"Perpetrators, Accomplices, Victims: Further Reflections of Domination as Social Practice"

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I. The question is: why did "the many" accept war and Fascism?

The notion is enormously suggestive: "Hegemony" may provide the key to explain the durability of domination in heterogeneous and conflict-ridden societies. Or to situate the problem more concretely: In Imperial Germany as in other European states the impact of class politics - or, for that matter, of class rhetoric - faded away as the respective governments invoked the nation's and even civilization's interests in August 1914. Millions of wage-earners risked their lives and fought "the foe". The regiments on either side consisted to a large extent of previous comrades. Obviously not only state violence but widely shared attitudes had been able to forge a consensus across boundaries of class or milieu: "to serve the nation" (or "the king"). The readiness to side with "the people" and "the state" instead of pursuing lines of "class" and its proclaimed internationality revealed attitudes and social mechanisms which did not need to be generated anew in 1914. On the contrary, during the later 19th century industrial-capitalist societies increasingly had invoked notions of "national" distinctiveness if not of superiority. Popular experiences to a large extent were shaped not only by the wage-nexus but also by the bonds which the monarchy or, for that matter, the republic provided. In the German case, many soldiers from proletarian background proudly served in the army or joined the navy. At the same time the slogan of "German quality work", coined by industrialists, was no less enthusiastically cheered in the socialist unions.
The willingness of "the masses" to support brutally enforced demarcations between "good Germans" and "foes" in the first world war was reiterated on an even more catastrophic scale under German Fascism\(^3\). In addition, proletarian passivity against, if not acceptance of the Nazi-takeover in 1933 was widespread. Contemporary anti-Nazis accused the leaders of the unions and the parties, primarily the Social Democrats but also the Communists of being traitors for not resisting. However, even if this could be proven, the question remains: why did so many "let themselves be betrayed" (Friedrich Engels)? Above all, why did so many unobtrusively submit to the Nazi-domination after 1933, even until 1945? Again, identifications across the divisions of class and gender, generation and milieu triggered compliance to Nazi-appeals for loyalty. To millions the goal of building a "Greater Reich" justified to millions the brutal exclusion and even murder of so-called "strangers to the community" ("Gemeinschaftsfremde"), for instance, gypsies or homosexuals, beggars and vagrants and, simultaneously, of "racial enemies" or "Untermenschen", in particular German Jews or Jewish Germans. This widely shared consensus to expel the "others" seems in retrospect to have prepared the ground in 1939 for expanding the internal warfare across Europe and the World - the Holocaust being its "final" conclusion\(^4\).

In both historical examples, the question can be posed in Gramscian terms: How did the cultural predominance of elite groups produce consent for the ruling block among the subordinate classes in both cases: when this block was rather unchanged (as in 1914)\(^5\) but also when it was partly composed anew (as in German Fascism)\(^6\)? How was "hegemony" actually brought about and what did it mean to those concerned?

II. "Hegemony": conceptual merits and deficits
Antonio Gramsci employed the notion of "hegemony" in his writings during the years of his incarceration (from 1926 to his death in 1937). He never systematically elaborated the term. However, tribute must be paid to Perry Anderson for having painstakingly unravelled the different and shifting readings Gramsci applied to "hegemony". In addition, Anderson has also partly reconstructed the historical context in which the Russian Social-Democrats and leading Bolsheviks used the term. Before 1917 they constantly debated the role of the proletariat in a prospective bourgeois-democratic revolution. Concluding that the bourgeoisie itself was politically inept, they argued, therefore, that the proletariat ought to take the political lead. After the revolution of 1917 the official views shifted once the Bolsheviks declared the arrival of the "dictatorship" of the proletariat. In this historical situation the concept of "hegemony" lost its importance. It continued to retain some theoretical urgency only with respect to developments outside the Soviet Union, since the Comintern ordered Communist parties to strive for "hegemony" over the exploited masses in their respective countries.

Although Gramsci was familiar with the pre-revolutionary debates, he did not investigate "the East"; rather he aimed at "the analysis of the structures of bourgeois power in the West". In his view, "hegemony" would address the particular mode of control the bourgeoisie exercised over the proletariat in civil or capitalist societies. In one of his notes on Italian history Gramsci stated the "methodological criterion" of his proposed analysis: "The supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways as 'domination' and as 'intellectual and moral leadership'". In this reading, which Anderson discerns as the first "model" in Gramsci's writings on "hegemony", Gramsci focussed on the modes of consent to
the "direzione" or direction by bourgeois groups. By way of contrast, Gramsci employed "dominazione" to refer to the direct threat or use of coercion. He denoted by "domination" the deployment of physical force; in addition, Gramsci mentioned subjugation "even by armed force". Thus he attributed domination to the realm of the state, while he confined hegemony to the organs of civil society.

At this stage Gramsci did not perceive domination and direction to be equal modes for controlling the subordinate classes. Instead, he emphasized that a consensual bond existed between both spheres, predicated upon hierarchy and which articulated itself as sequence. A section on "Past and Present" in a Prison Notebook of 1930 referred to force or "dominazione" as only 'the last resort' of the rulers: "If the ruling class has lost its consensus, that is if this class is no longer 'leading' but only 'dominant' and, thus, can only rely on pure coercive force, this indicates that the masses have disengaged themselves from traditional beliefs and ideologies." To Gramsci the result of "lost consensus" is "the modern crisis". In his view this "crisis" could only be overcome if "new" opinions and beliefs were to be widely accepted or, at least, not actively contested. Accordingly, the threat or actual application of force by those who aspire to dominate was a necessary but insufficient means to sustain their preeminent position and title. Only by combining force with "direzione" would rulers be able to achieve the power to define the rules of people's exactions - and, concomitantly, to justify those very claims and interventions.

Such well-ordered distinctions may convey, however, a misleading impression. Anderson points out that at various stages Gramsci proposed different views on the relationship between state and society. He had started from the notion that society and thus hegemony were preponderant over the state and its mechanisms of domination; in the "Notes from the Prison", however, he later came to emphasize the balance between and simultaneity of both spheres and
their respective modes of control. In the context of this "second model" of hegemony Anderson shows that Gramsci stressed the intricate interconnectedness of domination and direction. In a remark on French history Gramsci observed that hegemony was a "combination of force and consent" and was "normal" in parliamentary régimes. He added that, in such combinations, force never prevails "excessively over consent".

Anderson also remarks that Gramsci repeatedly referred to the direct participation of the state in establishing and sustaining ideological supremacy. He saw the separation of powers in liberal-parliamentary systems, accordingly, as an integral moment in constituting "political hegemony". He noted in this context the "positive educational function" of state-run institutions like the school system and other "so-called private initiatives and activities". All of these cooperate to generate and reproduce consent, in his words to create "the apparatus of political and cultural hegemony of the ruling class".

In his notebooks Gramsci still viewed force and domination, not as separate domains, but as constituent elements of the social fabric. Anderson criticizes Gramsci for committing "an error" in this respect. Weber cannot be wrong, Anderson maintains. More precisely: according to Anderson only the state "monopolizes" force in civil society. Anderson also indicates, however, that Gramsci's remarks were not simply erroneous but that they mirrored specific historical experiences. The violent squads in Italy after the First World War, for instance, proved abundantly the range of force and violence executed directly "by society".

Gramsci's thinking increasingly came to assert the interpenetration of state and society: societal agents also applied force, even as the state exercised "political hegemony", too. Above all, Gramsci suspended at several points any dis-
tinction between civil society and the state. He wrote, for instance, that "civil society is 'state' too, indeed is the state itself". Gramsci's "dual perspective" thus came to be focussed on the intricate interrelatedness of both in the application of force and the manufacture of consent. But this particular configuration still adhered to the context of civil society. He remained aware that fundamental changes might occur in the course of historical processes. As "ever more conspicuous elements of regulated society make their appearance", he wrote, coercion would be "tendentially capable of withering away".

In reviewing these quotes an ambivalent picture emerges. Gramsci clearly insisted in most of his writings on a continuous impact of force and coercion in controlling subordinate classes in civil society. He started out by employing clear-cut distinctions between the realms of control as executed by both, state and society. Increasingly, however, he pointed to their interrelatedness. In a parallel manner, he came to feel that in the long run the distinction between society and state might become secondary. At this point he surmised that the fragile balance between the two modes of control would then collapse. Societal transformations would render coercion less important than "ideological and intellectual direzione".

Gramsci referred to a body of notions on "domination" which framed his views as well as those of his contemporaries. Since the agenda of analyzing issues of control and compliance was strongly influenced by previous approaches to this field, some lines have to be traced here.
In Central and Western Europe the concern with curbing and controlling violence had gained momentum since the late 16th century. The growing appeal of order and legitimate authority reflected widely shared experiences of victimization by armed bands of princes or, for that matter, warlords during the religious wars. To common people authority seemed a sham. Proposals for restoration focussed on either the centralization of violence with "Leviathan" (Thomas Hobbes)\(^2\), or they advocated the advancement of propertied individuals\(^3\). The latter could and would refrain from violence since they were free to pursue the goods of the mind. Because, individuals by "returning" to a society which was largely modelled due to images of "free" Germanic tribesmen, or for that matter of citizens of ancient times, not only violence but all "corruptions" of modernity would vanish. The advocates of Scottish shifted the emphasis from real to mobile property. In their view, commercial society would render possible both, the exchange of values and the civilizing of social relationships and of actions dealing with the "common good". Thus, society would provide the means for improvement. Separated would be authority and the practice of state; state remained the last resort if not the focus of 'new' corruption. - The separation between the dominator and the dominated was also fundamental to those theorists of civil society, who prefered a monopolization of violence. But in their view the unequal balance between state and society favored the authorities. Only the dominators should control or apply violence. Thomas Hobbes, for instance, perceived the "Souverain" as exempt from any superarbitrium by other worldly powers.

In distinction to England, efforts to actually insist on the "limits of the state", in particular to contest a "standing army"\(^22\) and, thus, to question the deployment of the state's violence entered the discourse of a broader "public" in Continental Europe only when the quest for the "natural" rights of individuals was voiced. These voices grew from experiences of participating in bourgeois
and bildungsbürgerliche circles. Thus, aspirations to "limit" the state gradually developed from the middle of the 18th century, and were spurred, then, by the impact of the French Revolution.

The concerns to contain violence not only turned on the question of the state. Theories of the formation of the self also developed alongside reflections of the state. They emphasized the necessity to establish control over the self. But such related notions did not automatically aim at a separate sphere ascribed solely to the individual. Worldly and clerical authorities, for instance, rigorously seized the terrain and meticulously prescribed to their "subjects" practices of discipline. On various levels, lords and their middle-men sought to discipline body and "soul" in schools and in church, in workhouses and in the military. Thus, efforts for self-control and self-coercion coalesced with the monopolization of violence in and by the state.

To be sure, since the 17th century publicists and academics in different European contexts had argued that "legitimate" states should be founded in and by a "covenant" rooted in natural law. The "mortal god" (Th. Hobbes) of state was, however, most often empowered by the same writers with far ranging competences, including the monopoly of violence over those who had created the covenant and thence had been turned into "subordinates". In the course of the emerging "civil society" accounts of domination increasingly criticised the unlimited range of dominators. In the context of Central Europe, the focus of criticism had been on both the bureaucratic state in its capacity as "police" and the estate owners who relied on seigneurial privileges (such as those of the Guts- polizei and Patrimonialgerichtsbarkeit in Prussia until 1872 or 1848, respectively). The critics denounced justifications by private owners or bureaucrats who referred to the "common weal". Appeals to the "common weal" would only mask
the blend of willfulness and coercion which monarchs or their officials but also estate owners and seigneurial lords executed.25

Most of the critics of state in the 18th and 19th century shared the assumption that repressive intervention would characterize the "state" but not civil society. Only some ventured beyond this separation of spheres. For instance, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, but also conservative authors of the 1850s and 60s (as, for instance, Constantin Frantz) were intrigued by appeals for "mass" support which attracted or embraced even declared opponents. A case which stunned many contemporaries was Louis Bonaparte and his direct approach to the masses after his coup d'etat of 1851.26 His determined neglect of political intermediaries as parties or associations provided a most impressive example. And did not Count Bismarck of Prussia follow in his wake when he vigorously pressed for the general suffrage in both the North German Diet of 1867 and the Reichstag of 1871 and also for social insurance legislation in the 1880s? Ultimately, Bonaparte as well as Bismarck invoked notions of a 'kingdom of social reform'27 and, thus, tried to enhance the legitimation of their respective policies.

But "Bonapartism" as articulated by the late 19th C Marxist tradition had conceptual limitations, since it designed social interrelations and social actions solely in mechanical terms. Agency remained with "the prince" and - as his "arms" - with his ministers and bureaucracies, they pulled the strings to manipulate the "public". The "masses" of the population were conceived as objects who would function according to orders, incentives, or constraints 'from above'. This view neglects how policies issued "from above" are appropriated and, thus, reshaped by the "masses". Ignored is to which extent voices from the "masses" impinge upon the actions and notions (and rhetoric) of those who occupy the commando positions in polity and society. A prominent example concerns Bismarck's "social imperialism" of the 1880s, that is, his effort to rouse feelings of
national unity by nurturing colonial sentiment. The build-up of the battle fleet in
the Wilhelmine era pursued this line. Both efforts were not simply products of
clever strategies on the "level of command" (Max Horkheimer) of the polity. In-
stead, Bismarck and colonialists as well as Admiral v. Tirpitz and other
instigators of naval armament made use of articulations which had arisen from
various social strata. Not only small peasants, shopkeepers and artisans, but
obviously also people from proletarian settings, from the "new" commercial
bourgeoisie and from the Bildungsbürgertum focussed on "the other" as target, if
not villain, on whom they could blame feelings of actual social hardship and
cultural strife. From different points of view, encroaching wage-relationships
and booming industrial sites necessitated "political action" to ensure control over
the dangers of potential turmoil. Colonial expansion and arms build-up provided
languages of "manly" and "honourable" responses to an environment seem-
ingly governed by hostile forces.

The ascription of agency only to the dominators was also at the core of Max
Weber's delineation of "Herrschaft" (which Gramsci surely did not know). For
one, Weber vigorously stressed the monopoly of legitimate violence by the state.
Secondly, he concentrated his analysis on the particular demands for legiti-
mation as issued by dominators. However, the very process of fulfilling these
demands totally remained in the margins of his analysis. Above all, Weber's
occasional remarks on 'tending at' or 'caring for' legitimation as performed by
dominators relied on a certain implication: the subjugated would grant a
minimum of legitimation to any institutionalized and effective power. Thus,
Weber neglected the constant impact of violence in producing and shaping those
experiences which trigger acceptance or stimulate toleration of domination
before any reflection on 'justification' can or will begin. However, Gramsci's no-
tion of hegemony puts into perspective Weber's accentuation of the active role of
the dominant in accomplishing both, control and the modes of its justification;
for, at least the vantage point of 'hegemony' stresses the relative autonomy of
civil society.

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"Hegemony" seeks to cover those fundamental cultural formations which
bear upon and, thus, regulate "others". At stake is the capacity of particular
modes of life in their totality to cope with domination. The 'cultural' invokes 'the
whole area of lived experience'. 'Hegemony' places at the center of one's
attention the dynamic configuration of cultural meanings and (self)representa-
tions, as they are inacted in social encounters of the 'everyday'. Accordingly,
such analyses turn to those settings in and by which the web of 'lived experience'
can be unravelled.

The attractions of Gramsci's perspective should not, however, conceal its
deficits. Above all, his reflections neglect the actual processes of producing
"direzione" or consensus. The question is: How do the efforts of the propagators
of "hegemonic" orientations resonate within the subordinate classes? What are
the cultural thresholds regulating whether the icons or topoi are accepted or
denied? This focus forces us into the "field-of force" of everyday-life. In "actual
daily production and reproduction" (F. Engels) ways of representing the 'self'
and 'others' are appropriated from pre-existing patterns and meanings. These, in
turn, mould the societal forces.

The difficulty is that Gramsci's view of "hegemony" focusses too narrowly
on the sphere of "civil society" and the particular interests of its members,
thereby neglecting the range of their relative autonomy. Individuals or groups
are perceived as "the dominated". Gramsci's notion of "hegemony" denies to the subjects the capacity to develop strategies of their own. Yet, people appropriate the 'given' constraints and incentives, the orders and decrees, the work schemes and pay systems in a creative manner. In an by these practices the 'restrictions' are remoulded and reshaped. 'Conditions' are simultaneously imposed, shared and reformulated. That is to say, collusion and compliance means always (much) more than sheer obedience.

A second weakness is that Gramsci underrates the impact of force or violence in constituting the "consensus" of those on the receiving end. Even the occasional threat or periodic application of violence imposes long-standing marks upon the expectations, longings or anxieties of those affected. Broadly speaking, how we perceive social relations and assess "the political" cannot be separated from the processes of "material life". Economic hardship, and exploitation, as well as brutality by the "organs of the state", by soldiers and policemen generates, at least re-shapes and re-moulds experiences and, thus, meanings among the "many".

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In modern European "civil" society, at least two forms of "consensus" have become fundamental to sustaining and reorganizing domination: One is contained in Weber's notion of "belief in legitimacy"\textsuperscript{32}; the other was hinted at by Marx when he pointed to the "silent force" of the wage-nexus and, ultimately, of capitalist production\textsuperscript{33}. - In the following sections I want to outline practices by which these consensus were triggered and reinforced - but also appropriated and re-shaped. One resides in the domain of state action, more precisely of bureaucracy and, in particular, of police in Prussio-Germany. The second is
centered in the arena of wage-work; the scene is factory life again in Germany during the first third of the 20th Century.

III. State violence and "compliance to order" (M. Weber)

In 1884 a professor of administrative law, Freiherr von Stengel, complained that direct force was used particularly in administrating "spheres which should be handled only with care". Although he did not criticize the prerogative of the state in defining the terrain of force, nevertheless, he worried about the impact the modo militare had on the behaviour of the state's officialdom. Officials and policemen applied practices of "short shrift" (kurzer Prozeß) beyond the arena of spectacular events such as riots or large-scale strikes. They were inclined as a matter of course to categorize crudely the "administered" as either friends or foes ("of the state"). Such a Manichaean view of the world and society focussed only on the momentary maintenance of law and order: The "citadel" of the state had to defended; the 'others', its prospectives enemies would simply be forced to bear the costs. Diverse expressions of alternative life-style, various movements of disobedience or obstinacy, that is of interests "of one's own" - all became buried beneath the few crude categories of the police mind.

Yet, Stengel's criticism was shared only by a minority. Increasingly in the years around 1900 the dominant classes applauded the "police war" (P. Helphand) against numerous groups of suspects; in addition, "respectable" layers of the working-classes joined forces: Social Democratic press approved of harsh treatment of unruly "masses" (Hamburg 1906; Berlin 1912). No self-help or self-control but the state monopoly on violence appeared appropriate to cope with
what many contemporaries recognized as "rising tide" of criminality. Established society viewed offences of all sorts as synonymous with social upheaval and, eventually, revolution. And their socialist opponents colluded in a certain way: They shared concerns about the imminent dangers to "modern" civilization at large which the disorderly behaviour of riotous males, females and youngsters might engender. Thus, police could rely on a large consensus that was prepared to accept almost every mode of intervention: Police produced and simultaneously represented "order". They should be the ever-present "flying cohort" sorting out the "chaos" of modern life. In the end, the "flying cohort" might invoke widespread longings even among discriminated classes to become incorporated into the nation's "unity".

The routinized application of state force was enacted under the watchful eye of superiors, who relied on a framework within which customary acquired standards of perception, modes of interpretation and forms of conduct interacted to shape a form of "habitus" within the bureaucracy. The latter tended to block any deviation of officials in treating their clients. And in this sense the implicit code of officials' conduct resembles Bourdieu's notion of habitus: to a large extent it functioned as a "structuring structure". However, contrary to Bourdieu, the range of modes in which officials might re-act in encounters with "the public" were not completely 'given' by those already practiced rules. In the constant re-appropriations of the rules every single official also re-shaped and even twisted the 'given' standard. At least 'on the spot' individual anxieties or longings could 'spill over' the limits of the mode of conduct. These 'spill overs' were informed or fuelled by a wide array of personal experiences: these constituted a surplus which was not contained or predicted by and in the existing societal structures. To be sure, 'in the last instance' they had been produced in social interactions or contexts. But self-willed (eigensinnig) ways of
appropriation of rules did not necessarily result in a restructuring of structures. In contrast, it might end up in a sheer break-away of any 'structures'.

Evidently the demands of bourgeois society for intellectual and moral "hygiene" were inseparable from the exercise of violent policing. The open use of force may well have been seen, both by its practitioners and the cultivated public, as the only means by which "order" in the state as a whole could be secured. And by reflecting the boundaries of social and political inequality, the application of force in turn gave a disciplinary edge to the idea of the "rule of law". - Concomitantly, the letter of the law and the pretensions of the police sometimes proved to be more than "empty rhetoric" (E.P. Thompson)38. Occasionally propertyless people, maid-servants for example, also appealed to the police for help: the local lieutenant should execute the power ascribed to the police by the "Servants' Order" and enforce decent housing inside the master's home.

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The operations of the state do not require a constant and unwavering use of force but rather the constant threat of its use. These are symbolized in forms of "gentle violence"39, that is in the improvements of hygiene, compulsory education, or the "rule of law". In the Prusso-German case, the rhetoric of the "rule of law" was not in itself sufficient to filter or obstruct resistance and the development of alternatives. Nor could the insisting ritual identifications of commitment to "the king" or the common "fatherland", or the pressure of economic forces guarantee that domination would be accepted.

Police organization as well as police action (including police violence) drew upon and reinforced notions which related two experiences. These were confined to segmented situations but might occur to the very same people. They could
experience at the hands of the agents of the state both the terror of being beaten and relief by being supported. Police actions denied but also sustained among the public and among the police itself the notion of the "rule of law". Discretion was part of daily action; "the law" could be and was invoked, at least occasionally, to restrict discretion and violence. Thus, time and again a "Janus-face" emerged. However, the balance remained uneven; most often the terrible face prevailed.

Put more generally, the presence and intervention of the apparatus of physical compulsion established the foundations for those experiences out of which the "belief in legality" and attributions of legitimation first arise. Physical force ("violence directe") "spills over" into those forms of suppression which are effective in the very way they conceal their effects ("violence douce") - and vice versa. When related to situations of intervention by the police and, accordingly, to the situational experiences of their "clients", at least three interrelated processes are exposed: 1) the assertion of domination by the police; 2) the attribution of domination to the "state"; 3) the representation of the state as the idealized unity of the nation by the dominators and the dominated. Thus, "compliance to order" (Weber) did not reflect any silent self-propelled consensus on the part of the dominated; nor was it an expression of the intangible "omnipresence" of the social relations of power (as proposed by Michel Foucault). Instead, the justification and the forms of domination were shaped by police practices that connected harsh to soft violence.

The agents of the state not only expressed their - supposedly - inexhaustable power, but simultaneously defined who were the "dominated". Thereby, the executive organs of the state (often) exercised their task with a brutality which inevitably had further ramifications for those on the receiving
end. Did not their standards mark the "private" social relations between spouses, parents and children, colleagues and associates, the members of oppositional political parties and the trade unions? Telling evidence is provided by the unquestioning adoption of an outward military style, together with militarized forms of expression and action by the organized labour movement, from the "revolutionary army" to the well-rehearsed columns of May 1st-demonstrations around 1900. To what extent did "citadel practice" infiltrate and possibly mortally damage the political and social imagination of the dominated - in pubs, on the streets, at work and in the home, not only during the Wilhelmine period, but also during the Weimar Republic and under German Fascism?

IV. Labour processes: patchwork of control, necessity-cooperation and "Eigensinn"

Domination at industrial workplaces refers to the spectrum of "control" in work organization and work practices. The forms of "control" vary enormously. In the 1920s, however, a more general current seemed to homogenize those and, above all, to penetrate onto the shop-floors on a broad scale: "rationalisation" became the big slogan and issue.

Reports by contemporary witnesses, and even more so contemporary surveys show that after the mid-1920s in Germany there were clear signs of intensified efforts by management in most (larger) companies to increase the "rationalisation" of labour processes. First, the measures taken aimed at decomposing complex tasks. Simultaneously, they sought to improve the "flow" of work and products. To accomplish these targets managers employed
innovative specialised machines (or tools) and more elaborate techniques to record accurately the real labour processes.

Considerable segments of industry however still pursued schemes to organize work which did not bear the stamp of rationalisation. In 1930 about 30% of the machine tools in mechanical engineering had not been modernized or changed (union survey). In addition, more than 70% of the (larger) companies had not introduced a comprehensive system of "flow production". Thus, even at the level of technical and organisational rationalisation important segments of industrial work remained fairly untouched.

Even more significantly, workshops within "rationalised" factories were affected in extremely different ways. "Traditional" qualities were employed in perpetuating certain jobs - in passing on know-how and practical knowledge, and in teaching, most especially, manual skills. Engineers raised these issues to an ideological level in their forceful praise of the importance of "Handfertigkeit" and "Geschicklichkeit" or "manual dexterity" of "the German workers". In so doing they mirrored the constant difficulties within "rationalised" factories. In their view only a blend of routine and inventiveness on the shop-floor could resolve breakdowns and ease asynchronous "flows" of tools, raw materials and products. Thus, in the 1920s as well as in the 1930s the call for worker's "dexterity" fuelled a "German way" of work organization, and, even more, of "rationalising" industrial production.

Both contemporary accounts and autobiographies by workers demonstrate that the special "feeling" for their "own" lathe or milling machine was an important medium through which the operations of switches and levers were linked to wider patterns of work association. Even apparently simple operations were not possible without this mixture of experience with the implement and the
material. A photograph taken of locomotive construction at the Hanomag company in Hannover in the 1920s shows how fitting the cast bearing linings into the bearing casing was achieved with a lead hammer: we can see that considerable physical force had to be applied in a very "sensitive" fashion.

Despite all their differences of perspective, both directors and workers focussed on 'living labour'. There was no possibility of 'mastering' the factory day without the knowledge conferred by the experience of the workers. Orders continued to vary; one had constantly to cope with mechanical breakdowns and with tensions among workmates and neighbouring teams.

In order to stimulate or to sustain workers' cooperation, most managerial control strategies aimed at minimising direct confrontations between supervisors and workers. A chief issue revolved around "convincing" workers that rate-fixers (or rate departments) were not there to "squeeze the last drop" out of the workforce but to show that they were vital to the "plant community" if all were to be "appropriately paid for truly useful work". Establishing the "proper" rates therefore took on a dual aspect. Rates had to be recognisable and palpable, since they served as the material and symbolic underpinnings for recognition by superiors and the firm. At the same time, they were the central and optimal regulatory mechanism in distributing workers between workplaces; they permitted the transfer or dismissal of workers in the event of persistent failure to meet the required performance.

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The asynchronous and unevenly developed forms of control - i.e. physical supervision, technical devices (time clocks) and social incentives (as in wage schemes) - did not mesh into a network of control. Rather, the result was a
distinct patchwork. The "patchwork" of control was the "other side of the coin" of the labour process. Workes constructed a patchwork of their own - of acceptance and distance, of "Notwendigkeitskooperation" and "Eigensinn".

Notwendigkeitskooperation or cooperation due to necessity describes that minimum of attention to and support of (male !) workmates which, in turn, every worker could expect from his mates in order to survive during the workday. Helping out to avoid an accident might be necessary - not the least to carry on and guarantee a steady wage. In such interactions, the particular "style" of relating oneself to the mates, that is the limits of mutual hostility as well as support were developed on the shop-floor "by doing".

Group piecework, the wage scheme which had become predominant in the 1920s, created the most pressing constraints for cooperation. This form of piecework entailed constant observation of the course of the job both in one's own and in neighbouring work teams. There had to be particular care with one's own colleagues - no one could slack - but no one could push either. However, once the standard rate had been achieved or exceeded (common understanding held it that nobody should do more than 130% of the standard performance), there was little scope for changing relations in the group. Group piece work used the forms of cooperation at work, but at the same time tested them to the limits.

In contrast, "Eigensinn" (literally obstinacy or stubborness) embraces an array of (male !) workers' practices which expressed their self-will and self-reliance. Eigensinn took many forms: walking around inside the factory, talking, occasionally "disappearing". Interviewees report of whitewashing the soles of shoes or putting a stinking piece of old cheese in the shaft of a broom; but they also recall the "good booze up" at informal birthday parties. The primary manifestation of Eigensinn, however, was in mutual physical contact and horseplay. It
meant simultaneously "being by oneself" and "being with others". In this sense workers did not resist the labour process directly - they literally left it to run. In moments of Eigensinn workers created and fulfilled particular individual needs; in such moments they 'withdrew' from both the dictates and exactions of factory life and the strain of day to day survival. During periods of Eigensinn people could, at least for a few moments, act according to rules and precepts of their own. Eigensinn did not always mean direct resistance. Instead it was geared towards "winning distance" from commands or norms from above or from the "outside".

Above all, Eigensinn was, and remained, multifaceted. A good deal of horseplay was unpleasant; in fact it aimed to be so or at least accepted the discomfort of the victim: "Beard polishing" or a "dutch rub", for example, was "very painful" (Göhre). To be sure, Eigensinn simultaneously denoted situations of mutual recognition and acknowledgement: the next time an aggressor could well be the victim. On the other hand, these activities often reenacted and confirmed the 'traditional' social hierarchy among older and younger workers, among the skilled, the unskilled and the apprentices. And even though the hierarchy of victims was not established once and for all, this did not diminish the pain and torment of the victim of the moment: Eigensinn mostly employed physical force.

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Workers' practices kept to the pathways of Notwendigkeitskooperation and Eigensinn. Nevertheless, these were "coloured" by images of industry and labour which did not rigidly adhere to class divisions or the factory hierarchy. Union officials, industrialists and managers could, at least, easily agree on the notion of "German quality work". In this view, the necessity of "good, honest and proper
work" was decisive in the "struggle for the economic interests of a country" (Gewerkschafts-Zeitung 1927). For workers, "quality work" primarily meant "controlling machinery". For owners, directors - but also for many union officials - it meant producing marketable products at low costs. Certainly, this formula overlapped in certain of the orientations of "labour" and "capital" (at least in the views of the representatives of their respective interests).

There was also a national component to the class-transcendent elements of the "image" of labour. A technician who had emigrated to the USA highlighted these differences in the DMV journal for Works Councils. He noted that all plant equipment in the USA had to be "foolproof". The undertone of astonishment anticipated the head-shaking or disdain of some German engineering workers on reading it. At least in their self-evaluation, and perhaps also in everyday life on (and between) the machines, their work was by no means "foolproof". Rather, they continued to operate with another certainty: that the "flow of production" which signified the true foundation of modern industry, both for "capital" and for "labour", was a product of the continuing admixture of the routinized and the makeshift.

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Shared orientations refer to notions but also to the simultaneity of visual representations. If the manufacture of consent is the issue a short look at some features of the "imagery" of work and workers is necessary.

Images of products and machinery predominate in the visual representations of factory work. It is not surprising that factory journals displayed determinedly "framed" images of factory work and life, pretending
that such still lifes would stand for the daily reality. However, leftist journals (for example, "AIZ", issued by a communist group) and those published by unions also framed industry and factory work in the same manner.

The respective images and their aesthetics were disconnected from the day-to-day practices and struggles of "living labour". In such photographs of course every worker - mostly males! - whether working alone or in small teams, moved the spindles, steering wheels, levers and cranks. Still, almost all of these shots were remarkably monotonous; the published pictures, for example, do not show any worker drinking coffee, let alone beer or schnaps; almost nowhere can we detect any talking, not to mention fooling around; no one seems to be exhausted, dirty or bored from the constant noise and dust, or, even more, from the speed-ups and the division of labor; and no one, for that matter, seems to be injured.

Everyone appears to be totally absorbed in his job. The shots are stereotypes suggesting that factory work is identical with the constant workflow as determined by management. The endeavours of working people to articulate and assert their needs simply disappeared from public scrutiny and view.

Yet the visual abstraction from "living labour" not only veils, but it also reflects the social division of labour: the public's non-intimacy with actual industrial work processes was and remains necessary to generate the broader appeal for such abstractions.

But a second dimension is also revealed or hinted at in the published as well as the unpublished photographs of "living labour". The photos taken by company photographers during their inspections inside factories which capture work at the lathe or other machines, convey and preserve the impression that those being objectified by intruding photographers determinedly hid the very peculiarity of their daily practices. The postures and gestures of workers in these photos indicate that they concealed "something else". If photographs necessarily impose a certain "flatness" on those being photographed, we can still tell from those reconstructions of work processes and workers' \textit{Eigensinn} which draw upon a broader spectrum of sources that flatness was also a demonstrative posture, the silent, committed effort to stop the intrusion of "alien" photographers. In this sense, flatness mirrored conflicting interests in the contested terrain of visualization. Thus, such flatness is to be read as an expression of workers' struggles to guard, if not to reappropriate, terrain of "their own". To put it differently: "flat" images underline that the "real life" of "living labour" was not "shot" by either the photographers of management or labour.

As for the images workers kept and shared with each other, the result seems ironic: in the 1920s and 1930s the efforts to take and to display images "of
their own" overwhelmingly pursued the same "framing" as it was put forward by industry. Surely only few workers used photography - and if so they had formed a photographer's association and shared the equipment. However, these workers "pictured" themselves, their mates, and the whole of factory work by and through the same icons as employed by management and recommended by art critics or commercial photographers: they all favoured "true workmen" and steaming smoke-stacks or polished machines. The column on "critique of photographs" which regularly was carried by the journal of the worker photographers ("Arbeiterphotograph") time and again emphasized these aesthetics of heroic industrialism. Above all, the onlookers seemed to appreciate those views. Reports by editors of factory journals show that their clients avidly looked for the recent issue of the respective journal. Obviously, workers did not claim "other perspectives" of their work.

Photographs of work and industry reveal the impact of "hegemonic" efforts by industrial managers and their employees. Workers' images and icons of work invoked general notions of workmanship which were related to particular experiences. Bosses, foremen, and workers again were united in this respect, although for opposite reasons. Demonstrating non-workmanlike or inexpert performances at work neither fostered better sales nor gave the company a better standing with political or local authorities. Similarly, workers had to be afraid that such photos might unleash scorn or mockery within their own family or neighbourhood.

Images of "true workmanship" informed the everyday strivings "to get by" on a cooperative basis and individually. The instrumentalization of visual notions and themes by the Nazis perfectly revealed the range of these images. Photographs which simultaneously "documented" and stylized industrial work and industry, in general, could be easily put to use. Pictures like the "cathedral of
work" by Hemke-Winterer, which focussed on the play of sunbeams in a huge blast furnace or others which similarly captured labouring and achieving workers in their seeming joy at work - these were published in ever new variations46. Architects financed by the Nazis equally employed tokens of "cleanliness" in reconstructing old factories as well as in designing new buildings. The Nazi-concept and -organization of the "Beauty of Labour" intentionally relied upon those "modern" images and visual forms of factory work which had been furthered in the 1920s by socialist designers. Thus, factory areas increasingly combined functionalistic with "homely" images47. Both types of images, however, referred to "German quality work"; in this way both were transformed into symbols of the nation’s unity "beyond" class and milieu.

In more theoretical terms: Practicing self-reliance and withdrawing from the imperatives of superiors, or even resisting with determination: both implied the use notions and images which were shared or at least known beyond workshops or neighbourhoods. Even those who sought to negate or change given conditions, set out from common grounds, and, hence, could bear the marks of collusion. Simultaneously, however, the impact of these images and notions remained limited. Images of "quality work" impinged upon but did not completely shape the practices of distancing and self-will. In this sense, "hegemonic" strategies did not affect the totality of those attitudes which workers "kept to themselves". Thus, contrary to the general appeal of the notion it should be noted that "hegemony" triggers an analysis which by itself misses the multi-layered historical processes. As in these examples: "hegemony" never totally regulated or controlled the potential for alternative action which was comprised by the workers’ modes of acting and perceiving others and themselves.

V. Concluding remarks
The analysis of "hegemony" necessitates analyses of practices "beyond" or, for that matter, "beneath" the realms and arenas of organized action "from above". In this perspective configurations of different but related processes emerge. Practices of domination constantly were faced not only by resisting behaviour on the receiving end. Because, to a large extent practices of withdrawal or distancing from (any!) demands of 'others' informed the activities of those who appeared as 'the dominated'. The impact of conflicting aspirations and demands from "above" was negotiated in the peoples' everyday. Here it was that they strove to be respected as individuals even though from time to time many might share the "masses" at a demonstration. -- As regards the 'field-of force' of factory the processes of domination and of distancing were reflected in distinct patchworks of Notwendigkeitskooperation and Eigensinn when the workers appropriated the scène.

Eigensinn is characterized fundamentally by ambivalence. One example can underline this: An active youth official of the socialist metal workers union, DMV, continued to work at Krupp after 1933, where his workmates were also Social Democrats and where they were able to maintain their position as charge-hands throughout the war years. Their constant, everyday cooperation included and sometimes rested exclusively on individual und collective Eigensinn. The interweaving of cooperation and Eigensinn supported the continuity of the plant and functioned to safeguard "quality work".

This appeal to "quality work" thus had a shadowy side under Fascism which cannot be denied. Especially at a plant such as Krupp, it meant that concentration camp detainees and forced labourers were harassed and exploited not only by management, but by German workers and foremen alike. At the
same time, cooperation and self-willed distancing from the imperatives of politics as well as of the shop were central prerequisites for the collective and individual political survival of these workers. Following the destruction of the trade unions in 1933 and most of the illegal organisation of the SPD and KPD in 1933/36, all that remained to those who had not been immediately murdered and who were not in detention was maintaining distance through Eigensinn. Eigensinn was therefore both: a precondition for being able to continue to work, but one of the side-effects of which was that Fascism was enabled to continue that much longer. Yet for many - and perhaps even for the same person - Eigensinn was crucial in enabling anti-fascist workers to survive the horrors of war and fascism.

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In contrast to the exigencies of the labour process, for most proletarians the arena of formal politics and large political organisations remained marginal. My reflections are predicated on accepting this fact and asking how political attitudes and behaviour were articulated and shaped in everyday life. Since the late 19th century coercive state intervention had increasingly intruded upon those realms of day-to-day survival which until then had mostly been exempt from control and "hegemonic" penetration.

This change necessitates a fresh look at the ambivalence of Eigensinn. The ruling classes and governing elites were able to make spectacular use of the distance of the proletarian masses from formal politics in August 1914 at the start of war, and then, again, since winter 1933 at the fascist accession to power well into the early 1940s, that is the "victorious" years of World War II. In both cases it can be asked whether individual proletarian self-will or, for that matter,
Eigensinn did significantly contribute when workers as a class were unable effectively to pursue their needs and interests.

But this would address only half of the story. Because, in certain historical conjunctures "the masses" drew upon Eigensinn for articulating their needs and hence to contest domination. The anti-war strikes of April 1917 and January 1918, even more the revolutionary movements in 1918 and 1919 were the outcome of activities not only by the politically organised. Simultaneously the non-organised working-class men and women had left their daily chores behind. Hundreds of thousands of individuals came forward and cooperatively strove for establishing a "new" order of society, that is of work-relationships and local government. More generally: The ability to distance oneself from constraints and demands by both the state and resistant political groups could prove necessary for surviving domination⁴⁸, in particular during fascism. Thus, to rely on Eigensinn did not preclude but enabled efforts for alternative social practices, even in the arena of formal politics.


3. See esp. the impact of Carl Schmitt’s thesis that politics is about the capacity to define "the enemy", see the introductory sentences in Id., *Der Begriff des Politischen* (Hamburg, 1933), 7; this was the third edition (the first had been published 1927, the second 1931), and the publisher was one of the most commercially active distributors of right-wing and national-socialist politics; on Schmitt’ concepts see Laufer, H., *Das Kriterium politischen Handelns. Eine Studie zur Freund-Feind-Doktrin auf der Grundlage der Aristotelischen Theorie der Politik* (München, 1962), 138 ff; on Schmitt’s impact on the notions of politics and state, respectively, during German fascism cf. op. cit., 301 ff; the most intriguing recent analysis by Böckenförde, E.-W., *Der Begriff des Politischen als Schlüssel zum staatsrechtlichen Werk Carl Schmitt’s*, in: Quiritsch, H. (ed.), *Complexio Oppositorum. Über Carl Schmitt* (Berlin, 1988), 283-299.


10 Quintin, H. and Smith G. N. (edd.), Prison Notebooks, 57.

11 Gramsci, Quaderni, 311; cf. Quintin and Smith (edd.), Prison Notebooks, 12.

12 Quintin and Smith (edd.), Prison Notebooks, 80, fn.

13 Quintin and Smith (edd.), Prison Notebooks, 245.

14 Quintin and Smith (edd.), Prison Notebooks, 260.

15 Anderson, 'Antinomies', 22; Gramsci, Quaderni, 1049; see also Quintin and Smith (edd.), Prison Notebooks, 246.

16 Anderson, 'Antinomies', 32.

17 Anderson criticizes that Gramsci finally "cancels" their distinctiveness which, accordingly, "undermin(s) any scientific attempt to define the specificity of bourgeois democracy in the West", Anderson, 'Antinomies', 34.

18 Quintin and Smith (edd.), Prison Notebooks, p. 261; cf. the remark that "by 'State' should be understood not only the apparatus of government, but also the 'private' apparatus of 'hegemony' or civil society", ibid. Anderson denotes this as Gramsci's "third model" of thinking hegemony.

19 Quintin and Smith (edd.), Prison Notebooks, p. 263.


selves" of 'the French' yearning for "a society of interlocking institutions that would buffer individuals against the vagaries of life", cf. 158 ff.


23 In particular, Michel Foucault has argued that "modern" power is fundamentally defined by "disciplinary" approaches, such as "prophylactic inspection", see Id., Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison (Harmondsworth, 1982).


26 Marx, K., Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte, (1851/52), (Berlin, 1972) (MEW 8, 111-207); Frantz, C., Louis Napoleon (Berlin, 1852).


31 Williams, R., Marxism and Literature (Oxford, 1977), 111.


39 Cf. to the difference and, in particular, the simultaneity of "violence directe" and "violence douce" in the context of the pre-capitalist Khabyl society Bourdieu, P., Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge, 1977), xxx ((=Zur Theorie der Praxis, (Frankfurt, 1972), 369 ff in: ch. 5, at the end!!)).

40 Foucault, M., Discipline and Punish.


42 Anon., 'Voraussetzungen für deutsche Qualitätsarbeit', in: Gewerkschaftszeitung 37, 1927, Nr. 38 (17. Sept. 1927), 525-527; see also de Man, H., Der Kampf um die Arbeitsfreude. Eine Untersuchung auf Grund der Aussagen von 78 Industriearbeitern und Angestellten (Jena, 1927), in particular 197: "The skilled metal worker symbolizes the kind of industrial worker which is needed today"; a magistral account of the development of the notion "German work" is provided by Campbell, J., Joy in Work, German Work. The National Debate, 1800-1945 (Princeton, 1989).


44 These were predominantly published by larger companies, cf. Das Werk, the company journal of the electrical power company Siemens-Rhein-Ebbe-Schuckert-Union, based at Düsseldorf, which heavily employed photographs from its beginning in 1921. Since 1924 one of the leading companies in electrical equipment, Siemens, published its Siemens-Mitteilungen. In 1925 one of the leading companies of the Ruhr heavy industry, Gutehoffnungshütte (Oberhausen), started its Werkszeitung on a fortnightly scheme. In this case the visual component and 'modern' layout was primarily due to the initiative of one of the most vigorous proponents of the ideology of work's community, K.R. Arnhold, and his DINTA (German industrial institute for technical training): He sold the editorial production of company journals designed for the heavy industry of the Ruhr; the individual companies edited only additional pages. His approach focussed on visual presentation by photographs. One of the companies which did not support Arnhold was Krupp (Essen). However, this most prestigious concern followed Arnhold's lead when it reissued its journal Nach der Schicht, the monthly factory journal, as a modern illustrated news in 1928 (it had been stopped in 1917). Due to the depression this journal was suspended in March 1932. But it started again since October 1933 as
Krupp. Zeitschrift der Kruppischen Betriebsgemeinschaft. The title indicated the change of time; it also confirmed the continuity of work’s community policies from the 1920s to the Nazi ‘Deutsche Arbeitsfront’.

45 Arbeiter-Illustrierte Zeitung (AIZ), Nr. 6, 1928; see also Willmann, H., Geschichte der Arbeiter-Illustrierten Zeitung 1921-1938, (Berlin, 1974), 29: cover of Nr. 8/1926: again, a turner. Cf. for almost identical verbal icons the novel by the communist writer Bredel, W., Maschinenfabrik N&K (Ms 1930) (Berlin, Weimar, 1982), 67 ff, 99 ff.


47 Friemert, Ch., Produktionsästhetik im Faschismus. Das Amt "Schönheit der Arbeit" von 1933 bis 1939 (München, 1980); as regards particular industrial branches see Wisotzky, K., Der Ruhrbergbau im Dritten Reich: Studien zur Sozialpolitik im Ruhrbergbau und zum sozialen Verhalten der Bergleute in den Jahren 1933-1939 (Düsseldorf, 1983), 182 ff; a contemporary record of the Nazi efforts was compiled by Müller, W., Das soziale Leben im neuen Deutschland, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Deutschen Arbeitsfront (Berlin, 1938); see also Anon., ‘Die Auswirkungen des Gemeinschaftsgedankens auf das praktische Gemeinschaftsleben’, in: Jahrbuch des Arbeitswissenschaftlichen Instituts der Deutschen Arbeitsfront 1938. vol. I, 105-114; as regards industrial architecture cf. Durth, W., Deutsche Architekten. Biographische Verflechtungen (3rd ed., Wiesbaden, 1988), passim.

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