"Intellect and Power: Conceptions and Self-Images of the Literary Intelligentsia in Germany since 1945 and the Influence of Critical Theory"

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Any argument concerning self-images, roles and conceptions of intellectuals must first try to define its own highly problematic central concept. The intellectual, whether expressed in the singular or in the plural, designates neither a social class nor a class of profession. It is rather a thoroughly "discursive phenomenon", that "must be reconstructed from the elements of discourse about intellectuals" in each particular historical situation.¹ What an intellectual is is revealed in each act of positive or negative attribution of a 'mission' or 'designation'. Such attributions of course usually carry with them a social role, which can be accepted or rejected. Nonetheless, the social situation in which 'the intellectuals' exist remains diffuse. Distributed over a large number of professional categories, they belong to the "socially free-floating intelligentsia" (according to Alfred Weber's characterization, which Karl Mannheim then reproduced in a more differentiated way), to a "relatively class-free section of the population that is not very firmly fixed in social space."² This remarkable state of suspension sensitizes them socially and creates a "homogeneous medium" for a plurality of voices and for dynamic contradiction in discursive debate. At the same time the state of suspension encourages distance, that much-referred-to intellectual "doubt", as the correspondent of social "fragmentation."³

It is meaningful to connect these general socio-epistemological ([wissenssoziologischen]) remarks with a few historically concrete thoughts on the problem of the nature of intellectuals. The discursively generated figure of the modern intellectual as the spokesperson for universal values, as the 'conscience' (alternatively of nation, class democracy, humanity, etc.), as the guardian of "the definitive values of opinions and beliefs";" responsible for the symbolic order of things, appears not by chance at the same time as the decline of religiosity in Western modernity, and against a background of pervasive disillusionment, rationalization and secularization. Modern intellectuals, generally freed from immediate and unavoidable conditions of work and life, and equipped with the privilege of generally unimpeded contemplation that crosses existing boundaries, are simultaneously subject to the danger of having to appreciate and think through the global condition of modern civilization in its unadulterated unredeemability (Heil-losigkeit.) The intellectual as an outgrowth of the modernizing process par excellence experiences first and most consciously the pathology of modernity as the removal of meaning and hope of Redemption. The human psyche is not equipped to withstand this experience unmediatedly. The intellectual therefore, in the words of Max Weber, "tries to give a consistent 'meaning' to
his life by way of endless specious ethical rationalizations, looking to create 'unity' with himself, others and the cosmos." As the constitutional searcher for meaning who succeeds the priest, he endeavors to compensate for this experience of withdrawal and becomes the founder of meaning and the teacher of the doctrine of Redemption in cold, desolate, God-forsaken places, who in extreme cases claims "to control the Redemption of all reality." Very different philosophers, sociologists of knowledge and historians from Karl Mannheim and Karl Löwith to Jean-François Lyotard and François Furet have described these far-reaching processes both sympathetically and critically. Mannheim was the first to show in "Ideologie und Utopie" (1929) how in socialist-communist utopia the old chiliastic expectation of the Kingdom of Heaven on earth is renewed and transposed into the near future by the promise of an approaching collapse of capitalism. According to Mannheim Marxist thought neglected to apply its process of critical demystification, "this ontologically relativizing (seinsrelativierende) method" – a process it directed against all other ways of thought as ideologies to itself and "its own hypostatization and absolutism". The communist utopia in fact is empowered to an unchecked material violence by its own ideas of a realm of freedom and equality. Ideas themselves are endowed in Marxist thought with such an unquestionable reality status, with such unlimited power to control social reality as if according to some law, that one is not by chance reminded of the dominant status in earlier periods of the tenets of religious belief and of their predictions for the future. Karl Löwith demonstrated and substantiated precisely this connection convincingly: The grand modern philosophical sketches of history, and particularly the Marxist one, are "entirely dependent on theology, that is, on the theological exploitation of history as the history of the process of Redemption." They radically secularize theology's eschatological model, producing according to their "guiding principle" a connection between all individual historical events, and relate them to a "definitive meaning." Using such interpretation of the process of history as "the attribution of meaning to the meaningless" - in Theodor Lessing's words: - Communism, the Marxist creation of meaning, with its "surviving theological kernel", easily belongs among the "veiled religions" that blossomed in many forms in Europe especially since the turn of the century. In any examination of the self-images and roles of intellectuals it seems eminently important to me to keep in mind, in fact to adopt as one's main perspective the connection I have described between the 'emergence of the modern intellectual' and the radical crisis of meaning in Western civilization that caused the development of an immense 'hunger for meaning'. It is critical to note that the ideological worship that replaced the older religious one did not confine itself to that worship. Rather, in the new political mythologies a power existed that propelled it unavoidably toward practice: to stress it immediately, to totalitarian ideocracy, in which ideas actually became material, even bloody violence. The "ideas of 1914", the radically chauvinist, militantly violent visions of German intellectuals - writers, philosophers, historians, social
scientists, literary scholars, etc., most of them well-situated professors - already showed first what cruel contributions to the bloody reality of history intellectuals can make as rulers over the cultural-symbolic order, as self-professed 'consciences of the nation'. In fact, only the age of the totalitarian regime of 1917/18 through 1945, and then through 1989/90 - an age that would not have been possible in the same way without the grand utopian systems and the totalizing metanarratives from the pens of intellectuals - made shockingly evident how far the "Treason of the Intellectuals", decried in 1927 by Julien Benda, can go. This obviously applies also to the relationships with right and left versions of totalitarianism. Particularly with a view to critical theory, which would not be possible without the impetus of Marxism, it remains a continual source of irritation that the socialist-communist framework, in its ideal intention even more universal and freeing than Christianity, was bound together so powerfully with totalitarian practice. Even more interesting and noteworthy are the intellectual positions of the representatives of critical theory over the decades, none of whom ever subscribed to a materially socialist system or submitted to a totalitarian practice.

II

We know that a specific body of critical theory, or rather the Frankfurt School, did not really exist, with the exception of a few years in New York. Despite this, and even before the exile of its exponents, there emerged a clearly-defined understanding of their own intellectuality and of the relationship of theory to political practice, an understanding that already in the Weimar Republic was substantially different from the self-image of other relevant groups of intellectuals, particularly from those of the strict 'party' adherents. The experience of exile in America, the continual, alert observation from a distance of the German Nazi Regime, and finally the acknowledgment of the increasingly terroristic Stalinism in the Soviet Union, all sharpened during these years the consciousness of the social status of their own theories and the self-image of intellectuals. This resulted importantly in the elimination of earlier illusions and hopes. I am in no way able to develop this phenomenon here in the detail that it deserves; a crude sketch will have to suffice.

The Frankfurt theorists - and here I concentrate primarily on Adorno, secondarily on Horkheimer - had all been schooled in the Marxist critique of political economy and ideology, and never disavowed this perspective or its analytical apparatus, even when they avoided for tactical or opportunistic reasons terms like "Marxism" and "Communism". In addition they modified the Marxist approach distinctly by accepting psychoanalytic and sociopsychological theorems and methods, in order to live up to their own goal of broad social-scientific interdisciplinarity. Above all, however, they departed from several fundamental Marxist positions. Thus the industrial proletariat as the historical subject of the process of emancipation played no role for them. They also did not proceed from the expectation of stagnation
in the development of production in capitalism (as Marx had in the third volume of "das Kapital"), but rather diagnosed its constantly expansive dynamic, which would cause a progressive destruction of man and nature. Finally, it is crucial to note their negative view of all industrial social systems that existed in the 1930s and 40s, a view that put the critical theorists as comprehending observers and especially as agents in an almost aporetic situation. It was clear that neither the Nazi-Regime, from which they had had to flee, nor Stalinism during the show trials from 1936 on, left reason to hope for any kind of revolutionary change. But the fact that the U.S., motherland of democracy with its highly-developed capitalism, had to be diagnosed as an almost completely delusional coherence ('Verblendungszusammenhang') ruled by instrumental reason, and given over to the omnipresent principle of exchange - this fact also had decisive implications for the self-image of their own role as intellectuals.

Horkheimer's and Adorno's 'Dialectic of Enlightenment' was essentially provoked by American experiences, above all of the culture industry, and was even written without full knowledge of the Nazi genocide of the Jews. Yet it is even without this knowledge also, in the words of Habermas, their "darkest book." "Minima Moralia", the first of three parts of which had already been completed before Horkheimer's 50th Birthday on February 14, 1945, focused on the contemplation of the minimal options that Adorno saw for the intellectual given the bleak diagnosis of the global situation presented by the "negativist philosophy of history" in the "Dialectic of Enlightenment". The messianic perspective, which at least in Benjamin's schema had always fascinated Adorno even when he was harshly critical of it, had by now almost disappeared - almost as though Benjamin had taken it with him to his grave in his suicide on September 26, 1940. When the first Parisian edition of the "Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung" came out in the fall of 1933, one read in Horkheimer's introduction that the group of contributors at the Institute perceived "in theory a factor that would contribute to improving reality." It further stated: "Conceptual thought ('Das begreifende Denken') does not have the same meaning for all societal forces: for some it is harmful ballast; for the progressive forces of humanity it will, however, be indispensable." Here there is, in fact, neither the expectation of revolution nor any reference to a historical subject that would lead such a revolution. And yet the belief in the capacity to improve the world - and in the sizable role of critical theory in that process - persists. How different the perspective in Adorno's "Minima Moralia," the "Reflections from Damaged Life," written ten, twelve, and fourteen years later. "Progressive forces", with which critical thought could ally itself, are nowhere in sight, neither during the war nor after it, and even less than ever before in the proletariat: "The negative element of thought is universally scorned in all classes." Adorno holds fast to this "negative element of thought", but he knows that the "intellectual, and even the philosophical intellectual, is cut off from material praxis", which, however, "not only [is] the prerequisite condition of his own existence", but which "also [forms] the basis of the world", "with the critique of which his work
coincides. Repeatedly, almost obsessively, Adorno explicates the aporia of the intellectual, a problem that at that time - 1944-47 - seemed irresolvable (‘unaufhebbbar’) to him: the ability ‘correctly’ to think through the capitalist reality only when far away from it, without however being able to escape from it. For example: “Only he who stays relatively pure has sufficient hate, nerve, freedom and mobility to resist the world, but precisely through the illusion of purity - since he exists ‘in the third person’ - he allows the world to triumph not only outside but even in his innermost thoughts." There is no real escape from such an “entanglement”; “The only thing that one can justifiably do is to forgo ideological misuse of one’s own existence, and in all else to behave modestly, inconspicuously and unpretentiously, behavior that for a long time has not been demanded by good upbringing, but that is required to compensate for the shameful fact that in hell there is still enough air to breathe." The final, 153rd section of “Minima Moralia” poses for the last time the stubbornly penetrating question of where the place of the intellectual can be when there is “no right way to live within the wrong." Surprisingly Adorno now takes up the Messianic perspective again, admittedly in the conditional voice, which turns out to be unreal: “The only philosophy for which we are legitimately responsible when faced with desperation [“wie sie im Angesicht der Verzweiflung einzig noch zu verantworten ist”], would be [!] the attempt to see all things the way they represent themselves from the standpoint of Redemption.” It is at the same time “the easiest thing of all” to represent the world with all its “tears and crevasses” as a “completed negativity”, precisely because this demands nothing more than an unadulterated description of the true condition of the world. This is, according to Adorno, also readable as the “mirror writing” of what should be. But at the same time it is “the absolutely impossible, because it presupposes a position that is, even if only minimally, removed from the sphere of existence” - and that is precisely outside the realm of the possible. In spite of this Adorno holds fast to the paradox of such impossible-possible thought, even to the perspective of Redemption, although, as he concedes, “the question of the reality or irreality of Redemption” is unanswerable. We know that later authentic works of art will substitute in this gap left by Redemption, and we will return to this again. Here we must note that towards the end of 1949, when they return to Germany, to the newly-founded Federal Republic as the only members of the Institute along with Friedrich Pollock, Horkheimer and above all Adorno have a highly skeptical, if not bleak view of the world and, to put it bluntly, favor a theory without praxis. If it were otherwise Adorno would probably not have handed over his “Minima Moralia” to the German public in 1951 without any deletions. What the most educated, bright and politically sensitive German intellectuals offered the West German post-war public (the East German public was not asked for its input), was thus, in the form of the “Dialectic of Enlightenment” and of the “Minima Moralia”, above all quite possibly unwieldy, alienated from praxis, and scrupulous; no wonder the effect of these books and their thoughts remained decidedly weak for so long.
Turning to the question of the self-image and roles of German intellectuals after 1945, we must keep in mind that four or five important decades of the history of 'the' modern intellectual have already ended - with almost all thinkable discursive attributions and their (lack of) realization. There was the figure of the intellectual as spokesperson for universal values (justice, truth, reason), who, as a moralist, claimed that his mind was independent of the forces of power. Since then there have also been droves of 'intellectual traitors', to use Julien Benda's concept, who appeared in the name of a particular national, race or class identity and who joined up with a totalitarian regime as ideologues of a secularized doctrine of Redemption; who thus believed in or practiced opportunistically the compatibility of mind and power. Nazi Germany had provided enough examples. Martin Heidegger, Carl Schmitt and Gottfried Benn (for a good year), are only the most famous. But many left intellectuals - among them many literati, who acted as party communists (or "communists without the party manual", like Bertolt Brecht) - these also must be considered to be Benda's 'traitors' to the universal mission of intellectuals.

It is characteristic of the situation after the war, particularly in the west-occupied zones, that after such bad experiences there existed no general interest in the question of what public function intellectuals should fulfill. World War and Nazi terror had caused not only immeasurable physical devastation, but also moral devastation. Only very few non-exiled members of the intelligentsia were able to conceive of the 'Nullpunkt', the 'ground zero' not just as a collapse but as a freeing from a regime of terror and thus as a chance for a far-ranging mental and political revolution. In this inability these intellectuals were representative of the general population. The first notable exceptions were the initiators of the journal "Der Ruf. Unabhängige Blätter der jungen Generation", Alfred Andersch and Hans Werner Richter, who contemplated very seriously a radical sociopolitical reformation of Germany, and who found their orientation in the French resistance movement and in the existential philosophy of Sartre and Camus.

Admittedly the Gruppe 47, which was primarily initiated by Richter and which still has the aura of progressiveness and material democracy, has been revealed in the meantime as political legend. Klaus Briegleb has done the most to demonstrate concretely how questionable the anti-fascist "young Germany" assembled there really was: it was again a group of men who played power games, excluded the new or different, and barely suffered from any self-doubt about their own wartime pasts. Thus Alfred Andersch could write in 1946: "The Young Generation stood for the wrong thing. But it stood." Generally the proclamation of the 'Nullpunkt' in the West-occupied zones meant the refusal to deal with the Nazi past (and with one's own acts during it), a "helpless anti-fascism" that had already been characteristic of many intellectuals in the years before and around 1933.
as they then had refused to engage in decisive, practical political experience, they now refused again. The model of society with which they were newly confronted was that of western-liberal democracy (a privilege long underestimated also by the Left), a society bound up with capitalist market economy and with the "American Way of Life". All of this stood, sublime and distant, in dominant opposition to the "obscuring, removed literature" of the older Bergengruen, Carossa, R. A. Schröder and of the younger Hermann Kasack or Erhart Kästner, a literature that "made a production of culture" in order to "upstage the still present reality of fascism.\textsuperscript{xxxix} We should also not underestimate the role that Ernst Jünger played as an exemplary figure, a role that at first was covert, then overt after the repeal of the publication ban in 1949. Jünger's astheticizing, elitist texts from the time of the Third Reich, above all "Auf den Marmorklippen" and "Strahlungen", were very well received by those who in a similar way had withdrawn and stayed silent, or as Jünger put it, practiced 'desinvolture' and 'souplesse' ('relaxed and adapted themselves').

Of course the important intellectuals and writers who had gone into exile could have played a key role in the "sanitizing work that awaited Germany after the end of fascism," namely, in Enzensberger's words, in the "ideological garbage removal."\textsuperscript{xxx} But most of them did not, as we know, return. That was also true of the former members of the Frankfurt Institute and other important social scientists. All of them except Horkheimer, Adorno, and Pollock stayed in the U.S. or in Great Britain. Benjamin had committed suicide in 1940. In 1947 Karl Mannheim died in London, and in 1966 Siegfried Kracauer died in New York. At any rate, aside from the three from Frankfurt, four other important social philosophers returned around 1949-50 to the German-speaking world: Ernst Bloch to Leipzig, Günter Anders to Vienna, Helmuth Plessner to Göttingen and Karl Löwith to Heidelberg. Of the important writers Anna Sehgers, Bertolt Brecht and Arnold Zweig returned to the Eastern sector on political grounds, while no-one but Alfred Döblin settled in the Western sectors (or the young Federal Republic); even he stayed isolated. All other great exiled figures, particularly Thomas Mann, could or would no longer consider repatriating to Germany.

The new political-intellectual orientation thus occurred in a vacuum in those decisive first four or five years after the end of the Nazi regime - with the consequence that for a long time after the Nazi period people reverted to supposedly unblemished cultural traditions. Adorno also demonstrated this in his important essay of 1950, "Resurrection of culture in Germany?" Instead of the expected "dullness, lack of education and cynical distrust of everything intellectual", he found, especially at the university, a strong "relationship to intellectual things", even an "intellectual passion.\textsuperscript{xxxii} Adorno immediately recognized the snag inherent in this cultural enthusiasm: "Cultural involvement in Postwar Germany carries with it an element of the dangerous and ambiguous comfort of provincial security. [...] Today education fulfills the not insignificant function of obliterating and repressing past horror and one's own responsibility for it. As an isolated area
of existence utterly devoid of a precise relationship to social reality, culture is useful for obscuring the regression into barbarism. Unlike in the situation after 1918, now in 1950 Adorno misses a "refusal to consent" and - we should be amazed at this! - the "power of utopia". And at the end he outlines an almost hopeful perspective that definitely again credits critical theory and art with much more than even three years earlier in "Minima Moralia": "To see through the machinery, to know that the appearance of the inhuman conceals human circumstances, and to gain power over these circumstances - all of these are steps in a process of Redemption.

During the fifties the critical theory that had been renewed at the University of Frankfurt became "the critical decoration for a restorative society" but its intellectual influence remained limited. The return of Adorno was, as Habermas and others repeatedly maintained, a particular stroke of luck for intellectually bankrupt Postwar Germany, but it still took considerable time for the fruits of Horkheimer's and Adorno's pedagogical and journalistic labors to be harvested. Their most important work, "The Dialectic of Enlightenment", stayed in the shadows for over twenty years, until the mid-sixties, before it found broad circulation, first through word of mouth and then through pirate editions at universities. The consciousness-raising and incremental formation of nonconformist writers in the Federal Republic, together with the campaigns against rearmament and atomic weaponry, still occurred largely without the constitutive influence of the Frankfurt School. Nevertheless there were basic points of contact, but they were due to the German circumstances and not to any direct influence of critical theory. The West-German writers from Günter Eich to Heinrich Böll, from Wolfgang Koeppen to Alfred Andersch, were deeply disappointed by the path things had taken in Germany. The "era of our democratic illusions" (Andersch's words about the first Postwar years) was superseded by the cementing of the separation of states, the integration of both states in the military blocs of the superpowers, and the growth of a complacently conservative, even politically reactionary cultural milieu, which ignored as much as possible the involvement of many Germans in the Nazi crimes. In this milieu the critical authors felt like loners and outsiders, for whom there remained only refusal - nonconformism - provided that they did not resign themselves to the situation. Thus they weren't too far from Adorno's precarious relationship between theory and praxis.

We should add a second point here. During the fifties and early sixties a series of highly talented young German-speaking authors - from Alfred Andersch and Paul Celan to Ingeborg Bachmann and Hans Magnus Enzensberger - rediscovered a radical aesthetic Modernism that had been outlawed for twelve years under Nazism, and that was even largely unknown in the Postwar period. This also meant, however, a rediscovery of Max Weber's notion of the realm of art as an autonomous sphere of values, which by definition is nonconformist, and which can further be identified as a denial of and protest against the bad global condition, but possibly also as a utopian anticipation of Redemption from it. This is the common spirit of the
essay Andersch dedicated to Adorno, "Die Blindheit des Kunstwerks" (1956), of Bachmann's poetry readings in Frankfurt (1959-60), of Celan's Büchner Prize speech "Der Meridian" (1960) and of Enzensberger's essay "Poesie und Politik" (1962). Most of these and similar poetological texts of these years were inspired by trains of thought in Adorno's speeches and essays (above all by the "Noten zur Literatur" that had been appearing since 1958). These speeches and essays by Adorno attributed a special status to the work of art: it was the only human creation to be free of the rule of the principle of exchange and of the delusional coherence caused by it, and the only one to be able to resist, by way of its aesthetic form, any and all appropriations by that coherence. Adorno had actually written in 1949 that to write a poem after Auschwitz was barbaric, xxxvii but since then it was precisely this fragile work of art, whether poem or not, that had become the only thing Adorno thought able to respond appropriately to the suffering of the victims, and to make Redemption appear possible - all on account of the work of art's form. Here and in many other places Adorno thus departs from all concepts of engaged, even politically partial and strategic literature. Agitprop literature, politically-commissioned art, praise of those in power... - he couldn't bear any of these, and even the great Brecht found no favor in his eyes.

The Enzensberger of the years up to and including 1967-68 most clearly took up Adorno's conception of the work of art as the guardian of unrealized, truly human conditions, and he decisively opposed the conflation of art with power. "Its (the poem's) political task is to refuse all political tasks and to speak for all in places where no-one is talked about, to talk about a tree, a stone, or about what doesn't exist. (...) Poetry hands down the future. (...) It is anticipation, even if it is in the form of doubt, rejection or denial." Doubtless Adorno could also have written these sentences.

This conception of the tasks of the intellectual in general and of those of the artist in particular had, however, no permanence, and Enzensberger is the most striking example of this fact. The second half of the sixties in the Federal Republic was, as in many other Western countries, a time of radical change, protest and revolt. The phase of the '68 student movement is a good example of the fact that what an intellectual is or should be is not definitively determined, but rather is formulated as an attitude of expectation and as a discourse of claims in specific historico-political situations of crisis. A conversation between Alfred Andersch and Hans Magnus Enzensberger in 1979 about the role of writer-intellectuals in the '68 phase demonstrated this very clearly. Andersch insists, and I agree, that the nonconformist writers would have disturbed "the juste milieu of the German restoration" before the years of the protests, and would have played "an influential political role". They were apparently correspondingly accused, as for example in Ludwig Erhard's "Pinscher" speech of [196?]. Suddenly, in 1968, that was not enough. Together with the radical students one group of authors (and Enzensberger was among them) accused the other authors of not really acting politically, but rather 'only in a literary fashion'. Andersch insists, on the other hand, that it was precisely several writers who, inspired by critical
theorists, maintained important knowledge and passed it on to the students, who themselves possessed 'not even a minimum of the theoretical tools' from which they would have benefited. "They had no weapons", Andersch continues, because they had grown up under Fascism. Andersch therefore also in retrospect insisted on limiting the function of intellectuals to the communication of knowledge, consciousness-raising and remembering, and, for artists, effort in terms of authentic form. But he excuses him from operative or agitprop work in the political battle, action that Enzensberger and many others had vehemently urged in "Kursbuch 15" and elsewhere.

This explains the essence of the disagreement between the revolutionary students and Theodor W. Adorno. They wanted concepts and recipes from the country's leading intellectuals, such as Adorno, as to how the restorative system could be toppled. And they wanted active help in pushing through their positions; for example, they wanted an expert report from Adorno that would confirm the thesis of the lawyer Horst Mahler that the leaflets of the First Commune, which referred to a department store fire with 300 deaths, did not constitute a call to arson, but were instead merely satirical. Adorno delivered neither the desired recipes (even the increasingly favored Herbert Marcuse did not) nor the report, and it is well-known that this put a definitive end to any hope of communication between the protesting students and Adorno. Alfred Andersch's generalized commentary also applies to the precarious relationship between Adorno and the protesters: "The student movement overestimated rather than underestimated the intellectuals. It expected something from them that they could not deliver, and thereafter the iconoclastic and anti-intellectual trends within this movement grew out of the disappointment that these expectations were not fulfilled."

Since 1968, and under the pressure of relationships and events (from the Vietnam War, the State of Emergency laws and the edict against radicals to the "German Autumn of 1977" to the anti-atomic weapon movement, other ecological initiatives and the fight over the stationing of medium-range missiles), the search for and location of the West-German writer-intellectuals' position has resolutely pushed on and diversificated. Some of them joined up with leftist parties and sectarian leftist groups, which entailed more or less unconditional identification with the Soviet Union on the one hand or with Maoist China on the other - both shocking cases of continued delusion about the nature of the era, and of "treason of intellectuals", when one considers how much was known, and for how long, about the crimes of these totalitarian systems. We can see from this fact alone how far from the insights of critical theory and its standards these 'party' intellectuals had actually regressed. Others - most importantly Heinrich Böll - consciously held on to the status of the unconditionally independent loner, without, however, wanting to function as 'the conscience of the nation.' It was Böll who recognized the necessity of first of all using the guaranteed opportunities of a parliamentary democracy, and who in 1977 turned against "the developing utopia of the free-floating intellectual" as "politically irresponsible."
development initiated in 1968 was in fact completed by the mid-eighties, as a consequence of which "the monopoly on protest had been taken away from the liberals and left intellectuals." And Enzensberger was able to state even contentedly in 1987: "We have lost Böll, but we have Amnesty International and Greenpeace to replace him."

The controversies around German reunification and particularly the heated [West]German-[East]German literary debates surrounding Christa Wolf and others in the years since 1989 have demonstrated, often to a ludicrous degree, that the old claim of intellectuals to the defense of universal values, and to the power to define within the symbolic order, has in no way expired. Even when far-reaching errors should have been corrected people too often clung with unwavering self-assurance to system-bound, utopian and finally undemocratic leftist concepts. And there are writers/intellectuals who are still irrepressibly playing the role of conscience of the nation or of self-appointed spokesperson for particular groups of disadvantaged and injured - a self-attribution that, in my opinion, Adorno and other critical theorists would never have made. Possibly the approximately hundred year-old age of the universal, pioneering intellectual (if he actually ever existed), has ended, as we live today in a period of dynamic, democratic, grass-roots civic movements on the one hand and necessarily ever more differentiated expert knowledge on the other. Evidently we still need a constant development of interdisciplinarily conceptualized and critical social theory and research, such as that which the Frankfurt School called for and practiced, one which aims at the improvement of the conditions of life.

IV

Here we can only comment in passing on the self-images and concepts of East-German or GDR writer-intellectuals, and on possible influences of critical theory; this will necessarily result in abbreviation. To put it apodictically: The typical ideal of the modern intellectual as spokesperson for universal values, as the rigorous champion of a truth and morality not bound-up in ideology, who challenges power and its persecution with his intellect - this ideal hardly ever existed in the GDR. Whenever members of the intelligentsia, whether writers or not, went in this direction and expressed it publicly, it usually led to their arrest and/or deportation (as for example in the case of Rudolf Bahro, Jürgen Fuchs and many members of the citizens' movement.) What was typical for the forty-year duration of the GDR was the image of the intellectual as priest of the worldly religion of Socialism, as the spokesperson of a (hypostatized) "working class" identity, and as the conscience of an anti-fascist morality; For a long time this intellectual did not at all experience the label of "Dichter im Dienst" as derogatory. On the contrary Westerners, including the intellectuals who insisted on their independence, were pitied as "people without a sense of belonging." For too long the members of the literary intelligentsia in the GDR lived in a
familial, authoritarian relationship based on loyalty to their state, which essentially rested on the anti-fascist foundational myth of the GDR. After World War II the project of socialism was accepted by young people, including members of the intelligentsia, primarily because it promised to be the absolute opposite of "Fascism", and would thus provide a beginning out of nothingness, a Christmas-like rebirth. National Socialism - which the communists had a predilection for calling "Fascism" - was per se Evil, the absolute enemy of humanity. Consequently "Anti-fascism", and along with it Socialism, was promoted automatically to the status of the Good, the friend of humanity per se, which furthermore - after Nazism had just collapsed - opened up yet another eschatological ('heilsgeschichtliche') prospect for earth. It is historically plausible that people then would be attached to such dualistic, principle-bound conception and thought. Under the Nazi regime only two basic reactions were really possible: assimilation and subordination or refusal and resistance. The trap opened up by the newly-empowered founding fathers of the GDR consisted in the fact that they constantly decreed this dualism to be inescapable. Whoever was not "anti-fascist" and for the building of Socialism, was immediately labeled as a supporter of the discredited opposite, "Fascism" (later expressed more mildly as a "negative, hostile attitude.") "It was thus impossible to imagine political traditions other than the opposition of Fascism and its supposed opposite." The offer made to all former on-lookers, and even to perpetrators of 'minor deeds' in the Third Reich - now to be allowed into the broad anti-fascist alliance, and thus to count oneself among the "victors of history" - was at once enticing and comforting, provided that one suffered from a bad conscience. At the same time it proved to be a "trap of loyalty" that was hard to escape, since whoever wanted to describe the GDR-regime without gloss (for example, as writers), as it really was, and whoever wanted to behave according to his critical perceptions, automatically departed from the basic anti-fascist consensus, according to which being anti-fascist and a good GDR-citizen were identical.

In that the thus re-educated GDR 'intellectuals' - I am not talking here about the few older authors who returned from exile - supported another 'totalizing' belief and world view, for a long time they accepted voluntarily the system-immanent task given to literature: that of functioning to educate the people, of being socially activist, and of raising the country's inhabitants to "Socialist personhood". Until the sixties only very few therefore claimed art and literature as an autonomous sphere of values. Volker Braun's response to the already-mentioned essay "Poesie und Politik" by Enzensberger, entitled "Politik und Poesie" (1971), is an example of this. Most writers still lived in a state of "confessional euphoria after declaring their belief in Socialism", and did not question the construct of Socialism. They instead repeatedly and voluntarily made literary and essayistic contributions to the ruling optimistic anthropology, for which the ability to create the "new person" and hence a better world was unquestionable. Under such premises critical theory - with its radically skeptical analysis of modern
Western civilization, with its refusal of leftist totalitarianism, and with its scrupulous vision of the social role of intellectuals, artists and art itself - could only appear foreign and hostile to GDR writers. To my mind there was clearly no such encounter. With the exception of Benjamin the GDR published, until its collapse, no texts by representatives of critical theory.

Only from about 1965 on is there any gradual crisis of meaning among the intelligentsia. It was concerned with the existing Socialist system in the GDR, which was being increasingly perceived as authoritarian, even inhospitable. It also concerned, however, the growing industrialization and destruction of resources, with their detrimental impacts on man and nature. People started to recognize that these events, bi-products of instrumentalist reason, characterized not only the hated system of capitalism, but also all existing socialist states. From this realization there developed, after an almost uncritical cult of technology, a real phobia of technology and a hostility to modernity, precisely among those (such as Günther Kunert, Christa Wolf, Franz Fühmann and Volker Braun) who had even until the early sixties been the most passionate champions of the effort to push through an industrial civilization. A statement made by Günther Kunert in 1966 is exemplary of the 'new consciousness', of which the SED had to disapprove: "Auschwitz and Hiroshima stand at the beginning of the technical age; I am only naming them here in the same breath because of their relationship to the socially organized use of technology. I believe that it can only be out of great naiveté that one would equate technology with societal and humanitarian progress."

It has not been clarified yet in any detailed way if such a statement is based on knowledge of Horkheimer's and Adorno's "Dialectic of Enlightenment", nor to what extent that work informs the bellettristic literature from the GDR, a literature critical of civilization and rationality that has since proliferated on a large scale. We can assume or at least suppose that authors such as Christa Wolf ("Kein Ort. Nirgends", "Kassandra", and other works), Heiner Müller ("Medea-Stück", "Gundling-Collage", "Hamletmaschine", and other works), and Günther Kunert (poetry and short prose), possibly also Volker Braun and Christoph Hein, at least read that bleak book and other works by Adorno and Marcuse during the seventies and eighties. But I suppose that it is more important to note a kind of osmotic exchange beyond the iron curtain, a correspondence of alarmed realization that resulted from the real dictates and catastrophic consequences of instrumental reason in both East and West. Retrospectively we should appreciate that much more Horkheimer and Adorno's theoretical, analytical, and even prognostic achievement in 1944: At that time we know that their substantive focus was not yet at all concerned with the concrete destruction of environment and resources.

The discourse that had become almost dominant in late GDR literature - a discourse critical of civilization and that followed directly or indirectly in the wake of the "Dialectic of Enlightenment", contributed in a beneficial way to the general disillusionment of a literary intelligentsia that once believed so strongly in progress and enlightenment. Admittedly that was not enough to save this intelligentsia - an authoritarian state's substitute for its public that
was still privileged as critical because it was taken seriously - from falling hard after the collapse of the GDR. The literary intelligentsia was now no longer the conscience of the working class, but actually the spokespeople and guardians of a "true" and "personified, humane" Socialism (which did not preclude some authors' attraction to dictatorship through education); but this hypertrophied situation was untenable. The first months of the Wende in October/November of 1989 were only the climax of the illusions this intelligentsia maintained concerning the ability to reconcile intellect and power - these months did not represent their real reconciliation. That fact caused widespread offense and melancholy that in many cases was not conquered, but rather turned into the permanent condition of (N)Ostalgie. Here also an orientation along the lines of the critical theorists' scrupulous self-image of intellectuals could not hurt.

V

A balance-sheet of the concepts and roles of intellectuals from the last fifty years of German history, of which four decades have been lived as two states bound up with systems hostile to one another, reveals stark contrasts and an increasing lack of coherence, which should not be artificially reduced to a common denominator. There was, in fact, first a general, fundamental anti-fascist consensus in the four occupation zones after 1945. Clearly, in the East this consensus was defined from the beginning as a socialist one, necessary in its consistency, and immediately instrumentalized. The deployment of this consensus, conceived of from the beginning, became a practical one at least from 1949/50 on, most importantly for the writers [sic]. Under different political conditions the literary intelligentsia in the Western-occupied zones learned different lessons from the trauma of the Nazi crimes and from the totalitarian 'treason' of a segment of the intellectual population. Many of them dreamed the dream of a radical democratic Socialism, one that was however immediately shattered by reality. An attitude of nonconformism, most commonly of an isolated kind, remained, which only came out in isolated cases and which expressed itself as protest made public, when, for example, it concerned rearmament, acquisition of atomic weaponry, and later the Springer Press and the State of Emergency Laws. After almost two decades of right-wing conservative governmental majority and the subsequent Great Coalition, and especially under the pressure of a young generation (of those later called '68ers), the former self-conception of many, even of older West-German intellectuals became so questionable that they energetically cast off the nonconformist, reason-bound attitude and engaged themselves directly and politically within parliamentary democracy. They also later became involved politically outside it (as so-called APOs), and even with concepts of revolutionary coups (whose 'subject' in their own country was admittedly sought for in vain.) A small group decided on an "armed battle" against the "system", i.e. on terrorism. During the seventies and eighties this political activism was largely spent, and transformed itself into a productive
engagement in the new social (civic) movements, and in a moderate leftist-liberal position, which in many respects continued the old nonconformism. That did not stop many people from nourishing utopian hopes for the "true Socialism", without considering the feasibility of its practical realization, and above all often without separating this clearly from the totalitarian "actual Socialism". The majority of West-German intellectuals were thus badly if at all prepared for the collapse of the GDR and the reunification that was unexpectedly getting under way. There was a corresponding illusionary status on the part of the East-German literary intelligentsia, but with decisively more crucial consequences. The delusion was two-fold and, quite literally, groundless: firstly, because as reformed socialists they had never given up their basic loyalty to the socialist camp (which now lost its site), and secondly, because they abruptly lost their hypertrophied role as critical ersatz-public to the constitutional public of a liberal democracy. This democracy's need for the great intellectual as socialist conscience of the nation was now minimal.

What can the theory and praxis of the intellectual in modern societies, such as that presented by critical theory and especially by Adorno, offer in response to all this? We know that for many Leftists it did not go far enough. Even Lukacs vehemently rebuked the Frankfurt School, saying that they had installed themselves comfortably in the "Abyss Hotel", and Brecht shared this view in his many attacks against the "Tuis". Such reproaches multiplied after 1968. Wolfgang Fritz Haug, for example, thus criticized them for "resignative utopia" and "disillusionment with reality". And even in 1968 Jost Hermand reproached Adorno for "a mentality of l'art pour l'art" (art for art's sake) and for "elitist, pessimistic cultural criticism", a "stoic pessimism that expresses its now meaningless resistance only in an impotent gesture of refusal". I have already indicated that critical theory appeared to even incrementally skeptical GDR writers to be nothing more than late-bourgeois defeatism.

I would like to contradict such harsh dressings-down distinctly. It cannot be laid at the authors' doors that a seminal work like the "Dialectic of Enlightenment" lay around for twenty years as a "message in a bottle". With complete justification Adorno noted even in 1962 "the absence of a proactive intellectual movement today". If such a movement grew at all it is not least because of Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and Habermas. At any rate Adorno did, as Habermas affirmed, "make a generation of younger academics, [...] one or two generations of students, and an public that was ready to learn, that read his essays and heard his radio presentations, sensitive to the distortions and the marginalizing potential of their own traditions, and to that which had become estranged and suppressed in them." These effects are not least to be found in the arts - from Celan, Bachmann and Enzensberger to Alexander Klug's literary and filmic work and to the composition theory and practice of many younger composers; these effects are even to be found in Botho Strauß' texts, at least until the early eighties. I have already mentioned the indirectly massive effects of the theory of instrumental reason on the more recent civilization-critical literature from the GDR (and of course on
that of the Federal Republic). Admittedly, instructions for action were not to be obtained from the Frankfurt School critics. "Our task in life is theoretical work", Horkheimer had written in a letter at the end of 1941, and that is as far as it went. Even Herbert Marcuse ended his 1964 (German, 1967) study, "Der eindimensionale Mensch" - a study that led to so much political activism (and actionism) - with these skeptical sentences: "Socially critical theory has no concepts that could bridge the gap between the present and its future; in that it promises nothing and demonstrates no success, it stays negative. In so doing it wants to keep the allegiance of those who, without hope, have given and continue to give their lives to the Great Resistance." I share Albrecht Wellmer's (and others') reservations about the "metatheoretical premises of Adorno, through which real history is a priori fixed as a negativity", and about Adorno's "constitutive connection between negativity and Messianism". I also see an intellectual elitism at work that I now consider more dubious than ever, but the work should not be confused with the belief in the leading political role of an intellectual elite. I profit endlessly and continually, however, from the interdisciplinary, critical-theoretical beginning of the Frankfurt School theorists, and I consider their scrupulous, constantly self-reflexive attitude as intellectuals - one that is also allergic to appropriation - to be at least a still important option, if we want today to try to understand ourselves and each other as - naturally - intellectuals.

(Translation: Margaret Bloomfield)
ENDNOTES

(Note: The translator has followed the author’s numbering throughout the footnotes, although from x to liii they are mismatched by one entry.)


v Max Weber: ??

vi H. Schelmsy: p. 94.


x Carl Christian Bry: Verkappte Religionen. Gotha, 1925.

xi Cf. in addition to the expanse of older literature the more recent Wolfgang Mommsen (ed.): Kultur und Krieg. Die Rolle der Intellektuellen, Künstler und Schriftsteller im Ersten Weltkrieg. München, 1996.


xxiii Ibid.: p. 42.

xxiv Ibid.: p. 333.

xxv Ibid.: p. 334.

xxvi Ibid.


Ibid.: pp. 29 and 31.


Ibid.: p. 89.


H. M. Enzensberger: Die Gesellschaft ist keine Hammelherde. See above, p. 76.


"which tried to save the Socialist utopian kernel from damage caused by the bankrupting of realized Socialism [...] and in addition prepared an argument to justify the continuation of the Socialist state" (p. 195.)


iii As above.


iv In "Philosophie der neuen Musik" (1949) Adorno himself had spoken of Arnold Schoenberg’s music as a "message in a bottle" to new shores, mail that contained the only valid message. Willem can Reijen and Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (eds.) took up the word in their important book on the history of the effect of "Dialectic of Enlightenment": Vierzig Jahre Flaschenpost. "Dialektik der Aufklärung" 1947-87. Frankfurt/M.: 1987. They describe the book simultaneously (in slang, but appropriately) as a "time bomb" (p. 7)


60 Cf. A. Wellmer: Die Bedeutung der Frankfurter Schule heute: p. 29.