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**"Power Without Logic Without Marx"**

Wendy Brown

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Wendy Brown  
University of California, Santa Cruz  
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Contemporary Left intellectuals--Marxists, postMarxists, democratic socialists; critical race theorists and feminist theorists--are generally uncertain about how to think about the nature of power even as they are often preoccupied with power's effects. Indeed, much of the debate on the Left about poststructuralism's political value turns on the question of power, but does so without theorizing power directly. Most neo-Marxist critiques of poststructuralism fault the latter either for being unpolitical and unscientific; the two criticisms converge on poststructuralism's putative refusal of an extra-discursive reality and of law-like courses of events. In this reproach of poststructuralist critiques of ontological and epistemological objectivity, and of historical metanarratives, what is assumed is both a logic of society available to scientific apprehension, and a politics that directly issues from this apprehension. Yet in this reproach, the critique of Marxist formulations of power that poststructuralism advances is never addressed: the question of what generates power, where or whether it is held, and how it moves, goes unanswered in these debates. In the interest of bringing this debate more squarely in line with the terms that organize it, and to substitute argument for denunciation, I propose to reconsider the logics of power in Marx's work.

Marx discerned power underneath the cloak of metaphysics-- idealist philosophy and classical political economy--that kept it from view, and at the same time recloaked power with his own materialist metaphysics. Marx's brilliance as a critic was to track power where others saw contingency or fate, to supplant the magic of a history propelled by ideas with an articulation of processes that actually had the capacity to move things. But in these dynamics of history--from class struggle to fetters on the mode of production--elements persist of a Hegelian logic of history, including dialectics, contradictions, progress, unitary forces and aims. Marx's project of demystifying history thus inaugurates a new mystery even as this mystery is anointed in the secular tonalities of science. Marx's endeavor of demystification itself tells a story about power that aestheticizes it; this aestheticization is disguised by the claim to scientific transparency, by the conceit of science's non-ideological character.

This essay extends Marx's own project of demystification of the discourses of power, while recognizing that this demystification will not, as Marx hoped, resolve into a new, transparent and objective discourse, but rather, can only reveal some of the operations of truth in the discourses claiming such a title. The essay aims Marx's critique of metaphysical logics of power at the logics of power in Marx, in part to question more generally whether power has a logic or logics, in part to ask whether Marx sustains logics or whether they falter, in part to

ask whether he achieves the distinction he seeks between power and critique. Does power move along logical tracks, such as those mapped by discourses of contradiction and dialectics, and by formulas of exploitation and obfuscation? Are these logics tantamount to discursive frames or epistemes, are they orders of norms and deviations, or is something more physical, indeed causal, implied by the notion of logic and/or the notion of power? Moreover, if power does not have a logical structure or move according to logical sequences, how might power be thought and theorized in a different mein and vein? To what extent does Marx hint in this direction? Where does his own thought exceed and contravene his effort to discern power in scientifically mappable formulas? Finally, what are the generative powers of mystification, and how does Marx himself partake of these powers?

The problem of logics of power in Marx differs to some degree from the problem of his scientism, the latter perhaps exhaustively explored by the debates pursuant to Althusser's critique of Marxist humanism. Those debates centered on the question of what kind of theory of society and politics he authored, e.g., scientific (Althusser), praxis-based (Gramsci), or humanist (Schmidt). Those debates also very much turned on the question of how Capital is to be read in relation to Marx's more expressly Hegelian period, e.g., Althusser sunders the two "periods" sharply while Schmidt relates them. But the question of logics of power in Marx is a question of ontology that is meant to precede questions of epistemology, a question about how

the world works not yet concerned with the question of how we may apprehend it. Thus, the question of logics of power may be said to be conceptually prior to (albeit practically inseparable from) the science question insofar as the claim to discern the world through scientific method depends upon it partaking of the orderliness and lawfulness presumed to organize the natural world, the world on which science's validity is premised.

## i

Across the whole of his work, Marx aimed to replace the popular and scholarly preoccupation with political, institutional and ideological power, with a focus on what is most often translated as "social forces." Thus Marx's cognate terms for power include not only "labor" and "capital" and but "multiplied productive force," "real material life" and even "the actual nature of things." Marx understands all forms of political power in inegalitarian orders to be a mediated appropriation of man's "essential powers," that is, social and more specifically, productive power.

For Marx, political power is always derivative, while social power is conceived as original and self-generating. "all struggles within the State...are merely the illusory forms in which the real struggles of different classes are fought out among one another."<sup>1</sup> Here arises the paradox, Balibar notes, that "in order to reassert...autonomy in politics, meaning the self-determination and self-liberation of the people, Marx the

radical had to deny the autonomy of the political."<sup>2</sup>

Historically, this denial had the serious implication of preventing Marxists from much concern with the political institutions constitutive of radical democracy. If there is only one kind of human power, and if it gives shape to all human associations, then there is little point in tinkering power's manifestations rather than its source. Political organization is taken to follow social or material organization. "Assume particular stages of development in production, commerce and consumption, and you will have a corresponding social constitution, a corresponding organization of the family, of orders or of classes, in a word, a corresponding civil society. Assume a particular civil society, and you will get particular political conditions which are only the official expression of civil society."<sup>3</sup>

Marx understands the sphere of civil society, more specifically the sphere of material life, to be the domain of power's operation, and conceives a focus on this domain as always already a focus on power; "civil society is the true source and theatre of all history."<sup>4</sup> Thus to depict accurately the elements and operations of civil society is to depict the elements and operations of power. Civil society names the domain of power; the social names its ground; man's productive activity is its wellspring. A critique of the idealism (manifested in state-centered politics as well as Hegelian philosophy) that

both covers and apologizes for for power, is its method of apprehension.

Yet in transposing Hegel's dialectic from the realm of rationality and the state to the realm of materiality and civil society, Marx appropriates a metaphysics of power that retains the structure of idealism even as it aims to repudiate its content. It is not simply that Marx believed in progressive dialectical movement, the power of negation, and so forth, but that he conceived power as generated through logical entailment and as travelling along circuits of logic; power is neither random nor incoherent and its effects can be tracked by the logic of its generation. Indeed, for Marx, the dynamic and effects, if not the material, of power could be said to consist of logical entailment. This is as much the case for the formula for extracting surplus value specified in the labor theory of value as it is for the logic of alienation in labor articulated in commodity fetishism, and the logic of the camera obscura constitutive of ideology in class society. But if power is produced out of logical entailment, it means that logic itself generates power, thereby calling into question power's "material" content at the very moment and through the very theory by which this content is asserted. It means further that Marx's own critique cannot escape its implication in power, since it is a critique that depends on logical entailment and hence forms a chain of power, replete with the elements of mystification that Marx insists are an inherent dimension of power undemocratically



distributed. Put another way, if power is generated out of logical entailment, the logics Marx brings to the apprehension of power do not simply read power but generate it. If logic is generative, if it produces, then it never simply describes, which undermines not only the premise of Marx's scientific critique of power but the attempt to distance that critique from its object of apprehension. Science will emerge not as an account of power from the outside but a discourse of power which passes as an external account, and in this passing mystifies both its imbrication with power and power as such. Science, and the logics constitutive of it, will turn out to be a source of mystification rather than a solvent of it.

On the other hand, what if power does not operate logically or exceeds or escapes the logics generating it? Indeed, why should the material of power in the human world be logic? Why should power follow a logical course and what is our investment, as moderns, in the idea that it does so? Why should power produce order as opposed to anarchy in the human world? Even if power maximizes itself through regularity and systems, through the production of routine and calculable effects, why should it be the nature of power to maximize itself? What would give power this aim or this capacity? Even if power turns out to have a physicalist dimension which allows it to follow natural (physical) laws of movement and reaction in space, what would also give it a teleological or temporal dimension? What would tether it to purpose and aim in history, what would give it

purpose and aim of its own? And above all, what would serve to unite this physicalist (spatial) and historical (temporal) dimension in a common project? Indeed, in ascribing to power the kind of ontological independence and anthropomorphic ambition that logic does, is it possible that Marx ascribed to power a source and form independent of human beings--a natural or physicalist constitution bound to a divine aim--even as he strove to ground both power and history in human activity? At the moment he sought to return history to man, did he return it to a metahistorical content and course structured by a conception of power's relative autonomy from its human generators? In order to pursue this question, we must first consider the several logics of power Marx specifies as constitutive of modern societies.<sup>5</sup>

## ii

Those who would understand the secret of capitalist accumulation, Marx argues, must turn their attention from the realm of exchange, where both the classical political economists and popular belief are focused, to the realm of production, a less studied and less accessible place.<sup>6</sup> In this, Marx endorses an ancient distinction between appearance and reality in human affairs, and endorses as well their respective correspondence to surface and depth, popular opinion and philosophical truth, accessibility and relative opacity. This insistence on the importance of descending beneath appearances to find the truth they mask articulates as well both the fundamental move of Marx's

philosophical criticism and its putative scientific basis: "all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided."<sup>7</sup>

Marx characterizes as ideological and obfuscating the domain figured as the real in legitimizing discourses: the realm of the state, the realm of ideas, the realm of exchange. Conversely, he designates as real those realms ordinarily ignored (and considered unpolitical) in theory as well as everyday belief: civil society, materiality, and production. He not only locates significance in what has been disavowed, but spies the apparatus of disavowal in what has been valorized. ("It should not astonish us," he remarks about classical economic theory, "that vulgar economy feels particular at home in the estranged outward appearances of economic relations...and that these relations seem the more self-evident the more their internal relationships are concealed from it...")<sup>8</sup> Discernible here is a proto-deconstructive impulse in Marx's reversal and displacement of the dualistic constructs (inherited from Hegel and the classical political economists) that he submits to analogical analysis: state/civil society, idealism/materialism, exchange/production. Each dualism is understood to conceal not only the "real order of things" but the terms of production--the dynamic of power--of that order and to exist on the basis of that concealment. As he puts the matter in Capital,

...we therefore take leave for a time of this noisy sphere, where everything takes place on the surface and in view of all men, and [go] into the hidden abode of

production, on whose threshold there stares us in the face "No admittance except on business." Here we shall see, not only how capital produces, but how capital is produced. We shall at last force the secret of profit making.<sup>9</sup>

Significant here is less the problematic philosophical conceit of an essential truth that lies beneath deceptive appearances than the logic of power that such a conceit expresses. In Marx's account, power always operates behind a veil and always throws up a surface "in view of all men" that distracts us from its abode; power produces its mystification, and an order of mystification in daily life, as a fundamental rather than incidental product. This "perversion of reality," Marx suggests, is present in all forms of society that feature commodity-production and money circulation, but it is nowhere more precisely expressed than under conditions of capitalist production.<sup>10</sup> Because power produces its own camouflage and structure of legitimation when it is distributed undemocratically and because capitalism represents the extreme of this undemocratic distribution in its division of society into "two great classes opposing one another", the "secret" of capitalist power (profit making) must be "forced" through critical analysis that can reverse the reversals with which power covers itself. Above all, this requires grasping both subjects and objects of power as effects of power, as fabricated by power.

But if subjects and objects of power are always the effects of power, we might ask, why should this cease to be the case when power is no longer maldistributed, when it is shared between

rather than held by subjects? This is the point at which power is figured as legitimate and transparent by Marx, as no longer requiring dissimulation. It is also the point at which subjects are understood as recovering an essential nature prior to power. In this sense, they are figured by Marx as no longer the effects of power; a certain organization of power is a condition of this recovered nature but it is not constitutive of the subjects themselves. Thus, at the very point at which subjects are seen to have fully reclaimed their social powers as their own, power ceases to produce and organize them as subjects. Put a different way, subjects are returned to themselves simultaneously with rejoining them to one another but this return and rejoining are precisely a return to authenticity (unalienated species being and true community) that excludes or evicts power.

All-round dependence, this natural form of the world-historical co-operation of individuals, will be transformed by this communist revolution into the control and conscious mastery of these powers, which, born of the action of men on one another, have till now overawed and governed men as powers completely alien to them.<sup>11</sup>

Presumably a power fully mastered is a power no longer--hence its transparency as well as its impotence in controlling men's lives. Thus power would appear to evaporate at the moment that it is collectively grasped, at the moment that its historic maldistribution is rectified. And subjects appear to cease being produced by power, organized by power, positioned by power, and above all, mystified by power at the moment that they share in it equally. But if power is only power when it is not shared, and

hence when it is not transparent, we are faced with two possibilities. Either Marx, as Foucault implies, offers us a scene of emancipation that is beyond and outside of power, a picture that is otherworldly in the extreme, a picture that partakes of the very religious logic Marx sought to reject in his break with Hegel. Or, in the exhaustive abolition of ownership required in Marx's formulation of power shared equally, there is an implicit confession that power cannot be shared, that democracy is impossible precisely because power resists equal distribution, indeed, resists equality as such. Is there, in other words, a recognition that power shared is no longer power, that the only way to capture power collectively is to deprive everyone of it?<sup>12</sup> Can "actually existing communism" be compassionately understood as impaled on this problem, on the mistaken belief that power can be vanquished from human society?

If power is undemocratic by nature according to Marx, it is also unknowable insofar as it always and necessarily disguises itself. Here, let us make a return to the passage, cited earlier, in which Marx promises to discern the nature of capital by trespassing the private property line protecting its secret. In seeking to discover, in "the hidden abode of production," not only "how capital produces, but how capital is produced," Marx indicates the double operation of power: its simultaneous production of itself as a subject or agent of power, and production of an effect outside of itself. The exploitation of labor in commodity production, for example, not only produces

capital, but the system of capitalism that reproduces all of the system's elements. For Marx, power produces its own conditions of reproduction and hence its own futurity, although both moments of production are necessarily rife with contradiction. As Marx puts the matter in Capital,

Like all its predecessors, the capitalist process of production proceeds under definite material conditions, which are, however, simultaneously the bearers of definite social relations entered into by individuals in the process of reproducing their life. Those conditions, like these relations, are on the one hand prerequisites and on the other hand results and creations of the capitalist process of production; they are produced and reproduced by it.<sup>13</sup>

But how power could achieve such a feat--producing both its necessary prerequisites and its intended effects--without having divine or naturalistic dimensions, a metaphysical structure and a teleological course? And what would give humanly generated power these characteristics? Why should power know where it is going if those generating it, produced by it, steeped in it, are largely clueless? What imagine of God's prescience and human blindness shapes this putative secularization of history? Indeed, Marx would appear to be positing a metaphysical outside to human social and historical existence, a metaphysical outside that, again, is eliminated at the moment that human beings acquire control of their own existence, acquire freedom--a freedom that now seems to entail emancipation from metaphysics.<sup>14</sup>

The formulas for exploitation and accumulation that Marx discovered in the "hidden abode of production" are primarily

expressed in the labor theory of value, but involve the logic of commodity fetishism and alienation as well. Marx extends and revises Adam Smith's labor theory of value relatively modestly, but sufficiently to replace the "hidden hand" and "free exchange" with a theory of the systematic exploitation and inequality at the heart of capitalist accumulation. Capital is formed out of surplus labor, that is, labor performed over and above what is necessary to reproduce the worker: extracted systematically through a combination of lengthening of the working day (increasing the amount of labor power extracted) and technological developments (reducing the proportion of labor required to reproduce the worker), surplus labor is "realized" through the exchange of commodities on the market. "Capital is not sum of the material and produced means of production. Capital is rather the means of production transformed into capital..."<sup>15</sup>

A host of contradictions accompany the process of producing and realizing capital--from degrees of exploitation that destroy workers to suppression of purchasing power and investment through the containment of wages--but such contradictions only serve as affirmations of the logics themselves. Indeed, the contradictions operate as proof of the systematic nature of the process Marx maps insofar as they affirm the bounded nature of that process. Just as the unevenness of historical development consequent to dialectical materialism confirms rather than undermines the notion of progress in history, the contradictions



attendant upon capitalist production and realization confirm rather than undermine the systematic nature of the process.

The specific power in the economic process--that which "produces capital" as well as that which is "produced by it" is, of course, labor converted into labor power, labor that is first commodified and then purchased, wielded, and exploited by capital. Labor is converted into commodity form by removing its capacity to provide for itself, that is, by the ubiquity and dominance of capital as an economic form. Historically, this conversion is achieved through the enclosure movements and other social processes that proletarianize workers, depriving them of access to the means of production. Proletarianization is itself the outcome of a certain logic of history, in which the bourgeoisie is generated out of the fetters on late feudal production, and in which the bourgeoisie in turn configures labor in a shape necessary for the realization of its economic and political ambitions. For such realization to occur, what is required is the production of a class that Marx ironically calls "free" in the double sense of being free of the capacity to produce its own subsistence and free to sell its labor power on the open market, that is, free from feudal social or political constraints on its movement. Generation of a class with this double freedom, and of a propertied bourgeoisie, in turn necessitates political transformation of an order in which neither property nor labor could circulate freely: it requires that a liberal constitutional order be brought into being, one

that secures both universal property rights, including property in oneself, and bourgeois liberties of movement. Thus, the logic of capitalist accumulation in the exploitation of free labor entails the Age of Revolution that bears forth the conditions of such accumulation.

## iii

This brief sketch of the major elements of capitalist production suggests that the logics of power constitutive of Marx's political economy form a lengthy interlocking chain in which each element is hinged to a presupposition that is itself another vital element in the chain. On a literal level, "capital is dead labor that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labor, and lives the more, the more labor it sucks."<sup>16</sup> However, this paradoxical vampire logic in which the dead "lives" by sucking life from the living can only transpire within a complex logic of history in which capital is born out of contradictions in feudal production on the one side, and generates its "own gravediggers" on the other. Political economy has internal, spatially organized logics of power that generate capital, class, exploitation, commodification, fetishism, and so forth. But political economy is also ordered by temporal logics such as those expressed by the terms contradiction, fetter, and development, those logics comprising Marx's philosophy of history. "Class struggle" is an instance of both: as that which animates political economy in time, it is also that which opposes

the pure temporality of the Hegelian dialectic--it carries the spatial dimension that materialism installs in the dialectical progress of history. Yet the spatial and temporal logics also presuppose one another, and in this way cloak the workings of power precisely where it is meant to be exposed. Put another way, there is a curious shell game at work in Marx's schemes of logical entailment: in a series of effects, each of which comes on the heels of and generates another, where is the animating dynamic in the series; that is, where is power? To the extent that power is not a material substance but a relation, is it inevitable that bringing it literally into view would be impossible, even and especially in a materialist analytic frame? Or is this failure the consequence of a form of critique that hinges power to logic, and its circularities, rather than to a domain and mechanics of uncapturability, relationality, and contingency?

The problematic of alienation may provide a means of addressing these questions. For Marx, alienation results from a certain form of organization of labor and economic distribution and not, as Hegel insisted, from labor as such as an activity of "externalization." In this as in many other instances, Marx recasts Hegel's (eternal) anthropological verity as an historically specific production. In capitalist commodity production, commodities acquire a socially oppressive existence and are elements of an economic and social order that is oppressive and exploitative: they come to have a power "over and

against man" that is both drawn from and constitutive of the power of capital itself.

Marx makes alienation tell the story of labor that is congealed in an object "foreign" to the worker--produced neither from his intellectual conception nor under his direction and control. "...estrangement is manifested not only in the result but in the act of production--within the producing activity itself."<sup>17</sup> But Marx also makes alienation tell the story of man's psychic estrangement from a human universe not under his control but in which he dwells. In this, Marx employs the notion of alienation to signal a simultaneously psychic and economic effect, each of which conditions the other. In using alienation to signify a double effect of estranged labor--exploitation and psychic disorientation--Marx is attempting to forge an analytic link between economy and psyche, between mode of production and habitus, that exceeds what is ordinarily conveyed by formulations of the relation between material life and consciousness. The recognition that appropriation of man's labor in capitalist commodity production produces a lived experience of alienation (and not merely alienation of his labor) is a recognition that the economic produces the subject not simply as an objective member of a class but as subjectivity. How else to read Marx's evocative lament,

The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He is at home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home....Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of the human imagination, of the human brain

and the human heart...operates on him as an alien, divine or diabolical activity--in the same way the worker's activity is not his spontaneous activity. It belongs to another; it is the loss of his self. As a result...man...no longer feels himself to be freely active in any but his animal functions...and in his human functions he no longer feels himself to be anything but an animal. What is animal becomes human and what is human becomes animal.<sup>18</sup>

This passage suggests that the economic is productive of and co-terminus with the non-economic, that labor is always more than labor, and the material is always already more than the material. In fact, there would appear to be a formulation of power here that exceeds the vocabulary Marx has for describing it since the psychic formation he hints at is at least as complex as the process of production he maps.<sup>19</sup> Had Marx had access to or developed such a vocabulary, however, the logics of power he asserts might well have unravelled, for the reverberation of power between psyche and economy would likely have undone any logical relation as their dynamic produced something far less general, predictable, and in any event less progressive. Alienated workers can strike, subvert, or even seize the apparatus of production, but what of alienated psyches?

Even within Marx's terms, however, it should be evident that to designate Marx's formulation of power in production as an economic or commodity model of power, as Foucault does, is to vastly reduce the complexity of Marx's understanding of the effects of commodified, appropriated, and alienated labor.<sup>20</sup> While the precipitating moment in this process is the reduction of labor to the commodity, labor-power, and the alienation of

that commodity from its owner, even this moment is compounded from a much denser operation of power: the commodity is itself achieved through alienation and the latter is a simultaneously physical and psychic operation, neither element of which exists without the other. Put the other around, alienation is itself the prior condition of the production of the commodity insofar as it is the condition of commodity fetishism and of the procurement of labor-power by the capitalist.

Moreover, the logic of power Marx traces in the operation of the commodity is, by his own admission, not a tangible but a "mystical" one, "at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses."<sup>21</sup> As he puts the matter in Capital, "the existence of things qua commodities, and the value-relation between the products of labor which stamps them as commodities, have absolutely no connexion with their physical properties and with the material relations arising therefrom."<sup>22</sup> In short, Marx treats this kind of power neither as a commodity nor as a material force but as constituted by ideology or what is here denoted as fetishism. Pace Foucault, Marx does not figure power as a commodity but precisely, as a relation that comes to assume commodity form, which is, crucially, the form in which the nature of power is mystified.<sup>23</sup>

While commodity fetishism is an inevitable feature of the capitalist mode of production, while it is an effect of that mode of production, it is also a prerequisite to such production: If commodities were not fetishized, capitalist production would not

be possible. "This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labor, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities."<sup>24</sup> Capitalist exchange requires mutual exchangeability of goods, that is, the universal emphasis on exchange value over use value that can only occur when all commodities are fetishized. Neither the elements of production (labor), nor the elements of exchange (commodities) nor the currency of exchange (money) could be mobilized without being fetishized. In this regard, the phenomenon of the fetish, a mystical phenomenon, is not only the inevitable effect of capitalist production, a material process, but is what enables that process. Both cause and consequence, prerequisite and effect, the strange logic of the fetish in Marx appears more paradoxical than even its psychoanalytic cousin whose essential formula, "I know, but still..." conveys an undulation inherent in the working of power, an inability to be fully captured by structure or formula because power must move and dissimulate in order to persist. Never linear or sequential, yet essential to the material production of material things, Marx acknowledges that, notwithstanding all of its material effects, the fetish can be apprehended only through "recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world."<sup>25</sup>

It might even be said that the fetish is the consummate form of power in Marx insofar as it mystifies and materializes in the same gesture, insofar as it crystalizes the necessity and

inevitability of mystification for materialization. Indeed, if fetishism is that process whereby power as a relation is obscured through reification, through the guise of an object, then what Marx calls material life, with all of its objective, tangible, and concrete character, is always already fetishized. The fetish exemplifies mystification as a mechanism in the production of power as material currency, the power of the commodity, and the power of capital. The fetish is an operation of power in a logic that defies both agency and physicality even as it participates in both, is constitutive of both. The notion of power transpiring as an operation is a crucial component of the larger schema of power that Marx maps insofar as it marks the spatial dimension of power for Marx, its production outside of a temporal logic of development and contradiction. This suggests again the misfire of Foucault's critique of Marxism as proffering a notion of power reducible to "economic functionality."<sup>26</sup>

Commodity fetishism is a necessary and inevitable emotional-psychic configuration of capitalism. It is necessary because it binds humans to capitalist production and mystifies both the production process and the bind. It is inevitable because "the life process of society"--the dead labor congealed in the commodity--is inherently veiled in an inegalitarian and alienated order. "The life process of society, which is based on the process of material production, does not strip off its mystical veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men, and is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled



plan."<sup>27</sup> In short, the logic of commodity fetishism draws upon a prior logic in which power is necessarily mystified when it is not collectivized, the latter being a moment, as we have seen, when power mysteriously vanishes. This set of logical entailments is not simply a political mandate but an ontological one, and to see it clearly, we must move from Capital (back) to The German Ideology and "The Jewish Question," and thus from the problem of fetishism back to the concept of the camera obscura.<sup>28</sup>

## iv

If commodity fetishism partakes of "the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world" where "the religious world is but the reflex of the real world", if it is thus the religious corollary of alienated production, a brief consideration of Marx's understanding of the logic of religion is in order. More than merely the "opium of the people" in oppressive regimes, Marx regards religious consciousness, like ideology, as simultaneously the distortion, the mirror, and the necessary product of such regimes. It is in all three senses that Marx asserts a literal as well as figural "connection of German philosophy [ideology] with German reality."<sup>29</sup> Similarly, in Capital, he links the alienated world of commodity production with Christianity's "cultus of abstract man."<sup>30</sup>

In The German Ideology, Marx proffers the science of ideology that binds together his philosophy of consciousness and

his philosophy of history in a tight, linear logic. These links are clearest in the famous passage articulating the relationship between the activity and the consciousness of men:

The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behavior. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc. of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.--real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life process.<sup>31</sup>

If what we see, regardless of how distortedly, is what is actually in the world, so, too, according to Marx, "consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence"--it refers to the reality of our existence. 'Existence' thus has the same objective status as the visual domain apprehended by sight. When life is whole, unalienated, and unstratified, Marx argues, the material basis of all consciousness is transparent; when life is alienated, stratified, and controlled by alien powers, so also does consciousness suffer these effects. As he remarks in Capital, "the religious reflex of the real world can...only then finally vanish, when the practical relations of every-day life

offer to man none but perfectly intelligible and reasonable relations with regard to his fellow men and to Nature."<sup>32</sup>

Crucially, however, the relation between alienated consciousness and life under alienated conditions is not amorphous: with the figure of the camera obscura, Marx precisely formulates consciousness's inversion of reality as well as a potential remedy for this inversion that matches the precise inversion of images in the retina (and correction of this inversion by the brain) entailed in the process of seeing. For Marx, the logic of ideology's inversion of reality is just as absolute, just as necessary and inevitable, as the retina's inversion of reality in sight. In both cases, reality is not simply distorted, but precisely inverted, upsidedown. Moreover, what appears initially as metaphor or homology between vision and consciousness collapses as the contiguity unfolds between the two processes he compares. Ideology is not merely comparable to vision but is itself about ways of seeing, or more precisely, ways of perceptually distorting the world; it is about not seeing what is objectively there to be seen because that objective there-ness appears to consciousness upsidedown. Ideology is defined by the systematic inversion and dissimulation of reality, an inversion and dissimulation of both its dynamics and effects. Marx's science of critique promises to correct this inversion just as surely and precisely as the brain corrects the retina's inverted image. Thus, the figure of the camera obscura (and of the brain righting the image that the retina inverts) is not

simply a figure but a physical formula both for the production of distortion in inegalitarian orders and for the brain's capacity to correct this distortion. In the case of vision, the brain is programmed to reverse the retina's inversion; in the case of ideology, the brain requires social science for this reversal. Here, in an almost parodic insistence on the logical order of things, is the scientific foundation (ideological inversion akin to retinal inversion) of scientific critique (systematic reversal and displacement of the inversion) of the science of power (systematic mystification of unequal social relations).

Yet, according to Marx, ideology's inversion of reality does not only produce metalepsis, but a more general dissembling of social dynamics and effects. Thus, for example, in Adam Smith's political economy, a "hidden hand" is understood to reconcile individual and common interests; in Hegel's philosophy of the state, the idea of the state and the idea of freedom realize one another and "transcend" the unfreedom of civil society. This dissembling that exceeds inversion pertains to two crucial differences between Marx's understanding of sight and of consciousness: first, in consciousness, the brain is not only "curative" of distortion but itself produces distortions; and second, consciousness apprehends (or conjures) not simply objects but dynamics of social reality, the source and logic of reality's movement and direction. Marx identifies both elements in the following passage of The German Ideology:

In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises.<sup>33</sup>

Marx locates the initial production of ideology in the historically achieved division between mental and manual labor, a division that permits consciousness to "flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice" but that also signals a social division of labor that founds class society, and hence the existence of structured inequality.<sup>34</sup> The character of this founding moment suggests that ideology is born both out of a logical need for mystification--the need to legitimate exploitation and inequality--and out of a logical ground for it--the splitting off of thought from material production, the sundering of what was originally whole. There is, in this regard, a religious logic at work in Marx's own thinking: 'In the beginning...we were one, whole, and lived in Truth...' Truth, communism, authenticity, and transparency are made to coincide at the beginning and the end of history.

In this splitting of manual and mental labor, ideology not only becomes necessary but possible, since this is the splitting that disembodies consciousness, separating it from bodily existence and experience, as the eye might be separated from the

brain. And it is here that Marx would seem to posit a very nearly primary alienation rather than one specific to capitalism: man does not experience the world "authentically" or accurately when he does not experience the whole of human activity in his own activity, when his activity is a fragment of a larger social order rather than a microcosm of it. Hence Marx's argument that "the life process of society...does not strip off its mystical veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men and is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan."<sup>35</sup> The religious logic in which man's original wholeness is now recovered through a rationally achieved and sustained unity with other men allows Marx to fantasize an overcoming of the (generative) element of mystification in power. It is an image of power transparent, self-revealing, harmless, and fully within the control of those in its field-- in short, not an image of power at all. At the culmination of the logic of history, power itself dissolves; or, as the matter has been more commonly formulated, history itself ends with the realization of true communism. History as contingency and conditions thwarting particular intention gives way to (a fantastic picture of) life executed according to a deliberate plan. This is an unhistorical life not simply because the logics of political economy, ideology, and so forth have come to an end, but because the frame of this life is no longer conceived of as external to the humans living it: our control of life conditions is, potentially,

absolute. Thus, it is not only that conditions are transparent, they are no longer determinant of our possibilities.<sup>36</sup>

The division between mental and manual labor undergirds the logic of ideology's inversion of reality in another way as well. The division itself sunders the ideational from the material world, consciousness from existence, and so renders that separation as a commonplace that becomes common-sensical. The division of mental and manual labor, in other words, becomes the basis on which consciousness (and philosophy, religion, etc.) "flatters itself that it has an independent existence." This division, in short, generates the splitting off of consciousness that in turn generates "independent" intellectual life-- philosophy and religion, but also science. Moreover, the domination in the relation articulated by the division is expressed through the autonomy of mental labor as a natural rather than a conventional effect. In this way, the division between manual and mental labor appears as both the prerequisite to and ongoing condition of an ideological construction of an inegalitarian social order. Ideology represents the perspective of mental labor that does not grasp its participation and location in a division of labor, tantamount to a mind that does not grasp its lodging in a body and a history, which is for Marx, precisely the condition of the philosophical mind. Thus do ideology and philosophy necessarily, rather than accidentally, coincide.

Put differently, when mental labor is separated from manual labor, its idealist conceit about the constituent elements and order of social life is not entirely wrong from the perspective it inhabits. The ruling class sees the world from the perspective of its disembodiment--its separation from its own bodies as well as from the social body of production. Marx phrases the political effect of this in a famous passage:

the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas...the ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relations, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore the ideas of dominance.<sup>37</sup>

In sum, there is a strict convergence between disembodied consciousness, a social position of domination, and the very production of idealist thought and philosophy. But this convergence, which is an effect of the division of labor, is also generative:

Once the ruling ideas have been separated from the ruling individuals and, above all, from the relationships which result from a given stage of the mode of production, and in this way the conclusion has been reached that history is always under the sway of ideas, it is very easy to abstract from these various ideas "the idea," the notion, etc. as the dominant force in history and thus to understand all these separate ideas and concepts as "forms of self-determination" on the part of the concept developing in history.<sup>38</sup>

The belief that ideas have a dynamic and trajectory of their own is the inevitable outcome of an order in which the "real" elements of material life are disguised, and in which consciousness is regarded as a wellspring rather than an effect



of history. "...[A]ccording to their fantasy, the relationships of men, all their doings, their chains and their limitations are products of their consciousness..."<sup>39</sup>

Idealist philosophy is not only logically entailed by the division between manual and mental labor, it assists in legitimating that division, and the inegalitarian order it inaugurates, insofar as it undergirds an ideological formulation of the state. Again, what appears at first as a homological relation emerges as a chain of power relations. It is not merely that idealism is to materialism as the state is to civil society (and heaven is to earth) in a structural sense, although Marx does make that argument. Rather, for him, the state's occupation of the space of political life in modernity is a specifically idealist conceit, predicated on the illusion that ideas or principles concerning liberty and equality are the site of enactment of these principles. The equation of the state with the political is further premised on the notion that values such as equality and liberty are secured through abstraction from the concrete dimensions and activities of social life, through removal from the (material) orders of life constitutive of its lived particularity. The universalist reach of the state, and of idealist claims about "man," "freedom," and so forth, are thus both a consequence of and legitimation for the division of mental and manual labor in class society. In the wake of this division, consciousness not only fantasizes its independence but its universal status--in part because it imagines its thoughts to be

independent of any body, time, or lived situation and in part because universalism is the necessary political claim of a class contesting for hegemony. "For each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it, is compelled...to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that is expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality..."<sup>40</sup>

Yet another respect in which the division of mental and manual labor and of ideas from material life entails rather than simply corresponds to an ideological formulation of state and civil society brings us closer to Marx's argument that the state as such is a product of the conflict between individual and community in inegalitarian orders. According to Marx's critique of Hegel, this is the conflict that is masked by the production of the state as the universal representative and as such, as the representation of community, a domain where harmony as well as freedom and equality can be said to prevail, and where the conflicts, unfreedoms, and inegalitarianism of civil society can be reconciled or discounted as comparatively insubstantial.

...out of this very contradiction between the interest of the individual and that of the community, the latter takes an independent form as the State, divorced from the real interests of individual and community, and at the same time as an illusory communal life, always based, however, on real ties existing in every family and tribal conglomeration...and...on the classes...which in every such mass of men separate out and of which one dominates all the others...

It follows from this that all struggles within the State...are merely the illusory forms in which the real

struggles of the different classes are fought out among one another..."<sup>41</sup>

In casting the state as an illusory domain of both politics and community, Marx would seem to be figuring the state as more than simply a mystification of them but as the site of their displacement or postponement. In other words, the mere presence of the state signals the absence of community and the displacement of "real struggles" among groups to a distorting but also limiting venue, a venue where they cannot be resolved. The state emerges in response to the contradiction between the interest of the individual and the community produced by the social division of labor; thus, some version of the state and its dissimulation of political life emerges under any conditions of inequality. While individuals experience their civil relations primarily through the idiom of individualistic conflict, capitalist relations of production situate them in relations of interdependence. This contradiction, in which subjects are caught simultaneously in relations of enmity and dependency, is smoothed ideologically by economic theories of the hidden hand, political theories of the benefits of interest group conflict, and philosophies of utilitarianism, each of which converts competitive self-interest into the common good. Marx, however, regards this contradiction as not only inherent to capitalism but as at the root of both the ideology of the political sphere as the domain of community, and the production of bourgeois individualism in the sphere of civil society. The state

represents the illusion of universal representation and of reconciliation of antagonistic civil interests.

In the "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" and the "On the Jewish Question," Marx argues that the state is only necessary because of conflict in civil society; the state presupposes rather than abolishes or resolves that conflict. Without the existence of such conflict, the state would have no raison d'etre. "Far from abolishing [the] effective differences [among individuals in civil society], the state only exists so far as they are presupposed."<sup>42</sup> State legitimacy is rooted in the logic of ideology that reverses this presupposition, the logic that figures the state's universality as prior to rather than dependent upon civil conflict. Yet this "illusion" is itself generative of state power and a certain form of political life, a power and a form which cannot be undone by puncturing the illusion on which it is based. For just as commodity fetishism and alienation cause "man's own deed to become an alien power opposed to him" in civil society, so does the power of the state rest on the displacement (from civil society to the state) of irreconcilable conflicts in civil society. This displacement of politics and postponement of universalism and community is not reversible but rather, is generative of the powerful institutions of the state as well as of the "depoliticized" character of civil society. The legitimacy of capitalism depends upon it being unpolitical; the legitimacy of the state depends upon it appearing to have nothing to do with capitalism or other media of

social conflict. The legitimacy of both depends upon the logic of inversion constitutive of ideology in inegalitarian orders, in short, upon the logic of power in ideology itself.

v

The logic of ideology traced thus far does not conclude with the illusory form of community provided by the state in alienated civil society. Marx moves next to show how the state/civil society relation mirrors, requires, and reproduces the relationship between heaven and earth in Christianity, and why Christianity is therefore the necessary rather than historically contingent religion of the modern state. The most succinct account of this mirroring occurs in "The Jewish Question" immediately following the passage in which Marx explains the fundamental mechanism of the liberal state discussed above, its presupposition of the very social powers (property, social rank, etc.) that it claims to overcome through their political abolition, its entrenchment in civil society of the particular elements that its universalism claims to transcend. On the heels of this claim, Marx writes:

All the presuppositions of this egoistic life continue to exist in civil society outside the political sphere, as qualities of civil society. Where the political state has attained to its full development, man leads, not only in thought, in consciousness, but in reality, in life, a double existence--celestial and terrestrial. He lives in the political community, where he regards himself as a communal being, and in civil society where he acts simply as a private individual, treats other men as means, degrades himself to the role of a mere means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers. The

political state, in relation to civil society, is just as spiritual as is heaven in relation to earth. It stands in the same opposition to civil society, and overcomes it in the same manner as religion overcomes the narrowness of the profane world, i.e., it has always to acknowledge it again, re-establish it, and allow itself to be dominated by it.<sup>43</sup>

Again, we need to ask whether the relation Marx ascribes to religion and the structure of a modern political order is a homological, analogical, or causal one. Does political life realize a certain religious formation? Is it more accurately understood as occasioned by this formation? In fact, Marx here surrenders the relatively simple notion of the camera obscura, in which ideology is the inversion of material reality, for a more complex and less easily metaphorized understanding of the subset of ideology that is religious consciousness. For religion does not merely invert material conditions but expresses elements of it, such as the separation of man "from himself and from other men."<sup>44</sup> In this vein, Marx describes political emancipation from religion (the formal secularism of the state and citizenship) as the moment in which religion ceases to be the "spirit of the state" and becomes instead "the spirit of civil society, of the sphere of egoism and of the bellum omnium contra omnes. It has become...an expression of the fact that man is separated from the community, from himself and other men."<sup>45</sup> Religion thus symptomatically expresses a certain experience, both emotional and physical in content, and so requires a reading attentive to the symptom it conveys. In Althusser's formulation, in ideology,

men do indeed express, not the relation between them and their conditions of existence but the way they live the relation between them and their conditions of existence: this presupposes both a real relation and an 'imaginary', 'lived' relation...In ideology, the real relation is inevitably invested in the imaginary relation.<sup>46</sup>

It is this slide between the "real" relation and "the way the relation is lived," this way in which the imaginary "carries" the real relation, that the notion of the camera obscura could not capture, and that required a more complex and in some ways less rigid or precise formulations of the mediations entailed in ideological expression and functioning.

For Marx, religious consciousness expresses not only a particular relation to existing conditions but, potentially, yearnings for a different order. Its fantastic formulations Marx reads as a kind of mass utopian political theory. Just as the ideology of universality, freedom, and equality in the liberal state signifies the desire for those unrealized values, so the Christian precepts of the brotherhood of man or equality in heaven represent the unrealized longing for them.<sup>47</sup> Or as Marx casts the matter with a slightly different emphasis: "just as Christ is the intermediary to whom man attributes all his own divinity and all his religious bonds, so the state is the intermediary to which man confides all his non-divinity and all his human freedom."<sup>48</sup> In the figure of the state and of Christ, ideology is shown to take very concrete forms: more than mere ideas or attachments of consciousness, ideology (mistakenly) attributes to the institutions of the church and the state powers

that are not their own, powers that are actually human capacities and human effects that come to be circuitously invested in church and state. But in and through this attribution, power is at the same time conferred upon these institutions, thus making the attribution at least partly true. Indeed, the power of these institutions is largely constituted by these systematic relations of misrecognition and misinvestment. From this perspective, the Althusserian construal of ideology as a force that is itself productive of the subject in its interpellative function appears to be far closer to Marx's own understanding than is often conceived.<sup>49</sup> Consider this passage from the "Jewish Question":

But the consummation of the idealism of the state was at the same time the consummation of the materialism of civil society...The formation of the political state, and the dissolution of civil society into independent individuals whose relations are regulated by law...are accomplished by one and the same act. Man as a member of civil society--non-political man--necessarily appears as the natural man...Egoistic man is the passive, given result of the dissolution of society...<sup>50</sup>

Marx here confesses the accomplishment of the state--a "celestial" and ideological entity--in dividing man against himself, in producing the depoliticization of civil society ("dissolving civil society into its elements"), in short, in bringing about the very political order and political subject that renders ideology as power. This same confession, however, undermines the notion of power as generative only in its strictly material form. Indeed, it undermines the claim that civil society alone is the "theatre of all history."



Although Marx does not made the argument himself, the state could be said to be fetishized much as commodities are, and to follow a similar logic of power and power's disguise. For the state, too, embodies "a definite social relation between men that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things" where the things at issue are institutions such as law and parliaments.<sup>51</sup> In this case, however, it is not human labor power but human political potential and political yearnings that are reified and refracted in state institutions. And these elements--potential and yearnings--cannot be commodified in the same way labor can, precisely because of their intangible dimensions, their non-definite quality. Hence Marx's alternative phraseology: Referring to the state as the "intermediary between man and human liberty" and Christ as the "intermediary to whom man attributes all his own divinity and his religious bonds," Marx concludes, "the state is the intermediary to which man confides all his non-divinity and all his human freedom."<sup>52</sup> Marx's language here--that of "attributing" and "confiding" (verlegen--to transfer in the sense of mislaying or misplacing)--is a language quite different from that of exploiting, extracting, and expropriating. In attributing and confiding freedom and non-divinity to institutions and phantasms, man is giving away by mislaying his capaciousness and independence, his sensual enjoyment of himself, his powers of self-governance. This disavowal or depowerment is not voluntary, of course, but is consequent to orders of power (church, state, and economy) that

solicit and depend upon it. Regardless of how it is accomplished, however, the mislaying does itself become a power, a political fact with enormous consequences. Like any fetish, the state becomes real through attribution, through psychic and social investment. Thus attribution is generative and not simply deflective, an admission Marx makes again and again yet cannot follow for its implications. Mystification is not simply a cover for power but a source of power, a maker of history.

This brief excursus into the relation between state, ideology and civil society suggests that the model as well as the logic of power pertinent to the state and religion implicates the analysis in the fetishism it criticizes. In its difference from the model of power he offers in Capital, it also suggests the limits of that model for understanding the economy. Would Marx have acknowledged as much had been able to return to the problem of the state and ideology in the unfinished part of Capital intended to take up these subjects? Would Capital have survived the return?

vi

Marx's effort to contain power in a critical mode through a strict materialist accounting of power is undone by his own recognition that the variety of institutions and ideas generated by particular modes of production (religion, the state, ideology) are themselves locales of power-- generative, creative, capable of making history. Power that would be tamed by materialist

analysis, rendered logical, predictable, and hydraulic, thus resists this taming. Power can no more be distinguished from its presentation than it can be separated from its particular institutional forms. Notwithstanding Marx's effort to do so, power does not bear a constant shape nor does it redound to a single source. And it is Marx himself, in his extraordinary attunement to the workings of power, who implicitly makes this recognition.

Marx's effort to tame or contain power in a normative mode, figured in his fantasy of an order in which power is completely negated by being completely shared, in which power emerges unadorned because the need for disguised has presumably evaporated, is also undone by his own recognition of power's unsharability. It is undone as well by Marx's appreciation of mystification as itself a modality of power.

The logics of power in Marx do not hold. What are the grounds of critique, and of normative visions, that can work free of these logics? This is a most serious question for Marxists who would seek to lay claim to political relevance.

#### Endnotes

1. "German Ideology" in The Marx-Engels Reader, second edition, ed. Robert Tucker (New York: Norton ), pp. 161-2.

2. Balibar continues: "He was to build the most powerful and comprehensive 'heteronomic' theory of politics in the history of philosophy, which relies on a provocative 'materialist' identification of politics with its 'other': what I call a short circuit of 'politics' and 'economy,' arising from the

simultaneous economic critique of 'politicism' and political critique of 'economicism'." Masses, Classes and Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy Before and After Marx, trans. J. Swenson (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. xi.

3. "Society and Economy in History", The Marx-Engels Reader, second edition, p. 136-137.

4. "German Ideology," p. 163,

5. In what follows, I will be moving between the "early" and "late" Marx with impunity, notwithstanding the changes of emphasis his work undergoes with regard to power's shape and location. This is because I take Marx's several different logics of power to offer a comprehensive social map that those of Capital alone cannot provide.

6. Capital, Volume I (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 176.

7. Capital, Volume 3 (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 817.

8. Capital, Volume 3, p. 817.

9. Capital, Volume I (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 176, emphasis added.

10. Capital, Volume 3, p. 827.

11. "German Ideology," p. 164.

12. This was, of course, Plato's recognition too, but justified by the beneficence of the philosophers at the helm. Plato differs from Marx as well in his appreciation of power's permanence in a polity--hence his solution to place it in the hands of those presumably uninterested in exploiting or even having it.

13. Capital, Volume 3, p. 819.

14. Marx's famous discussion of freedom and necessity in Volume III of Capital is instructive here:

Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilised man, and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. With his development, this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; but, at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom in this field can only

conssit in socialised man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control... But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis... (p. 820)

15. Capital, Volume 3, p. 814.

16. Capital Volume I, p. 233.

17. "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," The Marx-Engels Reader, second edition, p. 73.

18. "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts," p. 74.

19. The one place that this complexity is probed in experimental fashion is in Marx's critique of Hegel's Phenomenology in the "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts."

20. Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. C. Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980).

21. Capital, Volume I, p. 72.

22. Ibid.

23. What is the significance of this misreading on Foucault's part? That is, what does it mean that his reading of Marx on power engages in the very mystification Marx's criticizes in his theory of power?

24. Ibid, emphasis added.

25. Ibid. p. 72.

26. "Two Lectures," p. 88.

27. Ibid, p. 80.

28. In The Philosophy of Marx (London: Verso, 1995), Etienne Balibar suggests that Marx replaced the notion of ideology with the concept of fetishism. Fetishism does not, in Balibar's view, "represent of mere terminological variant [on ideology], but a genuine theoretical alternative, which has undeniable philosophical implications" (p. 42). With due appreciation for the interesting analysis following this claim, I want to argue

for more continuity between the two notions than Balibar's account emphasizes.

29. The German Ideology in The Marx-Engels Reader, second edition, ed. R. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 149.
30. Capital, Volume I, p. 79.
31. German Ideology, p. 154.
32. Capital, Volume I, p. 79.
33. German Ideology, p. 154, emphasis added.
34. Ibid. p. 159.
35. Capital, Volume I, p. 80.
36. As Marx puts the matter in reverse, "this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factor in historical development up till now." (German Ideology, 161)
37. German Ideology, p. 175.
38. Ibid, p. 174.
39. Ibid. p. 149.
40. Ibid. p. 175.
41. Ibid. p. 160.
42. "On the Jewish Question," Marx-Engels Reader, p. 33.
43. "Jewish Question," p. 34.
44. "Jewish Question," p. 35.
45. Ibid. p. 35.
46. Louis Althusser, For Marx (London: Ben Brewster, Allen Lane, 1969) pp. 233-234.
47. "Jewish Question," p. 35, 46.
48. "Jewish Question," p. 32.
49. "Ideology and State Apparatuses," Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. B. Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1971).

50. Ibid. p. 45-46.

51. Capital, Volume I, p. 72.

52. "Jewish Question," p. 32.

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