
Sociologists of the National University of Ireland, Galway, have done a service to the anthropological and sociological communities by reprinting this facsimile of a classic long out of print. The work was part of a wider Harvard Irish Study, carried out from 1931–1936; it became a classic for both its data and their interpretation, and its methods. The authors of the new introduction have done considerable research to place it in its historical context, describing how the study originated in Lloyd Warner’s program of work and how it related to the other parts of the Irish Study, and showing the process of the negotiation needed to establish access and to choose a particular community to study. It is also placed in the theoretical context of the time, and the contemporary meanings it had are related to that. It is suggested that Arensberg and Kimball’s version of functionalism, and their aim of producing a case study to contribute to an objective worldwide classification of societies, with the terminology they used to describe them, did not have the significance later imputed to them; some modern interpretations and critical comments have rested on misunderstandings due to lack of knowledge of the intellectual setting. Byrne, Edmondson, and Varley show, too, how the work has been interpreted and used by Irish authors in relation to Irish concerns. The study’s validity as a benchmark of the traditional, with which the modern can be contrasted, has been hotly debated; arguments in this debate are briefly reviewed. The book is nicely produced, including numbers of historic photographs.

The new introduction is a model of how past work can usefully be placed in its historical context, and adds to this important original text case-study material of wider interest to the historian of social science. Social science research libraries will want a copy of this book.

Reviewed by JENNIFER PLATT, Emeritus Professor of Sociology, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9SN, England.


The paucity of qualified personnel to treat the overwhelming number of World War II casualties led to the large-scale federal funding of training, research, and practice in the field of mental health. Specifically, it led to the astounding growth of clinical psychology. This volume describes this growth in psychological training, research, practice, and advocacy activity
within the VA from 1946–1988, and highlights the role of the VA in influencing the training, accreditation, and credentialing of psychologists and the large-scale employment of psychologists during this time. The volume begins with an introduction to the early history of Veterans Affairs, from its establishment to the GI Bill of Rights of 1944 (providing educational and vocational rehabilitation opportunities to veterans) and to Public Law 79-293, creating the Department of Medicine and Surgery within the VA in 1946 that would house the Neuropsychiatry Division and the Clinical Psychology Section and that would provide physical and mental health care.

The first two chapters focus on the need for large-scale health care professionals to treat the millions of demobilized soldiers returning from World War II and the resulting impetus for training guidelines for clinical psychologists. Although individual and organizational attempts to establish training guidelines had existed for a couple of decades prior to the war, the war provided the stimulus for the VA (and PHS) to pressure the APA for the creation, accreditation, and expansion of graduate training programs in clinical psychology. Such programs began in 1946, and the second chapter focuses on how the VA advocated for continued funding for such training throughout the 1970s and 1980s, how such training changed from non-funded to stipend training, and how the VA began funding post-doctoral training in 1991.

The next two chapters focus on the research contributions of VA psychologists during the 1950s and 1960s. Specifically, chapter three describes a unique VA research innovation—the cooperative study—involving multiple hospitals (and large subject pools) working on a common research protocol that would lead to better patient care. The chapter discusses some of the most important collaborative studies conducted by the VA, including programs on prefrontal lobotomy, psychopharmacology, tuberculosis treatments, treatment setting evaluations, and schizophrenia and drug addiction treatments. The success of such cooperative studies was such that the NIMH also began conducting them and they have now become standard practice. Chapter 4 describes the work of the two most active local VA hospital research programs: the Palo Alto VA hospital in California and the Perry Point VA hospital in Maryland. Not only did psychologists provide the methodological and statistical skills psychiatrists lacked, but the emphasis on research also served to attract high-caliber psychologists to the VA.

Chapter 5 describes some of the treatment programs provided from the mid 1940s to late 1980s in an attempt to prevent hospitalization, encourage early discharge when that was not possible, and address chronic mental illness among veterans. The most important developments in this direction were the creation of mental hygiene clinics and vocational rehabilitation programs that decreased dependency on the hospital and allowed large numbers of patients to be treated through group therapy. The theoretical shift in orientation from psychodynamic to behavioral treatments was also witnessed during this time period.

Chapter 6 addresses the VA’s, the APA Division 18’s, and the Association of VA Chief Psychologists’ (AVACP) attempts to define and protect the practice of psychology during the 40 years following World War II. During the first two decades, the emphasis rested on defining and legitimizing the practice of psychology through training and accreditation efforts. The next two decades incorporated attempts to provide administrative training for new chiefs of psychology, establish medical staff membership, and obtain prescription privileges and reimbursement for psychological services.

The concluding seventh chapter describes recent events in the history of the VA. Organizational changes in the 1990s led to a consolidation of professional services that grouped psychiatry and psychology into a single management unit (mental health services). This resulted in a decrease in the number of independent psychology services and chief of psychology positions (in favor of psychiatry), and spurred leadership conferences sponsored by the APA and
the Association of VA Psychologist Leaders (formerly the AVACP). The late 1990s saw the creation of Mental Illness Research, Education, and Clinical Centers, and the 2005 Mental Health Strategic Plan is also expected to increase funding and the number of psychologists involved in mental health programs. A timeline of significant events in VA psychology and a list of key appointments appear in an appendix.

This volume fills a significant gap in our knowledge of the relationship between the federal government—in this case, the VA—and the field of psychology. It is particularly impressive that the authors—Baker, VA psychologist for over 35 years, and Pickren, former Director of the American Psychological Association Archives—were able to locate, secure, and use so many primary materials from the VA, and we are very fortunate that they are archived at AHAP and APA for future scholars to study. This volume is an invaluable source, both as a history in itself as well as a starting point for other scholars interested in pursuing more detailed and analytical research on various aspects of the VA and psychology. It would have been very helpful to see many more citations for the valuable information presented, as it was often difficult to determine the source of the authors’ claims (e.g., personal experience, colleagues’ personal experiences as cited in oral histories, VA published or unpublished material, or other published or archival material). Some chapters also had much more detail than seemed necessary or appropriate given the general nature of the volume. Writing governmental history, however, is challenging given the lack of material available or its unavailability to non-governmental communities.

This volume should be of great value to various target groups. The most obvious one is the community of historians of psychology, which is focusing less and less on traditional, turn-of-the-century psychological research and focusing more on mid-century research and branching out to non-academic psychology. In addition, professionals and graduate students of clinically related and public health fields will also find this volume valuable in its historical portrayal of the research, treatment, and advocacy of which they are currently a part. As the largest employer of psychologists in the United States, the history of the role of the VA in the promotion of psychological training, research, and practice is not only timely but absolutely necessary.

Reviewed by INGRID G. FARRERAS, Asst. Professor of Psychology, Hood College, Frederick, MD 21701.


Understanding psychotherapy solely as sets of techniques derived from the methods of natural science can only result, Daniel Burston and Roger Frie contend, in a truncated and inadequate understanding of it. Therapy—as both theory and practice—draws on philosophical ideas, including those associated with the human sciences. In this book, the authors focus on human science ideas of particular relevance to psychotherapy, doing so through an exploration of the history of the human sciences.
Psychotherapy as a Human Science is not a history of psychotherapy understood as a manifestation or product of human science. It is, rather, a history of the human sciences, with occasional (and often very insightful) discussions of how they pertain to psychotherapy.

Burston and Frie address phenomenology, existentialism, humanism, postmodernism, and psychoanalysis, considering how those intellectual traditions arose and changed, and how individual thinkers and their ideas developed in relationship with one another. Beginning with Descartes and his problematic legacy, they address (among others) Pascal, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, Buber, Binswanger, Sartre, Lacan, and Merleau-Ponty. The authors are selective in what and who they discuss; for example, they address in depth few contemporary thinkers and do not emphasize (as intellectual traditions within the human sciences) hermeneutics, critical psychology, personology, and some current qualitative research approaches. Although their exclusions are sure to disappoint some, their inclusions are broad.

To organize and focus their discussion, Burston and Frie helpfully employ a fourfold taxonomy, identifying thinkers as religious or irreligious, rationalist or irrationalist, utopian or anti-utopian, and modern or postmodern.

Burston and Frie are especially effective in making clear the extraordinary diversity of human science perspectives, how each thinker’s approach is rooted in particular historical and cultural contexts, and how various perspectives both resemble and diverge from one another.

Topics addressed within human science (but often not by natural science approaches) particularly relevant to psychotherapy are emphasized: understanding the subjective experiences of others, agency, choice, the self, self-realization, self-knowledge, deception, self-deception, intersubjectivity, and authenticity. Emphasizing an existential-phenomenological tradition that “navigates carefully between modernist essentialism and postmodern reductionism” (p. 259), Burston and Frie articulate nuanced conceptions of those topics that address many natural scientific and postmodern objections to them. For instance, they espouse an embodied, culturally constituted, agentic self, rejecting a body-less Cartesian self, a fully determined self (lacking agency), a valorized hyperindividualized self, and a postmodern “self” deconstructed as mere sociolinguistic construction.

Attempting in general to be descriptive, the authors occasionally reveal their perspective, for example, in asserting that “what Sartre and Lacan call love is nothing more than a combination of lust, dependency, and a naked will to power” (p. 214). In the postscript, the great diversity of human science views Burston and Frie have assiduously and convincingly outlined earlier in the book disappears, as they discuss “the” human science view and its implications. I would have preferred a frank acknowledgement that “the” human science perspective the authors discuss so helpfully is their own, and other human science perspectives would have different implications for psychotherapy. But that is a small quibble.

Overall, Psychotherapy as a Human Science makes a convincing case that psychotherapy involves certain concepts about which the human sciences (but not natural science methods) have much to say. Most—even those contending psychotherapists should only employ techniques proven effective by natural science methods—think therapists should understand clients’ experiences, respect clients, and help them gain self-awareness and reach goals they have chosen. Through their philosophical-historical analyses, Burston and Frie provide a rich, nuanced, and very helpful exploration of human science contributions to our understanding of such concepts and, hence, of psychotherapy.

Reviewed by ALAN C. TJELTVEIT, Professor of Psychology, Muhlenberg College, Allentown, PA.

Flipping through theoretical and historical journals in the social sciences of the last decade, one is apt to conclude that social constructionism has secured a fairly firm footing in contemporary psychological theory. Although disagreements may persist about the proper way to articulate a constructionist perspective, scholars seem to recognize the value and limitations of such an approach. It is therefore refreshing to see a work that unflinchingly calls into question some of the basic presuppositions of social constructionist theory.

Hibberd begins her work by focusing on the role of social constructionism, as a meta-theory of psychology, in contemporary psychological theory. Although she discusses differences among the various scholars that espouse one form of social constructionism or another (e.g., Harré, Potter, Shotter), Hibberd devotes most of her analysis to Kenneth Gergen’s brand of social constructionism. Although the author’s choice to focus almost exclusively on Gergen’s work may at times be appropriate, it does seem to restrict the scope of her overall critique. Nevertheless, she does make a number of insightful observations that bear closer scrutiny.

Despite differences between the various forms of social constructionism, it is clear that most versions are at least suspicious of the uncritical use of the methods of the natural sciences in the investigation of social phenomena. In contrast to the prevailing positivistic tendencies of contemporary psychological research, social constructionists advocate forms of inquiry that highlight the situated and discursive dimensions of human experience. In this way, social constructionism is often presented as radically opposed to any form of positivistic scientific inquiry. For Hibberd, the tendency to view positivism and social constructionism as mutually exclusive philosophical positions fails to acknowledge some important characteristics shared by both positions. Despite brief excursions into issues surrounding relativism and Speech-Act Theory, Hibberd devotes the majority of her book to what she views as the specious antithesis between positivism and social constructionism.

Hibberd is particularly interested in the role that conventionalism plays in both positivism and social constructionism. Here, conventionalism refers to the doctrine that words acquire their meaning only against the background of concrete norms and practices. In other words, it is only within the context of a particular convention that words become meaningful. For the author, conventionalism requires one to view meaning as a form of *internal* reference so that words become meaningful through their contact with other words within the same sociolinguistic context. Because these relationships are internal, conventions are unable to contribute to our knowledge of anything that exists outside any particular “form of life.” It is Hibberd’s position that positivism and social constructionism share a commitment to conventionalism that ultimately renders both positions incoherent.

Yet it is precisely in the midst of her analysis that one begins to question the coherence of the author’s own position. A case in point is her suggestion that social constructionists fail to truly grasp the meaning of “knowledge” when they advocate a shift in focus from the *discovery* to the *creation or production* of knowledge. She argues that knowledge is simply a process of discovery and any view to the contrary involves a “misuse of language” (p. 112). Unfortunately, the reader is left wondering how one can decide if a word is being misused without appealing to a particular convention. Indeed, it appears as if Hibberd’s book is not so much a treatise against conventionalism but instead the outline of a single dominant convention.
Of course, social constructionism has had to face this challenge from the beginning. Scholars have even suggested that arguments against conventionalism are simply an artifact of modern society with little relevance in a postmodern world. It is therefore difficult to say whether Hibberd’s book provides a suitable vocabulary for exploring deficits in social constructionist theory or if it simply represents another attempt to reduce social science discourse to what Rorty has so aptly referred to as a final vocabulary. Regardless, this work represents an honest attempt to ask important questions about the future of social constructionism.

Reviewed by Michael E. Arfenk, Assistant Professor of Psychology, University of Prince Edward Island, Charlottetown, PE, Canada.

Marijke Gijswijt-Hofstra, Harry Oosterhuis, Joost Vijselaar, and Hugh Freeman (Eds.)

Research in the history of psychiatry has generally highlighted notable institutions and initiatives (such as the York Retreat and moral treatment); innovators (such as Sigmund Freud and Emil Kraepelin); and treatment methods (ECT and psychoanalysis). They often cover developments in a few countries only and tend to stop somewhere around World War II. The accomplishment of Psychiatric Cultures Compared is that it reviews and analyzes, in a systematic way, developments in psychiatry in mental health care throughout the twentieth century in a number of countries (the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the Netherlands). Several attempts are made to develop a comparative perspective to highlight the social, cultural, and political factors which have contributed to significant developments in the field (such as deinstitutionalization and the development of outpatient mental health care). In all these respects, the current volume breaks new ground.

To highlight some of the most interesting contributions to the volume, I will discuss four chapters. In his analysis of the development of psychiatry in the former East Germany, Greg Eghigian concludes that the discipline of psychiatry thrived in both communist as well as liberal democratic states. In East Germany, psychiatrists (and other mental health care professionals) aimed to rehabilitate and reintegrate criminals and delinquents instead of punishing them by providing psychotherapeutic treatment and outpatient care. Psychiatrists were invited by politicians to participate in the project of modernizing East Germany. In his extensive analysis of a number of randomly selected patient records from Dutch psychiatric hospitals during the twentieth century, Joost Vijselaar emphasized that mental hospitals in the early twentieth century were dynamic institutions where up to a third of newly admitted patients were discharged within a year. Mental hospitals were not merely warehouses for chronically insane individuals. Families played important roles in the commitment and discharge of patients. Vijselaar ends with sobering note: despite the introduction of a variety of new treatment methods and a number of revolutions in psychiatric care during the twentieth century, on the
wards there were very few changes. Toine Pieters and Stephen Snelders analyze the history of pharmaceutical treatments in mental hospitals, starting in the 1880s. According to them, the early 1950s did not witness a revolution in the way psychopharmacological medications were used in mental hospitals in the treatment and sedation of inmates. On the contrary, the use of drugs in mental hospitals has displayed a remarkable continuity during the last century: they were first applied with great enthusiasm, which waned after side effects became more widely known.

The authors of this volume give explicit attention to the formation of the outpatient sector in mental health care. After several chapters that provide thorough analyses of the development of this sector in the countries under consideration in this volume, Harry Oosterhuis provides an explicit comparative perspective. It appears that psychiatrists everywhere favored the presence of outpatient clinics and that many governments made plans accordingly. However, most of these plans have been implemented on a rather modest scale only. After the policy of deinstitutionalization had been implemented, most vigorously in the United States and Britain and modestly in all other countries, outpatient treatment became ever more essential. Unfortunately, mental health care in the community has only been able to address the needs of individuals with severe and persistent mental illness to a limited degree while addressing problems of living in less troubled individuals.

All in all, Psychiatric Cultures Compared provides a systematic comparative analysis of developments in psychiatry and mental health care in five countries. It sets the standard for future research in this area.

Reviewed by Hans Pols, Senior Lecturer at the Unit for History and Philosophy of Science, University of Sydney, Sydney NSW 2006 Australia.


Although Sigmund Freud seems never to have really written (but only asked Marie Bonaparte) the famous question “What does Woman want?” (see Alan C. Elms’s arguments, Elms, 2001), he was, nevertheless, ready to know the position of women in his own family, and to leave the daily command of his household to them, while he himself took care of the “business.” He was also active in conservatively controlling and giving patronizing support and advice to his three daughters, Mathilde, Sophie, and Anna.

Günter Gödde, in his work on Mathilde Freud (1887–1978), the eldest daughter of Sigmund Freud, has published and made use of her youthful letters and cards (1903–1910) to her friend Eugen Pachmayr, and of her notes (1899–1909). For the period covered by the correspondence there has been little biographical material about Freud, his family, and the “childhood” of psychoanalysis. The break with Wilhelm Fliess occurred in 1903, and the “psychoanalytic movement” (Freud first used this expression in 1908) began to institutionalize internationally in 1910, when Mathilde’s correspondence comes to an end.
Gödde’s work is a traditional and careful compilation of all kinds of information, both trivia and interesting details. It confirms the earlier views about the father of psychoanalysis having been a responsible, somewhat faintly available, mostly authoritative rather than strictly authoritarian parent to his children. He was more an interested onlooker in childrearing, but still one that could be trusted. Because of his ambition in professional and scientific life, the double motherhood of Martha and “Auntie” Minna suited him well.

From early on, Freud saw himself as a “lost case” in relation to the bourgeois pure reason. However, the ideals of assimilated Jewish liberal Bildungsbürgertum governed the Freud family atmosphere, enhancing cultural erudition, as evidenced by Gödde’s work. Both parents stuck to bourgeois values and conventions, stressing order, good habits, and punctuality. Freud revealed and re-evaluated the vicissitudes of female sexuality, but could not get rid of the double standard that prescribed the unequal possibilities for girls. None of the Freud daughters was sent to the Gymnasium, nor did they receive academic tuition while all the three sons did.

Mathilde would have wanted to take more part in the field of psychoanalysis, but she had to accept, with resignation, that “Papa” could not have any extensive use for her in the psychoanalytic movement, whereas Anna got the important tasks. Her career was steered by normative expectations for wifehood and motherhood. The female dreams of cultural emancipation and self-realization remained only dreams. Mathilde married but because of many severe illness periods (Gödde assumes that they were connected with problems of individuation in youth) could not have any children, adopted her sister’s son, who died as a child, and worked in clothing agencies in Vienna and later in London.

Actually, Papa Freud and his movement are only marginally present in Mathilde’s correspondence, and psychoanalysis was not discussed at the family table. Gödde’s work concentrates on the life history of Mathilde, and as such also the listing of Mathilde’s theater, opera, concert, and lecture visits is necessary, albeit tedious to most readers. The adult life course of Mathilde is more fragmentary. Readers get facets of biography that may be somewhat supplemented when new Freud family letters, now under preparation, will be published.

Gödde’s approach to his subject is tactfully balanced, giving reasonable appraisals of Mathilde’s life course in relation to her environment and to historical and cultural contexts. This work reads well together with Katja Behling’s Martha Freud (2002), in which the Freud family is described from another inside view, that of the “Hausfrau” Martha. Certain aridity of Gödde’s presentation could have got a more vital verve by impacts from the history of youth, youth psychology, and social, family, and gender history/theory. A closer and more daring analysis of the Viennese-Victorian moral codes connected with youth fantasies and “tender passions” could also have evoked more nuanced perspectives to the interplay of the cultural and the personal. Nevertheless, such additions could have changed this solid work to a more suggestive and conjectural one. From my copy of the work I missed 15 important pages (pp. 257–272) that would have included parts of the notes and the list of references.

REFERENCES


Reviewed by JUHANI IHANUS, Department of Psychology, University of Helsinki, PO Box 9, FI-00014 University of Helsinki, Finland.

Before 1973, multiple personality disorder, a psychiatric condition in which two or more personalities appear to coexist within one body, was rarely diagnosed: perhaps 50 published cases. By the 1990s, the prevalence of this disorder in the United States had escalated to 40,000. Therapists specializing in the treatment of this malady claimed the actual number was in the range of two million, nearly all of them women. According to Robert Rieber, the escalation of cases was propelled by the publication of a book, *Sybil*, which described the biography and life world of “Sybil Dorsett,” in reality a woman named Shirley Mason. The book was hugely popular; four million copies were printed, and a television series based on the book was viewed by additional millions of Americans. A similar biography, *The Three Faces of Eve*, had been published in the 1950s and made into a popular film, but neither book nor film had any obvious impact on the epidemiology of the multiple personality phenomenon. In 1906, Morton Prince had authored an account, *The Dissociation of a Personality*, which described the several personalities of his patient “Mary Beauchamp.” Morton’s book was widely read by the public, the patient’s condition was described in newspaper articles, and her case attracted the professional interest of many doctors. Miss Beauchamp’s example initiated no trend. It was only following the publication of *Sybil* that multiple personality disorder (MPD) spread across America.

*Sybil* exhibited features of the dissociated personalities previously reported for Eve (Chris Costner Sizemore) and Mary Beauchamp and, if one sought precedents in fiction, the personality split between *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*. What did these similarities between past and present signify? Therapists and patients involved in MPD believe that the recurrent features confirm the transhistorical character of the disorder: MPD exists independently of the clinical and cultural practices and expectations through which it is encountered.

*Sybil*’s disorder was unlike the earlier cases in some respects, however. Her multiple personalities were well defined: each had a name, a self-described physical appearance, and an autobiography. The onset of Sybil’s personalities had occurred early in life, around age 3, and their origins were vividly traumatic. *Sybil* describes a monstrous mother and a childhood of ferocious sexual abuse, all in clear sight of uncaring neighbors and with the tacit knowledge of the family physician. And, unlike earlier cases of MPD, little Sybil also had witnessed violent coitus between mom and dad.

The outbreak of MPD in the 1970s coincided with developing public concern with the battered child syndrome and, more specifically, childhood sexual abuse. Around the same time, knowledge of posttraumatic stress disorder and its symptomatic amnesia also entered into public awareness. *Sybil* described a life that mirrored perfectly stories of sexual abuse and repressed memory retailed in the mass media. Once again, the similarities were taken as evidence of the condition’s scientific validity. Rieber proposes a different explanation, based in part on his access to tape recordings of a clinical session between Sybil (Shirley Mason) and her psychotherapist (Cornelia C. Wilbur), and additional recordings of consultations between this therapist and a professional writer (Flora Rheta Schreiber) who, in concert, confected *Sybil*. In short, the book and its eponymous patient mirrored earlier cases and ongoing cultural panics because the patient and the book were shaped to this purpose. The quality of the collaboration between Wilbur and Schreiber is illustrated in an appendix to Rieber’s book, in which he includes transcripts of taped conversations between the therapist and the writer.
Rieber discussed *Sybil*'s origins with Herbert Spiegel, a highly respected psychiatrist who, at Wilbur’s request, had met Shirley Mason and conversed with each of her seven personalities. Spiegel’s conclusion is that that Shirley was a highly hypnotizable “brilliant hysterical” whose multiple personalities were products of inspired “game playing.” Rieber agrees with the verdict and writes that *Sybil* was a conscious misrepresentation of the facts, combining deception and self-deception. He implies that the explosion of MPD diagnoses following the *Sybil*’s publication has a similar explanation.

Rieber informs readers that he had two goals in writing this book. He wanted to detail the true origins of *Sybil*. And in this he succeeds. His second goal was to provide a historical context for the emergence of MPD and its place within psychiatric discourse on dissociation. There are pages on the neurophysiology of dissociation and the work of relevant clinicians and researchers. And there is a chapter that describes and tallies 14 cases of multiple personality, including Mary Reynolds, the earliest recorded case (1811), Pierre Janet’s famous subject Felida X, Ansel Bourne, Morton Prince’s Mary Beauchamp, and Eve White, the subject of *The Three Faces of Eve*. This part of his book is encyclopaedic rather than analytical. Rieber’s book makes no reference to writers—Ian Hacking, Ruth Leys, Elaine Showalter, and Michael Kenny among others—who, in the 1980s and 1990s, published seminal analyses of the multiple personality phenomenon. A still more puzzling omission is an article, “Sybil—The Making of a Disease: An Interview between Herbert Spiegel and Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen,” published in 1997 (April 24) in the *New York Review of Books*.

REFERENCES


Reviewed by ALLAN YOUNG Social Studies of Medicine, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada.


In our fragmenting, globalizing world, relationships between science and religion have become increasingly salient. Often cast as merely one of conflict, it is vital to specify the terms “science” and “religion” in order to have a meaningful discussion. This volume attempts to do this, taking a particular stance on the religious side, which makes claims that science (that is, reason) cannot ignore, because the claims are reasonable. Common to the essays is an Aristotelian, Thomistic philosophical background, yet there is nothing monolithic about its application. The form of the book entails nine essays, followed by “Colloquies,” dialogues among the participants on various issues raised in the essays. Gladys Sweeney informs the reader that “the essays presented in this book are the works of believers” (p. 1), although they are not...
intended only for Catholics, because of their reasonableness. Absent from the book are any voices within the Catholic community critical of official positions of the Church on social issues.

The book centers on the theoretical, practical, and ethical implications of philosophical anthropology for the human sciences. Psychology, anthropology, political science, and history fall under its purview. The anthropology is Christian and Aristotelian, central to which is that “the human being is the image of God and cannot be reduced to a mere fragment of nature or to an anonymous element in the human city” (pp. 15–16), writes Russell Hittinger, quoting Pope John Paul II. This “positive anthropology” stands in contrast to a “negative anthropology,” according to which, the human arose in a “state of nature” à la Hobbes, with an unspecified nature to be completed in “freedom and culture” (p. 19). Against a strong version of social constructionism, the authors argue that human nature has form and finality. As a result, there is much discussion of “natural law,” and on the meanings of “nature.”

Specific chapters deal with political science (Chapter 2), medical and other ethical issues (Chapters 3 and 4), law (Chapter 6), and architecture (Chapter 7). Of special interest is Robert Royal’s essay on “The Historical Dimension of Human Nature and Its Uses in the Contemporary World” (Chapter 5). Royal addresses the historical dimension of the Christian message and claims that “absent the Creation/Redemption historical matrix, what we call human nature is bound to be misunderstood” (p. 97). To acknowledge this, however, “does not depend on our fully solving the mysteries” of this history; Hegel and Marx, among others, thought they had, turning history “into a kind of disincarnate abstraction having little to do with the fullness of human life” (p. 98). This Christian conception of history stands between “absolute historical omniscience and absolute historical relativism” (p. 99). Royal examines the rise of Christianity in the Roman world and in other parts of the world, taking note of the conflicts between “the faith” and its various cultural expressions, and how the two cannot be confused.

Daniel Robinson, in “Science and Faith: The Warrants for Belief” (Chapter 8), reviews the “Galileo affair,” drawing on seventeenth-century documents and John Paul’s 1992 reappraisal, in which he acknowledged the mistakes made by Church officials. Bringing the astronomical concepts forward, Robinson notes an irony: “In the specific matter of the trial of Galileo, his critics were wrong. . . . In the circumstance, then, Galileo was ‘right.’ Now in our post-relativity age, it is clear that both were wrong” (p. 169). Robinson uses this case as a springboard for discussing the warrants for affirming claims of either faith or science, and he concludes that “faith and belief are integral to the quest for understanding in all compartments of life” (p. 180), a conclusion similar to that of Michael Polanyi (Polanyi, 1962).

The “Colloquies” offer further reflection, in the give and take of dialogue, on such topics as “nature,” the “person,” and the interplay of philosophy, science, and politics. If, as Roger Smith (1997) argued, integral to the history of the human sciences is the quest for human self-understanding, and if, as Hans van Rappard (1997) asserted, the history of psychology is historically informed theoretical psychology, then this book belongs in the conversation.

REFERENCES

Reviewed by ROBERT KUGELMANN, Professor of Psychology, University of Dallas, Irving, TX.

Psychologists, social and otherwise, too seldom tend to ask themselves exactly what they are spending their energies doing, where they have been, and where they are going. Brewster Smith does all of these things in this thoughtful book. Although volumes of collected writings are by no means rare, this one is unusual in a number of important respects. Most collections are posthumous, but Brewster Smith is alive, well, and productive. Editors of collected works do not usually include the author whose work is being celebrated; this collection is by Brewster Smith himself. Finally, almost all collections consist entirely of previously published work; this one includes four essays by Smith written specifically for the purpose of introducing each of the book’s sections. To these facts must be added the important point that Smith, a former president of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI), has been at the forefront of psychology generally, and social psychology particularly, for more than 60 years.

SPSSI, Division 9 of the American Psychological Association, has sometimes been called, at least by its members, the social conscience of the larger organization. That value orientation is prominent throughout the book, as is Smith’s continued aspiration and striving for a social psychology “that is interdisciplinary, scientific, humanistic, and socially relevant” (p. 3). He sees these attributes as missing from most current social psychological research, and therefore concludes that “my relation to social psychology as I have witnessed it and participated in it has not only been marginal but contrary to its main currents” (p. 3). This is a surprising statement from a former president of the American Psychological Association and the holder of its Gold Medal for Contributions to Psychology in the Public Interest, an award that could as well have been given for his theoretical contributions, which are well summarized in this book.

Part I (Chapters 1–6) is the most explicitly autobiographical section of the volume. It concentrates on the mid-century years that were formative for Smith, as they were for the hybrid discipline of social psychology, a merging of sociological and psychological concepts and research priorities. Smith went from undergraduate work at Reed and Stanford to graduate work at Harvard and then, during World War II, to service in the army, first with the programs of testing and communication directed by John Flanagan and Carl Hovland, and then with Samuel Stouffer's research branch, the source of the studies summarized in the classic *American Soldier*. Smith returned to Harvard after the war to complete his doctorate in the then-new program called Social Relations—Harvard’s version of the hybrid discipline of social psychology, with a touch of anthropology and political science. Somewhat similar interdisciplinary programs were developing at a few other universities, including the University of Michigan. The Michigan program, of which I am an early product, was more quantitative than Harvard’s and inclined to treat personality as an array of disaggregated characteristics rather than attempt to understand the person as an individual whole. In the Harvard program, Gordon Allport and Henry Murray concentrated on the study of personality in its social context, as revealed in qualitative and narrative material. Their influence on Smith, as he tells us, was profound and lasting.

The emphasis on personology dominates Part II (Chapters 7–10), entitled “Toward an Understanding of Selfhood.” The central issue of these chapters is “the quest for meaning, for
meanings compatible with a human life of self-conscious mortality” (p. 135). This is a challenge experienced at one level or another by each human being and it is a challenge to every human society, which must respond with its own myths, religions, and core beliefs. These chapters are the most critical and least optimistic parts of the book. Part III (Chapters 11–17) is titled “Toward an Emancipatory Human Science.” The title is more hopeful than is implied by the track record of psychologists in dealing with the three great and persisting problems in human affairs: poverty, prejudice, and peace. Smith’s own thinking is well summarized in the sixth of the seven chapters in this section: “Just getting older probably predisposes me to give less weight to Utopian hopes. . . . But I think I share with my younger colleagues an increased awareness of system complexity and of historical and situational contingency that leaves me more cautious than I once was about prescriptions for social action, but no less committed to using psychology and social and behavioral science to promote human welfare” (pp. 257–258).

The first chapter in this section, “McCarthyism—A Personal Account,” deserves special comment, less for its historical analysis than for its unique candor. Smith, like many other liberal academics, was called before the Jenner Committee, a McCarthy spin-off, and testified in 1953. Like some who were so summoned, Smith later invoked the Freedom of Information Act to obtain a transcript of his testimony. But like no other that I know of, he has written unsparingly of the difference between his self-protective memory of the event and the evidence of transcript.

Part IV (Chapters 18 and 19), “Reappraising Our Foundations,” summarizes Smith’s view of fundamental changes since 1950 in psychology as a science. He sees psychology as having gotten beyond the earlier effort, exemplified by Skinner and other behaviorists, to imitate the ahistorical and depersonalized discipline of physics. But Smith is concerned that some (many?) psychologists have instead adopted uncritically the assumptions of postmodernism, along with its antiscientific denial of evidence as reflective of a reality that is not merely subjective.

It is hopeful, in troubled times, to find a social scientist in his ninth decade writing lucidly, self-critically, and wisely about the essential problems and potentialities of his chosen field. And it is an additional pleasure to find that the humanistic values of his youth are burnished rather than tarnished in his old age.

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“[T]he idea that we acquire knowledge by a process of trial-and-error elimination has been one of the truly great ideas of the twentieth century . . . [and] Karl Popper credits himself for having invented this idea,” writes ter Hark (p. 1). Popper, Otto Selz, and the Rise of Evolutionary Epistemology is a study of the development of Popper’s concept of evolutionary epistemology, making two central claims. Ter Hark argues that evolutionary epistemology was
not a late “peripheral” (p. xi) development in Popper’s career, but was “integral” (p. xi) to his thought from the beginning, and that Popper is guilty of “seriously distorting the historical record” (p. xii) about how his ideas developed.

Scholars in the area of Popper studies will find Popper, Otto Selz, and the Rise of Evolutionary Epistemology of great interest. It is clearly based on many years of closely reading Popper’s works, especially his earliest unpublished graduate theses, and seriously challenges Popper’s and others’ accounts of how he got the idea of falsification as the demarcation criterion separating science from pseudoscience and thence the notion of evolutionary epistemology, a term coined by psychologist Donald Campbell (1974) in a chapter of an edited volume about Popper’s philosophy. Popper tended to present the idea of falsification as a penetrating insight of his own, but ter Hark plausibly argues that Popper got it during a “radical transformation” (p. xi) of his thought around 1930 caused by reading the psychologists Otto Selz and Karl Bühler. In addition to challenging the received historical record about the development of Popper’s thought, this conclusion is philosophically important because Popper famously rejected psychologism in philosophy of science. If ter Hark is right, Popper’s allegedly purely philosophical and logical analysis of science is in fact rooted in psychological studies of and theories about human thinking and problem solving.

On the other hand, scholars outside Popper studies will find Popper, Otto Selz, and the Rise of Evolutionary Epistemology of much less interest. The title promises more than it delivers. A more descriptive title would be The Influence of German Denkpsychologie—Especially That of Selz and Bühler—on the Development of Karl Popper’s Philosophy of Science. Ter Hark discusses the Würzburg school, Bühler, and the career of the otherwise obscure Otto Selz (Wikipedia has an empty placeholder for him) at length, but they are always seen through a Popperian lens. The “rise of evolutionary psychology” is not really addressed, because ter Hark never gets outside Popper. We don’t learn about predecessors such as the pragmatists, whose philosophy was rooted in Darwinian theory, or other evolutionary epistemologists such as Stephen Toulmin or Richard Dawkins. In addition, Popper, Otto Selz, and the Rise of Evolutionary Epistemology is relentlessly internal. Selz’s and Bühler’s work is not set in any psychological context (except for disparaging remarks about Gestalt psychology), and apart from a few passing references to the Nazis, we would never know that Popper lived through one of the most turbulent periods in world history. I would think that Popper’s famous opposition to dogmatic thinking and closed systems of thought would have been influenced by his experience.

**Reference**


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