THE NARRATIVE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN COMMUNISM'S COLLAPSE AND POSTCOMMUNISM'S ALTERNATIVE: EMANCIPATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF POLISH PROTEST AND BALTIC NATIONALISM

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abstract:

Civil society has been understood as a set of social relations, but it should also be recognized as a narrative of social reproduction and transformation. This narrative, however, is not so enduring as its ideologues might have it. Its meaning is transformed as it comes to be embedded within various historical periods and cultural fields of identity and difference. In this paper, we identify patterns of exclusion and inclusion within the labilities of the East European civil society project in the decade preceding and the decade following communism's collapse in 1989. We then identify two particularly important challenges to the emancipatory potential of civil society that are grounded in East European lifeworlds. By linking this study of civil society's lability to its normative critique, we seek to demonstrate civil society's continued significance to critical social theory, and Eastern Europe's importance for making that case.
The Narrative of Civil Society in
Communism’s Collapse and Postcommunism’s Alternative:
Emancipation and the Challenge of Polish Protest and Baltic Nationalism

Civil society’s significance in sociology and political science as a whole appears to have increased since communism’s collapse. Within Eastern Europe, however, civil society is not only a social phenomenon, but a discourse both shaping and useful in strategic action. Through its strategic invocation, civil society was critical to the emancipation of Eastern Europe from Soviet-type society. Its critical function in post-communist society is less apparent, however. By considering the abiding potential of civil society as a discourse of emancipation, we hope to contribute to the restoration of civil society to the center of critical social theory.

We illustrate in this paper not only why civil society remains an important concept for those working within Eastern Europe, but also why working within Eastern Europe is important for expanding civil society’s critical potential. To a considerable extent, one of the problems facing critical theory is its often implicit and untheorized grounding in particular historical contexts. In this paper, we want to highlight the significance of working within Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for developing critical sociology, for it is here where the engagement with socialism as lived experience, and civil society as its most compelling alternative, are most palpable and consequential for imagining the significance of civil society as an emancipatory vision.

Instead of civil society, identity and difference tend to assume center stage in cultural studies and much of critical theory. Some of the most fruitful work in critical social theory has been in search of the engagement between the integrating visions of civil society and the emphases on difference in identity projects. In this paper, we seek to extend that engagement by identifying under what conditions certain East European social practices and social actors are identified as commensurate with the civil society project, and under what conditions practices and actors are identified as antagonistic to it. For that reason, William Connolly’s recent work on the politics of becoming is especially useful. Instead of considering a political project like civil society to be defined by certain intrinsic principles like tolerance or pluralism, we can define it relationally. In Connolly’s terms, we might ask what the politics of becoming is in civil society projects, and how the vision of civil society changes as it comes to be associated with different sets of power relations.
In this sense, we approach civil society differently than many others who focus on solely its sociological limitations. Rather than emphasize civil society’s organizational weakness or inadequacy before the challenges of the “transition” from communist rule to democratic capitalism, we focus here on the shift in civil society’s framing and normative penumbras in the transformational politics of Eastern Europe. Clearly, civil society’s normative power was much greater in the 1980s when it was viewed by the East Central European democratic opposition and their Western allies as a politics based not only on the condemnation of communist moral failing, but also the legacy and distinction of East Central Europe. Is there another way in which critical theorists might recover the politics of civil society for an emancipatory project that deepens, rather than limits, the democracy of postcommunist capitalism?

Our approach to civil society also reflects a very different kind of discursive location for civil society within Eastern Europe. In and from the USA, civil society can be treated as a longstanding discourse in which one can identify a deep and durable structure opposing democratic and anti-democratic actors, relationships and institutions. Eastern Europe, by contrast, has been racked by the labilities of its cultural formations. The elements of dominant and subordinate discourses have themselves been unstable and the criteria for recognizing threats and promise within and across them have been altered radically over time. In this paper, we suggest broad patterns of affirmation and exclusion in the labilities of the East European civil society project, and how the substance and mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion have varied over historical periods and national spaces. Simply put, before communism’s collapse, civil society tended to be an expansive discourse in which its meaning was expanded as it included ever more types of action as consistent with its vision. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has tended to become a consolidating vision, in which its principal strategic function has been to identify who is part of the emancipatory future and who is part of the past to be transcended. In its common rhetorical terms, who wants to become part of the West and Europe, and who must be left behind in a socialist east?

In Part I of this paper, we identify why civil society theory must be an intrinsic part of any critical theory of East European social transformations. We begin this paper by considering why civil society endures as a fundamentally important concept in the theory and practice of East European social transformations. We turn next to consider how it became so locally meaningful. We suggest that its power was not only conferred by its putative logical or political opposition to communism, but through a social process. This social process began as an
intellectual praxis, in which intellectuals identified a wide range of autonomous activities as consistent with communism’s alternative. In turn, these intellectuals were then inscribed as civil society’s representatives when communist authorities and Western powers identified them as reasonable partners for negotiating communism’s end. To conclude Part I, we consider how civil society alters its ideological function in postcommunism. We explain how civil society establishes its new hegemony by subtly including and excluding forms of activity within a larger affirmation of certain kinds of power centered on political society and the state (civil society’s guarantor and antithesis) and the market (civil society’s Lockean manifestation).

In Part II, we turn to civil society’s challenge for critical theory. To be sure, civil society cannot simply function as a vehicle to ‘clarify the struggles and wishes of the age’. It has lost its qualities as an expansive emancipatory vision and has been transformed into a defensive consolidating vision (perhaps explaining thereby its growing appeal for neofunctionalism and those who would celebrate or explain, rather than deepen and interrogate, democracy). Nevertheless, civil society remains necessary to critical theoretical work in Eastern Europe. As post-colonial studies seeks to recover a form of community denied by a nationalism that claims to embody that community, critical sociology out of Eastern Europe ought to elaborate that potentially emancipatory civil society now denied by the hegemonic contest between liberalism and fundamentalism, or individualism and collectivism. In this essay, we offer a sociological method to elaborate that emancipatory potential. This method has three steps.

In the first step, one should identify particular contradictory moments in the elaboration of the civil society project. Contradictory moments are those in which past expressions of civil society’s potential are subsequently identified as their nemesis. Here we focus on two: labor movements and nationalist movements. In the second step, one should turn to particular manifestations of these contradictions, and explain how they have been constructed, by participants and by interpreters, as consistent or inconsistent with the civil society project. Here we focus on Polish Solidarity 1993-94 and post-Soviet Baltic nationalisms to illustrate the dilemmas of an “unreal socialism” and the “small nation” in the discourse of civil society. Finally, one returns to the critical civil society project itself, to consider what presumptions allow exclusions and what theoretical recasting might expand, rather than consolidate, the vision of civil society.
PART I: THE NECESSITY OF CIVIL SOCIETY

CIVIL SOCIETY AS POINT OF DEPARTURE

In many East European countries, the gap in ideological commitment to civil society between formerly communist parties and newly liberal parties is not so great, and the fundamental importance of civil society might easily be forgotten. But the continuing contest within Russia between a vision of a great imperialist Russia and a more democratic Russia helps remind critical theorists that civil society is still a political accomplishment and not an evolutionary inevitability. Some authors even consider the return of another imperial type of Russia to be well within a realm of possibility. Because what happens in Russia has terrific influence on what happens in the rest of the region, the fate of civil society in Russia remains important to its fate across the region. And if civil society remains only a political choice, then civil society remains a commitment too fundamental to assign to narrow liberal interests. The rhetoric of civil society becomes only that much more important in light of the 1996 presidential elections.

Communist candidate Gennady Zyuganov almost seemed to desire the consolidation of civil society proponents into a single camp opposing him. Consider how he spoke about Yeltsin’s leadership:

...the road we have traveled for the past five or 10 years. On it we have lost our country, half our national wealth, the dignity of a great power, the respect of the entire world, and our confidence in a future for each one of us. ... lost several million of our fellow-countrymen. Our fellow citizens killed in the 200 wars and conflicts unleashed on our native soil, dead before their time, or not born at all... they have stolen our faith in our own resources and our ideas of ourselves as a great power. We are being taught to accept promises of humanitarian aid, handouts of second hand clothes, and advice-cum-orders from abroad on what we should be doing and how we should be doing it. For the first time in Russia’s 1,000 year history, mothers and fathers feel guilty for leaving their children a half destroyed, untidy home... And I am ashamed that I was once in the same party as the turncoats, destroyers and traitors of the Fatherland who currently rule in the Kremlin.

But there is another road... Russia’s road to itself, a road to spirituality, prosperity, plenty and dignity. It is the road followed by countries against which the rest of the world now measures itself. These states live by the simple rule that the welfare of their citizens comes above all else. We simply need to shrug off our slumbering unreliability and depression, pull ourselves together, be ashamed for what we have done to our own history and the world of our forefathers and say to
ourselves: We are Russia, we are a great people, and there is no power on earth that can conquer us. Believing in ourselves and starting to act -- that is what we want.

This kind of invocation -- compelling with its powerful sense of victimization and injustice -- is nonetheless the kind of moral messianism Ernest Gellner identifies as one of civil society's most dangerous alternatives, where the social order is sacralized, power is concentrated, and economic dynamism and liberty denied. Yeltsin's political program, by contrast, appeared to embrace a vitalization of civil society in Russia.

Yeltsin of course praised his own rule and acknowledged some mistakes, but emphasized the reality and desireability of democracy and pluralism in Russia. He also emphasized the market model and the creation of a citizenry who are owners of their own apartments, houses, and plots of land; a civic society and support for pluralism and the development of independent associations; an absence of real threat or aggression toward Russia; and finally, the fact of the rule of law, freedom, and recognition of spirituality. Rather than invoking national indignation and the consequent nostalgia for authoritarianism, Yeltsin engaged concerns for “The Individual, the Family, Society, [and] the State.” He asked:

- How can each person live, how can he realize his potential, how is he protected in adversity and in his old age?
- How is every Russian family getting on, how is motherhood being supported and how is a mother’s great labor being eased, are parents happy about their children’s future?
- What does our society live on, how are its constitutional rights and freedoms being implemented, how are the opportunities for its spiritual and cultural developments being proved?
- Is Russian statehood strong? Are the authorities effective, how are they ensuring prosperity, security, and freedom for the individual, the family, and society. Are Russian citizens proud of their country, is Russia respected in the world?

These are clearly very different rhetorics. Whatever Yeltsin’s own limitations as an advocate of civil society, the opposition between civil society and Soviet nostalgia dominated the electoral contest. Civil society and Soviet-style society remain even in 1996 powerful alternatives in the portrait of emancipation and reaction. Critical sociology must be attentive to these fundamental oppositions and should not pretend as if they are irrelevant. They remain quite real not only in the lifeworlds of Russian citizens but also for those outside of Russia proper who would feel the effect of a return to Russian empire. Thus, one ought to begin with the conception of
civil society by one of its principal spokespersons in general and especially within Eastern Europe, Ernest Gellner.

For Gellner, socialism was not, and cannot be, emancipation. He writes,

The unification of the economy in one single organization and its fusion with the political and ideological hierarchy is not merely most inefficient: it also inevitably leads to both totalitarianism and humbug. In an industrial society, full socialism cannot but be totalitarian -- and totalitarianism cannot but be socialist. To allow an independent economic zone is to leave an enormous breach in the authoritarian system, given the importance of the economy. To deprive civil society of an independent economic bases is to throttle it, given the inevitability of political centralization. (p. 164).

Gellner's apparently fundamentalist position in support of civil society is a useful point of departure for a critical theory engaging East European emancipation. It is even more useful than beginning with familiar critical theoretical positions. For many critical theorists, socialism is an ontologically absent but epistemologically structuring desire; in Eastern Europe, socialism has been a lived experience. In the shadow of communist rule, and with the potential threat of Russian imperial ambition, civil society is the foundation of emancipation. It continues to structure alternatives, and thus Gellner offers a useful point of departure for a critical social theory of civil society.

What matters first and foremost for Gellner is whether the system is pluralist in a certain fashion. Of course there must be political constraints put on the economy. His fundamental point is that political control must be balanced by 'an autonomous set of production units'. Pluralism should exist within a desanctified ideological order, where no one vision is unassailable. Positions of power should not be the most lucrative in society, and rather these should be found in the economic sector. And individuals should be modular -- acquiring and disposing of identities as interactions demand, within a basic nationalist frame where all speak some kind of common language and have a common ideological referent. These are the preconditions for democracy, he argues, and one might say by extension, for emancipation. The book's virtue partially lies with Gellner's rhetorical appeal. What critical theorist would dislike a system where it is unclear who exactly is the boss?

At the same time, however, critical theory should not be constrained and limited by Gellner's discursive polarities. Indeed, we suggest that to leave civil society where it is potentially enervates its conceptual power. Although Gellner recognizes the sociological foundations that make civil society strong and weak, he doesn't
engage whether the *vision* of civil society can expand in cultural forms and theoretical imaginations. Indeed, mindful of his treatment of nationalism, he finds the notion of civil society also to be simple. But questions of how formations of identity and difference articulate with civil society’s own inclusive and emancipatory potential are not so simple. We fear that Gellner’s framing ultimately weakens civil society both as a political and analytical concept. It fails to explore whether civil society itself cultivates the possibilities of its own progressive supersessions, or whether its deployment only encourages its advocates to imagine alternatives to be inferior fundamentalisms. Might, in Connolly’s formulation, civil society become something different once it realizes its most obvious projects? What thematics lead it to become expansive and emancipatory, and what thematics lead it to become a defensive and consolidating vision? In the next section, we consider how civil society functioned as an emancipatory project through 1989 in Eastern Europe and through 1991 in the former Soviet Union. This story is particularly important for it explains the historical process with which civil society acquired a sense of necessity in emancipation.

**CIVIL SOCIETY AS ANTI-COMMUNIST HEGEMONIC PROJECT**

Democracy could be celebrated in 1989 because it, and its specific associations, the rule of law and civil society, were evident in the transformations of Soviet-type societies, in general, and especially in East Central Europe. The rule of law was only partially instantiated before communism’s collapse, as when the Hungarian opposition took seriously various constitutional rules to put their own people in electoral contests. For the most part, however, the rule of law was associated with the change only because its leaders said that this was their intention. Civil society was more widely evident. At least it was thought to be.

Civil society’s promise was based not only on the normative commitments associated with its liberal defenders, but also with the appearance of public action in its behalf. The most obvious manifestation of civil society’s existence was the prevalence of opposition intellectuals speaking the rhetoric of civil society—democracy, public sphere, rule of law, and so on. Not every society had prominent figures like Poland’s Adam Michnik, Russia’s Andre Sakharov, Czechoslovakia’s Vaclav Havel, and Hungary’s Janos Kis, but at some level, there were always public figures in the anti-communist opposition who would claim this as their ideology.
Typically, these civil society theorists gained oppositional status only to the extent they wrote for an alternative public sphere, samizdat, the parallel polis, the second society, and so on.

More infrequently, but in some sites, one could find social movements that articulated these ideals of civil society. Solidarity, from its 1980 inception through most of the 1980s, associated itself through its spokespersons with the celebration of civil society.\textsuperscript{38} Slovene social movements were even more clearly associated with this dimension of democracy's celebration. Its movements approximated the archetypal New Social Movement more than anywhere in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{39}

Mass public demonstrations animated with slogans of civil society dotted the regional map. The demonstrators' self-restraint and peaceful nature suggested a disposition of compromise many took to be associated with democracy itself. The Hungarian demonstration of March 15, 1988 was exemplary in this regard, as were the so-called 'singing revolutions' in the Baltic republics in the late 1980s, and the East German demonstrations of the fall of 1989. Commentators were disposed to put the civil society label on these demonstrations relatively readily,\textsuperscript{40} in part because they could compare them to earlier protests that were focused more on wage price hikes and were associated with violence against Party buildings, as in the 1956 Poznan riots, or against Party members, as in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.\textsuperscript{41}

The economic side of the civil society argument was a bit more complicated. On the one hand, the second or informal economy was even taken as evidence of a nascent civil society. Liberal commentators especially would take this as evidence of at least the Lockean version of civil society,\textsuperscript{42} demonstrating that people could organize economic activities independent of the state. Hungary was particularly celebrated in this regard.\textsuperscript{43} More difficult for civil society theorists, or proponents, as the two were often mixed, were the labor movements.

Of course not all labor protests or movements were associated with the building of democracy and especially of civil society's principles. As with most things in Romania, the labor protests in the Jiu Valley in Romania were difficult to identify as evidence of civil society's potential.\textsuperscript{44} The only independent trade union of note in Hungary's transformation was one of scientific workers, although it was explicitly aligned with civil society rhetoric.\textsuperscript{45} Polish Solidarity was perhaps least difficult to align with civil society, given that it was not only a labor movement, but self consciously a movement for democracy.\textsuperscript{46} And at least in 1989, the miners in Eastern Ukraine and Western Siberia were protesting on behalf not only of greater benefits for themselves but also for more
independence in economic activities, lending some credence to a civil society emphasis on economic activity.\textsuperscript{47} For the most part, however, labor issues were left out of the rhetoric of the civil society project. In retrospect, one might suggest that it was a strategic omission, given the subsequent importance of economic liberalism. Nevertheless, one should not fail to recognize that in some places, an independent labor movement was part and parcel of the emancipation associated with civil society. By extension, it was certainly envisioned as part of the broad movement for emancipation.

The more obviously troubling element for civil society theorists and advocates was nationalism. Today it is an almost boring convention to compare nationalists and democrats, advocates of the nation with advocates of the rule of law, proponents of collectivism and proponents of individualism. But during the opposition to communism, civil society advocates tended to assimilate nationalisms. Of course, there were always some nationalisms held at arms length -- especially those propagated by the more xenophobic and fascist organizations. But if one looks at the rhetoric of the dominant national movements -- Rukh in Ukraine, the Popular Fronts in the Baltic States, Solidarity in Poland, the Hungarian Democratic Forum --- one finds a remarkable synthesis of emphases on both the nation and democracy. The cases where the synthesis was rather between nationalism and fascism, or nationalism and communism, as in Serbia, Russia, and Romania, made democratically-oriented national expressions seem all the more compatible with civil society.\textsuperscript{48}

Finally, civil society was even in evidence among communists. Of course one wouldn't look to Nicolae Ceausescu or Eric Honecker, but various commentators emphasized the increasing reasonableness of communist leaders, whether Mikhail Gorbachev himself, or the liberal wing in Hungary, and even Jaruzelski in Poland. If they could compromise, then the possibility for a civil society transformation, one based on the rule of law itself, was ever so much greater. This kind of legal revolution was possible only because the authorities themselves wanted it \textsuperscript{49}, though it was clearly intended to strengthen rather than weaken the Communist Party's position.\textsuperscript{50}

Of course this is all quite variable. Societies vary in their overall development of civil society across these nodes of civil society discourse and within them. Poland was, across the board, the most "developed" in its expression of civil society; Hungary was not so developed on the broad social movement side and certainly not so much in the labor movement, but its second economy was among the most developed. Czechoslovakia, especially the Czech side, had its prominent dissidents but little else. Bulgaria had little in any regard, and Romania and
Albania less, until 1990. The republics in the former Yugoslavia differed considerably, but Slovenia was clearly associated with the most developed civil society formation in terms of movements and communist leadership.51

Although these different formations of civil society deserve elaboration and explanation, it is important to recall and recognize that they were assimilated into a larger vision of civil society’s ascent in a global political space. Within societies, and across them, the spectre of civil society haunted communism as all of its manifestations were knit together in one emancipatory vision that could not be resisted. This unprecedented combination in part accounts for the power of civil society as emancipatory concept. Civil society gained counterhegemonic status because intellectuals claimed that the variety of activities taken in opposition to communism were evidence of the incipient formation of civil society. Their words became more than the profferings of irrelevant intellectuals not only because of the moral capital they acquired in their political oppression,52 but because they could claim to represent civil society in negotiations with communist authorities, a position reinforced by international media.53

In retrospect, this association between a broad variety of groups and interests was hardly self evident. To a large extent, civil society was interpreted through the lens of civil society theorists/proponents, who sought to construct a particular interpretation of these events. Rather than think of civil society as some set of social relations that elevate pluralism, legality and an open public sphere, perhaps the best conception of civil society is as a narrative, a discursive construction, that must be situated historically and in its own field of cultural referents. In this period, civil society was a political project in which political leaders identified various forms of opposition to communism as evidence of civil society in the making. It was an expansive, and emancipatory, moment.

Of course it had its exclusions and its negative consequences, but these were minimized if not altogether ignored at the time by critical intellectuals. Even demonstrations highlighting the inclusive vision of civil society had other ambitions of a more exclusive sort. The second economy was evidence of lawlessness and not only independent economic organization. Nationalism, even of the most liberal variety, was premised on a form of exclusion as all national imaginations must be. Reformed communists were of course symbols of past privilege and worse. Labor movements were problematic because of their likely interest in constraining the free operation of the labor market itself. Only the refined civil society theorists might be read as unambiguously representing civil
society, but even here their own limitations in representing what the protest against communism was about suggests the limits of civil society's universalistic vision.

In short, one important project in rethinking civil society and the public sphere is to go back to these moments of civil society's expression to read them for their other expressions, and anticipations, of what we see today. Simultaneously, one should look for the forms of collaboration between leaders of democratic opposition and reformist communists. One should also consider those cultural formations that defy conventional notions of public spheres, such as those created by international agencies with cultural exchanges and East European indigenous scholars, that helped make a global referent of civil society apparent. Civil society's anti-communist history is yet to be written. But when it is written, and if set against its postcommunist expression, its tendency toward expansion ought to be the story's leitmotif.

Our purpose in this brief sketch of civil society in communism's collapse is to show that while civil society was being touted as the most meaningful and powerful frame with which to understand the end to communism, it managed this with a brilliant sleight of hand. Its power was based on the conviction of its normative superiority as a political project, combined with the appearance of many social phenomena that could be used to demonstrate the inadequacy of its communist rival. At the same time, recognizing difference and finding commonality in a wide range of previously incommensurate activities was why civil society could be so meaningful for critical theory. It was a marvelous moment of promise, a frame containing a broad intersubjectivity with autonomy expressed in a wide variety of ways, integrated through compromise, exchange, and common membership in an inclusive opposition. That didn't last.

CIVIL SOCIETY AFTER COMMUNISM

For some critical theorists like Adam Michnik, the problem with civil society after communism rests in its normalization. The very same people who 'ignited the revolution of lighted candles' tend to become marginalized in a normal democracy. This normalization not only leads the mediocre to become the modal public figure, but it also means that broad moral authority and decency is replaced by petty conflict among those who brought down communism itself. Within Poland, according to Michnik, this loss of solidarity has meant that the workers/civil rights component of the great movement tends to be transformed into populism. The
Catholic/traditional component tends to be transformed into nationalism and the instrumental treatment of religion.\textsuperscript{55}

Some Polish sociologists reinforce this critique of postcommunist times by indicting civil society itself. Civil society, they argue, has become passive. Typical indicators supporting this line of argument include low electoral turnout, a more general disaffection from electoral politics and a general depoliticization of social life.\textsuperscript{56} Others, however, find this depoliticization appropriate, and find civil society’s vitality to exist in the growth of the private sector, especially private enterprise. Their slogan is “economy better than politics, and micro better than macro”.\textsuperscript{57}

This ‘microeconomic turn’ in postcommunist civil society’s development corresponds to the ideological preferences of the more orthodox liberal in Polish political life. Even before communism’s collapse, Miroslaw Dzielski and others looked to the vitality of the second economy as evidence for the future ideal society. They sought no inclusive synthesis. They celebrated the entrepreneur and the middle class. Dzielski wrote, “the person who trades is the pillar of civilization, and in conditions of socialism also its heroic champion”.\textsuperscript{58} Alongside this celebration was the critique of Solidarity. The liberals considered Solidarity to be workerist and populist.\textsuperscript{59} Social movements themselves were seen as continued reflections of appeals to the state rather than of inventing new forms of institutional articulation.

Individualism vs. collectivism, rather than democracy vs. dictatorship, would thus structure the alternatives, and with it, civil society could take the turn toward a ‘Lockean tradition’ as Charles Taylor\textsuperscript{60} has called it. Even for those who would criticize the narrow foundations of such a Lockean tradition, the opposition between individualism and collectivism would become foundational. For instance, sociologist Jerzy Szacki’s critique of economistic liberalism in favor of integral liberalism rests on a critique of the proto-liberal. He identifies the movement-dominated moment in civil society’s elaboration as “protoliberal” because individualism was subordinated to the collectivist impulses from civil society writ large.\textsuperscript{61}

Although Michnik’s laments about postcommunist civil society reflect his distance from the economistic articulation of that vision, his perspective also is trapped in the antagonism between individualism and collectivism.\textsuperscript{62} The \textit{individual} agent of past emancipation struggles, the democratic intellectual, is marginalized in the present. Their voices are lost in a cacaphony of information flooding the public sphere.\textsuperscript{63} Movements are thus
drawn to those fundamentalisms associated with collectivism, civil society’s antithesis. The mobilization of movements only hastens the loss of civil society’s emancipatory potential, therefore. Collective organization, without that critical democratic intellectual’s empowerment, is a symptom thus of civil society’s decline rather than its fulfillment.

For the marxist disengaged from Eastern Europe, all of this discussion of civil society might seem irrelevant. Civil society has always been associated with vast material inequalities, and it should surprise no one that the making of postcommunist capitalism has been associated with vast increases in inequality, not only across statuses, but also across regions within and across the post-communist world.64 Thus, the problem is not with civil society or intellectual responsibility, but with to whom the intellectual feels obliged. What, for instance, about intellectuals engaging the proletarians? Postcommunist labor is not, however, simply proletarian.

PART II: THE CHALLENGE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

LABOR, PUBLIC PROTEST AND CIVIL SOCIETY

One of the greatest dangers for critical theories is to consider present forms of inequality as the sole grounds from which to interpret social conflicts. For instance, it is tempting to associate civil society with the privileged because the old and new middle classes tend to ally in support of the liberal civil society in the making.65 Can we then interpret the workers’ relative reticence as evidence of civil society’s exclusionary quality?

Edmund Mokrzycki has challenged the simple transposition of capitalist labor relations to Eastern Europe. He has argued that labor’s opposition is not so much a manifestation of class conflict as it is a manifestation of the conflict between a society made by socialists and the new system made by liberal elites.66 Thus, one ought to consider that inequalities are at least potentially a consequence not so much of capitalism’s introduction, but of socialism’s legacy. And that is a problem for civil society.

Ideologies and identities normally operate to reinforce each other.67 In postcommunist capitalism, however, the strongest ‘ideology’ -- liberalism -- generates a capitalist identity that can underpin the project of transformation. It lacks, however, clear spatial and temporal roots. The strongest identity, that of the working class in large factories, has several movement and organizational identities to which it can be attached, but these unions and movements are themselves weakened because they have no larger ideological frame that adequately
reflects the particular demands workers make. Socialism is, given its association with the illegitimate past, unacceptable for current hegemonies. Where the labor movement was overwhelmingly a labor movement made by state socialism (or even worse Soviet imperial power, as in the Baltics), the chance that labor could be discursively constructed as anything but a reflection of the past is hard to imagine. “Unreal socialism” – a vision self consciously as distant from the past and as utopian as importing wholesale capitalism’s wealth – is one discursive possibility. We return to that possibility only after considering why it is necessary. And for that, Poland becomes the critical case.

If any proletarian movement could develop an identity and ideology to challenge the hegemony of capitalist civil society in postcommunism while simultaneously challenging the socialist past, one might imagine Polish Solidarity to be so able. Solidarity was constructed in a society that had more movement mobilization than any other East European society. Its identity, while increasingly fragmented and market oriented through the 1980s, had a strong element of workers’ rights alongside its anti-communist and democratic commitments. Its practices were based on ‘solidarity’, on the idea that the strong should support the weak. The movement even won the fall 1997 parliamentary elections.

Solidarity’s campaign, however, was not based on the deepening of either civil society rhetoric or working class empowerment. It was built around a national Catholic vision. Of course this labor-religion alliance is based on the terrific power of the Catholic Church and the roots of the Solidarity movement in Polish Roman Catholic cultural formations. However, we also believe this outcome reflects the failure of civil society discourse, and its inability to consider the prospects of “unreal socialism”. To make the case, we shall focus on the spring of 1994, when Kennedy conducted fieldwork in Warsaw. The story needs a prologue that might begin with the summer of 1989 when Solidarity formed a government.

Nobody expected Solidarity to take power. It was expected that the communists and their allies would guide reform, with Solidarity in a comfortable, but now legal, opposition. Forced into a position of authority, Solidarity leaders over the fall of 1989 searched about for a vision of transformation, especially of economic change. They found it in the Balcerowicz plan of 1990, in which the economy was to be transformed as rapidly as possible. This shock therapy not only jolted the economy, but also Solidarity’s labor movement. It is difficult to assess the support or disdain this policy evoked. Regardless, workers did not have the organizational strength to
resist it given the weakness of the communist-led union and the support Solidarity felt obliged to give its own government.74

The second major shock to their identity came with the "war at the top" between Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Lech Walesa in the presidential elections of the summer of 1990. Most of these Solidarity workers appeared to support Walesa, whose criticism of Mazowiecki, while not consistent, held appeal for those whose security seemed threatened. But after Walesa's election as president, and especially through the staunchly liberal economic regimes of Bielecki and Suchocka, Solidarity assumed a more oppositional stance toward the government in general. Protest was increasingly directed against the government and not against the specific enterprises in which demonstrators were employed.75 Solidarity could not, however, draw easily on the anti-communist ideology of its beginning. The new authorities were, after all, part of the anti-communist opposition too. Solidarity portrayed itself only as a movement that sought limitations to existing policies while struggling to demand that they be participants in the process of transformation, and not merely the objects of political games.76 The Pact on Industry, negotiated during the end of Suchocka's government, is the result of this resistance. Before that pact could be implemented, however, the Suchocka government was forced out in the first half of 1993.

New elections were held in the fall. The Solidarity movement struggled to develop a new identity that might win them support. Their posters emphasized that "there were many parties, but only one Solidarity". Solidarity emphasized that they wanted a "Poland for you," defending the weak and fighting against corruption. Beyond invoking a beautiful memory, Solidarity could do little to distinguish itself from the post-communist left which also claimed to oppose corruption and slow down the reform. The postcommunist left finally won the elections and this was the final shock. After bringing down communism, Solidarity's liberals and workers both were out of power. The union itself was out of parliament thanks to new election laws.

These new political conditions, with a post-communist left in power and the trade union out of parliament, were a serious defeat for Solidarity. At the same time, it gave Solidarity activists a new set of conditions that enabled them to reconstruct an ideology and a new identity with which to challenge power. The parameters of that search can be explored by returning to May 27, 1994, when Solidarity staged a major demonstration in Warsaw.77
Organizers expected 50,000-70,000 protesters, but estimated that 30,000 actually participated on a beautiful day. Television commentators that evening estimated that there were 10,000 to 15,000 protesters present. Assembling on Pilsudski square for two hours, the demonstrators marched through the streets of Warsaw chanting and carrying various placards.

There were several dominant themes on the 42 different slogans that Kennedy recorded. Complaints of impoverishment were easily dominant with 25 of the 42 iterating this theme. Although some of the placards spoke of poverty in general, many were specific, naming health care, pensioners, peasants, and children as the victims of transition. In this sense, there was a clear identity: we are victims, or at least we speak for the victims. There were general demands, like for bread and work or for dignified work. There also were more specific demands: increasing the funds allocated to health care and education, for instance, or getting rid of the tax on wage hikes, or for guaranteeing a living wage. Only one placard was observed to deal directly with the method of reform itself: Restructuring yes, breakup no (Restrukturyzacja tak, wydzielania nie).

Many placards also conveyed a terrific sense of impatience: "patience has its limits". And they demanded better relations: "Instead of a hoax, we demand honest treatment". Few seemed to appreciate their government. "Precz", an old Polish word associated with the patriarch of a peasant household yelling 'out with you' but now having a general meaning (retaining the disgust) was used frequently. "Out with the thieves" or "out with the communists" were very common. One placard suggested that the communists go to Cuba. One carried around an empty cell for the Labor Minister Leszek Miller. Others carried implicit threats: "Today with flowers, tomorrow????..." "If you support the government, you will die".

By themselves, these do not construct an alternative to existing civil society as discourse. They identify what is wrong and who is suffering, and to a lesser degree, who is responsible and what can be done. Consider, however, the following slogans that appeared at the demonstration: “A state of freedom doesn’t mean impunity”; “Try to live on these wages”; and “It has to be otherwise, for it is worse”. These slogans anticipate the construction of a protest identity that, like others at the demonstration, is founded on dissatisfaction with the state of the society and the actions of the government. However, they (and some others like them) diverge from the general rhetoric of discontent in that they zero in on the condition of postcommunist capitalism. They begin to draw the outlines of a
case for a critique of a postcommunist development that by-passes social welfare in its rush to market. Elaborations by its intellectuals are more useful for finding how Solidarity's protest fits with civil society's potential.

One of the leading voices of this Solidarity opposition was Maciej Jankowski, the leader of the Mazovian Regional group in Solidarity. The outlines of his position could be found in a contemporary interview. Jankowski sought to construct a new "other". One of his familiar slogans is this: "They are playing their own games in their own class", referring to the government, parliament and president. There is no significant difference, he argues, among parties, whether they came from Solidarity or not. They all forget about the base of the movement and society is excluded from the making of reform. Elections are not enough; "democratic elections don't mean that the state is democratic". The leadership, he suggests, doesn't act democratically, but rather with Bolshevik arrogance. People know that elections don't matter, since what they vote for and what the government subsequently does are entirely separate. Government, whether from Solidarity or by Communists, is the antagonistic "other". Capitalism, though, is not the enemy; indeed, at one point he invokes Japan as a positive example, saying that there the relation of income of employee to management is 1 to 4; in Poland it is 1 to 40.

As Jankowski constructs "them", he formulates an oppositional "we." Solidarity, he says, is not egalitarian, but he does say that there should be equal chances and that one should earn according to one's achievements. Politicians are making more than their share, as are managers. Defending his movement against the charge of socialist-type egalitarianism, he says "Egalitarianism is bad, but elitism... is worse". And he also finds it strange that to engage in struggle on behalf of the most poorly paid is anti-reformist. This is not socialism, he argues. Solidarity, he argues, does not aspire to represent everyone, only the interests of 30 to 40 per cent of the society. But he proposes that the labor movement in Solidarity needs to be partners, as it is in other parts of the free market world. This is all he offers, programmatically: the need to be partners in government and in capital's management. They need to be able to negotiate.

Solidarity's protest and ideology in formation thus remained quite a part of the civil society project. On the one hand, it portrayed itself through peaceful protest as a strong force that is capable not only of representing its base, but also representing those less able to defend themselves. It continued its tradition of solidarity. On the other hand, Solidarity also sought to emphasize the importance of negotiation and compromise. Postcommunist capitalism, they argued, should be based on a negotiated settlement between the interests of capital and labor, and
not just the dictates of capital. At the same time, however, Solidarity also suggested elements that risked civil society's simple association.

Like Zyuganov's Russian communists, Solidarity's emergent ideology rested on strengthening and deepening a sense of victimization. This victimization was attached, then, to a notion of the sacred and profane in political terms, except in mirror image to Zyuganov. Rather than the liberals destroying the nation's tradition as in Russia, in Poland, the communists are the villains.

Solidarity had to retain its anti-communist emphasis for several reasons. First and most obvious is the need to establish distance from the continuing illegitimacy of the old regime. All actors do this, even if Solidarity does not need to do it as much as other more politically incriminated actors. Second, anti-communist rhetoric has become newly sensible, since the former communists are now back in power and anti-governmental demonstrations can acquire added emotive punch by adding the anti-communist theme. Third, anti-communist rhetoric distinguishes Solidarity from its principal opponent in the labor field. This is the other "other" in the rhetoric of many of Solidarity's leading political activists.

Although it was surprisingly not present in any of the leaflets or placards at the May 1994 demonstration, one of the implicit issues of the protest was a demand for one-on-one negotiations with the government. Solidarity felt that they should represent labor specifically, and not include the formerly communist-sponsored trade union OPZZ. In addition, the OPZZ held resources bequeathed to it by the Communist government in the 1980s that Solidarity felt it rightfully owned. This appears to be another war at the top, however, to many workers.

On the shopfloor, there is more cooperation among union activists and regular workers than the relations between union leaders would suggest. Kennedy's interviews with protesters suggested that there is really little conflict with other unions on the shopfloor itself. The 'class conflict' generated identities appear to have little need for these different union affiliations; on the other hand, these union affiliations bring with them inherited identities that bespeak former conflicts and compromise, and too they reflect a real fight in the political domain, if not in the social one. The 1994 strike in the Lucchini Steel Mill, jointly organized by OPZZ and Solidarity, is one manifestation of this potential for cooperation.\(^2\)

Anti-communist rhetoric, although an important element of Solidarity's cultural heritage and newly relevant in a variety of ways, actually impeded the formation of an ideology that could mobilize the larger identity
of post-communist proletarians. This anti-communist rhetoric expresses an identity and ideology that Solidarity's political activists no doubt find important; but at the same time, it represses a new ideology emergent from the social conditions post-communist capitalism generates. We see the beginnings of this ideology forming in some dimensions of public protest and in Jankowski's interview. Its elements include a demand for dignified work and a decent standard of living for the dispossessed. It refuses to distinguish between "our" politicians and "their" politicians. It refuses to accept the equation of elections with democratic governance. It seeks to define democracy in terms of negotiations with the society's proletarians. It is more critical of elitism than of egalitarianism. This new vision is certainly associated with a strong identity rooted in employment in the state firms and the state sector of education and health more generally.

This new ideological orientation is attacked on two grounds. On the one hand, intellectuals frequently charge that it is "populist." Certainly movements have this potential in this part of the world; indeed, without the extensive work of organic intellectuals committed to more rational and democratic critiques of post-communist capitalism, one could imagine proletarian opposition taking a turn reminiscent of Machajski's indictment of all politics and officials. At the same time, without populist pressure, intellectuals do not seem inclined to work within the proletarian left, given the disfavor with which socialism, as an intellectual tradition, is viewed. And to the extent this movement can be tarred with the label of socialism, it can be accused of endangering the successful exit from the past.

In retrospect, this gulf between democratic left intellectuals and Solidarity pushed the latter toward the national Catholic political establishment. And it would be easy to see this as inevitable, given that the democratic intellectuals put markets before labor in their vision of civil society. But that particular construction of civil society was not necessary. Jacek Kuron, former Solidarity advisor, former Minister of Social Welfare and 1995 presidential candidate representing the democratic intellectuals' "Freedom Union" certainly saw that. He argued that Poland made a mistake: it tried to build capitalism before its welfare state, and needed to build a Republic for Everybody (Rzeczpospolita dla kazdego). Political intellectuals, he said, needed to recognize and empower the activities everyday people are undertaking to develop their societies, whether in postcommunist or Western capitalist societies. Kuron was certainly trying to push the boundaries of what was civil society, but one could
imagine those boundaries being still pushed further. Kuron kept organized labor at a distance in these accounts, and indeed, maintained a strict distance from socialism as a legitimate element of postcommunist capitalism's civil society. And of course, real socialism remains civil society's antagonist. But Unreal Socialism might not.

Unreal socialism is a vision of socialism emphasizing its negation of the past in some sense. It is not the same as the socialism that was practiced in Poland's Soviet-type society. Unreal socialism might also mean that this socialism is impractical; at least this is the spin that Boguslaw Mazur wanted to put on the term in his article in Wprost. But practicality is itself a product of certain social relations, and does not exist in abstract theoretical space. The rhetoric of an unreal socialism, a utopianism that emphasizes all flights from real socialism are to one degree or another utopian, might reconfigure the postcommunist discursive space. It might challenge that frame in which pragmatism demands the delegitimation of capitalism's counterculture illegitimate. It might mean an escape into utopia, into imagination, in order to enhance the vision of alternatives. Without utopia, Adorno once wrote, the future can only be a smooth extension of the present. This culture of commitment to democratic alternatives must be cultivated in a field which up to this point has emphasized the importance of imitating that thought to be a proven success, however.

The challenge of this kind of discourse -- public protest, proletarian movements and left culture -- to civil society is absolutely vital. It is one central cultural opposition that civil society needs to incorporate for it to become an emancipatory vision once again. When movements and politics are identified as inconsistent with civil society because they either undermine its economic base or represent the past, they are effectively excluded from the conversation about how to reconstruct the society. In this sense, Ekiert and Kubik are on the right track when they argue that public protest and social movements must be seen as one of the fundamental ingredients of civil society's reconstruction in Eastern Europe. Movements must be part of it, for they can expand the agenda of civil society. At the same time, the ideologies framing movements must move beyond the dichotomous thinking characteristic of the opposition to communism. Unreal socialism might be just the vehicle to derail the socialist/civil society opposition.
The end to communist rule in the post-Soviet societies took place with a different dynamic than that in Eastern Europe. The mobilization of civil society, most obvious in the Baltics and in Armenia, later Ukraine, took place only in the mid-1980s, after Gorbachev had initiated the campaign for glasnost'. Top-down revolution was thus fundamentally more important in the Soviet Union than it was in Poland, or even in Hungary, where the formal independence (as opposed to colonial status) gave opposition activists potentially more room for maneuver. Furthermore, civil society in the Soviet space had less developed state and social structures within which to grow and few formal structures to facilitate mobilization.90

One of the principal exponents of civil society in Eastern Europe, Adam Michnik, embodies in his arguments some of the problems we seek to highlight in this section. Even in the mid-1980s, Michnik worried about the fundamentalisms within Solidarity itself, that a new antagonism was being developed between proponents of an open society and those of a closed society.91 Indeed, the challenge of such a politics for civil society’s emancipation and labilities are obvious. Today, fundamentalism’s major threat seems to come from those who refuse to allow those communists and former communists oriented toward the open society respect for their own biographies so that the future, rather than the past, can be the object of public gaze.92 Nevertheless, when asked about the distinction of the nation in the project of making civil society, Michnik paints a mixed picture.

On the one hand, he continues to identify those who would construct their own ‘particular’ route to modernity, and who see Europe and universal principles as a threat, as those who are also likely to restrict the openness of society. For Michnik, movement toward Europe is a movement toward civil society. Those who fear Europe also limit civil society. Michnik’s Hungarian colleague, Gyorgy Konrad, says something similar:

The self-shrinking national strategy takes what it considers non-national and delights in condemning it. The self-expanding national strategy takes anything from the outside world that can be fruitfully related to what was previously considered national and delights in integrating the two.93

Michnik, however, recognizes that there are moments, even for the advocate of European identity, that elevate a national identity above all others. When Russian nationalists talk about the indefinability of their global interests, for instance, Michnik’s own Polishness surges. He then speaks as a Pole, anxious about national security.94 The
considerable consensus in Central Europe, for instance, about membership in NATO is another illustration of this impulse, one that embraces the model of European civil society but wants with it a European sense of security.

The "small nation complex" prioritizes security in the discourse of emancipation. But given the relative security of borders in East Central Europe, the "small nation complex" can be subordinated among liberal thinkers in Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic. It cannot be so easily subordinated in the Baltics.

In this section of the paper, we treat the "small nation complex" using case studies of Latvia and Estonia, two of the three Baltic countries. Both Estonia and Latvia continue to fear for their safety and existence, and perceive these threats to be both internal and external. Fully 43% of ethnic Estonians in March 1996 definitely believed that "Russia is a danger to the independence of Estonia" and another 36% thought it probably was, while only 14% of Estonian Russians considered it likely at all. Distrust of the Russian migrant population in Estonia and Latvia has led to a close regulation of citizenship, while the fear of a resurgent Russia has undergirded the pursuit of rapid integration into European political and military structures. Thus, to consider one of the not so obvious challenges to critical sociologists in the expansion of the civil society concept, one should consider the relationship between civil society, the small nation and large state imperialism.

In the Soviet Baltic republics, civil society actively helped to end communism. These were overwhelmingly, but not exclusively, nationed civil societies whose principal emancipatory strategy was to emphasize the oppression of the titular nationalities under Soviet occupation. Over time, civil society was revitalized. It was especially powerful in the mobilization of national populations around issues of environmental protection and the "reclamation" of national histories. It was also apparent in the establishment of Popular Front alliances of reform communists and radical oppositionists. It was apparent in the relatively open election campaigns for the Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet in 1989 and 1991. In March 1991, referendums were held in the Baltics and majorities in all three republics voted in favor of "democratic and independent" states. Full independence was proclaimed during the failed coup of August, 1991 and in early September, 1991, the Soviet Union recognized Baltic independence.

One illustrative narrative of postcommunist achievements can be found in Mart Laar's celebration of Estonia as a 'success story'. Estonia, he writes,
is usually classed with Slovenia and the Czech Republic as having gone the farthest down the road away from socialist authoritarianism and toward democracy and a market-based economy. When we regained our independence, 92 percent of our trade was with Russia. Our industry and agriculture were a shambles... Inflation was running at the rate of 1,000 percent a year, and in 1992 alone our GDP fell by 30 percent. Basic goods like bread, milk and fuel were strictly rationed. On top of all that, we faced challenges to our political stability from extremists of the right and the left, while rising tensions between the native population and a largely Russian community (that immigrated during the period of Soviet occupation) seemed for a time as if they might spill over into overt conflict. Today, all these problems are receding so rapidly... like distant memories. Estonia has changed beyond recognition. We have reoriented our economy, going from dependence on the East to trade with the West. Inflation has dropped, and exports are increasing... Extremists...have been sidelined... Ethnic tensions have greatly decreased and a large majority of those residents who are not ethnically Estonian now support Estonia's independence.

Estonia is also trying to stake its claim in a European identity. Estonian Foreign Minister Siim Kallas says this, for instance:

Political and economic integration with the European Union has developed into a top priority in Estonia's foreign policy, and more and more in domestic policy as well. ... We are a European people and we are able to keep our identity only by belonging irrevocably to Europe, only together with other nations striving for the same goal. To belong irrevocably to Europe and to take part in developing its future is something Estonia can do only as a full fledged member of the European Union.

In many ways, Estonia is a major success story. Ethnic tensions have not led to violence and there are reasons to see Russian integration into Estonian national and linguistic structures as possible. Similarly, in Latvia, whose titular nationality is even less demographically advantaged than in Estonia, tensions exist around contentious issues like citizenship, but quotidian concerns dominate over political ones for most of the population. For the most part, ethnic groups coexist peacefully in both republics. Nonetheless, in post-Soviet states like the Baltics, which host large Russian immigrant populations, issues of ethnicity and nationalism remain central to the consideration of civil society's limiting as well as emancipatory potentials.

While individual rights and freedoms are central to the Baltic conception of democracy, the principle of individual emancipation does not stand alone here. Rather, while the state extends civic guarantees of individual rights, it is also seen as the guarantor of national survival. Hence, it also exists to ensure group rights, most
notably, those of the "primary nation." Even political organizations that embrace "Europe" and the promise of civil society, are not normally inclined to move outside of the boundaries of this conception. Within the discourse that legitimates this dual definition of rights, the tension between the two is not apparent because it is mitigated by the narrative of national survival and security constructed around the story of national oppression that dates at least and most powerfully from the Soviet era. Even after independence, the narrative that renders the historical events of Soviet occupation, mass deportation, and oppression episodes in a story about national survival, continues to play a powerful structuring role. In a 1996 speech at the national parliament (Saeima), Latvia's Prime Minister Andrejs Skele remarked that "Europe to us [in Latvia] is a symbol of the desired feeling of security and standards of welfare." Civil society, in this story, then, looks less to be an end in itself, as it is theorized, for example, in New Social Movements. Civil society is also a means to achieving national security and survival.

It is useful to consider how ethnic relations are posed in the narrative of Baltic independence. Estonian Human Development Report 1995, a United Nations publication, which also reflects a more centrist position than that represented by Mart Laar, offers a point from which to begin. Immigration is posed this way:

As a nationally homogeneous country where Estonians formed 97.3 percent of population in 1945, Estonia has become the country of residence for peoples of more than one hundred ethnic groups over the last fifty years. Non-Estonians as of 1989 comprised approximately 40 percent of the total population. The share of Estonians in Estonia's population decreased steadily from 1950 to 1989. Only the regulation of immigration after the approval of the Law on Immigration in 1991 and the sharp decrease of illegal immigration to Estonia after the closure of the borders, have resulted in an approximately three percent increases in the share of ethnic Estonians of the population from 1989 to 1994.

The publication acknowledges that integration of these Soviet era immigrants is "one of the largest problems facing Estonia", but the ball is put into the minorities' camp. For integration to happen, the minorities must demonstrate their loyalty to the Estonian state. Thus, an extension of citizenship rights (like the right to vote in national elections) takes time:

An absolute majority of non-natives in Estonia, including the Russians (90% according to a poll in December 1994), have decided to remain permanently in Estonia, and most of them also intend to apply for Estonian citizenship. The legal process is time-consuming, and Russian speakers have also had problems in learning Estonian. It is consequently obvious why relatively
few of the non-Estonians living in Estonia have received citizenship via naturalization so far."

The UN report points out that there are independent cultural associations, including organizations of minorities, as well as an “Ethnic Rights Information Centre of Estonia in Tallinn,” founded in 1994 as a civic initiative. Further, Estonia’s joining of the European Union Convention on Ethnic Minorities in February 1995 provides significant guarantees to minorities in Estonia, primarily in questions concerning their legal protection.

The document also notes that non-Estonian political parties are being formed and the national law on language mandates that the Estonian government provide more resources for Russian language instruction.

To consider how remarkable Estonian containment of the ‘Russian minority threat’ is, one needs to consider how politically excluded a large segment of the Russian population is. Although Russians constitute close to 38% of the residents of Estonia, all of the deputies elected to Parliament in 1992 were ethnically Estonian. In 1996, 6 deputies were Russian. Vello Pettai has argued that a major reason violent conflict became fundamentally less likely than it was when pro-Soviet agitators stormed parliament in May 1990 is because ethnic conflict and disparities in political power are constituted through legal categories that are ethnically neutral, even while the net effect is exclusive.

The Estonian government based their claim to exclusive power on a legal continuity, and by arguing that Soviet-era in-migration was a violation of that law, the Estonian leadership could claim to embrace the norms of civil society even while excluding a third of their population from political enfranchisement. In this way, the West’s historic resistance to recognizing the Soviet occupation of the Baltics as legal enabled the Estonians to argue that this exclusion of Soviet-era immigrants was reasonable, a claim that the West accepted grudgingly.

The resistance of non-citizens to (permanent or temporary) disenfranchisement from the political realm may be muted for other reasons too. First, they likely see a dearth of options for living elsewhere than Estonia or Latvia. Few believe that they would be better off in Russia, a disposition reinforced by the low proportion of non-Baltic immigrants who have opted to leave the countries. The quality of life in the Baltics is, as it was in the Soviet period, almost invariably higher than that in Russia. Second, a segment of the Russian population has realized significant success in business. One does not need citizenship to set up a business. While Latvians and Estonians may dominate politics in their home countries, Russian economic power in civil society is not incidental.
Citizenship may not, in fact, be so important for some citizens. Less than 5% of non-citizens with the right to become citizens have applied for and undergone naturalization in Latvia. Although the challenge of language tests, the cost of a naturalization fee and a lack of information can explain some of this, it also reflects the wishes of young male non-citizens to avoid the obligatory military service. Too, if one retains the old Soviet passport, one also need not obtain a visa to travel to Russia, while Latvian citizens do.111

Estonian social scientists tend to pose problem this way: they ask whether Russians are prepared to accept their identity as a 'minority'. After all, these social scientists argue, Russians came en masse after Estonia was illegally occupied by Soviet power and continued to arrive as massive industrial projects, links in the Soviet chain of production, were constructed there. They were not voluntary immigrants as much as they were colonists. Russian immigrants were then the majority because they were an extension of the politically and linguistically dominant Russian majority in the USSR. Few embraced or understood Estonian ways or language. Where Russians continue to embrace an identity of a majority nation (the concomitant sentiment of which is understood as non-recognition of the newly independent states as legitimate), a small nation's civil society is denied legitimacy. It is not uncommon to hear, for example, Latvians in Latvia arguing against full enfranchisement of Soviet-era immigrants because they fear that the new citizens would vote to rejoin a Russian political body.112 Political inclusion's value is, hence, relative to the risk it is understood to pose to the rights of the nation and the sovereignty of the state.

The issue is larger than that of large internal minorities, and includes fear of resurgent Russian nationalism and imperialism in Russia proper. In 1996, for instance, the Estonian Defense Minister, Andrus Oovel,113 said that Russia must change its approach to analyzing threats. In addition to seeing dangers to its security, Russia should also analyze the idea that it could represent a threat to other countries. In the week before the 1996 presidential elections in Russia, Boris Yeltsin suggested that the Baltic countries should join the Commonwealth of Independent States and, in late 1997, he suggested that Russia would provide "security guarantees" for the Balts (an offer that was unequivocally declined). Baltic independence is regarded by some in Russia as a threat, affront, or aberration: communist Gennadi Zyuganov said that Estonia "could not exist without being a parasite on Russia"; Alexander Lebed, promised in 1996 that "if NATO expands into Estonia ... this country will have no future"; Vladimir Zhirinovsky declared that he will construct giant fans along Russia's
border to blow radioactive waste into the Baltic states. The perceived (and actual) threat from outside of small states like the Baltics, then, needs to be considered in the evaluation of civil society’s realization and potential, especially where external threats (like those from Russia) are widely conflated with and understood as reinforcing internal threats to security, sovereignty, and survival.

The ambiguities, then, of civil society are quite apparent. On the one hand, the exclusion of Russian migrants from full participation in the political process is a violation of the inclusive vision that most civil society activists endorse. On the other hand, the discourse of national survival in the Baltics is a long-running narrative that might be said to underlie the commitment to civil society itself, in part because it recognizes in the civil society vision a means for realizing goals that include national security, sovereignty, and survival. Civil society discourse, to the extent it means integration into European security structures and protection from Russian expansion, is compatible with this small nation complex. This same concern, however, leads to an exclusionary practice toward Russian migrants. The narrative of civil society in the Baltics thus can be understood only in so far as it is connected to the narrative of national survival and security and the fate of the nation. And for civil society to reflect an emancipatory project that takes into account just such a lifeworld, it must engage the problem of the small nation before a potentially imperialist power.

CONCLUSION

The narrative of civil society is therefore appealing for a number of reasons. Its linkage to a larger international discourse of rights and organizational membership mitigates the potential arbitrariness of any national power. It provides to some degree an external observer that might assess how well civil society is developing. Of course the principles of civil society, and especially the rule of law, can be manipulated to construct exclusionary strategies. The Baltic cases illustrate that just such an embrace of legalistic principles has reduced the drift toward fundamentalist identities, as it makes the criteria for inclusion attainable and explicit. To the extent these criteria are not manipulated for obvious political ends, they will create better conditions for the adjudication of difference. Indeed, the degree to which Baltic postcommunist development has proceeded peaceably is already remarkable testimony to the value of the civil society perspective in these conditions of ethnic exclusion.
Political exclusion may be just cause for protest, but here the significance of thinking about what identities are acknowledged as part of civil society's present and future must also be addressed. To the extent the immigrant community is theorized as a remnant of illegal occupation, a present reminder of past domination and future endangerment, one of the very limitations of civil society is apparent. The state must be a compatible actor in the provision of liberty and justice. The relevant state is not only the sovereign state, but also surrounding states. To remove Russia from complicity in this limitation of civil society's emancipatory potential would be to disenfranchise the particular narrative Balts articulate: how is it that a small nation might survive? Therefore, we need to find a way of articulating the politics of becoming not only within a nation-state and civil society, but within a larger global framework that does not take for granted national security. This is a major challenge for Western critical theorists unaccustomed to theorizing the threat of a Russian or Soviet imperial project.

Critical theorists are much more accustomed to the problem with socialism and social movements, but postcommunist Eastern Europe sets up the problem differently here again. In these movements we can see the tension between the past and present in operation -- as movements challenge the authority of the national state or private economy, they also invite identification as legacies of the past brought forward. When they are identified as an element of the past, they are then cast as being unaware of how democracy works and how a private economy develops. These are familiar delegitimizing tactics across the world, but they are especially powerful in postcommunist societies trying to shed the legacy of that dysfunctional past. Before dismissing anti-communist narratives simply, however, these very repertoires of contentious action were embedded in the civil society project that hastened the communism's finish. In this terrain, therefore, the question about what forms of life and social activity 'fit' with the civil society project are the most wide open and accessible to political intellectual engagement. It is too easy for Western critical theorists to dismiss the allergy most East Europeans have for that which tastes of socialism. On the other hand, East Europeans need to find a way to articulate the socialist vision in a frame that resonates with the deepening of civil society.

Clearly, social movements and collective protest continue to be important means in identity formation and the articulation of difference, but to the extent they cannot translate this public opposition into new forms of interest articulation and institutional power, their place in the postcommunist order is unclear. Indeed, one may recall Jadwiga Staniszkis's powerful question: to what extent was the Solidarity movement during communism in
fact helping to reproduce communism by calling for the reallocation of surplus rather than challenging the institutional mechanisms through which decisions about that surplus allocation were made? In this sense, it is wrong to simply lament the demise of movement activity or, for that matter, to praise every industrial conflict that emerges. In many cases, the liberal critics might be right: these conflicts may work to reproduce the industrial structures that impede the reconstruction of the national economy and the construction of the kind of private economy that enables the civil society Gellner celebrates.

For this reason, notions like 'unreal socialism' are appealing. To the extent that any ideological formation stabilizes its meaning around a particular set of fixed qualities, that ideological formation seems to constrain its own emancipatory potentials. Individualism vs. collectivism is one particularly limiting antagonism. Indeed, one reason that civil society was so compelling in the 1980s was that it was suturing those elements that a formal theory of civil society might find antagonistic -- labor movements, public demonstrations, private economy, national identity, communist reformers and liberal intellectuals. One reason why civil society is so limiting today is that it has become a formula that leading politicians and businessmen must embrace in order to articulate with larger systems of power. And that articulation demands exclusion of those who do not fit the model. We propose that civil society's critical potential is limited precisely by such exclusions of the "unfit". A critical theory of civil society might do well by considering whether the premises that guide exclusion are themselves the barriers to civil society's continued theoretical, and political, power.

Critical social theory embraced civil society in the 1980s in part because it was part of an emancipatory movement, not only opposing the forms of domination associated with Soviet-type society but also because the vision itself was expanding as different forms of social activity were identified as its expression. Today, civil society is the discourse of power, and tends to be defensive, rather than expansive, in its theoretical work. As we seek to articulate civil society with unreal socialism and small nation nationalism, however, civil society might regain its more critical edge. It might again become a vision of transformation that is not limited to Eastern Europe. Indeed, it might find new commonalities with other proletarians and small nations in a globalized space where capital and large nations reign.
An earlier version of this paper was presented by Kennedy at the Chicago Humanities Institute for the conference "Beyond Civil Society" in 1996. We wish to thank our colleagues at the conference for their comments on this paper. In particular, we wish to thank the Social Theory Group of the Center for Transcultural Studies for the discussions which made the conception of this paper possible.


For reasons to be explored later, it is more useful to view civil society as such a “tool kit” to use the terminology of Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies” *American Sociological Review* 51(2):273-86. It is rather less useful to see it as a value that has been internalized, as neofunctionalists emphasize. Jeffery C. Alexander and Philip Smith, “The Discourse of American Civil Society: A New Proposal for Cultural Studies” *Theory and Society* 22(1993): 151-207 rely on both approaches to the cultural/action relationship in order to show how deeply the civil society code has structured American political action over more than a century. It is also difficult to see civil society discourse in this international space as a bounded cultural system, and therefore, difficult to approach it as analytically independent of practice, as Ann Kane, "Theorizing Meaning Construction in Social Movements: Symbolic Structures and Interpretation during the Irish Land War", *Sociological Theory*. 15:3(1997):249-76 recommends.


Within critical social theory, civil society’s theoretical value seems to have stabilized or even receded before the challenges posed by theorists of difference and political economists and the social relations on which they focus. Civil society appeared to be relatively more important in the 1980s culminating in the publication of Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, Cambridge: MIT, 1992. In more recent publications in critical social theory, civil society tends to be addressed through its relationship to public spheres, and here, in a less embracing, more critical fashion.


Implicitly, of course, we also work to examine how civil society, as a theory and practice of social transformation, might be identified as more and less commensurate with critical social theory. But in order to engage this last point, one must appreciate the difference of Eastern Europe.


13 For the evolution of this concept in social movement studies, see David Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation" American Sociological Review 51:464-81; Mayer Zald, "Culture, Ideology and Strategic Framing" in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds.) Comparative Perspectives in Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 and John Guidry, Michael D. Kennedy and Mayer N. Zald, "An Introduction to Globalizations and Social Movements" in Globalizations and Social Movements (ms under review).


20 Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988 was among those who indicated the modernizing pressures on a Soviet Union to yield civil society. While no doubt some of those pressures existed, and would continue to exist under a different kind of return to Russian communist rule, the political difference between commitments to civil society and to empire are quite consequentially different.


22 On a television broadcast, on Moscow Russian Public Television, First Channel Network in Russian 0440 GMT 1 July 1996 reprinted from the “Elections ‘96 Program”, in FBIS Sov 96-127-July 1, 1996, p. 11.

The invasion of Chechnya is a powerful reminder of what could be the fate of other erstwhile parts of the former Soviet Union if post-Soviet definitions of sovereignty and legitimate interests are altered.


Kennedy and Galtz, 1996.

The critical theoretical potential of civil society to those places like Central Asia where emancipation and domination are framed in very different terms is more complicated. See Roger D. Kangas, “State Building and Civil Society in Central Asia” pp. 271-91 in V. Tismaneanu (ed.) *Political Culture and Civil Society in the Soviet Successor States.* New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995.

Gellner, p. 167.

Gellner, p. 170.

Gellner, p. 170.

Gellner, p. 189.

As Gellner, p. 193 claims systems based on civil society to be.

In one notable passage, he wrote that nationalism’s “key idea is in any case so very simple and easy that anyone can make it up almost at any time”, thus moving away from cultural analysis toward its social foundation. This is in Gellner’s *Nations and Nationalism* (Blackwell, 1983), p. 126.

p. 53. And when he writes that we must go beyond the opposition between “pluralism and Bolshevik Caesaro-Papism” (p.60) what he has in mind is recognizing the possibilities of Islam and communalism.


One might instead say that this was their commitment, not their ideology, for ideology was something distant from civil society and rather associated with communist dogmatism. See Michael D. Kennedy, “An Introduction to East European Identity and Ideology in Transformation” pp. 1-45 in Kennedy (ed.) *Envisioning Eastern Europe: Postcommunist Cultural Studies.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994.


For an excellent overview of the East European region, see Ivo Banac (ed.) *Eastern Europe in Revolution.* Cornell University Press, 1992. For one account that integrates the “democratic” and “nationalist” into a theory of mass mobilization and political opportunity, see Anthony Oberschall, “Opportunities and Framing in the East European Revolts of 1989” in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds.) *Comparative...*
Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.


42 For a description of this Lockean version, see Charles Taylor, “Modes of Civil Society” Public Culture, 3(1/1990)95-118.


50 Today, various political forces in Poland and in other postcommunist countries would take this conciliatory disposition of communists, and the willingness of opposition leaders to negotiate with them, as evidence that the revolution is incomplete. Civil society is not part of their rhetoric, however. For an important anticipation of this issue, see Arato, 1994.

51 One should not, of course, assume that civil society and nationalism are mutually exclusive. See Susan Woodward’s important assessment of how Slovene liberalism contributed to the War of Yugoslav Succession in Balkan Tragedy. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995.


55 p. 105.


For an elaboration of these views, see Andrzej Walicki, “Liberalism in Poland” Critical Review 2(1988):8-38.


The decline of both intellectual and intelligentsia is a major theme in Polish sociology. For one exemplary statement, see Joanna Kurczewska, “The Polish Intelligentsia: Retiring from the Stage” pp. 239-54 in Christopher G.A. Bryant and Edmund Mokrzycki (eds.) Democracy, Civil Society and Pluralism. Warszawa: IFiS, 1995. The only empowered individual in this new vision is the entrepreneur, and for traditional critical intellectuals, it is difficult to find critical potential in that shift. For one effort to identify the critical potential in that shift, see Kennedy, “The Labilities of Liberalism and Nationalism after Communism: Polish Businessmen in the Articulation of the Nation” in Suny and Kennedy.

Personal communication, October 1996.


At least that is a typical sociological approach even if it is not so popular in Lacanian studies!

In what follows, we reconsider the movement through 1994, the time in which Kennedy conducted fieldwork.

Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik are conducting a systematic comparative analysis of Collective Protest across Eastern Europe.

See Kennedy, 1992.


For an account of Solidarity’s evolution through 1990, see Kennedy (1992).

For an ethnographic account of these problems, see Lisa Gurr’s analysis of the Ursus Tractor Factory. Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik. Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989-93. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, forthcoming) have a broader portrait of the evolution of protest.


This demand continues, as in the Western Coast pamphlet: “Chcemy by polskie społeczeństwo uczestniczyło w budowie Trzeciej Rzeczypospolitej, a nie było przedmiotem w kolejnych rozgrywkach politycznych”.

Following an earlier demonstration on February 9.
For 90 minutes Kennedy walked about the demonstration on Pilsudski Square looking at and recording all the placards that were being displayed. Kennedy also interviewed activists who looked interested in talking.


"Oni graj swoje sprawy w swojej klasie".


RFE/RL Daily Report, July 27, 1994 and July 13 1994. It may be that foreign ownership facilitates this cooperation; strikers apparently 'pounded hard-hats and tossed macaroni outside the Italian embassy on July 8".

During Kennedy’s May 1994 visit to Poland, not one intellectual with whom he spoke supported the Solidarity demonstration. Many of them said that both Krzaklewski and Jankowski were dangerous populists. Adam Michnik illustrates this tendency in “The Devil of Our Times” in Elzbieta Matynia (ed.) Grappling with Democracy: Deliberations on Postcommunist Societies. Prague: Sociologice Nakladatelstvi, 1996.


Personal communication to Kennedy, Ann Arbor, November 1, 1994.


Bauman, 1976,


“Letter from the Gdansk Prison” p. 91 in Letters from Prison and Other Essays.


Adam Michnik, personal communication, October 21, 1996.

Ethnic Lithuanians constitute more than 80% of their residential population, while Latvians constitute only 56.7% of their total population in 1997 (Latvia Human Development Report, 1997. Riga: United Nations Development Project, p. 49) and Estonians are 64.2% (Kirch, 1997, p. 13). Lithuanian legislation on citizenship and naturalization reflects this difference in its broad inclusiveness. Indeed, Lithuania, according to Paul Goble, is moving away from the survival narrative that continues to shape Estonian and Latvian national politics, and focus on “what kind of country it would be”. See “A Defining Election” RFE/RL Newsline, 191, January 8, 1998.


Aksel Kirch (ed.) The Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian Society: History, Problems and Trends Tallinn: Estonian Academy of Sciences, 1997. This is especially true in comparison to those nationalities that Russians view as inferior (notably Central Asians), and whose economies have not fared as well as in the Baltics. See David Laitin, Identity in Formation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (forthcoming).


p. 30

p. 31.

Chapter 7.


p. 9 of “Ethnic Democracy”...


After 1992, when over 53,000 people emigrated from Latvia (this figure includes Latvians as well), the number decreased markedly. Odne Oslands (ed.) Dzives apstakli Latvija. Riga: Latvijas Statistika, 1996:41.


In Latvia, 35% of non-Latvians are citizens according to 1995 data. Of this population of non-Latvian citizens, some are newly naturalized, but many others are descendents of citizens of the interwar republic and therefore entitled automatically to citizenship. In interwar Latvia, approximately 12% of the population was Russian and most were citizens. Data from 1997 show that 72% of all residents of Latvia are citizens.


