From the outset, Intelligence: A Brief History presents its readers with a problem: what is this book really about? Judging from the title, the unwary reader would presume that Cianciolo and Sternberg have set out to provide a quick overview of the historical development of the concept of intelligence, the practices that have been invented to measure it, and the uses to which it has been put. Indeed, this is precisely what they claim to have accomplished at the beginning of their conclusion (p. 135). However, as a contribution to history, the book is an abject failure. Events and developments that occurred before the 1960s or even 1970s are scarcely mentioned, and when they are, the exact details are often inaccurate. The authors provide no attention to historical context, to the specific intellectual traditions associated with the various articulations of the notion of intelligence they describe, or to the effects of the sociological/cultural locations of these developments in shaping the concepts and practices adopted. Indeed, a quick check of the bibliography reveals that of the approximately 291 works cited, only about 35 (12 percent) were published before 1960. Moreover, although there is an extensive literature on the history of intelligence and its tests, as the readers of this journal well know, only five (1.7 percent) of the works listed were historical treatments of the issues addressed by the book. Indeed, such central figures in the historiography as Hamilton Cravens, Kurt Danziger, Carl Degler, Raymond Fancher, Nikolas Rose, Franz Samelson, Michael Sokal, Gillian Sutherland, William Tucker, Adrian Wooldridge, and Leila Zenderland—and I could go on—are conspicuous by their absence.

So, if not history, then what is Intelligence: A Brief History really attempting to do? At its best, it provides a survey of some of the developments and issues raised around the psychological study of intelligence in the last two to three decades of the twentieth century. The authors argue that there have been, and still are, seven distinct metaphors that have guided investigations of intelligence: geographic, computational, biological, epistemological, sociological, anthropological, and systems. In chapters devoted to the nature, measurement, and teaching of intelligence, as well as to the relative weights of genes and environment in accounting for intelligence and to group differences in intelligence, they chart how these metaphors shape thinking and practice in each of these domains. Not surprisingly, given Sternberg’s own theoretical orientation, the systems vision of how to understand intelligence, which involves “viewing intelligence as a set of multiple independent parts, or even multiple intelligences” (p. 26) comes off best, as most consistent with the facts such as they are and most able to reflect the complexities of the individual dynamically blending genetic inheritance with biological development and sociocultural fashioning. Nonetheless, Cianciolo and Sternberg do an excellent job of providing balanced overviews of each of these metaphors, why they retain plausibility, and what they are contributing to current investigations of intelligence. For those seeking an easy-to-digest primer on the current state of the field suitable for undergraduates, Intelligence: A Brief History could work very well. Although some practitioners might dispute just how distinct the seven metaphors really are in practice, they do provide a useful heuristic for coming to grips with and thinking about contemporary intelligence research.
As their concluding observation, Cianciolo and Sternberg note: “Although scholarly thinking about intelligence has an illustrious history, there has never been a more exciting time than the present to explore the many facets of intelligent behavior” (p. 140). In many respects, this statement captures well both the strengths and weaknesses of Intelligence: A Brief History. The authors do demonstrate clearly that current research on intelligence is a vital field, and that the approaches adopted are more varied than the public might realize. On the other hand, to state without qualification that the history of this work is “illustrious,” given its central role in twentieth-century eugenics and many forms of scientific racism, not to mention the intense political and cultural battles it has engendered, is simply appalling. No one with any historical training or sensibility would ever advance such a patently unsustainable claim.

Reviewed by JOHN CARSON, Associate Professor of History, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.


This year marks the 150th anniversary of Sigmund Freud’s birth and, not surprisingly, this anniversary is also making headline news. For example, the cover story of Newsweek for the week of March 27, 2006, read “Freud Is Not Dead” and went on ask whether or not Freud was still alive in science, psychology, culture, and society. Jerry Aline Flieger, in her book Is Oedipus Online? Siting Freud After Freud, asks the same question.

Flieger’s book is part of Slavoj Žižek’s “Short Circuit” series, each of which examines a classic text, author, or notion and views it through a new and/or different critical lens. Flieger’s contribution to this series is interesting because Part One of her book analyzes the work of millennial theorists that resist the contemporary use of oedipal theory, while Part Two argues that an upgraded oedipal paradigm has a place in millennial theory as Flieger explores Freudian and Lacanian theory alongside knot theory and the nonlinear theories of emergence and fractal scaling.

In Part One, Flieger examines a number of millennial theories, with an emphasis on the works of Žižek, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, and Gilles Deleuze. Žižek, Lyotard, and Baudrillard’s theories are similar in that they all emphasize the dehumanizing effect of technology. These “panic postmodernists” argue that technology has created a hypervisible culture where there is a loss of dimensionality, intersubjectivity, and community (p. 69). They argue that cyberspace allows for communication without community, leaving no room for a mirroring “real” other or object; a virtual image replaces real objects, allowing the real and the imaginary to merge. These three theorists argue that oedipal theory is outdated for postmodern society because cyberspace replaces the face-to-face interactions necessary for the theory to be applicable.

Flieger counters these arguments with the idea that that virtual experiences and the Internet constitute a new reality, a new “real life.” Because cyberspace is the place where intersubjective experiences now occur, Flieger suggests that Oedipus is online, “making the computer itself an
important player in the intersubjective process” (p. 60). In the last chapter of Part One, Flieger takes on Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, arguing that their work, *Anti-Oedipus* (1983), reduces and limits Freud’s oedipal theory “to the story of Mommy, Daddy, and me” (p. 92) rather than understanding the theory from a broader social, economic, and political paradigm that can be used to analyze the “connections, disruptions, and refractions of desire that constitute human social interaction” (p. 94). Throughout the book, Flieger makes reference to both Freudian and Lacanian theory of the mirroring object or other and discusses how technology has augmented these. However, Lacan’s postmodern revision of Freud dominates the text, particularly his theory of desire and his psychic schema, which are used to support her arguments.

Part Two of Flieger’s book focuses on nonlinearity and psychoanalysis. Flieger begins by explaining 12 millennial concepts (nodal sites and nonlinearity) that can be found in contemporary culture and argues that these current research topics intersect with psychoanalysis. Flieger states, “Surfing the millennial web has made one thing clear: if Freud’s theory may enrich our understanding of ‘millennialism,’ psychoanalysis may in turn be enriched by examining new techno-cultural phenomena” (p. 155). To support this statement, Flieger goes on to explain knot theory, emergence, fractals, and bifurcation as they relate to the psychoanalytic theories of identification, projection, and intersubjective desire. In addition, Flieger examines Lacanian network theory, arguing that his concepts of the imaginary, the real, and the symbolic intersect in a nonlinear fashion, thereby creating psychical and cultural realities that are multidimensional and fractal in nature.

*Is Oedipus Online? Siting Freud After Freud* provides the reader with an interesting amalgam of modern (Freud) and postmodern (Lacan) psychoanalytic theory, millennial theory, and other concepts from contemporary science and culture. Flieger responds to critics of psychoanalysis while laying out a new framework with which to explore psychoanalytic theory. Thus, this book offers the reader a postmodern analysis that is both enlightening and thought-provoking.

Reviewed by Kate Harper, Department of Psychology, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada.

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According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 34 percent of all impoverished Americans in 2004 were under 18 years of age, whereas people 65 and older made up only 9 percent of the nation’s poor. Behind these numbers is a remarkable story about age and poverty. The Social Security Act of 1935 established both the old-age pensions called “Social Security” and the family assistance program called “welfare.” Since then, older Americans have benefited dramatically and disproportionately. A consensus was forged that lifetimes of hard work entitled retirees to public provision in return for their dedicated service, and over time their Social Security checks took a large bite out of poverty among the elderly. With the baby boom nearing retirement, it is difficult to envision any reversal of this consensus in spite of dire predictions about the system’s future fiscal stability.
In contrast, poor parents were stigmatized from the outset as undeserving freeloaders, all the more as the numbers of unmarried mothers and “illegitimate” children grew, and federal efforts to wage war on childhood poverty were, consequently, stingy and politically vulnerable. In 1996, President Clinton declared “an end to welfare as we know it,” eliminating the federal safety net and invigorating state-based reforms premised on moving absolutely everyone into the wage labor market, including mothers of babies and young children. It is not accidental that Alice Smuts’s excellent book ends in 1935, the year that the American welfare state was born. Her story about the relationship between advocacy and science during the Progressive era suggests that federal action on behalf of children, a huge victory for child welfare reformers, ironically proved to be no substitute for the tenacious mobilization of women and researchers on which it was initially built.

*Science in the Service of Children* brings together histories that have generally been narrated separately and in specialized studies, making it especially useful as an overview. By tracing the linkages between child study, child guidance, and child development, Smuts argues that science and social policy were not merely interdependent, but shared the goal of advancing child welfare. In order to understand the birth of developmentalism—a well-worn subject in the history of the human sciences—one must also know something about the female reform tradition, the U.S. Children’s Bureau, and philanthropies like the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and the Commonwealth Fund during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Sigmund Freud, Arnold Gesell, and Benjamin Spock may be the most famous architects of developmental expertise, but their fame would have been impossible without the work of Ethel Dummer, Cora Hillis, and Jessie Taft, among many others. Dummer was the affluent patron who funded the Juvenile Psychopathic Institute in Chicago, directed by William Healy, and the El Retiro School for Girls, directed by Miriam Van Waters. Cora Bussey Hillis was the organizational genius who convinced the Iowa legislature in 1917 to establish the first center dedicated to studying how normal children developed in order to disseminate reliable child-rearing advice to ordinary people. Jessie Taft was a social work educator, authority on child placement, and pioneer of therapeutic approaches to child and family problems. According to Smuts, “Women were the leaders, the innovators, and the driving force behind the new sciences of childhood” (p. 9).

The book covers a lot of ground clearly and efficiently. It documents the social research conducted by reformers and settlement house workers, G. Stanley Hall and the child study movement, parent education, the emergence of child psychiatry, the work of the U.S. Children’s Bureau during its first two decades, and a host of research initiatives and institutes committed to the proposition that knowledge about children was key to preventing delinquency and conserving precious national resources: future citizens. Smuts comments that no parallel to the American child sciences existed in Europe. Recent comparative work by social welfare scholars has emphasized that preoccupations with children and families were the distinctive, determining factors in state mothers’ pension laws and New Deal social policy. Maternalism marked the entire history of the American welfare state.

Smuts concludes her book by noting the expansion of child science after 1945. During the second half of the century, developmental research attracted piles of federal and private dollars, became ubiquitous in academic psychology and popular culture, and took a sharp turn away from normal development, concerning itself instead with questions of emotional and behavioral disorder. If children have been objects of such intense scrutiny designed to safeguard their welfare, why are they so much more likely than any other age group to be poor today? The answer suggested by history is that neither sophisticated science nor benevolent state power per se can deliver security. Even in the wealthiest country on earth, the patient
pressure of activist movements is necessary if children, as well as adults, are to be guaranteed the pursuit of happiness.

Reviewed by Ellen Herman, Associate Professor of History, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR.

Robert Alun Jones. The Secret of the Totem: Religion and Society from McLennan to Freud.


How can a scholar today write a serious book about totemism in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century anthropology without suffering public opprobrium from his or her postcolonialist colleagues? Robert Alun Jones has written a pithy volume that presents the contours of the debate among the leading anthropologists from 1865, when John F. McLennan published his book *Primitive Marriage*, to 1913, the year in which Freud's *Totem und Tabu* appeared. With a reverential bow to the influential treatise of Thomas Kuhn, he builds upon the writings of Quentin Skinner, George Stocking, and Richard Rorty proclaiming that the passionate debate over totemism—conducted by some of the most brilliant minds of the time—holds no substantial interest for us. It has nothing to do with our truths because the questions it posed are meaningless in an historical context that is so radically other. By immersing ourselves in the debate in that time and place, we might be able to see what the fuss was about then, even if, from the point of view of the positive advancement of science, it was full of sound and fury, signifying little.

Having preempted his potential critics, Jones provides us with a highly competent and nuanced account of the debate, beginning with discussions of animal worship, patriarchy, and theories of kinship before McLennan first called attention to elements of totemism in 1865 (when he broke free of the philological shackles imposed by Henry Sumner Maine and others), and advanced a theory of universal stages of progress from savagery to civilization, especially in his *Worship of Animals and Plants* (1869–1870). McLennan began to articulate a “non-intrinsic” theory of the sacred in animal worship that was later taken up by Durkheim. But McLennan was less interested in the religious side of totemism, and, as a rationalist, gave emphasis to its foundation in kinship (i.e., to its social-organizational roots).

Jones then focuses on the contributions of William Robertson Smith. Smith, an Old Testament scholar and Hebraist raised in the Free Church of Scotland, was greatly influenced by nineteenth-century liberal German theology. While studying in Göttingen in 1869, he discovered the theological writings of Albrecht Ritschl. Ritschl and his school incorporated many of the ideas of Ludwig Feuerbach, even though they believed they had overcome them (Rawidowicz, 1964, p. 355). Smith learned from Ritschl that religion was social, not individual, a thought taken up by Durkheim, who, along with Frazer and Freud, had been influenced by Smith. Durkheim and Freud in particular singled out Smith’s discovery of sacrifice as a communion with the gods that established kinship. (Levitt [forthcoming] shows that the main points of Smith’s theory of sacrifice, articulated first in 1887, had been spelled out in an article by Feuerbach (1862/1960) entitled “Das Geheimnis des Opfers oder der Mensch ist was er isst” [The Secret of Sacrifice or Man Is What He Eats]).
Chapter 3 is devoted to the ideas of classicist and later anthropologist James Frazer, a close friend of Smith from their student days at Trinity College, Cambridge. Influenced by Smith's theory of sacrifice and the German Romanticists' emphasis on folk traditions, beliefs, and rites, he compiled successive editions of The Golden Bough in which he supported the general universalistic and positivistic framework of social evolutionism. Jones also introduces the works of Fison and Howitt, the American lawyer and amateur ethnologist Lewis Henry Morgan (who played an important role in the ethnological writings of Marx and Engels), Sir Edward Burnett Tylor, Robert Henry Codrington, Frank Byron Jevons, Baldwin Spencer, Frank J. Gillen, and Robert Randolph Marett. The various and complicated relationships between and among these anthropological writers on various aspects of totemism developed with fine detail are beyond the limits of a short review.

In Chapter 4, after presenting a brief overview of the influence of Emile Boutrous, Fustel de Coulanges, and Charles Renouvier on the young Émile Durkheim, and after discussing Durkheim's early critique of Herbert Spencer and his sympathetic review of Jean-Marie Guyau's L'Irreligion de l'avénir, the author carefully tracks the changes in Durkheim's thinking in relation to the burgeoning debate over totemism. Durkheim, in an article on incest, argued that the modern incest taboo was derived from the practice of exogamy and not the other way around. He shows how Frazer (not Smith) had a greater influence on Durkheim's earlier views. Jones then offers a rather detailed account of Durkheim's argument in Les formes élémentaires and shows how it was both indebted to Smith and critical of him.

The final substantive chapter of the book presents a short history of the development of psychoanalysis, focusing on religion in general and totemism in particular. Jones points out Freud's cautionary words concerning the universality and necessity of totemism as well as Freud's distinctions between the psychic lives of "savages" and of "obesessional neurotics." The chapter concludes with a comparison of Durkheim and Freud on religion—a comparison to which one might easily devote an entire monograph.

The conclusion adumbrates the early critiques of evolutionism, especially those of Goldenweiser, Boas, and Lévi-Strauss. The book ends with a trumpeting of the self-contradiction of relativism: "For to learn that what were once assumed to be powerful, undeniable, permanent truths were in historical fact the merest contingencies of a particular context is surely to learn a more general truth, not just about the past, but about ourselves."

REFERENCES


Reviewed by CYRILLE LEVITT, Professor of Sociology, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada.

In the late 1950s, psychologist Abraham Maslow helped launch “humanistic psychology,” a new and more inclusive theoretical approach designed to transcend the reductionism and determinism of behaviorism and psychoanalysis. Maslow came to be identified as one of humanistic psychology’s fathers, but in private he harbored serious doubts about his intellectual offspring (Nicholson, 2001). At issue was not the scientific integrity of humanistic psychology, but Maslow’s own personal identity as a man. Turning away from positivist psychology was, he noted, “almost like giving up maleness” (Maslow, 1979, p. 731).

It is very apparent from James Gilbert’s fascinating *Men in the Middle* that Maslow was hardly alone in his obsessive concern about the state of his masculinity. Contrary to the popular stereotype of the 1950s, “John Wayne’s America” was a disorienting and anxiety-inducing place where “masculinity” was anything but stable. Indeed, Gilbert finds “masculinity in crisis” in an eclectic range of cultural locations—sociology, sexology, religion, television, and literature. The 1950s, he argues, were marked by a “relentless and self-conscious preoccupation with masculinity” (p. 2).

Although Gilbert’s ambition is to explore masculinity in American culture as a whole, his work has special relevance for historians of the behavioral sciences. Within this scholarly community, issues of gender and, more particularly, questions of masculinity have received relatively little attention. As historian Laurel Furumoto has noted (1998), “[P]olitical, religious, and class interests are assumed to matter in science… but not gender interests” (p. 70). By foregrounding “masculinity” in his analysis of such iconic works as David Riesman’s *The Lonely Crowd* and Alfred Kinsey’s *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male*, Gilbert persuasively demonstrates the extraordinary degree to which “male panic” was woven into the fabric of 1950s social science.

Gilbert’s reading of *The Lonely Crowd* is especially illuminating. Riesman’s book was a best seller, and its central argument that American character had been transformed from “inner direction” to “other direction” was enormously influential in academic circles. Inspired by the work of sociologists and historians of men’s studies, Gilbert reads Riesman’s classic text against the grain, viewing it not as a gender-neutral analysis of American character, but rather as a commentary on a masculinity besieged. This gendered reading breathes new life into a familiar text and, more important, helps to explain the extraordinary popular success of Riesman’s book. By carefully developing the broader cultural context of popular fears of masculine decline, Gilbert clearly demonstrates how Riesman emerged as the “reluctant prophet of the new man in this purportedly feminized modern world” (p. 61).

The other social scientist in Gilbert’s study—Alfred Kinsey—is a more obvious candidate for a gendered reading. Kinsey’s book on male sexuality was one of the “great publishing events in the history of American science,” (p. 85) and Gilbert carefully explains its academic and popular impact. Much of this ground has been covered in the extensive historiography on Kinsey. What is more unusual in Gilbert’s analysis is the attention he devotes to Kinsey’s uncoupling of male sexuality from masculinity. Surprisingly, Kinsey only mentions masculinity directly once, yet his unrelenting emphasis on the diversity of sexual behavior lent force to the notion of a strong “discontinuity between sex as a physical act and socially accepted notions of morality, normality, [and] masculinity itself” (p. 105).
Was masculinity central in the work of other behavioral scientists of 1950s and early 1960s? Gilbert’s focus on American culture leaves this question unanswered, but the very posing of the question is a measure of the book’s success. As is the case after reading Gail Bederman’s brilliant book *Manliness and Civilization* (1995), one comes away from reading Gilbert alive to the largely untapped potential of masculinity as an analytic category in the history of the behavioral sciences.

**REFERENCES**


Reviewed by IAN NICHOLSON, Professor of Psychology, Department of Psychology, St. Thomas University, Fredericton, NB, Canada.

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Following recent work by Andrew Winston, William Tucker, and others, Jackson here delves deeper into the nature and dynamics of the 1950s–1970s pro-segregationist “scientific racist” camp. Focusing on segregationist responses to the landmark 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, he utilizes numerous archival resources to impressive effect. Unknown enemies are proverbially more frightening than known ones, and this book left me curiously reassured. They may have been rich, have had impressive political contacts, and displayed dogged persistence, but Jackson’s account also reveals the pro-segregationists as profoundly inadequate to their self-appointed task. Major driving force Carleton Putnam was, otherwise than financially, no real asset. He was so totally oblivious to the real nature of science and utterly incapable of the kind of rational debate he proclaimed to be seeking that even his most ardent supporters eventually became embarrassed by him. Donald Swan turned out to be a kleptomaniac bibliophile. By contrast, Robert Gayre, editor of *Mankind Quarterly*, pro-segregationists’ one attempt at producing a scientific journal, was a bizarre Scottish racial mystic, obsessed by heraldry, who ruthlessly censored deviations from the party line. But saddest of all was the case of the eminent physical anthropologist Carleton S. Coon, here fully analyzed really for the first time. Privately backing Putnam to the hilt, Coon was too terrified professionally to admit it, ending up in the thoroughly tortured position of posing as a pure scientist with no responsibility for others’ political exploitation of his work while ardently promoting the segregationist political agenda behind the scenes. The rest of the cast did no better.
One should never assume opponents are acting in bad faith, and most of those in question were not, viewing themselves as brave scientific heretics fighting the delusions of ideological egalitarians or defenders of some noble Southern cultural heritage. Alas, they also displayed the classic symptoms of the paranoid authoritarian personality. They could affirm both that science had definitively demonstrated race differences and white superiority and that there was a plot to prevent any such research being done. They could only experience opposition as due to some sinister Boasian, and probably Jewish, cabal. They protested at exclusion from academic and scientific journals even while being given a hearing, while eliminating any note of criticism from their own outlets such as Mankind Quarterly. Their internal solidarity was in fact always shaky, as the group was to some degree an alliance of convenience between southern racists concerned primarily with African Americans and neo-Nazis seeking to revive anti-Semitic Nordicism, while the more scientifically astute prevaricated between biological essentialism and psychometric empiricism.

In retrospect, the 1950s–1970s generation of scientific racists (as they identified themselves) now appear quite historically embedded, their worldviews rooted in late-Victorian notions of racial destiny and race as the engine of history. And while this generation included several Europeans, their significant impact was confined to the United States. Even so, their heirs remain, and complacency would be folly. Jackson’s mastery of the topic and research resources enables him to provide a detailed and insightful map of the entire episode, particularly the complex interweavings of science, law, and political debate that it displayed, and how it helped compel scientists to face their public responsibilities. I recommend it to anyone interested in the topic from whatever angle. (The author should, though, have a moan to the publishers about proofreading.)

Reviewed by GRAHAM RICHARDS, Former Director of the British Psychological Society History of Psychology Centre, London.


Building on his extensive work over the last decade, Thomas Teo here boldly attempts a general “position statement,” upping the ante by moving from critical history of psychology to a metacritical history of critiques of psychology, with the further twist that such critiques often take the form of critical histories. Following useful preliminary discussions of the lack of such a historiography and metatheoretical perspectives on psychology, Teo turns first to “Kant and Early 19th-Century Critics of Psychology.” Adopting a typology of critiques of psychology into “natural scientific,” “human-science,” Marxist, feminist, postmodernist and postcolonial types (each with internal variations), he then devotes a chapter to each before closing with “Reflections on the Ethical-Political Character of Psychology” analyzing—I fear a little simplistically—the relationship between politics and psychology. This agenda clearly requires a wide-ranging knowledge of the history of psychology and its present condition, which, to the author’s credit, he demonstrates, often with some panache. Anglophone readers will particularly appreciate his expositions of figures like A. Waitz, F. A. Lange (not Karl of
emotion fame), W. Dilthey, and K. Holzkamp. It is, though, in the sheer range of issues it raises that the work’s major value lies. Most directly, and provocatively, relevant to historians of psychology is his opening claim that his metacritique of “historical critiques” of psychology is something historians will find uncongenial: “Critical historians are not interested in a history of the critique of psychology because it would make their critical historical reconstructions part of this history” (p. 14). How many critical historians would recognize themselves in this? Most will surely find such a move rather intriguing and be sophisticated enough to acknowledge that their histories are no more external to historical and social circumstance than the psychologies they criticize for believing they were. Teo himself cannot but descend from these heights in his final exposition of postcolonial critiques, where meta-critique is quite muted in favor of passionate promotion. In adopting an oppositional mode to critical history at the outset, Teo risks forfeiting a certain amount of goodwill in his primary readership. (As an aside, whether “historical critiques” means those produced in the past or those recently produced by historians is sometimes unclear.)

Teo also appears, unwittingly, to play a sleight-of-hand game with “psychology” itself. We have two options, one is to restrict the term’s referent to the “scientific” discipline, which emerged in late nineteenth-century Europe and North America. Discourses and disciplines existing before this and elsewhere are thus not psychology, however, they resemble it in their concerns and content. The alternative is using it in a sweepingly broad manner for all academic, philosophical, scientific, or religious accounts of human nature of whatever provenance. Yet while Teo is clear that the discipline “psychology” is a recent product of Western historical and cultural circumstances, he remains prepared to apply it to, for example, Greek thought and contemporary non-Western ideas and belief systems. It might be objected that the polarity is overly severe, leading only to sterile definitional pedantry, but it does highlight a genuine ambiguity regarding the subject matter of “critiques of psychology” that Teo does not resolve. For example, in illustrating the long-standing “close relationship between political and psychological thinking in Western thought” (p. 187), he instances Plato, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Locke, and Rousseau. Yet as none used this term and their agendas differed from modern psychology’s (whatever their historical roles as its “roots”), the term “psychological” becomes little more than synonymous with “reflections on human nature” and cannot carry the weight of illustrating his point, which I do not actually dispute. (Also, in this instance, only Locke in any sense differentiated the political from the “psychological” in his work.)

Regarding “reflexivity,” Teo is obviously conscious of the issue since the book itself instantiates an original reflexive move on Teo’s part and it permeates a good deal of the discussion of metatheory in Chapter 2. But he never tackles it head on and, in the reviewer’s opinion, fails to bite the bullet. For example, he rightly observes, “Persons live and act always on the background of a sociohistorical and cultural context, and such a fact makes psychology prone to ideological influences” (p. 38), but does not capture the sense in which ideologies are themselves psychological products and that we are dealing with a complex reflexive circuitry, not just “influence.”

The absence of serious mention of religion is perhaps only conforming to its usual marginalization in the historiography of psychology, but conformity is not usually among Teo’s vices. As Hendrika Vande Kamp has shown, religion figured centrally in the history of the concept of “psychology” in mainland European thought, especially the rationalist tradition. Moreover, religious critiques of psychology and debates between the camps have characterized most of psychology’s history since the 1860s. It is hard to see where in Teo’s typology religious critiques would fit, although culturally they have been of considerable significance. And alongside the “spiritual” turn in much recent psychotherapy, contemporary critiques of Western psychology from other cultures also often involve incorporating psychological ideas from indigenous religious traditions into psychology. While insisting on taking this facet of
the story seriously risks getting one labeled as a pro-religion advocate, continuing to suppress it is becoming a dereliction of historiographic duty, and it is a pity Teo did not spot this.

As alluded to previously, it is on turning to postcolonial critiques, after a finely impartial analysis of the other varieties, that Teo reveals his own hand, as he was honor-bound to do. Being committedly engaged in psychology’s present global condition, this is where he makes his stand, wishing to bury the old “cross-cultural psychology” and help forge an ethical psychology working for the oppressed and marginalized. Martín-Baró, the El Salvadorean Jesuit psychologist and author of Toward a Liberation Psychology (1994) murdered by the military in 1989, is representative of the direction Teo desires. (Indeed, it is, ironically, only in discussing him that Teo mentions an essentially religious critique.) While entirely sympathetic, I feel caution is needed here. Facing an originally alien culture self-evidently superior to one’s own in technology, medicine, and physical scientific knowledge, what are rational persons to do? Might they not indeed, having compared received psychological wisdom to Western psychological ideas, reasonably conclude that this is, in some respects, as inferior as received cosmologies and understandings of human biology are to Western astronomy and biology? This does not entail accepting Western psychological categories as being “natural.” What it does mean, reverting to reflexivity again, is that if psychology (in the subject matter sense) is constantly being recreated in the light of lived experience, rational young non-Westerners, with cell phones, satellite TVs, and e-mail contact with people worldwide, will necessarily have to adjust and change their psychological concepts accordingly. Western psychologists have to be properly, unpatronizingly postcolonial and accept that non-Westerners are entitled to evaluate for themselves what is and is not worthwhile retaining or adopting in both indigenous and Western traditions. It is, in any case, becoming obsolete to label the global culture now in its birth throes as “Western,” whatever its roots.

There are further minor points of criticism that I will forego, but one does need mentioning. Teo writes, “[T]he critique of lack of political, ethical, and practical relevance of natural- and human-scientific psychology drew attention in the mainstream only after 1945” (pp. 21–22). This notion of a lack of relevance is hard to reconcile with current understanding of how pervasively psychology affected twentieth-century Western societies, especially in North America. Child rearing, crime, education, “subnormality,” occupational selection, psychological distress, “race” and racism—all and more were firmly on psychology’s agenda by 1945, with enormous consequences for their political management, ethical construal, and relevant professional practice. Critiques of mainstream psychology certainly moved up a notch post-1945, but it was not irrelevance that was usually targeted, but rather how psychology was being used. Psychology cannot be both irrelevant and oppressive.

But to conclude, and to offset an unfairly negative tone, this is an invaluable work for which we should all be grateful. It genuinely advances the diverse major debates about the nature of psychology as a discipline, its place and status in a globalized culture, the ontology of its subject matter, disciplinary ethics, and the roles of historiography, while the historical material is generally either new or approached from a fresh direction. The reviewer is, finally, curious as to Teo’s next move, for there is no way home from here.

REFERENCE


Reviewed by Graham Richards, Former Director of the British Psychological Society History of Psychology Centre, London.
THOMAS TEO RESPONDS:

If one is doling out critique (including my critique of critical historians), one must be able to accept critique when it is directed against oneself. Besides, I agree with many of the points developed by Richards. They are valid even if, or because, one takes the purpose of the book into account. This publication is not intended as an *opus magnum*. In fact, given the extent of the theme, this work should be labeled a booklet with modest goals: to develop, for the first time ever, a *systematic* history of the critique of psychology; to provide an overview and sources of literature for those various critiques; and to present a historical-theoretical reconstruction for mostly didactic purposes.

Richards masterfully challenges my ambiguous conceptual relation toward the dialectic of history and theory—a problem that cannot be solved in introductory remarks. The struggle between historical representation and theoretical advancement in one and the same work must raise concerns for any new historian. The struggle is reflected in my own identity as a historian and theoretician of psychology. As a solution, I have suggested the perspective of *historicist presentism*, in which historical material is assimilated in order to discuss present topics. Such a perspective ran as a thread throughout the work (thinner in the beginning and thicker at the end). In doing so, the primacy of theory over history guided the booklet. And it explains my “passionate promotion” for the latest critique of psychology, which I identified as the postcolonial one, and to which I intended to make a theoretical contribution.

The primacy of theory also guided my critique of critical and new historians of psychology in my historical reflections. From a theoretical perspective, new and critical historians of psychology are not privileged epistemologically over old and traditional ones. Some of my polemics against critical historians were “unwise” because they are meta-theoretically closer to my own ideas than traditional ones. Yet, I still believe that the hermeneutic-methodological problematic has not been solved satisfactorily in the new history. If historical research is a fusion of horizons (Gadamer), then how can any truth claim (e.g., that there is discontinuity) be justified without making the very present the standard? Is critical history a metatheory that understands researchers (and their research) better than they understand themselves because it provides a historical perspective? Is the new history truer than the old one? If so, such arguments require extensive hermeneutic reflections, which are not developed and discussed sufficiently in psychological historiography’s literature.

My conceptualization of politics and ethics is, as Richards points out, basic. It was developed as a heuristic tool that helps students and readers not familiar with the complexities of this topic to reflect on the relationship between these two domains. Indeed, this heuristic has proven useful in my undergraduate and graduate teaching. Finally, Richards criticizes me rightly for not including a serious discussion of the role of religion in the critique of psychology. Yet, I am sure that historians and theoreticians can identify many more programs that might have been included, such as psychoanalysis and its developments. One could also argue that the natural-scientific critique should extend to the feminist or postmodern approaches. One could challenge the chapters on the feminist, Marxist, and postcolonial critiques as not doing justice to their complexity—how crude to present a Marxist critique of psychology in less than 20 pages, when one could fill, if not a library, then certainly a corridor with its books.

I will end with a religious quote, because spirituality is so blatantly missing in the book: “Seek and you will find.”
In May 2001, a group of scholars convened in Lübeck, Germany, to discuss the role of historical events in recent debates about human subjects research. This twenty-three-chapter edited volume, which grew out of that meeting, aims to provide a more contextually engaged analysis of topics that have become standard fare in public and scholarly debates about human experimentation. As Volker Roelcke notes in his introduction, the contributors examine “the contingency of descriptive categories,” such as what counts as an experiment, and “the origins and development of bioethical institutions,” such as ethics codes and review boards (p. 15). This is an important project, not least because present-day debates often rely on interpretations of the past to draw analogies, construct object lessons, and generally appropriate events to various ends—a process that above all, Roelcke contends, oversimplifies what were complex and at times incoherent social and political struggles. Undergirding this project is a methodological commitment to understanding human subjects research within specific local and temporal contexts, and the volume does contain several contributions that will stand as models of such scholarship.

It seems sadly appropriate that the volume’s contributors gathered in Lübeck. Seven decades earlier, this small Hanseatic city was the site of a tuberculosis vaccine campaign that turned deadly, which lent momentum to a political movement that resulted in the first state-sponsored human subjects regulations in the West (Germany’s Reichsrichtlinien). The volume is arranged chronologically, and it is in the section (number three, of six) on the 1930s Lübeck scandal that the book first hits its stride. Subsequently, the volume crystallizes around sections dedicated to Nazi medicine and the Nuremberg Code (the fourth section), and the post-Nuremberg debates (the fifth section). Among many high-quality chapters in these two sections, three contributions should not be missed: the work by Volker Roelcke on research programs and practices of Nazi investigators, by Paul Weindling on the discourse management of stakeholders in the Nuremberg Medical Trial, and by Susan Lederer on the long journey to, and vested interests encoded in, the Declaration of Helsinki.

These chapters combine novel arguments, lucid style, and—most important, given the aim of the present volume—serious methodological reflection. Together, they encourage us to bring the humans back into the history of human subjects research. Roelcke and Weindling suggest, for example, that an emphasis on the role of the state has diminished the attention paid to individual actors by recent scholars of human subjects research. Rather than portraying investigators as agents of the state and subjects as victims of the state, Roelcke argues that the literature would be enriched by a “comprehensive reconstruction of the identities and biographies of the victims” (p. 163). Likewise, Weindling suggests that a focus on the state limits many analyses because investigators’ motivations are left unquestioned, resulting in a literature that “does not allow for the unscrupulous scientist, who opportunistically exploited state power and resources for the pursuit of individual research agendas” (p. 178). It is exciting to see openings to pursue this new research agenda even within the chapters offered in the volume. The important pieces on sleeping sickness by Wolfgang Eckart and Christoph Gradmann can each be read as stories of research subjects’ resistance to being researched upon and the physicians’ practices of secrecy that were developed as a consequence. Moreover, by paying closer attention to individual actors, scholars could avoid the paternalism that unfortunately creeps in to some analyses. Maria Rentetzi’s chapter on women with radium poisoning, for example, could...
be strengthened by considering whether the women did, in fact, have wills or goals of their own—even if their agency was ultimately thwarted. Also pushing beyond the state, Lederer’s chapter on the creation of the Declaration of Helsinki documents the tremendous influence that pharmaceutical companies have had in the history of human subjects research in unexpected moments. The influence of drug companies throughout the twentieth century also emerges in Christian Bonah and Philippe Menut’s work on the aforementioned Lübeck scandal, as well as the more recent cases in Jiri Simek’s analysis of the advent of ethics review boards in the Czech Republic and Pei Koay’s tale of the creation of Iceland’s genetic database.

In some chapters, contributors undermine the broader goal of the volume by holding historical actors to twenty-first-century ethics standards or interpreting historical documents only in comparison to present norms. The volume’s best work, on the other hand, seeks to historicize and thereby comprehend the values and practices of all manner of individuals involved in twentieth-century human subjects research.

Reviewed by Laura Stark, Program in Science in Human Culture, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.


Hilke Kuhlmann, an American studies scholar at the University of Freiburg, has written the first nonparticipant account of the evolution of the major experimental communities that were directly (and indirectly) inspired by B. F. Skinner’s fictional utopian novel, *Walden Two* (1948). In the early 1970s, at the height of the cooperative living movement, there were literally dozens of interested groups throughout the United States who planned, both successfully and unsuccessfully, to establish *Walden Two*-type communities. Kuhlmann focuses the bulk of her account on the two most successful: Twin Oaks in Louisa, Virginia, and Los Horcones near Hermosillo, Mexico. She also offers briefer accounts of Sunflower House, Lake Village, Walden Three, and Dandelion Community. To date, the only other systematic sources of information about these real-life experiments are founder Kat Kinkade’s two books about Twin Oaks (Kinkade, 1973, 1994) and various articles in *Communities: Journal of Cooperative Living*. Thus, this book is a welcome addition to the utopian studies literature and a valuable contribution to the history of psychology. However, it is probably not the last word on the topic.

Kuhlmann’s interesting and provocative account is based largely on several interviews with members of the various communities, on her time spent living at Twin Oaks, and on her briefer visits to the other extant communities. In the Appendix to the book, she includes the transcripts of her interviews. In some ways, these interviews (especially the two with Kat Kinkade) provide the most interesting reading. They are useful not only in illuminating the firsthand experiences of community members and the influence of *Walden Two*, but also in revealing Kuhlmann’s own prejudices and biases toward her subject matter. In one of the exchanges with Kinkade, for example, Kuhlmann argues that external control should be minimized rather than maximized to “give more space to whatever there is in a human being to
develop from within” (p. 187). Kinkade replies, “You’re not much of a behaviorist are you?” and Kuhlmann responds, “No, I never said I was.” Although she attempts to maintain journalistic objectivity throughout some of her account, Kuhlmann observes in a footnote that she was not able to research Los Horcones more thoroughly because the members tend to “break off all communication with visitors whom they feel are hostile to behaviorist principles” (p. 162). Unfortunately, this leads to some holes in her reportage and a decided slant to many of her conclusions about the group and its individual members. As an approach to the book, I would recommend reading the interviews first.

Another curious theme that emerges in both Kuhlmann’s account and in some of the community members’ reflections (although apparently not at Los Horcones), is the expectation that Skinner should have been more actively involved in the communities movement. As an historian of psychology (and not, admittedly, a communitarian), I am always surprised by this expectation. Skinner wrote his novel “in white heat” in a matter of weeks in June 1945 (see Skinner, 1979, p. 298). When sales picked up in the late 1960s and he began to get more and more inquiries about a real-life Walden Two, he conscientiously responded to requests and set up a forwarding system so that Jim and Annette Breiling, two interested behaviorists and Walden Two enthusiasts, could compile information and coordinate communication. He was, by then, a 60-odd-year-old, well-ensconced Harvard academic. He corresponded somewhat regularly with Kinkade and other Twin Oakers, made modest monetary contributions to the community, visited once, and had communitarian visitors to his Harvard office. He was always fairly clear that although he was supportive of others’ efforts to experiment with the good life, community living was not for him. Yet Kuhlmann writes somewhat accusingly, “Apparently then, Skinner believed that an environment that he thought would be reinforcing for other people would fail to satisfy his own needs” (p. 44). While this may be an accurate statement, there were certainly other reasons for Skinner’s reluctance to move to Twin Oaks or Los Horcones.

Other parts of Kuhlmann’s analysis are more useful. She analyzes the fate of the Walden Two planner-manager system, child care system, and labor-credit system by examining the communards’ trial-and-error attempts to implement these aspects of Skinner’s vision. She concludes that all have been abandoned or significantly revised. Twin Oaks, it is clear, has moved far away from its behaviorist beginnings. Los Horcones has used behaviorism, rather than Walden Two per se, as its guiding philosophy. Whether Skinner approved or not is largely irrelevant, but most likely he was pleased that his work inspired real-life experimentation. As he put it in a 1979 letter to the members of East Wind, an offshoot of Twin Oaks: “I am in fairly close touch with Los Horcones and of course appreciate the closeness with which they are following behavioristic principles, but any way to work out the good life is okay with me” (Skinner, December 13, 1979; emphasis added).

REFERENCES

Reviewed by ALEXANDRA RUTHERFORD, Associate Professor of Psychology, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada.

In this richly documented and provocatively conceptualized work, Jan Goldstein argues that the economic, social, and political transformations of revolutionary France led to a debate over the nature of the self that pitted competing psychologies against each other in an effort to understand and control the individual in a changed world. As she did in her earlier work on the French psychiatric profession, Console and Classify (Cambridge University Press, 1987), Goldstein explores the intersection between politics and the human sciences to yield new insights into the history of each.

The first two chapters examine revolutionary-era debates over the nature and role of imagination in human thought. Goldstein demonstrates convincingly that eighteenth-century psychology was deeply engaged in the study of interior phenomena such as imagination but only marginally concerned with the self. Because the sensationalist self was built up from discrete atoms through association, it was necessarily contingent, patched together, and weak, prone to falling apart in a process Goldstein calls “horizontal fragmentation” (p. 5). The primary means of regulating such a self was by manipulating the environment, through education, public spectacle, and political reform. Revolutionary politicians and educators pursued these means with determination and vigor.

The excesses of the Revolution led to a questioning of the psychological assumptions that accompanied it. The theoretical foundations of a new psychology founded on an a priori, unitary, and active self were laid by Maine de Biran, but Victor Cousin popularized the philosophy known as eclectic spiritualism and institutionalized it through the French system of secondary education. Goldstein focuses on the foundational role of the psychological method in eclectic spiritualism and on the self that this method reveals. Cousin privileged a process of interior observation that was both arduous and necessary to produce the reflective self that characterized the educated individual. Because workers and women had neither the inclination nor the resources to pursue this process of introspection, only bourgeois males possessed a fully realized self. Cousin’s psychology fit perfectly with the Doctrinaire conception of a theoretically open but practically elitist society.

Although Cousin’s became the dominant psychology, it was not the only one. Goldstein discusses the persistence of sensationalism, which eclectic spiritualism displaced only with difficulty. The Roman Catholic Church promoted another approach to the self and provided detailed guidance on how to direct it. In a chapter on Ernest Renan, Goldstein shows how he employed both the specific discipline of his seminary tradition and the philosophy of Cousin as he struggled with his faith. Goldstein also explores phrenology as yet another alternative psychology, one that welcomed women and workers.

French philosophy retained its emphasis on the unitary and active self well into the twentieth century. Goldstein cites Jean-Paul Sartre’s astonishment upon first reading Freud to illustrate how thoroughly his philosophical training had ingrained in him the assumption that the self is one and indivisible (p. 3). Goldstein characterizes the Freudian unconscious as “vertical fragmentation” of the self and suggests that its history is only one aspect of a longue durée history of the unconscious (p. 329).

The Post-Revolutionary Self draws upon the historiographical insights of Michel Foucault into the connections between power and knowledge, but it postulates a degree of intentional
agency that would be alien to the author of *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. The ascendancy of eclectic spiritualism owed much to the very determined efforts of Cousin and the philosophers he trained. Goldstein’s analysis of the letters French lycée philosophy professors wrote to Cousin illustrates the intensely personal relationships he cultivated with them and their personal sense of mission.

Goldstein argues that Cousinian introspection was a “technology of the self” that assisted in the production of the bourgeois individual (p. 165). However, as she admits, there is a discrepancy between the importance of introspection in Cousinian theory and the paucity of examples in practice. Perhaps the focus could be broadened. Introspection was only one part of a yearlong immersion in the practice of reflection, logic, and analysis that had few counterparts in Western education. In this larger sense, Cousin indelibly shaped the post-revolutionary self in France.

Reviewed by JOHN I. BROOKS III, Associate Professor of History, Fayetteville State University, Fayetteville, NC.