Constituting Post-communism:
The Intelligentsia, Civil Society and Round Tables in Hungary and Poland
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The most prominent actor in the 1989 transformation of Eastern Europe was the intelligentsia, a class whose basis for power is its control over a special form of teleological knowledge, and a culturally constituted group whose claim to authority is its historic role as leaders of East European nations. On the basis of their claim to represent civil society, the intelligentsia, in association with the communist authorities, developed a form of transformative praxis, the Round Table, which enabled the peaceful yet fundamental transformation of Soviet-type society. In the wake of such “negotiated revolutions”, the intelligentsia appeared to win political authority. What enabled the intelligentsia to win this kind of political power, and does the mode of its victory matter for subsequent political and social transformations?

Answers to such questions require a broad comparative and historical sociology of the transformations wrought by the praxis of 1988-91. It is far beyond the ambition and capacity of this essay to address changes throughout Eastern Europe. I nevertheless believe that the comparison between Hungary and Poland is extremely important.

At first glance, these transformations were substantially different. The Polish transformation was based on a cross-class alliance in civil society against the authorities, while the Hungarian transition depended more on a negotiated alliance between Party reformers and opposition intellectuals. As such, one might argue that these two cases represent fundamental alternatives in the making of consequential post-communist social and political change. In the broader scope of things, however, they are also remarkably similar. These two societies moved the transformation of all Soviet-type societies. They tested the limits of tolerance in Soviet foreign policy and they developed the particular mode of transformation – the Round Table – that enabled the peaceful but fundamental transformation of the system.

Gorbachev’s perestroika was of course the necessary condition for systemic transformation in Eastern Europe, but it was itself moved by the experiences of Poland and Hungary. Both Poland and Hungary were
observed closely by Soviet authorities as a model for communism’s transformation. Nevertheless, General Jaruzelski’s failure to restore economic and political order without compromise with Solidarity meant that the Soviets were facing few options in Poland at the end of the 1980s other than invasion or allowing emancipation. The relative costs of the invasion and withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan probably suggested to many Soviet leaders that emancipation would cost the USSR far less than occupation. Thus, while Gorbachev’s “Sinatra doctrine” was critical to enabling the emancipation of Eastern Europe, this Soviet reorientation was made also by the politics on Moscow’s periphery.

These were eventful politics. Polish struggles enabled the development of the first successful example of Round Table negotiations, concluded on April 5, 1989. The Hungarian authorities and opposition both learned from these Polish developments. The opposition formed the Opposition Round Table on March 22, 1989, approximating in Hungarian conditions that which proved successful for Polish Solidarity. The Hungarian authorities also took the lead in some ways, especially in international relations. They tore down the barbed wire on their border with Austria on May 2, 1989, enabling East German citizens to escape to Western Europe. When the Hungarian authorities announced on September 11 that they would not repatriate refugees to their country of origin, East German citizens fled through Hungary for the West by the thousands. The Polish electoral results of June 4, and the invitation to form a Solidarity-led government under Tadeusz Mazowiecki on August 24, 1989, dramatically expanded the notion of what was possible in Eastern Europe. Given the outcomes of the Polish negotiations, the Hungarian authorities themselves were moved to negotiate with the opposition. After inaugural speeches on June 13, the Hungarian authorities used the Round Table to position themselves to win legitimacy through electoral means.

These democratic transformations in Poland and Hungary were not lost on the rest of the region. Emigration and demonstrations in East Germany during the fall led to the collapse of the Berlin Wall on November 9. Without hardline allies in Poland, Hungary or East Germany, the Czechoslovak authorities were increasingly isolated, and the opposition felt increasingly empowered. Building on the examples of their neighbors, the opposition developed its own Civic Forum and negotiated its own revolution, culminating in the election of Vaclav Havel as President on December 29, 1989. In this context, Bulgarian authorities attempted their own perestroika from November 10 till December 14, which itself led to Round Table negotiations there in January of 1990. Romania’s violent conflict between December 16 and 25, 1989 provided televised examples to the region, and to the
world, of the violent alternative to communism’s negotiated end. Keeping the transformation off the streets and at the negotiating table was a longstanding ambition even for the Poles and the Hungarians who didn’t have the benefit of the Romanian counterexample. The initiatives of Poles and Hungarians provided the example for the peaceful transition of Eastern Europe.

The success of their initiatives depended on the elevation of the intelligentsia as the representative of civil society in Round Table negotiations. This parallel acquisition of authority depended, however, on very different processes in Poland and Hungary. The timing of compromise and the dependencies of the intelligentsia were consequentially different. While in both cases, the intelligentsia has since “retired from the stage” the intellectual politics they undertook in the late 1980s continues to shape the alternatives within post-communist capitalism available today. In this essay, I shall emphasize the process by which the intelligentsia won this authority and developed this particular mode of emancipatory praxis. I’ll conclude by considering some of the implications of my comparison for subsequent social and political change in Hungary and Poland.

The Intelligentsia and Civil Society in Hungary and Poland

The Soviet-type system reinforced the prominence, already considerable before World War II, of the intelligentsia. As it enlarged the ranks of the intelligentsia with the expansion of higher education, it simultaneously made the autonomous intellectual scarce, thus elevating its value in cultural politics. Revisionism offered a marvelous strategy for the intellectual to redefine the communist project, and elevate the intellectual’s role in political authority. That explicitly marked project of revisionism failed, however, especially after the March 1968 repression in Poland, and the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia later that year. From that time forward in Poland, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to describe intellectuals as being on the road to class power.

In Hungary, by contrast, the intelligentsia remained on the road to class power, at least through the beginning of the 1970s. While Konrad and Szelenyi’s thesis was certainly contentious, by the end of the 1980s this vision of communist rule may have triumphed. At least the Nemeth government in 1989 called itself a “government of experts”. More broadly, one might interpret Gorbachev’s vision of perestroika, and the hopes of other reform communists to rest on the foundations of such a vision of rule by the intelligentsia. In Poland, that vision proved impossible to cultivate under communist rule, despite the attempt by communist authorities.
The Polish politics of intellectual responsibility put terrific pressure on intellectuals to choose whether they would serve civil society or the authorities. The seeds for this kind of antagonistic politics could be found in the failure of revisionism in 1968, but the failure of Gierèk’s approach to professionalism was the final blow. The politics of Solidarity 1980-81 assured that intellectual responsibility would lie with the intelligentsia’s immersion in civil society identified in opposition to the authorities. Already in 1976, Adam Michnik among others insisted that revisionism and neo-positivism were no longer viable, while his Hungarian counterpart, Janos Kis, was still insisting a decade later that “the resolution of the country’s crisis is conceivable only in the form of compromise.”

There were many lessons of 1956 for Hungarians, but one of the most important may have been that compromise is better than fundamental confrontation. Kis writes,

Hungarian society has yet to come to terms with the total defeat it suffered at that time, and those in power have yet to overcome the burdens of their victory. The economic crisis which in the 80s overwhelms Hungary is the crisis of the restoration regime which came into existence thirty years ago... Today we must remember the restoration not just in order to regain moral integrity, but in order to understand the present political crisis of the regime. We have to analyze former (failed) proposals of conciliation in order to find a more effective compromise to our present and future (perhaps less hopeless situation). The events of 1956-57 develop from a moral issue into a political one.

Kis’s analysis of that period clearly informs, and reflects, the Hungarian political strategy of the 1980s. He follows a form of historical explanation based on radical contingency rather than deterministic logic. He emphasizes how various “accidents” shaped subsequent events. For instance, had there been no Soviet tanks introduce to Budapest on 23 October, a new government under the aegis of the People’s Patriotic Front might have been formed and a multi-party system not become inevitable. Or when the Kadar government took power with the aid of Soviet tanks, the Kadarism of that period, could have been replaced by the retrieval of Stalinists or by a negotiated compromise with Imre Nagy.

This kind of historical explanation encourages the adoption of a political strategy based on compromise rather than fundamentalist politics. In particular, Kis studies the strategies of the workers’ council movement as examples, especially significant given that they survived the formal restoration of the Kadar government in Budapest on 7 November. The peaceful resistance by the Greater Budapest Central Workers Council, formed on 14 November, was the first exemplar of sophisticated compromise politics. They gradually dropped their demands for
the restoration of the Nagy government and multiparty system as well as the departure of Soviet troops in favor of promoting the self-organization of workers’ councils as well as council access to an open public sphere.22 The Stalinist wing of the Party had grown increasingly strong toward the end of November, however, and provoked enough violent conflict to end the possibility of negotiations with politically minded workers councils. The second phase of council resistance was dominated by the Csepel Iron and Metal Works workers council, which had advocated a less political function for councils, and took the restored Kadarist regime as its point of departure, not the ideals of the Hungarian revolution. But by 8-11 January, the possibility of even this kind of compromise was ruined by the increasing hard line of the Kadarist government, and the violent suppression of a strike by that factory’s workers. These compromise strategies might have worked, he thinks, had the international scene and internal conflicts been different.

These council activities give him the inspiration for seeking a politics of compromise in the search for democracy.23 But the legacy of 1956 has destroyed that democratic capacity already proven. To cope with the demand Kadar made, that society “forget” its experience in return for material compensation,24 society had to withdraw into private life. Under these circumstances, Kis writes,25

Whether a privatized society identifies with its defeated struggles or tries to forget them depends decisively on what its spiritual leaders – writers, journalists, artists, historians, priests, teachers – articulate. They, after all, are in the position that, by virtue of their profession, their words and silence constitute a public statement. It depends on them to decide if they will provide symbols of loyalty and models of endurance to be emulated. In Hungary, this stratum did not supply society with the instruments to enable it to remain loyal to its revolution while making peace with reality. Indeed, the selfsame intelligentsia evolved into the source and foundation of the consensus that insists that the cultivation of intellectual opposition is a 19th century romantic pose and inappropriate to Realpolitik.

In contrast to Hungary, Poland had no shortage of opposition or surplus of silence. Indeed, this was partially a consequence of its 1956. For Poland, 1956 was initially a year of triumph, a time when Polish party authorities defied Soviet authorities, opened new cultural boundaries, ended experiments with agricultural collectivization, established better relations with the Catholic Church, and legalized greater workplace democracy through workers councils. Even if this “Polish October” led to disappointment a few years later, and outright rejection by 1968, it was a far cry from the total defeat that 1956 signified for Hungary’s opposition.26
By 1980 in Poland, 1956 barely figured into the opposition's consciousness. The legacy of workers’ council and revisionist Party politics was far less important to consider than the issues raised by the 1968, 1970/71 and 1976 events which made independent trade unions, the loyalties of intellectuals, and the making of civil society central to the transformative agenda. The development of the Solidarity movement over 1980-81 made those strategic emphases socially real phenomena. The politics of compromise that Kis advocated in the mid 1980s was morally reprehensible for many Polish intellectuals. In fact, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that the imposition of martial law on December 13, 1981, turned the Polish intelligentsia, writ large, into an opposition to Jaruzelski’s regime. Poland established its “exceptionalism” with the militance and organization of its working class. The politics of intellectual responsibility became a matter of where one allied, rather than whether one would be public or private in the exercise of intellectual responsibility. This created the social foundation for a strong politics of intellectual opposition and opposition to any compromise that could resemble cooptation.

The contrast could not be clearer. In the late 1970s and early 1980s in Hungary, the opposition was relatively limited, and it was limited primarily to intelligentsia and students. Samizdat materials, a private charity to help the poor, the beginning of a tolerated political opposition in the 1985 Parliamentary elections, and an independent peace movement characterized the opposition in the first half of the decade. The environmental movement called the Danube Circle proved one of the most significant opposition activities by mid decade. In Poland, the 9.5 million member Solidarity movement, with its base among skilled workers in large factories and the support of the Catholic Church, promised that the opposition was socially broad, and not limited to the highly educated. This distinction would inform the way in which the politics of the Round Table could be constructed. In Hungary, the politics of civil society depended on the intelligentsia’s organizations; in Poland, the politics of civil society was based on the intelligentsia’s immersion in the activities of other social groups. The Hungarian intelligentsia led by default. The leadership of the Polish intelligentsia was hardly guaranteed.

The Hegemony of the Hungarian Intelligentsia

Although today the Polish case is treated as “exceptional”27 in the 1980s the Polish case established the baseline for asking why workers were not oppositional in other societies, notably Hungary.28 The authorities of other communist led countries may not have treated the Polish case as a baseline, but certainly considered its example a threat.29 The Hungarian authorities themselves could frame their economic reforms in order to provide a
“prophylactic measure to thwart the spread of Polish Solidarity-inspired labor activism”. Whatever the reasons for the implication of Hungarian workers in painting rather than dismantling socialism, it is relatively clear that the opposition was overwhelmed by the leadership of the Hungarian intelligentsia.

There were two dominant currents of Hungarian intelligentsia in the making of the negotiated revolution. The populists were numerically the largest group, and hardest to define formally. Five of its nine founding members were poets and writers. They identified their movement with the needs of the Hungarian nation, defined ethnically or racially. They generally spoke of a “third road” between capitalism and communism. The authorities had cultivated them as an ally, especially since the 1956 revolution, although in the mid-1980s the populists began to identify with some projects of the democratic opposition. The populists formed the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) in 1987 and generally avoided technical programs for economic transition in favor of literary emotional politics. They preferred “intuition to analysis, and literature to social science”. Until the November referendum on the timing of the Presidential election, they were the most successful in Hungarian transition politics, having won each of the four elections in the summer of 1989. They finally won the spring elections in 1990 and together with the Smallholders and Christian Democrats formed the governing coalition in mid-1990. But in the beginning of the revolution, they were the most closely allied with the reformist Party leader, Imre Pozsgay.

The other significant group of intellectuals in the negotiated revolution was called pro-western, democratic, liberal and urban. Many had their origins in the Budapest School of critical Marxism, and many were of Jewish descent. From 1981, their main efforts were directed toward the independent journal Beszelo, but in 1988 they formed the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD). Their program for institutional reform was generally considered the most elaborate and formally specified of all of the opposition. They were often allied informally with reformers within the authorities, especially the reformist legal experts and economists. Many other political parties and social groups formed in the wake of the political openings of 1988, but these liberals and their populist opponents represented the dominant alternative tendencies in the Hungarian opposition. And that was reflected in the spring 1990 elections, as these two parties received the most votes.

The populism of the HDF reproduced the traditional form of Hungarian twentieth century nationalism. Above all, they were concerned with the fate of Hungarian minorities living abroad. They also promoted the idea of Hungary being somehow special and in between east and west, deserving its own unique identity based on an independent small holding peasantry. But by 1989, their emotive program did not suggest as radical a transformation
of the Soviet-type system as the Free Democrats, for the main question of institutional transformation was not based on cultural matters or agriculture's ownership. The Soviet-type system's main antagonist had become the institutionalization of a free market-based civil society, and it was the AFD that promoted this as an alternative to the Forum's populism, and as the means for the transformation of Soviet-type society.

This group had already begun to move down that liberal road in the beginning of the 1980s. Much as in Poland, civil society became the principal alternative politics of emancipation to that of nationalism. To struggle in the Soviet-type system for the rule of law rather than that of the Party, for free associations instead of Party-sponsored organizations, for freedom from censorship and a multi-party system provided Hungarians, like Poles, with a coherent transformative strategy that did not have to elevate one's nation above others. Gyorgy Konrad expressed this simply.35

We want that internal process with which East Central Europe is already pregnant; we want bourgeois civil liberties and an embourgeoisment that is not hedged about with prohibatory decrees. We don't want the authorities to have discretionary rights over us. We want constitutional guarantees; we want it clear that semi-freedom is not freedom, half-truth is not truth, liberalization is not liberalism, democratization is not democracy. We want no less than what the most advanced democracies already have.

Unlike the Polish, however, this Hungarian project was not very successful in providing a program that mobilizes those beyond students and intelligentsia. The groupings discussed above were mainly composed of intellectuals. Two groups formed in 1988-89 illustrate this hegemony of the intelligentsia further.

On 30 March, 1988, thirty-two young intellectuals, students and workers (although mainly law students) established Fidesz, or the League of Young Democrats. The Hungarian acronym was designed intentionally to resemble the Latin fidelis, to symbolize the group's aim and character. Fidesz was constructed as an independent youth organization that would fill the gap left by the Party's youth organization. It was formed on the basis of an imagined civil society, with an ambition to make civil society more real. Following Hungarian postwar political theorist Istvan Bibo, they argued that the law should be made to control the state and its rulers, rather than made to control the people. It argued that the opposition should take rights guaranteed by the constitution seriously, and thus treat the law as if it, rather than the Party, ruled. On that basis, Fidesz used the constitutional guarantee of association to defend their formation. Their leaders were arrested, and legal proceedings were begun against them. But in the three months of trial, the group grew to be more than 2,000 members nationwide. They lost the trial, but
they ultimately won. In January 1989, legislation was passed in the Hungarian parliament that guaranteed rights of assembly.36

As a movement of students and young intellectuals, Fidesz did not claim to represent other classes. The group was mainly symbolic and exemplary, hoping that through their own civil disobedience and pressure for the rule of law others might learn how to exercise their own rights. These activists believed that civil society and the rule of law would represent the interests of everyone, so long as people could learn to exercise their rights. Fidesz activists ultimately would not only seek election to Parliament but also try to promote a broader awareness of legal rights and possibilities to workers and especially peasants. Fidesz thus represented the new "classless" universalism suggested by civil society. For these young lawyers, the emancipatory alternative was a law-based society in which individuals understand their legal rights and are ready to engage them, and where people's economic needs would be satisfied by their participation in a free market of goods and services.37

Given the experience of Polish Solidarity, independent trade unions might have suggested an alternative future for Hungary, but even they were overwhelmingly from the intelligentsia. On 16 May, 1988, the first independent trade union, the Democratic Union of Scientific Workers, representing those who work in the nation's research institutes, was founded. They followed a similar strategy as Fidesz, by acting as if a legal state existed. Because the Hungarian constitution and labor code had no guidelines about the registration of unions, and because Hungary accepted the International Labor Organization's statements on freedom of association, the Union argued that it had the legal right to form.38 Other unions of intelligentsia were formed in its wake, including those of filmmakers and teachers. The principal affiliates of the federative Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions, founded on 20 December 1988, also were white collar unions. Blue collar workers remained organized by and large by the old communist led unions.

The hegemony of the intelligentsia in the construction of Hungarian civil society was not only apparent in the personnel of its associations or in the philosophies of its proponents. Hungary's negotiated revolution was itself derived from the interactions of this intelligentsia with Party officials, in typically intellectual forms: conferences and publications.

The most proximate foundation for the negotiated revolution was Hungary's economic crisis. Although not so obvious as that in Poland or Romania, by the early 1980s Hungary was in a dangerous economic situation with the highest debt per capita level in Eastern Europe. But this crisis need not have laid the foundations for dramatic
change. Tamas Bauer, one of Hungary’s leading reform economists, argued that Hungary’s economic reform depended on three conditions: 1) a crisis so profound as to convince both ruling elites and intellectuals that the command economy was failing; 2) the existence of a “more or less free intellectual community of economists” and 3) “the readiness of both scholars and government experts to cooperate and make the necessary compromises”. Economic reform in 1968-72 had been shelved in Hungary, even if the reform economists themselves remained in their positions. Economic reform therefore depended on the autonomy of economists and the willingness of political authorities to respect their independent expertise. It depended on the restoration of the intelligentsia’s traditional position of autonomy and authority. But the intelligentsia won this authority not because of tradition or special talent but because of the dynamics of change in the Party itself.

In the spring of 1986, Imre Pozsgay, then General Secretary of the Patriotic People’s Front, requested that reform economists produce a report on the economic crisis. Published in 1987, this report, entitled “Turnabout and Reform”, documented the economic crisis and proposed solutions that were heretofore only discussed in samizdat form. This report was used later by Karoly Grosz to oust longtime leader Janos Kadar. While intellectuals and their products were being “used” by political leaders in their own infighting, this also created the opportunity for intellectuals to realize greater autonomous power and influence.

In June of the same year, the democratic opposition published “The Social Contract” in Beszelo, in which they called for political pluralism, with an independent parliament and freedom of the press, although not yet a multi-party system. Later that fall, the populists held a meeting where they established the HDF. Significantly, Pozsgay was there attempting to establish his base outside the Party. In effect, a small group of Party reformers had intended to use this mobilization of reform economists, populists and democratic opposition to change the Party leadership. They finally succeeded.

In May of 1988, Kadar was ousted as First Secretary. Karoly Grosz was but an interim leader, however, as his indecisiveness and inability to win significant improvements for Hungarian minorities living in Romania undercut his position. Between the fall of 1988 and winter of 1989, the Party reformers steadily improved their position within the Party. Simultaneously, Party rhetoric came to accept more and more the prospects of a multiparty system, even if still incorporating Communist party leadership. But the opposition organized itself into a new body that effectively undermined even this radical reformist strategy.
The HDF, the AFD, Fidesz, and the Democratic Trade Union of Scientific Workers as well as five other groups founded the Opposition Round Table (ORT) on 22 March 1989. Although alliances among the “opposition” were proposed before, this opposition alliance was much more clearly the product of the opposition itself. The ORT was formed in order to assure that negotiations with the authorities would not be manipulated to allow the Party unfair influence over the structure of the talks and their outcomes. Indeed, they even modeled themselves on the Polish experience, and tried to create through the Roundtable what the Solidarity movement created through at least a decade of social conflict. In contrast to the popular perception of negotiations in Poland, however, the Hungarian Round Table could claim to represent formally less than 1% of the Hungarian population, and was composed almost entirely of intellectuals. Nevertheless, by September 18, 1989, the Hungarians negotiated a more complete revision of the Soviet-type system than the Poles. The revision was finally realized with the fully open elections of March 25, 1990. Hungary’s “weaker” civil society realized a more fundamental change than the better organized Polish one. That, however, was a consequence of timing less than degrees of mobilization.

Thus, the foundation on which the Party reformers thought to extend their influence – independent associations of the intelligentsia – became instead the vehicle of an autonomous civil society that would negotiate the establishment of a multiparty political party system and inspire the dissolution of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party itself. How one interprets the Party’s role in its own undoing, and that of the system over which it rules, is itself profoundly complicated, and implicated in a complex intellectual politics. To be sure, the communist authorities knew that they were undoing what existed, but were not clear about what was replacing it. I am however quite convinced by Tokes’ argument that the reformist elements in the Party were “the ultimate guarantors of peaceful transition and negotiated political outcomes”. It is very difficult to raise the question in the Polish environment, but it ought to be posed, and to that I now turn.

Poland’s Mobilization of Morality and Struggle to Negotiate

Solidarity’s size and heterogeneity meant that it could have represented different things to different people. Certainly once it evolved beyond a defensive strategy for self-organization and toward a program for institutional reconstruction, a lively politics within the movement was healthy if not inevitable. But for the movement to survive as a total movement of civil society against the state, debate had to respect the anchorpoints of Solidarity’s self-
understanding in self-organization, equality and self-government. In 1980-81, dialogue, both explicit and implicit, reproduced these values in this cross-class movement.

The imposition of martial law destroyed the possibility for that continued dialogue, however, and with it, the cross-class quality of the movement. The public sphere shrunk, as most people retreated from politics. This sphere retreated unevenly, however, as the intelligentsia was more likely to remain actively engaged in politics than were workers. The distinction of the Solidarity movement then began to fade. The pragmatic construction of a political movement that embraces equality, pluralism, and self-management as a condition of cross-class unity depends on an open public sphere with broad cross-class participation and a coherent opponent. This breadth could not be preserved under conditions of martial law and its aftermath. This new uneven participation has several foundations and manifestations.52

First, the very condition of martial law presented new dilemmas for the opposition. Who would lead the opposition? Should it have a unitary or decentralized and federative character? Should it focus on dramatic actions and try to spark immediate reaction, or should it prepare for the long struggle, and build an underground society? Should its base remain workers in factory cells, or should it reflect the multiple associational character of a pluralistic civil society?53 Although it presented dilemmas, martial law also reinforced the moralistic qualities of the Solidarity movement. The imposition of martial law was one more element testifying to the alien qualities of the communist authorities, and why they could not be trusted. The philosophy of civil society articulated by Michnik and others in the 1970s became ever more self evident in the 1980s.

The opposition also fragmented into several currents. Smolar identified the mainstream opposition with Walesa, Solidarity and the Temporary Coordinating Commission (TKK). Smolar called realists those who considered it ineffective to continue to press for Solidarity’s relegalization, and advocated coming to terms with the system. Smolar recognized another wave as radical for its greater demands than that of the mainstream, pressing for some kind of political revolution in Poland. Finally, another tendency noted by Smolar was that characterized by the politics of youth, who rejected old formulations and sought a new politics resembling more anarchism than socialist or labor politics. Intellectuals could be found in all currents.

Despite their illegitimacy among the politically conscious, the Polish authorities of course tried to shape the strategies of the opposition. They tried to divide Solidarity along lines of authority, for instance. They tried to divide the underground leadership from those leaders captured by the authorities. The TKK underground, however,
remained staunch in its commitment to respecting the democratic procedures which established the Solidarity leadership, and thus insisted that Lech Walesa was the only person who could negotiate on behalf of Solidarity.55

The Polish authorities also tried to divide the classes animating Solidarity, by treating workers and intelligentsia very differently. On the one hand, the authorities established new unions that promised to realize many of the employees’ demands for which Solidarity struggled. These new unions were most unsuccessful among the intelligentsia and the fields they dominated: health, culture, and universities.56 The authorities also treated workers more harshly than the intelligentsia for oppositional politics. When interned, members of the intelligentsia were generally housed separately from workers, and treated better. The opposition activities of workers were also more strictly curtailed. Strikes in enterprises were treated more harshly than actors’ and writers’ boycotts. Efforts by physicians, teachers, academics and artists to establish a more open field of information and culture went relatively unhampered. The Minister of Culture even said that while they did not support it, they didn’t go out of their way to persecute the underground press either.57 It is not surprising, therefore, that workers’ oppositional politics declined more dramatically than that of intellectuals. This uneveness had devastating consequences on the class character of the opposition.

The social distance between classes grew in this period. Many in the intelligentsia were angry with workers for having failed to mount greater resistance to the regime. Negative stereotypes of workers became more common.58 Solidarity also began to be criticized for having been too socialist, to “workerist”.59 The response of workers to this criticism was ambivalent. On the one hand, they again began to identify the intelligentsia with their supervisors rather than with themselves. On the other, they began to rely more on the intelligentsia for maintaining the opposition.60 For instance, Zbigniew Bujak, one of the members of the Temporary Coordinating Commission and leader of the Warsaw/Mazowsze underground Solidarity movement from 1981-86, found most of his safe apartments among intelligentsia households.61

The intelligentsia thus realized its responsibility, but in the process, also assumed greater autonomy from the existing factory-based movements among workers. The anchorpoints of Solidarity’s self understanding, in social self organization, equality and self-management, were no longer decisive in defining the programs of the opposition, as the intelligentsia was no longer dependent on workers. Drawing upon the symbolism of Solidarity, if not its organization, intellectuals could now claim to represent workers, but only as they represented the Polish nation. But what kind of intellectual politics might claim the mantle of Solidarity?
The regime itself clearly tried to shape that choice. On the one hand, it treated most harshly those like Kornel Morawiecki of Fighting Solidarity, Leszek Moczulski of the Confederation for an Independent Poland, and others who advocated some kind of revolutionary, even if non-violent, politics. It lambasted the youth-based Freedom and Peace (Wolnośc i Pokój or WiP) as traitorous to Polish society. On the other hand, it also encouraged the realists by offering selective inducements for cooperation.

For those willing to cooperate with the regime, Jaruzelski established a "consultative council", with about one-third of its members from the regime, one-third from Catholic circles and one-third independent intellectuals. The Solidarity leadership criticized that Council, established on December 6, 1986, for the deliberate exclusion of the Solidarity's intellectuals. Only a few prominent and independent intellectuals, notably Władysław Sila-Nowicki, Andrzej Swiecicki, and Andrzej Tymowski, joined it. But its significance went beyond its effect on Solidarity; Jaruzelski dates his "conversion" to the belief that dialogue with Solidarity was possible to the formation of this group. In this sense, the meaningfulness of dialogue as an intellectual value was being spread to the Party through such organizations. Co-optation could work both ways. Likewise, PRON, the Patriotic Movement for the Renewal of the Nation, was indeed an attempt by the authorities to co-opt the opposition. It was also, however, one of the institutions among the authorities where the value of dialogue, rather than the spirit of repression, could be promoted by people like Janusz Rejkowski.

Nevertheless, it is apparent that as the authorities began to move toward dialogue, they also were increasingly interested in constructing a "responsible" partner, one that would respect Poland's system and geopolitical realities. The best example of their tolerance was their permission for the establishment in 1987 of the first independent, non-religious periodical in the Warsaw Pact, Res Publica. Although still subject to censorship, the publication pursued its liberal democratic themes vigorously.

The regime also encouraged another kind of realism attractive to members of the intelligentsia among others. It facilitated the promotion of a new patriotic politics based on the spirit of entrepreneurialism. Although its promoters included several former worker activists, this agenda was also anti-worker, arguing that the solution for Poland's dilemmas lay in the promotion of a free market economy and private enterprise system based on the multiplication of wealth, not in the continuation of workerist politics based on redistribution.

In effect, with these activities the Polish authorities were trying to establish a new modus vivendi between them and civil society. But this new agreement was not based on broad public participation, as Solidarity had been.
Instead, it was to be based on a skewed participation, with workers returned to narrow union concerns, and the intelligentsia once again established as the representatives of the nation. One might say that the Polish authorities tried to reconstruct the Polish opposition in the Hungarian image – with an opposition concentrated among a self-limiting intelligentsia. In so doing, the anachronistic status of autonomous intellectuals in communist politics was completely abandoned in the hope that the realism of such intellectuals could restore some measure of public consensus for the Polish communist order. But this was impossible with the presence of Solidarity.

Some have suggested that the authorities imprisoned the more militant unionists like Wladek Frasyniuk while allowing those more conciliatory figures, like Zbigniew Bujak, to continue their underground existence, but this is certainly debatable. Indeed, it is a familiar delegitimating tactic among the authorities: the outlaw is free because we, the omnipotent state, allow him to remain free. It is hard to believe that the regime would tolerate such an obvious blow to their own claims to competence if they could help it. Bujak remained for the most part in the capital city, and tried to change residences every two weeks for over four years. His very freedom was one of the principal goals of the underground movement: to show the weakness of the state, and the strength of the underground. He was only apprehended on May 31, 1986, when they tried to prepare a major underground Solidarity congress one month before the Party’s own congress.

The arrest of Bujak and two of his colleagues spelled the beginning of a new process, the move away from the politics of the underground, and toward a politics of negotiating revolution. With the capture of the principal symbol of Solidarity’s underground existence, those within the authorities seeking dialogue could increase their influence, and the authorities could begin their move toward a politics of negotiation. Of course, they tried to do it without Solidarity, as in Jaruzelski’s Consultative Council. Solidarity insisted, by contrast, that negotiations could not proceed without them. This apparent stalemate was broken not only by deft intellectual politics, as in the proposal by Bronislaw Geremek of an anti-crisis pact. Just as in 1980, when workers’ occupation strikes and demand for independent trade unions established the possibility for a negotiated settlement leading to Solidarity, in 1988 workers’ protest put the dialogue on a new level. In April-May and especially August, 1988, workers in Gdansk and in other places initiated a wave of occupation strikes demanding, among other things, increases in wages and Solidarity’s restoration. This movement was not, however, initiated by Solidarity’s activists. This was a new generation of workers, who trusted few outside their immediate milieu.
The authorities were extremely apprehensive with this new wave of strikes, fearing that they could not contain them.\textsuperscript{68} As such, the authorities had to abandon their strategy for promoting a new realism, and turn to another realism represented by the old Solidarity leadership. This leadership was, by now, relatively trustworthy in comparison to these new anarchistic youth. The authorities' only hope was that these former opponents could restrain workers from further strikes. In return, the Solidarity leadership demanded negotiations for Solidarity's legalization. At the conclusion of August, 1988, the path was set for the beginning of the first negotiated revolution. It was also an opportunity for the intelligentsia to consolidate its leadership in social transformation.

**Negotiating Revolution and the Contingencies of Change**

The politics of establishing the Roundtable negotiations with were filled with all sorts of contingencies. The Church was absolutely critical to establishing the possibility of their negotiations at all. They were a "witness" to the negotiations, assuring them legitimacy and indeed honesty in negotiations. Andrzej Gdula, a negotiator for the Communist side, said that ultimately it was Pope John Paul II along with General Jaruzelski who assured this peaceful change. Without the direct oversight of the Catholic Church, these negotiations could never have taken place, and most certainly could not have succeeded.\textsuperscript{69} One of the most important features of these negotiations, both as a prologue to the formal talks but especially in those two months of formal negotiations, was the "melting of resentments" among those who would negotiate.\textsuperscript{70}

Negotiations between the authorities and society were not the only challenges before the negotiators, and in this domain, the Party probably had the greatest challenge. Were it not for the abysmal performance of the official trade union leader, Alfred Miodowicz, in a televised debate with Lech Walesa, Miodowicz and his forces would have had much greater legitimacy to block the legalization of their principal union rival. Mieczyslaw Rakowski's announcement closing the Lenin Shipyards in November 1988 seemed to be designed to signal another kind of transition, one that at the least bypassed Solidarity. Some have even wondered whether it might have been designed to provoke a reaction that would have called for the imposition of a state of emergency.\textsuperscript{71} The authorities were not, after all, united in the wish to dialogue. General Jaruzelski wasn't 100\% sure that he would win his bet when he and three other leading figures threatened to resign in January 1989 in the face of Central Committee resistance to legalizing Solidarity.\textsuperscript{72} Nevertheless, that gesture suggests that the negotiations themselves depended on a will to talk and a capacity for leadership that was itself a product of the General's particular biography. There were plenty,
notably at the middle levels of the apparatus, who were absolutely opposed to any such legitimation of Solidarity, but none with the power to unseat Jaruzelski.

At last, negotiations were officially begun on February 6, 1989 and lasted for two months. Over 400 people participated in the various negotiations. There were three main tables -- on political reform, economic reform and on organizational pluralism, which concerned primarily the legalization of Solidarity. There also were eleven sub-tables devoted to questions of the media, health care, mining, youth and other issues. Negotiations were surprisingly easy on the question of Solidarity's legalization; but they were especially difficult in the political realm, for both sides recognized that they were negotiating the future political architecture of Poland. In addition to public meetings, private meetings among the top negotiators were held at Magdalenka, a resort outside of Warsaw, and in a separate room in what would subsequently become the Presidential Palace in Warsaw, where the official negotiations took place. In these entirely unrecorded meetings, the most profound obstacles were overcome. Compromises were finally reached, but the outcomes of those negotiations were not as most expected.

The opposition was frankly surprised by how much was accomplished in the negotiations. Beyond Solidarity's legalization, completely competitive elections were arranged to be held on June 5, 1989 for a new Senate; 35% of the seats in the lower house of Parliament, the Sejm, would also be contested. The rest were given to the governing alliance. And the Parliament, with communists and their allies assured most of the seats, would elect General Jaruzelski as President with relatively unspecified powers.

The authorities were not the only ones to have dissension in their ranks, although the opposition's troubles became more vigorous later in the process. There were some protests that this was a "disgraceful compromise with communists"; the All-Poland Conference of Independent Youth Environments was organized under the slogan that "one cannot negotiate freedom"; others complained that Solidarity's negotiators and its candidates were not chosen democratically. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of these protests was limited because those who suffered most in prison, like Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuron, and leaders of the Solidarity underground during the 1980s, including Zbigniew Bujak, put their entire reputation behind the talks. Equally important was the Church, and indirectly the Pope himself. The presence of Tadeusz Gocłowski, Bronisław Dabrowski and Aloyzy Orszulik during negotiations legitimized that part of Solidarity that compromised with communists.

Solidarity's election campaign was based on a new organization, the so called Citizens' Committees. These groups were not elected by any formal body, much less by Solidarity's remaining trade union base. They
were, in addition, composed primarily of representatives of the intelligentsia. Of Solidarity’s 261 nominations, only 10 were of workers and 35 of individual farmers. In contrast, there were 22 professors, 50 engineers, 35 lawyers, 20 journalists or columnists, 16 economists, 14 teachers, 13 health care employees and 1 religion teacher. These candidates chosen to represent Solidarity were not elected either, and rather picked by Lech Walesa and his closest advisors, much as the Round Table negotiators were chosen. Their most effective campaign element was a photograph of each candidate with Walesa, below which was written “We must win”. 

The ascent of the intelligentsia in post-communist politics is not unusual, of course. Like the Polish Roundtable negotiators, nearly all of the members of the Hungarian Opposition Round Table were intellectuals. Too, in both late communism and post-communism, in Hungary as well as across the Soviet Union at the end of the decade, the intelligentsia surged in parliamentary representation. One can view the whole process of reform, whether led by communists or opposition, as a process by which the intelligentsia sought greater authority and sought to establish its own particular modes of decision making and policy making on communist politics and programs. In both Hungary and Poland, it was quite apparent that the intelligentsia and Party reformers sought a way out of the impasse without allowing the streets to dictate the outcomes. But the particular dependencies of the intelligentsia and the timing of their negotiations vary significantly. Poland blazed the trail toward the Round Table. The Polish negotiations served as a model for the formation of the Hungarian Opposition Round Table coalition of forces. Too, had Poland not already resolved its own negotiations on April 5, 1989, Grosz and the Hungarian Politburo may not have begun their own Round Table negotiations. Nevertheless, as a relative latecomer, the Hungarian Round Table had fewer constrictions placed around what could be negotiated, and therefore generated a much more radical reform than that which the Polish reform provided.

Some of the very important faultlines around which subsequent politics has taken place can be traced to the ways in which the intelligentsia established its leadership. While there were several contingencies in the politics of reform and referenda that reconstructed the politics of Hungary transition, one can see in the Hungarian Round Table negotiations the electoral process in the making, as parties jockeyed for position. As Tokes put it, “the Hungarian NRT (National Round Table) may be likened to a cooperative, yet competitive multiplayer game.” The Polish negotiations were not anything like that, and Solidarity’s electoral success was not something that anyone anticipated.
General Kiszczak told me that the communists were not negotiating away their power. They expected, rather, to legalize Solidarity as an opposition, make them co-responsible for economic reform, and then in another four years hold entirely free elections. Things did not turn out as they expected. The authorities anticipated that Solidarity would at the most win 40% of the seats in the Senate, and not 99 out of 100 as they ultimately did. They did not expect that so few communists and their allies would get the minimum number of votes necessary to enter parliament in the first round of elections. They were shocked at how little support they won. With this terrific vote of opposition from society, even those formerly allied with the communists began to rethink their allegiances. Had several Solidarity delegates not absented themselves from voting, General Jaruzelski would not have been elected president. Even later, when General Kiszczak was asked to form the first government, he could not; Solidarity delegates explained to him that they could not take charge of the economic portfolios in his government, and he could not form a government without them. The society voted for change, and to form a government with the old ruling alliance would be impossible. Turning to those magic words provided by Adam Michnik publically on July 3, 1989 in his newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, General Jaruzelski (your president) finally asked Tadeusz Mazowiecki (our premiere) to form the government on August 24.

Of course this was not the end to the contingencies of change in Poland in 1989. Prime Minister Mazowiecki felt like a “saper” or minesweeper in his initial days in office. He was concerned that the security forces would support him and his government. He asked General Kiszczak and General Siwicki to join his cabinet as Ministers of the Interior and of National Defense, which they finally did. It was not obvious that one could assume that those with the weapons would be loyal to those forces they so recently had in prison. Prime Minister Mazowiecki went to those very security forces two weeks after becoming Prime Minister to tell them that he expected their loyalty. Apparently he got it.

Likewise, the Hungarian authorities also took actions to assure that the intentions of the Round Table agreements and elections would be followed. They disbanded the Workers Guard and Hungarian Army Commando Units raided the Workers Guard weapons storehouses. These actions undertaken by the communist-led government were a major step toward assuring the peaceful transformation. Communists in Poland have no such vivid examples of their own leadership in assuring such a change. Solidarity gets most of the credit, and that is consequential.
Today in Poland, the contingencies of these changes are not easily remembered. Mira Marody was surprised when she heard about Mazowiecki’s self understanding as a minesweeper. That is a surprise, she said, because for most of us the change looked so easy. It was almost as if it came straight from the Bible, where the words of Solidarity intellectual Adam Michnik -- "your president, our premiere" -- were made flesh or real. Instead, it can look like a conspiracy. And here lies the major difference between Poland and Hungary.

The Contrasting Implications of Negotiated Revolutions

Even as late as the October 1998 local government elections in Poland, representatives of the Union of Freedom were constantly being asked whether they might form local coalitions with the descendents of Poland’s communist party. Typically coy, party spokespersons would emphasize decentralized decision making and the importance of local conditions for dictating alliances. They are, after all, forming a national government together with the AWS or Solidarity. To form alliances with the Union of the Democratic Left might confirm the impression that they are, in fact, as “pink” as many of their detractors claim. Even worse, this might confirm that the discussion of the Roundtable as “Betrayal” has merit in the defeat of the Solidarity movement and its Church supporters at the electoral box.

The Union of Freedom is above all the party of the intelligentsia that in 1989 negotiated revolution with the communists. To be sure, Solidarity was the movement on which the claim by the intellectuals to represent civil society could find its real social power, but the movement was hardly united even during 1989. Walesa and his advisors were directing the course of the social transformation, and were no longer in a circumstance where their legitimacy as the movement’s leadership could be reaffirmed procedurally. It was taken for granted, and assumed given the extraordinary results of the June 1989 elections. But when Lech Walesa challenged Tadeusz Mazowiecki for the Presidency of Poland in 1990, the fictive unity of the movement was finally destroyed. Mazowiecki’s supporters turned to what eventually became the Union of Freedom, while Walesa went on to become President. The trade union came under the leadership of a new generation that was not prominent at all in the struggles of the 1980s. And then the party of former communists came back to power in the parliament, and their representative, Aleksander Kwasniewski, defeated Lech Walesa in his bid for reelection as president.

Hungary and Poland have shared this return of former communists to power. In both cases, this reignited a discussion of whether the Negotiated Revolutions were sufficiently revolutionary as to rid the country of the former
oppressors. But the parallels end there. The Hungarian negotiations of 1989 were based on a premise of political positioning, while the Polish talks were about power sharing. In Hungary, the opposition was sufficiently fragmented, and responsibility for the success, or failure, of the Roundtable negotiations was dispersed. Consequently, the Roundtable negotiations cannot be held to be the responsibility of any single actor or particular collusion of interests. Indeed, precisely because it became this setting for the contest of political parties, the charges of justice and injustice can be played out on the field of electoral competition. Without the equivalent of a Magdalenka, where “secret deals” could be made between communists and a unified opposition, the Hungarian negotiated revolution can be associated relatively unambiguously with the opening of the public sphere. Poland’s negotiated revolution remains mired in anxieties over dealmaking.

Another anxiety afflicting Poland more than Hungary concerns the moral evaluation of communist authorities. The Hungarian authorities could be distinguished relatively easily into reformers and hardliners, those responsible for the sins of the past, and those seeking an exit from those compromising times. In Poland, by contrast, the general who imposed martial law in 1981 was also the general who enabled the Round Table talks to come into being. The general responsible for hunting down the opposition and imprisoning them was also the man who led the authorities in negotiation. The distinctions and definitions of hardliner and reformer are much more difficult to draw in Poland than in Hungary. This dilemma is not only a problem for rational choice theorists; instead, it is a complex problem that vexes contemporary Polish politics.

Poland’s struggle to end communism was based not only on the mobilization of workers, but the mobilization of morality. It was not only based on the struggle for the rule of law, but the struggle to realize justice. Intellectuals negotiated revolution in all the Round Table transformations. In Poland, however, the intellectuals’ leadership was built on the sacrifice and struggle by ordinary people. It was not won by default, as in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany or Bulgaria. It could not be portrayed as simply a logocratic transformation, as might be the case in Hungary. The right to represent Poland’s civil society was based on their own moral claims to having suffered and led the long struggle of others who also suffered. Under these conditions, it is much more difficult to portray the Polish negotiations as a political game, as one might in Hungary. And that affects how one can view the process of political realignment in post-communist democracy.

If strategically advantageous and ideologically plausible, the alliance between Hungary’s Socialist Party and its Free Democrats could be made. In Poland, by contrast, the debate about the collusion of the liberal
intelligentsia with the communists is not over and it has prevented the alliance between liberal opposition and liberal postcommunist forces from taking place. The politics of morality and the mobilizational potential of Polish civil society keep the debates of the 1980s alive in the 1990s. Although morality politics and the rhetoric of betrayal have its place in Hungarian politics, it remains on the margins. One can’t say where it will fall in Poland given the way in which the authority of the intelligentsia was constituted in the struggle to end communism.

The comparison between Polish and Hungarian negotiated revolutions also highlights the complex politics of intellectual responsibility in late communism and post-communism. The intelligentsia was required to navigate an intellectual politics that was simultaneously moral and tactical, principled and political. To the extent that its moral leadership remains intact, its cultural role as leaders of East European nations might remain viable. In Poland, therefore, the elevation of morality politics around communism and Catholicism enables not only the Church, but also the intelligentsia, to regain a measure of influence in developing the post-communist polity. But where intellectual politics are subordinated to the rules of electoral contest, the accounting of capitalist enterprise, or the legal adjudication of difference, we are more likely witnessing the end of the intelligentsia, and its replacement with professionalism as the principal mode of intellectual power in post-communism.
NOTES

1 This essay draws on portions of the article I wrote in 1990: Michael D. Kennedy, “The Intelligentsia in the Constitution of Civil Societies and Post-communist Regimes in Hungary and Poland” Theory and Society 21:29-76, 1992. I extend and revise the basic argument based on my own and additional secondary research undertaken since that time. I especially appreciate the comments of the volume’s anonymous reviewers and of Laszlo Kurti for help in developing this paper.


3 The victory of the intelligentsia is only apparent under conditions of peaceful transformation. In the former Yugoslavia, Albania and Romania, where violence and its threat were palpable, the intelligentsia remained more subordinate to power resting in other domains, notably in the military and in the political apparatus. Bulgaria is the anomaly. Like Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, it also took the Round Table as its mode of extrication from communism. Unlike in these societies, communists won the first post-communist Bulgarian elections. The Round Table was important for East Germany too, but West Germany dominated the process of transformation after the March 1990 elections. For useful comparative views, see Jon Elster (ed.) The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996 and Ivo Banac (ed.) Eastern Europe in Revolution. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992.

4 Although Hungary’s role in economic reform under communist rule has been widely recognized (e.g. David Stark and Victor Nee (eds.) Remaking the Economic Institutions of China and Eastern Europe Stanford: Stanford University press, 1989.), General Wojciech Januszelski maintains that Poland was itself the laboratory for perestroika, notably in the political arena. Interview with the author, October 7, 1998.


6 Tokes, 1996:313; Laszlo Bruszt, personal communication.

7 See for example Norman M. Naimark, “Ich will hier raus”: Emigration and the Collapse of the German Democratic Republic” pp. 72-95 in Banac (ed.). Eastern Europe in Revolution.

8 In this sense, I draw on both the comparative and historical methods of “parallel demonstration of theory” and of “contrast of contexts” identified in Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, “The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry” Comparative Studies in Society and History. 22(1980):174-97.


14 Tokes, Negotiated Revolution, p. 326.


16 Kennedy, Professionals, Power and solidarity in Poland, 1991; Kennedy, “The Intelligentsia....”


20 Kis understands Kadarism in that period as three planks: the public display of party unity, the political neutralization of society and the refusal to recognize any extra-Party negotiating partner. See Kis, “After the Fall Session of the National Assembly” pp. 153-74 in Politics in Hungary

21 Kis, “The 1956-57 Restoration in a Thirty Years Perspective” pp. 31-84 in Politics in Hungary

22 Ibid, 47.

23 Ibid, 75.

24 Kis, “Can 1956 Be Forgotten?”, p. 28

25 Kis, “The 1956-57 Restoration”, p. 81


29 Tokes, 1996:316.


33 George Schopflin, Lecture on Hungary at the University of Michigan, 6 November, 1989.
34 See Tokes, Negotiated Revolution, for more elaborate accounts of the various groups and political leaders at the time.
40 Swain, “Hungary’s Socialist Project...” p. 17
41 Urban, “Hungary in Transition...”
42 Schopflin, 1989.
43 Beyond these groups already discussed, the Independent Small Holders Party, the Hungarian Social Democratic Party, the Hungarian Peoples’ Party, the Christian Democratic People’s Party, and the Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Society composed the ORT. For a discussion of these groups, see Tokes, 1996:308-14.
44 Tokes, 1996:313.
45 Bruszt, 1990.
47 Indeed, “Without the initiation on February 6, 1989 and the successful conclusion on April 5, 1989 of the Polish National Roundtable, Grosz and the PB would have hesitated to initiate a similar process in Hungary (p. 307).
48 In October of 1989, Pozsgay tried to take over the Party, but he discovered that the reformist wing had only 2/5 of the votes necessary. It was instead dissolved, and the reformists formed the Hungarian Socialist Party. (Schopflin, 1989).
49 Grosz said in 1993 that “we rejected that which existed, but did not know what else might come to replace it”. Cited in Tokes, 1996:285. Aleksander Kwasniewski told me on October 14, 1998 that had the Party and its international allies known what was to come, no agreement could ever have been reached at the Round Table.
50 Tokes, 1996:208. See also the discussion about how in May 1988, Hungarian Minister of Interior István Horváth refused to deploy force against nonviolent political dissent. Tokes, 1996:296.
54 Smolar.
58 Smolar, 14.
60 Smolar.
61 Interview with the author, November 23, 1998.
63 Interview with the author, October 7, 1998.
64 Interview with Rejkowski, October 10, 1998.
65 Walicki, Ost, Smolar.
66 David Ost, “The Transformation of Solidarity and the Future of Central Europe” Telos 79(1989):69-94, esp. 76. General Kiszczak claimed in an interview that he could have imprisoned Bujak before Bujak was finally arrested on May 31, 1986, but that he would have been more trouble as another martyr than as an underground leader. Interview, October 8, 1998.
67 Interview with the author, November 23, 1998.
68 Interview with Rejkowski, October 10, 1998.
69 This of course carried some risk for the Church, for these were difficult and delicate politics. One of the most extraordinary documents of these politics can be found in Peter Raina, Rozmowy z Wladzami PRL: Arcybiskup Dambrowski w Sluzbie Kosciolu i Narodu. Warszawa: Ksiazka Polska, 1995.
72 Interview, October 7, 1998.
Ian Gross discusses this dilemma, and the obligation of Bishop Alojzy Orszulik to deny that any secret deals were made in Magdalenka. See “Poland: From Civil Society to Political Nation” pp. 56-71 in Banac (ed.) Eastern Europe in Revolution, especially pp 58-59, FN 5.


This is a very common theme in my interviews with communist reformers in Poland; see Tokes, 1996:306 for Hungary.


Tokes, 1996:361-98


Although this was probably a majority position in the Party, the negotiating team was not so sure of the future, according to Janusz Rejkowski. After the first meeting of the political roundtable, high party officials as well as the negotiating team debated whether these are only mock negotiations. Solidarity doesn't want, one person argued, real negotiations, and won't negotiate in good faith. They concluded that this might in fact be right, but that there is no peaceful alternative. If they don't negotiate now, in three to five years there would be no chance for a peaceful resolution of difference. Even if the negotiations would mean giving up power, they would at least avoid the danger of civil war.

Interview with the author, October 3, 1998.

General Kiszczak initially rejected the offer, but President Jaruzelski insisted to him that he join the cabinet, out of a sense of duty. General Kiszczak told me that after the murder of Father Jerzy Popieluszko in 1984, he had successfully reigned in those "betony" or hardliners who wished to see the opposition destroyed at all costs, but he could not say whether the security services would have been so loyal to the new government if he was not the Minister of the Interior, and General Jaruzelski not president.


Personal communication, October 3, 1998.

