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THE ARTICULATION OF THE NATION

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Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation

Michael D. Kennedy and Ronald Grigor Suny

Along with the rise of nationalism in the post-Cold War world has come an explosion of interest in and study of what “makes” the nation. Supplying their own answers to that difficult question, historians and social scientists have arrived at a broad consensus on the modernity and constructedness of nations, explicitly rejecting the concepts of nationalists who argue for antique origins and long continuities of their nations. Rather than the product of primitive or perennial cultural and social forces, or the inevitable result of capitalist relations of production, or simply an expression of an innate ethnic or linguistic essence, the nation has been reconceptualized as a community imagined by its members and leaders to require their primary allegiance -- within a larger discourse in which nations, built on the people and a notion of popular sovereignty, provide the justification of claims to national rights, statehood, and territory. The nation as representative of the people has become in the twentieth century the principal form of legitimation of the state. But, “the fundamental problem,” as Etienne Balibar has pointed out, is therefore to produce the people. More exactly, it is to make the people produce itself continually as national community. Or again, it is to produce the effect of unity by virtue of which the people will appear, in everyone’s eyes, “as a people,” that is, as the basis and origin of political power.

The production of the nation and its constituent people has been variously elaborated in theoretical and macrohistorical accounts, but increasingly the attempts to explain the emergence of the nation have focused attention on the work of state and intellectual elites. In her work on South Africa, for example, Anne McClintock has emphasized the inventedness of community in order more powerfully to demonstrate the “implications of labor and creative ingenuity, technology, and institutional power.”

Nations are elaborate social practices enacted through time, laboriously fabricated through the media and the printing press, in schools, churches, the myriad forms of popular culture, in trade unions and funerals, protest marches and uprisings.

In this volume we focus on those who, in nationalism studies themselves, appear to have the greatest agency in the shaping of national understanding, propagating the values of the nation, disciplining the people internally and enforcing the rules and boundaries of the constituent people. We focus on intellectuals. We do not agree that there has been “an excessive focus on the activities of nationalist intellectuals as opposed to what are arguably the two most important dramatis personae in any nationalist politics: state and society” (in the words of Mark Beissinger). Although we do not disregard the broad structural and discursive frameworks and social dynamics that provided the context in which nations have been constructed or doubt that the popular exercise of nationalist visions and the utilization of national ideology by states has greater explicit social consequence, we are concerned here with the “quiet politics” (Beissinger’s term) of nationalism that establishes the possibilities for
what states and societies might do. In their contestation of the meaning of the nation intellectuals are
disproportionately involved in such quiet politics. As individuals, and perhaps as a group, intellectuals, "those
who create, distribute and apply culture" in Seymour Martin Lipset's phrase, appear to have the greatest effect in
their action, and the greatest autonomy in their actions. Intellectuals create different ideologies of national identity
within a larger discursive universe of available materials. They do the imaginative ideological labor that brings
together disparate cultural elements, selected historical memories, and interpretations of experiences, all the while
silencing the inconvenient, the unheroic, and the anomalous.

Writers on nationalism have longed appreciated the centrality of intellectuals to the emergence of national
consciousness and political mobilization. For those who have thought of the nation as always with us, a real,
natural given of social existence, intellectuals were those who articulated what was actually there but had remained
hidden, the pervasive submerged presence of the national in conditions of unfreedom and unconsciousness.
Intellectuals were enlighteners, liberators, the articulators of the national spirit that had to be revived, reborn,
resurrected. For a more modernist group of theorists, like the influential Ernest Gellner, intellectuals were the
articulators of necessary social processes without which industrial society was inconceivable. They were the clerks
who carried out the functions of mass education and skilled labor needed by the modern world with its complex
division of labor. Intellectuals helped to create the cultural homogeneity that industrialism required. Allied to this
functionalist analysis, other modernists saw intellectuals as rational actors, even cynical instrumentalists, prepared
to employ the rhetoric of nationalism for personal or political gains. Nationalism was available to outbid
competitors in the political arena by appealing beyond the material to the affective. But more suggestive has been
the work of those scholars who have seen intellectuals, not merely as reflective of what exists, but as constitutive of
the nation itself, active agents providing new visions and languages that project a new set of social, cultural, and
political possibilities. Intellectuals here are the creators, not only of nationalisms, but of the more universal
discourse of the nation, of the very language and universe of meaning in which nations become possible. Our
volume is interested in both the intellectual articulation of available materials and the creative construction of new
visions and understandings. But it is also interested in something more. Our essays investigate the ways in which
intellectuals as a category are provisionally constituted in the context of emerging nations. We are also interested
in what happens to intellectuals once the nation exists, particularly in the conflicted relationship of intellectuals to
power.

By focusing on the mutual articulation of national discourses and intellectuals, we shift the typical
historical focus of sociological studies of intellectuals. Most such studies emphasize the significance of mass
higher education and technocratic governance in late capitalism or post-industrial society for the production of
intellectuals and their influence. By focusing on the nation, we shift our historical eye to include the early
industrial age and the beginnings of print capitalism, the moment when nations could become popular, and
intellectuals might play a consequential role in refashioning the social imagination.

By focusing on the nation, we also diminish the salience of oppositions or tensions important in other
studies of intellectuals. The tension between function and power in studies of professionals, so important for those
who debate the relative value of expertise and its use in domination,\textsuperscript{9} looms less large in discussions of nation-making. Knowledge and power are central to studies of intellectuals and the nation. For nationalists the conquest of state power is motivated, at least in part, by a desire to create the conditions for the nation to know itself better. Similarly, the tension between expertise and criticality, so important for those who debate the political responsibility of intellectuals, is typically resolved in nationalism studies either by condemning nationalist intellectuals for generating dangerous products or celebrating those who elaborate the meaning of one’s own nation.

When we put intellectuals in the center of attention, however, we are not treating nationalism as a simple instrumentalist practice in which elite interests, understood as relatively objective and timeless, determine action. In the era of nationalism, elite agents certainly operate within the discourse of the nation, utilizing national symbols and traditions, reinventing and redeploying them to realize their own desires and “interests” disguised as the “national interest.” But a simple rational choice argument could neither capture the complex construction of interests themselves nor the constitution of the subjects who become the interest-bearers. Without denying that elites try to achieve their material and non-material “interests” in ways that can be formally modeled as a game, and acknowledging some sophisticated treatments of utility maximization in which both material and non-material goals are included, we rather see how interests themselves are constituted in changing historical and cultural contexts by actors. It is not that nationalism is not “useful” or “rational” in certain circumstances, but that it is also much more than useful and rational; it is also irrational, excessive, even self-destructive. And it is even more than that. Nationalism is a complex cultural field that deserves as much explanation as do the actors who are caught up in it. It is especially complex if we take as subject formations both the nation and the intellectual.

Like Brubaker, we believe that decoupling the categories of the nation’s practice and its analysis can facilitate the study of the nation in the variety of its formations.\textsuperscript{10} For instance, we cannot accept at face value claims that nations are reawakened or that nations mature, and we would rather see such invocations as discursive strategies that elevate the nation’s legitimacy into unassailable and teleological social formations. Such an approach also resonates with a familiar position within the normative politics of intellectual practice. For many analysts of intellectual practice, nationalism can destroy intellectuality. It is not, however, altogether clear that standing outside the streams of history, in an analytical position that claims to be divorced from practice, affords better tools for explaining social transformations.\textsuperscript{11} We believe, in the end, that articulation offers us a way to study intellectuals and the nation simultaneously.

Articulation is our keyword, a word that is helpful precisely because it provides an important double meaning. A noun that implies expression, something intellectuals are obliged to do to fill their role, it also implies a measure of fit between a cultural product and the social environment which enables its production and makes that product consequential. We are focusing on intellectuals as actors, rather more than on their environment and the institutionalization of their ideas.\textsuperscript{12} We also focus on that close articulation between intellectual and nation, with the ways in which different kinds of intellectuals, and different kinds of nations, fit together. We have adopted a broad definition of intellectuals and explore the practices of intellectuals which are not so obviously “intellectual” -
- kitchentable talk or languishing in prison, for instance. We are also interested in people who may not be credentialed as “intellectuals” but whose practice has consequences normally reserved to intellectuals. Indeed, the politics of intellectual definition is nowhere more apparent than in the claim about the relationship between intellectuals and nation. Intellectuals face a double risk when enveloped by the nation. On the one hand, as patriots they lose their credential as critical or independent intellectuals. On the other hand, as critical intellectuals questioning the very “authenticity” of the nation, they are either ignored, marginalized, or cast out altogether. The very investigation in which our authors (as intellectuals) are engaged is likely to draw hostility from “true” nationalists, as Katherine Verdery’s autobiography in this volume suggests.

This volume, then, is not only about the intellectual and the articulation of the nation, but also the articulation of two discursive fields of intellectual practice -- around the responsibility of intellectuals and around the making of nations -- which themselves have a limited fit with each other. The contest over what makes an intellectual is probably as vital as the dispute over the making of the nation, but those who have engaged in the discussion of the normative grounding of intellectual distinction have not usually investigated the nation. In this introductory essay we begin by reviewing how intellectuals have posed intellectual responsibility yet have either marginalized or negatively valorized the nation in the discussion. We then turn to investigate one form of intellectual activity -- the active participation of the intellectual in emancipatory or oppositional politics, which has the effect of not only further reducing the nation’s significance but of aspiring to minimize the distinction of the intellectual from the masses. This choice, moreover, fails to engage seriously the notion that intellectuals might not only be distinct, but also occupy a location in power relations that produces privilege. In the next section, we consider the linkage of intellectuals to power, especially where some fraction of the intelligentsia has been defined as a “new class.” The problem of intellectuals and the state, those within and without, was posed particularly harshly in the Soviet Bloc, where intellectual distinction was framed by regimes that sought to monopolize all social discourse. We ask how intellectual authority expanded or was constrained, how visions became transformative or reproductive, how the intellectual’s life, and not just their practice, resonated with the popular, and how the intellectual distinction itself was reduced or elevated in significance by movements of transformation. In the final section, we attempt to illustrate the ways in which intellectuals brought the nation into being and how intellectuals have been conceived in the making of nations.

THE NORMATIVE GROUNDING OF INTELLECTUAL DISTINCTION

Intellectuals are their own harshest critics. Much of the literature on intellectuals (of course, written by intellectuals -- who else?) is ruthlessly critical of their social effects, but the normative grounding of that critique is not at all consistent. The foundational text is La trahison des clercs (1927) by Julien Benda (1867-1956), who argued that “thanks to the clerks” -- those “whose activity essentially is not the pursuit of practical aims” -- “humanity did evil for two thousand years, but honoured good.” At the end of the nineteenth century the clerks, “who had acted as a check on the realism of the people began to act as its stimulators.” Giving up their disinterested national pursuits of knowledge, they “began to play the game of political passions,” primarily
adhering to nationalism, xenophobia, and racism, while favoring particularism over universalism, the practical over the spiritual, tradition and custom over reason, the strong state, the collective over the individual, action over knowledge, and adapting political forms to the unsocial and bloody nature of human beings.\(^{15}\) Benda was writing at a time when he perceived the abandonment by intellectuals of dispassionate Reason and a willing acceptance of forms of irrationalism ranging from Bergsonism to Fascism and Bolshevism. He yearned for the critical free-thinking of such people as Socrates, Jesus, Spinoza, Voltaire, or his near contemporary Ernst Renan, “symbolic personages marked by their unyielding distance from practical concerns.”\(^{16}\)

In the next decade Karl Mannheim established the sociological foundations for this argument with his notion of intellectuals as being socially unattached and relatively classless. They lose their “intellectuality,” he wrote, when they suspend doubt, to become politically effective\(^{17}\) This general sociological turn was, of course, also inspired by political concerns. At about the same time Edward Shils, the Chicago sociologist of intellectuals and ideologies, was stimulated to undertake his lifelong studies by the negative example of American “fellow-travelers” and Communist intellectuals, as well as the “active mischief,” “complaisant indifference or approval to ruin what might have been a decent society” of Weimar intellectuals. Shils divided intellectuals into those who oppose prevailing norms and those who work to maintain “order and continuity in public life.”\(^{18}\) The latter clearly have a role in the formation of national communities. Shils argues that

by means of preaching, teaching, and writing, intellectuals infuse into sections of the population which are intellectual neither by inner vocation nor by social role, a perceptiveness and an imagery which they would otherwise lack. By the provision of such techniques as reading and writing and calculation, they enable the laity to enter into a wider universe. The creation of nations out of tribes, in early modern times in Europe and in contemporary Asia and Africa, is the work of intellectuals, just as the formation of the American nation out of diverse ethnic groups is partly the work of teachers, clergymen, and journalists.\(^{19}\) From his very definition of intellectuals -- as those distinct from the “laity” by their concern, not only with the immediate, but with more remote values -- Shils appreciates that intellectuals can both elaborate and develop the potentialities inherent in a “system of cultural values” and reject “the inherited set of values.”\(^{20}\) While useful for elaborating how intellectuals work, his normative stance shapes profoundly how that work is to be evaluated. He is critical of their disruption of social solidarity, established tradition, and constituted authority and assumes a dedicated conservative opposition to the critical, oppositional intellectual.\(^{21}\) Of course, normative politics can move in the opposite direction.

Alvin Gouldner finds precisely in the intellectuals’ opposition to authority a normatively superior position. It is a universal class, if flawed, because “it subverts all establishments, social limits, and privileges, including its own... (and) bears a culture of critical and careful discourse which is an historically emancipatory rationality.”\(^{22}\) The critical intellectual gains authority by claiming it on the grounds of autonomous, ostensibly unself-interested rationality. The new intellectual class claims authority on the basis, not of force, violence, or even property, but of skill and science. The power of argument is juxtaposed to the argument from power. Nevertheless, in Gouldner’s
“new class” analysis, intellectuals remain a class whose interest disproportionately advantages them even as they seek knowledge. In his words, they are “a cultural bourgeoisie who appropriates privately the advantages of an historically and collectively produced cultural capital.” Like any other class, its objective is “to increase its own share of the national product; to produce and reproduce the special social conditions enabling them to appropriate privately larger shares of the incomes produced by the special cultures they possess; to control their work and their work settings; and to increase their political power partly to achieve the foregoing.” These alternative normative positions embodied by Shils and Gouldner reflect the cultural politics of the American academy for the last thirty years, even if the tide has moved somewhat to the left over that time.

In the thoroughly politicized context in which they lived and worked, East European intellectuals could not have embraced such a Euro-American aversion to political engagement in any other than a utopian way. Indeed, political engagement, especially over the national question, was the rule, rather than the exception, in Eastern Europe. Even the East European revisionist challenge to Stalinist rule, exhausted after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, might be understood as an attempt to transform Marxism and communist rule into a more intellectually vital project. In all of these efforts, intellectuality, of which reason is its prominent expression, was the primary challenge to crude political practice. It was a refuge from the pseudo-politics of a monopolistic regime, a sanctuary from which a new politics could be articulated even when actual political practice was precluded. As Kolakowski argued in 1972, when intellectuals fail to use reason to establish their political or moral position, they abandon their very identity as intellectuals.

This normative position is applied not only to intellectuals and communism but especially to the role played by intellectuals in the making of nationalism and anti-Semitism. Miklos Molnar finds that nationalism “paralyzed the minds of intellectuals and... the political culture of the Hungarian elite which seemed so promising in the nineteenth century came to suffocate and atrophy because of the static nature of Hungarian society.” Leon Volovici demonstrates how the Romanian intellectual, central to the nation’s definition, became more and more invested in the irrationalism of nationalism and “the latent perception of Jew as alien” so that by 1937 no Dreyfus affair was even imaginable. In his analysis, there was a “replacement of thinking by commitment, the exchange of the criterion of truth -- now in the service of mysticism and politics -- for myth, the repudiation of the intellect and the praise of barbarism.”

This theme is quite common in the wars of Yugoslav succession, but the arguments for where intellectuality lies are less clear cut. Consider how one anthropologist refers to the hope for western support: “even now some Croats are calling for a ‘desert storm’ operation to drive the occupiers from their soil, followed by the Bosnians who want air strikes on Serbian gunners and an end to the arms embargo that limits their capacity to fight Serbs. It is also not the first time that intellectuals have been vaporized, to be replaced by patriots. It is this sense of inevitability, of course, that politicians must have. They must create crisis so that the choice is to be loyal or disloyal, to be patriot or traitor, in order to achieve their own ends.” By contrast, Stjepan Mestrovic argues that such a disengaged intellectuality as this has become a kind of blasé voyeurism, and that many western intellectuals are simply naive.
In some circumstances, then, intellectual responsibility has demanded a political engagement infused with reason. Where communism and fascism have ruled, apolitical intellectual responsibility was harder to imagine, much less practice. To refuse to submit to communist or fascist ideological doctrine was obviously a political stance and to submit was to refuse intellectual responsibility. But in the United States, intellectual responsibility could be constructed in opposition to political engagement entirely, based on ideologies of reason and science ostensibly devoid of politics. To make these assessments of responsibility were obviously normative engagements themselves. But in the USA and other places where hegemony is articulated through political pluralism, to refuse to practice politics could more plausibly be constructed as apolitical. This commitment to an apolitical science in the context of political pluralism led Parsons and others to vaunt professionals as the intellectual par excellence of modernity.

In the construction of such an intellectual, "politics" in the national or class sense could disappear. At least those sociologists and others charged to explain the profession could miss its national and class bearings. The normative could slide into a narrowly conceived occupational code of ethics and miss the way in which the profession itself is national or embedded in class. The apolitical professional could be viewed in a mirror of the sociologist's own ostensibly apolitical gaze. While there has been an extensive critique of this political innocence by a long line of sociologists interested in the power and privilege of professions, most of these sociologists have focused rather exclusively on the occupational politics of professionals. When they have gone beyond the profession to consider the political, they typically did so to consider how national or class-based political conflicts affected the occupation's own professional projects. Recently, however, the discursive link between professional identity and the making of nations and empires has been explored. Ming-cheng Lo has demonstrated how the internal contradictions of the professional project among Taiwanese physicians helps explain their trajectory from being the primary exponents of an independent Taiwanese nation in the 1920s to apolitical doctors during the 1930s to, finally, imperial physicians during World War II. Indeed, it is one more reflection of the American national experience that intellectuals, or even professionals, could be theorized as somehow only occupational or class beings and not themselves as embedded in the nation.

While the relationship between the purely professional or scientific and the political has been increasingly problematized, the troubling relationship between the intellectual and the political remains. Professionals are, after all, manifestly political in their self-organization and reliance on the state for regulation. Intellectuals, by contrast, are constructed as potentially above politics, allowing their intellectuality to construct their response to politics even as they engage it. Habermas and those inspired by him seem to hold onto the hope embodied in the example of Heinrich Heine, who simultaneously remained autonomous from the contemporary politics of critical intellectuals but nonetheless engaged the politics of the day. But Habermas mainly uses that example and his philosophical elaboration of it to provide a normative grounding for the critique he emphasizes: the segmentation between intellectuals who become expert but not public (professionals narrowly construed), and the masses who remain public but not critical. This problem, however, should not be approached so readily as a general condition of modernity. There are several alternative relationships between intellectuals and power in modernity.
In China, intellectuals can draw on a tradition of ‘remonstration’ to be simultaneously intellectual and political. Although the particular confrontation in Tiananmen Square led to an initially more egalitarian dialogue and subsequently greater ‘confrontation’ than is traditional, its initial form was familiar. Intellectuals and students challenged the state and offered a different vision of what it means to be Chinese in a familiar historical repertoire. Remonstration is not an East European practice, but during late communism intellectuals sought a new strategy for critique that embraced the distinction between intellectuals and politics.

While their Western critics were increasingly likely to be making the argument that intellectuals are always potentially political because they can neither understand fully the conditions nor consequences of their action, East Europeans sought to challenge the state-sponsored politicization of art and science by posing the distinction between knowledge and politics in a virtually utopian way. Jerzy Szacki, for instance, acknowledged the difficulty of being primarily responsible to one’s own intellectual field and not to politics, but he nevertheless wished to consider just how the utopia of absolute cultural values could influence the cultivation of intellectual responsibility under communism. Communism collapsed before the full implications could be considered but the volume in which Szacki’s article appeared offered a remarkably interesting collection of views on how politics and intellectual responsibility should comingle.

Of course, a substantial segment followed Benda to argue that intellectuals must remain distinct and follow their own particular codes of responsibility. As Plato would have it, or as Benda argued, the treason of intellectuals is to abandon the commitment to a superior and ever more cultivated universalistic reason. Others argue that an intellectual’s primary responsibility is to the craft, a textual responsibility, and one abandons intellectual responsibility when one violates that code of textual responsibility. Indeed, intellectual responsibility is most apparent when moral action is conducted through modes of intellectual practice, rather than in explicitly political engagement. But even with that intellectual craft, intellectuals cannot be relieved of political or moral responsibility since it can, and must, be practiced within their field. For these authors, then, intellectuals have a different kind of political responsibility, perhaps even an elevated one; but one that is to be kept separate from popular politics. Ernest Gellner, however, offers caution by arguing that it is frankly difficult to recognize intellectual treason when any conclusion is reached by intellectual means; perhaps the greatest treason is to easily identify others who are guilty.

On the other hand, several of the authors emphasized that one cannot separate very easily intellectual responsibility from a more general political responsibility. For instance, the defense of truth seeking cannot be limited to intellectual affairs, since the real world impinges on those intellectual affairs, and truth seeking is not only the province of intellectuals, but is the province of all actors. Indeed, intellectuals have more responsibility than ever before, given that technological prowess now threatens not only human communities but the biophysical world itself. Another author, however, argues that to submerge one’s intellectuality into a political position can be intellectually responsible if it is a strategy realized through intellectual means. Expertise cannot be neutral and is rather connected to the values one embraces which might require political engagement.
East Europeans were more likely to emphasize that intellectuality should be separated from power, and West Europeans were more likely to emphasize this impossibility. In part this was because communism, as a system, sought to contain intellectuals, to coopt them, and through that lead them to abandon intellectual responsibility. To adopt the liberal position of intellectuals remaining apart from politics was a means of preserving that intellectual responsibility in late communism. This tendency of emphasizing intellectual autonomy was, however, more difficult to maintain before the politics of the nation. Jerzy Jedlicki argued that despite the protests of liberal intellectuals, one cannot be responsible only for oneself. One must also address collective responsibility for a nation’s past. As the nation is socially constructed, so is collective responsibility for its heritage. The obligation to assume that collective responsibility is as real as is the nation. In this regard, he says, historians have a special role. “The historian’s conscious and subconscious choices of topics and interpretations may make people remember what ought to be remembered, or may help them to forget the events they do not like to think about.”

Although it is impossible to resolve these profound theoretical differences about intellectual responsibility, one point of departure for those interested in developing a normative theory of intellectual distinction would be to adopt a more Gramscian position. Here a normative theory of intellectual responsibility is replaced with a theory of intellectuals embedded in a larger account of social transformation. For Gramsci and those who follow him, the question then is how to become an effective oppositional intellectual. Proximity to power is never a problem for Gramsci, for it is inevitable. The “taint” of power is not something to avoid, for far more relevant is where you stand.

**INTELLECTUALS AND OPPOSITION**

If the institutions that authorize and empower intellectuals are relatively “legitimate” and present themselves as neutral and disinterested, like France’s Ecole Nationale d’Administration, England’s Oxford or Cambridge, America’s Harvard or Yale, it is more likely that the politicized intellectual can be denied their status as intellectuals. By contrast, where national liberation movements define the trajectory of younger generations, intellectuals are likely to move from movements to ministerial office after the revolution. They must be politicized. In Russia, China, Vietnam, and elsewhere, revolutionary movements have been an effective conduit from the margins of society into the state. Likewise, the social mobilizations that transformed Soviet-type societies in the late 1980s, notably in those places with developed civil societies, propelled intellectuals into explicitly political roles in postcommunist regimes, with Vaclav Havel as the supreme exemplar. Clearly, then, the articulation of intellectuals and political engagement is shaped by the larger discursive field in which they are embedded, and the degree to which the dominant institutions are contested by those out of power.

In the intellectual politics of transformation, Gramsci is usually taken as the point of departure. Gramsci has most usefully distinguished between traditional intellectuals “whose position in the interstices of society has a certain inter-class aura about it but derives ultimately from past and present class relations and conceals an attachment to various historical class formations,” and organic intellectuals, who might serve any function, are
"the thinking and organizing element of a particular fundamental social class". As Geoff Eley reminds us of Gramsci's call for developing organic intellectuals of the Left: "Any social group that aspires to cast or recast society in its own image must be capable of generating its own organic intellectuals capable of exercising moral leadership and of winning over a significant proportion of existing traditional intellectuals; for otherwise the dominant meanings and understandings in society cannot be contested."

Following in many ways both Benda and Gramsci, Edward Said has put forth his own program for the public role of the intellectual, that of the "outsider, 'amateur,' and disturber of the status quo." For Said, intellectuals are "precisely those figures whose public performances can neither be predicted nor compelled into some slogan, orthodox party line, or fixed dogma." "Nothing disfigures the intellectual's public performance as much as trimming, careful silence, patriotic bluster, and retrospective and self-dramatizing apostasy." Said distinguishes, then, between intellectuals as critical, subversive outsiders who "speak the truth to power," and supportive insiders who promote special interests, "patriotic nationalism, corporate thinking, and a sense of class, racial or gender privilege."

Said defines an intellectual as "an individual endowed with a faculty for representing, embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for, a public." This definition works for the academic as well as the president of the republic. The intellectual is more than a thinker -- all human beings think. Intellectuals have an essentially public role in which they use their intellect and intellectual skills to some public end. Some engage in the unmasking of oppression and exploitation; others generate the mystifications that allow existing power relations to flourish.

This approach, however, assumes away the challenge of recognizing what is public and what is not and also takes for granted that the products are intellectual if they are produced by those who are credentialled so. It does not question how the credentialing takes place. Moreover, it takes a profoundly intellectual location to be able to recognize which products are intellectual and which are not and which products are contributing to the masking of power and which are unmasking it. In short, even in this self-evident definition, the power and limitations of intellectuals radiate: their power to define distinction, including their own, but only at the expense of hiding other problems. And very often, although not always, these accounts underplay the problem of the nation.

All intellectuals, given the fatality of language and the necessity of citizenship in the modern world, are "nationed". Contingently, at least, they have a national identity, and their practices may have important consequences for the nation. Intellectuals sometimes take up the most fundamental roles in the definition of the nation, being charged with "building" the nation, or perhaps even "destroying" it. Said clearly has a preferred role: "With regard to the consensus on group or national identity it is the intellectual's task to show how the group is not a natural or God-given entity but is a constructed, manufactured, even in some cases invented object, with a history of struggle and conquest behind it, that it is sometimes important to represent." The dilemma for this approach, of course, is to challenge one of the most important resources of a national identity: the power which comes from
claims of antique origins or divine fates. Speaking truth to power may involve challenging the power of the community one seeks to empower.

One need not begin from a Marxist or post-Marxist foundation to adopt a similar position on a politicized intellectual’s responsibility for speaking truth to power and practicing a national politics that is inclusive or expansive. One of the most potent examples of a theorist of and practitioner in a politics that emphasizes the engaged role of intellectuals is Vaclav Havel. Although all individuals are enjoined to develop their own personal morality and responsibility to resist ideology’s destruction of both life and environment, in Havel’s view intellectuals, as those leading in the elaboration of human consciousness, have a special role. As he argued to the US Congress shortly after the East European Revolutions of 1989, “If the hope of the world lies in human consciousness, then it is obvious that intellectuals cannot go on forever avoiding their share of responsibility for the world, hiding their distaste for politics under the alleged need to be independent.” Unlike Gramsci and Said, Havel begins from a much more individualist and spiritual normative foundation. Personal reason, humility and dignity are the basis for resistance to communism and other ideologically dominated forms of life. Without defining a set of power relations in which some individuals or groups are clearly aligned with power and others clearly aligned with emancipation, Havel’s theory of intellectual politics rests more comfortably with traditional approaches to intellectuals and their normative distinction. If intellectuals are only obliged to articulate “truth” and not to empower collectivities, Havel does not face the same dilemmas as Gramsci and Said. He need not question whether he must compromise his intellectuality for its social effect. Ethics are his principal guide, not social change.

Havel, Said and Gramsci, all exemplary intellectuals, nevertheless, illustrate a similar resolution of the relationship between the politics of intellectual responsibility and of the nation. While embracing their nation, they do so on grounds that are more “universal,” whether in an embrace of liberal respect for human rights, or in a philosophy of history committed to general emancipation. The nation is not foregrounded in their philosophy.

In general, nationalism is presented as the intellectual’s nemesis. Indeed, it is relatively rare to find those who would write first about intellectual responsibility to engage the nation positively and prominently. Of course, within national historiographies intellectuals are lauded because they struggle to release and elaborate their nation. But here the narrative of intellectual responsibility is subordinated to the narrative of the nation’s trajectory. With this collection, we hope to stimulate more discussion about the politics of intellectual responsibility that neither distances the nation nor is subordinated to it. We can suggest this direction of discussion by identifying one recent, and exemplary, effort within this problematic.

The celebrated Hungarian theorist of anti-politics, Gyorgy Konrad, has recently fixed his gaze on the nation in fear of the growth of anti-Communist fascism. Rather than condemn nationalism as inherently exclusive, Konrad recommends to his fellow nationals that the Hungarian nation be reconceived as a project rather than an identity, and as one that is open to external influences, rather than closed off from them. He writes:

The self-shrinking national strategy takes what it considers non-national and delights in condemning it. The self-expanding national strategy takes anything from the outside world that
can be fruitfully related to what was previously considered national and delights in integrating the two. As he proposes a reconception of the nation, he also writes from a remarkably confident position, eager to see the expansion of the nation’s meaning, rather than its consolidation. That is certainly a strategy for articulating the making of nations and of intellectual practice, but it also has the potential for reinforcing the gap between those globally oriented citizens and those unable to partake, for whatever reason, of this international access. It opens the door for the critique, once again, of intellectual privilege and dare we say it, cosmopolitanism. And it also treats the global as rather benign, or at least subject to intellectually responsible selection, rather than to the nation’s subversion.

For most postcolonial accounts, the global is by no means so benign. In his accounts of India’s nationalism, for instance, Partha Chatterjee explores how even nationalism, that which is supposed to be the property of a nation, is conceived within a global framework that undermines the indigenousness of Indian expression. How can one articulate an emancipatory politics in the frame of one’s own community when that frame, the nation, is not an indigenous cultural form but one gradually appropriated from the colonizers by Indian intellectuals and leaders? Part of the problem for India, he argues, is that one is resisting the domination of Europeans within the problematic of European creation. Part of the solution is to develop a different kind of methodology that searches for the community that a European imperialism has destroyed. East Europeans, by contrast, rarely find such a dilemma or need to unpack European imperialism from their own national projects. They have another kind of imperialism in the forefront of their mind.

Those escaping communism are also likely to see their movement as one way from empire, from a kind of imperialism which many East European liberals and/or nationalists see as far more destructive of community than global capitalism. In radical distinction from many postcolonial positions like that of Chatterjee, community might be found alongside global capital. Konrad’s own fusion of liberalism and nationalism suggests just such an emancipatory hope.

The comparison between such different kinds of postcolonial expressions as Konrad and Chatterjee suggest just how powerfully Soviet imperialism, as much as global capitalism, has shaped the construction of the nation and global capitalism. The differences are profound, but the similarities are intriguing too. In both cases, the nation is being reconceived as something which must be constructed and made along lines which are not already given. And here, the intellectual becomes absolutely central whether in facilitating a nation’s adaptation to an external world, or in search of that which global forces have destroyed.

These various examples -- from Benda to Gramsci and Said to Havel -- make it clear that any account of the relationship of intellectuals to power, to the nation, to the state, or to society is implicated in a complicated cultural politics informed by the case at hand. In some cases, the independence of intellectuals from politics is celebrated, while in others it is identified as irresponsibility. Sometimes, intellectuals are praised for their devotion to the nation, while in other cases, their devotion is devalued as irrational mysticism. If the politics are shared, whether revolutionary Marxist, nationalist or liberal democratic, the analyst is likely to celebrate the responsibility...
of political intellectuals; if the politics are opposed, he/she is likely to identify intellectuals as having lost their identity. Regardless, the Gramscian point is fundamental: intellectuals are invaluable to refashioning a nation, especially when that goes beyond rearticulating existing forms, as Konrad and Chatterjee recommend. Equally fundamental, however, is that intellectual indispensability and the political definition of responsibility cannot address that basic sociological question of the relationship between intellectuals and power.

**INTELLECTUALS AND POWER**

This transformation of intellectual roles -- from leaders or advisors of social movements to those with state authority and power -- invites consideration of intellectuals as a separate class or social group. Nationalist ideology makes little room for this kind of question, but certainly Marxism and populism have long made this a central object of inquiry, especially around the question of whether intellectuals form a "new class". To see intellectuals as a "new class" seeking or achieving power asks whether their particular "interests," either in terms of the valuation of intellectual labor over manual labor or in terms of alternative discursive frames -- the culture of critical discourse or the culture of rational discourse -- privilege intellectuals over others. This problematic is commonly pursued in class analysis but relatively rarely in studies of social movements or nationalism. Here we explore how theories of nation formation might be affected by a new class approach, and how the new class approach might be transformed if we consider how the articulation of the nation is connected to intellectual privilege.

Michel Foucault, in his many essays linking knowledge and power, notably, in "Truth and Power," is one who questions the role of intellectuals by laying out the limiting and particular claims of putatively general or universal intellectuals. "For a long period," he writes, "the 'left' intellectual spoke and was acknowledged the right of speaking in the capacity of master of truth and justice. He was heard, or purported to make himself heard, as the spokesman of the universal. To be an intellectual meant something like being the consciousness/conscience of us all." He finds that over time, such general intellectuals become less capable of claiming universal consequence. With the development of science and its extension to all domains of material and social life, the "specific intellectual" with a particular rather than general expertise eventually eliminates the general intellectual's claims to relevance. At the same time, the specific intellectual becomes closer to the masses as they are both confronted by the same adversaries and have the same material concerns. Although Foucault does not say it, the main domain left for general intellectuals could be in articulating the nation. But following Foucault, this ambition might be analyzed with attention to very specific lineages and circuits of power.

Pierre Bourdieu also has analyzed intellectuals in terms of his more general theory of fields, where each set of engagements is constituted by particular forms of capital and strategies of action. In this approach, rather than being obliged to define intellectuals in terms of some familiar theory of class, one considers each site of activity in terms of the relationship between the specific forms of capital circulating in a particular field of activity which is mediated by particular forms of habitus. He claims that intellectuals, and sociologists in particular, typically focus on their relationship to politics and power but outside the particular kinds of power relations which
constitute their own field of activity. So, instead of beginning an analysis of intellectuals and movements by assessing their relationship, one should begin with the field of power relations in which intellectuals are operating, and ask how the “aesthetic dimension of political conduct matters to intellectuals” or how the university or a discipline is connected to the political fields existing outside of it. Indeed, in his call for a reflexive sociology, one of the first objects of scrutiny should be one’s own field of action. This means, then, that we must be far more specific about the category of intellectuals we invoke: clearly historians are different from physicians who are different from engineers in their relation to the nation. This then, is a different picture of intellectuals: rather than begin their analysis once they hit the political field, Bourdieu suggests we begin their political analysis within the field of relations with specific forms of capital that are appropriate to their own stakes of advance and loss.

One of the more thorough applications and elaborations of Bourdieu’s theory is found in Katherine Verdery’s work. Verdery portrays in exquisite detail why national discourse becomes so central in the cultural productions of Romanian state socialism, and why intellectuals are so important. She argues that national identity’s meaning, so important in Romanian discourse for a long time before communist rule, becomes even more significant in Romania when the Communist Party opted to control society through coercive and symbolic/ideological controls more than remunerative ones. Intellectuals become significant because the invisible forms of domination Western societies manage through surveillance, manipulation and disciplining are radically underdeveloped in communist led societies, and thus the more explicit control over what is said by whom makes intellectuals crucial as both propagandist and threat. The intellectuals’ own milieu, Verdery argues, also contributes to making the nation ever more significant. In their own contest for resources, intellectuals use various images of the nation to situate themselves, and their particular claims for the allocation of resources from the center. In this process entirely derived from the rules and resources of their own intellectual fields, intellectuals elevate the overall centrality of the nation in public discourse. The West also elevated the nation in Romania and among its intellectuals.

The West’s emphasis on Ceausescu’s “maverick” status among communist authorities encouraged this national discourse. The West simply did not support an internal opposition as they did in “entrepreneurial” Hungary or “brave” Poland. The Western articulation of the meaning of Hungarian, Polish and Romanian nations shaped profoundly how the state, nation and civil society would be understood under communism and after. Even with communism’s collapse and a wish to return to Europe, the possibility for democracy and pluralism replacing the discourse of the Romanian nation appeared slim in the first half of the 1990s. That changed in 1996, but Western definitions of the Romanian nation remain profoundly important in shaping its own internal discourse, as promises of inclusion in NATO and the European Union shape the liberal hope.

To be sure, therefore, intellectuals are not the only ones that shape the nation. We do find, however, that Verdery’s work is exemplary: to understand the intellectual articulation of the nation, one must examine particular fields of action within which specific intellectuals work, as well as those more global conditions which shape how that work is to be received. Beginning with an intellectual field, however, skips over one of the most profound implications of Gramsci’s work.
Gramsci argued that intellectuals have no particular distinction, and that all people are intellectuals though they do not always have that function. Defining intellectuals by existing fields of social relations overlooks how intellectuals might be made in milieus defined as anti-intellectual or non-intellectual by those who rule. One of the best illustrations of this problem of identifying who is, and who is not, an intellectual can be found in the 1980-81 Solidarity movement. In that movement, the intellectual role was "crystallized" in the form of the "expert." But many activists were as "intellectual," in terms of degrees of education or social imagination, as the experts themselves; intellectuals had adopted both roles as suitable to their own influence. Co-authors of the famous "Open Letter to the Party," Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski were on opposite sides of the role divide, with the former serving as advisor and expert, the latter as political activist. Where was the intellectual operating?

More generally, the creation of Women's and New Social Movements illustrates that distinguishing the "intellectual" is anachronistic in postmodern cultural politics. As activists become more informed and educated, and as activists emphasize everyday life, as opposed to the grander claims of history and culture in most nationalist movements, traditional claims to intellectual distinction diminish. Access to "meaning" is not so difficult to reach, in terms either of consumption or production. At least the traditional credentials of recognizing "intellectual" are not so essential. The primary intellectual challenge in post-modern movement politics is to "identify the discursive conditions for the emergence of a collective action" and then "identify the conditions in which a relation of subordination becomes a relation of oppression, and therefore constitutes itself into the site of an antagonism." The task of the intellectual in such movements is to rely on everyday life and a deep, "organic," understanding of the popular classes. Here the distinctions among intellectual, activist and participant can become indeed difficult to draw.

Claims to intellectual authority in one domain are also difficult to transfer to another. Some kinds of knowledge are restricted to the area of a particular intellectual's claims to authority. For instance, physicians are permitted to make claims about the health of a body but may not be authorized to speak about the health of a nation or even more profoundly, when can those without any particular credentials challenge those with ultimate credentials, as when peace activists challenge those with military power over the definition of national security? Political sympathies obviously influence the accreditation of expertise too. During the Cold War leftist intellectuals critical of various aspects of American foreign policy were completely marginalized, excluded from decision-making circles, ostensibly because they were "committed" politically or even "disloyal," at a time when their ideological opponents on the Right were acceptable as value-free, or perhaps uncritically loyal, intellectual "experts." Suny was made particularly aware of this exclusion by his subsequent inclusion in such discussions at the time of the Soviet collapse, when ideological confusion and shaken confidence in ruling circles created an ecumenical opening. That opening, however, may not last as ideological forces realign and reconstruct new barriers to influence.

Challenges to the articulation of the nation come not only in conflicts between movements and state, but within social movements too. Janet Hart, for instance, has introduced a powerful argument about the relationship
between the elaboration of a national movement in Greece, and its transformation by women into a movement whose nation had new voices. World War II provided the political opportunity for women in the left wing EAM to transform gender regimes. The EAM was not, however, a feminist movement, though a women’s movement existed within the larger movement, reconstructing gender relations in the EAM and in the broader imagination of how the nation was gendered.

The transformation of gender relations fits with modernist narratives on progressiveness in education and a belief in personal autonomy or self improvement, but it gained its power by becoming embedded within a kind of Greek nationalism, articulated before the Axis invasion by a series of progressive intellectuals, beginning with those in the Demotic movement aiming to popularize Greek language. This emphasis continued later with Demetrius Glinos and others who sought to link education and the women question. Hart argues that without this opening by intellectuals, pressure from women for the transformation of gender relations could neither have been made nor be as successful as it was. The defensive nationalism that was developed to resist the Axis not only drew upon, then, the need for women to forget their “proper” gender roles and defend the nation but was merged with a political nationalism that extended citizenship rights and equality to the subaltern, to women. Although this ideology and praxis were still rooted in masculinist narratives, women’s subsequent mobilization in the EAM transformed these activists’ sense of themselves, and enabled them to resist the postwar Greek authorities’ attempts at forced confessions in the prisons of Averoff and elsewhere. While intellectuals provided the opening, women activists on the ground completed the translation and transformed their own sense of women’s rights and responsibilities. While we can easily attribute great intellectual innovation and consequence to those with authorial recognition and power, like Glinos, we must recognize the qualities of intellectuality in those, like the women whose histories Hart depicts, whose voices are hard to hear. In theorizing intellectuals it is essential to move beyond the matter of what elite intellectuals write and consider the institutional spaces available in any society for “free intellectual activity” and the particular products associated with that work.

In addition to seeking intellectual activity among those deemed non-intellectual, it is also important to consider the mundane worlds of intellectuals themselves in order to consider how their distinction articulates with their commonality. Indeed, it seems that to consider that world of the everyday, we might more clearly identify the conditions under which intellectuals become organic. Even while the Russian intelligentsia have never failed to speak on the nation’s behalf, Jane Burbank has argued that their historic connections to autocracy and elitism led to their failure during perestroika and after to generate the popular counterculture Gramscians would advise. Their culture of entitlement, their confidence in commitments rather than pragmatic politics, and their inattention to the public itself were the source, she believes, for their failure as organic intellectuals. A view from the kitchen table suggests a different account.

Nancy Ries argues that Moscow intellectuals in their publicly prominent role could articulate the liminality of opposition to perestroika but could not transform politics more fundamentally because of their real link to society. By examining their informal talk and everyday life, she identifies the commonality of genres between talk at the kitchen table and in the public sphere. Both tended to invoke litanies of what was wrong with
everyday life and the entire system. Both tended to portray the problem in moral, folkloric terms -- the inadequacy of superiors and the victim's moral superiority in suffering -- rather than in terms of systemic organization and rational political change. Solutions also were posed in these mythical/moral terms, dependent either on the saint for breaking out of the cycle of absurdities and resistance through victimhood's validation, or absolutely utopian demands unrelated to what might be realized. 92 Kitchen table talk was transported into politics, which in turn assured the reproduction of old forms of power.93

Organic intellectuals ought therefore to be considered not only in terms of their intellectual articulation with the subaltern, but also in the ways their mundane lives articulate with the popular and their visions articulate with the transformative. One ought to consider where their intellectuality is consequential and how new engagements with the popular transform intellectual articulations, as Hart's work has suggested. One ought also to consider how intellectuals transfer their claims to competence beyond the spheres in which authorities credential their expertise, as Kennedy has suggested, and examine the conditions under which those authorities exclude claims to competence, as Suny's experience with American foreign policy has suggested. One ought to consider how intellectuals' fields of action articulate with larger political fields, as Verdery has elaborated, but also consider how intellectuals are in fact identified as such and distinguished from others, as Kurczewski's work on Solidarity and those involved in contemporary identity politics illustrate.

INTELLECTUALS AND NATION MAKING

We have tried to suggest that intellectuals are best defined, not by their intrinsic qualities or self-defined role (which can be supportive or subversive or power), but by their social position, their relationship to most people, the non-intellectuals, from whom they would distinguish themselves. As Zygmunt Bauman reconstructs their early history, these heirs of les philosophes of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment played a key role in the transference of the pastoral role of the Church to the secular, tutelary state.94 With the emergence of the modern state, Bauman goes on, legislators, including intellectuals, carried out the functions of disciplining, repressing, educating, training the people. Bauman's negative valence here is reminiscent of Foucault. Intellectuals "inherited the image of 'the people' as it had been construed by the political action of the absolutist state. It had been constructed as a problem for, simultaneously, repressive measures and social policy."95 With the constitution of "the people," it was but a short step to link that community with aspects of culture, language, or shared religion, "customs" or myths, to create that most "invented" of communities, the nation.

The thrust of much recent scholarship on nation-formation has stressed how nationalism preceded the nation. In Eric J. Hobsbawm's succinct formulation: "[N]ationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make states and nationalism but the other way round."96 This scholarly turn in the work of such theorists as Elie Kedourie, Ernest Gellner, Hobsbawm, Miroslav Hroch, and Benedict Anderson has had the effect of confirming the role of intellectuals. "One factor," writes Anthony D. Smith succinctly, "does appear to be a necessary condition of all nationalist movements... -- the role of the intelligentsia."97 Particularly in the work of modernization theorists, like Gellner and Karl Deutsch, nationalism is seen to arise from a new form of education
or technology that creates both the intelligentsia and the media through which intellectuals are able to reach a newly-literate mass audience.

Gellner argues that modernization, which for him subsumes industrialization, erodes traditional agrarian societies and replaces "structure," the older system of role relationships, with "culture," a new form of identity that becomes equivalent to nationality. To be a member of the new community requires literacy and a minimal technical competence. This in turn demands a mass educational system that integrates subgroups into a single national community. But because this occurs unevenly across the globe and through society, modernization leads to class competition and the exclusion of some from the community. Nationalist intellectuals lead movements of national secession with the support of the excluded lower classes. For Gellner, though constructed, the nation is not a subjective choice but a matter of "genuine, objective, practical necessity, however obscurely recognised." Unlike agrarian society, Gellner argues, industrial society requires a national educational and communications system, a state, and "the kind of cultural homogeneity demanded by nationalism." As we noted above, for all his apparent emphasis on intellectuals, Gellner's argument is properly criticized for its functionalism, in which nationalism is made to play an essential role in the making of industrial society, and its lack of agency in the synthesis of the discourse of the nation. As must already be clear, our volume seeks to bring the creative, constitutive role of intellectuals, the key agents in generating and propagating nationalism and the discourse of the nation, back to the center of the nation-making effort.

The first and most successful ideas that nationalist intellectuals expounded were that nations were the natural units into which humanity is divided and that these units were culturally unique. From these "facts" followed a series of political claims: that the nation is the highest loyalty of "man," a clear challenge to earlier god-centered political legitimations; that political power ought to reside in "the people" constituted as "the nation;" that nations have primary claims over the piece of territory, that is, their "homeland;" and that nations must be recognized and institutionalized in their own states. In this nationalist vision, it was only in the nation-state, the highest stage of history, that the essence of humans was restored and allowed to develop in freedom. As Smith summarizes the "core doctrine," "nationalism fuses three ideals: collective self-determination of the people, the expression of national character and individuality," and finally the vertical division of the world into unique nations each contributing its special genius to the common fund of humanity." Left unspecified, however, are all the important matters of what constitutes the nation, its character and qualities, its boundaries and membership. That selection and privileging of the elements by which a given nation will be known -- and know itself -- has historically been the foundational role of patriotic and nationalist intellectuals. As Smith explains,

Nationalists aim to construct nations out of populations that lack, in varying degrees, a sense of identity and purpose, or are ethnically heterogeneous, economically backward and socially divided. They provide often elaborate and sophisticated analyses and programmes for communal regeneration and collective decision-making. They must often build up from nothing the whole apparatus of the sovereign state and instill a sense of group dignity through the creation of an autonomous system of education and culture.... Turning a social grouping into a 'nation'
exercising sovereignty in its own ‘nation-state’ is a taxing and agonising task, ‘but it is also a positive and constructive one, a challenge to man.”

Theorists and historians of nationalism have often noted that nationalism has been most powerful as a mobilizing ideology at moments of revolutionary instability, often during or following wars, as in the French revolutionary era (1789-1815), the revolutions of 1848-1852, the aftermath of World Wars I and II, and the revolutionary transformations of statist “socialist” regimes at the end of the Cold War. It is then argued that in a context of instability, insecurity, and unpredictability, intellectuals and politicians search for or choose the available forms of community to recreate a degree of stability and certainty. But here too an overly simple functionalist explanation loses the complex sense of creativity that comes together in generating nationalisms. The initial generation of the nationalist synthesis came from Enlightenment intellectuals, like the Germans Fichte and Herder, who married an affection for ethnic culture and tradition with a project of progress and enlightenment and in the process transformed the understanding of the solidarities that made up the community.

Perhaps the quintessential early national patriot, or “historicist intellectual” (in Smith’s phrasing), was Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803), the Baltic German literary scholar who inspired generations of his countrymen and others to investigate the creative function of language. In praise of Homer and Shakespeare, Herder proclaimed “A poet is the creator of the nation around him, he gives them a world to see and has their souls in his hand to lead them to that world.” In search of the soul of the nation, Herder collected his people’s folk songs, read Norse poetry and mythology, and analyzed the prose of Martin Luther. Language was for Herder intimately connected to culture and community, the medium through which humans understood and thought, were conscious and able to express their inner selves. “Language expresses the collective experience of the group,” he wrote. Through language people understand that they share a culture and historical tradition and therefore form a people (Volk). Rather than biological or racial unity, the nation for Herder was a matter of shared awareness of the social milieu into which one is born. This shared culture is, in the words of his translator, the “proper foundation for a sense of collective political identity.”

Herder contrasted the particularity of the nation and its Volkgeist to the universalistic rationality of the French Enlightenment. Yet, as Isaiah Berlin has noted, he was at the same time a creature of the Enlightenment, explaining his own philosophy of history in naturalistic and scientific terms. Nature (or God) created the plurality of languages and cultures, or, as Berlin puts it, “A nation is made what it is by ‘climate’, education, relations with its neighbours, and other changeable and empirical factors, and not by an impalpable inner essence or an unalterable factor such as race or colour.” At the same time Herder’s love of nations did not extend to the state. He despised government and power, the great absolutist monarchs of his time, and celebrated the cleansing force of the French Revolution. His Nationalismus, a word he apparently created, was cultural rather than political, and Berlin claims Herder as the ancestor, not of political or statist nationalism, but of all forms of populism. However he might be characterized, Herder, like his contemporary and successive historicist intellectuals, was a unique, often isolated figure, who pioneered the “recovery” of the cultural and national past.
An East European pioneer in theorizing the link between the intellectual and labor, Stanislaw Brzozowski (1878-1911), brought a more “nationed” argument to a subsequently elaborated “Gramscian” position where intellectuals are seen as central in the class struggle against those who rule. In his “Marxist” phase, Brzozowski argued that the working class ought to lead the national struggle; when they did not, it was a sign of social disintegration. The intelligentsia, he argued, should facilitate the development of the intellectual life of the working class “by creating a culture which would express and develop the potential spiritual richness inherent in the ‘life-world’ (Lebenswelt) of the workers.” The intelligentsia, according to Brzozowski, fulfills its mission only in alliance with the working class, as this proletariat realizes its conscious and purposeful control over labor.106

Brzozowski subsequently abandoned his anthropocentric theory of labor for a more nationalist and spiritualist position, one which finds the deepest source of the collective subconscious in the fatherland (oiczyzna), by which he understood family structure, material production, and statehood with military organization as the ‘material’ side, with language and the nation as the subjective dimension of this fatherland.107 While Brzozowski never abandoned the working class as the agent of Poland’s future entirely, he believed in this last phase that the intelligentsia had to return to the Catholic Church, which he thought potentially transformed into the ‘organ of will of working people, while preserving its historical continuity’.108 Nations become the “deepest reality” for humanity and a “necessary form of truth,” while labor, even if humanity’s universal experience, could not be its ultimate foundation.109

The social role of nationalist intellectuals was codified by Miroslav Hroch in his very useful periodization of nationalism. Phase A begins when patriotic scholars, like Herder, initiate the search for a useable national past and a language through which it might be expressed. In the succeeding generation individual patriotic intellectuals fuse into a collective social stratum, the intelligentsia, and in Phase B they turn nationalist ideas into a social force through their writings, editing newspapers, organizing clubs, leading marches, and teaching, as Brzozowski did.

As an example of the extraordinary effect of Herder’s and other early patriots’ ideas on intellectuals in various parts of Europe, it is worthwhile examining the case of Finland. Early in the nineteenth century the “Turku Romantics” collected Finnish songs and stories, and even though they were themselves Swedish-speakers they promoted the language of Finnish-speaking Finns. One of them, Elias Lonnrot, published in 1835 a collection of tales he had collected from rural Finns, the Kalevala, which was seen as the epic expression of the early Finns. The Kalevala gave the Finns an heroic past and identity and inspired the Fennomania movement which pushed for recovery of Finnish culture and language. Fennomen intellectuals organized clubs to speak Finnish and study the national epic.110 The Russian imperial government, which ruled Finland, also encouraged Finnish-language schooling in order to reduce the influence of the Swedish elite in Finland, and in 1863 Finnish was made an official language of the Grand Duchy equal to Swedish. A sense of Finnish nation liberated from Swedish cultural superiority developed in the conjuncture of three factors: Russian state interests, intellectual activity in forging a sense of Finnish identity, and the receptivity of the Finnish-speaking rural population.111 Empowered by a new positive identity, the Finnish-speaking Finns became more active politically in the late nineteenth century,
ultimately forming a mass Social Democratic party alongside smaller, less powerful nationalist and conservative parties. In Finland Hroch’s Phase C, the stage at which the broad masses become involved in nationalist politics, involved not so much a unified all-class national movement but a broad national consensus in favor of autonomy (and later independence) for Finland that fractured socially along class lines. Finnish identity over time became increasingly anti-Russian, anti-imperial, and in favor of an independent Finnish state, but that independence was achieved only after a brief and bloody civil war between Finns of different social classes.112

Hroch’s historiographical treatment of intellectuals in small European nations fits reasonably well with a more general historical sociological theory of intellectuals as a social stratum initially produced by, and then rendered redundant by, a colonial power. Imperial rule both creates the conditions for the education of a native intelligentsia and then makes impossible its full development into the effective elite of its own society. This is a familiar story that has been told about many places. Benedict Anderson indeed begins his tale of modular nationalisms with a similar story of the “Creole pioneers” of South and North America. Local elites, frustrated by their stunted “pilgrimages” into the ruling strata of the empire, developed national independence movements based, not on ethnicity and culture (which they shared with the metropole), but on borrowed Enlightenment principles and on the territoriosity that their “pilgrimages” marked out. These American Creoles “constituted simultaneously a colonial community and an upper class,” “economically subjected and exploited” to be sure, but able to read the writings of Rousseau and Herder and interpret their existence as essentially separate from the metropolitans by virtue of their different climate and “ecology” that they believed “had a constitutive impact on culture and character.”113 Summing up his approach, which has moved the discussion of nationalism from social determination to the complexities of cultural construction, and providing an explanation for the particular multiple nationalisms based on imperial administrative units, Anderson writes:

Liberalism and the Enlightenment clearly had a powerful impact, above all in providing an arsenal of ideological criticisms of imperial and ancien regimes. What I am proposing is that neither economic interest, Liberalism, nor Enlightenment could, or did, create in themselves the kind, or shape, of imagined community to be defended from these regimes’ depredations; to put it another way, none provided the framework of a new consciousness — the scarcely-seen periphery of its vision — as opposed to centre-field objects of its admiration or disgust. In accomplishing this specific task, pilgrim creole functionaries and provincial creole printmen played the decisive historic role.114

In a later chapter Anderson continues the story into the period of twentieth-century anti-colonial nationalism where once again the administrative unit “came to acquire a national meaning in part because it circumscribed the ascent of creole functionaries.”115 Here the vanguard role of intelligentsias “derived from their bilingual literacy, or rather literacy and bilingualism. Print-literacy already made possible the imagined community floating in homogeneous, empty time.... Bilingualism meant access, through the European language-of-state, to modern Western culture in the broadest sense, and, in particular, to the models of nationalism, nation-ness, and nation-state produced elsewhere in the course of the nineteenth century.”116 Similarly, just as frustrated
westernized intellectuals tended to be the primary movers in the decolonization efforts that ended overseas European empires and created new states in Asia and Africa, in the last years of the Soviet empire, Soviet-trained intellectuals were the catalysts in a series of anti-centrist movements for greater autonomy, cultural rights, and ultimately independence. Intellectuals in Armenia, Georgia, and the Baltic republics eventually came to power in relatively free elections, while in other republics, notably Central Asia and Azerbaijan, established political elites managed to crush the fledgling nationalist groupings and transform themselves into the ostensible leaders of the nation. Borrowing from the universal discourse of the nation, both anti-colonialist intellectuals and state elites attempted to make the case for their peoples' right to exist as nations and states, weakening the will of the colonizers to maintain the former empires, and enhancing their own claim as the leaders of newly independent states.

Nationalist intellectuals beyond Europe and the Americas introduced the idea of the modern and allied the local to the global within their societies. Though they began as relatively isolated groups of intellectuals, nationalist movements were able to translate into mass movements with the participation of charismatics like Gandhi or in alliance with the military. Intellectual nationalism thus preceded a sense of nationality among the population. By articulating forcefully the distinction between the colonized and the colonizer, they fostered a sense of the “people-nation.” Colonial nationalists rejected the imperial rulers while in admiration of their technology and statecraft they adopted their western ways to build a new post-colonial state. Just as in the earlier Russian Revolution, so in the anti-colonial revolutions and the post-Soviet transformations, wherever the transition was revolutionary and the former imperial elite was swept aside, intellectuals made their way into the seats of power. With power, however, their identity as intellectuals becomes ever more difficult to maintain; at least it becomes increasingly contentious. State power is not, however, the only threat to intellectual distinction.

INTELLECTUAL CHALLENGES

Commodification is another threat to intellectuals, especially in advanced capitalist societies. In such societies, celebrity can overpower intellectual work and notoriety can replace the acclaim of the scholarly community. To become a “public intellectual” requires some engagement with commodified media, and in so doing, the public intellectual risks becoming the media pundit. Intellectuals can themselves be claimed by consumer culture. Zygmunt Bauman writes,

Consumer culture creates its own, self-sustained and self-sufficient world, complete with its own heroes and pace-setters.... Tightly squeezed by the consumer heroes, politicians must behave like them -- or perish.... 'N'ews' is mostly a tool of forgetting, a way of crowding out yesterday’s headlines from the audience consciousness.... [W]ithin the context of consumer culture no room has been left for the intellectual as legislator. Even in France, a society that accords intellectuals greater distinction than most other advanced capitalist societies, intellectual prestige has become increasingly the consequence of media access, which is in turn determined by the ease with which their products are commodified and circulated through media. Under these circumstances,
then, intellectuals and the articulation of the nation change. That articulation becomes more difficult to consider without considering its increasingly commodified media.

Intellectual distinction has also receded with the displacement of the general intellectual. Bauman has argued that the rationalizing intrusive state of modernity, the nation state, created the space for modern intellectuals by inviting them to provide a culture which legitimates that state's intervention into new spheres of social life. Once state and culture are so constructed, the general intellectual recedes in importance. Simply put, intellectuals retreat to a relatively privileged life of autonomy (the independent intellectual), become the interpreter for cultures not represented by the logic of state power (the organic intellectual), or become a servant of bureaucratic power (a professional or technocrat). This shift, however, has not made intellectuals irrelevant.

As Foucault notes, the displacement of the "universal" intellectual, the writer as figurehead, by the "specific" intellectual, the specialist, the expert, since the Second World War has not lessened the interest of power in the intellectual. With J. Robert Oppenheimer, the atomic scientist who headed the Manhattan Project, Foucault writes, "For the first time, the intellectual was hounded by political powers, no longer on account of the general discourse which he conducted, but because of the knowledge at his disposal: it was at this level that he constituted a political threat." The specific intellectual is "no longer he who bears the values of all, opposes the unjust sovereign or his ministers and makes his cry resound even beyond the grave. It is rather he who, along with a handful of others, has at his disposal, whether in the service of the State or against it, powers which can either benefit or irrevocably destroy life. He is no longer the rhapsodist of the eternal, but the strategist of life and death."

Although intellectuals do own certain kinds of knowledge which are variably powerful, they continue to be made themselves by social forces beyond their jurisdiction and their effect is magnified or diminished by institutions and cultural projects in which they are embedded. The state, after all, was the principal agent behind the making of intellectuals like Oppenheimer. It also produced the bounty of elementary particle physicists in 1980s America, whose overproduction was a consequence of state investments in higher education and research. This in turn, however, was a consequence of an ideology of the nation: the national interest in the Cold War, in which particle physics was deemed essential to national security to stay ahead of the Soviet Union's own imagined military prowess. And now, without the link to the Cold War and national security, this intellectual specialization has lost its clout and its Texas supercollider.

Universities are the most immediate institution that simultaneously produces intellectuals and serves as their sanctuary. This institution can provide its resident and incipient intellectuals with the autonomy to define their mission and preserve their distinction from a more "interested" pursuit of knowledge stimulated by profit or power. This autonomy can be defended on its own grounds, but it also contributes to the public welfare by providing an institution from which truth can be spoken to power. Such an institution is important for all democratic societies, but it is increasingly difficult to preserve in post-communist societies where universities and other institutions of research and higher education fail to provide the material conditions that enable intellectuals
to choose "truth" over professional or bureaucratic service. Market research and governmental consulting become increasingly lucrative substitutes for intellectual practice.

In general, universities also are national institutions in which national historiographies and historians are produced, and entire specializations or disciplines are cast within a national frame. Within the USA, for instance, whole departments of sociology can focus only on its own nation, as if the study of one society were enough to produce expertise on societies in general. Departments of political science identify American politics as a speciality entirely apart from comparative politics in which the rest of the world is studied. Of course, this kind of ethnocentrism is unlikely to be viewed by most Americans as a reflection of the nation's ideological centrality much less as an expression of nationalism. That is partly because nationalism in the USA specifically, and in the advanced capitalist world generally, tends to be less obvious because it is both more deeply insinuated in the reproduction of power, rather than its transformation. It is also attached more directly to those ideologies which claim the universality of being on top, rather than in the particularities of resistance. This, however, may be in the process of deep transformation.

As the power of the nation state recedes and as capital and other social relations become more global, the university itself is likely to be transformed. The globalization of scholarship, scholars and students within leading universities of the advanced countries challenge the ways in which these institutions generate national visions and national intellectuals. The more immediate challenge to that national formation of intellectuality, however, comes from the proliferation of contest over claims to competence.

In the United States, cultural wars over the canon of the humanities, over the appropriateness of weapons research on university campuses, over affirmative action and over freedom of speech are not just isolated academic arguments, but contests that are redefining the relationship between intellectuals, universities and the nation. These contests are demonstrating the importance and profundity of a university life guided by academic ideals. The losers in these contests are, however, likely to contribute to the delegitimation of the university as intellectual sanctuary by claiming that ideology, rather than intellectuality, rules. Familiar epithets like "tenured radicals" or "racist administration" and charges of duplicity on all sides help to undermine the notion that intellectuals of various inclinations can belong to the same communities of discourse, and that intellectuals can share a culture of critical discourse.

From without, these contests may appear to make intellectuals no different from others motivated by ideology, profit or power. It can lead some, nostalgic for mythological days of a single canon and uncontested claims to competence, to question why intellectuals need a different kind of institution to articulate the truth when the intellectual distinction is so dubious. Ironically, or perhaps tragically, at the very moment when intellectual debate becomes ever more important for rearticulating the nation in the USA, the institution and its defining qualities, like tenure, itself are being doubted. And in such times, the challenge to intellectuals may be terrific; for in the contest over truth, the very importance of preserving and strengthening such a site may become increasingly important. Not only need its autonomy be preserved, for the development of intellectuality as such. It also must find a way to extend its influence when commodified media and corporate or state sponsored knowledge
overwhelm the public sphere. The university, in these circumstances, becomes an especially important place to cultivate the general intellectual as a trans-national community, if not as an individual. If that discourse cannot be generated within the university, then it is unlikely to be generated anywhere.

Intellectuals are significant in the articulation of nations. This is relatively obvious in the modern world of newly-emerging states and post-colonial nations where new states attempt to nationalize themselves and embryonic nations seek full statehood. There, intellectuals find familiar and obvious work in the codification of more pure languages, in the production of histories and future scenarios. Although post-modern conditions in the developed capitalist world might reduce the prominence of traditional intellectuals, intellectual powers remain potentially quite significant. In order to recognize their powers, however, new theoretical tools must be developed to recognize the distinction of a dispersed intellectuality and its potential organization within university settings only partially insulated from the circuits of capital, power and ideology that characterize public discourse beyond its walls. And as the nation is transformed through processes of globalization, the analysis of this intellectual articulation becomes ever more critical.

We hope this book inspires many more works on intellectuals in the articulation of the nation, for much needs to be done. First of all, the variety of ways in which different kinds of intellectuals articulate the nation ought to be studied. These articulations need be assessed in different circumstances, in times of rapid social transformation, explicit social struggle, quiet resistance and apparent social reproduction. We need not only study how intellectuals articulate the nation, but also how the nation articulates intellectuals, as well as how intellectuals are embedded in everyday life, institutional arrangements, power relations, and above all, the discourse of the nation. If nationalism remains the most powerful of the world’s explicit ideologies, then the functions and distinctions of intellectuals will be transformed as the nation itself moves from its initial consolidations, to the contest over its expression, to its potential transformation by globalization. These questions might be approached anywhere, of course, but we focus here on the distinction of Eastern Europe and Eurasia.

THE DISTINCTION OF EASTERN EUROPE AND EURASIA

We have this geographical focus not only because the two of us have been specialists in this world region and associates of the University of Michigan Center for Russian and East European Studies. It is also because Eastern Europe provides a fertile empirical ground for examples of nationalism and has been disproportionately influential in generating theories of both the nation and of the intelligentsia. Consider, for instance, Jeromy Karabel’s sociological attempt to develop a theory of intellectuals and politics. The following conditions make radical intellectual politics more likely:

1) the presence of well-organized and politically radical subordinate social groups; 2) the absence of a strong business class; 3) a high ratio of ‘relatively unattached’ intellectuals to those employed by large scale organizations; 4) the presence of a moderately repressive regime that lacks the means and or the will to stamp out dissent; 5) weakness or divisions within the ruling group; 6) when the state is unable to protect the ‘people’ or the ‘nation’ from economic, political,
or military encroachments from other states that occupy more powerful positions in the world system; 7) the presence of sharp boundaries between social groups, including the boundary separating intellectuals from non-intellectuals (i.e. the people); 8) the existence of historically grounded cultural repertoires of resistance to authority.125

There are few places in the world which have such a concentration of these conditions as in Eastern Europe and the lands comprising the former Soviet Union. And it is in radical politics that the most powerful linkages between intellectuals and transformative practices can be found. By using these more dramatic moments as a lens, or as a comparative base, theories of intellectuals and politics are typically built, but not without their limitations.

The relationship between the East European intelligentsia and communist regimes and progressive social movements has been the typical focus of sociologists like Karabel and Kennedy who focus on intellectuals and power. In this collection we seek to go beyond the particularly problematic relationships between communism and intellectuals, and rather focus on what likely complicates that relationship between intellectuals and radical politics in Eastern Europe, Russia and the Caucasus: the relation between intellectuals and the nation. Indeed, and especially for those scholars who have long focused on the relationship between intellectuals and left politics, we find another of Geoff Eley's recent reminders quite useful: that national politics has shaped left politics profoundly and not always in such obvious ways that one can leave the relationship unstated. In particular, at the turn of the century, it was difficult to say what nation the intellectuals of the German labor movement were articulating, given the "cosmopolitan messiness" of the period.126 Part of our effort in this volume is to show how the nation is indeed "messy," and where it is not, how intellectuals have contributed to fixing its clarity. Indeed, in each of the articles, the "fixing" of the nation -- whether in more familiar terms as in defining its membership or claims to a state, or in less commonly discussed terms, as in relation to matters of democracy, gender and business -- is the object of intellectual labor. Thus, one virtue of this region has been that it has several of modernity's powerful ideologies -- liberalism, communism and nationalism -- well articulated in opposition to, and in conjunction with each other, making the significance of intellectual labor in reformulating them more obvious than they might be in other sites.127

We are not only, however, focusing on these ideological labilities. By studying the agents themselves, their own social production, we can also explore the making of this intellectual power. We are considering, therefore, not just the fixing of messy nations in periods of dramatic social transformation. We also seek those more mundane moments, where the "quiet" politics of nation-making are being conducted through intellectual labor. Thus we consider how the social conditions and national discourses which envelope intellectuals shape their own work, and establish the conditions at least of the production of intellectuals, their articulation, if not also their influence.

Finally, this collection is an attempt to introduce a more nuanced approach to intellectuals and the articulation of the nation by considering how the relationship is itself influenced by the gaze of the theorist themselves. We wish to suggest the importance of the analyst's conditions of scholarly production in accounts of
intellectuals and power. Simply put, the power relations in which an analyst is embedded inflect the story of intellectuals and power that is told. The story of Emilia Plater in this case can then become exemplary.

In 1830, Emilia Plater, subsequently elevated to the pantheon of Polish national heroes, led a regiment of men to storm the fortress of Dynaburg. Halina Filipowicz compares various ways in which Plater’s life was used by different intellectuals at different times to emphasize different themes. While some have noted that Plater was elevated to that pantheon because Adam Mickiewicz, in his poem, “The Death of a Colonel”, found the literary device that could install her as hero at a moment of need, Filipowicz writes that Plater’s elevation was more deeply implicated in a complex politics of class, nation and gender. Her Lithuanian aristocratic status meant her sacrifice was all the greater; her wealthy relatives promoted her cause; and her virginity, implied but underplayed in all texts, was absolutely central, especially for those of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in which “her inviolate body is a metaphor of moral good as well as an urgent political symbol of national integrity, a projection of future restoration and unity”. Underlying all of these portraits, however, was an emphasis on her patriotism, rather than her challenge to gender hierarchies.

Because we wish to highlight the importance of the conditions of scholarly production on the products of intellectuals, we have included autobiographical essays of our volume’s contributors in this collection. If the social production of intellectuals is so important for the articulation of nations, the authors represented in this collection are themselves ‘nationed’ and imprinted with a particular life experience that enables, and constrains, them to make the arguments that they do. While short autobiographical statements are hardly adequate to explaining the articles written here, they suggest the directions of research we find essential to a theory of “nationed intellectual practice”. We shall let these autobiographical statements more or less represent themselves. In the conclusion, however, we shall discuss the essays in order to construct a more positive direction for the analysis of intellectuals in the articulation of the nation. We only provide a brief introduction below.

CONTRIBUTIONS

In the opening essay Alexander J. Motyl challenges the now widely-accepted constructivist view on nation-making. Constructivists or modernists, including the editors of this volume, have argued that nations are neither primordial, perennial, or natural divisions of humanity but rather the historically contingent and relatively recent product of imagination and invention. Without returning to primordialism, Motyl questions the role of elites in the “invention of tradition” and the generation of national identity and emphasizes the collective undertakings of ordinary people, those who orally transmit myths and epics, poems and songs, and live the lives that contribute the raw material for national identification.

Khachig Tololyan employs his skills as a literary scholar to illuminate a key early nineteenth-century Armenian poem that stands at the point of transition from the self-conception of the Armenian community as religious, oppressed, and dispersed, to a proto-national discourse of return, liberation, and restoration. Tololyan’s story is of a nationalist intelligentsia that operated outside of Ottoman Armenia in the dispersed communities of India, Venice, Moscow, Tbilisi, and Constantinople, where “a distant diaspora re-invented, re-imagined,
reconceived the homeland.” Patriotic intellectuals and self-proclaimed liberators constructed a national tradition, linking discrete events in the past into a continuous narrative of the nation subject (the subjugated nation) moving through history toward emancipation.

John-Paul Himka enthusiastically embraces the new theoretical openings of the recent nationalism literature to examine the contest of identities that Galician Rusyns held in the nineteenth century and explain why some identities resonated while others were silenced. Among a people that called themselves “Rus,” Galician nobles were Polonized, both linguistically and religiously, long before the nineteenth century, and even the first generation of “nationalists,” the patriotic clerics, had adopted Polish culture. But from Poland they had a template of national culture available for application to their own experience. A Russophilic orientation competed with a weak Belorussian alternative, but religion prevented full merger with the Catholic Poles or the Orthodox Russians. Himka’s explanation for the potency of a Ukrainian identity by the early twentieth century is historically contextualized in the politics of the Austrian state, the preferences of the local church, and the intense competition between Ukrainophile and Russophile intellectuals.

Yuri Slezkine uses the figure of Nikolai Marr, the dean of early Soviet linguists, to show how a powerfully placed intellectual not only established a unique pedigree for his mother language but more grandly attempted to solve the “Ethnological Predicament” (the missing symmetry among language, nation, state, and territory) with an elaborate classificatory system. Here authority was conferred by a discourse of science and the imprimatur of the Soviet state, possessor of or at least arbiter of truth. Marr’s work began in tsarist Russia, but it was with the empowerment of loyal intellectuals by the Soviets and in the context of the collaboration of intellectuals in the generation of a particular Soviet Marxism that Marr’s linguistics took its final shape. But Marr’s “final solution of the Great Ethnological Predicament proved temporary.” (p. 40) Scholars and state officials picked away at his theories until in 1950 the question of the relation of language to social base was “resolved” by Stalin himself.

While Marr was the quintessential establishment intellectual during his later life, Antonio Gramsci and Dimitris Glinos were, in Janet Hart’s phrase “civil intellectuals” who combined critical thinking with political activity, like the Russian intelligency of the nineteenth century, to save their nations from perceived disaster. Reading closely their letters and articles, Hart explores the “paralanguage” of the nation that lies behind the more explicit expression of politics. Deeply imbedded in the work of these revolutionary intellectuals was a commitment to “generativity,” the inspiration and education of young people to carry on the national revolutionary cause.

Andrzej Walicki is critical of the rush by scholars to imagination and invention as the primary forms of nation-making. His own historical narrative proposes an alternation between moments of ethnic consolidation, as in medieval Poland, and intellectual reconceptualization, as in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Contests over conceptions of the nation marked the politics and high culture of Poland through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but, he maintains, ultimately intellectuals only can imagine a nation on “a firm ethnic basis.”

Katherine Verdery explores a dynamic moment just after the fall of the Communist regime in Rumania when politicians, dissidents, and other intellectuals competed over definitions of the nation and its connection to Europe. Focusing on the “political economy of symbolism,” she weighs the relative power of different
conceptualizations and finds that more inclusive, multinational models or borrowed notions of "civil society" fail to resonate as loudly as the master symbol of "the nation" conceived more ethnically. But the opposition of the nation to notions of a liberal civil society does not exhaust the complex interrelationship of liberalism and nationalism.

As Michael D. Kennedy shows, both liberalism and nationalism are labile ideologies, internally discordant discourses in which the very understanding of liberalism requires the understanding of the nation and vice versa. Kennedy extends the category of intellectual to include articulate Polish businessmen who self-consciously cultivate images of and play the functional role of more traditionally-conceived intellectuals. Their business activity is involved in the articulation of a new Polish nation, now imbricated in the global networks of liberalism, democracy, and capitalism.

Originating in a lecture series on Ethnopolitics and Culture proposed by Ron Suny, this volume reflects the theme developed by him, Michael Kennedy, and Zvi Gitelman at the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Michigan in 1993 and 1994. Funded by the University of Michigan's Council on International Academic Affairs, the series was administered by Donna Parmelee, whose contribution was invaluable. The editors are grateful to the University, the Center, their colleagues, the University of Michigan Press, its external reviewers and our editor Susan Whitlock, not to mention the series' participants, for all their work and advice. Without their effort and help, this volume would not have come together. We also wish to thank Liz, Emma, Lucas, Armena, Sevan and Anoush, for without their support, we could never find the spirit and time to complete this volume. Thank you.
NOTES

1 Forthcoming in Ronald Grigor Suny and Michael D. Kennedy, Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation (University of Michigan Press). From the beginning, this volume, the introduction, and conclusion have been the result of the collaborative work of the co-editors, with the invaluable input of the paper writers. As we wrote, rewrote, discussed, argued with, and learned from each other, we lost a sense of who had originated or developed an idea or line of argument. This process has given us a greater appreciation of the value of collaborative work, especially since many of the conventions and rewards in the academy encourage more solipsistic practices of research and writing.


12 Robert Wuthnow, Communities of Discourse: Ideology and Social Structure in the Reformation, the Enlightenment and European Socialism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989 likewise makes articulation his central concept for exploring the relationship between ideology and social structure, but focuses on the environment and the institutionalization of ideas.


15 Ibid., p. 31.


20 Ibid., p. 7.


23 Ibid., pp. 32-35.

24 Ibid., p. 19.


32 Ibid., p. 77. In this, Volovici is explicitly invoking Kolakowski’s 1972 essay.


51 Jacek Kurczewski, “Power and Wisdom: The Expert as Mediating Figure in Contemporary Polish History,” in Ian Maclean et al., The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals, pp. 77-100.


54 Ibid., p. 76.


58 Geoff Eley, “Intellectuals and the German Labor Movement” in Leon Fink et al., Intellectuals and Public Life, p. 75.


60 Ibid., p. xi.

61 Ibid., p. xii.

62 Ibid., p. 9.

63 For this distinction, see Kennedy, “The Lessons of Eastern Europe for Critical Intellectuals”, op cit.


70 Charles Derber, William A. Schwartz and Yale Magrass, Power in the Highest Degree: Professionals and Rise of a New Mandarin Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). The culture of rational discourse includes these elements: a) a claim to scientific method and detachment; or to be rational and objective; b) anonymity and an impersonal relationship to clients; c) reification of the object of inquiry; d) abstraction and an emphasis on measurement, which allows for that absence of morality from the questions professionals investigate, and for a distinction from "craftsmen." This rational discourse is the dominant ideology of professionalism: critical discourse is at best a rival flower, and one that focuses more on the importance of making any assumption subject to critique. Rational discourse people, however, do not question the assumptions and find truth to exist outside their own forms of inquiry. One might say too that rational discourse people are more likely to see knowledge for exchange, rather than knowledge for itself, but this is not a perfect correlation.


73 Ironically, some argue that while Foucault emphasizes the constitution of subjectivity, even of intellectual subjectivity, his own writing implies a kind of traditional intellectual disposition, in which he "chooses freely and joyously to be a specific, deglobalized, local and counter-mnemonic intellectual". (R. Radhakrishnan, "Toward an Effective Intellectual: Foucault or Gramsci?", p. 70)


76 See also Jeffery Goldfarb, On Cultural Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

77 Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism, p. 311.


80 Jacek Kurczewski, "Power and Wisdom: The Expert as Mediating Figure in Contemporary Polish History," in Ian Maclean et al. (eds.).


85 The difficulty of recognizing intellectual distinction is not only a postmodern condition, but might also be recognized as a postmodern disposition in viewing earlier periods. Richard Carlisle and his zetetic movement in nineteenth century England are not typically thought of in terms of “intellectual” politics, but once put into a Gramscian frame suggest one of the challenges of radical intellectuals in an inhospitable popular culture. See James Epstein, “Bred as a Mechanic: Plebian Intellectuals and Popular Politics in Nineteenth Century England,” in Leon Fink, et al. (eds.), Intellectuals and Public Life, pp 53-73.


88 Ibid.

89 Janet Hart, New Voices in the Nation: Women and the Greek Resistance, 1941-1964 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996). Beyond demonstrating how the movement transformed the lives of women, Hart also has to argue against the dominant historiographical literature on the EAM as a ‘communist and anti-national’ movement. By comparing the EAM to the Yugoslav Partisans, whose odes to Stalin were extreme but did not last, the Greek movement was far more inclusive and populist in its mobilization narrative.

90 Geoff Eley, “Intellectuals and the German Labor Movement” in Fink et al., Intellectuals and Public Life, uses these points as a point of departure to consider intellectuals and the German labor movement. See especially p. 75.


93 Much as Jadwiga Staniszkis charged Solidarity of 1980-81 with a kind of moral rebelliousness which appeared oppositional but was only a pseudo-radicalism that promised no systemic transformation because of its reproduction of the redistributive, not rational economy. See Jadwiga Staniszkis, Poland’s Self-Limiting Revolution: Solidarity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).


95 Ibid., p. 77.

96 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism. p. 10.

97 Smith, Theories of Nationalism, p. 87. Florian Znaniecki also emphasized this in an earlier age of scholarship.


101 Ibid., p. 106.


Berlin, Vico and Herder, p. 163.


Walicki, Stanislaw Brzozowski and the Polish Beginnings of Western Marxism, pp. 162-65; 275-314.

Ibid., p. 298.

Ibid., pp. 301-09.


Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 58, 60.

Ibid., p. 65.

Ibid., p. 114.

Ibid., p. 116.

This is one of the themes in Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters, p. 167.

Regis Debray emphasizes this mediological approach; see his Teachers, Writers, Celebrities, trans. by David Macey (London, 1981); cited in Donald M. Reid, “Regis Debray: Republican in a Democratic Age” in Fink, et al. (eds.), Intellectuals and Public Life, pp. 121-44.


Ibid., p. 129.

Cited in Daniel Kevles, “The Death of the Superconducting Supercollider: The End of the Cold War and Particle Physics” Beyond the Wall: March 24-26 1995 Conference at the Advanced Study Center, International Institute, University of Michigan.


127 Harsanyi and Kennedy, “Between Utopia and Distopia.”


129 p. 45

130 She was celebrated in an American feminist’s text, but was apparently not so well received by many readers of that volume. Ibid., pp. 37-38.