"Crafting the Collective Identity: The Origin and Transformation of Taiwanese Nationalism"

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CSST Working Paper #108
CRSO Working Paper #518

November 93
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August, 1993
Abstract

This essay starts with the observation that the common perspective on third world nationalism, which emphasizes the centrality of West/non-West tensions, is inadequate in explaining the development of specific nationalist discourses in the third world. As an attempt to come closer to a good understanding of the specific situations of third world nationalism, it engages in a case study of post-war Taiwan, whose nationalist discourse had gone through three phases: Political Nationalism, Rational Nationalism, and Identity Nationalism. How and why these different phases developed constitutes my overarching question.

Noting the importance of social relationships and the specificity of contextual constraints in the life of a nationalist movement, I develop a perspective which stresses relationality and contingency. This new perspective leads to the recognition of the centrality of the relationships among the ruling party (the KMT), Taiwanese nationalists, social groups in Taiwan, and the dominant regimes in the world system in understanding the transformation of the Taiwanese nationalist discourse. This study points to the multiplicity of domination and contention, the reflection upon which reveals that particular groups, such as the bourgeoisie, are likely to occupy contradictory positions in the nationalist struggle, and that such contradictions may amount to transformative forces.
Introduction

In the original edition of Imagined Communities I [assumed] . . . that official nationalism in the colonized worlds of Asia and Africa was modeled directly on that of the dynastic states of nineteenth-century Europe. Subsequent reflection has persuaded me that this view was hasty and superficial, and that the immediate genealogy should be traced to the imaginings of the colonial state (Anderson 1983, p. 163).

Reading the above quote, we might be overjoyed with the precious chance to peep into an outstanding scholar's thinking process. But while these thoughtful changes in Anderson's intellectual enterprise are extremely valuable, the things that did not change are even more important. The centrality of the West in third world nationalist discourses seems a permanent fixture in Anderson's thoughts. In one way or the other, Western thinking is always shown to be the origin of the non-Western concept of the nation.

In fact, these West/non-West tensions are exactly the central theme in much of the literature on third world nationalism. It is often assumed that third world nationalisms should hold the common goal of emancipation from Western domination -- supposedly the major obstacle in the quest for national and political unity in the third world -- with the common objective of becoming more like the West.

This perspective, which emphasizes the centrality of West/non-West tensions, is very useful in understanding the general picture of Western hegemony. However, it is inadequate in explaining the development of specific nationalist discourses in the third world, for two quite important things are neglected. For one thing, a nationalist discourse is often informed by the specific social situations in which it takes shape. This means that local contexts and social relations are at least as important as the 'West' in influencing a particular nationalist struggle and how it is interpreted by the
local people. Furthermore, as it evolves over time, a nationalist discourse can change; its goal and meaning are not invariably anchored upon the struggle against the West.

How, then, can we come closer to a good understanding of the specific situations of third world nationalism? This essay attempts to address some aspects of this issue by engaging in a careful case study of post-war Taiwan, which had gone through at least three phases in the forming of its nationalist discourse, which I will call the Phase of Political Nationalism, the Phase of Rational Nationalism, and the Phase of Identity Nationalism. These different phases were not necessary to the development of one another, and we cannot assume a single internal logic that guided how the nationalist discourse evolved throughout the entire post-war period. To be specific, 'Political Nationalism', which may be the conventionally most recognized form of third world nationalist struggle, refers to the struggle to control the state apparatus, together with all the activities regulated by it, including control over investment and regulation of the infrastructure, and regulation of divisions in the rights of citizenship. We come across at least two other kinds of nationalism in Taiwan. One is 'rational nationalism', the movement to empower the colonized people by rationalizing the system. 'Rational Nationalism' differs from 'Political Nationalism' in that it tends to de-emphasize the contradictions between different groups and focus on the problems within the system. But the two are both nationalistic because they both aim to elevate the status of the colonized people. The other kind, 'Identity Nationalism', struggles to define the identity of the nation not just as 'anti' something but with something concrete and specific; it focuses more on the content of the desired nationality than the mechanism of articulating it.

To capture the variability and multiplicity evident in the development of the Taiwanese nationalist discourse, I take a perspective which emphasizes contingency and contextuality. As I will explain later, this perspective allows me to construct a
'narrative causality' for my case and to spell out the logic of why these changes took place in the way they did.

A good case study should be able to engage in a dialogue with larger theoretical issues. My study on the transformation of post-war Taiwanese nationalism attempts to generate new questions and ideas about third world nationalism as well. Most importantly, it points to the multiplicity of dimensions of domination and contention, our reflection upon which reveals that particular groups, such as the bourgeoisie, are likely to occupy contradictory positions in the system, and that such contradictions may amount to transformative forces. These points could contribute to a deeper understanding of those nationalist movements in which the national heritage is diversified or weak.

I. Posing the Question

Put differently, what I have tried to argue is that it is often assumed that there is only one kind of nationalism in the third world, while in fact there are actually many kinds. Moreover, there may be more than one kind of nationalism in a single case of nation formation. Thus, we need to know how and why they are transformed into one another.

The case of Taiwan illustrates how three forms of nationalism, Political, Rational, and Identity, took shape in different phases. Taiwanese nationalism began with the quest for political independence. In the first few years immediately following W.W.II, a nationalist discourse was forged by the local elites in Taiwan. This period can be seen as the first time in Taiwanese history that Taiwanese nationality became a dominant source of imagination in the struggle against colonization and oppression.1 In the beginning, the nationalist movement centered around the goal of freeing Taiwan from China's grasp2 -- a political nationalist movement -- but failed.
Prior to the formation of the opposition party in 1987, this Taiwanese nationalist discourse had been transformed several times. The focus on Taiwanese nationality had gradually evolved into a quest for democracy in the late 1950s and the 1960s until the intellectual ferment for political reform in the early 1970s. In this period, the Taiwanese sought to empower themselves vis-a-vis the mainlanders' regime through the construction of a rational civil society (rational nationalism). Then, the growth of the 'party-less' oppositionists since the mid-70s until the establishment of their party in 1987 registered a process in which the quest for democracy was gradually turned back to an effort to defend and re-define Taiwanese nationality. As the Taiwanese managed to rationalize the system to a certain extent, they began to realize that the rational move was not going to elevate their nationality, as they needed to know how exactly their nationality was defined. This case of Taiwan is an example of how these three kinds of nationalist discourses could develop and wither.

This essay asks the question: Why and how did the incipient post-war Taiwanese nationalism take the form of anti-Chinese struggle, then transform itself into a search for democracy, then change yet again into the re-defining and defending of the Taiwanese identity? In short, why and how did Taiwanese nationalism develop these different goals in its different stages?

II. Relationality and Contingency: An Alternative Perspective

Nationalism is generally understood as primarily a principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent (as the primary 'imagined community') (Gellner as quoted in Hobsbawn 1990, p. 9). Based on this definition, there have been numerous explanations of the development of third-world nationalist struggles. However, this essay focuses on the historical origin and transformation of the goals (rather than the strategies or organization) of a nationalist movement. And when we look to the works that explicitly deal with the goals of third world
nationalisms, we do not seem to find much diversity; as argued previously, most of them assume the goal in such struggles to be emancipation from some form of Western domination.

Benedict Anderson's and Partha Chatterjee's analyses of nationalist movements in Asia are among the few studies that address the importance of historical context to the formation and transformation of nationalist discourse. Anderson argues that the anti-colonial imagination, ironically, has its origin in the colonial state's classification of the colony's ethnic groups, territory, and history. Thus census and map created the social categories that allow the colonized to relate to one another beyond the level of personal relationships, and the museum created the historical depth that allows the colonized to imagine a tradition. The original goal of anti-colonialist nationalism, then, is to empower the nationality whose boundaries were drawn by the colonial state (Anderson 1983, pp. 163 - 185).

While Anderson rightly emphasizes the complexity of the relationships between the colonized and the colonizer, his explanations for the origins of third world nationalisms are not entirely satisfactory. Briefly, Anderson's model presents too unified a picture of both the colonized and the colonizer. He does not recognize the tensions within each side, and thus failed to see the full array of possibilities for the nascent form of an anti-colonial nationalist discourse.

Chatterjee, on the other hand, argues that the third world nationalist ideal is a product of two contradictions: 1.) the contradiction between the acceptance of the West/non-West dichotomy (a product of Western capitalism) and the challenge to that capitalist domination; and 2.) the contradiction between the specific interests of the nationalist elites and their claim to be representative of the nation. As a result of these two contradictions, in the 'moment of departure', a nationalist movement aims to combine the superior material qualities of the West and the superior spiritual greatness of the East. In the 'moment of maneuver', a nationalist movement aims to mobilize
mass support while maintaining the elitist nature of its program. In the final stage of
the 'moment of arrival', the goal is to gloss over all earlier contradictions and actualize
this nationalist discourse in the unified life of the state (Chatterjee 1986).

Chatterjee recognizes that the colonized is not a homogeneous group. But I
wonder if his distinction between the elites and 'the people' sufficiently catches the
internal tensions among the colonized. Furthermore, Chatterjee's stage theory depicts
the development of a nationalist ideal in an unrealistically coherent, even teleological
way. With the implicit assumption that there is an internal logic in the unfolding of an
anti-colonial nationalist movement, his model is insensitive to the impact of other forms
of social transformation, such as the development of the Cold War.

Miroslav Hroch's work on nationalism in smaller European nations (1985,
1993) is also relevant to our concerns, because even though he does not deal with the
third world directly, he studies the situations characterized by ethnic tensions and the
domination of an 'exogenous' ruling class. According to Hroch, the nationalist
conflicts in post-communist Eastern Europe and the same region a century ago are
extremely similar. With his comparative study on the nation-building process in
Europe, Hroch tries to come up with some useful patterns to decipher the numerous
stories of nationalism. He does this by postulating three stages of a nationalist
movement:

During the initial period, which I have called Phase A, the energies of the activists were above all
devoted to scholarly inquiry into and dissemination of an awareness of the linguistic, cultural, social, and
sometimes historical attributes of the non-dominant group. . . . In a second period, or Phase B, a new
range of activists emerged, who now sought to win over as many of their ethnic group as possible to the
project of creating a future nation, by patriotic agitation to 'awaken' national consciousness among them.
. . . Once the major part of the population came to set special store by their national identity, a mass
movement was formed, which I have termed Phase C (Hroch 1993, pp. 6 - 7).
On this basis Hroch develops a careful sociology of the patriotic activists in Phase B. His major contribution is to analyze the social and historical causes of the uneven penetration of nationalist sentiments. However, his attention to the social and historical factors in the spreading mechanism of nationalism makes all the more apparent the lack of such attention to the development of the nationalist program. According to Hroch's model, the formation of the category of the nation takes place only in Phase A. After that, what matters is the dissemination of such a category among the masses; the category itself remains fixed. This distinction, obviously, is rather artificial and arbitrary. We need to pick up the sociological task where Hroch has left it, namely, to analyze the social and historical causes for the changes in the nationalist discourse between different phases.

The theories reviewed above can address neither the history of 'multi-colonization' nor the commonly non-linear nature of nationalist discourse, of which Taiwan is a single example. Therefore, I argue for the need to construct an alternative perspective, one that allows a more rigorous understanding of the origin and development of the nationalist ideal in the third world.

A perspective that enables us to better capture people's experiences with the nationalist dream, I believe, needs to do away with the concepts of fixed social relationships and teleological historical development. Such a perspective will consist of two parts emphasizing, respectively, relationality and contingency. Using this perspective, I will centralize the role of interrelationships between groups of individuals. I believe that there are more than two or three groups such as the colonizer, the third world nationalists, and the 'people'. Rather, there are many more groups and their relationships are subject to change due to both expected and unexpected factors. It is these changing relationships that determine the relationships among the colonizer, the nationalist, and other social groups.
I also want to emphasize the importance of contingency in understanding the development of a nationalist discourse. I will argue that the goal of a particular nationalist movement is contingent upon how the sets of social and international relationships interact with one another. My proposition rejects the implicit assumption in many existing studies that the goal of a nationalist movement can be predicted by its origin and remains unchanged.

III. A Case/Narrative Method:

With this new perspective, I want to explain the changes in the Taiwanese nationalist discourse as well as to generate new theoretical hypotheses. One can call this project a 'hypothesis-generating case study' (for a discussion on different types of case studies, see Lijphart 1971, pp. 691--693).

I found the case/narrative study method to be most suitable for my project, which concerns changes in the Taiwanese nationalist ideal, because this method highlights the temporal transformation of a case. As Andrew Abbott points out, the ontology of cases differs sharply in population/analytic and case/narrative approaches. The former requires rigidly delimitable cases, assigns them properties with trans-case meanings, builds cases on the foundation of simple existence, and refuses all fundamental transformation. The latter, by contrast, assumes cases will have fuzzy boundaries, takes all properties to have case-specific meanings, analyzes by simplifying presumably complex cases, and allows, even focuses on, case transformation (1992, p. 63, my emphasis).

How, exactly, does the case/narrative approach explain? The answer to this question is not readily available because there seem to be many studies that defend the importance of this approach, but few that specify how to use it. What follows,
therefore, is not a description of a standard model of the case/narrative approach (as it
does not exist), but a piecing-together of explanatory strategies:

a.) finding the orienting concept. As Smelser (1976) and Skocpol (1984)
argue, to identify the causal relationship in a single case, one needs to rely on 'other
knowledge' or 'orienting concepts'. In other words, while in comparative studies we
pick the independent variables through observing variation across cases, in case studies
we do not have this option. As a result, we rely on a theoretical lens through which we
can identify the most important dimensions (i.e., independent variables) of a case.
This study, as argued earlier, adopts a perspective that emphasizes relationality and
contingency. Following from this orienting concept, I propose to look at the inter- and
intra-group relationships of the KMT, Taiwanese nationalists, other social groups in
Taiwan, and the dominant regimes within the world system, especially the USA and
China. More specifically, I have identified eight sets of relationships to be my
independent variables: the relationship between the KMT and the dominant regimes,
between Taiwanese nationalists and dominant regimes, between other social groups and
dominant regimes, between the KMT and Taiwanese nationalists, between the KMT
and other social groups, between Taiwanese nationalist and other social groups, the
internal relationship of the KMT, and finally, the internal relationship of Taiwanese
nationalists.3

b.) finding the major turning points. Abbott argues that before one can follow
the plot of a case, one needs to identify the major turning points (1992, p. 64). This
concept is explained more clearly by Quadagno and Knapp in terms of 'sequentiality of
events'. According to them, sequentiality is defined as the 'key turning points when
the potential for a variety of outcomes is narrowed to one or two' (1992, p. 503).
When trying to locate the major turning points, the researcher is guided by the question
being asked, for different questions call for different ways of reading history. In this
study, I am trying to explain why the changes occurred in the nationalist discourse in
Taiwan, so I have picked four 'moments' when such a discourse appeared to be in crucial transition. They are: the 2-28 event in 1947 when island-wide sentiment for independence was first born, the attempted formation of a new party in 1960 where the Taiwanese elites and the Chinese liberals began to cooperate, the intellectual ferment between 1971 and 1973 when the young elites called for democratic reform, and the formation of an organized opposition from 1973 to 1987 when the issue of identity gradually returned.

c.) discovering causality. After steps a and b, we are ready to look for the causal patterns in the case under study. Quadagno and Knapp suggest that with the narrative approach, causality should be understood in terms of 'contingency'. 'The [causal] 'force' is not constant, but rather contingent on the entire situation at a given time' (1992, p. 502). In Abbott's words,

rather than assuming universal or constant relevance, it explains only 'what needs to be explained' and lets the rest of the things slide along in the background. This selective attention goes along with the emphasis on contingency. Things happen because of a constellation of factors, not because of a few effects acting independently' (1992, p. 68, my emphasis).

So, to discover causality in this sense is to figure out the constellation of factors (or independent variables, identified in step a) that amounts to a particular outcome (or a major turning point, identified in step b).

d.) generating hypotheses. Since this essay promises to explain the case of Taiwan as well as to generate new hypotheses, I will also try to address the theoretical implications of my case. The case of Taiwan appears idiosyncratic by virtue of the existing theoretical tradition, so to address the peculiarity of this case is to confront the existing theoretical gaps. This has particular relevance since it is a case of a theory
developed in the West applied to non-western contexts (for a discussion on the use of case study in non-Western contexts see Bradshaw and Wallace 1991, pp. 155 and 163).

In what follows, I attempt to delineate a causal narrative of the Nationalist discourse in post-war Taiwan with this case/narrative approach. Guided by my orienting concept and focusing on my eight independent variables (the different relationships), I will generate a set of configurational causal factors to explain the four turning points identified earlier. I should emphasize again that these eight relationships do not assume universal significance, that is, some of them might appear irrelevant at certain moments. Also, determination flows back and forth between long duration attributes and shorter ones. More concretely, while the changes in the eight relationships are seen to cause the occurrence of certain events, these events are also seen to have reciprocal effects on some social or international relationships.

The Story of Taiwanese Nationalism

I. The '2-28 Event' of 1947 -- Political Nationalism

It is often argued that the Taiwanese nationalist struggle in the post-war era dates from the Uprising of February 28, 1947, when anti-Chinese sentiments and the call for an independent Taiwan crystallized and spread island-wide (Lai 1991, pp. 183-191; Lin 1989, pp. 169-170; Mendel 1970, pp. 26-41). So to talk about the goal of Taiwanese Nationalism, one needs to first return to these two most dramatic weeks in the history of post-war Taiwan.

On the evening of February 27, 1947, four mainlander policemen and two agents of the Tobacco and Wine Monopoly Bureau caught a widow in Taipei selling unlicensed cigarettes, confiscated her cigarettes and cash, and hit her when she tried to resist. When some Taiwanese on-lookers tried to defend the woman, the police fired
several shots into the crowd. Later that evening and the following day, crowds of Taiwanese citizens petitioned for apologies and relaxation of the tobacco monopoly. But the crowds encountered police who again fired their weapons, infuriating even more Taiwanese. Governor Chen Yi declared martial law and moved army units into cities to quell the rioters, yet the uprising continued to spread into every city on the island.

At first the Taiwanese seemed to control most of the cities because Chen Yi had too few armies to suppress the massive demonstrations (Mendel 1970, p. 33). Chen Yi agreed to negotiate with the Committee of Settlement, organized by members of municipal and provincial councils. By March 6, the Committee submitted to the Governor a reform proposal which demanded civil and political rights for the Taiwanese but by no means the separation from China (See Kerr 1965, appendix for an English translation of the reform proposal. See also Kerr 1986, pp. 60-61; Mendel 1970, p. 33). On March 8 the authority promised to consider the reform proposal and not to take any military actions, but that same night several thousand mainlander troops landed at Keelung, a port north of Taipei, and began their slaughter for 10 days. A whole generation of Taiwanese elites were killed, arrested, or fled overseas if lucky.

I am not engaging in the important and interesting debate on the causes for this tragedy; instead, I will try to explain why many Taiwanese came to embrace the dream of an independent Taiwan after this event. Notably, when the KMT's troops arrived in Taiwan in 1945, as many as three hundred thousand Taiwanese went down to greet them with the KMT's flags (Li 1987, pp. 25-27; Mendel 1970, p. 27). Even during the '2-28 Event', the crowds and the Committee of Settlement were only asking for reforms, not independence. But after the event, many Taiwanese began to petition Anglo-American leaders for 'the real neutralization of Taiwan by calling the Chinese regime . . . to withdraw from the island, to place Taiwan under UN trusteeship for a certain period' ('Neutralization of Taiwan,' p. 155). Apparently, the '2-28 Event'
significantly transformed the Taiwanese' understanding of their political identity; their understanding of the way to the attainment of an autonomous self changed from 'return to China' to 'separation from China'. Why?

One reason that can be identified, from my relational perspective, is the economic, political and ideological relationship between the KMT and the Taiwanese. The KMT's exploitation and oppression caused the Taiwanese people's rebellion. The failed negotiation stimulated radical thoughts. More important, the crackdown on March 8 marked the betrayal of the Taiwanese on the part of the KMT. As Mendel learned from his informants who experienced the '2-28 Event', after the crackdown many Taiwanese were asking the question 'how could we ever trust those pigs again when they broke all their promises to us and lured so many to their slaughter?' (1970, p. 37) Such oppression and distrust is part of the origins of Taiwanese nationalism.

But oppression and distrust alone is not a complete explanation of the origin of Taiwanese nationalism. An authoritarian government often stimulates hostile sentiments, such as the PRC's government in the June Fourth Event in 1989, but hostility toward a regime is not the same as hostility toward a nation or ethnicity. (The Chinese students did not turn against the Chinese ethnicity after the June Fourth Event!) The crucial thing that linked frustration with the KMT and Taiwanese nationalism for the Taiwanese people, I believe, is their experience of multiple-domination. This can be explained in three aspects. First, having been colonized by Japan made it easier for the Taiwanese to imagine themselves to be different from the Chinese, even though they might be of Chinese origin. That experience facilitated a comparison between the KMT and the Japanese, and, when the KMT appeared to be even more oppressive than the Japanese, many Taiwanese quickly came to see the mainlanders as another colonizer (Mendel 1970, p. 25). Second, the experience of Japanese colonization provided an alternative tradition for the Taiwanese. After they became frustrated with the KMT, many of them switched back to the Japanese language and other Japanese
customs (Mendel 1970, p. 46). In their rejection of the tradition that the KMT represented, ironically, the experience of the Japanese colonization provided an alternative, which made the rejection more plausible. Third, although it was only with the help of the US military that the KMT took over Taiwan and with the US government's 'policy of no policy' on Taiwan's problem (Kerr 1986, p. 44) that the KMT eschewed the issue of self-determination, contact with the USA later became a new source of political imagination. It introduced the Taiwanese people to the idea of self-determination and the possibility of US intervention on this issue. As mentioned earlier, many Taiwanese petitioned the US Embassy for help in neutralizing Taiwan, which signified the nationalist nature of their struggle.

So Taiwan's relationships with other nations constituted an important factor in the formation of Taiwanese nationalism. Though these relationships were oppressive and disliked by the Taiwanese at the time, they became sources for constructing an alternative tradition or an alternative future. Such imagination is crucial in the self-recognition of a nation (Hobsbawn 1990); without it the Taiwanese people's discontents with the KMT might have remained administrative and might not have been transformed into a nationalist discourse.

II. Forming an Opposition Party -- Rational Nationalism (1)

The flow of history reached another turning point in 1960. Against the tide of growing antagonism between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders, a group of mainlander liberals and some Taiwanese survivors from the 1947 massacre began to cooperate in their attempt at forming an opposition party in 1960. The mainlander liberals mainly consisted of the intellectuals associated with the Free China Fortnightly, a journal supported by the KMT earlier in the 50s because of its anti-communist stand. In the late 50s, these people published a series of critiques of and advice on the KMT's non-democratic and inefficient policies, but the KMT responded with anger and
political pressure (Li 1987, pp. 59-70). At the same time, before the local election in 1957, some Taiwanese survivors from the '2-28 Event' began to resume political activities and organized several meetings on how to ensure the fairness of the election. These two groups came into contact with each other in the discussion of election politics and their contact became regular. Finally, in their meeting after the local election in 1960, these people reached the conclusion that a strong opposition was needed for a rational system in Taiwan (See Fu 1989, pp. 181-210 for the record of this meeting). Immediately after the meeting, they started to organize lectures and discussions throughout the island in preparation for a new party, the Chinese Democratic Party. During this time, the KMT issued strong warnings against their activities, and the Free China Fortnightly published strong arguments for the need for a new party (Li 1987, pp. 76-77). In September of the same year, the editor-in-chief of the Free China Fortnightly, Lei Chen, and many of his associates were arrested, which put an end to the forming of the Chinese Democratic Party.

Though failed, the cooperative effort between the Taiwanese elites and the mainlanders had special meanings for the development of the nationalist discourse in Taiwan: it marked the change of emphasis from the Taiwanese ethnicity to democracy. The Free China Fortnightly group often based their arguments on the belief that Taiwan was part of China, so the issue of self-determination, the theme of Taiwanese nationalism in its nascent form, was illegitimate, or irrelevant at best, in the eyes of these mainlanders. So the Taiwanese survivors from the 1947 massacre had to push aside their original goal for independence in order to collaborate with the mainlanders. Why were they willing to change their discourse?

I believe that the changes in two sets of relationships led to the shift: changes in the relationship between Taiwanese nationalists and the rest of the Taiwanese people, and the contact between Taiwanese society and the West. On the one hand, Taiwanese nationalists had tremendous difficulties in mobilizing social support after the '2-28
Event', and thus were more willing to compromise their stand and cooperate with the mainland liberal. The obstacles to the social penetration of Taiwanese nationalism can be understood again by analyzing some social and international relationships during this time. First, because of the legacy of the '2-28 Event', the KMT was especially hostile to anyone in any way associated with Taiwanese nationalists (Mendel 1970, pp. 111-121). Due to the political logic of the post-war world system (Simon 1988), the relationship between the KMT and the USA grew steadily; thus, the KMT not only was less pressed to act like a democratic party (Cheng 1989) but also enjoyed political, military and economic support from the USA. The US support helped the KMT consolidate its rule and indirectly facilitated its suppression of political dissidents, including Taiwanese nationalists.

Second, combining the legacy of colonial social structure, land reform, and its control-based economic policies, the KMT effectively co-opted or weakened Taiwanese rural and urban elites. More specifically, 'the Nationalists [i.e., the KMT] soon repressed the more nationalistic small-scale Taiwanese urban elites, while coopting the larger-scale urban elites accustomed to collaborating with the Japanese. The Nationalists weakened small-scale Taiwanese rural elites through land reform' (Winckler 1988a, p. 61; see also Winckler 1988b, pp. 164-166). Such a 'divide-and-rule' policy made it almost impossible for Taiwanese nationalists to establish any social network.

Also, the transformation within the KMT itself constituted another obstacle for Taiwanese Nationalists in mass mobilization. The party apparatus 'acquired a high degree of organizational capacity' with the political reform of the KMT in 1951 (Cheng 1989, p. 475). By the late 50s, Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo achieved complete military and security control (Winckler 1988b, pp. 156-160) within the party. So by the time that Taiwanese nationalists were discussing the possibility of
a new party with the mainlander liberals, the KMT they were facing was not only oppressive but also strong and unified.

So the changes in the social and international relationships created a situation in which the two sides of the battle had very unequal shares in resources. The KMT was unified and resourceful whereas Taiwanese nationalists were cut off from any social network. It appeared that Taiwanese nationalists were advised by this situation to compromise their stand and mobilize any group they could cooperate with; the Free China Fortnightly people were such a group.

Furthermore, frequent contact with the USA at this time also contributed to the change in the Taiwanese people's attitude. As Mendel's interviews show, most of the local intellectuals were influenced by the Western idea of democracy. This influence seemed to revive the liberal tradition which some Taiwanese elites borrowed from the oppositionists in Meiji Japan in the pre-war period. As a result, Taiwanese nationalists at the time began to try to express their ideal in the language of democracy and rationality, which, together with the KMT's pressure, led them to de-emphasize Taiwanese ethnicity and stress universal human rights. The cooperative attempt at a new party in 1960, to be sure, was an expression of such a shift in their discourse.

III. The Intellectual Ferment in 1971-1973 -- Rational Nationalism (2)

The 60s was a political dark age in Taiwan. But starting in January 1971, for two years, another coalition for democratic reform emerged which achieved limited successes. What happened during these two years also resembled the situation in the late 50s in some ways. In response to a series of KMT diplomatic setbacks, some young intellectuals in Taiwan, who later came to be known as the University Magazine group, gathered to call for democratic reforms. They organized demonstrations, held forums, gave lectures, signed petitions, and published several articles criticizing Taiwan's society and government in the University Magazine. These intellectuals
called for the protection of human rights, the rule of law, practical and efficient
diplomatic and economic policies, and better social welfare (Li 1987, pp. 98-103). Yet
they were restrained from more sensitive issues such as the problem of political
prisoners (Huang 1976, p. 30). At first, the critiques invited reforms and changes from
the government. Yet in late 1972, the KMT began to fear that things were getting out
of control and demanded modification of the journal’s editorial policy, which solicited
polarized reactions from the leadership of the journal and eventually led to the split
and decline of this coalition in 1973 (Li 1987, pp. 106-108; see Huang 1976 for a
detailed study on the University Magazine group).

In a sense, this alliance of intellectuals continued the democratic discourse of
the Chinese Democratic Party. But it also had a new feature: while the attempt at
organizing the Chinese Democratic Party signified the cooperation between a
mainlander group and a Taiwanese group, the new reformist coalition appeared as one
group of intellectuals whose identities can hardly be categorized by ethnicity. One
could argue that the absence of ethnicity in the self-understanding and the portrayal of
this group’s identity indicated the growing momentum of the democratic discourse in
Taiwanese nationalism.

The increasing emphasis on democracy in Taiwanese nationalism can be
accounted for by analyzing the changing nature of the contention between the
Taiwanese dissidents and the KMT and the changing relationship between Taiwanese
businessmen and intellectuals and the government. First of all, it is noteworthy that the
struggle between the Taiwanese and the ruling party had shifted from a struggle to
capture the state to a contention between the market/civil society and the state by the
early 70s. The failure of the Chinese Democratic Party and the political repression in
the 60s (Mendel 1970, pp. 111-121)9 drove most of the Taiwanese people out of the
political domain and into the business sphere. Thus the split between the state and the
market. 'State and market remained at arm's length, largely because of the distinction
between mainlander's dominating one and Taiwanese dominating the other' (Winckler 1988b, p. 169).

At the same time, US aid helped strengthen the Taiwanese-dominated private sector. To facilitate the island's economic development, the US aid agency pressured the KMT to engage in economic reforms during 1958-1960, which included the liberalization of the exchange rate, the rationalization of the fiscal system, and the enactment of an investment promotional plan. Small-scale private enterprise started to grow during this time. Young people from the agrarian sector were rapidly incorporated into the numerous, newly built labor-intensive industries. A new private sector was born, with 'a decentralized pattern of industrialization, a low level of firm concentration, and a predominance of small and medium-sized family businesses' (Gereffi 1990, p. 98). On the other hand, the state remained the biggest capitalist. Most of the large-scale industries were still state-run (Hsu 1989, pp. 42-43), and most of the important positions in them were occupied by the mainlanders. In this situation, the sub-ethnic tension came to express itself in the competition between the state and the market. Unlike in the 50s, the distribution of social resources was more equitable; while the local elites in the past were almost exclusively intellectuals who lacked broad social support, the process of industrialization created a new social force of young bourgeoisie.

Another factor that can explain the momentum of democracy in the nationalist discourse lies in the new relationship of the KMT and the Taiwanese elite. Since 1970, the changes in US foreign policy and negotiations with China have affected the political situation. Consequently, the KMT's rule was no longer backed up by the power of the US. In 1971, it lost its seat in the United Nations; in 1972, President Nixon paid his first visit to Beijing. The diplomatic defeat and the rise of a bourgeoisie presented the KMT with an unprecedented threat and forced it into a softer stand. Consequently, beginning in 1973, Prime Minister Chiang Ching-kuo began to incorporate into the
government bright young businessmen and intellectuals, many of them Taiwanese (Winckler 1988, p. 169.) 'This was the turning point from vertical, rural-based, 'zero-sum' patron-client politics toward horizontal, class-based, growth-oriented politics' (Ibid.).

The KMT's shift to the development-based policy was smoothened by its sway over the public sphere.10 Since 1949, with the help of martial law, the KMT had monopolized the media and the educational curriculum, and suspended the freedom of speech and assembly for two decades. Its propaganda and indoctrination buried the memory of the 1947 massacre to some extent, and thus managed to persuade many young Taiwanese into cooperation.

Both the market/state contention between the dissidents and the KMT and the development-based cooperation between the social elites and the government, in different ways, sought to 'rationalize' the system. Under these circumstances, most political debates were carried out in terms of 'rights' and 'progress'. Thus, democracy appeared to be the 'noblest' goal in the nationalist discourse whereas ethnicity was either forgotten or silenced.

IV. Forming the Opposition in 1972 - 1987 -- Identity Nationalism

The political reforms in response to the intellectual coalition in the early 70s had the unintended effect of expanding the pool of new political elites from which the opposition was drawn in subsequent years. The political co-optation and reforms were limited in scope, so not all political dissidents could or wanted to be routed through the KMT; but the ruling party's softer stand assisted the re-emergence of radical dissidents, many of them being Taiwanese nationalists. Thus, starting from 1972, an organized party-less opposition -- since new parties were prohibited -- gradually took shape and won a victory in the 1977 local election. In the subsequent decade, 'the central thrust of the democratic forces was toward building a legitimate opposition party' (Cheng
1989, p. 485). The years 1977-79 were a phase of 'violence-prone confrontation between the opposition and the KMT' (Ibid.), but the radical expansion of the opposition met a crucial setback in the winter of 1979. In August, the radical dissidents published the Formosa Magazine and subsequently held lectures and rallies, in which they openly advocated Taiwan's independence. After a rally in December, they were jailed under the charge of treason.

After the imprisonment of the Formosa Magazine group, with moderates gaining power in the opposition and liberals in the KMT, a direct and strategic bargaining embarked between the two. The confrontation had different effects on each side. On the one hand, the KMT was forced to hasten its pace of reform to finally legalize the opposition party and lift the 38-year long decree of martial law in 1987, in order to deflect attention from the issue of self-determination. On the other hand, the more the KMT reformed itself, the less the oppositionists could unite against the common oppression of the KMT. In their attempt to speak in the name of the population on the island including both the Taiwanese and the mainlanders, they encountered great difficulties in defining the meaning of 'Taiwanese' as something other than 'not KMT'.

One can argue that the process of forming the opposition witnessed the laggard separation between the issue of democracy and the problem of identity in Taiwanese nationalism. While democratization proceeded steadily, the problem of Taiwan's identity became increasingly pressing and complicated.

What brought about the return of the identity problem? An easy answer is that the KMT's toleration of Taiwanese nationalists during this time released suppressed sub-ethnic antagonism. That is to say, after being suppressed for more than two decades, the Taiwanese finally had more of a chance to address their differences and voice discontent for the position given to the Taiwanese in the democratized political atmosphere.
But this is only part of the answer. The KMT's softer stand might explain the release of Taiwanese' ethnic concerns, but why did the ethnic concerns fail to provide a basis for defining the Taiwanese identity? To answer this question one needs to first examine the breakdown of the KMT's political myth. The KMT's intensified diplomatic frustration and mainland China's military threat made it increasingly difficult for the KMT to maintain the claim that the 'Republic of China' on Taiwan represented China and would recover the mainland. At the same time, the Taiwanese people's increasing contact with the West (Winckler 1988b, p. 168; Cheng 1989, p. 487) introduced them to different ways of understanding politics. Even though thought control and indoctrination had been carried out successfully for twenty some years, these changes presented a severe challenge. Eventually, the KMT's political myth began to collapse not only in the eyes of the Taiwanese people but also within the party itself.

However, no strong alternative existed to fill up the vacuum left by the breakdown of the KMT's political myth. Due to the KMT's sway over the public sphere, the Taiwanese tradition never evolved out of its peripheral status. The failure of the Local Literature Movement in the mid-70s was an example of the powerlessness of the Taiwanese tradition in the public sphere. Lacking a presumably legitimate tradition, past, or legacy to anchor itself to, the Taiwanese identity seemed painfully undefinable.

Furthermore, the lack of consensus both between the opposition and the Taiwanese elites and within the opposition itself hindered the search for Taiwanese identity. On the one hand, the arrival of democracy and a strong market created new cleavages, such as class and localities, in Taiwanese society (Cheng 1989, pp. 498-499). Thus, it became more and more difficult for the opposition to offer a unified solution to different forms of social inequalities and discontents for the Taiwanese people. For the same reason, the opposition was split within itself on its vision. As a
journal article remarked shortly after the formation of the opposition party, the new party's 'failure to provide the public with a clear picture' (Goldstein 1987, p. 25) was conspicuous. While some radicals insisted on the goal of an independent Taiwan, the majority believed that they should further the ideal of democracy and ally themselves with the working class and other underprivileged social sectors rather than 'accepting the identity as the voice of the native Taiwanese middle class' (Ibid.). Before a consensus on what the opposition should offer can be reached, the opposition will not substitute the KMT as an active agent in 'inventing' a tradition for Taiwan.

While democracy was gradually attained, it turned out to provide only the form, not the content, for the discussion on Taiwan's identity. Contrary to Taiwanese nationalists' expectation in earlier phases, democracy did not solve the identity problem, so the identity problem returned.

Theoretical Hypotheses

This case study of Taiwanese nationalism promises to generate new hypotheses. Through the relational and contingent theoretical lens, I have generated an explanation for the non-linear development of the nationalist discourse in Taiwan, which, as argued previously, is a phenomenon that has escaped most of the analysis on third world nationalism. Thus, the explanatory narrative carries important theoretical implications.

I. The multiplicity of Domination:

Most of the literature on nationalism perceives the West as the 'natural enemy' of third world countries. In the light of the commonly accepted dichotomy between the West and the non-West, it is interesting that the major conflict in Taiwan takes a different form: the form of sub-ethnic rivalry. Furthermore, both the mainlanders and
the Taiwanese nationalists rarely recognize any conflict with the West even on the surface level. On the contrary, they both view the West as friendly helpers: the mainlanders in receiving US aid and the Taiwanese in petitioning Anglo-American leaders for support. This total surrender to the colonial power forces us to problematize the usual point of departure and recognize the plurality of domination. To be more specific, the new question asks how, given the multiplicity of domination, the construction of a clear point of contention becomes possible in any nationalist struggle.

As our case study reveals, the multiple hegemonies -- the Japanese colonizers, the West, the KMT, and the Taiwanese elites -- are engaged in not only a competition for prevalence but also a creation of legitimacy. In the competition for legitimacy, the immediate experience of the 'second colonization' in post-war Taiwan provided a context which focused on the opposition between Chinese and Taiwanese.

Once constructed, the Taiwan/China opposition served as the rationalization basis in sustaining the post-War Taiwanese identity and defining the meaning of other forms of domination. The dichotomy between Taiwanese and Chinese -- instead of Chinese and Russians, or Taiwanese and Japanese -- is a power strategy which regulates and sustains the self-knowledge of the Taiwanese. The KMT's most important influence on Taiwanese nationalism is not that it imposed 'Chinese-ness' on the identity of Taiwan, but that, through various means, it tried to naturalize and legitimate the imposed identity. Furthermore, not only the dominant ideology is an invented reality, the alternatives are also constrained by such a creation. The dominant ideology, however much the Taiwanese dissidents oppose it, does function as a point of departure in the formation of the new discourses. For example, the dissidents often see Chinese culture as something against which 'the Taiwanese' are defined, in which case their visions are built on the exclusion of the possibility that 'the Chinese' could be part of the tradition they want. By contrast, the dissidents are much more open to the
Japanese colonial legacy and Western influences than many other post-colonial countries, such as South Korea. Positively or negatively, (if we can view it in these terms), the Chinese/Taiwanese dichotomy functions significantly as an axis of the formation of Taiwanese identity.

Thus, it can be argued that the point of contention in third world nationalism is hardly given. Instead, it is decided by the historical context. That something is recognizable as a power struggle is itself the result of other power struggles. This might be a useful point in understanding the origins of third world nationalism.16

II. The Role of the Bourgeoisie:

The role of the national bourgeoisie also takes on new meaning in the light of the tensions between the multiplicity of hegemony and the bounded-ness of the point of contention. Conventionally, the rise of a national bourgeoisie in third world countries is held responsible for an inherent contradiction within the nationalist ideal, namely, the assumption that the attainment of civil society and the realization of the national identity will be achieved at the same time (See Chatterjee 1986). However, recognizing the complex web of hegemonic relationships, third world bourgeois culture appears to be more transformative than contradictory. The growth of a national bourgeoisie seems to inevitably change, so to speak, the equilibrium of the binary opposition in a nationalist struggle.

Our study shows that in the case of Taiwan, capitalist culture changed the significance of the ethnic tensions between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders. The internalization of bourgeois rationality dissolved the insistence on ethnicity in the 70s, and the Taiwanese dissidents became more calculating, rational, and skillful at negotiating for their rights. Along with this change, the reference of their ideal vision also shifted from a sub-ethnic tension to a struggle between the state and the market/civil society.
Therefore, the position of the national bourgeoisie is subject to re-definition. In the case of Taiwan, there are not only two sides in the nationalist struggle, and we are confronted with the existence of the 'oppressed bourgeoisie'. According to Chatterjee, the national bourgeoisie are seen to engage in what Gramsci calls the 'passive revolution' by way of neutralizing opponents. And according to Gramsci, the weapon of passive revolution belongs only to the oppressor, not the oppressed. But in our case, the Chinese nationalism carried by the KMT to Taiwan, and the Taiwanese nationalism developed in response to it, can both be characterized as a bourgeois 'war of position'. Not surprisingly, the KMT had been engaging in a passive revolution. Developing means of control, co-opting the oppositionists, and controlling the public sphere, the KMT regime was able to expand its interests in the name of the interests of all. Undeniably, however, the Taiwanese bourgeoisie also participated in the war of position. They were tuned for a 'rational' dialogue with the Chinese oppressors, which ironically resulted in a path similar to that taken by the KMT: accepting the existent structure and bargaining within it, promising to incorporate the voice of the lower classes, and above all, guarding and expanding their own interests. Although on the basis of class interests the Taiwanese nationalists marginalized their insistence on the 'Taiwanese-ness' of their identity, their 'war of position' was liberating by virtue of being in opposition to the KMT oppressor, and thus should be understood as a transformative force, not just a contradiction.

III. Rethinking the market/democracy

It is in this sense that bourgeois rationality lends itself to re-examination. Gramsci and Chatterjee view it as a strategy to consolidate hegemony, but the Taiwan case suggests that it also serves to transform hegemony. In a sense, the principle of democracy proves to be liberating. In the case of Taiwan, the principle of universal access is utilized by different groups at different stages. The Taiwanese dissidents were
able to bargain for their right to participate on this basis; the mainlanders in turn were able to defend their right to remain in the public sphere on the same basis. Later on, the marginal groups such as the aboriginals and the Hakka people, and underprivileged classes arising from the industrialization process, who were previously excluded from the nationalist discourses, started to legitimize their voice also on the familiar principle of universal human rights. The theme of equal participation keeps coming back as a liberating force.

This situation seems to provide evidence for the Habermasian notion of the inclusive potential of the bourgeois democracy; the appeal to universal human rights might be, to a limited degree, more than just a mask of class domination. However much the market and its democratic culture serve the interests of the bourgeoisie, the discourse of rationality might function differently than the bourgeoisie imagined or planned in certain situations.

On the other hand, democracy is limited in its potential for answering the identity question. Having been engaged in the discourse of rationality and progress, the Taiwanese nationalists found it necessary to justify their struggle in scientific terms. In this frame of mind, ethnicity per se became meaningless unless it could enhance the rationalization and progress of that society. But is it possible to express a national identity completely in the scientific language of democracy? In translating political and cultural quests into this new language, there seems to be the danger of losing the particularistic qualities of the nationalist struggle. The irony is that the very content of democracy seems to be exactly its contentlessness. This problem becomes poignantly dangerous in non-Western contexts. When the Taiwanese nationality needs to be justified by the Western concept of modernity, one can argue that another form of cultural colonization has been created. Unfortunately, these questions were left out of the imagination of the Taiwanese nationalists when they made their 'rational' move. And so the 'who are we' question is left unanswered.
In sum, the study on Taiwanese nationalism suggests that the point of contention in third world nationalism is created rather than given, that the 'oppressed bourgeoisie' can be liberating to some limited extent, and that its limitation lies in the tendency that its democratic culture is powerful in offering the form but not the content for discussing the identity problem. These points could serve as helpful observations especially in understanding the nationalist movements in which the national heritage is diversified or weak. For example, the emancipatory power of the market prior to 1989 and its inability to solve racial conflicts afterwards in Eastern Europe might be better understood in the light of the contemplation upon the 'contentlessness of democracy'. In places with a strong national tradition such as Japan, the problem with democracy's contentlessness is probably less prominent, but the origin of its nationalism might be better explained with the concept of the multiplicity of domination. The generalizability of these theoretical hypotheses, however, awaits to be tested in future studies.
Endnotes

1Taiwan's earliest inhabitants came from the Malay-Indonesian-Philippine area in prehistoric times. Their descendants are the tribal aborigines who have been driven into the central mountains by the Chinese immigrants. Historians believe that Chinese and Japanese pirates and sailors stopped off at Taiwan earlier, but the first known permanent Chinese settlement was in the sixteenth century during the decline of the Ming Dynasty. In the following century, Taiwan was invaded by the Spanish and then the Dutch in their imperialist expansion. They were expelled by Koxinga (Cheng Cheng-Kung) in 1662, who then settled down in Taiwan and attempted unsuccessfully to overthrow the Manchu's mainland regime in the name of resurrecting the heritage of the Ming dynasty. In 1683, Koxinga's grandson surrendered Taiwan to the Manchu's regime. In 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan after the Sino-Japanese War and remained a Japanese colony until 1945. Under the Manchu's rule, there were numerous revolts organized by the Taiwanese, but 'many writers seem to think that they were a negative resistance to external rule rather than a sign of positive nationalism' (Mendel 1970: 14 -15). Under the Japanese colonization, the many Taiwanese uprisings constituted a complicated story. But in general, one could also argue that most of these uprisings did not call upon a local consciousness but rather relied on the hope of collaboration with a mainland party, the KMT or the CCP (Ibid. 24).

2At the end of WWII, Taiwan was 'returned' to China, by a decision reached at the Cairo Conference among Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and the Anglo-American leaders. This decision was made without granting the residents on the island a chance to voice their will. After Chiang was defeated by Mao's Red Army in December 1949, his government moved to Taiwan; about two million mainlanders arrived at about the same time to live among the six million Taiwanese. The government in exile was dominated by the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party — KMT), which was first headed by Chiang, and then his son, and whose members were almost exclusively mainlanders. Forced to become Chinese without being consulted, and then enduring the reign of the mainlanders, the post-war Taiwanese found themselves in a strained relationship with the Chinese rulers. Many of them became political dissidents.
This essay, an attempt to address some aspects of this sub-ethnic tension, will refer to the Chinese people who arrived together with or after Chiang's take-over in 1945 as the 'mainlanders', and the offspring of the earlier Chinese immigrants as the 'Taiwanese'.

3 There are, of course, other relationships within or among these groups, such as the relationship among the dominant regimes in the world system. While these relationships are all possible 'candidates' for my independent variables, I am only looking at the ones that seem most likely to influence the nationalist struggle and thus have chosen to focus on these eight sets of relationships.

4 See Abbott's critique of the 'monotonic causal flow assumption' (1988). This point is part of Abbott's argument against the temporal assumptions in the 'general linear reality' model. My method is heavily indebted to that article, though I cannot repeat the rest of its argument here due to space limitations.

5 There are many conflicting arguments for the causes for the '2-28-Event'. The few causes that most agree upon are: Chen Yi's monopolistic economic policies, serious corruption in the government and troop misbehavior, lack of Taiwanese representation in local government, and cultural differences between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders (Kerr 1965; Lai 1991; Li 1987; Mendel 1970).

6 Many petitions of the same kind are quoted in Kerr 1965. See also New York Times, March 29, 1947.

7 The Korean War and the two Taiwan Strait crises in the 50s led President Truman and President Eisenhower to abandon the earlier 'policy of no policy' and become committed to defending the Republic of China on Taiwan. This is not to say, however, that serious disagreements between Chiang Kai-shek and the US government did not exist about the attitude towards the People's Republic of China on the mainland, or that there was clear consensus within the US government. Nevertheless, the KMT and the USA's common antagonism against the PRC at that time resulted in America's strong military support for the KMT (See Gordon 1985 for a detailed discussion on US China policies during this time), which became an important military and political resource for the latter. US aid (1951-1965), on the other hand, supplied a crucial economic resource for the KMT regime.

8 See Mendel 1970, p. 96, p. 105, p. 110. One of Mendel's informants expressed an interesting opinion that shows how much the USA was a symbol of democracy in the eyes of local Taiwanese. 'T]he failure of the United States to exert pressure in the realm of civil liberties, free elections, and release of political
prisoners is even less understandable to us. Your government sends its troops to fight for Vietnamese freedom and forces Saigon to draft a constitution providing for popular presidential elections even in wartime. Why doesn't it also ask this regime to give us the same rights?' (p. 105)

9 See also Jones 1963 for a Hong Kong journalist's observation on the political control at the time. 'The extent of 'Taiwan of the Taiwanese' sentiment [was] ... probably quite strong, but the government [was] taking no chance'. Another example is the famous case of the arrest of a Taiwanese professor, Peng Ming-min, in 1964. See Peng 1972.

10 In discussing the public sphere, I am using Habermas' definition. See Habermas 1974 and 1989.

11 Taiwan has existed as an independent political entity since 1949 in reality. But up until 1987, the KMT had insisted that it was the only legitimate government of China, that it would recover the mainland in the future, and that Taiwan was part of China. After 1987, it softened its stand on some of these issues. Nevertheless, it did not, and still does not, tolerate any argument that Taiwan should formally claim independence and build an autonomous nation-state.

12 After implementing more liberal development policies, the party was relegated to a logistical position only at a superficial level. But the KMT still 'exercised its ideological influence over the economic structure through personnel power, the debate over policy, especially that related to ownership patterns, and the initiation of preliminary welfare schemes (Cheng 1990, p. 160).

13 In the mid-70s, political concerns revitalized social and cultural consciousness among the Taiwanese elites (Hsiao 1989, pp. 200 -204) and a group of Taiwanese writers tried to advocate a literature based on 'our' experiences. While literary works on the pre-Mao mainland or the West dominated the media, these writers preferred to write about their homeland, arguing that literature should be rooted in social reality (Ibid.). However, their attempt failed under the mainlander writers' attack at the end of the 70s.

14 In a close examination of both nationalist discourses, I find they bear surprisingly little rancor towards their colonial experiences. In the mass media and literary works, the discussion of the tension between the West and the third world is almost completely absent, although some reflection has started to emerge on how to locate Taiwanese literature in the category of third-world literature very recently.
The argument that KMT rule is essentially a second colonization of Taiwan after Japanese colonization is quite strong. See Gold 1988.

This understanding also suggests the relevance of the Foucauldian notion of power in studying third world nationalism. According to Foucault, Power exists as 'an infinitely complex network of 'micro-power,' of power relations that permeate every aspect of social life. Power not only represses; it also creates. Most challenging of all is the realization that power creates truth and hence its own legitimation. It is the job of historian to recognize this truth production as a function of power' (O'Brien 1989, p. 35, my emphasis). See also Foucault 1990.

'Gramsci . . . is led to the identification, in all their concreteness, of two inseparably related aspects of those movements: one, historical impediments to bourgeois hegemony, and two, the possibilities of marginal change within those limits. . . . A bourgeoisie aspiring for hegemony in a new national political order cannot hope to launch a 'war of movement' . . . . Its strategy would be to attempt a 'molecular transformation' of the state, neutralizing opponents, converting sections of the former ruling classes into allies in a partially reorganized system of government, undertaking economic reforms on a limited scale so as to appropriate the support of the popular masses but keeping them out of any form of direct participation in the process of governance' (Chatterjee 1986, pp. 43-45).

Recognizing the conflicts among different groups as a healthy part of communication, Habermas is sensitive to the multiplicity of resistance and therefore successfully avoids the trap of embracing any particular group interests or values at the expense of other social groups. As Mark Poster points out, for Habermas 'the appeal is not to a specific social group but to the potential inherent in self-reflection and in dialogue to reveal truth and distortion' (1989, p. 210).
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