"Fear and Loathing of the Public Sphere and the Privatization of Citizenship: How to Deconstruct a Knowledge Culture"

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FEAR AND LOATHING OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF CITIZENSHIP: HOW TO DECONSTRUCT A KNOWLEDGE CULTURE

by

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DRAFT
for Victoria Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, ed.

BEYOND THE CULTURAL TURN:
HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY IN AN AGE OF PARADIGM BREAKDOWN
... Concepts are words in their sites. Sites includes sentences, uttered or transcribed, always in a larger site of neighborhood, institution, authority, language. If one took seriously the project of philosophical analysis, one would require a history of the words in their sites, in order to comprehend what the concept was...to invoke the history of a concept is not to uncover its elements but to investigate the principles that cause it to be useful--or problematic...One conducts the analysis of the words in their sites in order to understand how we think and why we seem obliged to think in certain ways. If one embraced more specific conjectures about the ways in which the condition for emergence and change of use of a word also determined the space in which it could be used. (Hacking 1990, p. 360,62, my italics).

This chapter has two aims: One is theoretical--to explain an intriguing but worrisome puzzle about contemporary politics and political argument, namely the recurrent privatization of citizenship and the fear and loathing of the public sphere--the demonstrable anti-statism of our times.¹ The most recent expression of this phenomenon is evident in the curious and paradoxical fate of three significant and newly recuperated concepts in political and social thought--civil society, political culture, and the (Habermasian) public sphere. Together these concepts are three of the most significant in that cluster I call the citizenship concepts; their revival signals the rediscovery, rejuvenation, indeed the reinvention of the very idea of citizenship itself. In addition to their commonality as citizenship concepts, civil society, political culture, and Habermas's "public sphere" also share the common burden and the challenge of being invoked widely in the recent and increasingly popular effort to represent in theory a notion of a "third sphere" of participatory politics and collective solidarities in between the binary opposition that has been at the foundation of over three hundred years of modern political and social thought--namely the Manichean dichotomy between state and market, public and private. In the context of the Eastern European revolutions of the 1980s and the 1990s these concepts have been called upon to represent the social and political conditions that prompt individuals to come together in a space independently of both market exchange and administrative authority to participate in the collective decision-making processes that will shape their lives--in short, to participate in the conditions of citizenship.

The puzzle I find so intriguing and worrisome, and that which drives my inquiry, concerns the failure of these concepts to actually achieve their intent to successfully represent a third sphere free of the control of either state or market. Instead, the conceptual space in which they are most commonly placed is under the rubric of the private, market side of the stubbornly entrenched dichotomous formulation of modern social and political organization. The significance of this is hardly trivial: Given the extraordinary influence on social and political thought and practice of the post-1989 revolutions, this conceptual puzzle of the citizenship concepts--this failure of conceptual space--calls out to be explained, and challenged, for it signals nothing less than the conceptual privatization of citizenship and the diminishment of public life.

The second aim of my essay is methodological: To introduce and elaborate a general methodology that will help us to explain not only this particular puzzle, but more broadly to
articulate the basic elements of a research program that can be used widely in analyses of concept formation. It is a research program designed to analyze the complex and skewed relationship between the practical world of social and political organization and the symbolic conceptual systems of thought through which we try to make sense of that world. I call this research program a *historical sociology of concept formation*. A historical sociology of concept formation is a research program with a three-pronged approach to understanding "how we think and why we seem obliged to think in certain ways" (Hacking 1990:362). First, it directs us to take a reflexive approach to social science concepts; second, it defines social science concepts as relational concepts that exist not as isolated categories but in patterned matrices or conceptual networks; and third, it treats social science concepts as historical and cultural objects, rather than as labelling devices for natural objects or given social phenomena.

A historical sociology of concept formation is inspired by Hacking's premise that concepts are "words in their sites." Below, I take this up at great length; here I simply signal my argument that the spatial and historical sites in which concepts must be analyzed are best conceived as knowledge cultures (Somers 1996). I use the term knowledge culture to emphasize that knowledge is only accessible to us embedded in cultural forms and symbolic systems, that these systems have spatial and temporal regularities that create patterns of causality, closure, and boundary. Thus to understand knowledge and concept formation--such as the placement of civil society, political culture, and the public sphere, and the conceptual privatization of citizenship more generally--we need to look closely at these cultural structures, and to analyze how their distribution of spatial and temporal patterns organizes and influences their central concepts. This is the essence of the method of a historical sociology of concept formation.

I will explore two significant dimensions of a knowledge culture suggested by the term "site." The first is historical, for sites have histories, and thus to comprehend a concept requires a *history* of the words in their sites. The mandate to do history in conceptual analysis is not simply a wave at some notion of the "past," but rather an injunction "to investigate the principles that cause [a concept] to be useful--or problematic..." (Hacking 1990:362). The premise underlying this view of history, and of this kind of conceptual analysis more generally, is what I have called elsewhere an *historical epistemology* (Somers 1996). The term historical epistemology is purposefully oxymoronic: It questions the assumed anti-historical quality of epistemology--the rules and criteria for valid standards of truth; instead it suggests that all of our knowledge, our logics, our presuppositions, indeed our very reasoning practices, are indelibly, (even if obscurely) marked with the signature of time. They are "history-laden"--a phrase meant to evoke, and invert, the now well-established recognition that all empirical claims are "theory-laden," and to draw attention to the less discussed inverse--namely, that all social and political theory is founded on presuppositional historical claims. Its conceptual vocabularies and categories, its standards of knowledge, its definitions of significant problems, and its methods of justifiable explanation, all have embedded histories--histories that have shaped and continued to shape the very foundations of knowledge. For these reasons, con-
ceptual puzzles in political theory cannot be solved through an exclusively theoretical approach; they also require reconstructing and deconstructing many of the same historical narratives long encoded in modern political and social theory. History and epistemology need each other; neither can proceed effectively alone.

The second dimension of a knowledge culture qua site is spatial, and concerns the place of any given concepts in relationship to other concepts in the site as a whole. In the research program of a historical sociology of concept formation this becomes a mandate to develop "specific conjectures about the ways in which the condition for emergence and change of use of a word also determined the space in which it could be used" (Hacking 1990:62). Exploring the relatively neglected field of conceptual space as a crucial element in understanding concept formation is, as Hacking suggests, essential to being "well on the way to a complex methodology" (Hacking 1990:62).

The plan of this chapter is as follows: I first elaborate the elements of the conceptual puzzle I find so intriguing; I then spell out the idea that concepts as knowledge are best conceived as embedded in the "site" of a knowledge culture, and that the research methodology best suited to exploring concept formation is a historical sociology of concept formation. I then propose a central hypothesis and a series of propositions for explaining the problem of the failure of conceptual space in the placement of the citizenship concepts. This hypothesis, broadly, is that the concepts at issue are implicated in a knowledge culture qua metanarrative with a deeply intractable set of spatial and temporal arrangements that is continually being rewritten and reenacted--a metanarrative I call Anglo-American citizenship theory. At the causal heart of this metanarrative is the demonization, the fear and loathing, of the public sphere, and it is this that makes the privatization of citizenship a recurrent necessity. But the privatization of citizenship is what gives liberalism its claim to being a social theory. I will test this hypothesis and demonstrate the method of a historical sociology of concept formation by exploring the citizenship concepts in their initial period of invention in the seventeenth century, focussing above all on the "fear and loathing of the public sphere" that has repeatedly been the driving force in defining modern political argument.

I THE PUZZLE: THE PRIVATIZATION OF CITIZENSHIP: A FAILURE OF CONCEPTUAL SPACE

With the collapse of seemingly invincible authoritarian state regimes under the impetus of popular social movements for democratization, the intellectual world has of late recuperated the concepts of civil society, political culture, and the public sphere. These citizenship concepts with their echoes of past efforts to theorize democratization and citizenship (e.g. Jurgen Habermas's ([1962] 1989) early work on the public sphere, and Almond and Verba's [1963] work on civic culture) hold an immense conceptual allure for the urgencies of today--namely, to help us in the 1990s to make sense of a stunningly reconfigured post-1989 new world. They promise to do this by providing a new vocabulary liberated from the constraints of cold war political thought and adequate to the task of theorizing the anti-
The revival of the citizenship concepts is social and political theory's attempt to keep pace with history's exigencies.

The need is not hard to recognize: On the one hand, there are the firmly entrenched dichotomies of modern social and political theory. For over 300 years, political thought has been fixed by the historical belief that there were only two essential protagonists of social and political organization that forged the modern world: The modern administrative state and the market economy. This reading of the past was mapped onto a conceptual landscape with firm boundaries and "epistemological divides" that demarcate between two mutually exclusive conceptual zones of public and private—what Bobbio (1992) has called the "great dichotomy" of modern political thought. In this dichotomy the two mutually exclusive concepts of public and private, or the parallel ones of state and market, are used divide the world into two spheres which together are claimed to be exhaustive of social and political reality in the sense that every element of the world is covered between the two of them.

On the other hand—and here is where the pressing need enters—it is widely agreed upon that the popular revolutionary activities and collective solidarities we associate with democratization and citizenship practices in the 1980s were launched from a seemingly novel political and cultural terrain—a sphere of social life and free civic association insulated from both the rationalistic world of market exchange and flourishing of necessity well outside the folds of the coercive state. It has been called a "third" space of popular social movements and collective mobilization, of informal networks and associations, and of community solidarities oriented toward sustaining a participatory public life symbolized neither by the sovereign individualism of the market, or by the administrative apparatus state. It is precisely this new "third" sphere that many activists and intellectuals have come to call civil society or the public sphere, and is often characterized the space of political cultures. The citizenship concepts thus are the linguistic expressions of efforts to theorize a third political space that can serve as the commonly recognized precondition for successful democratic citizenship. At least two rival definitions compete for the power to control the meaning of civil society, for example: There are those who insist it is the liberating sphere of unregulated free markets that provides freedom and protection against the state. While others say it is a political community comprised of voluntary networks and free participatory associations unrelated to market exchange? The theoretical question on which these differences rest is whether civil society should be conceived as synonymous with the private side of the great public-private duality of modern political thought, or whether it is indeed a "third" sphere, not reducible to either public or private and best characterized in Toquevillian terms as something more like a "political society" comprised of local participatory associations, decision-making networks, and cultural norms of public life.
At issue in this argument is how to capture and win a high-stakes conceptual and policy debate over those conditions believed to be most conducive to continued democratization in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Both sides in the debate are stymied by the fact that the momentum of these unprecedented and undertheorized events has disrupted the standard parameters of modern political sociology's conceptual landscape and wildly outstripped the dichotomous oppositions of modern political and social theory. This is even more the case given that what is at stake is itself an elusive and ambiguous empirical phenomenon of a "third" sphere. The citizenship concepts are being mobilized by both sides of the debate: On the one side, to underline the value of private markets, individual rights, and the dangers of the state; on the other, while also stressing individual rights, to fortify the legitimacy of the idea of a space of participatory citizen politics and social interaction subordinated to neither state nor market.

The premise, and the puzzle, of this chapter is that those who have mobilized the concepts of civil society, political culture, and the public sphere to capture the conceptual space of a third sphere between state and market have been unsuccessful in their efforts. None of these concepts seems to be able to sustain the challenge of capturing a solid conceptual ground for a participatory third sphere conceived independently of both the market and the state. Instead, all three concepts seem to have been appropriated by those who would deploy them as part of the traditional binary vocabulary of public versus private in which they are relegated to the terrain of private free market society, a zone conceived in this discourse as one of safe haven from the coercive threats of the administrative and regulative reach of the state, itself continually invoked as the opposite--the source of potential danger, threat, tyranny, unfreedom, even "vampirism" (Block 1996). Thus if we conceive of public and private, state and society as a binary set of oppositions, in terms of actual usage the citizenship concepts are more often than not subsumed--placed, that is--under the standard dichotomized categories of private, economy-based, anti-political, markets versus public, institutional state. Ideas about an intermediate form of social organization between state and market seem to disappear into the "freedom of exchange" in the market where, for example, the "political" in the political culture concept refers to limited debate about how to best restrain the state in the interest of the private good. Lost in this conflation from three spheres to two, is the association of the citizenship concepts with the practices and powers of decision-making inherited from the Eastern Europeans as the normative baseline for theorizing participation. Lost in this conflation from three spheres to two is also the association of civil society, political culture, and the public sphere with the solidarities of a culture neither formed or deformed by the market's brittle attempts to create solidarity via a culture of exchange and "choice." Lost in this conflation of three spheres to two is the classical and the commonsense notion of citizenship as the domain of participation and of the "public" as the people--in common.

There is a notable paradox in this puzzle of conceptual space that make the losses even more striking: It was, after all, the unfolding of historical events that precipitated the demand
for a new theoretical vocabulary in the first place. On the other, it appears that the prevailing dyadic vocabulary is invincible to challenge, and the very terms mobilized to meet the conceptual demand seem unable to theorize adequately the very historical dynamics that brought into being their revival. Hence the puzzle that needs to be explained: Why? Why this paradoxical failure of conceptual space such that concepts originally recuperated to invoke the independent terrain of a third sphere instead have been trapped and absorbed into the rubric of the privatization of citizenship?

II. THE HYPOTHESIS: FEAR AND LOATHING OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN A DICHOTOMOUS CONCEPTUAL LANDSCAPE

The first aim of this chapter is to explain this puzzle. At the simplest level my hypothesis begins from the observation I have already alluded to above--namely that such a "third" terrain of participation and solidarity simply does not exist in the prevailing available vocabulary of modern political and social discourse. Instead (leaving out the complexification offered by Hegel's triadic inclusion of the family, because it does not change the basic claim regarding the relationship of state and market), the conceptual landscape has been monopolized by the "great dichotomies" (Bobbio 1992, p. 1-2) of modern social and political thought, a dichotomy that forces all political concepts to conform to one of only two binary possibilities.6 Bobbio describes how this dichotomous conceptual landscape divides the

"world into [only] two spheres which together are exhaustive in the sense that every element of that world is covered, and mutually exclusive in the sense that any element covered by the first term cannot simultaneously be covered by the second... from the moment that the space defined by the two terms is completely covered they arrive at the point of mutually defining themselves in the sense that the public domain extends only as far as the start of the private sphere (and the reverse is also true)..."

From this observation of the limits of possibility in conceptual space, the second element of my hypothesis follows inexorably: If political thought makes available only two possible zones in which to conceptually locate every instance of social and political organization--either the public administrative state, or the private sphere of the self-organized "people" independent of state control--it is the latter anti-statist zone that will always have priority in claiming those concepts believed to be associated with the conditions for democratization and freedom. This is because an essential element in the 300 plus years of the dichotomous conceptual mapping of political and social space has been the normative, or Manichean dimension of the great dichotomy--namely, an overwhelming fear and loathing, an imputed sense of "evil," tyranny, and corruption (in modern times, also inefficiencies) associated with the institutional public domain of the state. After all, it was not only the recent revolutions in Eastern Europe that were profoundly antistatist; modern liberalism, the dominant paradigm of our time, was itself born of the need to theorize a modality and a sphere of life believed to be free and, above all, autonomous from, what 17th-century thinkers saw as the chronic threat of state tyranny. Fear and loathing of the state coupled with the prosperity, safety, and freedom attributed to the private sphere of "the people" (their individual rights, their property and their
families) has from its inception been the dominant template of modern western political theory. In a dichotomous conceptual landscape reinvigorated by the anti-statist character of the anti-communist revolutions, the "orphan" civil society, political culture, and public sphere concepts—their recuperation motivated by dreams of individual freedom, democratization and prosperity—have no where else to go but into the only available non-state (hence non-threatening to political freedom) domain of the private sphere with its associated attributions of free market exchange and individual rights.

Beneath these recent revivals there is a deep legacy. "Civil society", of course, is hardly a new concept and has always been a central element in the conceptual terrain of modern political theory—but not as a third sphere independent of both state and people. Rather, in the rendition of classical liberalism that begins with John Locke and continues most prominently through Hegel and Marx, "civil society" has always been a central element of the private non-state world of private property, individual rights, and market society. From this observation follows the third element of my hypothesis, which is really the complement of the second: Just as there is a "push factor" (fear and loathing of the state) that directs the citizenship concepts away from the public side of a dichotomy limited to only two choices, there is also a "pull factor" towards the private sphere that helps account for their conceptual placement: Namely, in the absence of state authority or even political institutions political theorists recognized that something other than merely market exchange was needed to hold society together. This "something other" came to be seen as some kind of necessary infrastructure of social cohesion: Placing civil society, and even the "public" sphere and "political" culture concepts on the private side of the limited public/private state/market dichotomy of political thought is what allows liberalism to be a complete theory—a social as well as a political theory by adding the essential mechanism of social cohesion to the otherwise overly brittle sphere of individualized market exchange. These concepts have long served as the social glue that gives the private market the social cohesion necessary to be able to exist autonomously from the chronic threat of the institutional state. Once it was clearly accepted that indeed such autonomy from the state was the essential precondition for human freedom, then the most urgent task at hand was to establish and fortify the private sphere as a viable counter-domain to the state, one capable and robust enough to maintain that autonomy. This is why the citizenship concepts have an inexorable role to play in the private domain: Their theoretical job is to integrate and solidify the social foundations of cohesion, something that liberalism recognized that markets and individual property exchange alone could not do. It is this conceptual work that has frozen the citizenship in their "place"—firmly on the non-political side of the divide between public and private.

III: HYPOTHESIZING A KNOWLEDGE CULTURE:

In this chapter I will attempt to demonstrate and confirm this hypothesis (see also, Somers 1995b). Yet it must be said that even to succeed in my demonstration will in a sense only reframe and highlight that there are still deeper questions that call out to be answered if
we are really to unravel the complex puzzle I have posed. The most pressing of these is—Why
is modern thought so recalcitrant to challenge and so deeply entrenched in this dichotomous
opposition between public and private? After all, Eastern Europe in the 1980s should have
unequivocally disrupted this putatively dichotomous and exhaustive rendering of the social or-
ganization of modern life when its democratic revolutions were declared by their own makers
to have been nourished by a social and political space that refuses to fit comfortably under the
rubrics of either the public or the private, the state or the market. Moreover, there also have
been competing paradigms throughout history that should have readily disturbed the recursive
valorization of the market over the threat of a third sphere too closely associated with the in-
stitutional public state. Why—and how—when it has so often been outpaced by historical
practices and deeply convincing conceptual alternatives, does this binary dichotomy persevere
and escape disruption by history’s exigencies? And, Why and how does the dichotomy
repeatedly express an entrenched conceptual Manicheanism between the fear and loathing of
the public sphere and the state, on the one hand, and the recursive belief in the freedom and
goodness associated with the private sphere, on the other? In this normative schema, such a
fear and loathing of the public and the political is reproduced in even our most recent and
celebrated rediscovery of the citizenship concepts? Why?

As dramatic examples of the complex and skewed relationship between the practical
world of social and political organization and the symbolic systems of thought and the con-
cepts through which we try to make sense of that world, these deeper and knottier questions
suggest a need to probe further. Building on Ian Hacking’s premise that all concepts should
be understood as “words in their sites” suggests that to do so requires addressing concepts not
on their own apparent terms but as located and embedded in conceptual sites. I call those
conceptual sites knowledge cultures, and my hypothesis is that it is the character of a knowl-
edge culture (in this case, that of Anglo-American citizenship theory) to generate a set of
epistemological divides almost impervious to empirical challenge.

A knowledge culture (the term is introduced and discussed in Somers [1996a]) is a site
of inquiry in which knowledge is embedded—a site that takes the shape of a cultural schema or
set of schemas, such as a narrative structure, a binary coding, or a patterned metaphor or set
or metaphors. Let me briefly elaborate on the two components of the term. Knowledge (in
our modern scientific age) refers to truth; that which is untrue we do not call knowledge but
falsehood, or perhaps spirituality, mysticism, or magic. For any given intellectual claim to be
awarded the attribution of knowledge is thus a great privilege, synonymous in its privileged
status to those things we call facts. Their privilege is exhibited in their ability to trump compe-
ting claims that may not have the same status of being consensually defined as knowledge or
fact. To be awarded the privileged status of knowledge, however, is not a simple matter; it
entails passing the rigorous test of epistemology. Standard epistemology, rather than a particu-
lar theory or truth, is the theory of knowledge itself—those rules and criteria (the "lie detec-
tors" of intellectual claims) that are used to evaluate the question of whether any given piece
of information should count as truth, knowledge, and fact. To evaluate the truth-claims of knowledge, epistemology uses a set of criteria that transcend the particularities of any given theory or phenomenon and relies upon that believed to be universal and unchanging. These criteria have been called "foundational" as the history of epistemology has been a quest for the foundations for certainty. Thus Rorty's (1979) view that "the desire for a theory of knowledge is a desire for constraint--a desire to find 'foundations' to which one might cling, frameworks beyond which one must not stray, objects which impose themselves, representations which cannot be gainsaid" (p.315). My use of the term knowledge is thus capacious. It includes not only the "facts of the matter" but also the presumption that those "facts" have gained the status of truth and passed the test of epistemological accountability and credibility.

The second element of a knowledge culture is the term culture, which I define in this context as a network or configuration of analytically autonomous representations (signs, symbols, and linguistic practices) that exist as symbolic, structural, and social phenomena sui generis. This definition of culture assumes that meanings are determined not by the essence of things, nor from their goodness of fit with empirical phenomena, but as symbolic systems with their own histories and logics; and that these symbolic logics are themselves intersubjective, interactive, public expressions rather than either internalized subjective values or externalized expressions of social interests. To claim that cultural forms and schemas must be understood as "analytically" autonomous is a statement in the sociology of culture. It is a way of saying that cultural schemas should not be "reduced" to mere "reflections" of the material world--symbolic expressions of social and material relationships that are forged at a more concrete level of reality, what Marxists used to call the "ideological superstructure" in social life. To recognize that knowledge is embedded in analytically autonomous cultural forms is to recognize that knowledge expresses not merely an empirical world reflected in language but the demands and possibilities of a particular sui generis symbolic field of relations which shapes the way the empirical world is represented. Using the notion of culture as analytically autonomous thus helps us to remember that symbolic expressions are determined not by the essence of material things, nor from their goodness of fit with empirical phenomena, but by the organizational constraints (internal rules and relationships) of these symbolic schemas.

In coupling knowledge with culture, I am insisting that knowledge, truth, and claims to fact are always transmitted to us via some kind of cultural schema; they are culturally embedded—that is, mediated through symbolic systems or even literary devices, such as metaphors, stories, and analogies. The term knowledge culture is intended to underline the increasingly accepted idea that even the most straightforward kind of knowledge is not self-evident and facts are not simply given and immediate. Fred Block (1996), for example, in his recent exploration into the metaphors that shape our view of state and economy in the modern age, suggests that many of the most politically powerful ideas about the economy and the state derive not from distant academic or scientific influences but from images, stories, and especially metaphors (e.g. the image of a "vampire state" that is compelled to suck the blood out
of the economy) (p.6; see also McCloskey 1985, 1990). From the point of view of a knowledge culture, then, knowledge is itself a *historical and cultural object*, a representational form, rather than what Durkheim called (critically) a "natural object"—by which he meant facts that are allegedly simply *given* as part of nature, hence "pre-theorized" and putatively existing independently of culturally produced classification systems. In a move that was profoundly to influence Foucault, Durkheim and Mauss (1963 [1903], vol. 2) insisted that our most "primordial" logical and factual knowledge categories, such as time, space, and causality, are themselves social creations: "The first logical categories were social categories; the first classes of things were classes of men, into which these things were integrated," (p. 82; see also Douglas 1982). These representational categories are what makes the world accessible to us. Durkheim is not suggesting that there is no reality outside of these representations. His argument is simply that there is no knowledge of that world outside of the representational categories by which we have access to it. Indeed once in categorical form all aspects of the world are equally real dimensions of social reality: "Even the highest collective representations have existence and are truly what they are only to the extent that they command acts" (Mauss 1927).

It is crucial to remember what I emphasized above—that knowledge is not merely information, but conceived of as *truth*. Thus any talk of a knowledge culture must assume accountability for its foundational certainty, legitimacy, and credibility in view of those epistemological lie-detector mechanisms used to determine truth or falseness. In this task of achieving foundational certainty, a knowledge culture is buttressed by an *epistemological infrastructure* that establishes the criteria for distinguishing between more and less valid types of knowledge. What my use of the term knowledge *culture* suggests, then, is that it is the cultural form in which knowledge is embedded that acts as the epistemological infrastructure. Here I am again simply codifying the counterintuitive almost oxymoronic notion that epistemology—rather than resting on the certainty of the unchanging laws of nature (as per standard philosophy)—is better conceived as a set of historically constructed social practices fully dependent on available cultural schemas. The "facts" of the world simply do not come to us independently of symbolic schemas designed to let us know to recognize these as *facts*—rather than wild speculations—in the first place. In place of the image of epistemology as a lie detector modelled on the absolute regularities of nature itself, I am substituting a constructed set of cultural schemas that makes knowledge intelligible to us as *knowledge* rather than, say, religion or superstition. These cultural schemas, when coupled with knowledge, thus become epistemological infrastructures as well as symbolic representational forms; narrative, metaphor, and symbolic dualities, as I will stress below, replace our traditional conception of epistemology as entailing natural science and empirical experiment.

**Knowledge Cultures as Gatekeepers**

There is a second implication of my joining the terms knowledge and culture together that draws from the broader more popular sense of "a culture" as a historically specific "moment" in time—such as the "culture of modernity," or the "technological culture." In this use of
the term, a knowledge culture establishes a historically specific spectrum of epistemic conceptual possibility that set boundaries to what is conceivable within its historical moment. This is not really surprising: All forms of thinking and reasoning are historically configured within an historically delimited spectrum of thinking, reasoning, and institutional practices which make up the range of conceptual possibilities for any given historical time and space. Similar to other such ideas in the history and philosophy of science (e.g. Kuhn’s “paradigm”, Foucault’s "episteme", or Hacking’s “style of reasoning”), a knowledge culture defines the limits of "the possible" in its historical time. Hence its role as an epistemological gatekeeper: A knowledge culture sets boundaries on what is conceived by contemporaries as rational and reasonable investigation into all competing knowledge claims. Rather than advocating any single theory or truth, the hallmark of an epistemological gatekeeper is the capacity to demarcate the boundaries of what counts as rational (hence admissible) investigation into truth or falsehood in the first place. Hence not just answers, but more importantly the grounds for what counts as reasonable evidence to be brought to bear, are delimited within the gatekeeping parameters of a knowledge culture. Once this kind of closure is established--usually, as I shall argue, by the work of social naturalism--attempts at destabilization from outside the knowledge culture always run the risk of being considered irrational.

The challenge of understanding knowledge from the theoretical perspective of a knowledge culture thus becomes one of carefully exploring both the nature and the workings of the various symbolic systems through which knowledge is organized and made accessible to us, as well as the larger epistemological context that sets closure and gatekeeping limits on the epistemologically possible. In what follows, I stress three types of cultural schemas and classificatory arrangements through which knowledge can be mediated: Narrative structures (e.g. Ricoeur 1989), binary codings (e.g. Durkheim), and metanarratives, as well as dominant epistemological gatekeeper of our time--social naturalism.

**Narrative Structures**


A narrative structure is one in which meaning, structure, and above all causality and explanation is constituted through temporal and spatial relationships. Although relatively new in the social sciences, a significant body of interdisciplinary literature in the field recently has started to explore the significance and the features of narrative structures (see, for example Alexander 1992b, 1993a, 1995; Entrikin 1991; Polkinghorne 1988; Ricoeur ; Somers 1992,1994; Somers and Gibson 1994; Steinmetz 1992; Hayden White ). For purposes of this discussion, I briefly mention only a few of the most important dimensions of narrative. A narrative structure arranges its constituent elements in relations of time and place; it follows a characteristic sequence (beginning = problem; middle = crisis; end = resolution); and, most important, it contains a causal plot provides a narrative explanation for who or what is to ac-
count, or to blame, for the crisis at hand.

Narratives are thus organized as structures of causal relationships connected and configured over time and space. A narrative structure distributes events and relationships such that agents and events do not have intrinsic identities and meanings, but in virtue of their temporal and spatial place in the overall narrative structure. Meaning and causality and truth is then ascribed based on these temporal and spatial arrangements, sequences, and configurations. This is its method of establishing causal emplotment—something "causes" something else, for example, because the first thing comes before the second in time. Cause, in this manner, is established through placement and sequence; joining later outcomes to earlier events provides causal explanation through chains of causality, or what Abbot has called "enchainment" (Abbott 1993). So, for example, in Anglo-American citizenship theory it is the narrative structure that does the work of justifying the truth of the claim that the state is subordinate to the people because the narrative gives civil society (the people) temporal anteriority over the state. We will see how Locke's story of the temporal primacy of the social contract and civil "society's" temporal anteriority to the state serves to justify, because it explains—by virtue of its anteriority—its normative political priority over the state—the state it had, again by definition of its temporal anteriority, narratively constructed. As a cultural structure, then, a narrative is constituted by dynamics and presuppositions that must be understood largely in terms of earlier temporal and spatial conditions. Because narratives embed the identities of its parts within the entire story, the logic of any single element carries within it embedded fragments of the whole causal plot. This gives a narrative structure the status of a theoretical as well as a cultural object: Explanations and accounts are embedded in symbolic schemas that explain the present in terms of the past, and prescribe actions that will dictate the future in terms of the demands of the present.

In the context of a knowledge culture, narrative structures (counterintuitively, of course, given the longtime status of narrative as the "epistemological Other" in science and social science [Somers and Gibson 1994]) is not only a conveyer of information or a literary device such as a metaphor aimed to make knowledge "user friendly" but also an epistemological infrastructure—one in which the veracity and the validity of the particular knowledge is achieved (however subtly) through the veracity of its storied form. This means that it is the integrity of the story itself that does the explanatory and epistemological work—specifically, the work of justifying or evaluating claims to truth—and the success or failure of any given explanation depends less on its empirical or rational verification, and more on the integrity, logic, and rhetorical persuasiveness of the narrative. From this point of view, the explanatory power and believability of a theory depends not on its correspondence to empirical reality, but by how convincingly the elements of the story have been rationalized into their narrative logic. In this way the narrative—paradoxically, given its status as a cultural form rather than an expression of the regularities of nature—takes on the mantle of epistemology and endows the information it conveys with the stature of knowledge, fact, and truth.
Binary Codes and Social Naturalism

A second cultural form that knowledge cultures can assume is that of a binary code—probably the most recognizable of social science schemas. Building from what Durkheim had earlier classified as oppositions of sacred versus profane, Levi-Strauss ( ), for example, theorized that knowledge of the world of knowledge is always mediated through binary forms (e.g. the raw and the cooked) which ascribe cultural meanings, Douglas (1966) later articulated as those of purity and danger, and most recently Alexander (1992) as citizen versus enemy. The theoretical discussion surrounding binary codes is too well-known to need examination in this limited space. Instead, I want to focus on the binary code central to understanding the construction of social science knowledge cultures in general, and the knowledge culture of Anglo-American citizenship theory in particular—namely, that of social naturalism.

Social science knowledge—like all kinds of knowledge, as I stressed above—deals with questions of truth, and thus must have explicit criteria for evaluating the truth claims of contestants for knowledge. These criteria make up a discipline’s epistemology—the theory of knowledge itself. Epistemologists adjudicate truth claims by evaluating the methods and manoeuvres scientists use to generate accurate representations of reality. The epistemologists’ ultimate reference point (the "philosopher’s stone") has always been a set of universal criteria that can be depended upon to judge reliably the quality of knowledge claims. These criteria have, since the 17th-century, always been the laws of nature. Because it is universal, not subject to the vicissitudes of culture, place, and time, nature has always served as the foundational point of reference in the territory of epistemology. Only nature is credited by philosophers to have absolute regularities. Only nature escapes the fickleness and fortuitousness of culture and history, or what philosophers have increasingly come to call in epistemological terms, foundational, and hence privileged (Douglas 1986, p. 52; Rorty 1973). Because already there in nature—regardless of our apprehension—something represented as natural is thus more certain, firmer, and most appropriate to use as the highest standard against which all knowledge should be measured. This kind of knowledge is understood to have been discovered rather than created. The highest standards for knowledge are thus defined as those that are natural. By contrast, other contending criteria are considered constructed/artificial/ideological; they lack the quality of certainty because they are a product of the thinker’s conceptual schemas rather than natural phenomena which exist independently of the mind.

The binary code of social naturalism extends the criteria of the laws of nature from natural to social phenomena, and evaluates the quality of social knowledge by apportioning its conceptual arguments across a binary divide between nature/culture—attributing higher epistemological status to all that falls on the natural side of the epistemological divide. Certain social phenomenon—the market, for example—are attributed with the character of being natural, and are thus ascribed higher epistemological status. Others—the state, for example—are assigned to the rubric of all that is not natural, but constructed, artificial, arbitrary, contingent, and is thus in an epistemologically inferior position. In this hierarchy and
the boundaries it establishes are to be found the roots of social naturalism and the complex set of epistemological divides that organize social science knowledge cultures.

What is most paradoxical, and easiest to forget, about social naturalism is that it is itself a system of representations, a cultural schema--what is and is not defined as representational of nature is, after all, a "social category" rather than a "social fact"--to use Durkheim's words against himself. Yet by its own naturalistic criteria this cultural aspect of its identity is obscured and reconstructed as natural fact. The "unnatural" fact, of course, remains hidden that all epistemologies are social conventions, and only through "naturalizing analogies" is some knowledge considered to be more "natural"--hence more foundational as a structure of authority--than others. This process of naturalizing attribution makes certain knowledge appear as not only natural but as "the ground of argument"--hence foundational. These privileged naturalistic classifications are able to maintain their privileged naturalistic appearance only by means of an aggressive cultural schema such as social naturalism.12

Knowledge Cultures as Metanarratives

When a narrative structure is grafted onto the binary code of social naturalism the narrative is transformed to the much more potent cultural schema of a metanarrative.13 A metanarrative is a narrative structure that has been "naturalized" by its conjoining with social naturalism.

Metanarratives as Gatekeepers of Conceptual Authority

As a cultural schema that has been epistemologically naturalized, metanarratives are among the most potent--and troubling--types of cultural expressions that a knowledge culture can assume. Their worrisome qualities derive from the fact that metanarrative's are cultural schemas which exercise extraordinary conceptual authority through the naturalization of its conceptual attributions, its narrative and spatial distributions. Indeed by locating concepts within the larger sites of "institution" and "authority," Hacking vividly reminds us that a knowledge culture qua site--in this case a metanarrative--is not only cultural, but political, in that its symbolic logics take on modalities of power and authority, and create boundaries of exclusion and inclusion. These systems of classification inevitably establish lexical authority, just as Baker (1990:5) suggests that the "political" element of political culture refers to the fact that political authority in cultural schemas works by upholding "authoritative definitions of the terms within that discourse." In this ability to exercise the power of inclusion and exclusion, privilege and disdain, a metanarrative assumes the role of an epistemological gatekeeper.

Metanarratives wield the gatekeeping power of social naturalism to pass epistemological judgment on all candidates for the status of truth. Recall that social science establishes its legitimacy through an epistemology that looks to what can be found in nature as the baseline for the "foundations" of knowledge, this makes the non-contingent regularities of nature the standards by which the validity of different kinds of knowledge are adjudicated. What gives this epistemology great conceptual authority is that the boundaries between what is viewed as natural and foundational, and what is viewed as cultural and contingent, form a series of
hierarchical relationships. Knowledge that represents what is deemed natural occupies a privileged position in the epistemological schema, while knowledge deemed cultural is considered contingent, historical, and arbitrary—hence inferior to the natural. The gatekeeping power of a metanarrative emerges from the coupling of this epistemological system of authority with a narrative schema. When grafted to the epistemological grid of social naturalism a narrative’s temporal and spatial elements become subordinated to the binary epistemological divides of social naturalism—the hierarchical dichotomy between the natural and the cultural. Those categories of the narrative that fall under the natural side of the epistemological divide—e.g. the anterior private sphere—immediately gain epistemological privilege as foundational objects over those that have been relegated to the not-natural/artificial side of the divide—e.g. the post-hoc public sphere of the state. So entwined with the dichotomies of social naturalism, the temporal and spatial demarcations of a narrative are hardened into unbridgeable epistemological divides that cannot be transgressed within the bounds of rational and reasonable thinking. It is thus social naturalism that transforms social science conceptual networks into gatekeepers of conceptual authority; their internal epistemological infrastructure imposes a field of relationships, demarcations and boundaries that establish power, privilege and hierarchy among the internal elements of its narrative representations.

Social naturalism naturalizes, hence institutionalizes, the narrative authority of a metanarrative. When a narrative account becomes naturalized it means that its narrative structure (its temporal sequences and spatial units of analysis) is no longer recognized as a story—i.e. an assembly of parts whose significance is wholly a product of its (contingent) construction—but it passes into our knowledge culture as presuppositional—that is, given, "natural." As social naturalism empowers that which it endows, it endows a metanarrative with a narrative authority that allows its story to exist at a more foundational and unquestioned level than the empirical world (thus meta) and thus insulates it from the scrutiny of empirical social scientific inquiry. Social naturalism thus endows metanarratives with an air of existing "above and beyond" the level of empirical reality; its systems of classifications thus derive their authority not from empirical evidence but on the givenness of their seeming naturalistic or presuppositional qualities. This means that evidence alone is rarely enough to dislodge its putative truths as the authority of any particular claim to truth is maintained less through empirically refutable scientific methods and more through the complex codes of social naturalism. What is "natural" empowers what it signifies (see Sewell 1992 for a similar claim about "structure"); what is "natural" is virtually immune to empirical challenge.

If the notion of conceptual authority tied to boundary-drawing and hierarchy invokes an image of vertical power and privilege, its infrastructure of social naturalism also clearly gives a metanarrative the gatekeeping authority to institutionalize the status quo of conceptual possibility. It does so by controlling the epistemological agenda. In this sense, a metanarrative is similar to a paradigm; it not only provides the range of acceptable answers
but has the gatekeeping power to define both the questions to be asked, as well as the rules of procedure by which they can rationally be answered. Even more than others kinds of knowledge cultures, then, a metanarrative establishes the parameters of epistemic conceptual possibility through its power to adjudicate what counts as rational and reasonable investigation into all competing knowledge claims. Through its gatekeeping power to initiate, or to block, competing knowledge claims, a metanarrative institutionalizes its own conceptual authority.

To sum up: In the context of the above discussion of knowledge cultures and metanarratives my central hypothesis is that the citizenship concepts, like all concepts, are embedded in, organized and constrained by, and contained within a knowledge culture--(in this case the metanarrative of Anglo-American citizenship theory, as I discuss below). This metanarrative has the enduring "power to define" because it operates as a structure of conceptual authority, a gatekeeper, a cultural structure with its own internal symbolic logics of narrative causality and an epistemological infrastructure of social naturalism. Its identity as a cultural structure is underlined by the fact that the very durability and validity of the metanarrative is dependent upon its temporal and spatial integrity and the relational coherence of its narrative symbolic logic. It is a cultural narration held together by symbolic structural logics, and institutionalized not through empirical confirmation but through the cultural schema of social naturalism. As such, a metanarrative is remarkably immune to direct competing empirical evidence.

IV. AN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF CONCEPT FORMATION: CONCEPTS AS 'WORDS IN THEIR SITES'

My hypothesis of a metanarrative's power to reproduce its epistemological hierarchies even in the face of competing and seeming disruptive evidence suggests a deep pessimism regarding the possibilities of establishing a conceptual vocabulary adequate to the challenge of representing a genuine third sphere of participatory solidarity in democratic politics. This being said, however, there is a research method I believe well-suited for the challenge: I call this a historical sociology of concept formation (Somers 1995a, 1995b). An historical sociology of concept formation is a research program designed to analyze "how we think and why we seem obliged to think in certain ways" (Hacking 1990:362, emphasis added), and hence presupposes an historical and a cultural approach to knowledge, or a historical epistemology (Somers 1996a). Seemingly oxymoronic, the term historical epistemology combines the terms history and epistemology to emphasize what we now find to be relatively uncontroversial--namely, that practices of thinking and reasoning are themselves historically constructed products rather than simply reflections of the empirical world. An historical epistemology is based on the principle that all of our knowledge, our logics, our theories, indeed our very reasoning practices, are indelibly (although obscurely), marked with the signature of time. When aimed specifically not at whole disciplines or even theories, but toward our presuppositional conceptual vocabulary, the assumptions of a historical epistemology can be applied to the specific research method of a historical sociology of concept formation.

A historical sociology of concept formation is a research program with a three-pronged
approach. First, it directs us to take a reflexive approach to social science concepts; second, it directs us to investigate social science concepts as relational concepts that assume their identities from the patterned matrices or conceptual networks in which they are embedded; and third, it treats social science concepts as historical and cultural objects, rather than as labelling devices for natural objects or given social phenomena.

*Reflexivity:* Social scientists in recent years have increasingly come to recognize that the categories and concepts we use to explain the social world can themselves be fruitfully made the objects of analysis. The work of examining, instead of simply taking for granted, the fundamental categories of social research falls under the mandate of a "reflexivity"—meaning literally, to turn back on itself. Reflexivity begins by making social science concepts themselves the object of historical inquiry (the problem to be explained) rather than an unproblematic category of sociological research that is applied to other empirical data. Turning concepts back on themselves entails shifting terms like civil society and the public sphere from the position of explanatory tools to that of problematic objects-to-be-explained. This makes it possible to subject these terms to a new set of questions about why and how and to what effect have social scientists invented and reinvented the idea that there exists something significant in the social world called, for example, civil society or a public sphere? And how have these terms been used to make sense of the world? Problematizing reflexively our apparently presuppositional categories of social thought thus involves asking how the historical construction and transformations of a concept shaped and continues to shape its logical dimensions and its social meanings.

*Concepts as relational objects* An historical sociology of concept formation, secondly, requires looking at concepts as embedded within their knowledge cultures. This requires a relational approach, rather than what Karl Popper ([1934] 1959) called "essentialism"—a philosophy which looks to the "essence" of things for information about their "true" nature. An essentialist approach looks at concepts as a singular categories whose meaning is derived from a set of attributes posited under its rubric—attributes intended to represent the essence of that concept. In contrast, an historical sociology of concept formation rejects asking what the essence of a concept "is", and instead looks at concepts as relational objects embedded in a relational configuration of concepts, or a conceptual network. As such, it requires a methodology that embeds the object of analysis (the concept) within the entire relational matrix, the conceptual network, or site, in which the concept is embedded, again inspired by Hacking's notion of concepts as words in their "sites." It is another approach to historicizing by locating conceptual problematics not only in time, but in conceptual space and conceptual authority, as sites include "sentences, uttered or transcribed, always in a larger site of neighborhood, institution, authority, language" without which ideas would be just words, not concepts. Hence Hacking's imperative: "If one took seriously the project of philosophical analysis, one would require a history of the words in their sites."

The most notable implication of this is that concepts in a conceptual network are not
only related to each other in the weak sense of being contiguous; they are also ontologically related. This means that concepts are not single ontological entities; rather, the meaning of one concept can only be deciphered by virtue of its "place" in relationship to the other concepts in its web (Polanyi 1957b; Levi-Strauss [1964] 1969; White 1992). What appear to be autonomous categories defined by their attributes are thus better reconceived as historically shifting sets of relationships that are contingently stabilized in sites. As I suggested above, such sites can be conceived of as knowledge cultures or conceptual networks comprised of configurations and coordinates of ideas, epistemological rules of validity, cultural logics and so on (Somers 1995:135). A conceptual network is a web, matrix or the "field" in which concepts are nested—a structured configuration of relationships among concepts that are related to each other by virtue of sharing the same conceptual net. The network concept directs us to look for the matrix of ties between elements and the geometric shape of the patterns they form. Following Hacking again, this is the route toward a "complex methodology," one that would allow us to generate "more specific conjectures about the ways in which the condition for emergence and change of use of a word also determined the space in which it could be used." Indeed, conceptual networks are especially well suited to a methodology based on the spatial metaphor as the network concept invokes spatial images of matrices of ties among the network's elements. It is the geometric shape and logic of these ties that need to be reconstructed before turning to analyze the place of a single concept within that network.

In place of a language of categories and attributes, an historical sociology of concept formation builds from various approaches to relational thinking and substitutes a language of networks and relationships. Hypothesizing the relational embeddedness of the civil society and public sphere concepts thus suggests that the concept cannot be understood as an isolated category with free-floating meaning arbitrarily selected by the researcher. The conceptual network has a set of structured meanings that are also mobilized along with the concept, however inadvertently, into research analysis. When this embedded concept is used or applied to research, the entire conceptual network in which it is embedded is mobilized with it, willy-nilly. The result sets strict limitations on the empirical freedom available to the researcher. At the same time, however, that concepts have relational identities does not suggest that conceptual networks are holistic, consensual, or non-contested entities. Rather, it suggest the notion of a contingent but nonetheless internal integrity of a cultural pattern or logic, such that pragmatic choices within this pattern are regulated by the pressures of meaningful consistency. This pressure for patterned consistency within conceptual networks does not translate into notions of coordinated, systemic or uncontested coherence in the larger domain of culture as a whole—itself comprised of numerous, often competing, conceptual networks, mediated by a multiplicity of power relations.

Concepts as Cultural and Historical Objects From the hypothesis that knowledge cultures embed concepts in cultural forms, it follows that concepts must be analyzed as cultural objects. This requires making a critical distinction between analytic (or heuristic) autonomy and
concrete (or actual empirical) autonomy (Alexander; Somers 1995a,b). Although cultural objects can never be empirically autonomous—i.e. divorced from the world of social forces and practices—they always exhibit a degree of analytic autonomy independent of empirical or scientific validation (Alexander 1995). Treating cultural forms as analytically independent but concretely and empirically intertwined with the social has important payoffs for understanding the constraints imposed on a concept by the site in which it is embedded. First, it allows us to concentrate on discerning on its own terms that conceptual network's classificatory schemas and rules of procedure without immediately reducing or imploding such schemas and rules by their degree of consistency with exterior social relations. Recognizing that a conceptual network has its own internal logic allows us to do as Archer (1990) advocates: to "examine the interplay" between the conceptual network and the historical relations. Acknowledging the analytic autonomy of a cultural structure detaches it from "belonging" de facto to any particular social class or organizational interest; instead it allows us to examine empirically the historically contingent ways in which different groups may contest and appropriate its meaning.

Second, by examining the analytically autonomous logic of a conceptual network, we can identify and understand its rules for including and excluding evidence, its epistemological divides and demarcations, its modes of structuring of temporal and spatial patterns, and, especially, its criteria for what counts as public versus private domains, as culturally (and thus contingently) constructed versus naturalized (and thus foundational). This in turn makes it possible to see the imprint of this structure on the course of institutional and discursive history, and thereby to test and demonstrate empirically how "the social theories that were advanced to interpret these [structural] transformations [of Western societies] have necessarily been a part of the societies they sought to comprehend" (Bendix [1964] 1977:28). Looking in this way at the construction of social science thought allows us to see how concepts, and ultimately institutions, are built by men and women observing the empirical world through culturally constructed epistemological schemas. It is the particular shape and logic of these schemas' structures of thought that made it possible for them to see some things but not others. If it is true, then, that the power of Anglo-American citizenship theory to constrain and define the political culture concept is in part a result of its being a cultural structure, an historical sociology of concept formation commits us to studying as an autonomous cultural structure the shape and symbolic logic of this conceptual network if we are to understand its constitutive power. This approach foregrounds the equally robust and codetermining power of both cultural and social structures.

An historical sociology of concept formation also calls for a genealogical accounting of conceptual configurations; indeed some would dismiss the method for engaging in a "genetic fallacy." But here I would agree with Hacking that the accusation of committing the genetic fallacy is but name-calling produced by an overly great admiration for a priori logic. In fact, the most important aspect of an historical sociology of concept formation is the transgressive power that evolves from studying concepts as historical objects. Knowing how we got to where
we are helps to clarify where we are. If we can understand what puts ideas and knowledge
in place and what brings them into being—not a teleology but an account of contingencies and
"might have beens"—we can hopefully better grasp the meanings and the effects of those ideas,
and their role in problem-formation. When knowledge is recognized as a historical object, we
don't ask whether it is "true" or "false," but rather we explore how and to what effect ideas and
ontologies are even considered reasonable candidates for truth in the first place, how they
gain and lose their currency and resonance—a task that entails reconstructing their making,
resonance, and contestedness over time. The method thus mandates to explore the cultural,
historical and narrative construction of concepts, to explore the historicity of our theoretical
semantics as well as our epistemological foundations (standards of knowledge), usually to dis-
cover that they themselves have histories of contestation, transformation, and social
relationships—histories not unlike the more straightforwardly social phenomena that we study
regularly.

The method of an historical sociology of concept formation differs from the classical
approach of Mannheim's or Marx's sociology of knowledge in that it does not look for the ex-
ternal social interests from which theories are derived. Rather it looks for the "conditions of
possibility" within which cultural and historical forms frame and constrain concepts, and by
which epistemological boundaries and divides are created and sustained. It aims to account
for how concepts do the work they do, not why they do in terms of interests, by reconstructing
their construction, resonance, and contestedness over time. The method could thus also be
called a relational archaeology or a conceptual genealogy as it is designed to address the recur-
rent problems thrown up by the complex and skewed relationship between the practical
worlds of social and political organization and the symbolic systems through which we try to
make sense of that world (e.g. theoretical categories of political thought). As a method apply-
ing equally to the historical recounting of past particulars and to the sociological theorizing of
past and present generalities, it is intended to bridge the artificial divide between substantive
and theoretical dimensions. And most notably, by embracing aspects of philosophy, social and
political theory, sociology, and anthropology (indeed most of the human sciences), it is in-
tended to be boldly disrespectful of common strictures against transgressing disciplinary
boundaries. The challenge of an historical sociology of concept formation is to thus
deconstruct and reconstruct the fusion of history and social theory.

Let us take stock: An historical sociology of concept formation argues that just as
political ideas and social practices are not abstract reflections of external social attributes, so
also must our own social science concepts be understood not as given categories with natural
attributes but as cultural and historical objects embedded within and assigned meaning by their
location in symbolic and historically constructed cultural structures. From the perspective of an
historical sociology of concept formation concepts do not have natures or essences; they have
histories, networks, and narratives which can be subjected to historical and empirical investiga-
gation. In what follows, I use this method to do just that: To subject the histories, networks,
and narratives of the original civil society and public sphere concepts to historical and empirical investigation.

Three propositions

My discussion of this knowledge culture's enduring "power to define" the placement of the concepts can be distilled into three "sub-hypotheses" or smaller propositions which I will examine closely below. These propositions will be crucial if we are to understand why it is that the concepts at issue are placed as they are. The first proposition makes the object of study not the isolated concepts, but rather the knowledge culture of which they are parts; the second directs us to look for the symbolic logic of that cultural structure; and the third to reconstruct the authority structure of its epistemological boundaries and demarcations.

Proposition 1: The citizenship concepts are not isolated objects, but have relational identities whose meanings are assigned by their place in a conceptual network/cultural structure. Thus rather than concepts on their own, the subject of research should be the entire conceptual network, or the "site," in which these concepts are embedded. Proposition 1 thus makes the knowledge culture of Anglo-American citizenship theory the primary subject of inquiry in this research.

Proposition 2: The cultural form that the knowledge culture of Anglo-American citizenship theory assumes is that of a metanarrative--a cultural structure that joins together narrative forms with the binary coding of social naturalism. This directs us to the task of analyzing the metanarrative's symbolic logic--especially its relationships of time, space, and emplotment--as well its social naturalism which attributes naturalistic--hence privileged--status to some concepts and not others.

Proposition 3: Metanarrative's are structures of conceptual authority; they have an extraordinary "power to define" conceptual placement because they have intrinsic power and authority to establish rules of hierarchy and inferiority, boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, tropes of good and bad, rules of rationality and evidence--all the characteristics of an epistemological gatekeeper. Hence the mandate of a historical sociology of concept formation is to "question authority"--to challenge the power of a metanarrative by revealing its social naturalism to be itself nothing more, and nothing less, than itself a cultural schema constructed by intellectual practices.

V NARRATING AND NATURALIZING ANGLO-AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP THEORY: METANARRATIVE AS GATEKEEPER

In this section I carry out this program empirically (although briefly), applying an historical sociology of concept formation to the citizenship concepts. My conclusions are that the citizenship concepts are articulated through a coherent narrative logic in the Anglo-American citizenship story; this story has an epistemological infrastructure of social naturalism; when the narrative structure of the story is mapped onto the epistemological infrastructure of social naturalism, the result is the metanarrative of Anglo-American citizenship theory (AACT). It is this metanarrative that demands the conceptual placement of the citizenship concepts on the
private side of the divide, and it is this metanarrative that has so firmly entrenched the fear and loathing of the state that so relentlessly drives the privatization of citizenship.

**Finding #1: Theorizing through Narrative**

The conceptual network, or site, of the citizenship concepts, is a *story* about Anglo-American citizenship—a "conjectural history" of how popular sovereignty triumphed over coercive absolutist states to ensure individual liberties. First adumbrated in the 17th century by Locke, explicitly articulated by the 18th-century Scottish moralists (e.g. Ferguson, Adam Smith), appropriated into the foundations of 19th-century modern sociological theory, and still the basic core of liberal political thought today, my reading of this story is that it is a narrative political fiction less of citizenship per se, and more of the rise of a market and a anti-political private sphere and its heroic role in establishing and ensuring the individual freedom, the social foundations and the autonomy of "the people" against the ever-present tyranny of the state. One version of how Anglo-American citizenship theory came into being can be reconstructed by exploring its narrative construction, its transformation, and its sedimentation over the course of the 17th through the 20th centuries. Here I begin that project by imagining the making of a series of key narrative elements in their originary 17th-century context.

Most significant in this first finding is the discovery that Anglo-American citizenship theory theorizes, explains causality, and actually establishes its claims to truth and knowledge through the cultural form of a narrative. Because it is a story, it is the authority of its temporal and spatial relationships that does the explanatory work, and the success or failure of the explanation depends on the integrity, logic, and rhetorical persuasiveness of the narrative—not on its empirical verification. This means that the explanatory power and extraordinary durability of Anglo-American citizenship theory can be accounted for first and foremost by how well the elements of the story have been rationalized into their narrative logic which in turn works to convince us that the narrative actually records and explains, rather than constructs, the empirical world it narrates.

**The Crisis--What is to be Explained?**

At the heart of every narrative is a crises or "flashpoint" that cries out for a solution. Thus to gain access to the internal logic of a narrative requires first identifying the narrative's "problematic"; it is this that will determine the form the narrative is to assume. To do this the following questions must be answered: What is the problem to which this narrative account is being presented as a solution or explanation? How is the crisis/problem explicitly formulated and, above all, *accounted for*--i.e. to what or whom is blame attributed? What is the narrative's causal plot? And, finally, what new problems does the narrative explanation generate for the future?

The enduring problematic of Anglo-American citizenship theory has been constructed as the threat to individual rights and political liberty: How can "the people" escape the ever-present threat to individual liberty of a potentially tyrannical state? The suppression of personal liberties in 17th-century England catalyzed the first full blown formulation of this prob-
lematic of how to ensure the conditions for individual rights against the tyranny of the state. Over the course of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, the narrative has been driven by an amalgam of three successive formulations of this same problem. Each new incarnation of the problem is a result of difficulties the previous narrative answer has had in accounting for new historical events. But it is Locke's originary narration of the solution that first cements the association of "politics" with the coercive administrative state and sets the stage occluding in liberal theory of a participatory notion of citizenship.22

To understand the revolutionary character and impact of Locke's narration (and following the historical mandate in a historical sociology of concept formation) we have to look at the limits to Hobbes' answer to his earlier problem. Hobbes had been the first to conceptualize the "problem of order"--so called because it asked how and from where, in the absence of traditional monarchy, would authority and order come? (Parsons 1937; Pocock 1985b). Locke did not find Hobbes' solution of *Leviathan* satisfactory, for it opened only two bad choices: Either live with a war of "all against all", or live as a political subject under an absolutist state now purportedly constrained against future tyranny by its origins in the people's voluntary relinquishment of their individual autonomy (the social contract). Locke took as his starting point the new problem he believed flowed from Hobbes' solution: How could personal liberty be maintained if the end of the story was again the singular site of the all-powerful Leviathan? How could that Leviathan be truly contained? In this problematic/crisis we see how the story is set to be a Manichean one: The central antagonist and the constant threat is the public realm of the administrative state--a domain of unfreedom constituted by coercion, domination, constraint, backed up with physical compulsion, and generative of arbitrary personal dependencies. The job of the narrative is thus determined by the formulation of the crisis, and the danger: To theorize an epic struggle led by a heroic protagonist worthy and capable enough to meet the danger--a danger invented in the first place by the narrative's definition of the problem as embodied by the chronic tyranny of public sphere.

_Narrating Place: Theorizing through Political Geography_

After the problematic, a narrative form requires a sense of _space and place_--or a political geography. The prevailing political geography at the time of Locke's intervention was represented in Hobbes' famous *Leviathan*. In this allegorical engraving of political authority, Hobbes depicts a giant body of a wise, benevolent, and patriarchal-looking King standing God-like above a miniature landscape of everyday people's country farms and churches. Most significant, what at first glance appears to be merely the king's suit of metal armor is on closer look actually hundreds of miniature people all facing reverently towards the giant head of the King and Crown. What Hobbes has done here is wholly to insert into the spatial body of the King and state "the people"--more aptly, the "subjects"--of his kingdom. Embedded as they are within the king's one spatial corporality, there is _no separate terrain available for people to inhabit other than that of the king's own body_. Hobbes' narrative contained only one place of so-
cial organization—the state itself—leaving no place for the people.

Given his Manichean problematic of the state as tyrannical, Locke had to fiercely reject conflating the people into the singular administrative space of the King's body/state. The problematic of the ever-threatening state threat called out for a solution that would permanently relocate the place of the people and in turn reverse the direction and the source of political power—from that of the state to that of the people. Even though Hobbes had imagined a one-time "reversal" by narrating an original social contract, his political topography of Leviathan revealed his reversal to be only an abstract out-of-time originary moment that settled power back with the state. In Locke's contrary problematic of the tyrannical state, Hobbes' was a topography that called for its own negation; freedom from state domination depended on the existence of a distinct, coherent social place. Moral right he could invoke, but morality would not empower. To endow "the people" with the capacity to make and un-make political power and sovereignty, Locke had to endow the people with a collective terrain independent from that of the state. He needed, in short, a "civil (non-state) society."

Locke found this through a revolutionary remapping of social and political space. He invented, and narrated a new political topography of social organization—a pre-political and pre-state private entity spatially separate and distinct from the state, a new place for "the people" alone. It was to be a permanent place of individual freedom and property that would establish the grounds for an enduring collective entity and a normative reference point separate and autonomous from the state. In this permanence of a private sphere, he distinguished his social vision emphatically from that of Hobbes' and all previous political and social thought and introduced the most enduring formulation of how and why liberty would only be preserved through the spatial and institutional autonomy of a pre-political society. In this topographical narration, he recast forever our vision of the social and political terrain.

Locke thus created a narrative dualism consistent with the Manichean cultural schemas characteristic of narrative structures: The full spectrum of categorical possibilities in social organization is limited to the great dichotomy between a vilified dangerous public realm of the state (always lurking behind the tamed government of the people) versus a non-coercive voluntary and pre-political (hence private) realm of [civil] society. In inventing this political topography of a separate society as the sole realm of true freedom, in contradistinction to the contingent freedom of the administrative state, Locke forever imprinted on our political imaginations a singular binary spatial divide between public and private as the full and exhaustive range of possible forms of social organization conducive to political freedom. Since Locke, the story of the free individual's chronic struggle to remain free has been narrated through the fierce struggle of the non-political space of civil society to remain free of the public domain. The institutional administrative state does not disappear or become eclipsed by the birth of civil society; rather, by remaining a permanent threat in the form of a coercive spatial "Other," it plays an essential role in the story's continuing problematic and gives the sphere of civil society its raison d'être.
We think of the nineteenth century as the age of the discovery of society on which all of our modern social science is built. But in this narrative it is clearly Locke--usually thought of as the quintessential individualist--who first imagined the spatial possibility of a non-political domain of life that existed sui generis free from political authority and control. It is this notion of an autonomous pre-political society--for Locke, a civilized version of his state of nature--that by the 18th century explicitly takes on the terminology of civil society. He believed civil society is believed to be the realm of popular freedom because it was spatially independent from the state because was "non-political" and private.23

**Narrating Time: Establishing Causality through Sequence**

Locke's invention of the new site of pre-political/society, as revolutionary as it was, was not in itself a sufficient conceptual move to ensure that the "people" would remain permanently free of state control. What was to prevent a potentially tyrannical state from subordinating the whole of this new society to its will? To solve this problem, Locke constructed a narrative sequence in which the people in their fully formed non-political place (civil society) precede, and then subsequently agree to, a representative popular government. By narrating the temporal sequence in this way, Locke is able to depict a government that exists as nothing more than an outcome of the prior activities of the pre-political community. Voluntarily and freely given, and rooted in the temporally anterior separate sphere of natural society, these popular rights can be taken back at any time. Thus the temporal element in the story of popular sovereignty becomes crucial to the theoretical edifice.

Locke's imaginative use of time was not literally historical but political; his story of the social contract makes it clear that the import of civil society's temporal anteriority is that it justifies normative political priority over the government it had created. Here the narrative is doing the work of institutional explanation as well as of moral justification for the subservience of the state in relation to the people; what counts is society's temporal anteriority. By making society temporally anterior and prefigurative, Locke's temporal schema shows how the cultural syntax of narrative can be used to make society normatively, politically, and morally superior to the state. In this temporal order, a legitimate government is one morally reduced to being a contingent outcome of the people's rights first endowed to them in the pre-political sphere of natural society. Through sequence Locke establishes causality: Civil society is not only separate and autonomous from the state, but existed before it and thus, quite literally, caused government's very existence by its voluntary consent. Something that comes before something else, in this schema, gives it causality.24 This was not historical time in the common sense that Locke would ascribe actual dates to these events, but epistemological time or a temporal law of cause and effect.

**Narrative Structure and Causal Explanation**

A clear causal plot has begun to emerge from Locke's mapping of the narrative structure of the Anglo-American citizenship story. He has taken as his point of departure in time (in the "beginning") the epic problem of free people with natural rights (the protagonists of a
"natural community") confronting the chronic tyranny of an absolute state--the temporal and spatial "Other" of the public sphere. The danger to individual liberties and rights lies explicitly with this visible institutional and administrative state power (its personnel and bureaucracy): "A right of making laws with penalties of death..." is how Locke defines political power (a definition echoed two centuries later by Weber's characterization of the state bureaucracy as an iron cage of coercion). A resolution to the crisis can only emerge through a complete realignment of power and legitimacy, something that can only be accomplished by re-narrativizing the state/society developmental story on which the original problem was based. Locke's dramatic resolution is causally plotted not only by the establishment of the domain of pare-political/society, but also by the people newly establishing a representative government that is morally and scientifically a mere "provisional" product of the social. In this new story the rule of law, the participatory aspects of common law (e.g. juries), Constitutions, and so on are narrated to be the outcome of the temporally and causally prior and independent (of political rule) sphere of a pare-political/society. We now have a more balanced epic struggle framed by a fiercely normative set of boundaries between the external threat of the Institutional State, and the tamed de-institutionalized government under the control of the people.

The Place of Political Culture: The People's Sociological Glue

With the invention of a private sphere has come a novel sociological challenge: What would hold this society together? If "the people" were to have any sustained power against the tyranny of the state--and this is of course the driving problematic of the narrative--a potentially arbitrary government must always be counter-balanced not by a atomic aggregation of individuals but by a self-organized coherent and robust body. The authority of civil society over the state could not only be based on its being separate and prior to the state; equally important, it would have to be fully self-organized, and autonomous and did not need the state to maintain its identity as the site of the people--other than to protect property. The presumption of a society self-organized enough to be able to make and break government rule, indeed to snub all government intervention except that of security and protection of property and liberties, pushed Locke, billy-billy, to developing a social theory to account for the means by which this self-organization could occur (Calhoun 1993; Wolin 1960).

Locke found this in what we now understand to be political culture (and which anticipates Habeas's paradoxical notion of the "public sphere")--a sociological glue that would hold together society through a non-authoritarian anti-political social authority, a precursor of public opinion, that can only come from the autonomous and unregulated flourishing of the private sphere. Although Locke theorized both God and commerce to be sources for the harmony of pare-political/society, he also recognized the need for normative social cohesion beyond the fragility of theology or the brittleness of market exchange to hold together this society. It is Locke, then, who in addition to recognizing the objective interdependencies of the market, first introduces the idea of public opinion and trust as a form of common moral concern into the autonomous realm of pre-political society to allow for order and freedom,
and moral cohesion outside the channels and public institutions of the official political structure of the state (Dunn 1985; Taylor 1990). Unlike state authority, public opinion is free of "the legislative authority of man;" the authority of public opinion is voluntary, spontaneous, anti-institutional, and non-coercive. The political culture concept thus serves to fill the normative space of civil society that will be the sustaining force of popular sovereignty and representational consent. Its naturalism did not mean, however, that it had no authoritative force; in fact, Locke exalted its harmoniousness by the very fact of the presence of a different kind of authority, namely the everyday rational common sense political norms of a consensual public opinion. It was not the absence of "order" per se, but the absence of public authority that created the space for a kind of political life free from the any need for external, and especially state-centered, forms of constraint. Social order in civil society operated in this story through what we today call "informal social control"--not in any recognizably institutional form. This inherently anti-institutional anti-public form of authority thus becomes the normative guide for political organization.

A sociological theorization of robust and durable societal self-activation thus emerged in necessary parallel with the normative claim that authority and right of resistance and consent must be located within the private sphere. The radical change was in rejecting the notion of ordered social relationships sustained by the power of a political center, in favor of a conception of society as a self-activating unit capable of generating a common will--spontaneous in its workings, self-activating and functionally independent of the state. To endow "the people" with the capacity to make and unmake political power and sovereignty, Locke had to endow the people with a collective glue independent from the political cohesion supplied by the state. For this he needed to find the social foundations to subordinate permanently the state to a cohesive popular authority. He needed, that is, social foundations, and he found this in the privatization of citizenship.

**Finding #2: An Epistemological Infrastructure of Social Naturalism**

The privatization of citizenship and its concomitant fear of the public sphere is remarkable for the resiliency it has shown over the years in the course of having been subjected to multiple challenges from both history and theory. It thus becomes a crucial question as to why and how Anglo-American citizenship theory has been so invincible to direct empirical criticism--even in the face of such repeated competing evidence. To answer that, I turn to the second of the two cultural forms at work in the knowledge culture of AACT--the binary code of social naturalism as it developed within the knowledge culture of Anglo-American citizenship theory.

**Figure 1 about here:**

In social naturalism, as I discussed above and as figure 1 demonstrates, the world of knowledge is divided into a set of binary relationships along the classic axis of nature/culture. Power is established through a matrix of internally constituted epistemological divides which
ranks things located on the "natural", and anti-political side of the divides over (more valid than, because more naturalized) those located on the cultural, and political side. In this dichotomy culture and politics are taken to mean those non-natural constructed dimensions of knowledge. In Anglo-American citizenship theory, the division is articulated through a hierarchical delineation between that which is designated as "given"--unchanging, spontaneous, voluntary, natural, God given, law-like; versus that designated as "contingent"--socially or politically constructed, hence temporal, coercive, arbitrary, vulnerable to change or manipulation. Most important, that which falls on the "natural" side of the epistemological divide and so exists ontologically independently of political or human intervention is deemed epistemologically more valid--more foundational--to knowledge and science, and hence becomes a source of epistemological adjudication. Knowledge is scientific, admissible and true to the extent that it corresponds with the foundations established by that which is natural--be it natural law (seventeenth century), natural liberty (eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), or the natural science of political economy (nineteenth century). And although social naturalism is usually identified beginning with the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries' discovery of political economy, as we will see below the social naturalism of Locke's inscription of pre-political/society was the defining moment in modern political thought. Social naturalism became the basis for the imputation of a natural, rather than a contingent, logic to the workings of the market and the private sphere of civil society.

Finding #3: The Metanarrative of Anglo-American citizenship theory

A major reason for the tenacity of Anglo-American citizenship theory is that these two features were combined--that is, the narrative structure was grafted to the sophisticated binary epistemological coding of social naturalism in which nature provided the criterion for evaluating truth and knowledge, as figure 2 illustrates. With this grafting the narrative became "naturalized" into the dramatically more powerful form of a metanarrative. As I suggested above, metanarratives are among the most enduring, flexible, and troublesome of social science cultural schemas. When a concept is embedded within such a deeply naturalized cultural structure, it cannot be destabilized through competing evidence or routine empirical investigation. Like a paradigm, a metanarrative not only provides the range of acceptable answers but also defines both the questions to be asked, as well as the rules of procedure by which they can rationally be answered. In fact when a metanarrative confronts such evidence it is able to redefine, almost domesticate it, or else to rule it inadmissible by its own standards of rationality. Anglo-American citizenship theory gains this adjudicative authority in its conversion from narrative to metanarrative. The adjudicative criteria are established through firm epistemological divides between society and the state, capitalism and feudalism, spontaneity
and domination, private and public, and so on. These boundaries categorize evidence, argumentation, and hypothesis formation, into prestructured categories. Arguments that fall on the wrong sides of their usual distribution across the epistemological divides do not enjoy the privilege of being considered reasonable candidates for competing explanatory validity.

Figure 2 shows the grafting process by which the epistemological infrastructure of social naturalism is grafted onto the original narrative structure of Anglo-American citizenship theory. In the process social naturalism—an epistemological modality which is normally intended to adjudicate the methods by which knowledge is judged to be true or not—becomes embedded into the substantive content of the story itself so that certain components of the story are actually attributed with being natural. For example, when social naturalism is mapped onto Locke's depiction of the private sphere as the zone of freedom, the anti-political private sphere of the market is itself redefined as being a natural order. By this process, the placement and the meaning of the citizenship concepts are transformed from cultural to natural constructs.

Figure 3 shows the outcome of this process in its skeletal binary form. The temporal sequences (e.g. beginning, middle, end) and complex spatial mappings characteristic of narrative structure have been redistributed across the sharply reductionist binary nature/culture divide. In this redistribution, the narrative elements of the story have been transmogrified into a set of mutually exclusive abstract oppositions; to define any one category presupposes its oppositional Other, so that, for example, "modern society" only exists as a concept in opposition to its other—in this case, traditional society. The outcome is the source of Bobbio's (1992, p. 1-2) "great dichotomies" of modern political sociology and political thought including the well-known ones of public and private, state and civil society, tradition and modernity, the free/autonomous and unfree/dominated agent, and so on. Bobbio has captured in this term the structuralist insight that dichotomous concepts are posed in a zero-sum manner so that each can only be the negation of the other,25 "from the moment that the space defined by the two terms is completely covered they arrive at the point of mutually defining themselves in the sense that the public domain extends only as far as the start of the private sphere (and the reverse is also true)" (p. 2).

Social naturalism imposed on political narrative fixes firmly the rigidity of these dichotomies. The naturalism of the private, of modernity, civil society, and markets is fixed in opposition to the arbitrariness of the public, of institutionalism, the state, and even legal regulation. In the process the entire structure is naturalized, that is, given an aura of inevitability and unchangingness. Hence the meta in metanarrative.

Figure 4 about here:

Figure 4 represents the full metanarrative outcome and shows how Anglo-American citizenship theory distributes political and sociological categories, as well as temporal and spa-
tial relationships, across a series of firm epistemological divides. On the vertical axis the sequential path from unfreedom to freedom is represented. On the horizontal axis are represented the spatial and the epistemological divides between the private naturalism of society and the arbitrary power of the public state. Locke's narrative begins with the "golden age" version of the state-of-nature in cell 1. Because it is natural and God-given its time is the abstract "past" rather than the concrete past of the early "primitive" stage of 18th-century social theory or the "traditional/feudal" past of 19th century theory. Its very naturalism and God-given qualities give it both narrative and epistemological primacy as the original foundational force of Locke's normative justification for popular sovereignty. But it is cell 2 that embodies the first sphere of true social naturalism: Society is an autonomous self-activated natural sphere—the sphere of non-coercive pre-and non-political social intercourse. It is the fully realized natural commercialized civil society of cell 2 that provides the sociological capacity and justification as the 17th century's first concrete historical embodiment of this natural original force. And because it is the social embodiment of the "natural," the private sphere of civil society has an absolute privileged status. Cell 3 represents the the historically constructed political domain of public representative popular sovereignty—the locus of liberal democratic political institutions—to be recalled and resisted, if necessary, by "the people" who created it. Cell 3 is simultaneously a public zone while also a direct product of—and thus firmly tethered to—private and autonomous contractual interaction, of voluntary action taken by free agents in the epistemologically, historically, politically, and morally anterior realm of civil society. Its publicness, however, makes it always on the brink of being a source of tyranny. This danger is kept in check by its dependence for its very existence on the ongoing consent of the natural, original force of natural society. In Locke's vision, this is what keeps it safe from coercion. Cell 4, by contrast, is the site of the public, unfree, non-natural, institutional, arbitrary, hence dangerous, spatial Other. Without the Other of cell 4, the flow from cell 2 to cell 3 could not be theorized; the ever-present threat of the state's political domination and coercion plays as much of a foundational role in Anglo-American citizenship theory as do individuals, natural rights, and civil society.

By the 18th-century, cell 1 bursts out of the abstract onto the scene as the real-time primitive Other. It is portrayed alternatively as either a full-blown picture of savage society without private property (as in the Scottish "four stages theory"), or as a generalized archaic feudal past from which the modern world of natural liberties (cell 2) evolves through the natural civilizing process. It is then an easy transition from the 18th-century four-stage temporality to the more starkly posited simplistic 19th-century binary oppositions between tradition and modernity, *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft*, feudalism and capitalism, preindustrial and industrial, status and contract, each represented by cells 1 and 2 respectively. Note that when the "past" is specified as a traditional community organized through kinship, even though it is still clearly a locus of unfreedom, it is nonetheless viewed as *natural*, hence a necessary stage of progression to modern freedom. This contrasts with the fully aberrant non-natural arbitrary domain
of public rule in the absolutist state whose presence lurks in the foreground of Anglo-American citizenship theory as the reason for the ongoing effort pre-political/society must put into maintaining cell 3--the tamed and de-institutionalized public arena of private representation where the only rules made are those necessary to ensure the protection of cell 2's essential natural freedom (e.g. contract and civil law).

VI THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The Privatization of the Citizenship Concepts

The privatization of citizenship can be traced back to its embeddedness in the narrative structure of Anglo-American citizenship theory. Driven by the opposition to and the fear and loathing of the state, Locke reduced citizenship to public opinion which in turn he staked to the critical job of providing liberalism with a social theory that could hold together its otherwise narrow economic vision of civil society. In order to do the explanatory work it is being asked to do, the citizenship concepts had to be located squarely in the private/pre-political, anti-public side of the division between state and society. Their explanatory work in the narrative structure explains why the citizenship concepts are stripped of true participatory bearings. In this paradoxical sense, what is "political", "public", even "civil" about the citizenship concepts in Anglo-American citizenship theory is that public opinion and normative solidarities about politics are organized in the "public" spaces of civil society--and not in an independent third participatory site of citizenship or empowered arenas of collective decision-making; these are excluded from the metanarrative altogether. Political culture, civil society, and a public sphere can be the social foundations to liberal democratization precisely because newspapers, coffee houses, salons, etc. exist entirely outside of the institutional administrative state. In this sense, the citizenship concepts are limited to representing a commitment held in common to enforce the laws of nature by means of a form of authority entirely accountable to the society from whence it came and from whom its authority derives. Anglo-American citizenship theory's citizenship concepts are thus integrating forces of society--oriented to public affairs held in common, but decidedly anti-political in the distinct sense commonly associated with citizenship participation in decision-making processes. The invention of citizenship as inhabiting a space outside of, and anterior to any kind of political institutions proper, allowed civil society to be disembodied from any distinctive participatory aspect of the political, and devoid of any actual power to carry out public decision-making (Taylor 1990, p. 109-111; Warner 1990).

For Anglo-American citizenship theory this inherently anti-institutional anti-public form of authority and the interests of natural society become the normative guide for political organization. Democratic political structures thus emanate from the socially rooted anti-institutional political culture of civil society. From the needs and opinions of this common political culture--the social glue of civil society--putatively derive the ideas about politics that were the first expressions of liberal democratization. Where do democratic ideals come from? asked Locke. From the norms of society was his answer. The "public spirited man",
Smith echoed a century later, was he who respected the powers and opinions that operated in everyday life, not one who wanted to legislate and rearrange through institutional interventions (Wolin 1960, p. 299). It is the much the same answer, and the same narrative structure, given by much of public opinion research some 300 years later. It is within this narrative structure that the citizenship concepts have been frozen in their "place"--firmly on the non-political and anti-statist side of the epistemological divide between public and private. The demonization, the fear and loathing of the public sphere, is what made the privatization of citizenship a necessity. But the privatization of citizenship is what gives liberalism its claim to being a social theory; it is what makes it possible to provide a social foundation to representative government and a market economy.

The Metanarrative as Gatekeeper

Through social naturalism, Anglo-American citizenship theory's demarcations are thereby hardened into temporal, spatial, and epistemological divides with respect to the preconditions for democratization and freedom. Each of the cells in figure 4 above exist in a zero-sum relationship to the others. No part of cell 2, for example, the realm of civil society and freedom can bleed into either cells 1 or 4 and still be considered within the realm of democratic moral argument. If any rights at all similar to modern rights are discovered by the researcher to exist within the temporal or spatial boundaries of either cells 1 or 4--the rights of citizens in medieval cities, say--she learns very quickly that these same rights have been renamed and redefined when they turn up in the wrong set of temporal or spatial frames. Here they become "traditional" "premodern" rights, "prepolitical" "paternalistic" forms of a "moral economy" or the "lagging" remnants of a feudal order. It is the metanarrative of Anglo-American citizenship theory that adjudicates the distribution of evidence across the epistemological divides, ruling out of turn competing evidence about the social conditions for democratic political cultures. Anglo-American citizenship theory is thus empowered as a metanarrative cultural structure to adjudicate knowledge and evidence at the deepest levels of nature and truth. Social naturalism, grafted onto the narrative structure, endows a conceptual network with this extraordinary epistemological capacity. As a result, no alternative empirical challenge to the privatization of citizenship or the anti-statism of Anglo-American citizenship theory can have long-term success until the gatekeeping power of the dominant metanarrative is challenged historically, transgressed.

Figure 4 embodies the epistemological divides and the gatekeeping demarcations of the original 17th-century metanarrative of Anglo-American citizenship theory----foundations that continue to be bound up with modern political sociology: 1) the institutionalized state of the public sphere is the domain of potential unfreedom constituted through external coercion, domination, constraint, backed up with physical compulsion, and generative of arbitrary personal dependencies; 2) private pre-political/civil society is the realm of freedom because it is autonomous from the state, impersonal, self-activating through objective interdependencies (e.g. property contracts, division of labor, markets) and naturalistic; a unitary entity whose
normative roots are in the idealized harmony of the laws of nature; 3) in lieu of government authority in the work of maintaining social cohesion, the norms and pressures of public opinion would allow for both order and freedom. Combined, these comprise the relational infrastructure of Anglo-American citizenship theory with its binary opposition between the spontaneous free forces of pre-political/civil society and the normative order of political culture on the one side, versus the tamed representative state and, in the background shadows, always the potentially coercive, dominating, and enforced dependencies of public administrative power on the other.

From this legacy, we have the ineluctable connection established between freedom, the voluntary coordination of market exchange, and public opinion on the one side; potential tyranny in the institutional domain of the state on the other. It is a metanarrative born out of the ongoing "itch" (Baker 1990, p. 6) to find the solution to the fear and loathing of the public sphere, the social foundations for a spatial domain of society where liberties and rights of representation could be organizationally grounded outside the powers of the coercive state. To ensure these rights were themselves foundational and not at the behest of the crown or the positive laws of the land, Locke made them natural rights, hence God-given and part of the pre-political natural community; by this means he "naturalized" the organizational autonomy of society. It is this story, this cultural political construction, that remains central to Anglo-American citizenship theory. And it is within this conceptual matrix that the citizenship concepts have been frozen in their "place"--firmly on the non-political and the naturalistic side of the epistemological divide between public and private, nature/rationality and the arbitrary. Privatizing civil society and political culture is what allows liberalism to be a social theory; it is what makes it possible to provide a social foundation to representative government and a market economy, and a bulwark against the public sphere.

There are basic continuities between twentieth-century political sociologies and the metanarrative of Anglo-American citizenship theory first adumbrated in the 17th century, elaborated by the 18th-century Scottish political economists, and institutionalized firmly at the heart of modern social theory in the 19th-century. In grossly abbreviated form, and despite significant variations, it is possible to point to a striking degree of continuity in the way that social science and political theories were subsequently read to fit these originary 17th-century metanarrative constraints. In the eighteenth century, for example, although Smith maintained that political economy was a branch of statesmanship to be nurtured for public services (Winch 1978; Collini et. al. 1983; Polanyi 1957), he nonetheless insisted on its naturalistic law-like essence and hence the inherent danger of any institutional "meddlings." Indeed from the physiocrats’ notion that public opinion reflected the "ordre naturel" emanating from civil society (Calhoun 1992b), to Marx's utopian postulation of freedom as emancipation from both the exploitation of capitalist labor as well as from the dominion of institutional politics, we can observe a continuity in the idea that it is objective rationality of exchange in civil society that gives rise to the rational beliefs, values, even practices, of public discourse.
The cumulative result over the centuries has been to create a series of epistemological divides between the past and the present, tradition and modernity in which the sociological preconditions necessary for freedom could only conceivably and rationally be a causal product of civil society and its norm-based political culture. For Locke, Smith, and Marx, the liberal state was only an outcome of this; otherwise it would bleed over the divide into the institutional state and the public sphere and the freedoms of civil society would be suppressed. Marx, of course, understood these to be bourgeois freedoms which in turn created unfreedom for the exploited "free laborers." But this did not in any way affect his de-institutionalized view of the state. In perfect harmony with Anglo-American citizenship's metanarrative, Marx's source of freedom was also to be found in civil society--only for Marx it would be a more developed stage of civil society, one that followed the demise of capitalism and the bourgeois democratic state.

I cannot trace the entire historical trajectory--the institutionalized path-dependency--of Anglo-American citizenship theory and its associated arguments in liberal theory. Suffice it here to show how the earlier work set a template, and recognizing this template gives crucial insight into later arguments. In so doing, I demonstrate the difference between the method of an historical sociology of concept formation and intellectual history. In the latter case, there is the assumption that ideas are passed along in chains from one individual thinker to another, so the key proof of continuity is to demonstrate these chains of "influence" by one thinker on another. One of the things I have tried to underline in my insistence on the intersubjective and public character of a knowledge culture is to show that influence does not work in quite that way--a theme pioneered by Mannheim (1985). While finding direct connections does not hurt, they would not mostly be one-to-one connections, but rather mediated by larger currents of thought. An historical sociology of concept formation, by contrast, to demonstrate influence must find a basic continuity between the organizing assumptions and conceptual imagery of the modern approaches, and the earlier ones; it must show how the metanarrative's epistemological divides and narrative presuppositions remain the adjudicators of what counts as valid empirical argument in modern political social science. Recursive use of the metanarrative, from this perspective, is not necessarily through chains of influence but through a constrained process of appropriation and evaluation from a limited number of available choices to the "exclusion of competing aspects that might turn choice in another direction" (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, p. 19). The process by which metanarratives overdetermine data works through the quasi-automatic self-activation of these a priori boundaries, classifications, distinctions, and metanarrative assumptions. Information from "outside the boundaries" is ignored, redefined, or even "polluted" (Douglas). For the task at hand, then, reconstructing the inner logic of the arguments and demonstrating a continuity in the underlying logic of the arguments is more important than demonstrating possible chains of direct influence linking one argument to another.
CONCLUSION

The paradox and the puzzle I posed at the outset was that the newly rejuvenated citizenship concepts—recalled to theoretical service to represent a participatory third sphere—have again been privatized in widespread political argument; the phenomena they were called to explain now reduced into a cluster of pre-political, anti-public, and naturalized attributes—the market, public opinion, etc, all the private side of the public/private dichotomy. According to the normative and empirical standards of social practice and organization made salient by recent events in Eastern Europe, the citizenship concepts are failing to provide an adequate theorization of a "third" sphere of citizenship formation that focuses on participation, solidarities, and a robust public discourse of rights. Instead citizenship practices are hailed as a derivative form of social activity whose significance emanates from the morally anterior private sphere. Not only is this something deeply counterintuitive in the face of history, it is also deeply paradoxical: The citizenship concepts cannot meet the theoretical demands of the very historical events that precipitated their revival.

One purpose of this essay has been to demonstrate the method by which an historical sociology of concept formation can help to explain this paradox. The method suggests that the privatization of the citizenship concepts can best be understood by making the primary subject of analysis not the isolated concepts but the larger knowledge culture of Anglo-American citizenship theory in which they are embedded. For an historical sociology of concept formation the citizenship concepts are best understood as words in their sites, and the sites most useful for making sense of knowledge are knowledge cultures. By deconstructing its making, its narration, its naturalizing strategies we can see how the knowledge culture qua metanarrative of Anglo-American citizenship theory works to mediate knowledge through a narrative cultural structure with its own internal symbolic logics and cultural constructions, its extra-scientific explanations and normative prescriptions, which—because they have been naturalized—are not answerable to direct competing empirical evidence. The metanarrative’s narrative authority and its claims to epistemological validity are established by its temporal and spatial integrity and the naturalized quality of its narrative symbolic logic.

Temporally, the metanarrative of Anglo-American citizenship theory entails a beginning-middle-end process: In the beginning the people existed in nature, outside of political authority. In the middle, the crisis of institutional tyranny in the form of the state. The resolution? The emergence of civil society and political culture that allowed the private sphere to be held together through non-institutional interdependencies, and morally through interests and opinion. From this private sphere of freedom is generated a representative government of popular sovereignty—yet one wholly subservient to the private sphere that created it. In the end, to prevent the return of tyranny, the government can be nothing but a social trust; it is entirely subservient to the society which preceded it, and on which it depends morally, ethically, politically, and sociologically. It is precisely the naturalized cultural form of narrative temporality that provides the grounds for claiming an a priori status to pre-political
society as the causal explanations for democratic institutions.

The cultural schema is also notable for the centrality of *place* in the metanarrative, which depends wholly on the invention of a new permanent spatial identity for the people--pre-political/civil society, an autonomous site, integrated by a natural economy, and its boundaries defined by the presence of non-institutional forms of public opinion independent from official political institutions (Taylor 1990, p. 110-11). Where Hobbes saw in the state of nature an atomistic war of all against all, Locke changed the face of social and political theory by deploying a political geography to announce a self-organized place that could exist independently of state authority. So coordinated was this pre-political private space that--with the few important exceptions of security--its cohesion could be effectively secured through anti-institutional natural processes. Its spatial integrity as an autonomous, cohesive, and naturalized pre-political entity is what makes it possible for the people to defend themselves against positive legislative intervention where there was always the threat of people being bound to submit to the "unjust will" (Locke) of another. Spatial narration thus provides the grounds for claiming the existence of an autonomous and self-organized sphere of society not only prior to but sociologically independent from the space of the state in which democratic political cultures flourish naturally and independently of any political institutional history.

The cultural construction of conceptual knowledge is further highlighted, most paradoxically, by the metanarrative's epistemological infrastructure of social naturalism. Social naturalism, which evaluates the quality of social knowledge by dividing it along a binary divide between nature/culture, and attributes higher epistemological status to all that falls on the natural side of the epistemological divide, is itself a cultural structure. That means we can recognize that the very definition of what is and is not natural, hence privileged, in Anglo-American citizenship theory is itself a product of cultural practices. From the point of view of recent history of science, this is hardly surprising. Latour (1988, p. 68) has recently reminded us that the first business of any discipline is to establish and fix the "metrology" or the "axiology" by which concepts are evaluated. In this he turns upside down the premise on which all of modern epistemology is based, namely that knowledge is evaluated by its level of accuracy in representing what is already present externally in nature. Instead, he tells us that the standards of evaluation--whether they be social naturalism or mysticism--are themselves "established" and "fixed" through human intervention. Historicizing Anglo-American citizenship theory did show how its metrology was "fixed" at its very epistemological foundations through the convention of social naturalism. And if social naturalism's very standards of validity are historically constructed, then so too are the epistemological hierarchies between natural and constructed, private and public, concepts.

An historical sociology of concept formation also suggests that social naturalism as a cultural system is also mutually dependent on Anglo-American citizenship theory's narrative structure. Once the binary epistemological divide between nature and culture was grafted onto the temporal and spatial dimensions of the narrative structure, the narrative and the
epistemological became intertwined. The survival of the binary logic between nature and culture as a legitimate grounds for evaluation in political theory fully depended upon the natural side of the divide being tethered to the morally superior and historically anterior side of the divide between private and public, society and the state. For some 300 years, what is natural and what is socio-economic have been intimately joined in maintaining their respective privileged positions as the foundational grounds for political and epistemological argument. A historical sociology of concept formation challenges us to call into question that which is and is not considered a "natural object," and to destabilize the "naturalizing" of private over public that has long been the source of the privatization of citizenship. Linking epistemology to the historicity of its production allows us to question the "primordial" distinctions between nature and culture and to undermine the epistemological framework which supports the privatization of the citizenship concepts. From the viewpoint of a knowledge culture naturalized representations are redefined as social categories rather than natural objects. Be they economies, states, markets, political institutions, symbolic codes, or identities, no aspects of the social world are inherently more "natural" than any other but are, as Chartier puts it "objectification [representations] that construct an original figure each time" (Chartier 1982, p. 43).

Perhaps, then, the greatest pay-off of exploring the citizenship concepts through a historical sociology of concept formation is the challenge it poses to the idea that epistemological boundaries and hierarchies are given in the nature of things; no political, social, conceptual or epistemological boundary comes without a history.
ENDNOTES

1. Throughout this chapter I purposefully use the term *public sphere* in two contradictory senses: In the first, as in title, I use it in the common sense that it is generally understood as something that is related to the sphere of government, and thus not within the sphere of the market or private life; in the second case, when I include it as one of the citizenship concepts, I am using it in Habermas's ([1962] 1989) paradoxical sense as the public spaces within the private sphere of civil society (see especially his diagram on p. 30). Which sense is being invoked will be evident by the context of its use. (The same kind of paradoxical semantics is evident in the privatization of the political culture concept. For extended discussion of Habermas's public sphere and the original Parsonian political culture concept, see Somers 1995a, 1995b.)

2. Modern sociology, for example, emerged from a particular historical rendering of the macro-historical rupture between "tradition" and "modernity" as it was perceived by the historical sociologists who were the social theorists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Smith, Durkheim, Marx, Weber, etc). Endowed with generality, this highly particularistic historical narrative was abstracted into the foundations of what we still know as social science theory: Frozen fragments of an historical narrative distilled into unquestioned theoretical axioms (Somers and Gibson 1994).

3. The major treatises on the conceptual rediscovery of civil society in this context are Keane (1988a, 19988b), Cohen and Arato (1992), and Seligman (1992).


5. Taylor (1990) talks about a similarly competing historical notion of civil society by use of the terms "L-stream" and "M-stream" approaches, named, respectively, after the figures he chooses to represent them--Locke and Montesquieu. Silver (1990, 1995) theorizes yet another definition of civil society that he derives from his reading of the 18th-century Scottish moralists, one organized around the practices of trust and friendship.

6. Bobbio's argument here dovetails with the work of Alexander (1992a) and Alexander and Smith (1993) who have charted the "great dichotomies" in the binary codings of "citizen" and "enemy" in the discourse of civil society.

7. This presumes the disappearance after Locke of the theological basis of civil society in the predominant channels of liberal theory.

8. The most obvious competing paradigm is that of Durkheim. But even Parsons failed at establishing fully a third sphere. On other important competing paradigms that have failed to win intellectual dominance even while they have played essential roles as paradigmatic "Others", see especially McCormick (forthcoming) who has developed at length the alternative vision of public and private embodied in the work of Carl Schmitt; and on the Tocquevillian/civic humanist competing tradition, see of course the opus of Pocock (1985).
9. In doing so, Durkheim also produced a socialized version of Kant's famous distinction between noumena and phenomena, often recognized in philosophy as nominalism. More recently, ethnomethodologists have made problematic the discourse and practice of the human sciences, finding that "scientific accounts of human behavior are themselves permeated by rich, subtle practices and assumptions which are typically ignored and unrecognized "(Pollner, 1987, p. ix).

10. For a complete discussion, and a comparison with the more familiar notion of a paradigm, see Somers (1996a).

11. In this relational interpretation of the term narrative I draw a close connection between narrative and networks ("Identity is flexibly built from and stored in sets of stories held in common. These stories record social ties and thence networks..."(White 1993, p. 6). What makes narrative structures historical and structural is their dual character of being unstable and vulnerable to temporal change at the same time as they endure in and over time and space (Aminzade 1992; Lloyd 1993; Sewell 1992; White 1993). White elaborates on the complex way that narratives both stabilize and destabilize structures, while--most important--they "decenter" (de-essentialize) individual categories (persons, events, things) within them. From White, I take it that identities are established when the multiplexity of a single element is stabilized and rationalized into a relatively coherent narrative (White 1992).

12. What we call "the market" probably remains both the prime historical demonstration of the power of such naturalizing analogies as well as the other most important sociological fiction at the heart of the political culture concept. In a paraphrase of Polanyi "the road to laissez-faire was paved with state intervention" (see especially Polanyi [1944] 1957; Agnew 1986; Block and Somers 1984).

13. Jameson 1983; Lyotard 1984; Skinner 1986; White 1987. Metanarratives are all around us. They are the stories in which we are embedded both as social actors as well as in our analytic role as social scientists. Our sociological theories and concepts are encoded with aspects of these metanarratives--Progress, Decadence, Industrialization, Enlightenment, etc--even though they usually operate at a presuppositional level of social science awareness. They can be the epic dramas of our time: Capitalism vs Communism, the Individual vs Society, Barbarism/Nature vs Civility. They may also take the form of macro-sociologies of teleological unfolding: Marxism and the triumph of class struggle, Liberalism and the triumph of Liberty, the Rise of Nationalism, or of Islam (see Somers 1992,1994a,b). The "new institutionalists" have been especially lucid (in both their own research as well as building from others' work in economics, organizational psychology, and anthropology) in demonstrating that metanarratives can be found at work in everyday social life by recognizing them in the form of cultural schemas around which institutions and organizations stake their everyday routine identities--consciously or not (see especially DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Lamont and Fournier 1992).
15. The term "place" in relationality comes from Polanyi (1957b); for empirical application see Somers (1993). Another similar expression denoting very similar thing is that of "positions" in a "field" (see e.g. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992)
16. The similarity of this to White’s (1992) relational theory of identity is discussed below.
17. One of the great ironies of this positivist dismissal is that Comte’s treatise on positivism was itself a genetic account of the successive transformation of knowledge. See Lepenies (1988).
18. See also Taylor (1984; 1989) in support of this position.
19. By citizenship theory, I refer not to one particular theory but to the deeper common features shared by those who have attempted to provide social science accounts of the conditions of possibility for both individual protection by the state, as well as individual freedom from the state. The concept of conjunctural history I take from Dugald Stewart's characterization of Adam Smith's historical sociology. See Collini, Winch, and Burrow (1983); Meek (1978); Winch (1980).
20. Although in this paper I carefully deconstruct only the 17th-century discourse, and then make the leap to 20th, there is a very clear trajectory of both continuity and transformation from Locke through to the early 18th-century English social policy to the late 18th-century Scottish Enlightenment (Adam Smith; Dugald Stewart; Fergusson; see Allan Silver), and to the 19th-century development of modern social and political theory as represented by e.g. Marx, Mill, Weber, Durkheim, Maine, Spencer, and Tonnies.
21. By political argument, I mean both texts and events—that have since been dubbed as political or social Theory (e.g. Hobbes, Smith, Marx) as well as lesser or hardly known arguments that were less texts in any lasting sense and more so to be institutionalized political interventions in the political dynamics of the time—how beheading a king, for example, was justified "by law," or how "the sovereignty of the people" was somehow made synonomous with free markets (see e.g. Morgan 1988 for this kind of informal intervention). As indicated above, there is a significant alternative non-English story, one that would include Montesquieu, Rousseau, Durkheim, Tocqueville, and the French revolutions (1789, 1830, 1848) most prominently. See Taylor's (1990) account of the two versions of the civil society concept and story.
22. In focusing on Locke, I demonstrate how an historical sociology of concept formation requires a difficult balance between ascribing anonymity to the cultural form and overly identifying it with any single thinker. Thus although I use Locke as my to provide a subject to my reconstruction, this is not intellectual history and I use him more as a representative figure in the making of the narrative. The literature on Locke is immense. See, e.g. Ashcraft 1987; Dunn 1969, 1984, 1990; Sewell 1980, pp. 20-). In using Locke as the major 17th-century representative of Anglo-American citizenship theory, I am not doing justice to his context in the wide range of other political treatises. This is a caveat, but one that is un-
avoidable given the limitations of space.

23. Locke still used the traditional language of political theory in which the terms "civil society" and "political society" were used interchangeably to refer to the state-centered domain of social organization.

24. In this he capitalizes on a generic quirk built into English language narratives themselves: Linde (1993, p. 11) explains the "natural logic of English is post hoc ergo propter hoc," or that which comes before causes that which comes after.

25. Bobbio's argument here dovetails with the work of Alexander (1992) and Alexander and Smith (1993) who have charted the "great dichotomies" in the binary codings of "citizen" and "enemy" in the discourse of civil society.

26. Indeed as Habermas has pointed out so well, for most of the time since Locke the normative discourse of public opinion and political culture (Habermas' public sphere) was articulated via the newly non-institutionalized conception of the law as a cohesive force deriving from social norms. Law was appropriated as the symbol not of the state but of society--indeed it was celebrated as virtually the only legitimate institutionalization of public opinion along with Representative government. But this was less the law in any institutional form as it had in fact developed historically from mediaeval Rule of Law (e.g. administrative courts and principles of justice such as the "just wage") and more the law now being defined as general and abstract norms (Habermas 1989, p. 53). Locke thus theorized and empowered the law--rather than the command of the state--as the "constant and lasting force" (Locke 1953, p. 191): "And so, whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemprary decrees..." (Locke 1953, p. 182). Habermas captures the processes of de-institutionalization brilliantly as it proceeds from Hobbes through Locke and Montesquieu: "In the 'law' the quintessence of general, abstract, and permanent norms, inheres a rationality in which what is right converges with what is just; the exercise of power is to be demoted to a mere executor of such norms" (Habermas 1989, p. 53).

27. Downing's (1992) recent study is an exception.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exogenous/Natural</th>
<th>Endogenous/Cultural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Given-in-the-nature-of-things</td>
<td>Historically Constructed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laws of nature</td>
<td>arbitrary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God-given</td>
<td>historical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>universality</td>
<td>particularism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foundations</td>
<td>manifestations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rationality</td>
<td>irrationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>representations which cannot be gainsaid</em></td>
<td>artificial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>certainty</td>
<td>fickleness and fortuitousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>universal criteria</td>
<td>particularities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scientific</td>
<td>magical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discovered</td>
<td>constructed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regularities</td>
<td>contingencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in-the-nature-of-things</td>
<td>externally imposed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1:** Table of Social Naturalism's Binary Oppositions
Natural/Given/Foundational
Functions independently of political interventions

Historical/Constructed/Cultural
Functions through arbitrary political interventions

Spontaneous
Universalistic
Autonomous
Natural
Self-Regulating
Rational
Voluntary

Private
Civil Society
Market
Trade
Commerce

Public

Natural Community

State
De-Institutionalized
Representative
Government

Institutional
State

Arbitrary
Artificial
Culturally conditioned
Externally regulated
Irrational

Potential for
- domination
- state regulation
- positive law
- redistribution
- collectivism

Epistemological Grid of Social Naturalism Mapped Onto the Narrative Structure of Anglo-American Citizen Theory

Figure 2.: The Making of a Metanarrative:
Narrative Structure Grafted With Social Naturalism
### Natural - as Original Force
(functions independently of political interventions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>voluntary</td>
<td>coercive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spontaenous</td>
<td>orchestrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rational logic</td>
<td>irrational force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>autonomous</td>
<td>dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>natural rights</td>
<td>institutional power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>impersonally rule</td>
<td>personified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regulated</td>
<td>power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>right of resistance</td>
<td>abject domination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil society</td>
<td>arbitrary state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>free market</td>
<td>state regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>market society</td>
<td>political power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coordination between equals</td>
<td>hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bourgeois homme</td>
<td>master/slave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>natural law</td>
<td>positive law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public opinion</td>
<td>tyranny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political culture</td>
<td>artificial passions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Historical - as Constructed Force
(functions through arbitrary political power)

Figure 3: The "great dichotomies" of Anglo-American Citizenship Theory
Epistemological Grid of Social Naturalism

Given/Natural Object | Constructed/Historical Object
---|---
Private | Public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Given/Natural Object</th>
<th>Constructed/Historical Object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2 Market</th>
<th>3 De-Institutionalized State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>free labor</td>
<td>representative government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>free markets</td>
<td>contract law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capitalist</td>
<td>laissez-faire government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exchange</td>
<td>liberal democratic institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private property</td>
<td>&quot;bourgeois democracy&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic rights</td>
<td>&quot;executive committee&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rational logic</td>
<td>of ruling class*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public opinion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>natural rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political interests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>freedom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>popular sovereignty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>popular consent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>representative ideals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democratic principles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 Community</th>
<th>4 Institutional State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;state of nature&quot;</td>
<td>regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>feudal community</td>
<td>redistribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>serfdom</td>
<td>bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unfreedom</td>
<td>classical citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>collectivism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>interventionist state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Epistemological Divides | Direction of Political and Epistemologic Influence
---|---
Historical Time | Direction of Chronic Potential Threat

Figure 4: Metanarrative of Anglo-American Citizenship Theory
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