"Outwitting the Historical Dynamic: Mimesis and the Construction of Antisemitism in Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*

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OUTWITTING THE HISTORICAL DYNAMIC: MIMESIS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF ANTISEMITISM IN HORKHEIMER AND ADORNO'S *Dialectic of Enlightenment*

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I.

Dialectic of Enlightenment first appeared in 1944 in a limited mimeographed edition presented to Friedrich Pollock, the Institute for Social Research's economist, in honor of his 50th birthday. For that occasion the simple title Philosophische Fragmenten -- with its oblique allusion to Kierkegaard -- sufficed. When an altered and expanded version of the text was published four years later by Querido Verlag, the German exile publishing house in Amsterdam, title became subtitle and the title of the lead essay "Dialectic of Enlightenment" became its permanent title. Stylistic improvement notwithstanding, the intense discussion of the authorship, composition, and place of Dialectic of Enlightenment in the oeuvre of its co-authors that has unfolded over the past few years makes the rationale for the original title worth keeping in mind. This oddly structured book, with its two main essays, two "excursus", "theses" on anti-Semitism, and aphoristic "notes and drafts" attests to its erratic mode of composition over several years, and its mosaic of distinct genres of writing. The presumption that a unified "critical theory" could be embodied in this text, or in the work of the "Frankfurt School" as a whole, has long since become a dubious proposition.¹

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The publication of Rolf Wiggershaus' Die Frankfurter Schule and the Max Horkheimer Gesammelte Schriften, which includes correspondence, drafts, minutes of discussions, and internal institute debates that surrounded the composition of Dialectic of
Enlightenment, have contributed a great deal to our understanding of the circumstances under which it emerged during the years between 1938 and 1944. We can see the justification, as well as the exaggeration, of Horkheimer's assertion in the preface to the 1968 edition: "No outsider will find it easy to discern how far we are both responsible for every sentence. We jointly dictated lengthy sections; and the vital principle of the Dialectic is the tension between the two intellectual temperaments conjoined in it." This sentence, for all its ambiguity, stresses not merely the collaborative composition of the work, but the tensions out of which it was constructed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr's caveat, in his otherwise indispensable essay on the "Place of Dialectic of Enlightenment in the Development of Critical Theory," that "it is nonetheless to be doubted that both theories represent, in the sense of this declaration, an unbroken unity" is somewhat misplaced, since no such unity was implied.

Work on a proposed book began in earnest in late 1941, after Adorno's decision, taken after much prodding by Horkheimer (who provided detailed descriptions of the local real estate) to leave New York and join him in Santa Monica. Much of the book was written before and during the early days of American involvement in World War II, when its outcome was still uncertain, and only the "Elements of Anti-Semitism" were drafted during the last two years of the war. Its last "thesis" - added in 1947 - alone registers the authors' realization that Hitler's barbarism had exceeded even the most melancholy prognoses of 20th century philosophy's most melancholic thinkers.

Dialectic of Enlightenment was a collaborative work undertaken with no strict division of labor, nor any superordinate effort to conceal its authors' distinctive sensibilities and voices. This makes any definitive mapping of their respective roles difficult if not
impossible, though the extant manuscripts establish the main lines of responsibility for the book's distinct sections. According to Schmid Noerr, drafts found in either Horkheimer's or Adorno's papers make it reasonably certain that the Introduction, "The Concept of Enlightenment," "Excursus II" or "Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality" were largely drafted by Horkheimer, while the Excursus I on "Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment," and chapter on "The Culture Industry" were Adorno's responsibility. The "Notes and Drafts" are exclusively Horkheimer's while the "Elements of Anti-Semitism" can be attributed to Adorno, with the collaboration of Leo Löwenthal, though thesis "VII" which was written solely for the 1947 edition, was principally Horkheimer's.\(^5\)

Despite the reliability of this archival evidence, there is still considerable controversy over the authorship of the first chapter. Robert Hullot-Kentor, for example, "casts doubt on Horkheimer's primacy in its composition. With few exceptions, there are no comparable lines in the rest of Horkheimer's work' neither before nor after did he formulate such compelling ideas."\(^6\) Though obviously partisan to Adorno, his assertion is not entirely inconsistent with Rolf Tiedemann's account, attributed to Adorno himself, that both authors dictated "The Concept of Enlightenment."\(^7\) Oral testimony and stylistic clues must, as Schmid Noerr acknowledges, also be taken into account and joint authorship is further attested to by the fact that the recorded discussions between Horkheimer and Adorno in early 1939 bear most heavily on this chapter.\(^8\) At the time, Horkheimer described his work-habits to Paul Tillich as follows: "in the morning a short walk with Pollock, then directly after, based on rather methodical study, I write notes and drafts, and in the afternoon I see (at least) Teddie, in order to finalize the finished text."\(^9\)
Chapter I contains many formulations, particularly its detours into intellectual history, that could only stem from Horkheimer, and others are similar to those in his essay "The End of Reason" published in 1941 (which also emerged from the period of close collaboration with Adorno). For example, sentences such as "the increasingly formalistic universality of reason, far from signifying an increasing consciousness of universal solidarity expresses the skeptical separation of thought from its object," are typical of Horkheimer during this period.\(^{10}\) However, Horkheimer's sole authorship of the first chapter can be disputed on the grounds that its main theme of the self-destruction of reason through the domination of nature and the sacrifice of the ego was already substantially developed by Adorno more than a decade earlier in his Habilitation on Kierkegaard, and was reiterated in the draft of Zur Philosophie der moderne Musik, also written in 1941. The first chapter fuses that motif with Horkheimer's more general argument, characteristic of his early philosophical essays and set forth in the Eclipse of Reason (1946), that universally valid norms and the idea of a good society, once embodied in the tradition of "objective Reason" (Plato, Aristotle, German Idealism) had given way to the calculating, self-preserving "subjective reason" of modern bourgeois society. However, in the published version, the categories of objective and subjective reason no longer appear, and the reconstruction of rationality as the "myth of omnipotence" is grounded not in the history of philosophy but in philosophical anthropology.

Even more difficult to disentangle than authorship, is the question of how to weigh the respective authors' contribution to the text's central philosophical themes. Jürgen Habermas has elaborated a critique of Dialectic of Enlightenment which, briefly stated,
charges that the work "owes more to Nietzsche then just the strategy of an ideology critique turned against itself." According to Habermas, "Nietzsche gives the critique of reason such an affirmative twist that even determinate negation -- which is to say, the very procedure that Horkheimer and Adorno want to retain as the sole exercise, since reason itself has become so shaky -- loses its sting. Nietzsche’s critique consumes the critical impulse itself." Dialectic of Enlightenment subordinates critique to aesthetics, critical reflection and judgement to taste: "Nietzsche suppressed the paradoxical structure and explained the complete assimilation of reason to power in modernity with a theory of power that was remythologized out of arbitrary pieces and that, in place of the claim to truth, retains no more than the rhetorical claim proper to an aesthetic fragment." This fateful turn in critical theory is understandable only against the background of "the darkest years of the Second World War" when it appeared to the authors "that the last sparks of reason were being extinguished from reality and had left the ruins of a civilization in collapse without any hope."

Though Habermas does not substantially distinguish the two authors in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, elsewhere he clearly makes Adorno culpable for its fall into Nietzscheanism: "On the one hand, Dialectic of Enlightenment marks a break with the program pursued in the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung; on the other, it fits seamlessly into the continuity of a way of thinking later characterized as negative dialectics." Habermas also asserts that the more generous position that "Enlightenment must reflect on itself if humanity is not to be totally betrayed"(DE/5) is found only in those chapters in which Horkheimer’s hand is visible." Horkheimer’s pessimism, Habermas believes,
brought him closer to Benjamin's "theological" critique of progress and into a "temporary rapprochement" with Adorno. Horkheimer then issued assurances "covering up the differences that had always existed between their positions." Even the fragmentary character of the work bears traces of Adorno's conviction that philosophy had to follow Nietzsche's path: "It was not even Horkheimer's original intention that Dialectic of Enlightenment remain a collection of fragments. He had planned a systematic work and had previously made use of conventional forms of presentation. By contrast, Adorno was convinced from early on that fragmentary representation was the only suitable form for philosophical thought." It should at least be pointed out here that Horkheimer's own ambivalences regarding Nietzsche are more complex, a point that can be made by simply referring to Horkheimer's earlier collections of aphorisms, which even bore the Nietzschean title Dämmerung (Daybreak). Habermas holds Adorno entirely responsible for the excesses of a book that is something of an embarrassment for Horkheimer, who "holds fast with a defiance born of despair, and sometimes even an abrupt naivete, to the liberal heritage of the era of Enlightenment." Adorno's influence drew Horkheimer towards the radical critique of reason, while Habermas dissociates Horkheimer from the taint of Nietzscheanism by pointing to his discomfort with the text's preface: "If enlightenment is caught up in an irresistible process of self-destruction, then on what does the critique that determines this base its right to such a diagnosis? Since Nietzsche, the answer has always been the same: the radical critique of reason proceeds self-referentially; critique cannot simultaneously be radical and leave its own criteria untouched." Horkheimer, Habermas claims, "is troubled by this aporia" and he "shies away from the conclusion that the very act of enlightened
knowledge is affected by the process of self destruction." Horkheimer "would rather entangle himself in contradictions than give up his identity as an enlightener and fall into Nietzscheanism." Habermas’s version of the emergence of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is echoed by Richard Wolin when he writes that though it was "allegedly jointly dictated by Horkheimer and Adorno, the work’s basic theoretical inclinations seem to be overwhelmingly indebted to Adorno’s influences and proclivities. In fact, its fundamental argument tended to contradict not only the Institute’s previous positions on Western philosophy, metaphysics, and so forth, but also its philosophy of history, which had been, in the Marxist tradition, basically progressivist." This view makes Horkheimer and Adorno’s close collaboration in the late 1930s and early 1940s something of a pactum diaboli, and its most important result, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, if not anathema, certainly an anomaly in the history of critical theory.

II.

A rereading of the text of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, as well as the supporting documentation and correspondence in the Max Horkheimer-Archiv suggests that this account serves more establish Habermas’s role as the legitimate heir of the original Frankfurt School than to illuminate the conditions under which it emerged. A rather different, perhaps even opposing interpretation in which Horkheimer’s often undialectical pesseimism is consistently challenged by Adorno’s more acutely "desperate hope" is more plausible. No doubt in the 1940s both authors shared a sense of civilizational breakdown -- hardly illegitimate in light of the events of that era. But even their specific prognoses, for example, differences over the
probable outcome of the war, shows that Adorno registers far more optimism than does Horkheimer, whose attachment to his youthful idol Schopenhauer, came increasingly to the fore. For example, in a May 1945 letter to Horkheimer, lamenting the fact that they could not be together at the moment that the Hitler regime collapsed, Adorno could not resist commenting that his "bourgeois thesis, that Hitler could not hold on, had ironically if belatedly, been confirmed." 

Adorno never "slipped into irrationalism" as Habermas' antipodal interpretation implies, while Horkheimer's prognoses and philosophical reflections frequently take on the contours of a truly apocalyptic pessimism. As Hullot-Kentor rightly points out, there is no evidence that the passages arguing for the weak power of reason are, as Habermas claims, "from Horkheimer's hand," and many other passages from Adorno's work attest to the fact that "he is pursuing a critique of reason by way of reason." Wiggershaus too cites examples from Adorno's draft of Zur Philosophie der neuen Musik (published 1949), written shortly after his arrival in California, which directly parallel the assertions of the paradoxical character of enlightenment in the development of modern music: "conscious control over natural musical material is both the emancipation of humanity from the musical compulsion of nature, and the subordination of nature to human aims." 

Habermas's interpretation manifestly ignores, as Alfred Schmidt notes, "the fact that Horkheimer appropriates historical materialism from a Schopenhauerian point of view from the very beginning." It is not so that Adorno's influence seduced Horkheimer away from his earlier preoccupation with the recouping of an "eclipsed" tradition of Enlightenment thought. Horkheimer regarded the rejection of all rationalistic systems and the "move from
Kant to Schopenhauer" as "an advance in the self-enlightenment of reason, not a relapse into irrationality," a view that underscores the many references to Schopenhauer throughout his early work, particularly in his belief that the blind contingency of history and the suffering of individuals could not be redeemed by an abstract, objective Reason.\(^{28}\) The thesis of a clearcut division between the rationalist Horkheimer and the irrationalist Adorno does not do justice to the "tensions" between the authors alluded to by Horkheimer in his preface, and in many respects blocks an understanding of the distinctions between them privately acknowledged elsewhere by the authors themselves.

Moreover, even an adequate summary of their distinct philosophical positions would not exhaust the ambivalences, tensions and dissonances that often plagued not only the composition of this work, but the individual authors. For example, in a letter to Adorno, written just before the latter's arrival in California and the beginning of the period of collaboration on *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Horkheimer remarked: "That I myself feel, comically enough, that we are being pressed against our will into a front with rationalism, which no longer exists, and as the main content of my essay I am thinking about the delimitation from rationalism. But I confess that at the moment, I do this with difficulty."\(^{29}\) To be sure, both before and after writing *Dialectic of Enlightenment* Horkheimer placed greater emphasis than Adorno on "rescuing the enlightenment" (a title he proposed for the never written sequel to *Dialectic of Enlightenment*), but it was, as I will argue, Horkheimer's, and not Adorno's pessimism, that precluded further collaboration on the planned volume in the post World War II era. Thus, we can conclude that it is more in reaction to the perceived threat of an "irrationalist" postmodernism that Adorno's reputation
has so readily been sacrificed to restore the rationalist roots of critical theory.\textsuperscript{30}

III.

In the Fall of 1931 a series of internal discussions were held at the Institut für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt on the general theme of the "crisis of science." Their point of departure was Horkheimer's recently published article "The Present Situation of Social Philosophy" which had appeared earlier that year. Horkheimer maintained that a reconstruction of social philosophy was no longer possible and that the interdisciplinary research program which he had proposed for the Institute — guided by theoretical reflection on "the essential"— was the only reasonable way to confront the impasse: "The current situation of social philosophy can be understood in principle in terms of its dissolution, and of the impossibility of reconstructing it in thought without falling behind the current state of knowledge."\textsuperscript{31} Horkheimer defended his conclusions against Adorno's criticism that his conception of an interdisciplinary social theory was "too primitively formulated" and that it conceded far too much to analytical empirical research. Adorno's difficulties with what he called Horkheimer's "two world theory" in which subjective reason was confronted with the impossibility of objective theoretical reflection could, he noted, be avoided only by "the singular moment of non-identity," in which dialectical thought gives itself over to the object as "merely concrete phenomenality."\textsuperscript{32} It was, Adorno said, preferable to completely abjure any "total dialectic" than risk, as did Horkheimer, becoming both "a theoretical positivist and a practical materialist."\textsuperscript{33}
When the Institute moved to New York in 1936 these discussions resumed, and, by 1939, already began to touch on some of the central themes of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. At that time, Horkheimer's still retained the hope that historical materialism could bring sensual, empirical reality into the domain of theory without abandoning either the achievements of the scientific understanding of the world, or the historicity of Hegel's critique of Kant. Horkheimer and Adorno's exchanges at that juncture capture some of the essential differences between their conceptions of philosophy in the late 1930s:

Horkheimer: "For me it is a matter of more strongly highlighting the positive importance of the moment of the factual for dialectical theory. Even we have to work with substantial relations (*Sachverhalte*), which can be controlled, or else we have no criterium any longer to distinguish sense from nonsense."

Adorno: "One must be very subtle here. We must determine the distinctions between the positivist concept of facts and our concept of substantial relations."³⁴

Here Adorno alludes to his long essay on Husserl, which was concerned with establishing the nature of "*Sachverhalte*" or substantial relations without falling, as he believed Husserl had, into assuming the existence of Transcendental ego. Only the historicity of experience could escape the idealist moment lurking in any positivist epistemology.

"Facts," Adorno claimed, "are always that which as *caput mortuum* [dead physical existence] is left over from the historical process. The substantial things of which we speak are actually never a first, but always a last: the are the Residua, that which remains indissoluble against a fully developed state of theory."³⁵ These conversations often go the core of the distinct understandings of "theory" that coexisted in critical theory at that time. Whereas
Horkheimer still conceived of theory in conventional Hegelian terms "as the tension between you yourself and reality," or as "a means to come to terms with the world" Adorno reacted caustically: "Theory is, god knows, not the holy Spirit. Nor can Theory be reduced to spontaneity or to thought, it has the facts within itself."^36

Horkheimer's attempt to reconcile Hegel with contemporary scientific developments appeared to Adorno as a fixation on the concept of totality, and he questioned whether the very definition of facticity proposed by Horkheimer didn't presuppose an organizing totality in the Hegelian sense. "The whole difference with Hegel lies one stratum deeper than the distinction between totality and non-finality, namely if everything, which falls into the circle of thought, appears only as thought or if it can be really seen as something which does not fall into it, but which can still only be understood in relation to thought." Recalling Benjamin's prologue to the "Baroque book" (The Origin of the German Play of Mourning), Adorno admitted that "the kind of gaze that I have, is such that it finds in things the refraction (Widerschein) of that light source, which can never be the object of intention and thought."^37 Such starkly theological motifs remained incomprehensible to Horkheimer who suggested that Adorno might have an "omniscient wink of the eye." That Adorno took the joke seriously is not untypical: "All that remains of theology is the wink of the eye."^38 Adorno affirmed not a nihilistic collapse of reason, but the credo he had expressed in his Kierkegaard study in 1933: "The supreme paradox of all thought is the attempt to discover something that thought cannot think."^39 Unlike Horkheimer, Adorno remained skeptical of any statement in which truth is positively expressed: "I cannot conceal my opinion that a formulation of the concept of truth without a particular conception of negative theology is
impossible."40

The gap between Horkheimer’s skepticism concerning a theory that no is no longer capable of containing the world as facts (positivism) and the world as moral imperative (the ideal), and Adorno’s phenomenological philosophy of immanence, was not, however, in those years, entirely unbridgeable. They acknowledged, often with brutal frankness, their differences in style and depth. Horkheimer’s prose, Adorno once tells "is below the experience which you would like to communicate, while mine, is far above that, which I can communicate."41 As Adorno put it, "I believe, that our conceptions are much more similar here than it may at first appear. I always say, that theory does very little, almost nothing, it solves only the questions, that are brought to it from materiality." Adorno also reassured Horkheimer that despite their differences, they still shared a "hope for utopia." Adorno the metaphysician who distrusted metaphysics,"and Horkheimer, the materialist who distrusted positivism, had, Adorno observed, arrived at a similar point from two different perspectives42: "The fact that I was influenced by certain metaphysical thoughts, and that you liquidated the entire positivistic heritage of Marxism is not accidental. It comes from a certain feeling of impoverishment in that kind of knowledge, where there is cognizance of the of traces." This, he said, contained "my core philosophical experience, and your critical motor."43

If these conversations demonstrate their different styles and "sensibilities" they also point to broad areas of consensus. Adorno did not entirely reject Horkheimer’s insistence pm facticity, nor his implication that theory was linked to experience, remarking that he too had to "follow the facts." While Horkheimer’s mistrust of any closed theory presupposed the
identity of "each insight" and the whole of the theory, Adorno asserted, "I instead require the thicket of experience."44

IV.

In June 1941 Hannah Arendt provided Adorno with a copy of Benjamin’s last text, the now famous "theses on the philosophy of history." Though Benjamin had instructed that it not be published, and though there was, as Adorno put it, "a certain naivete in the passages that speak of Marxism and politics cannot be overlooked," in light of Benjamin’s suicide he urged Horkheimer to publish the theses as a kind of testament. More importantly he emphasized that "no other work of Benjamin shows him to be closer to our intentions." Its major themes: history as a permanent catastrophe, the critique of progress, the domination of nature, and the attitude toward culture were indicative of his — and their -- intellectual preoccupations. But, Adorno also added a postscript with his reservations. In particular, he noted, thesis XIII with its notion of "progression through a homogenous empty time" troubled him, since it appeared to reduce the "conformist conception of history" to the "appearance of time" as something "sui generis." And finally Adorno questioned whether Benjamin’s explicitly messianic emphasis on "the presence of the now" would "entirely liquidate the image of the future from utopia," adding parenthetically and underlining in handwriting, "by the way, we would have difficulty speaking of the 'whore' ratio."45

V.
The arrival of Benjamin's philosophical testament provided for Horkheimer and Adorno, as Wiggershaus notes, a kind of "guiding star" around which the constellation of themes -- the fate of the exile, the fate of the Jews, and catastrophe of civilization -- that ultimately make up Dialectic of Enlightenment could be organized. In a work of exile that makes Homer's ancient exile its "hero," the narrative of Odysseus provides a kind of allegory of the theory elaborated in the first chapter. Odysseus embodies the "homesickness" that is the origin of the adventure through which subjectivity is first constituted in the epic narrative, and who "by his cunning and reason escapes prehistory."(O/139.) As Odysseus resists regression into the world of magic and matriarchy, the modern epic of the homelessness, exile, and diaspora of reason is counterpoised to the fascist glorification of rootedness and the mythology of Heimat. In the Odysseus chapter any "phantasm of a lost golden age" is explicitly rejected. Rather, heimat "is the state of having escaped."(O/139)

To Nietzsche's adage, "It is even part of my good fortune not to be a house-owner," Adorno commented, "Today, we should have to add: it is part of morality not to be at home in one's home."

Yet, the price of this "escape" is identity, the imitatio of the power of the gods in the power of the individual ratio. The reason that outwits myth becomes mythological. Rational thought, the intellect, binds itself to its object to the degree that it attempts to undo its power over thought. Reason sacrifices itself to myth, in its effort to outwit myth by replicating nature. By its very dependency on the object, it is robbed of its autonomy and freedom, so that "all sacrifice in the domain of consciousness assumes the form of the paradoxical."(K/119)

For Horkheimer and Adorno, enlightenment does not consist of drawing boundaries
against myth, but in acknowledging both the mythical character of rationality and the rational character of myth: "Just as the myths realize enlightenment, so enlightenment with every step becomes more entwined in mythology."(DE, 16) Enlightenment no longer demands the derogation of myth that the eighteenth century savants indulged with generous wit and scathing criticism, but an appreciation of the price of progress as "the mythical sacrifice of Reason." Exile brings with it speech, discourse, and remembrance of disaster. Enlightenment, in this sense is equated with the "cold distance of narration"(O/140).

The first chapter of Dialectic of Enlightenment is a genealogy of the mimetic origins of consciousness: first in the order of animistic identification, then in magic, subsequently in myth and finally in Reason: "The categories by which Western philosophy defined its everlasting natural order marked the spots once occupied by Oncus and Persephone, Ariadne and Nereus."(DE/5) At all stages the concept of mimesis, understood not as imitation, but as a form of mimicry that appropriates rather than replicate its object in a non-identical similitude, plays a central role in Dialectic of Enlightenment. Mimesis is not the repression of difference but an act of substitution that intervenes between the helpless subject and the overpowering object: it appears in the terror with which all living creatures react to fear, in the magician’s impersonation of demons, in his gestures of appeasement to the gods, or in the wearing of masks which guarantee that the identity of self "cannot disappear through identification with another"(DE/10). From the earliest stages of human culture, language is bound up with mimetic sacrifice, which involves the ritual substitution of an animal that is both representative and surrogate, the "non-specificity of the example," already marks a step toward discursive logic."(DE/10) Mimesis therefore represents both the prefiguration and
the "other" of reason: in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* the modern principle of calculability and equivalence is already prefigured by a growing abstraction and distance from nature that occurs first in the "specific" duplication of anthropomorphism, in the "non-specific" sacrifice, and ultimately in the unification of myth as the sovereignty of the human subject over nature.

Yet, as "second nature," mimesis is completely assimilated to its object, repressed by the act of subjugating nature to instrumental reason. "The *ratio*, which represses mimesis, is not simply its opposite. It too is mimesis: mimesis of death." The domination of nature is adaptation, renunciation, calculation. It "renders unto nature what is nature's and precisely thereby deceives it"(O/122). Mimesis only retains its former status "weakly" in works of art which self-consciously refuse to "imitate" or "authentically" replicate reality, which refuse, as Martin Jay notes, "to imitate or be assimilated entirely to a bad external reality — by paradoxically honoring, one might say, the Jewish taboo on graven images — works of art hold out the hope for the return of a more benign version of mimesis in a future world beyond domination and reification."50

Rationality is thus both equated with and marked off from other historical forms of mimesis, as mimesis' realization, overcoming, and prohibition. Reason "asserted the power of repetition over reality, long after men had renounced the illusion that by repetition they could identify themselves with the repeated reality and thus escape its power"(DE/12). The prohibition on the graven image extends far beyond the representation of nature in animism or sacrificial substitution: "Just as hieroglyphs bear witness, so the word too originally had a pictorial function."(DE/17) However, in enlightenment, the word as sign abandons the claim
to be like nature and is distributed among the different art forms, further separating mimesis or "imitation" from substitution as the abstract equivalence of the concept: "as a system of signs, language is required to resign itself to calculation in order to know nature and must discard the claim to be like it" (DE/18). Not merely *imitatio* but self conscious inauthenticity is the all-important element in mimesis: In the substitution that occurs in every ritual sacrifice, the "stupidity of the ritual" serves "the cleverness of the weaker."

The taboo on pictoriality in the modern world is explicitly identified with Jewish Monotheism, which proscribed imitation by converting ritual into law. The Jews crossed the threshold from mythology to symbolism not by eliminating adaptation to nature, but by converting it into a series of duties in the form of ritual: The Jews "transformed taboos into civilizing maxims when others still clung to magic" (DE, 186). Over thousands of years the Jews carried forward the process of enlightenment by enacting and transforming the taboo on images: "The Jews seemed to have succeeded where Christianity failed: they defused magic by its own power -- turned against itself as ritual service of God. They have retained the aspect of expiation but have avoided the reversion to mythology which symbolism implies" (DE, 186). However, even in the "disenchanted world of Judaism," Horkheimer and Adorno write, mimesis is still expressed in the "bond between name and being" that is recognized in "the ban on pronouncing the name of God."(DE/23)

In the *Odysseus* chapter the premythical magical world is identified as matriarchal, populated by "ancient heroines" and by Odysseus' own mother. Mythic mimesis, is as, Andrew Hewitt has argued, is already a step beyond these images, a step towards the symbolic, to the point where "mimesis feeds into rationality."
premythic world of archaic images, he suggests, is to fall back into the "nondifferentiation of nature" and any preemptive attempt to reactivate archaism, as in fascism breaks through the prohibition by a return to a world of inauthenticity and terror masking as authenticity, heroism, and "being-in-the world." The "language of images" of mass cultural hieroglyphics are equally regarded as a "medium of regression" which "displays the archaic images of modernity."

For Adorno and Horkheimer there is no "outside" of enlightenment once image and knowledge are completely severed, and no "authentic experience" can artificially restore the lost unity. True mimesis in the realm of art does not claim authenticity, but as Miriam Hansen shows, "assumes a critical and corrective function vis-à-vis instrumental rationality and the identifying logic of conceptual language which distances subject from object and represses the non-identity of the latter." Adorno's concept of mimesis is close to Benjamin's insofar as it is both the remembrance of a "nonsensuous similarity," between image and thing, and at the same time, an attempt to conceptually recapture the survival of mimesis in language, substituting for the identity of word and thing "a gap between the words and the things they conjure." Art can never substitute for concepts, nor can a world of images be restored. If enlightenment is a "universal taboo" on images, dialectic counters the taboo by interpreting every "image as writing," disclosing its false claims to authenticity. The "sacrifice" required of consciousness is understood by Horkheimer and Adorno in Hegel's sense, not as positivistic reason, but as the negation of false mythology.

In art, which contains the utopian remembrance of the world before the prohibition and the illusion of its overcoming, "the capacity of representation is the vehicle of progress
and regression at one and the same time."(DE/35) In *Minima Moralia* Adorno chides Nietzsche, whom he says was wrong to have reproached Wagner with play-acting since "all art, and music first of all is related to drama," and more importantly, because his reproach betrays his own inability to penetrate the fetishism of authenticity. Adorno's criticism of Nietzsche is further elaborated in the remark that despite his radical approach to truth, "the word genuine stands unquestioned exempt from conceptual development".56

Mimesis for Adorno stands in the same relation to authenticity, as theology stands in relation to ontology. Ontology refers here to the claim to totally encompass being by its concept, which is the essence of any claim to authenticity: "Indeed, not only inauthenticity that poses as veridical ought to be convicted of lying: authenticity itself becomes a lie the moment it becomes authentic, that is in reflecting on itself, in postulating itself as genuine, in which it already oversteps the identity that it lays claim to in the same breadth."57 For the founding thinkers of existentialism, Kierkegaard, for example, the doctrine of inwardness, and "the priority of the self is as untrue as that of all who feel at home where they live." If, as Adorno asserts, all that is human is "indissolubly linked to imitation," any claim to genuineness is ultimately disingenuous. Theology, on the other hand, adopts the "likeness" of self to God, but never assumes its identity. As opposed to the idea of genuineness and authenticity, Adorno, maintains, the "self should not be spoken of as the ontological ground, but at most theologially, in the name of its likeness to God."58
VI.

By its repression of mimesis -- which is the prohibition on the name and likeness of God -- the self-sacrifice of enlightenment, as Adorno had written earlier, "is carried out with its own categories, rationally."59 Through the element of deception, sacrifice is transformed into subjectivity; the phrase "subjectivity is truth" is therefore entirely paradoxical. It "reveals the horrible lineaments of the sacrificial mask. In the demonic sacrifice of consciousness, man is still the rule of a sinful creation; through sacrifice he asserts his rule, and the name of the divinity succumbs to his demonic nature."60

During their initial conversations about myth and enlightenment during the Winter of 1939, the idea for an "Urgeschichte" or primal history of subjectivity first makes an appearance in Horkheimer's question: "Where does the experience of the individual appear decisively for the first time?" Significantly, it is Oedipus and not, as is later the case, Odysseus who immediately comes to mind as the figure who embodies the identity of selfhood with property and power. A passage retained only in altered form in Dialectic of Enlightenment offers this account: "Oedipus's answer to the riddle of the mythical sphinx, which he makes disappear, constitutes the Identity of the human being against the disparity of his stage of life. In the same moment as the word "the human being" drives the sphinx into the abyss, both the vagabond wife and the imperium fall into his possession"61 The real crime of Oedipus is perhaps "nothing less than the fact that he became an individual and possessed something." Here they drew a tentative connection between the incest taboo and the dissolution of the communal property. The site of the tragedy is the boundary line
between "myth and maturity" (Adorno) or what Horkheimer calls "the announcement of the power of humanity through thought: The beginning of 'humanism'." Not surprisingly, it is also in the course of this discussion of the mythical stage of history, that a direct parallel is drawn between "regression to the collective body" (Adorno) and the fascist concept of the "mass."  

Horkheimer and Adorno's decision to shift the focus from Oedipus to Odysseus, can therefore only be partially explained as a shift from psychoanalytic theory to philosophical anthropology. Oedipus emerges in the published text, not as a thinker who solves the riddle of the sphinx, but who, by dint of a trick, "evades" it. The element of deception, which occurs in the very act of substituting the "mask" for the name or image, is even more central to the story of Odysseus, and thus to the central theme of the prohibition on mimesis that emerges in the first chapter.

Freud, as the authors were aware, also invested Oedipus' fate with the originary tale of maturity against myth, individual against multiplicity, identical subject against the chthonic forces of nature that conspire to tear the ego asunder. The Oedipal narrative is at once a prohibition against regression to the maternal body, to a descent into undifferentiated nature, and an assertion of the struggle to acquire the autonomous ego of the father to internalize the paternal prohibition. However, since the ego "knows nothing" of the id, the latter remains "the perennial element of that which is not absorbed into identity." In the course of their discussions of myth, both Adorno and Horkheimer retreated from the Freudian concept of "the individual. The problem with Freud's Oedipal story, they claimed, is that it already assumes as a goal what it purports to explain whereas "the individual is only a theater."
Since the outcome of the struggle presumes authentic selfhood, however, Horkheimer and Adorno regarded Freud’s account as the "inadequate attempt to do justice to the historical transformations which the individual undergoes."\(^60\)

*Dialectic of Enlightenment* also attributes to *Totem and Taboo* the conclusion that there are no parallels between totemic mimesis and the scientific description of nature. Freud, they claim, restricts the absolute identity of thought and reality to magic, ignoring the way that sovereignty reappears in the autonomy of ideas achieved by the rational ego. These remarks notwithstanding, Horkheimer and Adorno’s account of the prohibition on mimesis closely parallels Freud’s discussion in *Totem and Taboo*. In both texts conscience and consciousness arise as the consequence of an originary prohibition of images that occurs at primordial juncture in human evolution, and both interpret the prohibition as the impetus for its transformation into abstract thought. As Gertrud Koch points out, Adorno did not simply consider the prohibition in terms of a historical moment of cultural anthropology, but conceived of aesthetics as a "particular variant of the Jewish prohibition on images." The prohibition leads, on the one side, to the liquidation of the image and the traces of animism in magical cult and ritual, but also on the other, to the autonomy of the artistic representation.\(^65\)

At the core of Freud’s interpretation of the originary prohibition on uttering the name of the dead, is his claim that "totemic religion arose from the filial sense of guilt, in an attempt to allay that feeling and to appease the father by deferred obedience to him."\(^66\) Fear of the dead is the result of a hostile projection of evil impulses into demons that gives rise to animism." In Freud’s narrative this fear leads to the substitution of animal names for the
name of the dead, and extends through a series of displacements designed both to outwit the evil spirits, and to efface the hostile feelings. In the fully developed totemic system the prohibition on the image of the father gives way to religion. The prohibition on representing the dead is thus "probably the earliest form in which the phenomenon of conscience is met with."67 Freud also remarks on how the mimetic impulse takes the form of the "symptom" in hysteria, and how neurotic behavior parallels the growing process of abstraction from totem animal to God, and ultimately to scientific rationality: "It might be maintained that a case of hysteria is a caricature of a work of art, that of an obsessional neurosis is a caricature of a religion, and that a paranoic delusion is a caricature of a philosophical system."68 Thus, the origins of consciousness is located at the intersection of two decisive processes: the prohibition of the image and its displacement into the abstract system, and the need to differentiate self from nature.

In their initial conversations Adorno and Horkheimer often equated Odysseus with Oedipus, perhaps following a passage in Beyond Good and Evil where Nietzsche anticipates dialectic of enlightenment: "hardened in the discipline of science, he [man] stands before the rest of nature, with intrepid Oedipus eyes and sealed Odysseus ears, deaf to the siren songs of old metaphysical bird catchers who have been piping at him all too long, "you are more, you are higher, you are of a different origin."69 The equation of Odysseus with Oedipus here concerns their respective blindness and deafness to nature, while for Adorno and Horkheimer, the capacity for speech, for its transcendence in music and images, also divides humanity from nature. In the Freudian account, the story of Oedipus presents the differentiation from mother and myth as tragedy. However, in Horkheimer and Adorno's,
Oedipus's blindness to his fate cannot compare with the more powerful theme of the Homeric hero's successful evasion of the presymbolic and premythical world of identity through cunning and reason. In the course of their discussions the fundamental paradox of enlightenment emerges even more emphatically in relation to the conclusion of the Homeric epic: "Myth bears witness equally to the enslavement of humanity to nature, and to the possibility of escape." Adorno also alludes to his book on Kierkegaard, where he wrote that in the act of annihilating nature, spirit becomes subordinate to nature by its act of mimesis, "originating in nature itself, hope is only able to truly overcome it by maintaining the trace of nature."

Mythical narratives for Adorno are the "replicas of prelinguistic experience in a world from which prelinguistic experience has already disappeared." His interest in the destructive potential of mimetic identification with nature was reinforced by his inordinate interest in a text which played an important if peripheral role in the discussions out of which Dialectic of Enlightenment emerged, La mante religieuse, Recherche sur la nature et la signification du mythe by the French anthropologist Roger Caillois. Caillois was a leading figure of the College de Sociologie (with which Benjamin was briefly associated), and Adorno reviewed the book for the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Caillois' focused on the residues of animal biology in the psychic life of the individual, exemplified by the Praying Mantis' devouring of her mate in the moment of copulation as the natural historical source for a variety of similar motifs in myth and religion. Though Caillois posits a kind of primal biological "memory" in human behavior, Adorno was "positively stimulated" by it ("Es hat mich positiv berührt"), especially because of Caillois attention to the material elements in the construction of myth.
Above all, what drew Adorno to Caillois' text was his emphasis on the mimetic impulse in nature, an impulse that was all the more "strange" because the organism -- in the mimetic act -- gives up the vital difference between life and matter, the organic and inorganic. Much as Adorno's philosophy regarded mimesis as a particular instance of the compulsion to identity that obliterates distinction, so in the animal kingdom mimickry is the "fatal attraction" that annihilates itself in the act of desire. Adorno's analysis of anti-Semitism, as we shall see, adopts the same strategy, locating in modern Jew hatred the return of the archaic impulse to mimesis, which in its antipathy, imitates and therefore liquidates the Jew, all the more consequentially.

Adorno was aware that Caillois' theory bore traces of "Freud's theory of the death drive," "Jung's collective unconscious," and "fashionable anthropology," and that it threatened to reduce all mythology to its biological substratum, thus making incomprehensible "all human attempts to escape from the blind context of nature." In a letter to Benjamin, he explained that the fact that Caillois had not dissolved myths into some immanent theory of consciousness, or flattened them into the growing capacity for conscious symbols (a reference to Ernst Cassirer's account of myth which he and Horkheimer explicitly rejected in their discussions) resulted from the "materialism that he has in common with Jung and certainly with Klages," and with a "cryptofascist belief in nature." As if to underscore the "mantis" as the emblem of fascist regression to undifferentiated and captivating femininie destructiveness, he adds that myths first emerge when a conflict comes into existence between the self identical human essence (Menschenwesen) and the husband eating woman. "As opposed to Caillois, Adorno sees
myth is an explanation for the fact that human beings were once animal, and now have become something else, while Caillois basically takes pleasure in the fact that they are still animals. "What we have to 'rescue' in the individual is the moment of thought or language," a concept of language that, as Horkheimer adds, is lost in any fundamental ontology of being, since "the moment of slyness or cunning disappears."  

VII. 

_Dialectic of Enlightenment_ initially arose from two distinct projects, a book on "dialectical logic" which Horkheimer planned to write as early as 1934 with the assistance of Marcuse and Karl Korsch, and the so-called "anti-Semitism project" which was initially financed by the American Jewish Committee, and on which Horkheimer and other members of the Institute worked intensively during 1943. By then, however, it was already evident that Horkheimer and Adorno's efforts conformed to neither of these projects but would consist of a separate work, one in which, as Horkheimer noted, "the fragments contain the principles of philosophy to which we can stand and which is really original"  

At that time, several theses on the psychology of anti-Semitism, originally destined to become part of the larger empirical research project on anti-Semitism, ended up as material to be included in the volume of "fragments."  Thus it is understandable that in the first months of collaborative work on the _Dialectic of Enlightenment_ anti-Semitism did not manifest itself as a central concern. Nor was it mentioned in the internal Institute memorandum" of 1942 which outlined the Institute's future projects in terms of a conventionally Marxian program of
political and economic analyses. "It appeared," Wiggershaus comments, as if Horkheimer and Adorno were still afraid of this theme, or they allowed it to perform its function as a "hidden center" of the book. No doubt a decision to shift the focus of critical theory from the traditional Marxist questions of monopoly capitalism or class conflict to the fate of the Jews would have produced dismay and skepticism among the Institute’s more orthodox Marxist contributors. Franz Neumann, for example, wrote Adorno in 1940 that "I can imagine, and I have done this in my book, that one can represent National Socialism without attributing to the Jewish problem a central role." Wiggershaus suggests that Benjamin’s death played an important part in Adorno and Horkheimer’s decision to seriously propose a joint book on anti-Semitism. Indeed only a few months later, Adorno wrote to Horkheimer: "It often seems to me, as if all that, which we were used to seeing in terms of the proletariat, has today shifted with terrible intensity to the Jews. I ask myself, though it is not completely consistent with the project, if the things, which we actually want to say should not be said in connection with the Jews, who represent the counterpoint to power." In the Fall of 1940, Horkheimer wrote "I am convinced on the basis of our joint convictions, that grant or not, we will go forward on anti-Semitism." In September 1940 Adorno sent Horkheimer "a couple of — completely unformulated — thoughts on the theory of Anti-Semitism." However "provisional" these thoughts were, and however much "they might be in need of modification, we have arrived at a really important place," Adorno wrote, "namely, at a unified and non-rationalistic explanation for anti-Semitism." Adorno begins with the inadequacy of all rational economic and social
explanations of anti-Semitism since anti-Semitism predates both liberalism and capitalism. The stubborn resistance of anti-Semitism to rational argument points towards the fact "that very old motifs that have long since become second nature" must be in play, motifs that have nothing to do either with the relationship between Jews and Christians, nor with the money economy, nor directly with enlightenment, although the last probably stands in a deep relation to those archaic motifs." Adorno's analysis is directed at the prehistory of the Jews, at their persistence in a nomadic existence long after the world consisted of permanent settlements. As "the secret gypsies of history," the Jews are a "prematriarchal" peoples whose lack of ties to the earth and to a fixed locale, always threatened to subvert the ideals of civilized life: home, family, labor. From the standpoint of other peoples "the image of the Jew represented a stage of humanity which did not yet know labor, and all later attacks on the parasitic, thieving character of the Jews were mere rationalizations."83

Here the Jews represent, not the imperative to civilization but the refusal to be "civilized" and submit to the primacy of labor, whose collective remembrance of a "land of milk and honey" is the "Jewish utopia." The taboo on that image is simultaneously the taboo on the recalling of a nomadic existence and is, according to Adorno, "the origin of antisemitism." The expulsion of the Jews is the attempt, Adorno concludes, to reproduce the expulsion from Paradise, and, as such to imitate it."84 In a letter sent only a two weeks earlier Adorno alluded to the broader significance of the theses for the conception of the Jews as representatives of the principle of non-identity in the modern world: "There are by the way the closest connections between the theory of the Jews as "fools", and our conception of modern art on the one hand, and that of Jews as nomads, since the absence of
a settled existence, and the failure to bind to the reified character of an object of action stem from the same source."85

In October 1941, Adorno, anticipating his impending move to Los Angeles, hoped that the planned joint book on anti-Semitism would soon "crystallize" with the justification that "Anti-Semitism "signifies today really the focal point of injustice, and our sort of physiognomy must return to the world, where it shows its most terrible face,"86 In the Odysseus essay, which was finished one year later (1942), we find clues to the suspicion that the figure of Odysseus is not merely the primordial "subject", the bourgeois in nuce, but also the Hellenic prototype of Ahasverus, the wandering Jew. In a letter to Pollock, Horkheimer explained that "the Odyssey is the first document on the anthropology of man in the modern sense, that means, in the sense of a rational enlightened being." But he also noted that the study "will also be of some value for the project [Anti-Semitism] "since the idea of ritual sacrifice which Odysseus tries to overcome will probably play a dominant role in the psychology of Anti-Semitism."87 Odysseus reveals "the fate that the language of the cunning man, the middleman brings down on himself." He is described in terms that suggest the stereotype of the Jewish tradesman: he is a rootless wanderer, a Greek Ahasverus physically weak, deceitful, and babbles incessantly. In his excessive attachment to speech, to language, Homer embodies in his hero, as does the eternal Jew, "the disaster that the enlightened word brings down on itself."(0/132) The "Semitic element" of the Odyssey is also suggested in a footnote which echoes the theme that Odysseus, "the feudal lord, bears the trace of the oriental merchant."(0/125). If this is indeed the case, the figure of Odysseus is directly linked to the nomadic, prematriarchal character of the figure of the Jew outlined in
Adorno's theory of anti-Semitism in 1940.

By the middle of 1943, the chapter on the culture industry as well as the first, second, and third essays had been completed and work was focusing on what was still thought of in terms of the theoretical part of the Anti-Semitism project. It is apparent, however, that by then little remained the central argument of Horkheimer's "The Jews and Europe," (1939) which interpreted the persecution of the Jews as a direct consequence of monopoly capitalism's systematic elimination of the "sphere of circulation," on which the Jews, as personifications of market "rationality" were dependent. In 1941, Leo Löwenthal joined Adorno in formulating what became the "elements of Antisemitism" and which unequivocally announced that National Socialist anti-Semitism was "a turning point in history" (DE/200).

"Whereas there is no longer any need for economic domination," the first thesis maintains, the Jews are "marked out as the absolute object of domination pure and simple" (though, as a concession to Marxism, the workers, are still considered "the ultimate target"). For the fascists the Jews are "an opposing race," "the embodiment of the negative principle" and as such, their extermination is necessary "to secure the happiness of the world" (DE/168). For Adorno and Horkheimer modern anti-Semitism is no longer a diversionary tactic, a "luxury for the masses," but rather a manifestation of its deep roots in civilization which still remain obscure.

The relationship between the reappearance of a false, mythologizing mimesis in fascism and the project of the extermination of the Jews is boldly stated at the beginning of the "Elements": "the portrait of the Jews that the nationalists offer to the world is in fact
their own self portrait."(DE/168) Paradoxically, the anti-Semitic goal of ridding the world of the stigma of difference led to the Jewish desire to assimilate, just as the "barbaric collective" singled them out as different. But such rational explanations ignore the fact that both "persecutor and victim belong to the same circle of evil"(DE/171). Anti-Semitism is "a deeply imprinted schema, a ritual of civilization."

Though the argument that commerce is the "fate of the Jews," is still mentioned, the "Elements of anti-Semitism" are in fact a series of interpretations of the "ritual" of anti-Semitism, of the sacrifice of the Jews in which theological, psychological, and anthropological motifs are intertwined. All of these suggest a connection both to the Odysseus chapter and to Adorno's provisional 1940 theses: that the Jews are sacrificed as the ultimate victims of the taboo on mimesis. The origins of the thesis that the prohibition against making an image of God was the specific form of a more generalized renunciation of mimesis can of course, be attributed to Freud, who noted in Moses and Monotheism that "it meant that a sensory perception was given second place to what may be called an abstract idea." In modern civilization uncontrolled mimesis is expunged first in the religious prohibition idolatry, on images of god, subsequently in the general contempt for all image bound wanderers: nomads, actors, gypsies, and finally in rationalization. For Horkheimer and Adorno, anti-Semitism is explicitly identified with the proscription on mimesis: "Civilization has replaced the organic adaptation to others and mimetic behavior proper, by organized control of mimesis"(DE/180). The murder of the Jews is a form of revenge for civilization's triumph over nature; those who first turned ritual sacrifice into rationality by carrying out the prohibition are themselves sacrificed as the expression of "repressed
mimesis."(187) The secret gypsies of history "are abandoned by domination when its progressive alienation from nature makes it revert to mere nature."(DE/184)

Insofar as the Jews represent, not only the carriers of the taboo on mimesis, but also those who have not entirely succumbed to its logic, they appear to "those blinded by civilization experience their own taboosed mimetic features"(DE/181) The very torment that the Jews experience as a result of their lack of security and membership in the community is a provocation, an image of the "powerless happiness" that is "unbearable because it would be true happiness." The image of the Jew as powerful, intellectual, wealthy, but also as suffering and powerless evokes the unfulfilled promise of civilization, whose "image is then used by domination to perpetuate itself"(DE/172). Jews represent, at once, power and abjection, property and impotence, which evokes fear and "attracts the enemy of impotence."(DE/169)

The transgression against the prohibition on mimicry, imitation, and archaicism is endemic to fascism's sanctioning of the visual image over the written word, and more specifically evident in the anti-Semitic obsession with the physiognomic and corporal marks of Jewishness. The taboo is evoked first in nationalist hatred of the cosmopolitan ideals of Bildung and demystification, but also in a deep-seated religious hostility at the Jewish responsibility for Christianity's "interdiction on natural religion." The fact that Christianity cannot sustain the taboo and is forced to resort to mimesis, first in the "spiritualized idolatry" of Christ as spirit become flesh, and second, in the reversion to pagan and magical practices in the church (lighting a candle, cult of the saints), compensate for the unfulfilled promise of salvation, for which the Jews are also sacrificed. Horkheimer, in a lecture given at Temple
Israel in Los Angeles in April 1943, quoted Freud's argument in *Moses and Monotheism* that Christian rage against the Jews derived not from the Jews themselves, but from a deeper core of pagan resentment against Christianity: "they have not got over a grudge against the new religion which was imposed on them; but they have displaced the grudge on to the source from which Christianity reached them."\(^9^0\)

The most archaic form of mimesis is evident in what they call the "idiosyncracy" of the anti-Semites, their fear of and obsession with the "alien" quality of certain gestures, or psychological techniques, like flattery, "passed own by a process of unconscious imitation." The Jew's own unique form of mimicry arouse gentile anger because, "in the face of the new conditions of production, it displays the old fear, which, ... must be forgotten." (DE/182) Mimesis also reappears in the fascist refusal of a "homeland" to the Jews who are forced to imitate their nomadic past, and finally in the very physiognomy of torture, the terror of the victims: in "the convulsive gestures of the martyred, we see the mimetic impulse which can never be completely destroyed." (D/183) It is of no consequence whether the Jews actually have the features attributed to them: "when all the horror of prehistory which has been overlaid with civilization is rehabilitated as rational interest by projection onto the Jews, there is no restriction." DE/186

The prohibition on mimesis brings all of its past history to bear on the persecution of the Jews: the ritual discipline, the uniforms, the marches, the "monotonous repetition of words and gestures are simply the organized imitation of magic practices. Even the nature that fascism claims to be is not authentic nature but a copy of its copy, a "mimesis of mimesis (DE/185). This fact explains the peculiar synthesis of rational and irrational
practice -- the "rationalized idiosyncracy" -- that fascism employs: the violence of speech, the gesticulating of the fascist leaders, the abrogation of law, the replication of mythical practices, and the rationality of destructive violence all partake in a "surrender to the mimetic attraction."(DE/183)

The "Elements of anti-Semitism," it might be argued, ultimately holds the Jews accountable for their own fate. In contrast to the image of the Jews in the first chapter, where, in Freud's words they secure "a triumph of intellectuality over sensuality," the Jews appear here in a more ambivalent light, as those who impose the taboo on mimesis and as the carriers of a "premythological," "prematriarchal," residue of mimesis. Adorno's thesis that anti-Semitism preserves the image of Jews as "nomadic" explicitly identifies them, not merely with the perpetration of the taboo, but with the refusal to adapt to it. Even assimilation is a deception, for the Jews a self-deception, for the anti-Semites, a magical ruse. The Jews appear here as they are sometimes portrayed in the Nazi racial ideal, in the personification of "Jüd Süss," for example, who cleverly masks the gestures of the "Ostjude" and transmogrifies his physiognomy in order to "pass" as an enlightened man of Western culture. In the "Elements" this image is turned against the Nazis in the form of a paradox. Insofar as the Jews are at one level responsible for the renunciation on mimicry, they are, at the same time, evocative of the taboo, since, from the standpoint of the anti-Semites, even the desire to assimilate is mere imitation. Both the Jewish experience of modernity, and modernity's refusal of the Jew can be seen as mutually constitutive facts of their historical experience. What is never expressed in the "Elements" is the implicit connection between the banished and defamed Jews, and "degenerate" modernist art (which are considered identical
by the Nazis) which are both subject to execration and repugnance because of their "mimetic attraction. Both are condemned to be obliterated by the practitioners of the cult of false mimesis because they alone still bears traces of a dangerous "true mimesis," the shared refusal of complete absorption in the object as "picture", representation, and symbol.92

VIII.

It is difficult to find fault with the argument that Nietzsche holds pride of place in Dialectic of Enlightenment. Nietzsche, Adorno grants, "was one of the few since Hegel who recognized the dialectic of enlightenment. He formulated its ambiguous relation to domination" (O/110/). There is, however, little justification for Habermas's assertion that in Dialectic of Enlightenment "Hegel is also Nietzsche's great antipode" and that "Nietzsche radicalizes the counter-Enlightenment."93 This judgement could hardly be further from Adorno's sympathetic evaluation of Nietzsche, whom he described in 1947 as "one of the most advanced enlighteners of all." Nietzsche, he claimed, "sensed in the 'system' and what it entailed the same apologetic desire he sensed in the religion of redemption or, for that matter, in the truly systematic totality of the Wagnerian Music drama. When he turned against the accepted values of civilization, love and pity, ultimately reaffirmed by Wagner, his motive was not complicity with the dawning relapse into barbarism, but just the opposite; he realized the barbarian momentum inherent in official cultural values."94 This judgement aligns Adorno with Nietzsche, not merely as an enlightener who "recognized in enlightenment just as much the universal movement of sovereign spirit," but, more
importantly as the inspiration for his reflections on the guilt sacrifice in the Odysseus chapter. In a letter to Horkheimer he added that Nietzsche's "misconception" was only that he failed to see that the will to power was nothing more than the anxiety of losing power, of becoming caught in the compulsion of nature. Nietzsche's will to power became his ideology, insofar as he was not critical enough to recognize that what he regarded as a "pure drive" or instinct, was already undergoing rationalization. "Had Nietzsche really grasped the will to power as anxiety and entrapment in nature, and he often comes close enough, then his philosophy would have coincided with the truth." Adorno's sparse comments on the fascist appropriation of Nietzsche could be expanded on here, but it is clear that unlike Horkheimer, Adorno considered the "the liquidation of enlightenment" and the ideological glorification of naked force in the name of an archaic mythology, as entirely inconsistent with Nietzsche's philosophy. Nietzsche's "error" was not his failure to take the victim into account, as Horkheimer had once said, but rather his "Amor fati," his willingness to sanction as fate the "infinity of such sacrifice" (MM/98), which ultimately turns him into an accomplice of the rationality he otherwise despises. One can, without stretching the analogy too much, see an act of mimesis in the relationship between Dialectic of Enlightenment and On the Genealogy of Morals: without becoming its other, through similitude and appropriation, the genealogy of morals becomes the genealogy of domination.

That Adorno, more than any other figure in the Frankfurt School's inner circle, was attracted to Nietzsche is also evident from the revealing transcript of a lecture and discussion by Ludwig Marcuse, the biographer and historian, held in Los Angeles on July 14 1942. Though Marcuse's lecture is not preserved apart from a brief summary, it focused on three
distinct concepts of culture in Nietzsche: the cult of the genius artist; the anti-aestheticism of the "free spirit", the breaker of idols; and the Übermensch as the distillation of all historical utopias. Marcuse's conclusion, which amounted to a defense of Nietzsche's "radical work of destruction" and his transcendence of the material through "desire", provoked a strong reaction by most of the Institute members present, most prominently Herbert Marcuse (no relation) who questioned whether the Übermensch could ever be equated with "utopia."

Marcuse refused to consider Horkheimer's cautious proposition that with the abolition of material human want, our thinking, as well as Nietzsche's "will appear radically different"96 "If Marx is right, then Nietzsche is wrong," Marcuse replied. By contrast, Adorno saw advantages in Nietzsche's thinking that did not merely supplement, but went beyond the insights of Marxism: "Despite its categories, Nietzsche's cultural criticism revealed certain aspects of the social problematic, which are not immediately evident through the Critique of Political Economy. We have to decode Nietzsche and to see what sort of weighty experience lies behind it. I believe, that one then arrives at things, which are not so distant from the interests of most human beings." Adorno saw in Nietzsche's phrase, "no shepherd but a herd" the intimation that domination can survive the eclipse of direct forms of control, that control can "migrate into human beings themselves." 97

In this circle Adorno could only hint at his debt to On the Genealogy of Morals, and specifically to those passages where Nietzsche elaborated on the principle of exchange embodied in sacrifice as the "prehistory" of man.98 Indeed, in Dialectic of Enlightenment, "the history of civilization is the history of the introversion of sacrifice," as it is expressed in Nietzsche as "guilt indebtedness."(DE/90). Both Marx and Nietzsche understood history as
sacrifice incurred through exchange: where Marx sees the price of labor's transformation of nature as self-alienation and abstraction, Nietzsche sees originary exchange as a spiritualization of cruelty, internalization of instinct, religious self-denial, and the asceticism of modern science.99

The sources of Dialectic of Enlightenment's Nietzscheanism are not only to be found in Nietzsche's moral philosophy but also in his version of the taboo on mimesis in The Birth of Tragedy, where "theoretical man" substitutes for Dionysian "wisdom and art," as well as for myth, "a metaphysical comfort and earthly consonance, in fact a deus ex machina of its own, the god of machines and crucibles, that is the powers of the forces of nature, recognized and employed in the service of a higher egoism."100 And finally, "the enlightener" of the Odysseus chapter is often undermined by Horkheimer's far more disparaging treatment of Nietzsche in the "Juliette" chapter where he goes so far as to suggest that critical theory ultimately prefers "the formalism of reason" to Nietzsche's remythologization of power and his preference for the "predators" over the weak (DE/99). Though Horkheimer begins by considering "the will to power" as the final incarnation of Kantian morality, the "abrogation of the law through self-legislation," the chapter concludes by upholding Kant against Nietzsche. "The fact that Sade and Nietzsche insist on the ratio more decisively even than logical positivism implicitly liberates from its hiding-place the utopia contained in the Kantian notion of reason, as in every great philosophy: the utopia of a humanity which, itself no longer distorted, has no further need to distort."(DE/119)

Here there is little trace of Nietzsche the "enlightener," but rather the Sadean figure that appears as an anti-Kant who "maliciously celebrates the powerful and their cruelty."
Classes, races, and nations, which dominate, and those that are dominated are all that remain of enlightened reason denigrated to mere self-preservation, to the point where "theory itself becomes an incomprehensible concept" (DE/93). In this, the weakest chapter of Dialectic of Enlightenment, there is no hint of the arguments about sacrifice, cunning, and mimesis that redeem enlightenment in its moment of self-preservation. If enlightenment can be rescued from these "dark" but "true" thinkers, Horkheimer implies, it is only by the vaguest assertions about "the Law," the "ten commandments," spiritual love," and other pieties. "Hope," wrote Horkheimer, in "The End of Reason," "has been overshadowed by the consciousness of universal doom." Habermas notwithstanding, there is very little dialectic in this enlightenment. Though Horkheimer sees Nietzsche's thought as a symptom of the radicalization of the autonomy of Reason that reduces the power of nature "to mere indiscriminate resistance to the abstract power of the subject," (DE/90), one can also regard the mimetic substitution of sacrifice in both morality and in Nietzsche's aesthetics as constitutive of a subjectivity capable of resisting mythologization.

IX.

The humor of the Frankfurt School is underservedly ignored. Consider, for example, the perhaps not so tongue-in-cheek 1944 memorandum from Adorno to Horkheimer, suggesting that since "not all the recurring objections against the Jews are of an entirely spurious, projective, paranoid character," that a "manual for distribution among Jews" be prepared which lists these objectionable traits and "contains suggestions how to overcome them," for example, "the disproportionate concern with one's own bodily comfort or with
health." Adorno further remarked that the "manual" should "appeal to the inexhaustible source of Jewish self-criticism, irony, and encourage Jews to draw the consequences out of the critical insight into their own deficiencies instead of simply laughing at them." Among the jokes suggested is this one: if a gentile is thirsty he drinks a glass of water, whereas the Jew sees a Doctor and gets a test for diabetes. Dr. Adorno received from Horkheimer a response suggesting that he take this idea up with the "section on business ethics of the Anti-Defamation League in Chicago." Did Adorno slip from a description of the paranoid projection of the anti-Semite, of the Jew as the physical embodiment of the taboosed gestures and repressed emotions to the belief that it is the Jews themselves that unconsciously provoke the anti-Semitic reaction? This ironic text, which should perhaps be taken just so seriously echoes the ambivalence towards the Jews that is expressed in the "Elements of Anti-Semitism." Just as the Jews themselves participate unconsciously in eliciting the "mimetic attraction" of the anti-Semites, so too American Jews must be warned against evoking anti-Semitism through their unconscious behavior.

In the concluding pages of the Odysseus essay Adorno proposes yet another reading of the mimetic element in enlightenment, one which emphasizes the element of wit in the act of substitution. If the Gods are appeased with human objects and animal sacrifices, their stupidity in the face of the ruse is the object of Homeric laughter. Laughter outwits not merely external nature, but confounds the gods, and makes escape possible: "Laughter is bound to the guilt of subjectivity, but in the suspension of law, which it announces, it also points beyond entrapment. It promises the way home." This sentence also helps explain why Adorno, who wrote with such seriousness, could also be at times, as his
contemporaries knew, so silly (Albern). He composed parodies of Hasidic folktales à la Martin Buber, and collected clippings of "Nancy," "Steve Canyon," and other comics of the day. Anyone who reads the correspondence between Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno is immediately struck by the humorous "pet names" with which they frequently addressed each other. Horkheimer was the wooly "mammoth," Adorno, "Archibald" and "Hippopotamus" (Nilpfend), Gretel Adorno "Giraffe" and "Gazelle", and so on. Awaiting word on his decision to emigrate to California, Adorno reminded Horkheimer, that "for a hippopotamus the most important thing is peace and quiet." These "cute" terms of endearment are so unnerving, perhaps because they are partake of the animism which lives on, not least in the culture industry, whose most prominent stars are animals with human speech and countenances. Such figures belong to the mythology of childhood, and their continued use by the philosophers of the Frankfurt School attests to the intimacy of relationships that had begun in adolescence and early adulthood. But under the conditions of exile, their persistence can also be seen in a more biblical light. The Institute was Horkheimer's Ark and Adorno's Odysseus essay, which pays homage to another heroic voyager, offers a more profound theological interpretation of these nicknames as the echo of a primordial laughter that is "the irruption of blind and obdurate nature," as Adorno writes. Such names also represent the opposite, a triumph over natural force: "in laughter blind nature gives up its destructive force. This duality of laughter is close to that of the name and perhaps names are nothing but frozen laughter, as is still evident today in nicknames, the only names in which something of the original act of naming survives"(O/139). As Benjamin showed in his famous 1916 essay "On Language as Such and the Language of
Man," the naming of the animals occurred before language "fell into the abyss of the mediateness of all communication." Nicknames thus contain a weak totemic power insofar as they evoke the memory of solidarity with nature before it had become mute.

For the theorists of the Frankfurt School the catastrophe of the Jews was inextricably bound up with the prohibition on mimesis and its return in the form of anti-Semitism and politicized mimickry. The loss of the capacity to imitate nature, and the taboo on "reverting to mimetic modes of existence," was the price of civilization. But if the "pitiless prohibition of regression becomes mere fate," the tabooed mimesis was preserved in the fear of the victims. The persistence of mimesis, in art, or in the nicknames or jokes that parry terror retain the remembrance of the nature that is obliterated by the taboo. As Odysseus replaced Oedipus because his wit permitted him to evade the fate to which Oedipus blindly succumbed, Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment was an effort to philosophically outwit myth, and to create "the possibility of escape" through enlightenment sensitized to the power of mimesis.

X.

In December 1946, in a lecture to the American Philosophical Association meeting in Eugene Oregon, Horkheimer defended his critical theory against the criticism that the "since neither the revival of the old, nor the discovery of new mythologies can bring the process of Enlightenment to a halt, they had been pressed into a pessimistic attitude, a condition of despair and nihilism." Far from falling into "romantic wish-dreams", as so many critics of Enlightenment had done, he concluded, "the hope of reason lies in emancipation from its
own fear of despair." Only a few months earlier, Horkheimer elaborated on this idea to Adorno, proposing that they collaborate on a sequel to *Dialectic of Enlightenment* which Horkheimer suggested calling "Rescuing Enlightenment" (*Rettung der Aufklärung*). In contrast, to existentialism which hypothesized the moment of existence, Horkheimer suggested, a "solution to our opposition in relation to Schopenhauer." Our theme, he continued, is "to positively embrace truth in the determination of meaninglessness, and by this measure, to save thought." Here it is not any "irrationalism" on Adorno's part, nor the "Nietzscheanism" of critical theory which divided the authors. Rather Adorno's antipathy was directed at Horkheimer's positive Schopenhauerian embrace of the senselessness of the world and thereby to refuse any reconciliation with it. From Adorno's perspective Horkheimer's solution, to turn "senselessness into sense," brought him into close proximity to Heidegger, for whom the "transcendence of being realizes itself thorough the consciousness of its nothingness." Schopenhauer, Adorno responded, was in fact, the "ancestor" of existentialism.

For Adorno, Horkheimer's insistence on the "consciousness of negativity," seemed anchored in the philosophy of totality: "If for you I am a positivist, you are an idealist" he wrote. "Bad Enlightenment dispenses with the concept of difference through absolute totality, the correct one, holds on to the concept of difference (*Differenz*) against its flattening." It is perhaps less important here that Adorno once again reiterated his critique of all philosophical reconciliation and his insistence on the "experience of difference," than the more important fact that these exchanges bear witness to Horkheimer and Adorno's inability to work through the consequences of their critique of reason. When
Horkheimer, suggested, just a few days later, that their difficulties with the dialectic were in large part analogous to the conundrum of simultaneously criticizing Soviet tyranny and (American) democracy, and that critical theory was in danger of becoming a modern equivalent of ancient stoicism, Adorno agreed only that the "congealment of power, is as difficult today as was then." "As theoreticians of reason," Adorno remarked, "we cannot simply leap with one jump into the categories of politics and society." Evoking Benjamin in Minima Moralia, Adorno, expressed his notion of theory as addressing itself to the things which were not embraced by the dynamic of victory and defeat, "which feel by the wayside — what might be called the waste products and bind spots that have escaped the dialectic. His sense of what might still be salvaged from Enlightenment is expressed not in terms of a "political" or "philosophical" solution, but in terms that remain loyal to the fundamental posture of the Odysseus chapter, critique is possible as a ruse of reason: "Theory must needs deal with cross-grained, opaque, unassimilated material, which as such admittedly has from the start an anachronistic quality, but is not wholly obsolete since it has outwitted the historical dynamic."
ENDNOTES


4. GSS, 486.

5. GSS, 427-429


8. See, for example, GSS12, 19. 1 1939; 23. 1. 1939.


12. Ibid., 120.

13. Ibid., 120.

14. Ibid., 117.

15. Ibid. 57.


17. Ibid., 56.

18. Ibid., 57.

19. Ibid., 51.

20. Ibid., 57.

21. Ibid., 57.


24. MHA, Adorno to Horkheimer, May 9, 1945.
29. MHA, Horkheimer to Adorno, November 11, 1941.
33. GS 12, 371
34. Ibid., 473.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., 506.
38. Ibid., 508.
40. GS 12, 492.
41. Ibid., 509.
42. This characterization of their differences is in part indebted to Benjamin Snow [pseud. for Susan Buck Morss], "Introduction to Adorno's "The Actuality of Philosophy," TELOS 31 (Spring, 1977), 117. Her apt characterization reads: "Adorno, the metaphysician with no faith in metaphysics; Horkheimer, the moralist with no belief in Divine Providence."
43. GS 12, 507.
44. Ibid. 509.
45. MHA, Adorno to Horkheimer, July 24, 1941.
46. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, "Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment," New German Critique 56 (Spring-Summer 1992),
139. [Hereafter cited in the text as 0.] Robert Hulott-Kentor's translation is often superior to Cummings', but both have been consulted.


52. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 152. However, the possibility that Enlightenment could contribute to reenchantment and not merely to disenchantment is suggested by Horkheimer in a compilation of notes and drafts, retrospectively entitled "New York Notes." True Enlightenment does not drown out mythology. Rather, its power is appeased. "In refusing the blind domination of nature the dialectical spirit withdraws from domination through nature, without however cutting off from things the possibility of enchanting them."


54. Ibid., 53.


56. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 152.

57. Ibid., 154.

58. Ibid.

59. Adorno, Kierkegaard, 114.

60. Ibid., 118.

61. GS 12, 454.

62. Ibid, 457.

63. Ibid., 456.

64. Ibid., 440. For an important discussion of the paradoxical attitude of Freud and Dialectic of Enlightenment towards paternal authority see Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, feminism, and the problem of domination (Pantheon: New York, 1988), 145, 146. Benjamin also emphasizes Freud’s avoidance of the theme of Oedipus’ “efforts to evade the prophecy” of the oracle.


67. Ibid., 67.

68. Ibid., 73.


70. GS 12, 461.
71. Adorno, Kierkegaard, 112.
(incomplete note)
74. GS 12, 459.
75. Ibid., 461.
76. Wiggershaus, Die Frankfurter Schule, 363.
78. Ibid., 357, 358.
79. MHA, Franz Neumann to Adorno, August 14, 1940.
80. MHA, Adorno to Horkheimer, August 5, 1943.
81. MHA, Horkheimer to Adorno, September 16, 1940.
82. MHA, Adorno to Horkheimer, September 18, 1940.
83. MHA, Adorno to Horkheimer, September 18, 1940. The theses comprise 4 typescript pages.
84. Ibid.
85. MHA, Adorno to Horkheimer, September 4, 1940.
86. Wiggershaus, Die Frankfurter Schule, 346.
87. See the argument by Dan Diner, "Reason and the 'Other': Horkheimer's Reflection on Anti-Semitism and Mass Annihilation," in On Max Horkheimer, especially 340-343.
88. Wiggershaus, Die Frankfurter Schule, 362.
89. Freud, Moses and Monotheism, 113.
91. Freud, Moses and Monotheism, 113.
92. The Jews, however, also represent, as Chapter 1 notes, the suppression of mimesis in the proscription on images. The emphasis on the Jews as a "nomadic" people, on their permanent condition of exile, and on the exile of Odysseus, suggests the double power attributed to them: as rationalizers, and as the reminders of their pre-mythic state.
93. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 120.
95. MHA, Adorno to Horkheimer, July 30, 1941.
96. GS 12, 565.
97. Ibid., 567.
99. Nancy S. Love has argued that Nietzsche's theory of exchange permitted critical theory to "transcend Marx's complicity in the dialectic of Enlightenment." What "ties us to Nietzsche," Adorno said on the occasion of the Institute debate, is that his cultural criticism raised the whole problem of whether socialism was in danger of
transforming itself into a "pragmatism that threatened to encompass the globe." Nietzsche had seen that not only democracy, but socialism had become an ideology and "had in certain critical things gone further than Marx, insofar as he had a certain sharper thunder against the bourgeois." Whether one agrees with Love that in Dialectic of Enlightenment the shift from Marx to Nietzsche ultimately results in a "schizophrenic" failure to chose between contradictory alternatives, or conversely, with Habermas that the "Nietzscheanism" of Dialectic of Enlightenment concedes too much to the critique of Enlightenment, both propositions ignore the radically different ways that Nietzsche is deployed throughout. See Nancy S. Love, "Marx, Nietzsche, and Critical Theory," New German Critique 41 (Spring/Summer, 1987): 81, and GS 12, 568.


102. MHA, Theodor Adorno to Max Horkheimer, October 30, 1944.

103. Ibid.

104. MHA, Horkheimer to Adorno, November 2, 1944.


106. MHA, Adorno to Horkheimer, July, 30, 1941.


108. David Roberts has argued that Adorno's utopia of reconciliation "may be seen as the rational veneer for a profoundly arational mysticism of redemptive mimesis beyond and behind all civilization." Art and Enlightenment: Aesthetic Theory After Adorno (University of Nebraska Press: Lincoln Neb., 1991), 70. In his later work Adorno attempted to further elucidate the connection between mimesis in the primordial and aesthetic domains: "As the mimetic struggle against taboo, art attempts to give the answer and gives it as an answer free of judgement — but then again not; thereby the answer beomes enigmatic, like the dread of the primordial world which changes, but does not disappear." Hohendahl regards this enigmatic character not as "mystical" but as an imperative to interpretation. Cited in Peter Hohendahl, Prismatic Thought: Theodor W. Adorno (University of Nebraska Press: Lincoln Neb., 1995), 237.

109. GS 12, 118.

110. Ibid., 595.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid., 599, 603.

114. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 151.