TOWARD A THEORY OF
NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PRACTICE

by
Ronald Grigor Suny
and Michael D. Kennedy

#563 February 1998

CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
WORKING PAPER SERIES

The Center for Research on Social Organization is a facility of the Department of Sociology, The University of Michigan. Its primary mission is to support the research of faculty and students in the department's Social Organization graduate program. CRSO Working Papers report current research and reflection by affiliates of the Center. To request copies of working papers, or for further information about Center activities, write us at 4501 LS&A Building, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48109, send e-mail to crso@umich.edu, or call (734) 764-7487.
Toward a Theory of National Intellectual Practice
Ronald Grigor Suny and Michael D. Kennedy

The fusion of a modernist, constructivist approach to nation-making with attention to the role of human agents in that construction has guided researchers to a new set of analytical problems and a heightened (some would say excessive) attention to the position and contribution of intellectuals in the gestation and elaboration of nations. Beginning with modernization theory (here Karl Deutsch and Ernest Gellner were the paradigmatic examples), social theorists connected the processes and institutions of social communication, education, and the production of intellectuals to the generation of nationness. Gellner in particular emphasized the shift from structure to culture with the move to the modern. But even more impressively, with the turn toward discursive and culturalist analyses, scholars have elevated the actively creative, imaginative, and constitutive activities of nation-making intellectuals. To take but one species of intellectual, Eric J. Hobsbawm writes of his own profession, "Historians are to nationalism what poppy-growers in Pakistan are to heroin addicts; we supply the essential raw material for the market. Nations without a past are a contradiction in terms; what makes the nation is a past; what justifies one nation against another is the past and historians are the people who produce it."

Neither national past nor national language exists before the hard intellectual work of appropriation, selection, distinction, and articulation takes place. That creativity (in many ways an act of creation, pace Motyl) is neither completely arbitrary nor fatally determined; it is not fabrication from nothing, but from the elements and experiences available to be remembered, recombined, and reorganized into a narrative of a continuous subject, the nation. A single poet, like the unknown author of Der Getzo, or a veritable army of scholar-priests, like the Mekhitarists in Venice, may contribute essential threads to a new national tapestry (in this case, the Armenian), sometimes quite accidentally, but more often, in the wake of already-existing ethnic communities or prenational dynastic or imperial states, quite consciously reacting to and accommodating to patterns given by others who are then historically privileged as forerunners. The essays in this collection illustrate the varieties of practices of national intellectuals. Our task in this conclusion is to elaborate our own views on a theory of national intellectual practice, and in carrying out that task we will both borrow from and contest some of the ideas put forth in our contributors' chapters.

NORMS, THEORY AND THEIR OBJECT

When we work toward a theory of national intellectual practice, we are nominally doing the same as our other contributors. But as the previous pieces suggest, and especially what is to follow indicates, we all do not share the same theoretical assumptions and goals, even if our conversations with other theorists help refine our ambitions. The pieces by Alex Motyl and Janet Hart in our collection are more self consciously "theoretical" than the others and represent the poles of inquiry available in the academy. Both of them explore more general
problems of intellectuals in the articulation of the nation than they offer particular historical explanations. But Hart and Motyl suggest very different analytical stances.

Motyl argues that the constructivists are, if logically consistent, empirically inadequate and if they are empirically adequate, they are theoretically trivial. We agree with Motyl that the articulation between lifeworld and national identity is very important and believe that ideology and identity are analytically distinct concepts, capturing different parts of national identity formation. As Motyl, we believe that intellectuals refashion cultural stocks and do not invent nations ex nihilo. Indeed, without stocks of culture and compelling and resonant stories of origins and danger, nations cannot be invented. For that, it is also useful to consider both intellectual and non-intellectual contributions to the articulation of the nation. But we also need to problematize the category intellectual and, following Gramsci, locate intellectuality in those who do not claim the term. We agree that it would be misleading to think only of conscious intellectual work as the basis for nation-making, but we also think that we need to move beyond such categorical distinctions as elite and non-elite, conscious and unconscious, voluntary and coercive, structural and cultural. Although both Motyl and we recognize that these are merely analytical distinctions, we find other concepts more useful to clarify and explain social processes, if not generate abstract theory.

Motyl seeks a logically pure theory, one without fuzzy concepts and retaining only the precise ones. For example, although he never defines elites, their action must be conscious (and not habitual), for their contribution to nation making to be “constructivist.” Also, elites must visibly construct nations with arguments. To enforce those arguments with resource laden penalizing rules turns intellectuals into bureaucrats. In this sense, he shares much with positivists, who treat concept formation as only the means to the explanatory end. By contrast, we seek not only to explain the relationship among phenomena, but also to problematize the concepts themselves which purport to illuminate the social processes we seek to explain. Hence, in contrast to treating elites as self-evident, or resolved by operationalization, we are trying to elaborate how intellectuality is itself expressed in the nation’s articulation and where it is located. Also, instead of considering how elites consciously invent nations, we inquire into how their practice contributes to the reproduction and transformation of various elements of national identity and ideology. Hegemony, rather than coercion, intellectual practice rather than elites, are signposts for our different conceptual tastes.

These differences also extend to propositional thinking. For Motyl, propositions about nation formation ought to be generalizable and conditional, not conjunctural. He seeks an abstracted theory, one that can imagine what nations are (“groups of people who believe in two things: that their group, as a group, comes from somewhere and that their group differs from other groups in other ways besides origins as well” (p. 20)) and what conscious elites do, or do not, accomplish, in general. This approach can yield generalizable propositions, like, “a nation comes into being when people sharing a lifeworld believe in a set of logically complementary propositions regarding origins and otherness.” (p. 21) This also reflects something important for Motyl: the question, as he put it, is “what are the conditions which make national identity possible?” (p. 18). The answer, if generalizable, conditional and based on large scale comparative work, must minimize differences among nations, and among
elites, and among the alternative formations of nations and elites, for this theory to become possible. This approach to theory building comes out of a very strong tradition in the social sciences, especially sociology and political science. But in our effort here we prefer to build theory into historical explanation, and history into theory, and not to rip theory and history apart. We see concepts as inevitably bound up with the processes we seek to untangle. As such, it does matter to us when and how people use the nation category. Indeed, the nation is not just a nominal term, but it is a resource used in a world of nations. To identify it as perennial means that the concept itself is not consequential. While the distinction between national identity and nationalism is very appealing, it is not clear what theoretical advantage one obtains by insisting on such a loose definition of nation that most of its qualities as a peoplehood are lost in the search to generalize. Indeed, the search for generalizations, it seems to us, might be better sought by holding social environment relatively constant. To compare nations in periods with and without nationalisms, is to compare apples and oranges without an obvious compote in mind.

In light of our critique of Motyl, it would appear that we share Janet Hart's theoretical ambitions: Hart self-consciously adopts a feminist and postmodernist stance but at the same time admires and seeks to recuperate the confidence and commitment evinced by two socialist intellectuals facing interwar fascism: Antonio Gramsci and Demetrios Glinos. Although she is also interested in how intellectuals articulate the nation, she does not seek, as Motyl does, to decide whether they do or do not, based on comparison with non-intellectuals. She also does not assess all intellectuals but is specifically interested in radical intellectuals, and the paralanguages that undergird their praxis. She is not interested in modeling the relationship between these intellectuals and their nations, but rather in using their experiences to "clarify the dilemmas of radical selfhood and nation-building in the modern era." (p.3) As in her book, New Voices in the Nation, she seeks to "open up new worlds of conversation about the past" in order, simultaneously, to enable us to rethink our own constraints and possibilities. Much like the intellectuals she engages, she scours "the historical record for analogous moments, comparable in terms of scene, emplotment and protagonists; and maintaining a critical consciousness about past events" in order to craft future praxis. (p.40)

Gramsci and Glinos suffered the wrath of repressive regimes and gained an authority through their conscientious commitment, maintained despite its devastating effects on their health and lives. They were intellectuals in the Foucauldian sense of thinking actors who disrupted existing cultures, shook up habitual ways of acting and thinking, dispelled commonsensical beliefs, and participated in the making of a new political will. These were intellectuals as revolutionary citizens unable to coexist with tyranny and willing to engage in politics to reconstitute their national civil societies along the lines of justice and freedom. Here the making of the modern nation was a revolutionary project articulated by oppositional intellectuals against the visions of those in power. Fascism presented an urgency to the socialist intellectual faced by a life and death struggle, not primarily for personal power, but for popular empowerment. With that kind of threat, it is hard to imagine Gramsci and Glinos as part of a new class, even one in statu nascendi, antagonistic to the popular classes.
Hart focuses on how Gramsci and Glinos articulate new visions of the nation within the constraints their authority establishes. Theoretical consequence is to be found in analogy and the inspiration of new imaginations about comparable circumstances for intellectuals today. Here she shares something with Tololyan's method, who examines the poem, "Der Getzo", to examine how it negotiates the contradictions of the moment and of history to project its own national future (pp. 22-23).

Hart's essay does not focus on the particularities of the Greek or Italian nation very much, but rather on how commonly Glinos and Gramsci engaged the nation, both with a degree of commitment that found them prisoners of conscience. They both focused on generativity, finding in future generations the freshness and innovation that they sought in remaking the nation according to their radical visions. They approached youth as a group to be enlightened and educated, approached with tenderness but also reproach. Youth were in a sense foundational but age was not exclusive. Indeed, their common emphasis on continuing mass education meant to transform and expand the citizenry of the nation by providing people the means to realize those visions while simultaneously transforming the intellectuals themselves through their immersion in the everyday life of the masses. Through their political activity and their own intellectual example, Gramsci and Glinos sought to transform the meaning of the intellectual as they sought to transform the nation.

For Gramsci, Glinos and Hart, the nation was hardly something perennial. Rather, history was but a resource in the elaboration of praxis. How, but through "loved emotion", might the people be transformed intensively and aesthetically? (p.35) How might the nation "fit the foundational agendas of the modern political era" as they envisioned them. (p.19) Instead of theorizing enduring objects, Hart finds that Glinos and Gramsci engaged in a "non-static, contingent, proactive theorizing resulting in the practical resolution of communal problems." (p.18) Thus, here we find something profoundly important about the way in which Hart, Gramsci and Glinos approach the problem of intellectuals in the articulation of the nation. The nation is not the principal object of engagement, but one of the communal levels through which the solution of practical problems is realized, much as the Polish businessmen treated the nation in Kennedy's essay.

If one theorizes only nationalist intellectuals in developing a theory of national intellectuals, the nation is portrayed as a rather clearer object, centered in intellectuality both as subject and object of history. But if the ideology is as powerful as we believe, it affects not only nationalists, who make the nation the "key signifier" in their intellectual practice, but also affects those whose aims, whether socialism or capitalism, subordinate the nation to other principles. And in such a subordination, the nation becomes even more contingent than one would imagine in a constructionist account of a nationalist. Hence, by decentering the nationalist intellectual from our analysis and introducing others, we can more effectively see how intellectuals help to "fix" the nation. By considering non-nationalist intellectuals, and those conventionally not included in a narrower understanding of intellectual, we can see more clearly the nation's lability, as Kennedy illustrates.

Although Hart helps us explore the ambiguities of the nation and especially the intellectual, for our theory of national intellectual practice Hart does not elaborate as fully as she might how these intellectuals themselves became national. Indeed, even as they transform the categories and imperatives of intellectuals, they seem to be
the ultimate political intellectuals, remarkably if not omnisciently aware of the national conditions structuring their action and seeking ever greater capacities to produce those intellectual products, through publication and education, that might realize their transformative ambitions. They inspire, much as Hart intends. But how are they constrained? Through Hart’s footnotes we can see how their ideas are gendered and raced, but, in this work at least, the nation appears mostly as an object to be transformed, rather than a structure that empowers and constrains.

In Kennedy’s essay, the Polish businessman, while clearly not the ‘pure’ intellectual typified by Glinos and Gramsci, nevertheless finds himself trapped by his nationing, even as he seeks to escape it. Working out of the tradition of structuration theory which seeks to explain not only how agents transform structures but how structures form agents, Kennedy’s approach allows us to inquire into the conditions of agency more clearly. Consider the following as a working proposition: to the extent intellectuals are dependent on national resources, the constraints of their activity will also be more national. Hence socialist intellectuals dependent on popular empowerment of a single nation are likely to have to congeal socialist and national visions. Businessmen who are dependent on international trade are likely to be obliged to diminish the significance of the nation in their work, but might, through other structures of life, whether at the kitchen table or in the governmental ministry, find the contradictions of the nation and the global more palpable than the socialist intellectual. The overlap between structures of the nation and other ideological or more material structures therefore vary depending on the location, and practice, of intellectuals.

Methods of case selection, and not only theory, alter how we approach intellectuals in the articulation of the nation. By focusing on businessmen, Kennedy maximizes the contraditoriness of the nation in its structuring of intellectuals. He cannot identify the consequence of these businessmen’s rethinking the nation, and can only suggest that an alternative vision of the nation is in the making. By focusing on those who seek the radical transformation of both of our foundational categories, Hart stabilized the actor, and finding exemplary actors, she makes the nation disappear as a structuring object, even as she transforms our very subjects of inquiry, intellectuals and nation.

Yuri Slezkine’s contribution is, in method, very similar to Hart’s. He also stabilizes the problem of intellectuals articulating the nation by focusing on another “exemplary” intellectual. But for Slezkine, the intention of the case is radically different. Although Slezkine’s article is less explicitly “theoretical,” the mood and tone of his article challenge Hart’s specific theoretical arguments and inclinations. As told in Slezkine’s ironic style, Nikolai Marr’s “nationing” shaped, from the womb, his intellectual direction. The offspring of parents who literally did not speak the same language, Marr sought the languages that transcended apparent divisions, even while seeking to elaborate the foundationalism of Georgian. Marr was, in some ways, the ultimate intellectual for Slezkine, being simultaneously a “linguist, archaeologist, historian, folklorist and ethnographer.” (p.10). But while his claims to intellectual capital were considerable, Slezkine compromises Marr’s status throughout the essay.
Marr's role as a "minor celebrity and powerful academic entrepreneur" (p.8) are hardly the words used to elevate intellectuals, as Bourdieu's analysis reminds us. Throughout the text, Slezkine engages in a subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, mockery of Marr's theoretical transformations and ambitions, calling the Japhetic thesis an epidemic, for instance (p.13), and elaborating in considerable detail its empirical and logical inadequacies. The intellectual distinction of the products, too, are called into question by invoking the well known story of Party arbitrariness, and at the end, Stalin's supremacy. If Marrism gained influence, it did so not as a consequence of intellectual work per se, but because of its use by the Party. Rather than being the fount of creativity and potential consequence, as Glinos and Gramsci were for Hart, Marr becomes the symbol of communism's absurdity and its wild inconsistency before nations and other ethnographic and linguistic groupings.

Particularly ironic (and paradoxical) is Marr's support for primordialist notions of the nation in an intellectual context in which an argument from contingency and constructivism would have conformed better with the official ideology's deepest historicist impulses. Marr helped "make" nations in a huge multinational "non-nation" that over time resembled for more and more people the epitome of that ubiquitous pre-national state form, empire. In this sense, intellectuality became victim to the empire state.

These portraits of intellectual victims, radical intellectuals and businessmen in the articulation of the nation all produce very different effects and images concerning the nation. In part, a matter of selection, they are also a consequence of theoretical orientation and normative grounding. Kennedy, being the unmarked white American man, having a socialist background but also a newfound admiration for the power of business practice in remaking Eastern Europe, stands ambivalently before business intellectuals articulating the nation. By contrast, Hart seeks the possibilities of radical selfhood, inspired not only by the examples of women resisting fascism and intellectuals rearticulating nations, but also reflecting the lifeworlds of African-American women. To appreciate the initiative and motivation of such revolutionary intellectuals in our own post-revolutionary, post-Communist age takes its own kind of act of imagination. Hart reminds us that Communist can mean Gramsci in his cell, exercising the brain that Mussolini tried to stop, just as it has come to mean Ceaucescu turning off the heat. Slezkine's essay is grounded in an ironic detachment, an understandable response to conditions shaping intellectuals in the articulation of nations under Stalinist rule.

Tololyan's essay is marked, by contrast, with a kind of familiarity and sympathetic position vis-à-vis a broadly conceived Armenian national project of diaspora intellectuals. More than any other author in this collection, Tololyan makes discourse his object of inquiry, which he argues is situated midway in the subjective-objective continuum. He writes how discourse originates in "real" events, perpetuated and made accessible by material and social practices, and acquires consequence by speaking to the subjectivity of individuals and larger audiences, which in turn initiates a new consciousness that subsequently produces new texts and a politics unimaginable without the prior work. By focusing on a single work, its "agency" in history can thus be explored. He finds that the poem can both intentionally and unintentionally articulate the relationship between various forces in order to recruit people to new ideas and practices that create "the subject position of the nationalist." Tololyan is not, then, interested in assessing whether intellectuals are necessary nor
articulating the conditions under which they might be. His and Motyl's concerns are radically discontinuous, but his discursive interest means that Tololyan's theory fits well with our ambitions of clarifying the intellectual in the articulation of the nation.

Verdery's theoretical orientation also fits rather well with the theory we seek to develop. While focusing less on any particular text, Verdery does focus on the rhetoric of civil society intellectuals and the political economy of symbolism that enables them to succeed or structures their failure. But more than the text itself, Verdery assesses the producers of texts. Their capital influences how texts are read and what they can accomplish. In National Ideology under Socialism, Verdery focused on the capital intellectuals acquired through a politics of complicity with the state which in turn helped to reproduce the nation as a master symbol. The moral capital associated with civil society intellectuals is a resource acquired "in opposition" to those structures of domination. These forms of capital might, therefore, augment the power of argument, but at the same time, she is quick to point out, they do not guarantee success as the fate of civil society discourse indicates.

One's choice of theory clearly influences, then, how one views intellectuals and the articulation of the nation. We seek to develop a textured theory, grounded in historical and cultural analysis, assuming the pervasiveness of power relations, the constructedness of social life, and the inevitability of normative influence. Rather than providing the skeleton with which we might go out and test propositions, we enter the cases, and juxtapose them in order to provide variable accounts of intellectuals in the articulation of the nation. We seek anomalies, as much as consistencies, in order to refine our understandings not only of the variations in the relationship between intellectuals and nations, but also in the construction of each of the concepts themselves. This is theory building of the first order, where we not only try to refine our propositions about the world, but the conceptual tool kit we bring to study it.

This is a profoundly social theory as well, for we are not only looking at those mythical actors who are conscious and autonomous imposers of values, but at real historical beings who are formed by social, political, historical and cultural forces (evident in Kennedy and Slezkine) and then attempt to reshape those worlds sometimes by virtue of their direct political activity (evident in Hart and Verdery), or by the intellectual products they leave behind (as in Tololyan). We are working in a tradition of structuration theory, where the multiplicity of structures and their contradictions give variable opportunities to those who have experience across these structures and can transpose rules, with adequate resources, across sites of action to express their agency. In the words of one meta-theorist, Jonathan Turner, we are developing "sensitizing analytical schemes" that allow us to explain historical processes in ever more refined theoretical categories.

**DISTINGUISHING THE NATION**

Whether one sees the imagination of a national political community as a modern, elite-driven process or the generation of "national propositions" by ordinary people depends on what one understands by "national." A sense of kinship or cultural community, what might be called ethnicity, is produced daily and through time by lived experience of people in proximity to one another, and here elites as well as ordinary people actively develop
traditions, institutionalize customs, and define sameness with one another and difference from an other. Motyl equates this generation of ethnic culture and community with the national, which while perfectly defensible as a heuristic choice, has the unfortunate effect of conflating all cultural communities through time into "nations." Our preference, consistent with the recent work of most scholars of nationalism and the majority of the authors in this collection, is to reserve the concept of nation to that form of "imagined political community" that was constituted from the late eighteenth century to the present with its distinctive imaginative style, discourse, and structures.

Our argument in this book is more than what Motyl calls the "soft constructivist" approach -- that everything in history is made by humans and is therefore "constructed" -- and closer to his "hard constructivist" position that emphasizes the pivotal, though not exclusive, role of elites in nation-making. For us, nations, like the mobilized, cohesive, "conscious" working class of Lenin's imagination, are particular formations that may grow out of ethnic (or civil/territorial) communities, but that come together and understand themselves as a nation only with the efforts of intellectuals and political elites that bind disparate social and cultural pieces together, dissolve differences within the community as much as possible (at least on the discursive level), and elaborate the differences with those outside the community, the "other." The relative significance of intellectual practice varies, of course, historically and culturally, and it is the task of a theory of national intellectual practice to offer the conceptual tools with which such an explanation can work in a comparative and historical framework.

This nation formation first took place historically as a universal "discourse of the nation" was being constituted, which involved notions of the "naturalness" of the nation, its apposition to other "nations" in a world in which the "natural" division of the human race was into nations. Ethno-cultural and linguistic distinctions, or civil cultural differences (even in the same ethno-linguistic community, as in eighteenth-century America's rupture with England) separated one people from another and made possible, in this new discursive environment, claims to territory, political self-representation, and statehood. Rapidly included in this new discursive formation were ideas of popular sovereignty and the requirement that for states to be legitimate they must represent nations. As a hegemonic political universe was established through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in which states existed in a multistate environment, legitimized themselves through appeals to the nation, and implicitly and explicitly challenged the remaining "non-modern" non-nation-state polities, state legitimation flowing from the nation and its people (in both the sense of the population and of the national community) worked powerfully to undermine more multiethnic, cosmopolitan polities like empires. Intellectual activity was absolutely central to this transformative project because of its disproportionately significant role in formulating the discourse of the nation.

Nations in this modern sense could not exist before there was a discourse of the nation, that is, before there was an understanding, a language, and practice of nationness in this modern sense. This does not mean that before nations there were not other forms of political communities, other styles of imagining community (even some called natio or "nation" in another sense), but they are usefully distinguished from what has become in our own century, especially with the demise of the last colonial and contiguous empires, the hegemonic, nearly uncontested state form. 12
As Andrzej Walicki demonstrates, a particular use of "nation" already existed in the Polish-Lithuanian Rzecz Pospolita of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, where "will of the nation" meant the sovereign will of the gentry. This precocious nation imagined its political community as a cosmopolitan cultural unity defined, not by ethnicity or language, but by membership in a social estate. To be a Pole meant being a member of the gentry independently of religion, ethnicity, or language. In the late eighteenth century, and under the influence of the French Enlightenment and Revolution, a "republic view of the nation," which involved inclusion of non-noble property owners and a notion of popular sovereignty supplanted gentry republicanism. This rationalist, civil nationalism, really a kind of patriotism, was still-born, as the partitions of Poland eliminated the Polish state, and was in the nineteenth century replaced, first, by a national ideal based in Polish literary culture and embodying an historic mission of freedom and brotherhood for all nations. Still later, after the defeat of the 1863 insurrection, nationalist intellectuals decisively moved to include the peasantry into a new concept of an ethno-linguistic nation.

The problem for Poland through most of the next century was the bad fit between the ethnographic Polish nation and the historic Polish state that existed in the visions of some Polish nationalists. A variety of ideas of the Polish nation competed for the loyalties of peasants and workers, and the independent Polish republic of the interwar years was a hybrid polity that was at one and the same time a Polonizing, nationalizing state (in Rogers Brubaker's formulation) and a multinational state with indigestible national minorities, some of which had "homelands" across the eastern and western borders.13

Part of the problem for assessing the significance of intellectuals in the articulation of the nation depends on the degree to which the imagination of a people as a nation (Tololyan's Armenians), or the transformation of that nation into a different form (Gramsci's Italians or Glinos's Greeks), is assessed in terms of a) the degree of intentionality of the actors, and b) the exclusivity with which that construction is made by those arguably "intellectual". In other words, to what extent must national consciousness be articulated and discursive, rather than merely "practical" and unarticulated?14 Nationalist intellectuals and socialist intellectuals symbolize this radical and conscious elaboration of an explicit ideology. But at the same time, to distinguish discursive from practical, conscious from habitual, is to miss one of the important points of the profoundly national intellectual. As Tololyan and Hart suggest, deeply national intellectuals find in their identities the collective as well as the individual, in which their individual self is immersed into a nation or the popular.

Intellectuals, in the narrow sense, are not so important when identities are imposed by legislative fiat. In this case, it is state authority and their elites which matter. But even as the Polish state is legislating the Polish nation anew, the businessmen on whom Kennedy focuses are anticipating, and expressing a tension in identity that the ideologically liberal nation state cannot recognize. In this case, and in contrast to the nationalists and socialists perhaps, identity is less coherent than ideology. But it is, perhaps, in the struggle over the contradictions between nationness and liberalism in the businessman's lifeworld that a new vision could be produced, one that reconciles those tensions and restructures states to articulate the nation differently. But that, as far as Kennedy is able to see, has not yet happened, although it is in process of formation among elites.15
In short, we ought to recognize that to explain the intellectual’s articulation of the nation, we should elaborate the different kinds of national identities that might emerge. We should look at the nation’s initial “formation” as well as its various alternatives in relation to ethnic inclusiveness, political economy, gender politics, and so forth. Finally, one might consider whether the nation’s significance might in the future be diminished. A single dependent variable of initial nation formation will not do.

STRATEGY, RESOURCES, AND CONSTRUCTED VS. OBJECTIVE NATIONS

Walicki is particularly convincing when he distinguishes between the different paths to the nation of different peoples. He writes, "The relative weight of the subjective and objective factors in the making of nations is different in different countries and in different historical periods." He shows how the transition to modernity opens up opportunities for transformations of the historical nation through intellectual interventions. The noble nation of the Rzecz Pospolita exemplified the power of intellectual politics in defining a nation. Even the initial post-partition politics shows the power of this intellectual politics, in both its accomplishments (survival and redefinition of the Polish nation) and its failures, which Walicki attributes to the “underestimation of the ‘objective’ aspects of nationalism.” The power of ethnicity seems to thwart those modern nations which aim to construct themselves as purely political nations. But, as the Himka essay demonstrates, ethnicity itself is also constructed.

As Himka emphasizes, the Ruthenians of Galicia cannot be understood as “basically the same as other Ukrainians, albeit with certain local variations.” (p. 43) While it is true that literary Ukrainian did resonate with the vernaculars of Galicia, and while Ukrainophile constructions of the nation did accommodate more elements of pre-existing culture than Russophile constructions, it was in the political constellation of available alternatives that the Ukrainian orientation gained precedence over a number of alternative definitions of ethnicity that were available to that population. In contrast, perhaps, to the Polish, this sense of alternativity in ethnicity, and hence constructivism as a theoretical option, is apparent because of the oppositional position of Ukrainian national identity. Where hegemonic, a national identity can appear more “objective” because, all other things being equal, it is more difficult to transform it.

Thus, we might challenge the language of invention and imagination because it leaves little room for the variable degrees to which nations are transformable. We need a language that allows us to recognize that nations are made out of a combination of more enduring and more constructed factors, or in Walicki’s terms, more objective and more subjective factors. Here the range of views remains great. Anthony Smith remains far more objectivist, looking, like Walicki, for the prior ethnic core around which the future nation was constructed. On the other hand, Brubaker pushes the limits of contingency. But we might reorient this problem, and change it away from a theoretical position to one which is the subject of empirical inquiry based on comparative analysis. Our own view is that one needs to employ the kind of sensitivity to context, time and space, that historians, even better than other social scientists, exemplify. One ought to consider how embedded various national identities are at
different times and under what conditions they are most malleable and least malleable. Or to put it in the terms Roman Szporluk uses\textsuperscript{19}, does it always matter in the same degree what a nation imagines itself to be?

Speaking in terms of objective and subjective may not be the most effective distinction. Perhaps if these terms referred less to categories and rather pointed toward a more continuous spectrum that indicated the relative structuration of a process they would be more useful. In some ways, objective factors are also subjective. They are also the consequence of some kind of intellectual politics. For example, as Walicki indicates, without the historical classes, national consciousness was delayed. When it came, it came as a consequence of modernization, but included in that modernization package was not only ethnic competition but also the education of a part of the budding nation's stratum, who in turn revealed to others the nature of their conflict. After all, Poles in Lodz could recognize perhaps that Jews and Germans were their oppressors, but they chose to emphasize these distinctions rather than other distinctions, like their position in the hierarchy of the enterprise. Here they drew upon an available discourse, an intellectual politics of ethnic distinction that linked their oppression in Lodz to that which was happening in Poznan or elsewhere.\textsuperscript{20}

When Katherine Verdery describes the challenges and failures of a politics of civil society in Romania, the “objective” quality of Romanian nationalism seems to come up against the failed subjectivity and intellectual articulations of Romanian liberals. The objective qualities, too, of a political system meant alliances with Hungarians were less valuable to the liberals than distancing that sympathy for a politics of inclusion. The nation was, thus, hegemonic, the master symbol as Verdery calls it. But Verdery avoids the language of objective vs. subjective. While she indicates the problems that peasants and villagers must face and how the discourse of civil society fails to resonate, she does not deploy a language of inevitability but of failure. It was not that the liberals could not; rather, they did not do enough to “translate it positively into the life terms of everyone else.” (p. 127) The nation endures in part because the discourse of its alternative can neither address the needs of everyday life, nor mobilize the indigenous constituencies that might challenge the nation’s dominance as the key symbol in postcommunist politics. This distinction is even more apparent in Ukraine, where the contest between Russophile and Ukrainophile imaginations of their peoplehood was above all the consequence of intellectual politics, itself also a reflection of the manipulations of intellectuals and their communities by state powers.

Instead of reserving to intellectual elites the subjective role, and assigning to social history the objective, we propose that while the social construction of any phenomenon, especially the nation, goes on everywhere, the relative power of any actor to reconstruct preexisting patterns in a new way varies with the conditions of their action (the particular conjuncture) and the strategies and resources the actor has at his or her disposal to transform existing discourses. There are several examples in these papers we can use to illustrate this problem.

For those who like to emphasize the “organic” quality of nations, the articulation of the nation with the people must be emphasized, and there the conditions of the articulation can differ profoundly. One contrast that might work well in this regard is to compare the ability of Poles and of Ukrainians to link national emancipation with peasant emancipation. Here we can see that the “objective” process of national awakening actually depended in part on mobilization by Ukrainian organic intellectuals in Galicia, a kind of mobilization that Polish
intellectuals could not realize because of the organization of Polish class relations. The fit between class and ethnic relations is absolutely central to defining the "social" resources of intellectuals articulating the nation. 21

"National" depictions of the process, however, sometimes can lead to accounts that underemphasize the role of external agents. This theme, a familiar one in the social movements literature, 22 certainly involves a measure of intellectual politics within the analytical community. To emphasize the external, one calls into question the nationalist assumption that nations are simply realizing who they "ought" to be. To suggest that nations are themselves tools in great power politics undermines the rhetoric of self-realization. Clearly, Himka’s identification of the significance of the Vatican and Austrian state in making the Ukrainophile tendency is an illustration of the potential importance of the external. An even greater illustration of the delicate political nature of the problem is in Himka’s depiction of the intimate relationship of Polish politics and its state with Ukrainian movements. Properly treated, any nation should not be simply the object of great power designs; but to leave out geopolitics in a nation’s making is to attribute a greater degree of "objectivity" to the nation than empirical conditions, and critical theory, would suggest. Such an emphasis on "external" actors invites us, as Himka illustrates, to consider how nationalists themselves attempt to construct relatively distant peoples as their own. The Ukrainophiles’ attempt to transform the Subcarpathian Rusyns into more proper Ukrainians was also an intervention by an "external" actor in some sense. Such a formulation may be intolerable to most nationalists, but the borders between the “national” community and the “other” are never simply given but are themselves part of the intellectual (and social) construction that brings forth the nation.

A theory of national intellectual practice suggests that the articulation of a nation by the leading lights of one’s own nation is not that different from the articulation of that nation by those formally “external” to the nation. But one should not discount the nationalist position either. One should explain it. What are the social processes which make boundaries between internal and external self-evident in nationalism? Rather than take that as a given, as nationalism would demand, we must investigate the social processes which make it obvious. And to do that, we must ask how the nation’s field of legitimation acquires the power of the obvious. What better place to begin that investigation other than in a place where the qualities of the nation are less than obvious?

Himka is thus extraordinarily helpful. While the Ukrainophiles do command a powerful position for claiming national leadership by suggesting their literary language connects better with the vernacular, the Russophiles also have a significant claim: they are better connected with the region’s tradition of using a “foreign” tongue for high culture. The Ukrainophiles ultimately win the status of “authentic” national intellectuals not because of the greater authenticity of their argument but because of their greater resonance with the ideological frame of a global nationalism. Part of that global ideology was that each nation must have its own high culture. If the “authentic” Ukrainian nation lacked one, it had to be made in order for that nation to become the equal of other nations. Intellectuals had to make that argument; it was not something embedded in the nation. And that suggests a power for intellectuals that ideologies of nationalism tend to undermine, especially since that power also implies a potential divergence of interests.
As we argued in the introduction, New Class Theory is quite accustomed to articulating the potentially different interests of intellectuals, whereas nationalist theory is loathe to suggest that intellectuals and the nations they articulate might have different interests in that articulation. In our volume, although Himka opens the question, Verdery more clearly than others expresses the potential of that new class theory not only with her explicit embrace of Szelenyi's thesis on the potential hegemony of teleological intellectuals in postcommunist and communist systems, but especially in her identification of the intellectual's problem: civil society theory fails, in part, because the popular lifeworlds and articulations of intellectuals are radically different. What an intellectual from Bucharest knows about peasant needs is likely minimal, she suggests. Nationalists too might well elevate the significance of the peasantry, but this itself can be more of an ideological celebration, than it is an awareness of their life conditions.

One's normative politics influences the object of analysis, of course. To demonstrate the significance of the nation, many a nationalist points out how the intellectual merely brings to explicit awareness the conditions of a people's history and life. The intellectual's brilliance is embedded in the nation's virtue. To advance the new class thesis, one must move beyond the nation as a field of reference. One must demonstrate how the intellectual's own lifeworld is apart from the nation that she/he released. To identify a nationalist project as a new class project one should show how the intellectual's position is or would be improved with nationalism's successes. But to pose the question of a new class establishes a critical distance from the movement under investigation, and the analyst might well decide that the power relations enveloping that movement are more noxious than the hierarchies within it.

By questioning the boundaries of the nation and the possibility of intellectuals becoming a new class, we take issue with a basic assumption of nationalism. There is no alien intervention in nation-making, just as there is no authentic expression of the nation. At least there should not be in analytical terms. We seek to construct a conceptual framework that subverts the implication of authentic and inauthentic which resides in the perennialist vs. constructionist opposition. Rather, we compare how those with various kinds and degrees of resources attempt to construct nations out of various cultural stocks. It allows us to compare, for instance, the resources and strategies of Ukrainian nationalists and communists in Subcarpathia, and the resources and strategies of the Austrian government and Vatican in Galicia. It also allows us to question how the strategies and resources available for making a people translate into the elevation of that individual's or his or her group's status and conditions incommensurate with those they claim to empower.

THE DISTINCTION OF INTELLECTUALS IN MAKING NATIONS

As we have mentioned above, one definition of intellectual refers to actors by virtue of their products, which are in some way construed as the formulation or manipulation of symbols of national meaning. This understanding, however, slips easily into making intellectuals and other political elites relatively interchangeable, since political elites use symbols in their own legitimation. In these terms, one could argue that Kosciuszko was an intellectual-activist, moving beyond the legislation associated with modern intellectuals toward mobilization of
these ideas in the popular imagination and social action. He in many ways developed a better intellectual politics as he elaborated a more powerful politics of emancipation that included the normatively superior position of extending the whole of Polishness to any estate and any ethnicity. To exclude someone like Kosciuszko from the imagination of intellectuals articulating the nation would miss a powerful example of an important transformation of symbols of national meaning with potentially great social consequence.

After partition, Polish patriots managed to retain the national sense relying more exclusively on intellectual, or cultural, means which simultaneously elevated literary culture and the significance of intellectuals in the nation’s making. This intellectual strategy was ideologically consequential, too, as it provided a proto-modern vision within old formulations of political legitimacy. But it had unintended consequences. The literary definition of Polishness moved the sense of the nation away from its political definition toward an ethnic definition. This ethnic definition then undermined the capacity of intellectuals to define who was and who was not Polish. The practice of intellectuals also shifted away from the high intellectual toward more organic intellectuals in Gramsci’s sense. Organic work, especially in education, if not in industry, was a key form of intellectuality in this period. But the ease of distinguishing intellectual from non-intellectual also declines. Organic intellectuals are more embedded in everyday life. In short, in moments of political definition, when future possibilities are open, such as the initial periods of nation formation, intellectuals clearly play an apparently heightened role in the nation’s articulation. That role seems to decline as the intellectual becomes more organic and the nation is based ever more on the everyday sense of what it means to be of the people.

The problem is exacerbated in the postcommunist scenario. While communism managed to preserve the distinction of an intelligentsia, the postcommunist scene threatens to undermine it. Indeed, those who are as easily identified as business intellectuals are influencing the nation’s imagination of itself more than its writers or philosophers, as Kennedy argues. In this sense, not only might we be witnessing the declining influence of the intellectual over the nation’s articulation, but we might also be witnessing the decline of the intellectual as a recognizable actor, even if intellectuality remains fundamentally important.

One might propose the following: a national intellectual is a social actor whose claim to distinction rests primarily on his/her claim to cultural competence and whose social consequence is indirect, through the use of their symbolic products as resource in other activities constructing the nation, whether through histories, poetry, or organizing pamphlets. Intellectuals may organize themselves in different ways -- through associations, through coffee houses, through political parties. They might even deny the category, and claim that they are really something else -- an entrepreneur, a man of the people. But these modes of distinction are themselves part of the definition of intellectuals: they define their own distinctions. And thus we are in a terrible quandary for stabilizing our unit of analysis.

We resolve the problem by moving away from focusing on intellectuals as such, and rather focusing on intellectual practice which may, or may not, be done by those who claim themselves, or are designated by others, to be intellectuals. Verdery deals with this problem by discussing “the global and local aspects of the conditions of production through which symbols are processed as well as of the resources utilized in doing so”. To be more
specific, we can say that we are interested in a) the formation of intellectuals -- i.e. the basis for their claims of superior knowledge; b) the activity of intellectuals -- i.e. what they do in the name of their superior knowledge; whether that is organizing social movements or writing poetry; and c) the products of intellectuals -- those various discourses which carry the effects of the intellectual beyond his or her ordinary milieu, whether that is in the oral repetition of the intellectual’s speech, the reproduction and consumption of her poetry, or the mobilization of a movement around the cultural frame the intellectual articulated.

There are some activities and products which are more “obviously” intellectual than others: the creation of a standard literary language and its promotion through literature and poetry are, above all, the product of intellectuals, requiring a degree of linguistic sophistication which mandates some intellectual claim. Ethnographic work, detailing the cultural properties of various peoples, is another illustration of significant “intellectual” activity, as we see in Slezkine’s discussion of Marr. Writing history might be less exclusively intellectual -- consider, for instance, the number of “histories” being produced to explain the Wars of Yugoslav Succession (most by journalists with the authority of being eye-witnesses), and how many of them are not regarded highly by professional historians25 - but it clearly is one of those activities and products normally associated with intellectual practice. To the extent any of these things is done well, the intellectual category is more easily applied. That distinguishes, after all, the propagandist from the intellectual in most discourses. But when one returns to Hobsbawm’s claim of the centrality of history to nation-making and notes how histories are actually manufactured -- in daily reportage, official commemorations, publicly sanctioned textbooks -- the work of professional historians can be seen as far less influential in the generation of nationalism than more popular productions of historical remembering.

Clearly, some intellectual products are critical resources for the making of the nation. Himka has illustrated, and Walicki more or less assumes for Poland, given its earlier construction, how important these products of intellectual work are for the making of a nation. Without a high culture, one cannot claim the rights of nations.26 Making a high culture is most important in the “early” stages of nation-making, and indeed an essential one for many nationalisms. Yet even the most purely “intellectual” of activities requires additional resources to be consequential. Sometimes consequence is realized by being the “servant” of state interests or populist imaginings. Then the “independent” intellectual may attempt to delegitimize the dependent intellectual by denying her the intellectual distinction. This is the last strategy of intellectuals after all: to define not only their own distinction, but who belongs to it. Hence, the category intellectual remains as important in the nation’s construction as the nation remains important to the intellectual’s making.

As historians, or historical sociologists, or historically-minded political scientists, we must be sensitive when similar phenomena, even those described in the same terms, are different. Walicki compares the Polish ethnolinguistic community at two very different stages of existence: in the thirteenth century and the one born at the end of the nineteenth. Though more research is required to substantiate this point, it can be argued that the former was much more an imagined community based on intellectual politics and elite ideologies, while the latter was much more the product of long and deep social processes. In the latter, the imagining of the national...
community is in this way more dispersed, that is more popular and egalitarian, and intellectual politics less concentrated. Both intellectuality and nationness seem fundamentally different in these two periods, and we believe should not be collapsed into one another.27

Himka's discussion of the alternatives in the Ukrainian nation reinforces this point about the historical variations in intellectual consequence. While the direction of Galicia might have been imagined in many different ways in the nineteenth century, by June 1915, the Russophile tendency, despite Russian military aid, could not suppress the Ukrainian movement and convert the population to orthodoxy.28 This sedimentation of the Ukranophile position was constructed earlier, however, by state action and intellectual articulations, as when the Austrian government reconstructed the ecclesiastical boundaries and monastic orders that were pro-Russian.29

In short, our essays seem to demonstrate that the centrality and visibility of the intellectuals' creative construction of the national in the earliest phases of nation-making dissipates with the acceptance of the national framework by broader layers of the population. As the national processes over time become ever more "social," as a process of "social layering" occurs, the intellectuality involved in the nation's reproduction is dispersed ever more widely. Whereas earlier intellectuals had freer range to act upon the incipient nation, once the nation becomes the naturalized form of political community, intellectuals lose that freedom to act "arbitrarily" in disarticulation with the social, that is to legislate with impunity in Bauman's sense. Likewise, it becomes increasingly difficult to identify a distinct intellectual articulation of the nation, as intellectuality itself is more widely dispersed, and national consciousness becomes ever more practical, rather than discursive. To illustrate that, let us return to Walicki and Tololyan.

While the Polish intellectual elite was on the verge of defining an ethnolinguistic nation in the medieval period, the social processes were not there to reinforce it. Here the "subjective" vision of the elite played the principal constitutive role but it did not have great reach. Because the elite imagined a common language to coincide with the boundaries of state does not mean that such a language yet existed both among the ruling elites and the lower estates. Language use may have varied among the lower classes significantly. The Goraly and the Kaszubs are the most obvious distinctions from the standard Polish, but might linguistic ideologies themselves be responsible for our assumptions of linguistic homogeneity?

However grounded in linguistic expertise, ideas about language communities might diverge from the "subjective" perception on the ground. The differences between Eastern and Western Armenian (or the many dialects of modern Armenian which were not mutually intelligible) served to divide Armenians, but linguists can demonstrate that they are part of the same language. Whoever, then, defines these Armenians to be part of the same ethnolinguistic community establishes the community. Is Serbo-Croatian a single language or several languages? What about Bosnian? The arguments over Macedonian and its relationship to Bulgarian or the various Yugoslav languages, just like the debate in the United States about Ebonics, and the deeply politicized question of whether a given speech practice is a dialect or language, all are powerful examples of how intellectual power contributes to the making of the nation and how contingent is the nation's making.
Walicki's discussion of the Nation of Nobles illuminates important contributions of elites and intellectuals to nation formation. An ideological construction by intellectuals (Sarmatism) facilitated the polonization of non-Polish ethnic gentry, and by this embrace of Sarmatian theory by Lithuanian and Ruthenian gentry the non-Polish masses were effectively deprived of their "historical classes." Without this elite, the masses were delayed in the development of their national consciousness as the particular cross ethnic formation of the gentry nation undermined the previous foundations of the ethnolinguistic Polish nation in formation in the fourteenth century. Whatever view one might have about the medieval ethnic Polish nation, Walicki's argument about the gentry nation attests to the importance of the character of the intellectual articulation of the nation and its very existence as a precondition for nation formation, at least in the transition to modernity.

In Romania the post-Communist regime employed the "nation" to legitimize its rule, just as oppositional parties and movements tried to enlist it in their causes. Those who attempted to link Romania with Europe, the path of "civilization," or civil society found that an existing discourse and symbolization around the nation limited the range of political imagination. Romanian elites, particularly under the Communists, desperately needed this kind of normative legitimation for, in Verdery's terms, they were "teleological elites" defined by their pursuit and defense of certain values rather than elites empowered by competence and the mastery of certain procedures. Dissidents as well as rulers fought for this moral high ground, and once the Communists were displaced, those that had suffered under the old regime could use their accumulated moral capital to make a claim to power. Not only Iliescu in Romania, but Havel in Czechoslovakia and Walesa in Poland, were able to build a political claim on their oppositional role and persecution. But in Romania, where dissidence had been relatively weak and the anti-Communist "revolution" relatively late, rather than real oppositional dissidents coming to power, refurbished "reform" Communists took over and managed to legitimize themselves through anti-Communist postures and nationalism.

Although the advocates of civil society gained more power in 1996, Verdery's main story illustrates the limits of intellectual consequence in redefining the Romanian nation. One might make an even stronger case that the main articulation by intellectuals today is toward the diminishment of the nation. Indeed, the postcommunist world promises a different kind of nation than any other previous period. More than before, the world is globalized; circuits of capital, both financial and intellectual, are more extensive and more rapidly flowing than ever before. Forms of international organization are better developed than ever before, and at least based on different principles than the old imperial orders. States have less ability, or are said to have less ability, to control the conditions of their own reproduction, undermining the nation's claim to sovereignty and supremacy in the world system. Might intellectuals in fact be implicated in the articulation of globalization in the same way that they articulated nations?

The case is good: consider their work as interpreters and communicators of information across the globe (the significance of the internet in redefining the Chinese nation, or calling attention to the plight of East Timor under Indonesian attack); by legislating the architecture and terms of their entry into larger supranational organizations, and by doing the lobbying in international bodies which at one time might have required organic
intellectuals protesting in the streets with the masses. Are they not the principal advocates of an international politics of human rights intellectuals? Or might we not consider that intellectuals, precisely by their status as those best able to “interpret” for their nations in a globalized community, are situated to acquire a kind of status that allows them to legislate anew? And with globalization, has the local not been elevated, enhancing the very possibility that a new formation of organic intellectual can emerge, in the Gramscian sense, but at units in which the nation is less statist, and more local in its wish to control education but not economies and state sovereignty?

This final paragraph is certainly speculative, but suggests the value and importance of seeing just how the categories of our inquiry, whether nation or intellectual, are mutating before our eyes.

THE NATIONAL PROCESS OF MAKING INTELLECTUALS

Focusing on the intellectuals’ articulation of the nation is more than simply noting the ways in which elite ideology inflects social processes. It is also exposes the ways in which social processes inflect the subject position of intellectuals. By looking at the ideology and identity formation of intellectuals, states and the peoples on which they have an effect and by which they are affected, an investigator can attempt to judge the relative weight of various factors in defining the nation. In John-Paul Himka’s rich and nuanced essay examining the complex context of cultures, structures, and social processes in which national imagining operates (and is operated upon), historical determinations never fatally dictate futures, for human interventions and state politics affect the degree of a nation’s contingency at particular moments and places. Himka shows how the denaturalizing of the nation-making process among scholars has brought forth questions and avenues of research seldom imagined in a more organic narrative. Galician Ruthenians end up as Ukrainians by the twentieth century, but once scholars have problematized that result, the exploration of alternative streams that eventually ran out into the sand offer new insights into choices made.

One of Himka’s most important contributions is to identify how intellectuals do have autonomy, but that their ideas do not always have consequence, much less win hegemony. By introducing the intellectual who breaks from dominant social determinations -- the revolutionary Ruthenian Assembly supporting leftist Poles, for example -- Himka shows that intellectuals must have resources beyond their ideas to realize their intentions. But certain kinds of resources may undermine the claim to being a good intellectual or a good nationalist. Some definitions of the intellectual even rely on their resource poverty. Becoming a political leader, for instance, could mean compromising one’s intellectual status. Or, for example, when Poles emphasized the confessional basis for Ukrainian ethnicity, the Ukrainian nationalist had to minimize the confessional distinction and elevate language and culture, thus refusing Polish resources for their movement.

For many peoples in the pre-national period, elites often assimilated to the dominant culture of the state or empire in which they lived, as in Himka’s story where Ruthenian nobles adopted Polish language and the Catholic religion. Distinguished by their ethnocultural differences from the people, as well as other marks of material and social distinctions, elite cohesion was maintained in acts of separation from those below. Class distinction and privilege often took on ethnic or religious coloration. Baltic German aristocrats and bourgeois looked down on
Estonian peasants and artisans from separate, higher parts of town, or ruled over Latvian farmers from grand manorhouses. Often it was from these “foreign” elites that the first interest in the “people” came, but once “native” intellectuals began to explore the past and customs of their own people, distance became a disadvantage and connectedness an integral part of the new national imaginary.

In the Ruthenian case the ethnic elite were clerics, who accentuated the religious differences with the fellow Catholic Poles, emphasizing the difference between the Greek and Latin rites. Married Greek Catholic priests could not adopt Latin Polish Catholicism that did not recognize married priests. Religious barriers were great enough to encourage the development of a separate Ruthenian higher culture, but, Himka argues, religious distinctions alone offer only part of the answer to the move toward separate nationality. In other cases, like the Polonophile Ruthenians of Chelm or the Catholic Armenians of Lviv, people of different rites assimilated into Polish culture quite willingly. With the Galicians the larger discourse of nationality of the mid-nineteenth century provided a context that placed folk culture on a positive historical trajectory. 1848 gave a new political clout to nationality, and Ruthenian intellectuals had to choose between joining one of the dominant nations, the Poles or Russians, or develop their own distinct nationality. Himka shows how state patronage and repression aided and undermined the fortunes of Ukrainophiles and Russophiles.

Whatever the vicissitudes of identification, by the 1920s a Ukrainian orientation dominated the Galician population -- not to be reversed in the twentieth century. The physical presence in Galicia of key Ukrainophile intellectuals, many of them immigrants from Russian Ukraine, contrasted with the relative absence on the ground of Russophile intellectuals, the most prominent of which emigrated to the Russian Empire. The shared language intelligible to readers on both sides of the Austro-Russian border consolidated identification with Ukraine, despite the religious differences between Galician Greek Catholicism and Ukrainian Russian Orthodoxy. Ultimately, Himka concludes, “the Ukrainian construction could accommodate more elements of the pre-existing ‘cultures’ of Ruthenian Galicia than could the all-Russian construction.” (p. 49) Rather than borrow a language appropriate to “industrial culture,” like Polish or Russian, Galicians joined Russian Ukrainians in the harder task of transforming a vernacular into a language of higher culture.

Himka clearly challenges the portrait of nation making based on a primordial, perennial, or foreordained emergence of a national essence. Indeed, this view, while continuing its popularity within nationalist ideology, is no longer plausible. But what is contestable is the relative place and importance of different features. For Himka, the “primary determinant of the construction of a national culture was political,” by which he means political struggles within empires and contests among empires themselves. Intellectuals in the articulation of the nation were formed within this nexus. Although they played generative roles in formulating literary languages and alternative histories, the conjuncture of their demographic and class position with occupational mobility within Galicia produced the blocked opportunity which so often leads intellectuals to articulate the grievances of the grassroots. This is not inevitable, as the assimilators indicate, but it increases the likelihood of their opposition to authority. The concentration of Ukrainophile intellectuals in Galicia, and the insignificant numbers of Russophile intellectuals there, suggests that a substantial number of intellectuals is necessary for a national movement to
To determine how general this rule might be, one would need to focus more on those cases where intellectuals have appeared relatively unimportant. Few such cases exist, and this suggests that intellectuals are necessary, though, as Verdery’s case of the initially failed civil society project illustrates, they are clearly not sufficient.

CONCLUSION

We have sought in this volume to elaborate a theory of intellectual practice affecting and affected by the nation. From the different contributions of our authors, and the discussion in our introductory and final chapter, we offer the following theses and diagram on intellectuals in the articulation of the nation.

Diagram 1 indicates the complete set of factors we have discussed throughout this book. No one works at every different level with the same measure of attention, although Himka and Verdery are the most balanced across these different levels. They both discuss how intellectual practices are constituted, which intellectual practices articulate with the nation, alternative images of what the nation means, and which intellectual practices are consequential. Alexander Motyl and Andrzej Walicki limit the degree to which they investigate the formation of intellectuals, and rather establish conditions under which the intellectual articulation of the nation is consequential. They also, perhaps not accidentally, limit the variations with which we might consider alternative nations within the same ethnolinguistic community, and rather focus on nation formation. Khachig Tololyan also does not investigate as extensively as Verdery or Himka the formation of intellectuals, but does focus on the formation of that text which he identifies to be history’s agent, and suggests is consequential in the very initial formation of the modern Armenian nation.

Michael Kennedy cannot explain how the articulation of the nation by businessmen affects the nation independently of state power, but does spend more time than others on examining how the various structures, including that of the nation, influence the formation of business intellectual practice. Janet Hart spends, by contrast, relatively little time indicating the formation of Gramsci and Glinos, but rather focuses on their effects. Yuri Slezkine spends little time on effects, or rather indicates that the intellectual, apart from the state, has little effect. Instead, he mostly spends his time indicating how Marr’s intellectual practice shifts with state power behind it.

Though each nation’s evolution travels its own path, the focus on intellectuals in this volume reveals many of the broader, common features that nationalisms share. Empirical studies of intellectuals and the nations in various parts of the world have already (and will continue to) amplify the varied and shifting relationship of intellectuals to the nation. To take but one example, a recent study of the complex history of Jewish intellectuals illustrates their extraordinary odyssey from initial acts of Zionist imagining to the empowerment of part of the intelligentsia in the state of Israel. The traditional stance of influential Jewish intellectuals, from Moses Mendelsohn in the Enlightenment to the “critical humanists” like George Stein in the present, has been one of distance from nationalism and a dedicated loyalty to a cosmopolitan ideal of learning and emancipation. The limits on Jewish integration in Europe inspired a small number of Jewish intellectuals, most notably Theodor...
Herzl, to elaborate one of the most daring projects of imagined nation-making, the founding of a Jewish state in Palestine. But the anti-nationalist position, articulated by Julien Benda, Franz Rosenzweig, and others, remained strong, and even after the triumph of Zionism in the late 1940s, committed nationalist intellectuals, who had long attempted to marry nationalism and critical reason, despaired at the gap between the ideals of their national vision and the bitter, embattled reality of the new state. In the history of Zionism intellectuals originated the idea of the return to Palestine, the foundational idea of a religio-secular Jewish nation. They fostered the revival of the Hebrew language, most importantly in the years before World War I, and taught it to the migrants to the “new land.” They organized and led the nationalist movement in its various phases, transforming themselves from scholars and journalists into strategists and military commanders, and, finally, rulers of the state. From emancipators they also became the oppressors of the indigenous non-Jewish population.

These phases through which intellectuals passed occurred in a variety of nationalist trajectories, not always all of them, and not necessarily in the same sequence. But this range of intellectual activity and articulation needs to be specified. It is not simply that intellectuals followed their cold rational self-interests and sought good jobs in a new polity, as one might vulgarize (though not by much) the position of some analysts. They were also the “revivers” of cultures that had been forgotten, or, in many cases, not yet constituted. They were the discoverers of the folk, the people, whom they defined and delimited. In an increasingly democratic age they were the political philosophers who shaped the new universal discourse of the nation, linking people, power, and territory to notions of representation, self-determination, and popular sovereignty. Intellectuals transformed inchoate peoples into mobilizable nationalities and modern nations in ways similar to the homogenization of populations carried out by bureaucratic states. They spread the national message, wrote the articles and published the newspapers, edited the grammars and dictionaries, taught the classes and wrote the laws that bounded the people and determined the citizenry. And in many cases they came to power, took control of the instruments of the state, and used that awesome power to promote their nation’s welfare and security as they saw it, its advancement and expansion, in an increasingly dangerous world of national competition.
Diagram 1: A Theory of National Intellectual Practice

Analyst’s normative and theoretical priorities establish object of analysis within this larger set of issues.

THE NATION (in its manifestations through History, Language, etc.)

Other structures (Economic, State, Everyday Life, etc.)

Constructs in various ways, through socialization, construction of interests, etc.:

Intellectual practice, understood as a combination of

Intellectual Resources
Cultural capital, sophistication of intellectuality, autonomy of activity, prestige and articulation with other kinds of power

Forms of Intellectual Activity
Organization of more exclusively intellectual associations, implication in state power, mobilization of popular movements, cultivation of new readerships, etc.

Kinds of Intellectual Products
Social movements, state action, exemplary performances, literature, etc.

Which influences, both intentionally and unintentionally, singly and in conjunction with other social forces, various manifestations of the nation:

THE NATION

Other national actors

Nation → Nation

Formation → Alternatives

Nation → Decline

Social and ideological environment, geopolitical alliances
NOTES

1 Forthcoming in Ronald Grigor Suny and Michael D. Kennedy, Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation (University of Michigan Press). As with the introduction and the editing of the collection, both authors have written and rewritten this concluding essay. The ordering of names is not designed to mark the measure of contribution. We thank Geoff Eley and Yaroslav Hrytsak for their readings, as well as the comments of the anonymous reviewers for the press.


3 In this sense, this collection, while more focused on the intersection of nationalities with intellectuals than Alexander J. Motyl’s Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), is also more epistemologically and disciplinarily diverse, with postmodernists and positivists, anthropologists, sociologists, historians, literary theorists and political scientists participating.

4 For one good example of the value of this disposition, see Margaret Somers, “Narrating and Naturalizing Civil Society and Citizenship Theory: The Place of Political Culture and the Public Sphere,” Sociological Theory (1995), XIII, 3, pp. 229-274.

5 Here, we derive the point from Gerhard Lenski, Patrick Nolan, and Jean Lenski Human Societies (New York: McGraw Hill, 1995), where the distinction between agrarian societies in an industrial social environment, and agrarian societies in an agrarian one, is fundamental to assessing their structure and dynamics of change.

6 Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) contrasts intellectuals with scientific capital with those possessing administrative capital. In the discourse of intellectual status, it is not difficult to see what kind of intellectual is awarded more status, if status were to be based on normative foundations elevating the power of arguments over the argument from power.

7 Normative grounding of course influences all intellectual practices. For how it has affected work in Polish studies of stratification, see Michael D. Kennedy, "Transformations of Normative Foundations and Empirical Sociologies: Class, Stratification and Democracy in Poland," in W. D. Connor and P. Ploszajski (eds.), The Polish Road from Socialism (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 1992), pp. 283-312.


16 Walicki’s argument here contributes substantially to those authors who wish to emphasize the deeply embedded and necessarily ethnied or raced qualities of the most political nations. Consider, for instance, not only how Anthony Smith indicates that even the most territorial or political of nationalism draws upon some ethnic core to legitimate claims (The Ethnic Origins of Nations [Oxford: Blackwell’s, 1986], p. 216), but also how the whiteness of American national identity is raced (See David Roediger, Toward the Abolition of Whiteness [London: Verso, 1994]). Contrast this with Liah Greenfeld’s optimistic image of American political nationalism that finds racism and sexism in its midst an aberration (Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992], pp. 456-459), and to this the discussions of the “whiteness” of American society, from Anthony Smith to David Roediger contra Liah Greenfeld are useful illuminations.


18 As Walicki points out, the idea of nations as constructed goes back at least to the Austro-Marxists of the last century (one might also see a similar idea in the famous address of Ernst Renan). But the theorization of the implications of constructivism is relatively recent, and it has spilled over into the study of other social categories, most importantly class and gender. In part because objectivist or realist inclined scholars tend to focus on classes and less on nations, classes remain more defined in realist terms than nations do. But those who emphasize the constructedness of nations, if pushed about classes, usually make similar claims about classes. While some Marxists still claim class to be a more “objective” social entity than nations or races (see, for example, Barbara J. Fields on race: “Ideology and Race in American History,” in Region, Race, and Reconstruction: Essays in Honor of C. Vann Woodward, ed. J. Morgan Kousser and James M. McPherson [New York, 1982]; and “Slavery, Race and Ideology-in the United States of America,” New Left Review, no. 181 [May-June 1990], pp. 95-118), a number of other writers have argued for the historical contingency of class (see Suny and Eley, introduction to Becoming National). While never divorced completely from processes and structures outside the sway of individuals, the meanings and experiences attached to class, like those attached to gender, nation, or race, are not simply subjective in the sense of what “I” experience, but more importantly what is understood and endured intersubjectively, between and among individuals and social groups.

19 Personal communication to Michael Kennedy.

20 See Brian Porter, When the Nation Learned to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in 19th Century Poland (unpublished manuscript).


25 This came out very clearly in a workshop called "Doing History in the Shadow of the Balkan Wars", organized by the Working Group on Southeast European Studies at the University of Michigan, January 17, 1997.

26 Himka, p. 20.

27 But obviously, to argue contrarily, and emphasize the continuity of the Polish nation is to privilege certain elements of national identity formation over other more social forms. That in itself is an important strategy in the nation's articulation.

28 Himka, p. 29

29 Himka, p. 28


32 Himka, p. 25, 28, 40, etc.

33 Himka, p. 38