious, rational, ideological order" (Bauman, 1991:112). Power becomes then "the content and the consequence of all the tasks ideology would have to put in front of itself" (Bauman, 1991:112). Although the intellectuals' power is to be based on "persuasion", it was a persuasion backed up by the coercive force of a state which was eager to convince the populace that their "wants" are not their "true needs" (Bauman, 1991:113). Legislat ing intellectuals rely on their power to access the needs of those who don't know better.

The state soon loses the need for an intellectual to provide justification as the state's intrusive power becomes increasingly self-evident and without need of the intellectuals' legitimation. In that outcome, the intellectual's function changes to become either the "autonomous", but powerless, intellectual, on the one hand, or the empowered but limited expert with competence in a singular field without teleological claim, on the other.

The post-modern intellectual is different from each of these modern variants because this intellectual is again political. But rather than claim any "superior" knowledge to legislate political communities, the post-modern intellectual acts as the "interpreter", the intellectual who translates the needs of one cultural community into a discourse understandable by those from without. Even the intellectuals who represent the dominant system rarely act, Bauman argues, as legislative intellectuals of old and rather wish only to "defend our way of life", rather than try and bring Reason to those who are incapable of living it. And those modern intellectuals who continue to wish to legislate do so on the basis of their recognition that it is a praiseworthy, even if local tradition, that western intellectuals, like Richard Rorty, find (Bauman, 1989:328).

Rorty's (1991:488) own unsympathetic description of his example of the post-modern intellectual, Andrew Ross, is interesting on this score:

More generally, Professor Ross wants his students to stop assuming that they, as prospective intellectuals, will be in a position to teach the uneducated what it is they really need and to suggest to them how they might get it. The whole idea of intellectuals knowing something that non-intellectuals should know but do not is, for Ross, largely a refusal to recognize and respect difference.

Rorty's hostility to some post-modern social theory, especially for its political consequence, is not hidden in this essay. But the point I want to draw upon here is that one of the premiere "modern" US intellectuals sees terrific difference between his intellectuality and that of the post-modern. It is not just a case of the post-modern making a difference where otherwise there would be none. Bauman's case allows us to see from without the context the justification for distinguishing the modern from the post-modern intellectual. Bauman's is the clearest, most direct and
perhaps the most dangerously simple available. But in its basic
argument, I think it is right, especially if we might develop it in two
more steps.

First, post-modernity not only emphasizes the difference of present
from past, but also more radically severs the present from the future
while modernity tried to connect them. The modern intellectual was
connected, through Reason, to the making of a better future. While Marx,
Weber, and Freud understood the present in terms of the future it could
yield, post-modern perspectives are much more backward-looking,
emphasizing how disconnected present identities are from those past, and
with that move, showing how impossible it is to anticipate any kind of
future, be it either a smooth extension of the present or its radical
transformation. This makes the post-modern intellectual a prisoner of
opposition, and makes the assumption of authority in legislating systems
impossible. Authority requires not only legislation, but the projection
of the future from the systemic choices made in the present. It involves
the suppression of identities and difference in the name of an ideal
which is the projection of the intellectual's, or legislator's, own
identity.

Second, I think Rorty is right. The post-modern world view devalues
the intellectual and her exclusivity, even if it does find a new mode of
intellectuality. Intellectual work is not so different from other forms
of work, and most certainly does not represent a "culturally superior"
knowledge. But one form of intellectuality is quite new in the
perspective. Michel Foucault's work illustrates that novel
intellectuality, but also shows quite nicely why the intellectual's
position is devalued, and perhaps why it is so difficult for
intellectuals again to assume political authority.

FOUCAULT'S DIMINISHED INTELLECTUAL

Foucault does not argue that post-modernity, as a period, devalues
the intellectual position. Foucault's discursive turn devalues the
intellectual in all periods. He exposes the intellectuals' self
misrepresentation as the voice of Reason or Progress in modernity. In
this sense, post-modernity refers to a perspective that might be used to
assess other historical periods. Post-modernity as perspective is
dependent for its development, however, on its formation in the 1970's as
a more influential if not dominant cultural mode in the West. In both
perspective and period, the intellectuals' dependence on power and the
particularities of local culture, rather than on universal Reason in any
of its garbs, becomes a central claim. And with that rejection of
universal Reason as a legitimation for certain cultural dominance, the
legislative role of intellectuals is undermined.

On normative grounds, Foucault rejects explicitly the legislative
roles of intellectuals around him. Indeed, he criticizes rather directly
not only the global theories and systematic accounts which denigrate
local forms of knowledge, but also the "universal intellectuals" who
claim to represent Reason or Conscience (1977:67-68). Such a universal
claim, and the regime of knowledge that elevates it, disempower and make
less possible the representation of conditions by ordinary people.
On empirical grounds, the intellectual becomes less capable over time of claiming such universal consequence. With the development of science and its extension to all domains of material and social life, the specific intellectual with a particular rather than general expertise eventually eliminates the general intellectual's claims to relevance. But the specific intellectual's knowledge need not lose world historic consequence. The atomic scientist is the dramatic example used by Foucault to illustrate the potency of specific knowledge. But Foucault takes us beyond Oppenheimer and the Bhagavad Gita to a more general argument that the most effective praxis for intellectuals is to try to pull out *from within their own worksite* how power shapes truth (Foucault, 1977).

The peculiarity of the intellectual is diminished in this framework. Indeed, Foucault emphasizes that the specific intellectual is closer to the "masses" because they are confronted by the same adversary and have the same material concerns of the proletariat (1977:68). The last remaining reserve of the general intellectual is the academy, which operates as a point through which all intellectuals must at some time pass, and through which ideas are exchanged.

In this, Foucault is far from being apolitical and also far from the relativism with which the unsympathetic often charge him. He rather views intellectual work as a potential contributor to the critique of the scientization of knowledge and its associated power (1980). But in this, does the intellectual have any special competence or contribution beyond that of the "ordinary" individual? Is the intellectual different from the ordinary person? Is "intelligence" any different from "knowledgeability"? What enables us to talk of the intellectual in a separate category, as a distinct identity?

Foucault elevates certain kinds of intellectual work in the struggle against domination. It seems that the reverse discourses associated with everyday resistance are different from the genealogical research that recovers meanings more effectively repressed, those around which reverse discourses do not form. This research seeks to emphasize the complexity and contingency of historical formation, while reverse discourses need not embrace such complications in their resistance of dominant discourses. Genealogy accomplishes more than knowledge based on perspective, for it reveals the ways in which perspectives are made by their own naturalization and the suppression of alternatives. Hopefully, then, the intellectual might facilitate local forms of resistance.

genealogy as critique refers to the association or union between 'erudite knowledge and local memories', between retrieved forms of historical knowledge of conflicts and struggle and low-status unqualified or disqualified knowledges... respectively" (Smart, 1985:61).

Thus, while Foucault’s intellectual is being more than Bauman’s interpreter for communities, the political consequence of her work hopefully is to empower dispossessed communities by revealing their localized knowledge.
Despite the possible elevation of the intellectual role beyond the status of reverse discourse, Foucault's profound pessimism about fundamental change or emancipation ultimately diminishes the intellectual's potential significance. Rather than intellectuals helping to provide a direction to history, Foucault rather sees the succession of modes of domination (1977a) Consequently, critical intellectuals remain in a state of perpetual opposition, uncovering silences and illuminating contradictions, recovering the past omissions rather than helping to emancipate the future.

One implication of this is that intellectuality itself, to realize its critical responsibility, opens itself up to power's fragmentation of the world by exposing the silences and repressions it has managed. But the success of the critical project in Foucauldian terms may be the fragmentation of intellectuality itself into a series of more and more distinct representations of the local. And therewith, the distinction of intellectuality as a level or form of knowledge is made even more suspicious, for intellectuality, rather than located on one rung of some kind of ladder, is rather located in more horizontal space, distinguished not by its superiority, or even its intellectual authority, but by its very marginality from power. The differences between intellectuals, rather than their commonality, is elevated. The impossibilities of critical intellectuality in authority exposed.

While a peculiar kind of research is identified in Foucauldian work, the exclusivity of intellectuals as a social group is diminished by the Foucauldian move, precisely because of this location of the intellectual in horizontal, rather than hierarchical space. The intellectuals' significance for political change is thus eclipsed.

POST-MODERNITY'S POLITICAL INTELLECTUALS

Laclau and Mouffe (1985) manage to restore the significance of the intellectual, while simultaneously making more directly political the post-modern project. By elevating the problem of "hegemony", Laclau and Mouffe restore the intellectual to some significance, but within the post-modern position as the "interpreter" rather than as a legislator of the future, as Bauman argues. But they also illustrate my other point about the post-modern intellectual. Laclau and Mouffe explicitly criticize the efforts of intellectuals in trying to make a connection between the heterogeneity of the present with the totality of the present and the (Socialist) Reason of the future. Of course here they argue with Marxism, their principal representative of modernity.

Laclau and Mouffe argue that the socially fragmented proletariat required the political intervention of intellectuals to maintain its rational unity. The tendency toward the fragmentation of the working class even before World War I required a political initiative that would somehow restore the unity of the proletariat in its struggle for socialism. Intellectuals, in this project, assumed responsibility for the effects of "contingency", for the working class and its being moved toward the resolution of its exploitation in socialism. But as the contingent grew in its importance for explaining the failure to realize socialism, so too would the role of political intellectuals increase in
the socialist project (p. 25). The revisionist project only strengthened this tendency, by making the political even more constitutive of the class base of the socialist transformation (p. 32). Lenin's reformulation of the marxist project realized its authoritarian potential by linking politics to the discovery of a class constituted and pregiven in history, before politics (pp. 57-59). Political intellectuals were thus at the helm of the new socialist project. But the elevation of contingency need not elevate the intellectual, as the discussion of Sorel and revolutionary syndicalism suggests (pp. 36-42).

The elevation of the intellectual is retained only when the contingent remains connected to the rational and determinant. For intellectuals are uniquely suited, it seems, to connect strategy to movement in history, and thus remain uniquely within the modern project. But once the modern project is abandoned, as it is with Sorel's revolutionary syndicalism, the "moral" or the "will" is no longer the exclusive project of intellectuals. It is, rather, the project of the community in formation through the necessary myth of the general strike. Syndicalism, in this variant at least, anticipates the movement toward the post-modern and the diminution of the intellectual role. Both elevate the natural community to be something to be discovered in popular mobilization, rather than in the rational constructs of the intellectual. But this is too radical (and too anti-intellectual or populist?) a turn. Laclau and Mouffe consider Gramsci's articulation as a more appropriate foundation for their radical democratic politics.

Although Gramsci does not take them far enough, he does provide the springboard for their conclusions: First, the distinction between the necessary and contingent is dissolved in favor of rethinking the unfixity of social forces. There is no necessary link between socialism and concrete social agents. The meaning of new social movements, this explosion of the social, depends on their articulation with other struggles and demands. But this then means, above all, that the movements' separation from one another cannot be itself fixed. Instead, they turn to the role of interpreter by trying to articulate a new counter-hegemony which will allow new social movements to realize their progressive role (pp. 85-88). The intellectual, in their work, becomes a "subject position" which is obliged to address their "central problem".

to identify the discursive conditions for the emergence of a collective action, directed toward struggling against inequalities and challenging relations of subordination. We might also say that our task is to identify the conditions in which a relation of subordination becomes a relation of oppression, and thereby constitutes itself into the site of an antagonism (p. 153).

The intellectual, then, manages to retain her "exterior" position, as she had with her connection to Reason. But now, the intellectual is distinguished only by virtue of her ability to translate conditions of subordination into discursively explicit conditions of oppression (p. 154). Democracy is deepened to the extent that more and more relations of subordination are reconsidered as oppression (p. 163); hence, critical intellectuals can play a vital general role, not only as advocates of a community's interests, as Foucault's extension suggests, but in the very expansion and deepening of the normative frame of their analysis, democracy.
The formation of contending blocs is the great contribution of the tradition from Gramsci through Laclau and Mouffe, and is what leads Radhakrishnan (1990) ultimately to intermix Foucault with Gramsci, rather than the other way around, in his ruminations on the "effective intellectual" (p. 91). But unlike the Gramscian rendition, the post-modern reading of bloc formation and democratic transformation has no telos. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) speak directly to this:

the democratic revolution is simply the terrain upon which there operates a logic of displacement supported by an egalitarian imaginary, but that does not predetermine the direction in which this imaginary will operate. If this direction were predetermined we should simply have constructed a new teleology..." (p. 168).

And there is no qualitative break, either:

There is no unique privileged position from which a uniform continuity of effects will follow, concluding with the transformation of society as a whole (p. 169).

This profound indeterminism is a consequence of identities and their distinctions from one another having become more and more fluid, and subject to reconstruction, evidenced by the ascendance of the neoconservative project in post-modernity. For Laclau and Mouffe, then, the important project of critical intellectuals is to reformulate democracy and create a new definition around which a historic bloc of more progressive egalitarian orientation toward liberty would emerge. For that project to emerge, intellectuals come to the fore once again, in providing the "radical imaginary", the utopia, which helps to negate the existing order, while of course avoiding the extreme of the "Ideal City" (p. 190). The ambition is to create a new hegemony. This is a hegemony of opposition, however.

THE INTELLECTUALITIES OF POST-MODERNITY AND POST-COMMUNISM

Post-modernity’s suspicion of the intellectual’s claim to superior knowledge means that the intellectual’s role cannot become more than an interpreter of local visions, or the archaeologist of lost visions. Laclau and Mouffe certainly elevate the role of the intellectual in political struggles above that which Foucault provided for, by making the intellectual an important contributor to the formation of alternative hegemonies. But they certainly retain the disdain of the post-modern project for the intellectual’s old legislating role in society making. The only institutionalization of Reason they are prepared to acknowledge is the discourse of democracy and its legitimation of pluralism, which they perceive as a procedural foundation for the discursive transformation of subordination into oppression. Thus, while certainly making post-modernity a more political vision than Foucault, and while elevating the role of the intellectual, Laclau and Mouffe retain the important hallmark of the post-modern vision: of an intellectual as interpreter. Without a connection to the Totality through an imaginary system, or to the Future with an imaginary motor, intellectuals can do no more. But, in fact, they do, and sometimes, they must.
When Chantal Mouffe visited the University of Michigan on September 21, 1989, I suggested to her that their argument about political intellectuals would be of little value to the legislating efforts facing the Polish and Hungarian intellectuals then assuming political authority. And she agreed, arguing that the critical intellectual should remain in opposition, deepening democracy through critique. But while this does not deny alternativity in legislating systems, especially in Eastern Europe, it does mean that post-modern intellectuals are not helping post-communist intellectuals very much. Post-communist authorities are instead legislating new social systems based on the advice of modernity’s intellectuals. And that seems to be a profound limitation for post-modernity’s political consequence.

With the decline of socialism as counterculture, post-modernity becomes the main alternative counterculture in the West. Or at least its advocates might claim that. But while post-modernity be useful in the development of critical intellectuality in the West where democracy can be deepened rather than established, at present it seems to offers little to those intellectuals who must still legislate systems. Is it possible for the post-modern view to offer intellectuals in authority any guidance, any vision? Or do intellectuals in political authority by necessity return to their role in the beginnings of modernity: providing legitimation for the suppression of popular wants on the basis of knowing the public’s true needs?

To a great extent this has been a moot question for in the metropole, intellectuals are marginalized from power for the most part. Too, the post-modern seems to have relatively little to offer struggle in capitalism’s old periphery, given the even greater distance of intellectuals from power there, and the more likely embrace by its intellectuals of some variant of marxism, one of post-modernism’s main foes. But in the place that treats marxism as demon, and the place where intellectuals have access to power, in capitalism’s new periphery, its post-communist periphery, the possibility of post-modern influence is relatively great. For there, the visions of post-communist and post-modern intellectuals also have some assumptions in common.

1) In both post-modernity and post-communism, the "State" is a far more obvious and threatening actor, no matter what ruling class it claims to represent. The elevation of an autonomous civil society as a sine qua non of the good society is embraced not only in the post-communist (most obviously in Michnik, 1976) but also in the post-modern vision (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985:152-71).

2) The crisis of Soviet-type society also made claims to intellectual representation of others’ unknown or unrecognized interests even more fantastically unreliable. The intellectual mode in civil society, in fact, was not to claim to speak for anyone, but only to act as an expert providing advice to the social body, or as an actor, not a superior intellectual, within that social body itself. Intellectuals were on both sides of the expert/activist divide (Kurczewski, 1989). This is mostly the case in Poland, however, where social forces beyond the intelligentsia were most developed; but even in Hungary, where the intelligentsia was quite alone in speaking for civil society, the
intelligentsia was quite hesitant in negotiations to speak on behalf of civil society (Kennedy, 1992).

3) The crisis also transformed the view of history; no longer was the future considered a march of progress or reason, but rather a series of accidents. For example, the fate of Poland and its occupation by the Red Army after World War II inspired an illuminating exchange in the New York Review of Books about the moral responsibility of actors to fight the inevitable, but accidental outcomes of war (Kolakowski 1986; Draper, 1986). Leszek Kolakowski is one of the principal intellectual contributors to the post-communist project throughout Eastern Europe.

4) The relationship of power to knowledge also became more explicit in post-communism and post-modernity. Without a analogous body of autonomous social power, given to Polish intellectuals by the organized and independent Polish working class, Hungarian intellectuals felt obliged to compromise and work with the authorities to achieve reform. Principles were neither transcendent nor dependent on class forces, but rather dependent on the articulation of social forces (Kennedy, 1992).

Of course one fundamental difference between post-communist and post-modern perspectives was in the capacity of the former to identify the "normal" and "good" society: that of the West with its relatively developed civil society. The post-modern view has relatively more difficulty with such simple descriptions of systemic alternatives.

Another fundamental difference, and the most disconcerting one, is the ease with which these post-communist intellectuals have been able to forget their rather self-limiting claims about representation, and embrace the old legislating mode of modern intellectuals. In part, this is of necessity, of course; political authority has been thrust in their laps. But at the same time, the embrace of the modern bourgeois intellectual approach to legislating systems has their origins not only in the collapse of socialism as capitalism's counterculture, but also in post-modernity's failure to develop an intellectual politics of authority.

I conclude this section with an important observation: this mode of intellectuality, this post-communist embrace of civil society in the Soviet-type system, was one of the most effective forms of critical intellectuality this century has witnessed. While it has shown its limits after the revolutions of 1989, its revolutionary accomplishment cannot be overlooked for whatever its subsequent failure. Indeed, it might yet be restored should it find new alliance with the post-modern, rather than only the modern, intellectual. But now, that is the only real ally they have.

INTELLECTUALS OF MODERNITY CONSTITUTING SYSTEMS

Most of the intellectual authorities making post-communism are modernity's intellectuals: specialists with a claim to competence in only one narrow field. But while they may be specialists, they claim something no post-modernist would dare: that their field of expertise carries systemic consequences, and that their advice is the best that they can get. And whether they are right or wrong, their voice is helping to shape the post-communist system.
I am presently engaged in researching the expertise constituting post-communist Poland, and unfortunately I have not completed enough of my research at this time say anything conclusive. But I can provide some rough comments.

In the summer of 1991, Poland’s university intellectuals were, for the most part, discouraged. The Mazowiecki government passed a bill on higher education that decentralized authority over higher education, making each actor as self reliant as possible. When taken in conjunction with the democratic transformations of the institutions of higher education that took place over the 1980’s, Poland’s intelligentsia was now as autonomous as could be. But they were also desperately seeking to become "modern", if not equally across the board.

Polish historians, lawyers, humanists, theoretical physicists and even some sociologists have no need to become more "modern". Surely they can have more international collaboration, but the desperation to learn was more easily seen in economics and business. Indeed, Western perceptions are such that professional economists are much less appreciative of their East European counterparts’ competence than are those in other fields.

Easily the most dynamic sector of the field of higher education, and perhaps the only confident field, was that associated with "business". Five existing Academies of Economics are moving toward becoming more like Business Schools, and entirely new Business schools are forming, outside the old system of higher education. Indeed, the British Know-How Fund explicitly targeted money toward Polish intellectuals willing to start up business schools outside the old, inertia ridden system (see Kennedy, 1991c, for elaboration).

These developments are, of course, entirely consistant with the post-modern view, especially in its Foucauldian form: knowledge and power are inextricably intertwined so that those intellectuals most confident of the future are those simultaneously receiving funds from more "powerful" advisors. When we add to this comparatively minor injection of expertise the considerable competence claimed by representatives of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in dictating the character of Polish economic reform (see Kowalik, 1991), we can see quite easily the point of the link between knowledge and power.

One principal kind of expertise is being elevated in this making of post-communism: that of the free market economist. Indeed, the so called "government of experts" under Jan Krzysztof Bielecki was based on the number of professional economists in the Cabinet. Clearly, the expertise of the free-market economist is the hegemonic intellectuality remaking post-communism today.

The proximity of the economist to state power and the making of systems is of course not exclusive to the post-communist world. They only reflect world and core capitalism’s elevation of the economist as the only intellectual with the capacity to legislate, or at least regulate, social systems. Another intellectuality that is becoming quite important in the making of post-communism is that of the constitutional
lawyer. This is an especially interesting development, too, as it coincides with the "discovery" by many sociologists of the "modern" persuasion that constitutions are sociologically foundational for making democracy.

At the Annual Meeting of the Hungarian Sociological Association in 1991, two out of three plenary speakers from outside Hungary devoted their comments to the importance of sociologists studying constitutions (James Coleman and Shmuel Eisenstadt). Predating them, however, was another sociologist of modernity who argued that constitutions are the codified universalism that enable democracy to function.

Jeffery Alexander, in his neofunctionalist project to resurrect Talcott Parsons as the only great theorist of a stable modernity (1990), reintroduces the famous Parsonsian theme of value consensus in a new important way. While he continues to argue that elite differentiation and competition are the structural foundations for democracy's success (1991:160), he argues that there must be a universal cultural foundation as well.

For Alexander, the cultural dimension of democracy's analysis is to be found in the "deep symbolic structures that provide a common medium of communication for conflict groups despite their strategic and divisive aims" (p. 162), for it is "the language of community and integration ... (that) is a code that sustains democracy wherever it even fleetingly appears" (p. 162). These universalistic codes are created, Alexander argues, in civil society itself (p. 166).

In this civil society, the particular gives way to the universal, and more abstract criteria for membership, and inclusion, are given. And it is the rules of this membership which gives, Alexander argues, the possibility of voluntary participation, freedom and democracy: "Because the ultimate loyalty of citizens is to overarching rules rather than to the outcome of any particular game, policies and officeholders can be changed, though the process may be difficult and subject to continual contestation" (p. 168). And Alexander argues that constitutions codify these overarching rules that integrate. A democratic constitution becomes, then, one of the social requisites of democracy (p. 171).

For Alexander, democracy should be understood as an ideal type, and thus rarely realized in practice. But he manages to establish the social foundations of the normative good, democracy, and then to suggest that deviations from these foundations are themselves the explanation for democracy's failure. Social crisis, he argues, undermines the possibility for democracy. "Democracy is preserved only if common ground is sustained, if it proves possible to ensure the generalized, universalistic bonds that allow critical reflection to be sustained without sacrificing social solidarity" (p. 171).

While the post-modern view has so far had little to contribute to reformulating the economic project of the International Monetary Fund, it might, one would imagine, have a great deal more to say about this matter of democracy, civil society and integration. And of course it does, but Alexander and the neofunctionalist project in sociology seem to proceed as if the post-modern is irrelevant. Indeed, Alexander manages to move
the post-modern critique of power and society to the side rather well.

He dismisses Foucault with an appreciative gesture of being more sophisticated and precise than Marcuse, but being similarly stuck in a view that "ignores the meaning of a democratic state" (Alexander, 1991:158). Alexander also argues that such a perspective emphasizes only repression, not the resistance domination meant for Foucault. Third, he fails to mention much less consider the major work which extends the post-modern project in the direction of theorizing democracy, that of Laclau and Mouffe. But why does he do this? Alexander wants to develop a "realistic theory of democratic societies" (p. 159), a category into which post-modern views apparently do not fit.

Rather than "deepening" democracies, Alexander is interested in how they are constituted to start with. Rather than constantly trying to find a way to turn a form of subordination into one of oppression, thereby creating yet another social conflict, Alexander calls for the construction of a universalism (if not one based on Reason) that will allow the democracy that Laclau and Mouffe are so fond of deepening, to survive. That universalism is to be found in the Constitution, and thus, another intellectualism is elevated: that of the constitutional expert. With Alexander's theory of democracy in modernity, then, we have the problem for intellectuals turned on its head. Intellectuals might be the most important actor contributing to the legislation of the good society. That proposed solution is certainly comforting to most East Europeans, for intellectuals can provide some kind of answer to how to legislate the good society. Here, precisely, is the problem, for modernity becomes the exclusively emancipatory vision.

Modernity acquires even more purchase in post-communist societies because of the revival of pre-modern intellectualities. In my interviews of university intellectuals in summer 1991, the only non-business intellectual expressing considerable confidence was the prorector of the Catholic University of Lublin. The end to communism, he believed, confirmed the vision and significance for Poland of the Church. He was quite proud that a number of "their" professors were in positions of governmental authority. Indeed, with their own graduates, he felt confident that a new more Catholic Poland might be made. In his sermon in his summer 1991 Warsaw mass, Pope John Paul II ridiculed the claims of returning Poland to Europe, the popular theme of modern intellectuals. Rather, he said, Poland has been at the heart of Europe for over 1,000 years, communism notwithstanding. For Europe was based on Christian civilization, and indeed, Western Europe might itself need to back off from its own consumerism and materialism to return to the spirituality that marked European culture.

Thus, the constitutional order Alexander finds essential for democracy is likely to be filled, if the Catholic Church can realize its aims, with an intellectuality profoundly influenced by a Catholic Church that finds not only the anti-essentialist criticality of post-modernity but also the pragmatism of modernity inadequate grounds for the constitution of a moral society. But this very conviction is of course the grounds for the kind of conflict Alexander sees as antithetical to democracy, where the higher principles to which one holds derive not from citizenship, but from a "pre-given" identity in faith.
If the post-modern perspective is to get in on the action in Eastern Europe, it must somehow confront both pre-modern and modern intellectualities and intellectuals on a turf from which the post-modern cannot easily be swept. I believe one of the fundamental issues facing postmodern social theory may be then to theorize an postmodern intellectual praxis of authority. Or is that a contradiction in terms?

POST-MODERNITY AND EMANCIPATORY INTELLECTUAL PRAXIS

Post-modern intellectuality does not serve the crisis of post-communism very well in the present conjuncture, for several reasons.

1) The post-modern perspective diminishes the distinction and significance of intellectuals, while elevating the importance of knowledgeability.

This is a healthy move toward democracy within social movements, I would argue, as we no longer have the convenient separation between intellectuals and labor, or knowledge and power, that has animated socialist and communist movements for decades. New social movements are appealing in the sense that they have elevated knowledgeability into intellectuality, and obliged intellectuals to be activists. One might argue that social movements and democracy are strengthened too by this broader distribution of intellectuality. But unfortunately, the post-modern critique is limited to those intellectuals already sympathetic to the liberal and egalitarian democratic project. The modern intellectual easily ignores the post-modern critique for its failure to offer a positive theory of institutional formation.

2) The post-modern perspective can be embraced only by those in the opposition to authority; in fact it ceases to be relevant when encountered by those in authority.

Precisely because it has no theory of institution-making, shunning the codification of general rules as but one more inhibition and repression of difference, the post-modern intellectual retreats to a status of opposition and critique. While this will mean innocence from the kind of fault many a marxist in power has suffered, it also means an escape from the demands of the age, especially when they fall into one’s lap as they have in Eastern Europe.

3) The post-modern perspective is viable and effective only within a democracy, established at least in rudimentary form. It assumes the existence of a democracy that allows the fluidity of identity formation to flow (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985:154).

Identities are also incredibly unstable in post-communist societies, but in this sense, they don’t lead to a deepening of democracy, but to the greater possibility of either an uncooperative anarchy or politics of demogogery. Thus, most East European intellectuals will find little consolation in an approach that promises to exacerbate conflict and destabilize an already dangerous condition. But if democratic discourse
is the precondition for the post-modern opening of society, and if intellectuals now have considerable authority in legislating new systems, what might the post-modern vision articulate for post-communist intellectuals in power? What kind of stabilization, what kind of restructuring of power, might facilitate the rise of the post-modern opposition in these systems? I have been thinking about this for a while, now, and frankly I am perplexed. My thinking moves in two directions, however.

First, the post-modern hope for a wider dispersion of intellectuality through the broader recognition of the link between truth and power had especially fertile soil in Poland, or so I thought (Kennedy, 1990). The civil society of Solidarity encouraged a wider range of people to consider how the break between power and knowledge was based. Now, however, the intellectuals that brought civil society to Poland have sought to institutionalize, instead of the ideal public sphere which motivated them in 1980-81, the commodified public relations world in order to hide their own complicity in negotiating with an international system matters that should be the province of the local demos (that is if democracy means self-rule). Kowalik (1991a) illustrates nicely just how important good relations with the IMF, perhaps more than with domestic society itself, have become for Poland’s post-communist authorities. Returning to the ethos of the open public sphere motivating open negotiations between Solidarity and communist authorities in the Lenin Shipyards of 1980 might be a good alternative post-modern politics for those in authority. Whether that would be sufficiently "reasonable" for modern theorists of democracy like Alexander is another question, however. One way in which is reasonableness would become apparent would be to consider how a media might be organized to facilitate open discussion and the discovery of subjugated discourses rather than motivate their repression and manipulation. But how? To where do we go for answers to that?

Second, the post-modern recognition of "blurring frontiers" and "constructed demarcating lines" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985:171) might help to formulate a new intellectual politics of authority not only designed to combat neo-conservativism in government, and now neo-fascist tendencies in civil society, but also the sanctity of state borders themselves.

One of the greatest opportunities for a post-modern political authority is in the making of the new Europe. With a new European Community in formation, the ideas of nations and citizens, the stable categories of modernity, are being transformed. And now that inclusion in the Community itself is becoming increasingly a "political" issue, a new space for institution remaking is being opened up. Pre-modern or traditional intellectuals are likely to resist this, for fear of what it will do to the "natural" or "spiritual" nation. Modern intellectuals are likely to embrace it, but only for the formal economic ties it might bring. Post-modern intellectuals should see in the making of the Community the very foundations for a new politics of democracy, one that makes the idea of citizen and rights subject to deepening not only within nation-states, but across them from East to West. Post-modern intellectuality has a great chance for not only the opposition in Europe, but also for intellectual authority in a post-communist Europe that seeks
to redefine the continent's political and social boundaries, and the identities and alliances which might make for a more democratic future.

In these concluding remarks, however, the dependence of the post-modern vision on modernity becomes apparent. Not only is post-modernity dependent on the critique of modernity for its distinction, but it is also dependent on its institutions. The open public sphere, the enlarged demos, are extensions of the Enlightenment suggested by post-marxist intellectuals like Jurgen Habermas and David Held, intellectuals who have taken the post-modern challenge seriously, but who have retained modernity's concern for how intellectuals might theorize Reason in the institutions of society. Post-modernity needs this kind of modern intellectuality for its own relevance to be established: it needs the self-remedial institutions post-marxism claims to seek in order that the differences post-modernity aims to elevate can find a place in public life. At the same time, post-modernity also needs modern intellectuals of a critical persuasion; too easily can post-modernity be dismissed as "unrealistic" or "insufficiently attentive to the distinction of democracy". One major challenge for intellectuality in the 21st century, I would propose, is to consider and to help found the institutional foundations that make post-modernity a counterculture that is more than the exclusive preserve of the autonomous, but politically irrelevant, intellectual.
NOTES

1. "there are few if any times and places in human history in which the educated and thinking crust of society was seen -- by others as much as by themselves -- as a unified and compact group, which could compare with that of le philosophes in France in the third quarter of the eighteenth century" (p. 24). Bauman argues their significance was great for six sociological reasons: 1) "absolutist monarchy was about to reach its maturity"; 2) "a new concept of social control was needed", given the new direct link between state and citizen; 3) "the nobility lost its political significance well before a new social force, strong enough to claim the vacant political estate, appeared", and they were themselves being remade as academies in the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries provided them with the training that would given them their right to rule; 4) they were "distinguished by the absence of a traditional status or particular function appropriate to them in the society", which distinguished France from those other European territories, like the Germanic lands whose university professors, state officials and clergymen fit the bill; 5) their autonomy was reinforced by their own considerable integration through a "dense network of communication", providing a "horizontally structured" that could generate new foundations for certainty through its own production of consensus based on Reason that could challenge the certainty imbedded in faith in the Divine (p. 35); and 6) habits and old ways of life were now to be the object of legislation (pp. 24-26). Of course the foundation for this quarter of a century was laid as early as the mid sixteenth century, as culture as "vertu" came to mean more and more an achieved rather than ascribed trait (p. 31).

2. The CSST Power discussion group made a good point about Bauman's argument: his argument about legislating modern intellectuals could be strengthened by referring not only to domestic absolutist European society, but also to the "civilizing" legislator in Europe's colonial interventions.

3. For instance his genealogical research contributes to counter hegemonic struggles by bringing out voices which have been silenced by global theories. Indeed, his focus on discourse and reverse discourse has been found quite useful in developing feminist practice, so argues Chris Weedon (1987:107-35).

4. An especially fruitful comparison might be drawn with intellectuals in Poland, given that it is there where civil society in its broadest democratic form was mobilized in 1980-81; elsewhere, mobilization has been restricted largely to the intelligentsia, or to a broader public but with much more limited duration and organizational effort. Nevertheless, the potential for relevance is still great in all of post-communism, given the prominence of an intelligentsia motivated by ideals, the only reward post-modernity potentially can offer.
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