Pierre Ayrault v. The Society of Jesus: Gallican-robin Constructions of Paternal Authority on Legal, Political, and Religious Grounds

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Introduction: Biography

It has been three years and more that I have been trying to learn where the Jesuits are holding my son. If I had discovered the place, I would have made this remonstrance to him privately. But seeing that I was losing time, and more, my hope, I wanted to write to him as to the contumacious….This being done, I leave it to his illiberal will to obey or disobey me.¹

Pierre Ayrault addressed this short note to the reader as part of his ongoing struggle to find his son René, whom he wanted to believe the Jesuits were holding captive, in spite of his nagging suspicion that the Jesuits had corrupted his son to defy his paternal authority. In response to the latter presumption, he wrote a treatise entitled *De La Puissance Paternelle: Contre ceux qui sous couleur de Religion vollent les enfans à leurs peres & meres* (On Paternal Power: Against those who under the guise of Religion steal children from their fathers and mothers) addressed to his son, whom he labeled contumacious. Contumacy described people who held the law in contempt, especially those who refused to appear in court or to speak, and Ayrault’s considerable discourse on it will be analyzed in depth in Chapter One. This piece will attempt to contextualize Ayrault among his peers whose values inform many of the choices he made in his remarkable treatise.

Pierre Ayrault is not a household name. He remains a relatively obscure historical figure overshadowed by such sixteenth century names as Jacques Cujas, Montaigne, Étienne Pasquier, Jean Bodin, François Hotman, Jean Calvin, François Baudouin, and Charles Dumoulin, to name only a few. As such, he appears literally as a footnote to history, making his way into studies about law and the family in at most a few paragraphs or a passing

¹ “Il y a trois ans & plus, que je suis à apprendre où les Jesuites tiennent mon fils. Si je l’eusse peu d’escouvrir, je luy eusse faict ceste Remonstrance en privé. Mais voyant que je perdois temps, &, qui plus est, mon esperance, je luy ay voulu escrire comme aux contumax….Celà fait, je luy laisse en son illiberal arbitre de m’obeyr, ou ne m’obeyr point.” Pierre Ayrault, *De La Puissance Paternelle : Contre ceux qui sous couleur de Religion vollent les enfans à leurs peres & meres* (Tours: Jamet Mettayer, 1593), note to the reader. Spelling of his last name varies among the sources and is often listed as Airault.
The one notable exception is Cristina Quarta’s study on Ayrault and Bodin.\(^2\) The Angevin judge has received attention for his discourse on ambassadorial immunity in a context of a study on international relations.\(^3\) His apparent legal relativism has been compared to the moral relativism of Montaigne.\(^4\) But two points of interest stand out among the rest in recent studies. The first appears in a discourse on actual legal trials of animals, corpses, and inanimate things for which he wrote a small, and certainly odd, book in 1591 (*Des Proces Faicts au Cadaver, aux Cendres, à la mémoire; aux bestes brutes; choses inanimees; & aux contumax*—On Trials Made to a Cadaver, to Ashes, to Memory, to Brutish Beasts, Inanimate Things, and to the Contumacious) which has been variously interpreted.\(^5\)

The other is usually summarized rather mysteriously as the “Ayrault affair,” which is a non-committal way to describe the controversy which surrounded his son René joining the Jesuits.

However, even these two topics are overshadowed in scope of larger histories devoted to the rising legal class.

Ayrault was a member of a rising bureaucratic class frequently dubbed the *gens de robe* or *robins*. This group has been difficult to classify and is occasionally referred to as the fourth estate. Contemporaries also found classifying these magistrates problematic, which was amplified at convocations of the Estates General, which at different times made them


representatives of the nobility, the third estate, or judicial moderators.⁶ These men were essentially royal bureaucrats, who purchased magisterial or secretarial offices from the king. Technically, they belonged to the bourgeoisie, but their family enjoyed enough wealth to buy them a sort of hybrid status through a royal office and/or a marriage with a member of the old nobility (noblesse d’épée). Even so, their noble status was still in a state of development and disputed especially in cases of inheritance. In these instances, local and Parisian Parlements tried to determine whether the person made the office noble or the office made the person noble and whether the status was inheritable should a person be ennobled. The difference was significant under customary legal systems because the nobility practiced primogeniture while lower classes practiced plenary inheritance. It was not until the seventeenth century that they received the classification of noblesse de robe.⁷ The sixteenth century was a time of transition in this regard, as in so many others.

Ayrault was a typical robin. Born in 1536, his uncle François paid for him to study humanities and philosophy at the University of Paris before moving on to study law at Toulouse under the renowned Jacques Cujas. The erudite legal scholar was not shy about his royalist allegiances, and like many of his peers, Ayrault was a Gallican, promoting the privileges of the French church against the papacy while identifying himself as strictly Catholic. It is unclear from the sources whether he was a moyenneur—someone who doctrinally sought a reformed middle ground between Catholicism and the Protestant faiths—like Baudouin.⁸ Ayrault categorically opposed the rebellions of the Catholic League, writing

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several pieces of propaganda from 1589 to 1594, one of which was titled Deploration de la mort du roy, Henry III, & du scandale qu’en a [éprouvé] l’Eglise (Deploration of the death of King Henry III and of the scandal which afflicts the Church). He had it published in 1589,\(^9\) after the assassination of the king (to which the Jesuits were attributed a role as Leaguer agents) and while Henry IV was still trying to gain entrance to Paris.\(^10\) Ayrault maintained correspondence with Pasquier\(^11\) (a legist and famous historian known for his nascent sense of nation and anti-Jesuit works) and probably knew other members of Pasquier’s circle fairly well.\(^12\)

It is important here to note that France was not “simply” a Catholic country in the sixteenth century. Much of the country, especially the royalist portions, tended to adhere to a special French ideology known as Gallicanism. This ideology asserted the privileges and relative autonomy of the French Catholic Church, citing the Gauls’ relationship with the Roman Empire. Gallican policy was basically Catholic but anti-Roman: the monarchy tried to distance itself from the papacy while still remaining within the Catholic faith. It encouraged an idea of Gallicanism that promoted the ancient rights and privileges of the Franco-Gallican Church, which included a sort of immunity from excommunication and interdiction and the recognition of Church Council decisions above those of papal policy.\(^13\) Paris, in particular, seemed to be a major center of anti-Jesuit sentiment. In the words of A. Lynn Martin: “The rights of the Gallican Church in opposition to papal supremacy were

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\(^12\) Kelley, Foundations, see especially part 4.

\(^13\) Salmon, Society in Crisis.
ardently championed by the University, the Parlement, and the Bishop of Paris.’” 14 Theologians (at the Sorbonne) and royalists set Gallicanism as theoretically opposed to Romanism, including Roman law, language, and to a certain extent, religion.

Gallicanism was a crucial element of the French thought-world in the sixteenth century. However, it was far from a monolithic ideology. Frederic J. Baumgartner argues that two versions of Gallicanism existed, stating that “Royal Gallicanism emphasized the authority of the king in the French Church, especially his right to appoint the occupants of its major offices; ecclesiastical Gallicanism placed that power in the hands of the clergy itself.” He explains further that “The two competing theories of Gallicanism battled both the papacy and each other until the end of Louis’ [XII] bitter dispute with Julius II toward the end of his reign.” 15 This “bitter dispute” entailed an embarrassing scandal of a failed council which Louis called to remonstrate the “war mongering” of Julius II, who had been challenging French supremacy in Italy. 16 An alliance between England, Spain, Venice, and the Holy Roman Empire forced Louis to negotiate with Julius II, who had already made preparations to crown Henry VIII as king of France. 17

Baumgartner argues that Royal Gallicanism prevailed. 18 This international threat, created at the hands of the papacy, only strengthened Gallican fears and suspicion of Rome. Gallicans denied that the pope had the authority to depose and replace kings. This heightened suspicion created difficulties for the Jesuits, whom the Gallicans described as agents of the pope—due to their special vow of obedience to him—and Spain. Spanish power was nearly a continual concern for the French monarchy and it did not help that “[t]he reasons why the

16 Ibid., 63.
17 Ibid., 69.
18 Ibid., 55.
Society has always been identified with the diplomatic and military programs of Philip II seem to be that the founder was Spanish, the first five generals were subjects of Philip, and many of the early members were Spaniards.”19 As a result, the Jesuits faced fierce opposition in France, not only from the Huguenots, but from Catholics as well because of their international character and presumed international loyalties.

Much anti-Jesuit sentiment stemmed not only from Gallican fears of radical Catholic ambitions but also as a means of criticizing unpopular Church policy. Many robins were unhappy with the Council of Trent’s decrees. These included its unsatisfactory resolution, for reform-oriented Catholics, to what were viewed as corruptions and its stance on clandestine marriage (which will be discussed in depth in Chapter One). This dissent became more and more obvious and determined with the thinly veiled procrastination on the part of the robins to ratify the Council of Trent. As Martin characterizes it: “Since the close of the Council of Trent in 1563 the French monarchy’s concern for the privileges of the Gallican Church and tendency towards Caesaropapism had defeated the strong papal efforts to obtain the publication of the decrees in France.” Furthermore, he continues: “it is ironical to discover one of these shock troops [Jesuits], Emond Auger, arguing against the acceptance of the decrees of the Council of Trent on the grounds that they would be detrimental to the rights and privileges of the Gallican Church.”20 Gallicanism was a difficult and complex ideology on many fronts.

Amidst these controversies, Ayrault spent about ten years in Paris where he established himself as a lawyer, began his family,21 and pleaded a case against the Jesuits in

19 Martin, Henry III, 216.
20 Ibid., 174, 216.
1564 before Parlement (highest appeals court) on behalf of the *curés* of Paris. Following this, he bought (a common practice) the assignment to Angers (in Anjou) as *lieutenant criminel* in 1568, which he held at the time he published *Puissance*. In Angers, he earned a reputation for being a strict upholder of law and custom, and it is rumored that he earned the nickname Cassius Angevin. The position of *lieutenant criminel* was new to the sixteenth century and grew out of the *bailli*. The *lieutenant criminel* became a branch of (and eventually replaced) the *bailli* after the unmanageable growth of the legal system and the practical need to divide responsibilities. A *lieutenant criminel* was the provincial judge who presided over criminal (as opposed to civil) cases. In 1589, Henry III named him *lieutenant-général* (customarily an important military post, performing functions similar to the *gouverneurs*) a title he held until 1591, after which he resumed his position as *lieutenant criminel*. Ten years later, Ayrault died.

Among his books, Ayrault’s contemporaries appear to have valued his *Pandectae* most, but it was his *Ordre et Instruction Judiciaire*, a discourse on judicial procedure first published in 1576, which earned him esteem among nineteenth century writers and remains

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23 Musset, *Histoire de Pierre Ayrault*.
29 Langbein, *Prosecuting Crime*, 235, note 122. Langbein studies Ayrault alongside Jean Imbert, *lieutenant criminel* of Fontenay Lecomte. The *Dictionnaire de Biographie Française* states that some confusion exists
the work for which he is best known. In it, he argues that every suspect must receive a formal judicial proceeding in order for the justice system to work properly. The only exception he cited was *raison d’état*, but this excuse was to be handled with the utmost care and only to be used in cases where the trial of the suspect posed a threat to the security of the realm.

Some scholars cite this argument as evidence for his having been humane. While this interpretation is plausible, it is equally plausible that he was promoting the royal judicial system, as opposed to private or *seigneurial* (lordly—a remnant from feudal systems) justice with which it theoretically, if not practically, still competed. The discourse also promoted a level of immunity for ambassadors—presuming that the represented country would reprimand him—but excluded assassination attempts.

His claims, in this work and *De La Nature, Variété & Mutation des Loix* (1564) that laws or customs must be taken in context and that what was appropriate in one context is not necessarily so for another, reveal his apparent legal relativism. Such relativism primarily addressed Roman law and promoted an understanding of legislative intent. Not only partially Gallican in its reservation regarding Roman law—Rome being strongly associated with the pope—it was also an exercise of interpretation popular among his legist peers. Finally the text concluded with a discourse on the trials of animals, corpses and memory (added in the 1591 edition), arguing that animals are to be tried in order to call attention to the dangers of neglecting children and that corpses are to be tried in the memory of a person—reasoning that

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if a person can be exonerated posthumously, he can be condemned. These bizarre subjects were to be tried in the same manner as the contumacious.

“Un énorme scandale”

Like most fathers of the time and of his standing, Pierre Ayrault had a vested interest in paternalism. He sent his oldest son of fifteen children to be educated in Paris at the College of Clermont, a Jesuit school. After completing several years of study, the first-born’s letters stopped coming. In 1586 René, against his father’s will and plans for his magisterial career, joined the mysterious international society and disappeared, never to communicate with his father again. All of the distraught father’s attempts to locate him failed. As a well-connected member of the judiciary system, he soon involved some of the most influential people in France in tracking down his son. Parlement, King Henry III, and even the pope attempted interventions with the Jesuits but to no avail. In his anger and frustration at the Society and his son, Ayrault wrote a treatise about the history of paternal power as a remonstrance and plea to his son. He declared that a son’s primary duty is to obey his father and mother and suggested that his own son was rebellious and irreverent for not responding to his attempts at communication. He denounced the Jesuits as hypocrites, who under a pretext of religion (which commands people to honor their parents), taught impressionable children to disobey, despise, and abandon their parents. Ayrault appears to have modeled part of his treatise on a letter by St. Bernard to his nephew.

The crux of Ayrault’s case for convincing others to become involved in recuperating his son was René’s age. Not surprisingly, a discrepancy among both primary and secondary

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33 Dictionnaire de Biographie Française, 964.
34 Several of these letters can be found following the text of Puissance and also in Victor Jeanvrot, “Notice Biographique” in preface to Pierre Ayrault, Ordre et Instruction Judiciaire (Paris: A. Chevalier-Marescq, 1881).
36 Ibid.
sources has arisen over René’s actual age (see Appendix A). For example, the *Dictionnaire de Biographie Française* states in Ayrault’s biography that René entered the Society of Jesus at 16 years old in 1586. In René’s biography, on the following page, it lists René’s date of birth as 1567. It follows by reiterating that René entered the Society in 1586 which would make him 19, not 16 years old when he joined the Jesuits. Part of this discrepancy appears to be Ayrault’s handiwork.

Ayrault spent a large part of his treatise making a case for *rapt*, which is a term borrowed from cases of clandestine marriage and which relies on the presumption that the child was underage at the time he or she took vows (this phenomenon will be developed more fully in Chapter One). He published the edition of the treatise used here in 1593, and in it he cites an *arrêt* passed by the Court of Parlement, ruling in favor of René’s return to his father, for the same year René disappeared: 1586 (a difference of seven years). If René was 15 going on 16 as his father suggests (which would be pushing the ecclesiastical age of majority at 16), then he would be only 18 at the time this treatise was originally published and therefore still under the secular age of majority at 25. This interpretation would support the conclusion of Paul Musset who stated that the father would know his son’s age best and that the Jesuits, in high conspiracy, changed his date of birth—plausible but unsubstantiated. Conspiracy theory aside, it appears that many subsequent scholars have used Musset’s work.

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38 *Dictionnaire de Biographie Française* lists Musset as a source, as well as Gilles Ménage (see note on Musset below), 965.
40 “en quinze à seize ans,” Ibid., 67.
41 Barbara Diefendorf summarizes this “disparity” in the legal age of majority in her article. Her research also notes that 16 was the official age designation of the Council of Trent and that it was only in 1615 that the Gallican Church officially accepted its decrees. “Give Us Back Our Children,” 285-6.
42 Musset, *Histoire de Pierre Ayrault*. This same author began his biography of Ayrault with a nine page biography of Ignatius of Loyola, founder of the Jesuits, so his objectivity must be suspected. He does not use modern citation practices but admits in the preface to have based his work on a biography of Ayrault written by Gilles Ménage, Ayrault’s grandson (p. 4). He then, in a rather striking footnote, admits that Ménage lists René’s date of birth in 1567 from a letter written to a Jesuit but that it was a “lie” that the Jesuits “imagined,” because
On the other hand, if René was 18 going on 19 at the time he disappeared as every available biographical date of birth suggests, then he would be 25 at the time this edition was published and had reached the age of majority by either system. This interpretation would also mean that Ayrault himself fudged the figures. Consider the following passage:

But just as the girl abducted immature, as long as she remains with her abductor, does not reach adulthood, the majority that you acquired in the hands of those who hold you against my will, will never excuse you, nor them either, that what you will attempt thereafter does not proceed from induction and impression made at the improper place and time and what is more, by detainers and possessors of bad faith. The Holy Spirit is not where there is crime. As the furtive thing is always so until it be returned into the power of its lord, so as much of a major as you may be, you will always be grievously and plagiaristically where you are, until my will intervenes. To whomever will tell you the contrary, tell him that he does not have understanding. For Plato wrote thus: Neither God nor wise man would ever advise a child to scorn his father and mother.43

This passage is the last of the edition used here, which would have made it an easy addition. Ayrault’s suggestion that his son had reached the age of majority seems to support the latter interpretation that Ayrault fudged the figures for his son’s age (because who would know the age of a son better than a father?) for dramatic effect and to strengthen his case. He was after all, a lawyer. René would not have reached the secular age of majority by the time the first edition was published, so assuming that Ayrault was appealing to his peers, he probably had the secular age of majority in mind. A copy of the 1589 edition, should one be found, would verify or correct this conjecture that the above passage was an addition and that the latter interpretation stands. Ayrault cites the year in which René disappeared, the youth’s age at the time, and that he has reached the age of majority by the time he published the second edition.

Ayrault says himself in De patrio jure (Puissance) that his son was 15, so the child born in 1567 “is without doubt an elder sister of René Ayrault” (p. 31).

43 „Mais tout ainsi que la fille enlevée immatura, quandiu apud raptorem est, aetatem non attingit, aussi la majorité que vous acquerriez entre les mains de ceux qui vous detiennent contre ma volonté, ne vous excusera jamais, ne eux aussi, que ce que vous attenteriez par apres, ne procede d’induction & impression faite en lieu, & en temps inconvenable, & qui plus est, par detenteurs & possesseurs de mauvaise foy. Le S. Esprit n’est point où il y a crime. Comme la chose furtive l’est toujours jusqu’as ce qu’elle soit retombee en la puissance de son seigneur: aussi, ta-t majeur que vous puiissez estre, vous serez toujours doleusement & plagiairement où vous estes, jusqu’as ce que ma volonté y intervienne. A quiconque vous dire le contraire, dites luy qu’il n’a point d’entendement. Car Platon escrit ainsi: Jamais Dieu, ny homme sage ne conseillera à enfant de mespriser ses pere & mere.” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 99-100.
However, he never cites René’s date of birth in the treatise. That allows him to make a case to his *robin* friends without appearing to contradict himself or create any inconsistencies in his case, which logically, he would be careful about given his position as judge.

In any circumstance, René was too young, by secular standards, to take vows, but the incentive for Ayrault to fudge the figures would lie in his attempt to persuade an ecclesiastical audience, putting his son’s majority in doubt by that system as well. The latter interpretation has been adopted by Barbara Diefendorf, who states definitively that René was born in Paris in 1567 and entered the Jesuit novitiate at Trier in 1586. Unfortunately, her use of a Jesuit source does not totally discredit Musset’s conspiracy theory. She does however use a 1588 pamphlet, which is a mini-version of *Puissance*, verifying Ayrault’s version of René’s age as stated in either edition of *Puissance*. Whichever interpretation is correct, the issue is important because the only legal claim Ayrault could make was that his son was too young. Presumably, it would be much easier for Ayrault to subtract three years from his son’s age in his treatise than it would be for the Jesuits to sneak into a record hall and change the young man’s date of birth.

**Notice on the Source**

Pierre Ayrault first wrote *De La Puissance Paternelle* in 1589, three years after his son’s defection to the Jesuits, and it appears to be an elaboration of a pamphlet he wrote in 1588. This project will examine the second edition published in 1593. Cristina Quarta used the same edition, which she found in the *Miscellanea Ecclesia Gallica*, in her study of Ayrault. She notes that another copy of the treatise, signed by Ayrault, indicates its “perfect adherence” to the 1589 edition, while perfect adherence is unclear, its authenticity seems

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44 Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children,” 293.
certain. No copies of the first edition have turned up in major databases. The second edition, published by Jamet Mettayer, has two different emissions. The first was published in 1593 in Tours; the second was published in 1595 in Paris. This treatise also appears in a collection of Ayrault’s works entitled Opuscules et divers traitcez, which survives mostly in a third edition published in 1598 by Jérémie Perier. It is unclear whether earlier editions of the collection contain the treatise. Of the 1593 edition, I have only been able to locate five copies and of the 1595 edition, only three. This small survival suggests a modest distribution and perhaps a more targeted audience.

Jamet Mettayer, a well known royalist publisher, was prolific from 1580 to 1600, publishing a wide array of royalist propaganda. Included among these are anti-Leaguer tracts (works about those who do not want peace in France); declarations and edicts from the king; reports about the wars; and works concerning the Jesuits, in particular the Jean Chastel scandal, which involved this student at a Jesuit collège being arrested for attempted regicide. Thus, it is probable that De La Puissance Paternelle played a propagandist role, especially since the first publication came in the year that King Henry III was assassinated (to which the Jesuits were attributed a role). This book, however, appears to be the only book of Ayrault’s that Mettayer published.

Preliminary investigation also indicates that the surviving editions of De La Puissance Paternelle were published in octavo. Thus it is unlikely that this treatise would have been treated as a luxury work aimed exclusively at professional legal bibliophiles, but rather, would have been more useful as propaganda.47

47 However, one source lists the 1593 Latin edition as having been published in octavo and presumably for the same year the French edition in quarto, which would have been more common among collections of legal scholars, the audience which he was most likely targeting. Biographie Générale, 903.
While few copies have survived, the book appears to have held some appeal, especially among Protestant circles. Ayrault apparently had the book published in Latin (De patrio jure ad filium pseudo-jesuitam dissertatio juridical) in Paris by Perier in 1594 and then again in 1597, as a second edition. The Latin publication was then translated into English and published in London by Harper in 1614 and Barnes in 1616. The book also appears in German and Dutch editions in the 1680s.

The Project

Quarta offers an interesting study of Ayrault’s assertion of paternal authority in response to René’s disappearance, but it appears to be incomplete. Her work focuses primarily on Roman law, and while covering the philosophical context of the treatise well, it neglects the context to which Diefendorf’s and the present study speak.

In composing his treatise, Ayrault had both exterior and interior problems to negotiate. His first problem was the Catholic Church. His royalist leanings and Gallican sympathies set him almost directly opposed to the Jesuits, who had the unfortunate reputation of being Spanish agents. Ayrault added the corruption or “theft” of children to this reputation. More specifically, the Council of Trent threatened Gallican privilege and removed parents from the contraction of marriage at a time in France when the idea of the necessity of parental permission had a firm grip on society. Nevertheless, Ayrault was, along with many Frenchmen, a self-proclaimed Catholic. A question of obligation emerges. To whom does one owe allegiance at a time when institutions and ideologies are shifting? This thesis explores the way in which the Angevin judge tries to reconcile legal, political, familial,

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48 Dictionnaire de Biographie Française lists the year as 1593, 965.
49 Cristina Quarta. Ayrault e Bodin; and Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children.”
50 “Family” had a much broader designation in the sixteenth century. It included not only what modern people know as the “nuclear family,” but also extended kin such as uncles, cousins and other such blood relatives. It also included in-laws, especially patrilineal ones, and servants under the other designation “household.” This
moral, and spiritual obligations and uses the Jesuits and fatherhood as a cover to discuss bigger issues in France during the latter half of the sixteenth century.

This study will divide Ayrault’s reasoning on paternal privilege and power along the lines of a popular ideology: *une loi, un roi, une foi*. This motto corresponds neatly to his three main points in the treatise, which he wrote as a response to his son René’s clandestine religious vows with the Jesuits. The first (*une loi*) will address his case of *rapt* and his understanding of his son’s disappearance as a crime. It will follow in particular, Ayrault’s use of a letter written by St. Bernard of Clairvaux to his nephew Robert. The second (*un roi*) will examine Ayrault’s understanding of the father as a king (and vice versa), leading to fears of sedition and treason to family and state, which the Jesuits appeared to encourage. The similarities between this treatise and Jean Bodin’s “De La Puissance Paternelle” in his *De La République* will be especially useful. The third (*une foi*) will address Ayrault's attempts to reconcile a perceived conflict between spiritual and familial obligations, while at the same time looking at his confused sense of hierarchy and his adherence to Gallicanism. Of course, it will also examine his hostility toward the Jesuits. In presenting the material thusly, I hope to show how Ayrault, if inadvertently, grapples with the shattered ideology and to explore secondarily hostility in France toward the Society of Jesus.

thesis will employ the very broadest sense of the term and seeks only to define it as it relates to paternal authority, and even so this designation will usually stand in for father/son relationships (literal or symbolic).
Appendix A

Timeline for René

1567: born (the official record noted by Diefendorf and the *Dictionnaire de Biographie Française*)
1570: born? (suggested by subtraction in *DBF*, Musset, Ayrault)
1586: disappeared (undisputed); 15/18 years old (age derived for this year from Ayrault and Musset listed first hereafter/age derived from official record second hereafter)
1588: *Conclusion de l’Ordre* published (pamphlet written by Ayrault) lists René as 15 in 1586; 17/20
1589: first edition of *Puissance* might list René as 15 going on 16 in 1586; 18/21
1593: second edition of *Puissance* lists René as 15 going on 16 in 1586 and as having reached the age of majority; 22/25
Chapter One: Une loi

[W]e see that if he [the son] wants to make himself a Religieux or to make himself of the Church, his will is followed although that of the father and of the mother are contrary to it or without seeking it [parental will] or desiring it out of honor…[W]e will treat principally…[this point] because it’s this one to which either you or I have erred: you, to undertake to be a Jesuit against my will, me, to be offended by it, if the Church gives you this faculty to make and dispose of it thusly.1

On May 19, 1586, the highest court in France, Parlement (a “mixed body of people of the Church and laypeople”) officially forbade the Society of Jesus to accept René into their order.2 This case was part of a larger jurisdictional conflict between religious and secular authorities over the requirements for taking marital or religious vows and over the authority to dissolve ones contracted clandestinely. Barbara B. Diefendorf has shown that attempts to restrict the taking of religious vocations utilized similar language and methods as those to restrict marriages. The legists in Parlement tried to enforce an age of majority of 25 for men, before which sons had to obtain parental consent in order to take marital or religious vows. These robins declared all vows made without parental consent null and void, while at the same time ruling that violation of this law was to be prosecuted as rapt (abduction).3

A case of rapt centered fundamentally on age because legislators, prosecutors, and otherwise interested parties presumed that a minor was not mature enough to make a sound decision in such grave matters. Therefore, when a minor chose to take vows without parental

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1 “Et quant à l’Estat & condition à quoy le pere, sans controverse de tous les Philosophes, pouvoir vouer & dedier son enfant: nous voyons que s’il se veut rendre Religieux, ou se faire d’Eglise: sa volonté est suivie, quoq que celle du pere & de la mere y soit contraire, ou sans la rechercher ny desirer par honneur. Or de ces deux poincts, nous en traicterons principalement le second, parce que c’est celuy auquel vous, ou moy avons erré: Vous, d’entreprendre d’estre Jesuite contre ma volonté. Moy, de m’en offenser, si l’Eglise vous donne ceste faculté d’en faire & disposer ainsi.” Pierre Ayrault, De La Puissance Paternelle: Contre ceux qui sous couleur de Religion vollen les enfants à leurs peres & meres (Tours: Jamet Mettayer, 1593), 36-37.
2 Ibid., 88-89.
consent, others concluded that there were parties involved who were taking advantage of the youth. But because of the sacramental nature of the vows, there was little parents could actually do after the fact except disinherit the children (which incidentally was a major issue for the children in question but not always satisfactory to the parents),\(^4\) although the crime was technically a capital offense for the abductor (*ravisseur*). Regardless, only the Church could nullify the vows, and the Church set the age of majority considerably lower, at age 16.\(^5\) Both parties agreed that vows made under the age of reason were not valid, but they differed substantially on what that age was. Jurisdictional tension between secular and ecclesiastical authorities added an interesting complication to questions of paternal authority.

This emphasis on age arose in part from early modern stereotypes of youth. Griffiths’ study on Tudor and Stuart England is particularly insightful in this regard. He argues primarily that “The problem of youth was an issue of authority and socialization.”\(^6\) While addressing the problem of defining the age of youth, he notes that “Marriage, setting up an independent household, and full participation in a trade marked various points at which young men and women crossed into adulthood.”\(^7\) The importance of marriage as a bridge to adulthood and independence helps explain the controversy over clandestine marriages and when authorities wanted to define adulthood. Griffiths’ suggestion that youth was “contested territory” applies not only to questions of socialization in a moral sense, but also in the sense of defining adulthood in the interest of having reasoning minds controlling society and hopefully maintaining some semblance of order.\(^8\)

\(^4\) Diefendorf, *Paris City Councillors*, 167.
\(^7\) Griffiths, *Youth and Authority*, 32.
These questions of socialization stem from what Griffiths has dubbed “The Politics of Age.” He examines metaphorical designations of youth to reveal complex early modern stereotypes: “Youth implied incompetence and inadequacy; age implied seniority, proficiency, and knowledge.” Thus, he argues, youth and boy served as derogatory terms and insults. He continues by stating that: “There were two principal ways in which age functioned as a principle of authority; in a direct relationship in which an elder guided a junior, and in a metaphorical fashion in which expressions of authority were given a paternal edge by disguising superiors as fathers—‘political fathers’—and subordinates as children.”

The complex early-modern understanding of youth—both of its boldness yet inherent simplicity—sheds light on rapt charges and Ayrault’s conflicted perception of his son’s action as a crime. Rapt stemmed from the presumed simplicity and lack of discretion of youths, who were clearly misled because they had nothing to gain from the unfavorable alliances of which their families disapproved. At the same time, youth’s penchant for defying authority implicated minors into the crime to a certain degree because despite having been seduced, they knew that they were defying parental will, making these youths perpetrators and victims simultaneously. Rapt was a means of removing responsibility from the child and of undermining the discretion which ecclesiastical authorities presumed he had. Nevertheless, once an offending child had realized that he had been “deceived” (or had incurred the displeasure of his parents), he had to accede to his parents’ judgment or risk facing accusations of willful disobedience. The difference between returning to parents or not could tip the scale of guilt against the child. Ayrault designed his treatise in many ways to

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9 Griffiths, Youth and Authority, chapter 2, especially pp. 100-3.
10 Ibid., 63.
11 Ibid., 73.
12 Ibid., chapter 1.
13 Diefendorf, Paris City Councillors, chapter 5.
serve as a moment of realization. Thus, he blames his son not so much for his disappearance as his failure to return.

These perceptions of youth and its challenges to authority corresponded to ideas about fatherhood and the reassertion of paternal authority. Fatherhood in the sixteenth century fell into what Delumeau and Roche have called the “Golden Age of the Sovereign.”\textsuperscript{14} Fathers enjoyed extensive and thorough legal privileges. But these privileges came with an understanding of responsibilities. On the one hand, fathers had the duty to provide for the continuation and support of the family, so as Alain Molinier has noted, “Marriage and profession of children enters therefore into a paternal and familial calculation of growth and of the profit of lineages which do not go without bullying individuals and creating notably false religious vocations.”\textsuperscript{15} In addition, fathers could not escape specific duties to raise their children properly, providing the right balance of love and discipline along with nourishment for mind, body, and soul, for “As much in countries of statute law as in countries of customary law, maintenance and upbringing [religious and profane] were considered a debt that the father owed his child: the heir did not have to bring back, to the paternal succession, what was paid for his upkeep and his education.”\textsuperscript{16} Nevertheless, Ayrault argues that these gifts demand gratitude—which means obeying parental will.

On the other hand, once the demands on education became more sophisticated, it became necessary for fathers to make provisions for education beyond what could be provided in the household, and it follows, according to Molinier, that trivializing “the delegation of the right to childcare can only...[diminish] paternal authority to the profit of the third party.” Molinier uses Ayrault’s grievances as a case in point, claiming that Pierre

\textsuperscript{14} Jean Delumeau and Daniel Roche (eds.), \textit{Histoire des pères et de la paternité} (Paris: Larousse, 1990), part I.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 103.
Ayrault wrote his treatise in response to this diminution and to “demonstrate the superiority of his authority over that of the religieux, his delegates.”

Ayrault and the robins had an implicit understanding with their delegates, hence their outrage when they felt that these delegates betrayed their trust by inciting their children to defy parental will.

Molinier continues by noting that the monarchy profited from the diminution of authority at the expense of fathers because it could enlist youths in the army without parental consent; however it is necessary to proceed with caution on this point because, ideologically, as shall be discussed in Chapter Two, many discourses on monarchical power likened the king to a father. Moreover, Molinier notes for religious vocations that royal law resisted ecclesiastical prerogative and insisted, notably in the Ordinance of Blois of 1579, that children could take vows after reaching the age of 16 but that they had to have parental consent if they had not reached the age of 25, which suggests that royal law supported parental prerogative in some matters. The monarchy, in negotiating its own authority along the often-blurred line between secular and ecclesiastical prerogatives, applied the same apparently vacillating technique to parental authority and the family. Furthermore, the legislation appears to compromise between both parties’ ages of majority.

This chapter will discuss Ayrault’s legal understanding of his son’s defection. It is framed by questions of provision and gratitude, which centered on robin initiatives to define and secure their newly developing position in society. Cristina Quarta sees Ayrault as focusing on education and correction rather than patrimonial concerns, but she has perhaps

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18 Ibid.
overlooked the implications of *rapt*. Nevertheless, she rightly asserts that Ayrault argues that the Jesuits had violated divine and human law.\textsuperscript{20} Ayrault was deeply immersed in the jurisdictional conflict, but while he sided definitively with Parlement against the Council of Trent on the issue of parental consent, he left himself, and fathers everywhere, room to maneuver outside of the controversy by appealing to a higher ideal of respect. Nevertheless, Ayrault understood his son’s defiance as a crime. He spent a considerable part of his treatise constructing a case of *rapt* by contumacy. In so doing, he employed the rhetoric of abduction, coercion, and deception which had developed around the idea of *rapt*. His utilization of this rhetoric culminates in the resonances he saw between his case and a letter by St. Bernard, which he comments on extensively and which he appears to follow closely when composing his own work. At the same time, an interesting contradiction emerges because fundamentally, contumacy presumes guilt for the son while *rapt* presumes innocence. This hesitation to definitively assign blame to one party or the other reveals Ayrault’s conflicted feeling toward the crime and the complex relationship between youth and authority.

*Parlement v. the Council of Trent*

The Council of Trent formed the famous centerpiece of counter-reform initiative, but it had important secular implications in addition to ecclesiastical ones, notably in this study, for marriage, which inhabited both secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictions. It promoted ecclesiastical prerogative to the detriment of secular interests, denying parental consent as an essential legitimizing force in the contraction of marriages. In a time where paternal authority was on the rise, this policy threatened to undermine parental prerogative. The Parlement of Paris, on behalf of scandalized fathers, cited its own precedents and Gallican ideology in order to contest this council, which it only officially accepted in the early seventeenth century,

nearly fifty years after the council concluded and in spite of its religious importance and the robins’ tendency toward Catholic self-identification. Religious grievances will be discussed at length in Chapter Three; nevertheless it is important to sketch the boundaries of robin concern in relation to this controversial council in order to better understand how Ayrault perceived his own son’s disappearance.

By Parliamentary standards, there was more than one reason to reject the Council of Trent, but Chapter 24 of its decrees—that which addressed questions of marriage—was particularly troubling. The Catholic Church had always promoted ecclesiastical jurisdiction when it came to marriage. While adamantly reaffirming marriage as a sacrament, it simultaneously and fundamentally removed parents from the entire process:

CANON XII.—If any one saith, that matrimonial causes do not belong to ecclesiastical judges; let him be anathema. […]

Although it is not to be doubted, that clandestine marriages, made with the free consent of the contracting parties, are valid and true marriages, so long as the Church has not rendered them invalid; and consequently, that those persons are justly to be condemned, as the holy Synod doth condemn them with anathema, who deny that such marriages are true and valid; as also those who falsely affirm that marriages contracted by the children of a family, without the consent of their parents, are invalid, and that parents can make such marriages either valid or invalid; nevertheless, the holy Church of God has, for reasons most just, at all times detested and prohibited such marriages.22

The Church strongly encouraged the couple to seek parental consent before taking vows but denied that parents could contract or annul marriages. However, while it did not deny a couple the ceremony, it did make the process more difficult, stiffening the requirements for the publication of announcements and placing restrictions on witnesses and location.


Not surprisingly, many felt that these reforms were insufficient, and in opposition to this decree, Parlement cited a body of legislation which denied that clandestine marriages were valid at all. In particular, it invoked the edict of 1556, which allowed parents to disinherit offending children and which attempted to “separate the sacramental nature of marriage…from its temporal effects.”23 It also stated that the age of majority would be 30 years for men and 25 years for women.24 The Ordinance of Blois (1579) was also crucial, for it formally confirmed that any marriage contracted without parental consent was *rapt* and thus invalid. Priests who performed the ceremony were to be charged as accomplices to *rapt*, which officially became a capital offense for the *ravisseur*, although as Jean Gaudemet notes: “this sanction was so severe that the tribunals most often hesitated to pronounce it.”25 The edict expanded the definition to include sons as “victims” and to qualify *rapt* as any form of abduction, coercion, or deception of minors (*rapt de séduction;* as opposed to simply forcible—*rapt de violence*), 26 inducing them to take marital vows without formal permission.27 These impressionable minds included any man under the age of 25 and woman under the age of 20. It is also interesting to note, as Sarah Hanley does, that “the French charge [*rapt;* as opposed to its precedent in Roman law] concentrates on damages to a whole family injured by covert removal of a son or daughter from the family, or by covert entry of a person into a family, its lineage, and its property holdings.”28 The controversy over clandestine vows cannot, therefore, be easily separated from the patrimonial strategies of these elite families.

This controversy over the legitimacy of clandestine marriages interests this study of clandestine religious vows precisely because authors from the period chose to make connections between the two. That is, as Diefendorf has shown, outraged fathers employed the language of *rapt* upon learning that their child had taken religious vows without their permission and formally appealed to the authorities on such grounds.\(^\text{29}\) This connection should not be too shocking given the sacramental nature of the two sets of vows—giving them a permanence and formally removing them from parental jurisdiction—and the language of marriage of the two (either betrothed to a beloved or Christ). Ayrault, in keeping with his Parlementary connections and judicial profession, chose to infuse his treatise on parental power with this legal charge of *rapt* leveled against the Jesuits. It is within this context that people such as Pasquier found Ayrault’s case compelling and useful, both in pursuing their own cases and in trying to have the Jesuits expelled from the kingdom.\(^\text{30}\)

Adding to these reservations about the Council of Trent, the new religious orders that emerged in the sixteenth century were controversial in France. Monastic orders certainly were not new; nor was the idea of an ascetic lifestyle particularly innovative. Nevertheless, Diefendorf has argued, many parents were reluctant to give their sons (and daughters) over to this new lifestyle, regarding the vigorous ascetic practices with shock and horror. Aside from parental affection and concern for their children, was concern for the future of the family in general, especially regarding the eldest sons and daughters. Monastic orders were historically places to put spare heirs, and such vocations could add to the status and prominence of a family if the child took over the position of abbot from another relative at a major monastery.

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\(^{29}\) Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children.”

These kinship networks were not as strong within the new orders nor were they intended to be. Diefendorf attributes part of the tension to a generational conflict.\textsuperscript{31} Kelley also sees a generational conflict in the tension surrounding the reforming fervor with “the mentality of alienation and defiance underlying the struggles of that age.”\textsuperscript{32} Although it is doubtful that this tension would be absent from any period, nevertheless, the idea of generational conflict is important because it provides insight into early modern conceptualizations of youth and its relation to paternal authority.\textsuperscript{33}

Furthermore, the regulation of religious vocations had similar implications to those of clandestine marriages. It was relatively easy to adapt the same arguments for restricting the taking of marital vows to taking religious ones. Restricting the taking of vows of either sort was an important means for the robins to maintain their prominence within society. Hanley has done considerable work on the relationship between the French state and the new bureaucratic class in the early modern period.\textsuperscript{34} Her idea of a “Family-state compact” and “marital regime” will be discussed at length in Chapter Two; nevertheless, it suffices here to note that she has argued that robins sought security for their social status in the next generation, which they did through the regulation of marriages.\textsuperscript{35} Diefendorf has also noticed this among the Parisian elite.\textsuperscript{36} Robins worked to secure marriages among their members or more prominent members of society. Regulating marriage and preventing clandestine marriages became critical to solidifying the new class because they wanted to restrict the number of people moving into their class too. J.H.M. Salmon has also argued that they even tried to convince the king to limit the number of offices he created and filled, but a series of

\textsuperscript{31} Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children.”
\textsuperscript{33} Griffiths, \textit{Youth and Authority}.
\textsuperscript{34} Hanley, “Engendering the State;” Hanley, “The Jurisprudence of the Arrêts.”
\textsuperscript{35} Hanley, “Engendering the State.”
\textsuperscript{36} Diefendorf, \textit{Paris City Councillors}.
financial crises hindered such restrictions because it was too tempting to resort to venality to make up for fiscal shortcomings.\textsuperscript{37}

The introduction discussed how the new bureaucratic class was negotiating its noble status, and in so doing, it reveals a potential flaw in the above arguments. As Robert Descimon has shown, nobility (i.e. social position) for these people was still in a state of development. While seeking security, they simultaneously undermined their position:

Society therefore posed a crucial question: Was nobility such a desirable possession? The question seems astonishing for a so-called society of orders. The answer reflected the conflicts and divisions within families moved by ‘the different motivations of honor and interest,’ and was, in fact, painfully banal: the oldest children were partisans of nobility, and the younger ones were against it, inasmuch as they sought for themselves the privileges of personal ennoblement that would permit them to avoid the inconveniences that came with the old nobility [primogeniture].\textsuperscript{38}

In other words, Descimon complicates the previous argument by suggesting that at times of inheritance, younger children often denied their father’s status and did not support his position. They perhaps supported the exclusiveness of his bureaucratic privileges but not his inherent nobility. Thus, the position which the robins were supporting and for which they were seeking security was fractured by a question of the desirability of nobility; meaning that they were not perhaps trying to secure their position so much as trying to create it in an official capacity. That is, the class as a whole may have moved generally toward legitimizing its position, but on an individual family scale, the reservations of younger children had the potential of undermining a family’s strategies for advancement, thereby forcing a new beginning in the ennoblement process and leaving less to secure.

These technicalities aside, Ayrault lends credence to the concept of hope resting in the next generation. “[I]s it not that the son is the pillar of the house? that it is he who retains the

name and weapons? consequently it is in him where there is more fear that he will ally himself badly? it is he who owes more honor to his father and mother, more example, more respect?” he asks.39 The hope and security of the family rested on the son, who inherited the responsibility to provide for and protect the family. Following this, Ayrault suggests that joining the Jesuits, especially against parental will, was to “ally badly.” This notion of a poor alliance stems directly from the clandestine marriage controversy, developing from concerns for good social and political alliances (and reputation) in addition to those for patrimonial security.40 Therefore, clandestine vows posed a significant threat to a family’s well-being and so provoked a strong response. Ayrault sides firmly with Parlement against the Council of Trent, while trying to make his son recognize the gravity of the consequences of his actions.

Like his *robin* associates, Ayrault cites secular precedents to support his argument. The most notable is article 19 of the ordinance of Orléans (1560), made by King Charles IX in response to the *doléances* of the Estates General41:

> ‘We prohibit fathers and mothers, tutors and parents, from permitting their children or pupils to make a religious profession, if they have not reached 25 years for males and 20 years for girls. And before the said time [that] the said professions would be [made], the said professed will be able to dispose of their portion of the hereditary share or to leave in direct or collateral line, to the profit of whichever of his parents will seem good to him and not the monastery.’42

Ayrault’s citation is remarkable on at least two accounts.43 First, it addresses fears of monasteries attracting heirs to usurp their inheritances. If nothing else these directions for

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39 “N’estoit-ce pas que le fils est la colomne de la maison? Que c’est luy qui retient le nom & les armes? consequemment que c’est luy où il y a plus de crainte qu’il s’allie mal? c’est luy qui doit plus d’honneur, à ses pere & mere, plus d’exemple, plus de respect?” Ayrault, *Puissance Paternelle*, 50-51. Quarta finds the reference in Numbers 30. She sees Ayrault arguing that joining a religious order is contrary to divine law. *Ayrault e Bodin*, 30.

40 Diefendorf, *Paris City Councillors*, chapter 5.

41 Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children.”

42 “‘Defendons aux peres & meres, tuteurs & parens, de permettre à leurs enfans ou pupilles, faire profession de Religieux, qu’ils n’ayent, scavoit est, les masles xxv ans, & les filles xx ans. Et où avant ledit temps lesdites professions se seroient, pourront lesdits profez disposer de leur portion hereditaire escheué, ou à eschoir en ligne directe ou collateralle, au profit de celuy de ses parens qui bon luy semblera, & non de Monastere.’” Ayrault, *Puissance Paternelle*, 87. Ayrault quotes the ordinance word for word; see “Ordonnance d’Orléans,” in Isambert, *Recueil des Lois*, 14:69, item 8, article 19.

43 Quarta states that Ayrault never cites passages in their original words, which may be true for his citations of Roman sources but is not in this case. See *Ayrault e Bodin*, 19.
renouncing and recuperating the inheritances of these children reveals that such usurpations were an actual concern of people like Ayrault and unveil the importance of patrimonial strategies in filing complaints. At the same time, Ayrault used such grievances and concerns to his advantage in making his case to recover his son. They become more acute in light of Ayrault’s supposed religious concerns, and an accusation of greed will be examined more fully in Chapter Three.

Second, the above citation appears to deny that children can take religious vows under the age of majority even if they have parental consent. That is, it undermines paternal prerogative from a secular angle by denying fathers the right, should they so desire, to allow their children to take vows. It is the ultimate opposition to the Council of Trent, but it is a curious addition for one arguing for the absolute supremacy of parental will. It appeals to secular authorities and indicates part of the intended audience for this treatise—officials in Parlement, who strangely enough accepted the legislation to support their own status as fathers. Ayrault invokes a piece of legislation which directly addresses *rapt*, thereby associating his case with the crime of *rapt* and allying himself with Parlement. He therefore established paternal authority as a secular authority. However, at one point he places paternal authority outside of government control: “It happens that this private authority often has more force, more credit than that of all the Republic put together: that is to say that the father has more over his son than the Magistrate, the assembly, and the army.”

Thus, he paradoxically placed the family both inside and outside of the legal order. The private authority which he extolled held a place of prestige and in some regards defied secular limitations. In fact Quarta

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44 “Il advenoit que ceste auctorité privee avoit souvent plus de force, plus de credit que celle de toute la Republique conjointement: c'est-à-dire, que le pere pouvoit plus sur son fils, que Magistrat, qu’assemblee & armee qui fist.” Ayrault, *Puissance Paternelle*, 3.
sees Ayrault as establishing a decentralized corrective power for fathers;\textsuperscript{45} although one must proceed with caution in qualifying decentralized. Nevertheless, he was attempting to combat an ecclesiastical prerogative by whatever means possible, even if it involved abandoning some of his personal authority to a higher secular cause.

\textit{Contumacy}

While establishing paternal authority as a secular authority by siding definitively with Parlement against the Council of Trent, Ayrault offers another indication that he thought about his case in legal terms. In the opening letter of this treatise, Ayrault addresses the reader and claims to be addressing his son as a \textit{contumace},\textsuperscript{46} which in sixteenth century French legalese was someone who was summoned but failed to appear in court (originally ecclesiastical) for his trial and roughly translates as being in contempt of court or insubordinate. Contumacy presumed guilt, and those accused were tried accordingly. The use of this term indicates that Ayrault articulated his understanding of his relationship with René as analogous to one between judge (father) and defendant (son). Ayrault spends a significant part of another book expanding the utility of this term, so there is reason to believe that his use of the term was deliberate.\textsuperscript{47} It was also clever. While pleading a secular case of \textit{rapt}, he borrowed a term from the canon legal system. The extent to which this term was borrowed into the French legal system is beyond the scope of this study; nevertheless, Ayrault’s legal education and wide experience would have taught him the original use of this word. Thus, he complicates his secular case by constructing a crime using both secular and ecclesiastical terminology, making the issue difficult for ecclesiastical courts to ignore.

\textsuperscript{45} Quarta, \textit{Ayrault e Bodin}, 31.
\textsuperscript{46} Ayrault, \textit{Puissance Paternelle}, note to the reader.
because he is trying to use their own system against them. In other words, he employs the ecclesiastical system to press a secular agenda; however it also introduces an inherent contradiction in Ayrault’s conceptualization of the crime. That is, contumacy presumes a culpability for René which rapt theoretically removes. This contradiction need not be a fault in Ayrault’s argument but rather represents an interior struggle and a complex understanding of his son’s and the Jesuits’ actions.

Ayrault borrows “contumacy” to add canonic validity and perhaps urgency to his argument as he approaches his problem from as many sides as possible to recover his son (recall that the pope sent a letter forbidding the Jesuits to accept René into the Society).48 However, he transforms its meaning slightly. He gives it a broader connotation of insubordination: “You will say…that all just piety and bounty cease if the son wants to make himself a monk, that then cruelty is piety, incivility reverence, contumacy fidelity and obedience.”49 Succeeding a quote by St. Jerome, Ayrault claims that his son is not contumacious simply because he failed to answer his father’s summons, rather he is disobedient, disloyal and perhaps faithless—if we take the previous accusation of infidel in a double sense (loyalty and faith). It also underscores canonical relevance. He accentuates his son’s disobedience via military analogy, comparing René’s contumacy to the “contumacy of the soldier to his captain.”50 Ayrault expands the meaning of contumacy beyond mere absence, which is obvious to this case, to include more cases of disobedience and contempt of

50 “contumace du soldat à son Capitaine.” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 22.
Ayrault usurps, to a degree, canonical authority to summon his son and so perhaps this would compete with the spiritual and at least legal authority of clerics. Because of the original designation of the term, Ayrault, by using it, suggested that part of René’s crime was one of irreverence. However, a distinction must be made between Ayrault’s argument that René’s religious motives were flawed (which will be discussed later) and his conception of the deed as a crime. While this distinction seems superficial and was probably not explicitly conceptualized as such during Ayrault’s lifetime, Ayrault did address two different audiences in two different ways. His primary stated audience was his son; his unstated and de facto audience was authority figures, whether secular or ecclesiastic. Ayrault did not particularly care who delivered his son and appealed to all sources of authority. He presumed that he was not going to change his son’s mind by a legal argument; his son rejected secular forms of authority when he defied paternal authority, so Ayrault addressed his son’s motives. This dispute on the merit of these motives was a covert way of attacking the Church—which was reasserting its own motives and morals—by means of the Jesuit “façade.” He addressed the Church directly through its ongoing struggle with Parlement, appealing to the authority of law instead of religious spirituality. Using the word “contumacy” allowed Ayrault to subordinate ecclesiastical priorities to secular interests. Again, secular and religious legal systems were not clearly distinguished, despite opposing jurisdictions—including elements of both woven tightly together—although the sixteenth century was an important period of this long process of dividing these competing sources of authority. Thus, when Ayrault employed an example from the life of St. Gregory, these concepts overlapped considerably; however, it is useful to examine them each separately.

51 Ayrault, Des Proces, 1591.
Ayrault used an episode from the life of St. Gregory—a case where he saw profound resonances with his son’s—in a notably secular manner: “[I] know that he withdrew from worldly affairs (as they say) fleeing the bishopric, and that he elected a contemplative and monastic life, against the intention of his father who was destining him his successor; however, he feared in the end to fall into this crime of disobedience, irreverence, and impiety toward his father. He returned from the monastery…” 52 Like René he had answered a religious calling against his father’s intention, but unlike René, he changed his mind. It is important to emphasize this difference. St. Gregory may or may not have been deceived into defying his father, but after a moment of realization, he did return. The decision to return provides an active role to René in his culpability which in turn allows Ayrault to accuse him of contumacy. René was deceived and then recalled (moment of realization) but did not return. However, St. Gregory did not simply have a change of heart. Ayrault draws particular attention to the excuse that he feared to be disobedient to his father. Going against the will of a father, even to serve God, is thus portrayed as a crime. Moreover it is not surprising that this case would attract the attention of a *robin*. The “intent” of the father and the idea of succession resonate strongly with the class’s own attempts to secure its position through the regulation of vows and vocation, which prompted an elaborate construction of *rapt* with full criminal implications. Likewise it is important to note that Gregory fled the bishopric, which was a part of the secular clergy and often included benefices which factored into family fortunes.

Ayrault’s equation of paternal authority and law becomes clearer when he attributes the role of judge to fathers. He does so by recalling ancient privileges of fathers from secular

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52 “jaçoit qu’il se fust retire des affaires de monde (comme lon dit) fuyant l’Evesché, & qu’il eust esleu une vie contemplative & monastique, contre l’intention de son pere qui le destinoit son successeur: il craignit toutefois en fin de tomber en ce crime de desobéissance, d’irreverance & impieté vers son pere. Il retourna de Monastere…” Ayrault, *Puissance Paternelle*, 17.
and biblical sources: “By these human laws [Greece and Rome], the father himself is judge of disobedience done to him.” He continues with an example drawn from the pre-Flood era: “the father’s denunciation alone had the place of full proof whether he came to present his son to the elders as contumacious, or fathers had in that time private and domestic power and authority over their children.” Ayrault seems to assert that the father possessed the supreme authority in the household and that his domestic authority spilled over into a semi-official capacity in the public sphere (to the degree that these two places were theoretically distinguished because in Ayrault’s time such distinction was ambiguous in practice). On the father’s word alone presumably, one could bypass criminal procedure as it developed in the sixteenth century and due process in the modern sense. Here Quarta sees Ayrault lamenting the decline in fathers’ corrective power and the superficiality of paternal authority while claiming that public jurisdiction should be an extension of the paternal one. The father interpreted the law and crime in a domestic legal system, and such infractions were recognized as being threats to society as a whole. Furthermore, the father probably was the legal system because he most likely made the laws in his family and then decided when they were broken.

However, these interpretations are not so simple. Most notably, Ayrault gives other indications that he was an avid supporter of due process (ordre et instruction judiciaire) and wrote an entire book advocating it. He also claimed that a lack of due process was a major

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53 “Par ces loix humaines le pere est luy-mesme juge de la desobeissance qui luy est faicte.” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 3.
54 “la seule denouncedation du pere n’eust eu lieu de pleine preuve, s’il venu presenter son fils aux Anciens comme contumax & proterue, si les peres n’eussent eu dës ce temps là, de l’auctorite & de la puissance privee & domestique sur leurs enfans.” Ibid., 6.
56 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin, 27.
57 Ayrault, Ordre et Instruction, 1576.
fault of the League’s assassination of Henry III. As soon as we acknowledge Ayrault’s assertion that according to ancient custom, parents had the right of life and death over their children (citing Abraham and ancient law), we realize that at least in the case of Abraham, the father was not acting on his own initiative but rather obeying a higher authority. Similarly, when Ayrault writes, “It is well true that in Rome…fathers sometimes, by consequence of their domestic power, undertook jurisdiction of their children, even for crimes committed outside of the family,” he does not necessarily advocate fathers usurping public jurisdiction and punishing crimes in the public sphere; quite the opposite in fact, in light of his professional position as royal judge. He used this example more to illustrate the extent of a father’s “domestic power,” that is, the power he has over his family, which figuratively and customarily also included the right of life and death than to incite others to action. “[O]ur Gauls had it too.” Ayrault, adding a little Gallican perspective, appeals in this instance to custom, which derived its authority from its age. Thus, patriarchal authority had a long and powerful history that, in Ayrault’s eyes, commanded respect. This authority developed from both secular and divine sources, of which the divine was more important but which remained in the hands of the patriarch and God rather than strictly filtered through the Church.

59 Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 5-8, 17-22. Quarta interprets these references as a demonstration of God’s will alone having supremacy over a father’s. Ayrault e Bodin, 32.
60 “Il est bien vraye qu’à Rome…les peres ont quelquesfois, en consequence de leur puissance domestique, entrepris jurisdiction sur leurs enfans, voire pour crimes commis hors la famille…” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 19.
61 One sees this phenomenon also in adultery cases where a husband is permitted to kill an adulterous wife. See Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in Sixteenth Century France (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1987). For a medieval tradition of this phenomenon as it pertains to adultery, see R. Howard Bloch, Medieval French Literature and Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
64 Quarta sees Ayrault opposing religious orders. Ayrault e Bodin, 26-30.
Church was both essential to (in performing services such as marriage for religious legitimization), but in a sense not to interfere with, the family (and *robin* machinations).

The most important thing to grasp from this discussion is the concept that these distinctions between public and private spheres, laws, and jurisdictions were still developing. Ayrault seems to discourage multiple jurisdictions and in particular, the legal jurisdiction of fathers:

I say that their [the ancients] principal intention was not to introduce a form of magistrate in the person of fathers (I know that one gives them this name sometimes) nor to establish a diversity of jurisdictions, one public, the other private and domestic; that is, if the children were delinquents against the public, then they had their fathers for judges. The magistrate was ordained for this, and to be a son is not a quality that merits this privilege of only being judiciable from his proper father.  

As a royalist judge, he would probably have been supportive of the monarchy’s campaign to monopolize law and justice. The royal courts had for a long time been in competition with seigneurial and decentralized courts. Of course the rebellions of the Catholic League also urgently necessitated the maintenance and control of law and order. Advocating such an idea then would be part of his professional duty. But he never went so far as to deny them an unofficial magisterial position, even admitting that “one gives them this name sometimes.”

Officially, a crime within the private sphere could (and should) be tried in the public sphere but never vice versa. However, as previously mentioned, Ayrault placed the authority of the father above that of the magistrate to the degree that he had a more direct magisterial role within (and for the benefit of) the family.

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65 “Je dy que leur principale intention n’estoit pas d’introduire une forme de Magistrat en la personne des peres (jaçoit qu’on leur donnast ce nom quelquefois) ny pour establir une diversité de jurisdictions, l’une publique, l’autre privée & domestique: c’est à dire, que si les enfans delinquoient contre le public, qu’il eussent leurs peres pour juges. Le Magistrat estoit ordonné pour cela: Et estre fils, ce n’est pas une qualité qui merite ce privilege de n’estre judiciabile que de son propre pere.” Ayrault, *Puissance Paternelle*, 19.

We have seen how Ayrault articulated his case in secular terms and how he sided firmly with Parlement against the Council of Trent. Paternal authority was especially vulnerable to such conflicts of jurisdiction because it had both a secular and a sacred element to it. Fathers had legal rights over their children, but fathers were also thought to have been placed in a position of authority as head of household by God. In addition, Ayrault presumes that René is to be held accountable for his actions. First and foremost, however, Ayrault was influenced by and dialoguing with Parlement’s conception of *rapt* because it was the only legal grounding he had—the only hope he had—for recovering his son. In building his case Ayrault appears to closely follow a letter of St. Bernard of Clairvaux. This case of *rapt* suggests that René is in fact innocent in his disappearance and that the Jesuits are guilty, but Ayrault unmasks the Jesuits’ deception with this treatise, thereby assessing blame to both his son and the Jesuits.

Ayrault includes, as part of his case, an appeal to the secular hope embodied in all children:

> Whether therefore the son, vowing what belongs to the father, had made a pious choice or not, it would have been from the other side a species of theft [furt] and injustice…[T]he father and the mother by the child’s profession and adoption would have lost their hope, their heir, the continuation of their family, the profits and emoluments that were owed them from their negotiations and actions. It follows therefore that to the vow of Religion that the son or daughter had made, the wish and consent principally of the father was required there. Religion is a very favorable thing but not such as against the natural and essential forms that thinking to favor it, one annuls or profanes it.67

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67 “Quand donc le fils voüant ce qui est au pere, eust fait chose pieuse, que non: c’eust esté de l’autre costé espèce de furt & d’injustice. Car les biens n’estoient pas au fils, mais au pere…le pere & la mere par la profession & adoption de leur enfant, eussent perdu leur esperance, leur heritier, la continuation de leur famille, les profits & emolumens qui leur revenoient de leurs negotiations & actions. S’ensuit donc qu’au vœu de Religion que le fils ou la fille eust fait, le vouloir & le consentement principalement du pere y estoit requis. La Religion est bien chose fort favorable: mais non pas tellement contre les formes naturelles & essentielles, que pensant la favoriser, on l’annule ou on la prophane.” Ayrault, *Puissance Paternelle*, 42-43.
This passage is a *robin* way of saying that the choice of taking religious vows does not pertain to the son (or daughter), and that going against the formality of the father offering the son to a monastery (“what pertains to the father”) profanes religious intent.\(^{68}\) Ayrault maintains that going against patriarchal prerogatives is irreligious and his use of the word “annul” is interesting because Ayrault flips the legal maneuvering of the clerics and *robins*. That is, the *robins* pressured clerics to annul clandestine vows by an argument of secular prerogative, but a dispute arose with clerics about the prerogative of religion. In this case, the undermining of secular prerogative annuls religious intent instead of vice versa.

In addition to cleverly reversing the usual jurisdictional argument, Ayrault employed the rhetoric of *rapt* and linked it to the *robin* motives for the extension of this term. The word “*furt*” appears to derive from the Latin *fur*, which means thief. It implies a willful wrongdoing and suggests a secrecy and theft that incorporates the idea into the realm of *rapt*. Furthermore, if justice is understood to be “rendering to each his due,” then “injustice” in this case is denying what is owed through the “stealing” (abduction) of a possession (the son).\(^{69}\) By enumerating a list of abstract and concrete goods that would be lost by the taking of religious vows, he argued that all hope of livelihood and continuation of the family rested on the son, and so he belonged to the family, which the father controlled. Because so many other conditions pertaining to the well-being of the family were attached to the son, and the father was responsible for ensuring the well-being of his family, the son could not, as a possession, operate under his will alone. Therefore the father had to consent to how the son chose to dispose of himself because in so doing he disposed of the family. The father’s preservation and protection of his family was “natural” and his consent was “essential.”

\(^{68}\) Quarta argues that Ayrault supports religion but disdains religious orders. *Ayrault e Bodin*, 26.

\(^{69}\) Quarta uses the analogy of creditor and debtor to father and son, claiming that the first relationship is material while the second is one of subordination. However, this passage (and others) suggests that the father/son relationship had a material aspect as well. Ibid., 57.
Linking his construction of *rapt to robin* motives necessarily leads to the typical failed distinction between “types” of rapt. This connection is evident when he reiterates a work by his friend Pasquier:

[F]inally the fathers [religious delegates] declared at the Council of Trent, in Session xxiii that although clandestine marriage (such as that which is made without the consent of the father and mother) is marriage, so much and so long as the Church will not have broken and annulled it; [the Church] herself, however, has always prohibited and detested it for very just causes. The Church desires that, if it is marriage, it depend on her and not the father. He has moreover the Ordinance of the Christian Princes, who say loud and clear that it is *rapt* and if it is marriage that they have from God a good sword to dissolve it. I will add however two passages, not for undertaking to confirm or quash what the Church or the Prince wanted from it, or would want to define, but to make children think twice, three times, that all of which is permitted is not *honnête* and think again to disobey so easily in an act which will never show them in a good light.70

While Ayrault coyly denies that he takes a side in the conflict in this place, his *robin* perspective is evidently coloring the secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictional conflict if for no other reason than the fact that he chose to insert this passage into his treatise in the first place. The style is one frequently employed in refutation, beginning with the opponent’s claim and finishing with one’s own. He (through Pasquier) acknowledges that there is a difference between what the clerics and the lawyers consider prerequisites to marriage. He also grudgingly acknowledges that the lawyers cannot annul the marriages which the Church deems to be legitimate. He does insist, however, that reasons for dissolving such marriages are “just,” adopting the term of the Council of Trent and implying that parental disapproval qualifies as such. Ayrault recognizes the Church’s adamancy about monopolizing the control of marriage as a sacrament. But then he turns around and suggests that God approves of the

70 “Il a pour luy, qu’enfin les Peres ont declare au Concile de Trente, en la Session xxiie que bien que le mariage clandestin (tel qu’est celuy qui est fait sans le consentement du pere & de la mere) soit mariage, tant & si longuement que l’Eglise ne l’aura cassé & annulé: que toutefois elle-mesme l’a tousjours pour tres-justes causes defendu & detesté. L’Eglise veut, si c’est mariage, que cela depende d’elle, non pas du pere. Il a encores l’Ordonnance des Princes Chrestiens, qui disent haut & clair que c’est rapt: & si c’est mariage, qu’ils ont de Dieu une bonne espee pour le dissoudre. J’ajousteray toutefois deux passages, non pour entreprendre de confirmer, ou infirmer ce que l’Eglise, ou le Prince en ont voulu, ou voudroient definir: mais pour faire que les enfants pensent deux fois, trois fois, que tout ce qui est permis, n’est pas honnest: & pensent outre à ne desobeir pas si facilement en acte qui ne leur produira oncques.” Ayrault, *Puissance Paternelle*, 37-38.
bureaucrats’ outrage and desire to annul clandestine vows. By inserting Pasquier’s words into this treatise, Ayrault links the virtue of parental consent in the case of both marital and religious vows. Because of Church monopoly, though, the only weapon these fathers had was to appeal to a higher code of reverence and obedience outside of the conflict of jurisdiction, which carried more weight since such an appeal was attached to reverence and obedience to God. He tries to make the argument that children should not be tempted to take advantage of the opportunity presented to them, that it is not always right to do what is permissible.

Ayrault cleverly maneuvers around the jurisdictional conflict concerning age as well. He presents his son as a minor by both secular and ecclesiastical standards: “At the age of fifteen to sixteen years you have undertaken to vow yourself to the Jesuits. You had and (if it is to have what one despises) you still have your father and mother in this world.”?1 Ayrault continues, though, by acknowledging robin values: “Consider now if this text [St. Jerome] excuses you, you who were and are still a minor of 25 years, who have your father and mother living, who were not already required by another vow to be a Jesuit.”?2 It is important to note that even though Ayrault had claimed that René was fifteen when he joined the order against his father’s will, he still asserts the secular age of majority, that is 25 years old, to make doubly sure that others, regardless of jurisdiction understood that his son had not reached the age of reason.?3 Nevertheless, the passage shows that Ayrault’s loyalties lay more with civil law prescriptions than those of canon law. It also resonates closely with part of a letter by St.

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?1 “En l’aage de quinze à seize ans vous avez entrepris de vous voüer aux Jesuites. Vous aviez, & (si c’est avoir ce qu’on mesprise) vous avez encore vosre pere & vosre mere en ce monde.” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 67-68. St. Basile (to whom this passage refers) according to Ayrault, delayed taking monastic vows until his parents died.

?2 “Considerez maintenant si ce texte vous excuse, vous qui estiez & estes encore mineur de xxv ans: qui avez vosre pere & vosre mere vivans: qui n’estiez point deja obligé par autre voeu à estre Jesuite.” Ibid., 81.

?3 Diefendorf notes that Ayrault, in another work, fudged René’s age from about nineteen to about fifteen for dramatic effect. “Give Us Back Our Children,” 293.
Bernard of Clairvaux, whose nephew defected to Cluny on the grounds that his parents had previously dedicated him there.\textsuperscript{74}

In addition to addressing specific legal questions regarding his case of \textit{rapt}, such as age and jurisdiction, Ayrault deepens the rhetoric of \textit{rapt} by attacking his adversaries’ methods. In so doing, he argues that Jesuits seduced his son with misinformation: “But the greatest evil in this is that it seems that our Religion…instead of establishing this domestic power, destroys it and that nothing dispenses much our children to the honor, reverence, and obedience that they owe, that…to serve well God and men conjointly…are reduced as contrary and incompatible.”\textsuperscript{75} He argues that the Jesuits enticed his son to defy his father by means of an “evil,” reductionist argument which seemed to put parents (“domestic power”) and religious devotion at odds. Ayrault continues along this line: “[I]f the theology, or those who attract you to them, give you a pertinent solution to it, I would be well at ease that you or they taught it to me.”\textsuperscript{76} The Jesuits “attracted” the impressionable young man, which implies a sort of malice, or at least deception and dishonesty. Instead of being the active decision-maker characteristic of a \textit{contumace}, René here becomes a passive, entranced subject. The quote also suggests underhandedly that no justification in “theology” exists and that the secrecy, at least on the part of the Jesuits, is designed to cover illicit behavior. Ayrault cloaks this invitation to open text-based argument in an “innocent” request for an explanation. Moreover, Ayrault suggests that René is being misled by his “teachers,” who have selected “a

\textsuperscript{74} St. Bernard, letter 1.
\textsuperscript{75} “Mais le plus grand mal qui est en cecy, c’est qu’il semble que nostre Religion (comme nous avons dit) au lieu d’establir ceste puissance domestique, la destruise: & que rien ne dispense tant nos enfans de l’honneur, reverence & obeissance qu’ils doivent, que la difficulté qu’on veut dire estre à bien servir Dieu & les homes conjointement Preceptes qui s’accordoient & marchoient d’un pied, sont rendus comme contraires & incompatibles.” Ayrault, \textit{Puissance Paternelle}, 31.
\textsuperscript{76} “Que si la Theologie, ou ceux qui vous attirent à eux, vous y donnent solution pertinent: je seray bien aise que vous, ou eux me l’appreniez…” Ibid., 39.
truncated passage” (out of context), and he presents the ensuing “perplexities” as deliberate on the part of the Jesuits, who seduce and lure children into the Society.77

This attack against the Jesuits presumes the accusation of rapt, that René was not wholly to blame for his decision to join the Jesuits. Rapt was considered a form of coercion, and under Parlementary law, such a transaction was null and void. Ayrault explicitly links his case to the various connotations of rapt which were circulating at the time he wrote his treatise. He may have delighted in the irony of a young man being seduced or that a group of celibates were seducers—sexual innuendo intended. However, ambiguity arises from the verb séduire, which had multiple meanings such as to corrupt innocence, to deceive, to lead astray, to make fall into error, to make to shirk a duty, and to persuade78 and which can be interpreted in various ways.

Ayrault’s use of the rhetoric of rapt culminates with an episode from the life of St. Bernard of Clairvaux. In fact, Ayrault appears to model at least part of his treatise on a letter which St. Bernard wrote to his nephew Robert. Ayrault evidently saw some striking parallels between St. Bernard’s case and his own. Apparently, Robert had been promised to the abbey of Cluny by his parents when just a boy. However, he entered Cîteaux as a novice and began a sort of father-son relationship with St. Bernard. After a few years as a Cistercian, Cluny looked more and more desirable to the youth. He snuck out of Cîteaux with the help of some Cluniacs and justified his action based on his parents’ previous vow and the transfer of property which had accompanied it. Needless to say, this defection to a rival order troubled St. Bernard, prompting him to write a letter, mixed with admonition and tenderness, to his

adopted son, which Ayrault’s treatise echoes. In using this letter, Ayrault not only borrows St. Bernard’s voice for his treatise but also speaks through St. Bernard’s letter.

In recounting St. Bernard’s story, he interprets it as a *robin case of rapt*. It will be useful here to juxtapose the texts in question. First, Ayrault gives his account of the young man’s disappearance: “There was a quarrel between these two monasteries. St. Bernard blamed first of all the way which those of Cluny had used…to have proceeded by secret inductions and persuasions…they had deceived the doormen of the convent and had drawn and raised this Robert without the seal of his superiors and his uncle…. *Fefellit te*80 sanctitas, *seduxit religio, perdidit auctoritas seniorum.*”81 Compare this narrative to that of St. Bernard:

[H]e [hypothetical youth] was duped by sanctity, misled by religion, allured by the authority of age….Outwardly he [a Grand Prior] came in sheep’s clothing, but within he was a ravening wolf. Alas! The shepherds were deceived…The smallest sheep in the fold did not fly from this wolf, he too was deceived….This wolf in sheep’s clothing fascinated, allured, and flattered. He preached a new Gospel….By such sophistries the too credulous boy was talked around, led astray and led off by his deceivers.82

Notice in particular the language of secrecy, persuasion, and deception in the two accounts. It is intriguing that Ayrault, in playing the role of St. Bernard, appears to equate the Jesuits with the monks of Cluny. At first glance, this equation might seem counterintuitive. After all, the Cistercians were the reformed order, recapturing the spirit of earlier monasticism. However, the Cistercians were highly ascetic, and the Jesuits operated uniquely in the world. Thus, the accusation of luxury from St. Bernard toward the Cluniacs: “Who else would not scold your

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79 St. Bernard, letter 1.
80 The Latin passages from Ayrault’s account are translated in the juxtaposed excerpts of St. Bernard’s letter. This *te* appears to have been inserted by Ayrault and seems to be a way of personalizing the account through Latin because the corresponding passage in the letter is impersonal “that man” (*illum*) not “you”: *fefellit illum sanctitas, seduxit religio, perdidit auctoritas seniorum*. See Bernard de Clairvaux, “Ad Robertum, Nepotum suum, qui de Ordine Cisterciensi descenderat ad Cluniacensem,” in *Lettres I (1 à 41)* vol. 2 of *Oeuvres complètes*, (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1997), 66.
82 St. Bernard, 3-4.
disobedience and be angry at your desertion, that you should have left the coarse habit for soft
raiment, a fare of roots for delicacies, in fine poverty for riches,” could be echoed by Ayrault
against the Jesuits: “you for whom it was not a question of fleeing Paganism or its
persecutions, not to go into the desert of Scythia but into the most beautiful places and richest
houses and most beautiful (cities) in the world.”83 The accusation that the Jesuits were soft
derived principally from their concern to stay fit and thus remain able to perform their duties
in the world.84 By extension Ayrault concludes: “St. Bernard…condemns without doubt your
pretended vocation and inspiration of which you flatter yourself.”85

Ayrault continues by emphasizing the primary role of parents, which he selects from
St. Bernard: “Petitio quam Regula praecepit, non est facta pro eo à parentibus, wanting to
say: although the defunct father of this young man had some will that he was of your [order],
however it did not have any sort of effect.”86 Again, compare this passage with the
corresponding one of St. Bernard’s letter: “[T]here is no doubt that the boy was promised to
the monastery without any formal oblation, for the petition prescribed by the Rule was not
made by his parents…and the offering made before witnesses.”87 However, immediately
preceding this passage St. Bernard appears to undermine the importance of parental offering:
“Let them see and judge which has the more force: the vow a father makes on behalf of his
son, or the vow a son makes on his own behalf.”88 Ayrault chose to ignore this point, adding
in his narrative: “what your rule and ours requires notably, that this one who wants to enter

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83 “vous, à qui il n’estoit question- de fuir le Paganisme, ou les persecutions d’i-celuy: non d’aller és deserts de
Scytie, mais és plus beaux lieux & plus riches maisons, & plus belles Citez qui soient au monde.” Ayrault,
Puissance Paternelle, 81.
University Press, 1988), see especially chapter 8.
85 “St. Bernard…condamne sans doute vostre pretenduë vocation & inspiration dont vous vous flattez.” Ayrault,
Puissance Paternelle, 83.
86 “Petitio quam Regula praecepit, non est facta pro eo à parentibus, voulant dire: Bien que le defunct pere de ce
jeune homme eust eu quelque volonté qu’il fust de vostres: toutesfois elle n’avoit point sorty d’effect.” Ibid.
87 St. Bernard, 6.
88 Ibid.
into religion, be offered by his parents and before testimony (he [St. Bernard] added still) which is not found in your profession made to Cluny.”

Reading the above passage from the letter, it is clear that this quote by Ayrault is not verbatim but rather it is Ayrault paraphrasing his own interpretation (unless we assume that Ayrault misunderstood the Latin, which would be highly unlikely). Not only is Ayrault extending Benedictine Rule to the Society of Jesus (which had its own constitution), but he switches St. Bernard’s negative construction to a positive one. That is, he takes St. Bernard’s point that Robert was not offered by his parents and before witnesses to mean that both are required to take monastic vows. It is a subtle ploy, but in so doing, Ayrault emphasizes St. Bernard’s case of rapt as he sees it.

Even in St. Bernard’s case of rapt and outcry against deception, Ayrault sees blame assigned to the victim. Consider this passage from the letter: “And so if you left through my fault, as you believe and I do not deny, or through your own fault, as many believe but I do not affirm, or, as I think more probable, through the fault of both of us, from now on you alone will be to blame if you do not return” (my emphasis). Ayrault echoes this sentiment saying: “either you or I have erred: you, to undertake to be a Jesuit against my will, me, to be offended by it.” Likewise he states: “But just as the girl abducted immature, as long as she remains with her abductor, does not reach adulthood, the majority that you acquired in the hands of those who detain you against my will, will never excuse you, nor them either.”

Ayrault thus recognizes both the guilt of the Jesuits and his son’s guilt while building a case of rapt. That is, Ayrault (perhaps alongside his robin associates) defines clandestine vows

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89 “Ce que vostre reigle & la nostre requiert notamment, que celuy qui veut entrer en religion, soit offert par ses parens, & devant tesmoins (ajoutez-il encore) ne se trouve point en vostre profession faite à Cluny.” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 83.

90 St. Bernard, 2.

91 “c’est celui auquel vous, ou moi avons erré: Vous, d’entreprendre d’être Jesuite contre ma volonté. Moy, de m’en offenser…” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 37.

92 “Mais tout ainsi que la fille enlevée immatura, quandiu apud raptorem est, aetatem non attingit, aussi a majorité que vous acquerriez entre les mains de ceux qui vous detiennent contre ma volonté, ne vous excusera jamais, ne eux aussi…” Ibid., 99.
(marital or religious) as an act of disobedience and thus illegitimate, and he justifies this estimation because the deed did not result from necessary discretion: the will of parents. This legal action, in turn, presumes (despite the innocence of seduction) the son’s recognition of his disobedience which permits an accusation of contumacy. Moreover, Ayrault tries to convince René that his disobedience will have consequences that he did not anticipate and which actually contradict his religious aspirations.

Ayrault emphasizes the idea of damnation, also borrowed from St. Bernard: “And the fault of this nephew, to change monastery only, was such (said St. Bernard) that he was going there to the damnation of his soul. What to the son who stomps under foot so arrogantly the commandment of God and the holy decretals?” Compare this to St. Bernard:

[The whole significance of the suit was nothing more than that the robbers could keep their spoils...And withal a soul for whom Christ died must be lost to please Cluny....a clean heart will avail more than crafty words....May Christ save you from this, dear son, for at the last judgment you will incur a greater penalty on account of this letter of mine if, when you have read it, you do not take its lesson to heart.

While these two passages both make the pretension of being concerned with the offending party’s salvation, it is important to note that St. Bernard does not mention the commandments or decretals in his letter but rather sin only. More about the commandments will be explained in Chapter Three. Notice also, as Ayrault must have, the label of “robbers” for the Cluniacs and then compare it to the title of the treatise, where Ayrault accuses the Jesuits of “stealing” his son. The passages indicate the complexity of Ayrault’s understanding of René’s guilt, for although being stolen implies innocence, damnation implies guilt.

It seems fitting to conclude this comparison between Ayrault and St. Bernard by examining emotion in the two accounts. The clearest correlation comes from the opening of

93 “Et si la faute de ce nepveu, pour changer seulement de Monastere, est telle (dit S. Bernard) qu’il y alloit de la damnation de son ame: qu’est-ce au fils de fouler aux piedz si arrogamment le commandement de Dieu, & les saintcts Decrets, non pour changer de foy, mais de robe? non d’Eglise, mais de College?” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 83-84.
94 St. Bernard, 5 & 10.
both works. Ayrault addresses the reader: “It has been three years and more that I have been trying to learn where the Jesuits are holding my son. If I had discovered the place, I would have made this remonstrance to him privately. But seeing that I was losing time, and more, my hope, I wanted to write to him as to the contumacious.” Compare this to St. Bernard: “Long enough, perhaps too long, have I waited, dearest Robert, for the Lord that he might deign to touch your soul…moving you to salutary regrets for your error….But seeing myself still disappointed of my hope, I can no longer hide my sorrow, restrain my anxiety, or dissemble my grief.” The opening of this letter is perhaps merely a topos; nevertheless, the similarities are striking. Elsewhere, Ayrault adopts some of the emotion in the letter: “[W]hy therefore (said Saint Bernard) have you charmed and robbed me of my nephew, my pleasure, my contentment….he called them thieving wolves what opportunity can I have of it who was deprived and despoiled of my son. *Fortè miserti sunt tui.* You were lost from between the hands of father and mother, uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters all Catholic.” Compare this to the actual letter: “Unhappy man that I am who have not you by me, who cannot see you, who am obliged to live without you…So I do not ask why you left me, I only grieve that you do not return; I do not blame your going away, I only blame your not coming back….No doubt it may have been my fault that you left. I was too severe with a sensitive youth….you who have been the cause of so much grief to me.” While these two passages do not directly correspond, Ayrault’s treatise echoes the sentiment expressed by St. Bernard. Another passage from the letter expresses perhaps Ayrault’s unspoken sentiment: “Sadly I weep, not
for my lost labour, but for the unhappy state of my lost child. Do you prefer that another should rejoice in you who has not laboured for you?" 

It may demonstrate the extended utility of St. Bernard’s letter, whereby Ayrault can speak through it. It is merely the hint of a sentiment otherwise buried beneath the oppressive and calculated rhetoric of an outraged father.

However, Ayrault does not, in his passage on St. Bernard, remove all responsibility from René, who “flatters” himself with his “pretended vocation and inspiration.” By saying that St. Bernard would disapprove, Ayrault recruited the authority of a saint to his cause. René is not among the Jesuits against his will, but has rather been wholly convinced (and deceived) into believing that his irreverence is actually pious. He moves to accuse René of willful arrogance against a commandment. These accusations implicate René in the crime as Ayrault sees it. If Ayrault identifies on a certain level with St. Bernard then there is a certain amount of tenderness and genuine concern here as well; behind the threat of damnation is concern about it. But added to this concern is an appeal to a father’s “pleasure and contentment” in the company of his son, of which he has been deprived without so much as even a letter. Furthermore, Ayrault adds Latin passages, which in many ways condense his main points, to underscore the importance of his argument. The opposition between the sacred and deception, religion and seduction (or perhaps coercion) serves as a distinction between what René thought he was doing and what actually happened.

The final point of Ayrault’s case of rapt is his equation—in typically melodramatic fashion—of the offense to murder: “[I]t is good to remark that to kill our children or to attract them to the Monastery without our permission, is placed in the same rank. For is it not murder to render our children in such a state that they are no longer ours? that they do not

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99 St. Bernard, 7.
inherit from us nor us from them? that posterity and succession are lost by it? sight even, frequentation, presence?...it is homicide.” The language of *rapt* emerges through the word “attract” which, as has been observed, is synonymous with such ideas as luring, seduction, and coercion (because the children are not making the choice under their own reasoning will). By such an accusation, Ayrault does not imply merely an abstract symbolic social death through which the children are no longer in the world but rather a more personal symbolic social death. It was personal because parents were deprived of the company of their children and because it interfered with *robin* networking practices. Such a disruption posed a threat to the family and undermined *robin* values, which sought to secure inheritance and succession.

Beyond accusing the Jesuits of *rapt* Ayrault realizes that at some point he needs to come to terms with his son’s own will. After having spent the greater part of his treatise arguing that his son’s will cannot deviate from the interests of his father, he uses the language of *rapt* to face his son’s apparent heartlessness:

> Whether this would be therefore even of my consent that you made yourself Jesuit, could you well have the heart to remain there now, to be there hearing speak, in security and repose, of the calamities where we are; of the miseries of our France; of these piteous and impious wars; to not make a case to come console us, defend us, support us. Maybe one detains you by force. I like to believe it so better than to esteem you so felonious, so denatured, so stupid as to be absent from us in these misfortunes.

Ayrault constructs even this moment of tenderness in terms of *rapt*, preferring to believe that his son was being held by force of abduction (“detained”) rather than that his son could be so cruel as to deny his parents his company in times of crisis and hardship. It suggests that Ayrault does not want to believe his son’s guilt but nevertheless acknowledges it in spite of

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100 “[I]l est bien à remarquer, que, tuer noz enfans, où les attraire au Monachat sans nostre vouloir & consentement, est mis en mesme rang. Car n’est-ce pas meurtre, que rendre noz enfans en tel estat qu’ils ne soient plus noyrs? qu’ils ne nous heritent, ny nous à eux? que la posterité & succession en soit perdu? la veuë mesme, la frequetation, la presence?...c’est homicide.” Ayrault, *Puissance Paternelle*, 86-87.

101 “Quand ce seroit donc mesme de mon consentement que vous vous fussiez fait Jesuites: pouvez vous bien avoir le coeur d’y demeurer maintenant? d’estre là à ouir parler en seureté & en repos des calamitez où nous sommes tous? des miseres de nostre France? de ces piteuses & impieuses guerres? ne faire cas de nous venir consoler, nous defendre, nous soustenir? Peut estre qu’on vous detient par force. J’aime mieux le croire ainsi, que de vous estimer si felon, si desnaturé, si stupide que de nous manquer en ces malheurs.” Ibid., 91.
rapt. It is unclear whether Ayrault underwent any personal hardship himself (other than his son’s disappearance of course), but as a confirmed royalist, he was certainly affected and troubled by the religious-political turmoil in the aftershocks and aftermath of the League.

**Life, Liberty, and Bourgeoisie**

Addressing the will of the son, inevitably it seems, leads to questions of gratitude. In a context of *robins* trying to secure their social position, a child’s taking of clandestine vows appears to have undermined their efforts and rejected their ambitions. Oftentimes the patriarch had specific plans for his eldest children, including marriage arrangements, and in the case of sons, occupations. To prepare a son for his future vocation required special training and education. The security of the family’s wealth and status frequently rested on the success of this son. All of the hard work and sacrifices that the family had made were theoretically in vain if these children took clandestine vows. Proceeding from family ambitions, Ayrault argues that rebellious children are ungrateful for the secular gifts which they have received over the course of their lives.

Ayrault characterizes youth in general as ungrateful: “so presumptuous, so foolish, so rash, and going along with and accommodating itself so little to the will and discretion of those from whom it holds its being and beginning.” In other words, children owed their existence to their parents: “Now what obligation is there in the world greater than that which is owed to parents? They are, after God, the second authors of our life and our being.”

Members of the new generation who resisted their fathers’ plans and preparations for them failed to appreciate the work and sacrifices involved in raising, training, educating, and caring

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102 Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children.”
103 “si presumptueuse, si fole, si temeraire, & d’elle-mesme se rangeant & accommodant si peu à la volonté & discretion- de ceux desquels elle tient son estre et son commencement.” Ayrault, *Puissance Paternelle*, 7.
104 “Or quelle obligation plus grande y a-il au Monde, que celle qui est deuë aux parans? ils sont, apres Dieu, les seconds auteurs de nostre vie & de nostre estre.” Ibid., 25.
for them. Furthermore, youth resisted discretion which rendered him or her incapable of making sound decisions and rationalizing, which would impede his or her ability to take marital or religious vows without the wisdom and judgment of parents. Ayrault attributes René’s abandonment to the impulsiveness of youth thereby suggesting that he made a poorly calculated decision and was stubborn to not admit it. The idea connects carefully to the concept of the necessity for a sufficient age of reason so that a parent’s reason may govern youth until his own develops.\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Rapt} would be a violation of this principle.

Ayrault extends this idea to explain how indebted children are to their parents: “That which we can [give] all our lives…is nothing compared to what once they gave to us: life, knowledge, liberty, bourgeoisie, training, institution, and goods.”\textsuperscript{106} Children essentially receive everything from their parents, most of which is impossible to repay. Thus, children must be in a constant state of gratitude toward their parents because without them, they would be and have nothing. These “gifts” are all secular and in some ways particular. “Training,” “institution,” and “bourgeois” are practically speaking, class-specific. The bureaucratic class at this time was trying to maintain its newly elevated position (or rather still working to elevate it),\textsuperscript{107} which required a particular training, most often including law school for the magistrates. But these “gifts” have a more profound meaning. They imply a certain level of reciprocity in the parent-child relationship.\textsuperscript{108} Children owe everlasting gratitude, but parents have a responsibility to provide for their children and to earn this gratitude. However, what is missing is more striking than what is present in this list. Ayrault makes no mention of religion or morals as something for which to offer gratitude, even though in other parts of the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[105] For more information on conceptualizations of youth see Griffiths, \textit{Youth and Authority}.
\item[106] “Ce que nous pouvons toutes nos vies…n’est rien, eu esgard à ce qu’une fois ils nous ont donné: la vie, la lumiere, la liberté, la bourgeoisie, l’éducation, l’institution, & les biens.” Ayrault, \textit{Puissance Paternelle}, 25-26.
\item[107] Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children.”
\item[108] Molinier, “Nourrir.”
\end{footnotes}
treatise he allows leeway for the obedience requirement for converting children of non-
Christian parents (although he still fundamentally frowns upon even this deviance). Perhaps, taking religious vows out of fervor would be too easy to justify as gratitude to a gift such as this.

**Conclusion**

Ayrault thought of his son’s disappearance as a crime and constructed his treatise to reflect such sentiment. His concept of the crime derived from his legal training but more importantly from his connections within Parlement. It allowed him to treat his son as a *contumace* and accuse the Jesuits of *rapt*, but as we have seen, ambiguity arises out of the question of guilt because contumacy and *rapt* are theoretical opposites. Nevertheless, a son’s knowledge of his own disobedience, even if it results from seduction, implies guilt which Ayrault’s emphasis on return reveals. But this case of *rapt*, far from simply dialoguing with *robin* perspectives, reveals concerns more profound than merely a rebellious child. It is symptomatic of the breakdown of the *une loi, un roi, une foi* ideology. The conflict of jurisdiction between Parlement and the Council of Trent results in part from Gallican mentalities and attempts to cope with disintegrating older forms of authority and unity.

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Chapter Two: Un roi

A family may be defined as the right ordering of a group of persons owing obedience to a head of a household, and of those interests which are his proper concern. The second term of our definition of the commonwealth refers to the family because it is not only the true source and origin of the commonwealth, but also its principle constituent.1

Jean Bodin, native of Angers,2 established the family as the foundation for a well-governed commonwealth, and not surprisingly, he placed the father at the head of the household. As Bodin indicates, family was a broader term in the sixteenth century and included domestic servants as well as blood relatives. Regardless, the father was the dominant ruling figure.

There were three predominant father figures who had certain conceptually interchangeable characteristics in the sixteenth century: God, the king, and the head of the household.3 They were characterized as creators, protectors, and sovereigns, who formulated and upheld certain rules and laws over their charges. Of course, there were other father figures, such as priests, but they did not embody the same set of paternal characteristics, although the pope came close in many minds (whether this was good or bad depended on who was asked). Thus, as Alain Molinier has noted, in the sixteenth century mind “Paternal authority has a double goal: to assure the life and upbringing of the child and to maintain familial unity.”4 In other words, the father had a simultaneous individual (the child) and collective (the family) responsibility. “The duties of the father are therefore very great toward his children and family….The father has a general right of command and particular rights: the right to childcare which consists of keeping his children next to him or of giving them other

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2 Ibid., introduction, vii.
educators; the right to correction which aims to punish ungrateful or rebellious children.”

This chapter is concerned primarily with the objectives of “maintaining family unity” and the punishment of children labeled “rebellious.” In particular, the rhetoric of unity and rebellion has broader communal and societal implications and interests.

Paul Griffiths noticed the political significance of age metaphors in defining a person’s place within authoritative structures. He argues that

Magistrates became fathers and fathers became magistrates. The parent-child relationship was proposed as a pattern for imitation, thereby casting all social relations in a paternal hue, while retaining the valued qualities of perpetual subordination and education. The language of ‘place’ provided one way of articulating this familial ideology, which was also given institutional precision and permanence in the ‘place’ structure.

He continues by stating that the early modern consensus was: “If this sequence was disrupted, if superiors failed to educate their juniors, or subordinates elected to evade or even resist appointed authority, there would be utter confusion.” Ayrault follows these ideas carefully when arguing the political aspect of paternal authority and its important implications for stability within the state. Cristina Quarta also sees a significant pattern in the way Ayrault in particular, but also Bodin, constructed the relationship between paternal authority and institutional sovereignty in order to “reorganize family and state through the common principle of power.”

She focuses on Ayrault’s lamentation and reassertion of the paternal right to juvenile correction, especially in regard to upbringing and the right of life and death, examining his reflections on the development of paternal prerogative in Roman law and practice. It should be remembered from Chapter One, though, that Ayrault may have utilized

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5 Molinier, “Pérenniser,” 73.
7 Ibid., 67.
8 Cristina Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin: Diritto, famiglia, e formazione morale nel XVI secolo (Manduria, Italy: Piero Lacaita Editore, 2004), 59. On the subject of political philosophy, she sees Ayrault as a precedent to Grotius, who, arguably, established a connection between paternal authority and political sovereignty. See pp. 19-23.
9 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin.
the example of the right of life and death to emphasize the decline in paternal authority but did not actually advocate a revival of this practice.

This chapter will discuss the domestic monarchy as it appears in Ayrault’s political argument concerning paternal authority. Ayrault used Bodin’s ideas about the family’s role in the commonwealth to make a suggestive accusation against his son and the Jesuits. On the one hand, he constructed a father’s authority using monarchical language. On the other hand, he suggested that disobedience to this fundamental stabilizing unit of society led to rebellion and treason. In fact, one could even argue that Ayrault considered disobedience to parents to be high treason against the state proper. These implications were important in conceptualizing the highest secular authority: the sovereign father, embodied in both king and head of household.

“This domestic monarchy”

Regardless of the influence of the Society of Jesus on young René, his disobedience was his own responsibility. He ignored his father’s pleas and evaded attempts to locate him. However, this disobedience had broader implications than merely disrupting family harmony, for a prevailing ideology in the late sixteenth century likened the king to a father and vice versa.¹⁰ Fathers literally ruled over their households in the way the king ruled over his subjects. In constructing the authority of fathers, Ayrault incorporated the concept of the domestic monarchy as a major line of reasoning into his argument. In so doing, he appears to have derived much of his understanding of this role for fathers from Jean Bodin’s De La République (published in 1576¹¹), in particular from his section “De La Puissance Paternelle.” It is doubtful that Ayrault would not have known or been influenced by Jean Bodin, a

¹¹ Tooley, Commonwealth, introduction, xi.
prominent figure of the sixteenth century. His section on “puissance paternelle” would surely have inspired some of his articulations of paternal authority. Fathers enjoyed an absolute power and a special place within secular and ecclesiastical hierarchies, and these ideas allowed Ayrault to reimagine and reinterpret the highest secular authority. Because Ayrault did not develop his ideas in an intellectual vacuum, it is important to examine the context in which he operated.

Jean Bodin’s primary work was focused on the commonwealth, so his construction of the family and paternal authority are necessarily viewed from this vantage point. He argues that “the well-ordered family is the true image of the commonwealth, and domestic comparable with the sovereign authority. It follows that the household is the model of right order in the commonwealth.”

Therefore, the family or household (because the family included more than parents and children) was a miniature commonwealth. Succeeding this, paternal authority includes the right to command another which “is either of a public or a private character; public when vested in a sovereign who declares the law, or in the magistrate who executes it, and issues orders binding on his subordinates and private citizens generally; private when vested in heads of households.” Bodin makes an important distinction between public (general) and private (particular) authority. Fathers rule over their household as the domestic counterpart to (or perhaps representative of) the king who rules over his people. This separation gave the father a measure of autonomy in their authority which would presumably serve the interests of the commonwealth.

A father’s sovereign authority relies on a reciprocal relationship with his children: “The rightly ordered government of a father over his children lies first in the proper exercise of that power which God gives to a father over his natural children, and the law over his

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12 Bodin, Commonwealth, book1, chapter 2-5, p. 6.
13 Ibid., 9.
adopted ones, and second in the obedience, love, and reverence that children owe their father. Authority properly belongs to all those who have recognized power to command another.”  

“Rightly ordered government” requires in part that the son recognize the sovereignty of his father in addition to the authority he derives from external sources such as God and law. This reciprocity becomes more evident in questions directly addressing obligations: “And just as nature impels the father to foster his child so long as he is defenceless, and educate him in honourable and virtuous principles, so the child is prompted, and by an even stronger impulse, to love, honour, serve, and care for his father, to be obedient to his commands…and to spare neither goods nor life to preserve the life of him from whom he draws his own.”  

Children’s duties thus mirror those of their parents, with both incorporating notions of provision and care-giving.

Paternal authority, in addition to its relative autonomy, characteristically includes right reasoning: “But if a father is not out of his mind, he will never be tempted to kill his own child without cause, and if the son has merited such a fate, it is not for the magistrate to intervene. The affection of parents for their children is so strong, that the law has always rightly presumed that they will only do those things which are of benefit and honour to their children. The real danger lies in the temptation of being too partial.”  

Parents are just, or perhaps indulgent, in their punishments “[b]ut I hold that the natural affection of parents for their children is incompatible with cruelty and abuse of power.”  

A father holds supreme authority over his household of a character similar to the sovereign of a nation, but he is immune to abusing that power according to Bodin. Fathers themselves are governed by reason and love. This naïve idealism justifies the relative autonomy of a father in his own

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14 Bodin, Commonwealth, book 1, chapter 2-5, p. 12.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 14.
17 Ibid.
sphere—a sphere to which the magistrate is not invited. But this explicit distinction was not nearly so clearly defined outside of this book’s bubble of idealism, for while Ayrault was evidently inclined to agree with the absoluteness of a father’s authority, and of its benefit for promoting political stability, the magistrate was not willing to compromise “public” authority, either, by creating multiple jurisdictions.

At this point, it is necessary to complicate these ideas even further by examining several works by Sarah Hanley, who has done extensive work on the relationship between the French state and the new bureaucratic class in the early modern period.\textsuperscript{18} While she places emphasis on the role of women in this endlessly renegotiated relationship, she offers the idea of a “Family-State compact” which “purveyed a family model of socioeconomic authority based on gender distinctions” and “influenced the state model of political authority in the making.”\textsuperscript{19} Families invested in royal offices, and legists in Parlement worked to secure these positions by “promoting the superiority of French judicial expertise” and “constructing and consolidating family networks.”\textsuperscript{20} Thus, the new bureaucratic class sought to secure its position through the regulation of marriages. Similarly, the monarchy used the ideas and methods which came from Parlement to secure its own position, much in the same way and using the same language as the establishment, management and regulation of a household.\textsuperscript{21}

This “Family-State compact” was thus symbiotic\textsuperscript{22} and reciprocal. The king gained more authority as the father of the state at the expense of ecclesiastical and seigneurial courts. And, if the fundamental unit of the paternalistic state model and legal order, the family, strengthened and consolidated its power, then ideally the monarchy’s power continued to

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 7-8.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 8-15.
\textsuperscript{22} Hardwick, \textit{Practice of Patriarchy}. 

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strengthen as well. By this logic, if the king supported the privileges of the new bureaucratic class, he was supporting himself. But this idea has already been complicated in an earlier chapter by pointing to Alain Molinier’s conclusion that the king actually benefited from undermining paternal authority.

Hanley also argues that the monarchy in this period was a “marital regime.” By this she means that popular iconography presented the king as the husband of his kingdom: “They created instead the marital maxim, which linked family formation and state building by contractually uniting king and kingdom in a political state marriage likened legally to that of husband and wife in a social civil marriage.” She attributes this phenomenon to attempts within the government (“shocked and embarrassed”) to reconcile Salic Law into the legal system: “From the early 1500s to the decades around the 1650s, legists and parlementaires propagated a French Law Canon, which secured legal foundations for the male right to govern along the lines of a Marital Regime in law.” She argues in particular that marital status offered legal foundations that did not come with fatherhood and that “marital governing power was recognized as legitimately French, whereas paternal power was Roman.” She even cites Jean Bodin as making this distinction promoting the maxim “The law of paternal power is not legitimate [in France]” which “legally structured a formidable Marital Regime

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26 The Salic Law originated in about the sixth century; editions were forged (still claiming to be original) in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to justify succession to the French throne through a male line only. This “French Salic Law” was discovered to be fraudulent in the sixteenth century, prompting the creation of the French Law Canon to preserve succession custom. See Hanley, “Monarchic State,” 107-9.
model of government that drew under its singular aegis both family and state units.”  

However, while she offers some convincing evidence, she also fails to do justice to another equally convincing corpus.

Far from trying to undermine Hanley’s arguments, this study merely seeks to complicate them. It is entirely possible that the husband and father ideologies existed simultaneously, that early modern legists, despite protestation, may not have clearly distinguished the two. For example, while Hanley clearly found evidence that Jean Bodin did not view the king’s power as a paternal power, we have seen that, in the exact same book, he clearly conceived of a father’s power as a sovereign authority. He also argued that the family was a model for the commonwealth and that the breakdown of paternal authority could have political consequences (which will be discussed at length shortly). Now, it could be argued that Bodin was linking the father’s authority as husband to govern his family to the king’s authority as husband to govern the realm, but this distinction is not explicit. In fact, the title was “On Paternal Power,” and he definitively used the term father for the head of household, which indicates that he meant father and not husband (if he had been consciously making a distinction, he would have used an alternate term). Of course, the father necessarily had the authority of a husband as well as head of household. Likewise, in that the husband supervised the well-being of his family, he had a broadly paternal role as well.

Bodin was not the only one who appeared to have trouble distinguishing the roles of father and husband. Ayrault himself makes ambiguous representations of the king’s authority: “Good or bad treatment does make Princes legitimate or illegitimate, Kings or Tyrants, no more than severity or indulgence makes a man a father or not, a husband or not, master or not;

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it’s the law, it’s the contract.” By this he clearly connects kings to fathers, husbands, and masters as figures of authority. He also links rebellion to these figures: “No, no, the goal of these claimed propositions, excommunications, and opinions, was to make, by wrong or by right, this late king odious to his subjects….There is not a man so insolent that he would dare say at the first opposition kill your father.” Again, Ayrault links regicide and parricide, which indicates that he considered paternal and regal authority to be comparable, even if the monarchy officially liked to characterize itself in a husband role.

This study will delve into the king’s role only marginally and only to focus on its logical inversion—the father as a king—for the sake of understanding Ayrault’s construction of paternal authority. Fathers possessed absolute authority in “this domestic monarchy.” By this, Ayrault explicitly adopted the ideal of the father as king of the household and used ruling terminology and analogy to describe the father’s role within it. Ayrault compares military discipline and hierarchy to the family dynamic with the father commanding his household as a dictator: “[A]s military discipline required that the least disobedience…was capital, otherwise all the army would be able to desert; so, domestic discipline, where the father is like a dictator, desired that from his voice alone depended all of what is under him…” The relationship of soldier to captain equates to that of son to father, and the entire army relates to the entire society, all with the possibility of capital punishment for insubordination. The father is the supreme authority with wife and servant subjected to his will along with the children. If one

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29 “Le bon ou mauvais traitement ne fait pas les Princes legitimes ou illegitimes: Roys, ou Tyrans: non plus que la severité ou indulgence ne fait pas l’homme, pere, ou non pere: mary, ou non mary: maistre ou non maistre: c’est le droit, c’est le contract,” Pierre Ayrault, Deploration de la mort du roy, Henry III. & du scandale qu’en a l’Eglise (n. p., 1589), French political pamphlets, 1547-1648, UM Special Collections; 59.
30 “Non, non: le but de ces pretendues propositions, excommunications & avis, estoit de render, à tort ou à droit, ce feu Roy odieux à ses sujets….Il n’y a homme si effronte qui ostast dire au fils de prime face, tue ton pere. Ibid., 15-16.
31 “ceste Monarchie domestique.” Pierre Ayrault, De La Puissance Paternelle: Contre ceux qui sous couleur de Religion voilent les enfants à leurs peres & meres (Tours: Jamet Mettayer, 1593), 32.
32 “Certes, comme la discipline militaire a requis que la moindre desobissance & contumace du soldat à son Capitaine, fust capitale: autrement toute l’armee se pouroit perdre. Aussi la discipline domestique, où le pere est comme Dictateur, à voulu que de sa voix seule dependist tout ce qui est sous luy…” Ibid., 22.
subordinate in this model rebels, the entire “commonwealth” could potentially be turned upside down. Protecting society by controlling his family is one of the father’s primary duties.

Ayrault could not help but note that, customarily, the father’s authority sometimes extended beyond the confines of the private sphere. As seen in the previous chapter, Ayrault does not advocate fathers usurping public jurisdiction and punishing crimes in the public sphere. It is important to consider, however, that the boundary between public and private was not clearly defined during this period. Thus, Ayrault’s apparent confusion is symptomatic of the beginning of attempts to develop this distinction.

Moreover, Ayrault places the authority of the father over his “subjects” above the authority of the king because of proximity. And this authority, this power, has, from antiquity, been “more absolute than that of the Prince.” That is, a father’s power is more timeless and less subject to politics than the power of a king. Ayrault even argues that this power is more than just divine right. It is natural and universal. This absolute and primary authority becomes clear over the right of life and death where Ayrault evokes the nostalgia of ancient Roman paternal authority, saying that: “[N]either the authority that the high priest bore over her, was authorized sufficiently, if he did not have her from the hands of the father, which having alone…the power of life and death, could alone in good right dedicate his child to this vocation and genre of life which relates to a form of banishment and exile, not from a city but from the world.”

Ayrault’s construction of death is suggestive. By entering a religious order, a child (in this instance a daughter entering the Vestal order) becomes essentially dead.

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34 “(Denis d’Halicarnasse) [C]este puissance plus absoluë que celle du Prince.” Ibid.
36 [N]y que l’auctorité que le grand Pontife prenoit sus elle, fust auctorisee suffisamment, s’il ne l’avoit des mains du pere, lequel ayant seul…la puissance de la mort & de la vie, pouvoit seul à bon droit dedier son enfant à ceste vacation & genre de vie qui se rapporte aucument à une forme de bannissement & exil, non d’une ville, mais de ce monde.” Ayrault, *Puissance Paternelle*, 45.
to the world. Only the father holds the right of life and death over his child, even if only symbolically. This idea is even more poignant when one considers the previous chapter when Ayrault equated clandestine vows to murder.

Furthermore, Ayrault constructs a suggestive hierarchy. He states explicitly that a high priest (pontifex) does not hold sufficient authority to usurp the privilege of making a symbolic sacrifice. Thus, a father has more authority over the person of his child than the priests. He has more influence over his child than the magistrate (de facto), but the magistrate has more punitive authority over the child than the father (de jure). And if parents claim sacred reverence as an aspect of that which is due to God, how does the hierarchy shape itself? It is certainly not linear. While not usurping a theological authority, the father has a power over his child that reigns above and outside of legal or religious structure. The relationship between child and father is the fundamental base of human social networks, but it has autonomous characteristics. However within a legal hierarchy, the magistrate is above the father and the father above the ecclesiastical hierarchy. This construction is in some ways a covert assertion of Gallican ideals of the autonomy of the French state and the relative autonomy of the French Church.

Seduction and Sedition

Comparing the father to a king and establishing the family as the model on which the stability of the state rested created interesting implications. If king and father were ideologically linked, then so were parricide and treason, in fact, regicide was commonly called parricide. Ayrault went only a little further in his analysis by linking disobedience to rebellion. From this arose the suggestion that not only were rebellious children dangerous to their immediate family, but also to their collective family in the form of the state at large. Thus, René’s disobedience was in a sense double treason. Ayrault even used the term lèse-
majesté explicitly to characterize the deed. René disavowed paternal authority, and he rejected the model and foundation responsible for the stability of the French state. More importantly, his insubordination was symbolic of the Society’s aspirations and the inherent problems with reformist and counter-reformist initiatives, which led to tension and civil war.

Once again, it appears that Ayrault drew inspiration from Jean Bodin on this point. Bodin argues that reciprocal obligation does not necessitate reciprocal denial: “A father is bound to educate and instruct his children, especially in the fear of God. But if he fails his duty, the son is not excused his.” Regardless of prescription, children still pose a threat to the state through disorder in the family: “For children who stand in little awe of their parents, and have even less fear of the wrath of God, readily set at defiance the authority of magistrates, who in any case are chiefly occupied with the habitual criminal. It is therefore impossible that a commonwealth should prosper while the families which are at its foundation are ill-regulated.” Bodin goes a step further by suggesting that the state of paternal authority was at a dangerous low in his own time: “Nowadays, fathers having been deprived of their paternal authority, and any claim to property acquired by their children, it is even suggested that the son can defend himself and resist by force any unjust attempt at coercion on the part of his father.” Perhaps Bodin was using this chain of ideas to attribute some contemporary societal problems (religious civil war) to a breakdown in the former or necessary authority of father figures (excluding the clergy and especially the pope).

Moreover, Julie Hardwick argues that gender roles influenced power relations within the state. She argues that “ways of thinking about gender…illuminated and signified relations

37 Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 56-57.
38 Bodin, Commonwealth, book 1, chapter 2-5, p. 13.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
of power of all kinds.”^41 She continues this argument by stating that the comparable relationship between fathers and family and rulers and kingdom “became a central representation of and justification for royal authority,” and patriarchal authority was linked to social stability.\(^42\) While she focused primarily on notarial families, her ideas are nevertheless interesting. Paternal authority seems to have been the basis for law and order, which would help to explain why authority within the family appeared to have semiautonomous characteristics. It also reveals why the idea of insubordination to paternal authority became such a preoccupation. The idea of insubordination was applicable to many different ideologies of paternal authority, including those with familial, religious, political, and legal meanings.\(^43\)

Ayrault builds on these ideas of the importance of paternal authority in order to give fathers a place of privilege and prestige in the social hierarchy. In so doing, he allows his Gallican views to shape his commentary: “The oldest Senators, the magistrates, and the high priests had been able to do nothing in her place.”\(^44\) (“She” refers to Veturia mother of Coriolan who led troops against the state; only she was able to convince him to stop). This passage is remarkable because Ayrault neatly places parental authority above that of both secular and ecclesiastical authorities. Furthermore, it suggests that such authority restrains youthful ambition and confines the forces of anarchy and chaos.\(^45\) Such an argument is all the more resonant in light of the religious civil wars and League rebellions. It was the family and not the legal system or the Church which preserved stability and held society together. Parental authority and family values were the foundation on which other authorities operated.

\(^{41}\) Hardwick, *Practice of Patriarchy*, x.
\(^{42}\) Ibid., xi.
\(^{43}\) See Griffiths, *Youth and Authority*.
\(^{45}\) See Paul Griffiths, *Youth and Authority*. 
It follows that Ayrault argued extensively that disobedient children were a menace not only to the family but to society as well. In so doing Ayrault made use of his favorite Old Testament authority, Moses:

‘When a man has an arrogant and rebellious child, who does not obey the voice of his father and mother, and when they have chastised him and his does not want to hear them, then the father and mother will take him and lead him to the elders of the city and will tell them: this son of ours is perverse and rebellious, and does not want to obey our voices...All the men of the city will throw stones at him and he will die.’ Are those crimes only crimes to the father and mother?46

Ayrault quotes this passage from Deuteronomy47 to characterize a disobedient child as “perverse and rebellious” but then adds that this “crime” concerns all of society. Ayrault then expands upon this idea, apparently drawing inspiration from Bodin, to suggest that the stability of the state relies on strong paternal authority:

He who wants therefore to maintain a State well, to rule it well, and to govern it well; he who desires to banish from it so many crimes, so many insolences, and so much luxuriousness, establishes straightway domestic police and discipline. Men and women manage from there and will come to habituate themselves in public, channeled to obedience, modesty, and plied and accommodated to live there sweetly and happily. Laxity and slackening: you will only see murders in the Republic [Commonwealth], bawdiness, superfluities, rebellions, and seditions.48

These two passages suggest that rebellion is a persistent insolence toward any authority and so concerns all. This authority could be the “government” of the family proper, but it could easily be applied to a state (a kingdom or otherwise). Quarta claims that Ayrault advocates a

46 ‘Quand un homme aura un enfant arrogant & rebelle, lequel n’obeisse point à la voix de son pere ny de sa mere, & quand ils l’auront chastisé, il ne les vueille ouir: lors le pere & la mere le prendront & le meneront aux anciens de la Cité, & leur diront: Ce nostre fils est pervers & rebelle, & ne veut obeir à nostre voix...Tous les hommes de la Cité le lapideront, & moura.’ Ne sont-ce pas là crimes qui ne sont crimes qu’au pere & à la mere? crimes domestiques, crimes cendriers?” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 21-22.
48 “Qui veut donc bien maintenir un Estat, le nien regir, & bien gouverner: qui desire en bannir tant de crimes, tant d’insolences, & tant de luxe: establest estroictement la police & discipline domestique. Les hommes et femmes desmenageront de là, & se viendront habituer en public, duits à obeissance, tous modestes, tous pliez & accommodez pour y vivre doucement & heureusement. La lache, & la detende: vous ne voirez que meurtres en la Republique, que paillardises, que superfluitez, que rebellions & seditions.” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 30-1.
decentralization of power, ensuring collective stability by preserving particular authority.⁴⁹ When the parents led the child before a tribunal, it reinforced this “domestic crime” as a concurrent a crime against the state. Ayrault also affirms the punishment for rapt by linking it to this ancient punishment, which was a form of communal retribution, being performed by “all the men of the city.” Disobedience to parents was therefore subversive to the state and dangerous. The converse was also true; domestic discipline transferred to an orderly society. In other words, disobedience to parents was the source of all of society’s ills. Ayrault established the family, which also served as a sort of policing force, as the model for a state. Crimes and insolence in the family created instability in the state, but family authority trained good subjects.

It follows that Ayrault makes a serious accusation against the Jesuits. If the Jesuits encouraged children to defy paternal authority, they were, by extension, encouraging treason, which only confirmed circulating rumors of their role as Spanish agents. Pasquier also accused the Society of treasonous activities and of trying to subvert the French state. Their Spanish origins and Romanist loyalties suggested conspiracy of the highest degree. They were “Spanish spies” (d’espies Espagnoles) and “sworn enemies of France” (ennemis jurez de la France).⁵⁰ Their international operations and their lack of commitment to any state or authority except the pope (“that wicked vow”⁵¹) rendered them especially threatening to the Gallican church and the stability of the French state.

In fact, Pasquier dedicated an entire book of another work to Jesuit political involvements. He accused them of masterminding not one, but two assassination attempts.

⁴⁹ Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin, 31.
against the French king, the father of the French state and legal system: “yet without doubt they have made profession of, & taken glory in, the murther of Kings and soveraigne Princes.” He argues that the Jesuits instigated Pierre Barrier and Jean Chastell (one of their students) to attempt parricide against Henry IV on two separate occasions, for “the trade of murthering was lodged within their Colledges” and “al their Lectures and Sermons, tend to no other but bloodshed, exhorting men to murther.” Pasquier does not stop there. He continues to suggest that the Jesuits are heretics because they “hath maintained, that it is lawfull for subjects to kill the Tyrant, and to expell a misbeleeving Prince out of his Realme: as if the people could or should give la wes unto their King, whom God hath given them to be their soveraigne Magistrate.” He suggests that they defy God’s will in trying to affect political control and then explicitly links king to father:

Yet ought not a King abuse his power, but know that he is a father, not to provoke his subjects, his children…for if he do, God the father of Fathers, & king of Kings, wil (when he least thinks of it) dart his vengeance against him…To conclude, seeing that thou Jesuit, yeeldest a blind obedience to thy superiors, who are but thy adopted Lords, thou owest it in greater measure a hundred-fold unto thy King, thy true, lawfull, naturall Lord, & father.

Thus, the Jesuits have misplaced their blind obedience and actually disobey the one who should be their most important Father. Pasquier does “redeem” the Jesuits in part of this book by claiming:

[T]hat their harts are Spanish, I utterly deny. It proceeded not of any especiall devotion, which they had to the late King of Spayne, more then to any other Prince, but for that (following the course of the Jesuits, who measure the right and justice of a cause, by the advantage of theyr owne affaires) they devote themselves usually to him, whom they suppose to have the strongest partie, and from whom they stand in expectation of greatest commonditie, which is no small secret in matters of state, for them which in their harts stand neutrall, & indifferent.
It is doubtful that the Jesuits would have found this to be much consolation. Instead of being Spanish agents, they were neutral and had no allegiance at all. Theoretically, this was exactly what they wanted for the international service of Catholicism above secular concerns, but the suggestion that this neutrality followed from a selfish expectation of reward thoroughly undermined their noble intentions. In fact, it seems that as much as Pasquier and others wanted the Jesuits to stay out of political affairs, they feared this neutrality because it could lead them into unforeseen or undesirable allegiances due to their lack of loyalty or commitment. Neutrality was a dangerous thing to negotiate.

A. Lynn Martin’s research on the Jesuits is insightful in this regard. The relation between the Society of Jesus and France was extraordinarily complex. First of all, Martin argues that “Oddly enough, the Huguenot threat was a fortunate situation as far as the Society’s mission to France was concerned. Had it been otherwise, Jesuits would have probably not been permitted to work in the kingdom. The rights of the Gallican Church in opposition to papal supremacy were ardently championed by the University, the Parlement, and the Bishop of Paris.”56 Furthermore, he argues that “a man with ability, given a humanist education, sent out in the world to lead a life of active Christian service, and urged to court ecclesiastical and secular rulers would stand a good chance of becoming involved in political affairs.”57

More importantly, Martin makes a distinction between the individual and the collective: the Society tried to remain apolitical, but there were individual Jesuits who took

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57 Ibid., 22.
initiatives and became involved in matters of state. It was these individuals that earned the Society an especially bad reputation. Emond Auger received criticism from fellow Jesuits for making excuses to avoid obeying the general’s orders and for involving himself in court politics. He accompanied Henry, duke of Anjou, as army chaplain on campaign against Protestant forces, and when Henry became King Henry III of France (he was king of Poland for a little while), Auger eventually became court confessor. After awhile, he even opposed adopting the decrees of the Council of Trent in France! Needless to say, those Jesuits who supported the Catholic League, especially in Paris, where factionalism was particularly strong, had a difficult time maintaining an apostolic community of love. Other Jesuits operated under aliases for their covert missions, which included trips to Rome without informing the general. For example, Henri Samier also went by Jacques La Rue and Hieronymo Martelli, Robert Persons went by Richard Melino, and Claude Matthieu (fierce rival of Auger) went by the number 120. General Aquaviva, however, took an ambiguous role in his views about political involvements. Thus, Henry III, upon hearing of Jesuit involvement in assassination attempts in England and League operations, regarded assurances from the general that the Society strictly opposed political involvement with the utmost suspicion and even perhaps defensive hostility.

It follows that Ayrault constructed his argument about the Jesuit threat very methodically: “If the Council is above the Pope, the Estates above the Prince, if the popular government is more free, if diverse religions have to be suffered…their conclusion, their catastrophe would be as soon schisms, seditions, civil wars….For he who has once placed in doubt the reverence and obedience that the son owes…he who once [tamed] Nature,

59 Martin, Henry III.
engenders in the end scorn, riots, parricides.” Ayrault offers several layers of interpretation and meaning in this quote. At a more obvious level, he seems to suggest that a representative or popular form of government leads to disunity and ultimately, violence within a state. This viewpoint is not necessarily unusual considering his advocacy of state stability and an authoritative, centralized governing force realized in the monarchy. As a royal judge, he staunchly defended royal jurisdiction and prerogative. He even advocated a *raison d’état* which permitted princes to operate outside of the law as means of ensuring the well-being of state and subjects. But Ayrault, also as a condition of his profession, was very procedure oriented. He was careful to outline such *raison d’état* within a framework of an ideal form of justice based on proper trial procedure and defendant rights. Only under the most extreme circumstances could a legitimate prince dispatch with an individual without hearing a defense of some sort. He even went so far as to define what precisely he meant by legitimate:

> We can infer that if an occasion ever presents itself by which to close and terminate due process, that it is necessary that five points concur together. The first, that those who would use that power are legitimate and natural Princes; the second, that those against whom one would make use of it are subjects; the third, that they are guilty of not just any crime but of the crime of lèse-majesté against the highest leader; the fourth, that they are nevertheless so powerful, pose such a risk, and the affairs be in such a state that Justice cannot do anything about it otherwise without extreme peril and danger to the Prince and the Republic; the last, that after the execution, one tries the cadaver or the memory, and then some of the accomplices and allies of the least estate, by the issue and event of which the machinations and enterprises of those who would have been the first punished, are entirely and undoubtedly discovered.

60 “Si le Concile est pardessus le Pape: les Estats pardessus le Prince: si le gouvernement Populaire est plus libre: si diverses Religions se doivent souffrir…Leur conclusion, leur catastrophe, ce seroit aussi tost schismes, seditions, guerres civiles….Car qui a une fois mis en doute la reverence & obeissance que doit le fils…qui a entamé une fois la Nature, il engendre à la fin des mespris, des riottes, des parricides.” Ayrault, *Puissance Paternelle*, 33-4.


62 “Nous pouvons inferer que s’il se presente jamais occasion de commancer par où se doit clorre et terminer l’ordre Judiciaire, qu’il est nécessaire que cinq poincts concurent ensemble. Le premier, que ceux qui useroyent de telle puissance, fussent Princes legittimes & naturels: le second que ceux à l’encontre desquels on en useroit, fussent sujets: le troisieme, qu’ils fussent coupables non de tout crime, mais de crime de lese majesté au premier chef: le quartriesme, qu’ils fussent neantmoins tels, si puissans, si factieux, & les affaires en tel estat, que la Justice ne s’en peut faire autrement sans le peril & danger extreme du Prince ou de la Republique: le dernier, qu’apres l’execution on fist le process au cadaver ou à la memoire, & puis encore à quelques uns des complices & aliez de moindre estat, par l’issue & evenement duquel les machinations & enterprises de ceux qui
Thus, even those assassinated should be ensured their eventual due process according to Ayrault.

Ayrault also suggests that the family is the model by which other relationships are constructed and understood. A child’s disobedience translates to instability, rebellion, and parricide in both literal and figurative terms. Furthermore, while “diverse religions” almost certainly referred to Protestants, it may very easily refer to the Jesuits too, whom Pasquier accused outright of encouraging schisms: “[N]ourishing them among us is to introduce a schism.”63 The Jesuits, according to Ayrault, constituted a major threat to the interests of the state whether against the stabilizing force of the family or defensive strategies in international relations, not to mention the Gallican Church.

Ayrault definitely exploits Gallican fears by ensuring that the international threat is realized:

Fear of the authority of one [father] and the charity of the other [mother], hindered you from resolving anything there without their wish, you have fled their presence, you have hidden yourself and sped from them three years, without doing them the honor of writing them a single letter, without telling them where you are, if it is in France or in Spain. You are afraid that your mother...says to you these words:...will your brothers who are little serve me? what assurance will I have that the will not play me such turn as you? they have the example of their oldest.64

Ayrault seems to make a more personal appeal here: three years of silence, not knowing René’s state of health or even if he is in the same country, and speculation that he is in Spain, arch-rival of France. It is interesting that Ayrault resort to a plea from René’s mother as a

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63 “[L]es nourrissans au milieu de nous, c’estoit y introduire un schisme...” Pasquier, “De la Secte des Jesuites,” 324.
64 “De peur que l’auctorité de l’un, & la charité de l’autre, vous empeschast d’y rien resoudre sans leur vouloir, vous avez fuy leur presence: vous vous estes caché & celé d’eux trois ans sont, sans que vous leur ayez fait cest honneur de leur escrire une seule lettre: sans que vous leur ayez faict entendre ou vous estes: si c’est en France, ou en Espagne. Vous aviez peur que vostre mere (que vous appelliez, Hortensia) vous dist ces mots: Dieu ayant fait sa volonté de vostre pere, que me serviront voz freres qui sont petits? quelle assurance auray-je d’eux qu’ils ne me jouent tel tour que vous? ils auront l’exemple de leur ainsé.” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 67-68.
mode of persuasion. He falls back on the deeper bonds that ideally developed between a mother, as primary caregiver in infancy, and son. This passage reveals that Ayrault had other sons but also the anxiety that such an example/precedent would set. There were cases of a chain of sons joining religious orders without parental consent. The explicit naming of the Jesuits and Spain creates the link to the international loyalties and the threat that they posed.

Ayrault’s explicit naming of Gallicanism cinches the allusion: “There is so much, to be brief, that in a foreign Empire, from which laws do not hold and obligate us, I oppose to you those of our kings, the decretales of the Gallican Church, the consent of the Estates of France, and the rulings of our sovereign courts. Charlemagne made several laws touching the Church and made them...from the consent of the prelates of the Gallican Church.” Ayrault expounds Gallican ideals, which incidentally stand in opposition to “foreign empires” with which the Jesuits are connected, possibly including the Holy Roman Empire, Spain or “Rome” (i.e. the Roman Catholic Church). The Jesuits and their nonallegiance to any one government except the Roman Church caused suspicion among robins. They had been accused of conspiring to overthrow monarchs in England and even France. Then, of recent memory, there was the conflict between Pope Julius II and the French state (Louis XII) where the pope was making deals with foreign powers to depose and replace the king of France. It perhaps seems strange that the Society was held under suspicion for its nonallegiance but then simultaneously accused of being Spanish agents. This apparent contradiction is due primarily to their special vow of obedience to the papacy, the nationality of their generals (Spanish or

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Spanish subjects), 68 the international character of Catholicism, and the recent hostility of the papacy to France, leading to special alliances with Spain.

René allied himself with the enemy. Ayrault takes advantage of these concerns about foreign infiltrations and allegiances in order to strengthen his case against the Jesuits. He claims that they are opposed to and actively work against French values and interests and are therefore dangerous to the French state. Moreover, the Jesuits were not only working to undermine paternal authority, which also translates to undermining the authority of the king over his subjects/children, but they were also recruiting and converting children to foreign powers. The robins extended fear of the mysterious order to their own grievances. Thus, robin values are a major issue in the attacks against the Jesuits.

**Politiques**

It is important to remember that while there were strong polarizing forces within French society, especially with regard to religion, these forces also encountered strong resistance. While religion and politics were tightly intertwined, there were efforts to limit these polarizing forces within politics. This is not to say that political masterminds sought a separation of religion and politics altogether but rather a separation of Church, as the institution, and state, and a compromise of coexistence to promote stability and prevent bloodshed. In other words, there were those who recognized that the polarizing forces within France left it vulnerable to foreign invasion, and there were some who even went so far as to accuse foreign powers of fanning the flames of strife on French soil.

Those who usually sought these compromises received what became the derogatory label “politique” and were usually identified with royalist allegiances, Gallicanism, and for

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some as being *moyenneurs* (similar connotation to “neutral”). They were also associated with Machiavelli’s prince archetype. Pierre Ayrault was a staunch royalist and a loyal Gallican. While there are no references to his having received the label “*politique,*” his allegiances during the time of the Catholic League probably would have earned it.

However, the concept of *politique,* which may be roughly described as doing or encouraging what is necessary to ensure one’s political status, came to be a word that propagandists liked to throw around almost as much as heresy. For example, the Guise family, who basically controlled the Catholic League and thus the radical Catholic faction, also received the title “*politique.*” Even Ayrault was not shy about suggesting that Leaguers operated on political ambitions rather than purely religious motives:

> But that the Roman Apostolic and Catholic Church was and are still the tool of this sacrilege and public parricide, of this Guisard rebellion and felony, what can one say of it?...It’s the College of Cardinals, it’s the pope, who undertook to damn and excommunicate for that alone that he [Henry III] dared to defend himself by all means against his traitors and disloyal (faithless) subjects, for that alone that he dared to chastise them and to use the blade of justice which he has from God not them.

He also levels this charge at the papacy and the Jesuits.

The Jesuits posed numerous threats. They were not merely kidnapping and corrupting children for the sake of undermining paternal authority and toppling the French state. The distinct impression that arises from the sources is that beneath the rhetoric, authors like Ayrault and Pasquier felt that the Jesuits were meddling where they had no business. If they were to be considered papal agents, then this accusation of meddling included the pope as well. The Gallican sense of autonomy in relation to Rome meant that they did not want help

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71 “Mais que l’Eglise Catholique, Apostolique & Romaine ait esté. & soit encores l’outil de ce sacrilege & parricide public: de ceste rebellion & felonnie Guysarde: qu’en peut on dire?...C’est le College des Cardinaux, c’est le Pape, qui a entrepris de le damner & excommunier, pour cela seul, qu’il a osé se defender par tous moiens contre ses trahistes & infidels subjets: pour cela seul qu’il a osé les chastier, & user de juste glaive qu’il a de Dieu, non pas eux.” Ayrault, *Deploration*, 5 and 6-7.
or intervention. In fact the Jesuits exacerbated polarizing tendencies by stepping on toes. In other words, they made matters worse by inciting Protestants to action in an effort to counteract them. Gallicans were perfectly happy to sort out their contentions with the Protestants on their own while hopefully holding the state together. This is not to say that Gallicans approved of Protestantism or even that they had reforming tendencies. To the contrary, Protestants were not viewed as passive agents in the ensuing chaos. However, accusations of corruption did undermine the Church’s credibility, adding another justification to Gallican initiative. Examining various modes of criticism against the Jesuits is crucial to understanding Ayrault’s nuanced hostility toward the Society in his Gallican construction of paternal authority, for religious and political conflicts were not separated from paternal concerns.

Martin sees accusations of corruption as an important motivator for Jesuit activity, trying to combat Protestant arguments, which stepped on toes: “Another reason for the unfriendly relations between the Jesuits and some of the clergy was Jesuit criticism of clerical abuses and ignorance. To a certain extent this criticism explains Jesuit interference with the rights and prerogatives of other clergy….Too often Jesuits behaved as if abuses existed in all the clergy rather than just in some, and in consequence they considered the Society to be the only source of help to many areas seriously affected by heresy.” 72 Ayrault and Pasquier capitalized on the wounded egos and hostility of the French clergy to add an extra bite to their arguments. In this way, jurisdictional conflicts within the ecclesiastical hierarchy itself translated to other jurisdictional conflicts such as those in the legal or perhaps educational system.

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72 Martin, Jesuit Mind, 208.
Moreover, the Society’s sense of its mission is crucial for understanding its activities in France and the ensuing hostility, for “Jesuits had difficulty distinguishing between the honor and glory of God and the honor and glory of the Society.” Martin argues that this failed distinction developed out of a “concern for the Society’s honor” which “is to a certain extent understandable, for the order was a new one and Jesuits were justifiably anxious about its image and its reputation. Another factor that helps explain this concern is the tendency to identify the good of the Society with the glory of God.” Martin continues: “Perhaps this identification of the Society with the divinity at least partially explains the tendency for some Jesuits to adopt means of questionable integrity to achieve the Society’s ends, as if the Society’s mission placed it above morality. The correspondence yields no horrendous deeds, no murders or abductions perpetrated to advance the cause of Catholicism or the power of the Society, just various sneaky misdemeanors.” It is doubtful that Ayrault, Pasquier, and others would have agreed.

The Society’s concern for its reputation created an interesting contradiction, for if people know nothing else about Ayrault, they almost assuredly know that his son’s joining their order was a huge scandal. However, Martin argues that “The term that probably best describes the nature of Jesuit relations with the elite of French society is obsequious….Especially during the early years of the French mission, when the Society had a tenuous existence in France, Jesuits came to their patrons cap in hand, head bowed, begging (even fawning) for support and favors.” Martin fails to acknowledge the problem, by attributing complaints against the Jesuits to bad reputation or their sense of mission. He only mentions Ayrault in the context of the conflicted attitudes of the Jesuits toward parental

Martin, Jesuit Mind, 122.
Ibid., 121-2.
Ibid., 122.
Ibid., 204.
While Martin’s study of Jesuit involvement in France is particularly insightful about what the Jesuits thought they were doing, this balance between the sense of mission and the obsession over reputation merits further study. Where did they draw the line? The answer seems to be imbedded somewhere in Ayrault’s case and others like it.78

The Jesuits, despite the merit of Martin’s study, seemed to have earned part of their reputation, at least from a robin perspective. Money appears to be a particular point of contention: “Evidence indicates that money flowed from Jesuits and Jesuit institutions in France to their superiors in Rome rather than vice versa.”79 A Gallican nightmare scenario envisioned sending French money (extracted from an already cash-strapped state80) to Rome, supporting papal campaigns which often included anti-French offensives. Pasquier, in particular, borrows this concern when he suggests that the Jesuits target wealthy heirs to usurp their inheritances. It is interesting to note, then, as Martin argues, that “Jesuits were somewhat limited in the means at their disposal to acquire money to meet both ordinary and extraordinary expenses….but the only other source of income to which the Society had repeated recourse was the patrimonies of individual Jesuits.”81 He continues, stating: “William Creichton attempted to obtain the small inheritance of one novice without his knowledge, even though Creichton doubted that the novice would persevere in the Society….These examples reveal that, to achieve the Jesuit strategy for France, the ends could

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77 Martin, Jesuit Mind, 188.
78 Diefendorf presents the controversy of Pierre Coton as parallel to that of René Ayrault. His father opposed his joining the Jesuits as well, but Coton’s Jesuit biographer notes that his father eventually, if reluctantly, consented or at least gave up his appeal against the Jesuits. This book provides a Jesuit perspective to “clandestine” religious vocation and, taken with caution, gives insight into René’s recruitment. See Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children;” and J. M. Prat, S. J., Recherches Historiques et Critiques sur la Compagnie de Jésus en France du Temps de Pierre Coton, 1564-1626, 5 vols. (Lyon: Briday Libraire-Éditeur, 1876), vol. 1 is most relevant.
79 Martin, Jesuit Mind, 150.
81 Martin, Jesuit Mind, 151.
sometimes justify the means.” 82 Suddenly robin concerns about preserving a family’s property do not seem to have been so paranoid (see Chapter One). Such funds were not only removed from the family, but were diverted to a mysterious international organization with allegiances to Rome and ties with other Catholic powers. The more personal familial concerns mingled with political ones and raised questions of allegiance and investment within local communities. As we shall see in Chapter Three, failure to honor local hierarchies not only offended the local clergy but also rendered their operations suspicious to local elites.

Papal operations were of course another major point of contention. Martin’s argument is particularly strong: “While ecclesiastical and secular rulers throughout Catholic Europe clamored for the services of Jesuits, one ruler need not clamor but simply command. Jesuits took a special vow of obedience to the pope. This vow could almost be regarded as the Pandora’s box of the Society’s involvement in politics.” 83 “Pandora’s box” is no understatement, for “[t]he successes achieved by Catholicism during this period were largely due to the vigor and militancy of these three popes” 84 For France alone, Pius V sent a papal army to France; Gregory XIII celebrated the news of the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre with a Te Deum and gave encouragement to the Catholic League; Sixtus V promised Philip II support for the Armada (important because it meant papal support of Spanish imperialism), the Duke of Savoy was encouraged to attack Geneva, and Henry of Navarre was excommunicated. 85 Furthermore, as Martin suggests, Jesuits undertook missions for secular leaders as well: “Of course many of these mission [sic] were strictly concerned with spiritual matters. Others were more political in nature. However, the important thing to remember is that in the sixteenth century, the century of cuius regio, eius religio, it was oftentimes

82 Martin, Jesuit Mind, 123.
83 Martin, Henry III, 22-3.
84 Ibid., 23.
85 Ibid.
exceedingly difficult to make a distinction between the spiritual and the political, the affairs of Church and the affairs of state.”86 Suddenly, royalist and Gallican fears do not seem to have been so paranoid either.

Many competing forces threatened to tear France apart in the sixteenth century. The nobility was still trying to preserve its rights and privileges at the expense of the monarchy and the new bureaucratic class to which Ayrault belonged. Towns were also trying to maintain a measure of autonomy from the royal government and judicial system.87 The violence and instability of the religious wars often resulted as much from political and legal ambitions as it did from religious ideology and fanaticism. Under the guise of moral and religious obligation, factional rivalries ran their brutal course, especially between the Guise family and the king himself, culminating in the rebellion of the Catholic League and the king’s forced flight from Paris, shortly before his assassination in 1589.

At the same time, the king’s authority was being equated with paternal authority. This meant that the king had a responsibility to protect and provide for his kingdom and to serve the interests of his children. It also meant that subjects owed him a sacred obedience. Thus, regicide was parricide and sacrilege. Furthermore, Robert Muchembled has rightly argued that the sacralisation of justice and the connection to paternal authority was a means by which the monarchy could monopolize the judicial system. This meant that the construction of the greatest secular authority held important implications for paternal authority by making the father figure into a crucial agent in the preservation of order. Muchembled argues further that the monarchy cultivated and exploited the fear of strangers, foreigners, and outsiders at the

expense of local governments in order to extract obedience. The cultivation of fear perhaps transferred neatly through legal theorists like Ayrault to create animosity toward the Jesuits, who threatened to unravel the pattern.

Jurisdictional conflicts almost defined the legal system during the sixteenth century. Not only were there conflicts between royal and regional jurisdictions but also between secular and ecclesiastical ones. The monarchy was still trying to consolidate its power at this time. The Catholic Church was recovering from the Protestant Reformation with new vigor after the Counter-Reformation around the middle of the century. The monarchy tried to distance itself from the ultramontanist papacy while still remaining within the Catholic faith. It encouraged an idea of Gallicanism which promoted the ancient rights and privileges of the Franco-Gallican Church. In so doing, the king emerged with a greater role as protector of this institution and had more influence over the distinction between royal and ecclesiastical jurisdictions.

At the same time, the monarchy wavered in its policy toward the new religions. Competing religious ideologies impeded the stability of the French state because France was a Catholic nation with a strong Protestant minority, especially in the south. The monarchy—especially under Henry III (former leader in Catholic attempts to expel Protestants) and his mother Catherine de Medicis—avoided sympathizing with them but likewise avoided systematic, definitive, and violent persecution of them either.

Meanwhile, the papacy, which was reputed to involve itself in stately affairs and the overthrow and replacement of rulers, still constituted a threat to French sovereignty. The most disconcerting group by far was the Society of Jesus which was mobile and overtly loyal to the pope alone. Thus jurisdictional conflicts over clandestine marriage—and religious

89 Salmon, *Society in Crisis.*
vows by association—led to attempts by both parties to define, outline, and distinguish between spiritual and temporal duties and responsibilities. Depending on how well France stood in international relations and in defense against foreign powers, especially in what concerned Spain, the king could, and frequently did, maintain an ambiguous policy or change his mind in such conflicts to what suited him.\textsuperscript{90} For example, Donald R. Kelley has argued that Henry II’s coolness toward Rome prompted Charles Dumoulin to write his sensational Gallican “classic” \textit{Commentary on the Edict of Henry II against the Little Dates and Abuses of the Court of Rome} in 1550, but that the king’s fear of schism removed the favor that Dumoulin had enjoyed and made him a scapegoat of anti-Protestant sentiment.\textsuperscript{91}

\textit{Conclusion}

France underwent a political and religious crisis in the sixteenth century. Political propaganda circulating during the dominance of the League divided opinions about government and the institution of monarchical authority. On the one hand, royalists asserted the supremacy of law and custom in determining who would reign as king; on the other, League supporters promoted Catholic identity as the superior qualification for a monarch. The first camp promoted the Salic Law against the League’s proposition to elect the Infanta of Spain as queen of France, although Gallican patriotism within the radical Catholic faction itself undermined this campaign. Nevertheless, law and religion collided at politics.\textsuperscript{92} These conflicts disturbed and affected Ayrault. His treatise on paternal power and his unabashedly anti-Leaguer pamphlet (\textit{Deploration}) reveal royalist, Gallican, and \textit{robin} concerns inseparable


\textsuperscript{91} Kelley, \textit{Foundations}, see chapter 6.

from paternal ones in addition to demonstrating a more profound significance for the otherwise superficiality of one youth’s disappearance.

Ayrault significantly established paternal power as a political entity. Obedience in the family was the model that promoted the stability of the French state. Therefore, Ayrault connected defiance of paternal will to rebellion against the state as a whole. As constructions of paternal authority became linked to monarchical authority, they became entwined in Gallican concerns. Conceptualizing the highest secular authority in this manner was a feeble attempt to recover _une loi, un roi, une foi_ ideology which was quickly dissolving. Boosting paternal authority should have served the interest of both types of fathers.
Chapter Three: Une foi

This notwithstanding, these holy Fathers would not deliver the youth againe, so that the poore Father was faine to comfort himselfe, first with his teares, and then with his penne, by writing and printing a booke of the power of a Father, wherein he shewed, that it was impudently to abuse the holy Scripture, to take them rawlie, according to the Letter onely, as the Jesuits did, to the disadvantage of Fathers. He spake like an honest & worthy man, as hee that felt no small griefe, for the stealing away of his sonne. I will speake without passion, & say, that it is a hard thing, that the child should enter into orders of religion, against the will of his Father and Mother, of whom himselfe is a good part. And yet I think it not onely excusable, but commendable, when being of a competent age, a man betakes himselfe to a Monasterie, though his Father and mother consent not to it: but when these things are carried by the crafty conveyance of Munks, the matter deserves extraordinarie punishment.¹

In this passage, Étienne Pasquier summarizes Pierre Ayrault’s predicament eloquently and succinctly. At the same time, the pathos of this account, equally exemplifies Pasquier’s flair for the dramatic. Pasquier paints the picture of a father whose grief prompted him to write a book on paternal power—the tears invite sympathy for the presumed despair of a father hopelessly separated from the company of his child, perhaps forever. In this book, provoked by the “crafty conveyance of Munks” (rapt),² the desolate father explains that the deed was flawed on religious grounds, “abusing” and misinterpreting scripture “to the disadvantage of Fathers.” Having already examined Ayrault’s legal and political understanding of paternal authority, this chapter will delve into Ayrault’s complex religious understanding of his son’s disappearance, which he used to undermine his son’s supposed spiritual motives. He attempts to show that René’s religious vocation was as flawed spiritually as legally, and as dangerous religiously as politically.

It is important to understand the pervasive idea of the sacred authority of fathers during the sixteenth century, which developed over a long history and continued well beyond

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² Conveyance can mean “taking away secretly” and a “transfer of property,” which implies that the son is family property.
the period of this study. Sabine Melchior-Bonnet argues that in early modern ideology parents shared a complementary function: “The specialization of tasks—to women the cares of the body, to fathers the care of the soul—established nevertheless a sharing of responsibilities.” Fathers possessed a sacred and customary authority, but this privilege took on a sacred responsibility around the sixteenth century—a profoundly significant responsibility given the heightened sensitivity to heterodoxy following the Reformations. Almost simultaneously to the development of a new concept of sacred duties, the Church tried to remove a form of idolatry in the father/son relationship, exhorting, according to Odile Robert, a “biological father to assume his paternity remembering that his children, entrusted to him in deposit, have other fathers and above another Father…” While these ideas of sacred responsibility and multiple fathers, with varying levels of primacy, were part of sixteenth-century Catholic reformed policy as outlined at the Council of Trent, it is equally important to note for France that Robert relied heavily on sermons of the Jesuits, who were as popular in radical Catholic circles as they were the objects of fierce criticism, fear, suspicion, and hatred in more traditional Gallican circles.

Defining the spiritual component of fatherhood during the sixteenth century proves difficult because of the varying and often contradictory conceptions of the father’s exact role within the family. The only role that the competing ideologies seemed to be able to agree upon was a fundamentally biological role. Beyond that, concepts of fatherhood clashed. Although Catholics and Protestants sacralized the Decalogue and emphasized the importance

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4 Odile Robert, “Porter le nom,” in Histoire des Pères et de la Paternité, ed. Jean Delumeau and Daniel Roche (Paris: Larousse, 1990), 151. Robert’s study focuses on the seventeenth century, but Melchior-Bonnet addresses the same passage of Paul (Éphésiens, V, 22) alluding to the idea that the child is a “deposit,” which she argues that contemporaries used to link fathers and sons as sinners and therefore bring fathers to humility. The apparent shift in interpretation probably resulted from the Council of Trent and the different occupations of the interpreters. Melchior-Bonnet, “De Gerson à Montaigne,” 61.
of filial obedience, they disagreed about the proper extent of this obedience. Robert argues that papal policy tended to limit the authority of the father, who shared paternal responsibilities with godparents and priests and was ultimately subject to God the Father.\(^5\) Carbonnier-Burkard maintains that Protestants tended to assert more forcefully the prerogatives of fathers because fathers “partially assumed the role of ‘priest’” and because Protestants placed more emphasis on the Ten Commandments.\(^6\) However, Donald R. Kelley asserts that in Protestant circles “the family itself came to be supplanted by a sort of spiritualized domestic community….the most essential step was the transcending of fatherhood – the replacing of one’s natural progenitor…by a more fulfilling source of authority and purpose.” There was a sort of generational split, and the emphasis became one of brotherhood rather than a father/son dynamic.\(^7\) In any case, ecclesiastical prerogatives threatened to spiritually undermine paternal prerogatives during this period. Ayrault attempts to reassert the spiritual nature of paternal authority by demonstrating that reverence to God and reverence to parents are not incompatible; on the contrary he contends, they are inseparable.

Ayrault argues that sacred authority provides a firm basis for the paternal. At the heart of this argument was his accusation that the Jesuits, albeit a religious order, had violated divine law by encouraging his son René to defy his father’s will and clandestinely join the Society. Ayrault utilizes the Ten Commandments in order to prove that divine law established and supported paternal prerogative.\(^8\) He argues that the commandments must be taken as a whole, which he did to combat the Jesuits’ claim that it was permissible to abandon

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\(^5\) Robert, “Porter le nom.”


\(^8\) The placement actually varied and this commandment could appear first on the second tablet, making the commandment of parallel importance to the first.
parents for the Society since God was foremost in reverence. Cristina Quarta explains Ayrault’s preoccupation with the Jesuits’ claim as evidence for his praise of religion, but his assertion that religious institutions are fundamentally fallible because they are human creations.\(^9\) While this argument offers important insight into Ayrault’s frustration with the Society, it neglects Gallican hostility toward the Society of Jesus in particular, which he capitalized on to assert paternal prerogative.

Ayrault’s efforts to reconcile spiritual and familial obligation lead to an equally important component of his religious argument. He suggests that the Jesuits are impious for encouraging his son to break God’s law and criticized the Jesuits for trying to erase rather than merely multiply and transform the father/son structure of authority. At the same time, he uses Pasquier’s suggestion that Ignatius of Loyola was ignorant and a failed theologian to argue that the Jesuits took gross liberties in interpreting scripture. In short, Ayrault contends that the Jesuits led his son astray by selectively and reductively misinterpreting scripture, prompting an elaborate accusation of heresy.

**Piety: The Ten Commandments and Reconciliation**

The idea of piety dually incorporated notions of reverence for both God and father. It derives from the Latin *pietas*, which broadly means a respect for origins and translates roughly as a sense of responsibility or duty, devotion, and loyalty. Ayrault hinted at the concept of piety (although never explicitly using the term) in order to link what he sensed the Jesuits were trying to distinguish. That is, using this concept allowed Ayrault to reconcile an apparent contradiction between religious and familial obligations. In so doing, he claimed that paternal authority contained a sacred or spiritual authority in addition the secular counterpart. Fathers exercised legal rights over their children while at the same time enjoying

divine sanction for their authority. In the treatise, Ayrault appeals to his son by using arguments extracted from three systems of law, namely natural, civil, and canon. Of these, canon law may be further subdivided into divine law (scripture and specifically the commandments) and ecclesiastical law (the Church’s official interpretation of scripture). It is important to distinguish these subdivisions because Ayrault, in certain instances, uses scripture—and the Jesuits as a cover—to negotiate the dangerous waters of dissent toward Catholic Church policy on the taking of vows and so to combat an ecclesiastical prerogative.

From this, obedience (honoring the commandments) becomes pious, which in turn means that parental consent is sacred and that the Jesuits are impious. Ayrault gives his secular case of *rapt* important religious implications as he tries to contradict his son’s religious motives for disobeying his authority.

Ayrault uses the idea of piety to suggest that parents are entitled to reverence similar to that of God because of their status as second gods; that is, reverence due to parents is an aspect of that which is due to God.10 Amidst abundant classical references, he maintains that: “[I]t is a crime against humanity…to be unobliging and ungrateful. Now what obligation is there in the world greater than that which is owed to parents? They are, after God, the second authors of our life and our being.”11 While juxtaposing a suggestion of ingratitude with a suggestion of crime, Ayrault claims that parents are a type of creator or, in this case, “author.” Ayrault continues this line of thought, adding that one of the simplest reasons for honoring the sacred authority of parents is that they too are creators, at least, when it comes to children:

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10 Quarta claims that Ayrault emphasized loving parents “in the same manner and with equal intensity.” *Ayrault e Bodin*, 32.
11 “Toutefois la force & la prerogative de l’aage, donnent auctorite & commandement en tous temps, dit Aristote aux Politiques….Nous sommes obligez naturellement à rendre le bien (si Ulpien est croyable) & c’est crime contre l’humanité (dit Philon) qu’estre inofficieux & ingrat. Or quelle obligation plus grande y a-il au Monde, que celle qui est deuë aux parans? ils sont, apres Dieu, les seconds auteurs de nostre vie & de nostre estre.” Pierre Ayrault, *De La Puissance Paternelle: Contre ceux qui sous couleur de Religion vollen les enfans a leurs peres & mere* (Tours: Jamet Mettayer, 1593), 25.
In the generation of children, God (he said) cooperates with fathers. He supplies the soul, fathers, the body, passions, and affections: consequently, he who despises the one, despises the other, who is certainly the master and principal worker, but not the only. The father and mother...are visible gods, which in generation imitate the one who is neither created nor engendered otherwise. They differ (he said) in one thing: that God created this world, they their children, that God is the universal creator, the father and mother singular and particular.12

Ayrault negotiates a fine line in his argument: he cannot call parents creators without serious hedging because he cannot and does not want to deny God’s primary role in generation. He is, after all, trying in part to convince an ecclesiastic audience. Instead, he describes a cooperative effort. That is, God and fathers “cooperate” in the generation, with each party supplying a part of the whole. He still maintains a distinction between worldly and otherworldly, with fathers supplying the flesh and God supplying the soul.13 He is also careful to acknowledge that God is the “master and principle worker,” and that parents play a role of imitation. Furthermore, he distinguishes the role of creation between God and parental “gods” as that of universal versus particular. That is, God is the creator of everything while parents’ role as creators is limited to their own children. Nonetheless, arguing that reverence and obligation due to God and parents should not or, rather, cannot be differentiated allows Ayrault to dissolve an apparent contradiction between familial and spiritual obligation:


13 Natural philosophers and physicians generally believed that women had no generative power. This idea replaced the Salic Law to justify why women could not hold the crown of France; they could not, it was said, keep a dynasty going. Ayrault seems to follow this line of reasoning, yet it is interesting that he still characterizes mothers as gods too. Ayrault often adds mother or speaks collectively of parents when he discusses paternal authority. It seems to suggest that he includes maternal authority as a subset of paternal authority. For more about women and generative power see Sarah Hanley, “Social Sites of Political Practice in France: Lawsuits, Civil Rights, and the Separation of Powers in Domestic and State Government, 1500-1800,” The American Historical Review 102:1 (Feb., 1997): 27-52, esp. pp. 27-31. Also more in depth see Hanley, “The Monarchic State in Early Modern France: Marital Regime Government and Male Right,” in Politics, Ideology and the Law in Early Modern Europe: Essays in honor of J.H.M. Salmon, ed. Adrianna E. Bakos (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1994), 107-126. For more on Hanley’s interpretation of the Salic Law see Les droits des femmes et la loi salique (Paris: Indigo & côté-femmes, 1994), introduction.
familial obligation becomes a spiritual one. Since God is not in this world, parents move to the top of the worldly hierarchy.

By this same token, Ayrault establishes a chain of piety by emphasizing the visibility of these “creators”: “[I]t is impossible for one to be pious and religious toward the immortal and invisible God if he is impious, unobliging, and disobedient to these second visible gods who touch and handle us.” Ayrault implies that those who cannot obey the “visible gods” will be unable to obey God, who is more abstract, invisible, and intangible. He explicitly states that impiety and disobedience toward parents translate to such offenses toward God Himself. In this sense, disobedience becomes impious both to the parents and to God because reverence to them is an aspect of reverence to Him. From this, Ayrault suggests that René’s defection, although intended to be an act of piety, was in reality an act of impiety.

Ayrault undermines René’s presumed piety further with his interpretation of an episode from the life of St. Gregory, contraposing the actions of a saint to those of his son. First, he draws a parallel between St. Gregory and René because like René, St. Gregory “elected a contemplative and monastic life, against the intention of his father who was destining him his successor.” However, unlike René “[St. Gregory] feared in the end to fall into this crime of disobedience, irreverence, and impiety toward his father” and “returned from the monastery.” This example again underscores the importance of repentance and return discussed earlier. Gregory, in all humility, feared divine retribution and recognized, according to Ayrault, that his actions, while from the best of intentions, were actually contrary

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14 “[I]l est impossible que celuy soit pieux & religious vers le Dieu immortel & invisible, qui est impieux, inoffieux & desobeissant à ces seconds Dieux visibles, qui se touchent & se manient entre nous.” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 28.
15 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin, 28.
16 “jaçoit qu’il se fust retire des affaires de monde (comme lon dit) fuyant l’Evesché, & qu’il eust esleu une vie contemplative & monastique, contre l’intention de son pere qui le destinoit son successeur: il craignit toutefois en fin de tomber en ce crime de desobeissance, d’irreverance & impieté vers son pere. Il retourna de Monastere....” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 17.
to divine will. The issue, then, revolved around a question of piety. Ayrault insists that defying the will of a father makes even a religious vocation impious and irreverent. Thus, by insisting that fathers are objects of veneration, Ayrault tries to convert René's religious fervor back upon himself. He thereby insists that not only is René misguided but his piety is also misplaced.

Ayrault argues, rather, that the Commandments should be the foremost guide for piety and reverence. He invokes the Ten Commandments to remind René that disobedience to one’s parents is a grave infraction. Ayrault even places significance in the ordering of the Commandments, saying that “Moses, which among the precepts and commandments of God, had put from the beginning in the first place and on the first Tablet to love and honor God, begins by this of fathers and mothers, enjoining children to fear, revere, and love them, then said as much of God as if these two who it is necessary to serve and honor are gods in concurrence.”17 Ayrault links the reverence of and obedience to God to the reverence of and obedience to parents by simple textual proximity, emphasizing that the commandment to honor parents is on the first tablet and, further, on the same tablet as those to honor God. It also allows him to support his claim that parents are entitled to reverence and that honoring parents is an aspect of honoring God.18 He explains these ideas further by saying that “to not obey one’s father and mother (whom the proximity of the first Commandments induces to be

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18 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin, 28.
honored as gods) is to sin more grievously than to be an adulterer, a murderer, a thief.” 19
Thus, defying one’s parents was above all other crimes, except those against God directly. If
René, presumably, decided upon a religious vocation to honor God first rather than be
distracted by reverence to parents, he still erred according to Ayrault because by defying his
father he inevitably, if unintentionally, defied God’s law. 20

It is no accident that Ayrault emphasized the Commandments to the degree that he did,
for they had become the centerpiece of spiritual rhetoric by his time. While modern Christian
spirituality may deem this obvious, especially since the Commandments directly address
paternal authority, John Bossy has argued that the Decalogue only returned to its central
position within the Christian catechism in the sixteenth century, replacing the Seven Deadly
Sins. Among the reasons for previous neglect of the Decalogue, Bossy claims, were early
Christians’ attempts to distance themselves from the old law, the relative ease in memorizing
and allegorizing the Seven Sins and administering penance, and the fact that “[a]part from
their brevity, the Sins had the advantage of fitting into, the Commandments the disadvantage
of disrupting, a whole string of septenary classifications: the seven Sacraments, the seven
works of mercy, the seven petitions of the Paternoster, and so on.” 21 Fifteenth-century
theologian Jean Gerson ensured that the Commandments received a greater theological status,
leading to the development of a viable method of teaching them. 22 The most notable element
of this gradual transition, however, was the shift from an emphasis on sins against one’s
neighbors to sins against God. 23 This shift from a communal to a more personal spirituality

19 “[N]’obeïr point à ses peres & meres (que la proximité des premiers Commandemens induict d’estre honorez
comme Dieux) c’est pecher plus griefvement que d’estre adultere, d’estre meurtrier, d’estre larron.” Ayrault,
_Puissance Paternelle_, 58.
20 Quarta, _Ayrault e Bodin_, 28, 30, and 32.
21 John Bossy, “Moral arithmetic: Seven Sins into Ten Commandments,” in _Conscience and Casuistry in Early
22 Ibid., 221-4.
23 Ibid., 217.
helps explain the dominance of the Commandments in Ayrault’s argument because, in spite of other arguments, decline in paternal authority personally affected him, and he constructed his arguments from a personal (father’s) perspective. In addition, the fact that “[t]he Decalogue was truly a law, in a way that the alternative system had not been” helps explain the attraction for Ayrault, himself a man of law. The emphasis on the idea of breaking God’s law helped Ayrault not only assert the authority of parents, but also link reverence to God and to parents. Quarta draws attention to these ideas as well, claiming that Ayrault’s discussion of Jesus reveals the compatibility of spiritual and temporal authority and that it is necessary to love parents in the same manner and intensity as God.

Ayrault finds the proper adherence to the Decalogue in the model of Jesus, arguing that Jesus did not come to undo God’s laws but rather enhanced them by his example, thereby reinterpreting the traditional understanding of New Testament commands to leave family. Ayrault challenges his son to a disputation, which he then carries out one-sidedly: “Christianity (it seems to you) otherwise disposed of the reverence and obedience to which you were required me. Let us see if it is true that Jesus Christ came to trouble Nature, civility and good morals…came to change the commandments of God his father, and by that give example to others to do the same.” Ayrault insists that Jesus did not come to break the authoritative relationship between father and son, which Ayrault links explicitly to Christian law and values. He implies that filial obedience is in accordance with “Nature, civility, and good morals.” Therefore, the controversy as Ayrault sees it is not a question of civil or societal values opposing moral or religious values as others (i.e. the Jesuits) would argue.

25 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin, 28, 30, and 32.
26 “Le Christianisme (ce vous semble-il) a autrement disposé de la reverence & obeissance à laquelle vous m’estiez obligé. Voyons s’il est veritable que Jesus Christ soit venu troubler la Nature, la civilité, les bonnes moeurs…soit venu changer les commandements de Dieu son pere, & par là donner exemple à vous autres d’en faire de mesma.” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 51-52.
27 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin, 32.
because filial obedience is in keeping with both value systems.28 Furthermore and finally, the commandments stand as authoritative and so those who would make the pretension of following Jesus in apostolic service (the Jesuits), must honor them all after the model of Jesus himself.

This Model establishes Himself as Son, thereby reinforcing the father/son relationship. Moreover, in using Jesus as a model of filial obedience, Ayrault negotiates a balance, endorsing obedience to fathers while distinguishing between celestial and terrestrial fathers. Both claim authority, and both are to be recognized as having sacred authority. But even more significantly, Jesus embodies both a sacred and temporal aspect for Ayrault. Jesus is in some ways a terrestrial son, due to his relationship to Mary and Joseph and in others a spiritual son, due to his relationship with God the Father:

[T]his great Doctor [Tertullian], in the book of the trinity, wants to prove against the Heretics that Jesus Christ was not God the Father but God the Son. He said: I came to do the will of my father, not mine. He did it until and in death. He is therefore the Son. What force would this argument have if the son did not depend on the will and discretion of the father? What grandeur and authority would even this name of father, taken and borrowed from what we are (for otherwise God would not be intelligible to us), bring to God if this was only an imaginary name, without propriety or substance?29

Ayrault navigates tricky Trinitarian theology. He uses the distinction between God as Father and God as Son as his model for authority and obedience between fathers and sons. In order for such a model to be intelligible to mere mortals, he states, the dynamic between father and son in this world must have authoritative substance. He argues that God took the name of Father and that Christ made this distinction between Father and Son precisely because those

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28 While Ayrault discusses nature at significant length, it is too large an area to be within the parameters of this study and so while not being ignored, will not receive the attention it merits.
29 “[C]e grand Docteur [Tertullien], au livre de la Trinité, veut prouver contre les Heretiques, que Jesus Christ n’estoit pas Dieu le Pere mais Dieu le Fils. Il a dit: Je suis venu faire la volonté de mon pere, non pas la miene. Il l’a faite jusques à la mort inclusivement. Il est donc Fils. Quel force aurroit cest argument, si le fils ne dependoit de la volonté & discretion du pere? qu’apporteroit de grandeur & d’auctorité à Dieu mesme ce nom de pere, pris & emprunté de ce que nous sommes (car autrement Dieu ne nous seroit intelligible) si ce n’estoit qu’un nom imaginaire, sans propriété ny substance?” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 29.
titles and relationships had meaning for “us.” The “son” depends on the “will and discretion of the father” (even if they are the same being in three manifestations). Jesus becomes the model of piety because he honors his Father by honoring his parents.30

To complicate things further, Ayrault seems to compromise his previous arguments by saying that “I agree with you that it is more necessary for a man to love God than his father.”31 Ayrault concedes that God is the foremost object of veneration, in keeping with the arguments of the opposition. A tactical move, for he quickly qualifies such a concession: “But that it follows thereafter that it is more expedient to be a Cordelier or a Jesuit than to love and honor father and mother, I say that this is poorly concluded.”32 He maintains that one does not have resort to extremes to prove such veneration, especially since reverence to God and to parents is inseparably linked. The commandments, he asserts, are more important to follow than a religious calling, for “There is no commandment from God to you and me to be Priests, but well did he command you to honor me.”33 Therefore, parental consent is essential in a religious calling to avoid disobeying a commandment: “This is a mortal sin, a curse, and an anathema for you to offend me. To be a Jesuit or not is a matter of indifference. You can be a good Christian and follow Jesus Christ without that.”34 Ayrault distinguishes between need and want, necessity and option. A religious vocation is an option, a commandment is not. To deny a commandment is a serious offence, but most people do not become priests. A person can be a good Christian by obeying his parents, whether or not he is a *religieux*, but it is impossible to be a good Christian by adopting a religious vocation that

30 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin, 28 and 32.
31 “Premièrement donc je vous accorde, qu’il faut plus aimer Dieu que son pere.” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 64.
32 “Mais qu’il s’ensuive de là: il est donc plus expedient d’estre Cordelier ou Jesuite, que d’aimer & honorer ses pere & mere: Je dy que c’est mal conclu.” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 64-65.
33 “Il n’y a point de commandement de Dieu à vous & à moy d’estre Prestres: mais bien vous commande-il de m’honorer.” Ibid., 65.
34 “Ce vous est peché mortel, malediction, & anatheme de n’offencer: d’estre Jesuite, ou ne l’estre point, c’est chose indifferente. Vous pouvez bien estre Chrestien, & suivre Jesus Christ sans cela.” Ibid.
defies parental will. Quarta sees in this line of reasoning Ayrault’s asserting the fallibility of these human institutions and their subordination to divine law. She claims that Ayrault denies justification to joining a religious order, but she does not emphasize the idea of consent in this instance. In asserting parental consent, Ayrault subtly reverses the object of indifference: instead of parental will being a matter of indifference to religious vocation as the Jesuits would claim, religious vocation becomes a matter of indifference to parental will. This clever reversal reveals an ulterior motive for the treatise: to undermine the credibility of the Jesuits.

The primacy of the Commandments leads Ayrault to conclude that consent is sacred and therefore an essential prerequisite for any religious calling. Ayrault presumes that God placed fathers in a position of authority as heads of household. As such, their discretion merited consultation in the taking of religious vows. Ayrault cited his interpretation of the apostles James and John receiving permission from their father, Zebedee, before leaving to follow Jesus. He used the presence of Zebedee to imply consent to their leaving: “For they [James and John] were with him [Zebedee] when Jesus Christ called them…Zebedee, not opposing it, consented by his presence that they follow him [Jesus].” Thus, “to follow Jesus Christ does not mean to abandon one’s family.” By this, Ayrault insists that Jesus valued parental consent for religious vocations.

Moreover, Ayrault questions the validity of vows taken without parental consent: “The question has always remained, if the vow subsists without the wish and consent of fathers.” He argues that in fact the consent of fathers is essential for legitimizing religious vows and

35 Cristina Quarta. *Ayrault e Bodin*, 30 and 32.
36 “Suivre Jesus Christ, ce n’estoit donc pas abandonner sa famille. Il y a plus: ces deux freres Jacques & Jean, de quelque aage qu’ils fussent lors, suivirent bien Jesus Christ: mais ce fut du consentement de Zebedee. Car ils estoient avec luy quand Jesus Christ les appella. Il s’ensuit donques qu’ils prindrent congé de luy, on que Zebedee ne s’y opposant point, consentit par sa presence qu’ils le suivissent.” Ayrault, *Puissance Paternelle*, 60.
37 “La question fust toujours demeurée, si le voue subsistoit sans le vouloir & consentement des peres. Or est-il vulgaire, que si on deliberoit de faire sacrifice aux Dieux, & de leur immoler des enfans, c’estoient les parens qui les donnoient & offroient.” Ibid., 40.
moreover that it is a father’s moral prerogative and duty to ensure that his son’s motives for taking said vows are sound: “[I]f you could marry rigor, either to make yourself a monk against my will, and that marriage, or the vow thus made, subsists of faith…you do not have to undertake it without my leave and opinion, without revealing to me your intentions and conceptions, so that I may experiment from where they come: if it is a good zeal or a lightness, subordination, and induction.” 38 Ayrault argues that it is the father’s duty to evaluate his son’s desire to take religious vows because the only thing worse than taking religious vows without parental consent is taking them insincerely or by coercion (a clear allusion to rapt). The Angevin judge appeals to procedure: the son expresses his desire, the father scrutinizes it and then offers or withholds his consent based on his sense of moral duty. If the son has reached the age of reasoning, then such a process is a choice but nevertheless a matter of honor. By not revealing his motivations and intentions, René leaves them open to suspicion. Why else, according to Ayrault, would he hide them, except out of fear; of what would he, or the Jesuits, be afraid? Ayrault creates this suspicion for his son’s defiance in order to more easily accuse the Jesuits of impiety.

It so happens that René’s choice of religious order was as much at issue as his decision to take vows. Ayrault evidenced particular hostility toward the Jesuits whom he accused of having seduced his son. At stake were the proper boundaries between, and the relation of, secular and sacred authority. Both Ayrault and Pasquier accused the Jesuits of being hypocrites and thieves because they claimed the strictest adherence to Catholic ideals while simultaneously encouraging children to abandon and defy their parents—a blatant violation of

38 “[S]i à la rigueur vous vous pouvez marier, ou rendre moyne contre ma volonté, & que le mariage, ou le voeu ainsi fait, subsiste de foy: toutefois, suyvant ce precepte, vous ne le devez pas entreprendre sans mon conge, sans mon avis: sans me reveler vos intentions & conceptions, afin qui j’expericmente d’où elles viennent. Si c’est d’un bon zele, ou de legereté, subordination & induction.” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 47-48.
Christian law.\textsuperscript{39} It follows from the equation of obedience and piety that Ayrault implicitly accused the Jesuits of impiety and blasphemy. Thus, Ayrault capitalized on a negative image and Gallican fear in order to reinforce his argument.

One may detect the irony of a religious order being accused of impiety and, further, of the Jesuits, in particular, being condemned for encouraging disobedience to a paternal authority when they were infamous because of their strict and particular vow to obey the pope (a father figure). That the Jesuits would be accused of condoning any form of disobedience is itself shocking, for they demanded strict hierarchical obedience within their order. However, as A. Lynn Martin has shown in several works, the practice of this ideal was not nearly so neat. He has shown through examination of Jesuit correspondence that this ideal of obedience caused uncertainty and concern among Jesuits because there was always the question of how far to take it. Some followed it to the point of seeming to be unwilling to make any decisions on their own, thereby clogging the bureaucracy, while others such as Emond Auger at times only managed to thinly disguise their disobedience.\textsuperscript{40} Furthermore, complaints from people such as Pasquier indicate that the issue of obedience caused many problems for the Jesuits in France. They were generally unreceptive to integrating into and honoring local hierarchies (of towns and regions and at the national level, both secular and ecclesiastical) in a country which was trying to distinguish its sovereignty from both secular and ecclesiastical foreign authorities.


Whatever their policy on obedience, which clearly shows a difference of priorities, veneration and service required indifference to other sources of authority for the Jesuits—an extremely controversial obligation for those who operated “in the world.” Martin’s extensive research on the Jesuits indicates that they encouraged members to sever familial bonds. As he suggests, this severing included authoritarian restrictions and even censorships of a novice’s correspondence. Furthermore, he cites an example—that of Jesus leaving his parents and remaining in the Temple for spiritual service—extracted from Loyola’s *Spiritual Exercises* which reveals an effort to “develop indifference to all created things, which of course could include the family, so that a Jesuit could better devote himself to apostolic service.”41 Ayrault, on the contrary, uses the same passage about Jesus and the Temple to emphasize that Jesus nevertheless returned to his parents out of obedience. He states that Jesus at one point left Mary and Joseph under the precept that “it was more reasonable that he employed himself to serve his celestial father than them [Mary and Joseph] who were merely his terrestrial and mortal parents.” But he returned to them and later came to the realization that “it is compatible to serve and obey both without abandoning one to serve the other.”42 Ayrault concludes, Jesus was not indifferent to his parents and recognized his obligation to them, as outlined in the commandments. Thus, the Jesuits emphasize Jesus leaving his parents to worship in the Temple, while Ayrault emphasizes his return to counterpoint them. It is symptomatic of Ayrault’s attempt to reconcile the supposed “incompatibility” between spiritual and familial obligation by combining them.

Nevertheless the issue of parental consent remained a slippery slope for the Jesuits to negotiate. Martin suggests that there was some doubt about indifference toward parental

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41 Martin, *Jesuit Mind*, 187. For more information, see especially chapter 11.
42 “il estoit plus raisonnable qu’il s’employast à servir son pere celeste, que non pas eux, qui n’estoient que parens terriens et mortels….il est compatible de servir & obeîr à tous deux, sans en abandonner l’un pour servir l’autre.” Ayrault, *Puissance Paternelle*, 52-53.
consent within the Jesuit community. While it is unclear how widespread or pervasive this
doubt was, he mentions the case of Ponce Cogordan who was apparently so “amazed” that
children could join the order “without the permission of the parents, whose only purpose in
sending their sons to the Jesuit colleges was to receive financial assistance from them once
they had been educated free of charge” that he once demanded that the “general of the Society
give [three boys] back” because “according to natural law the sons must return and relieve the
poverty of their parents.”

Cogordan’s doubt is interesting for at least four reasons. First, Cogordan appeals to Nature and an obligation to parents in order to reinforce his argument. Second, this doubt recognizes a certain legitimacy for the secular ambitions of families. Third, it suggests that Jesuits fulfilled a role in those ambitions, but that finally, they should not be allowed to assume that role to the point of usurping authority.

Law greased the slippery slope for the Jesuits. They had to be careful because as
Martin rightly notes “law as well as custom supported the authority of parents over their
children,” so “the support of the royal council was essential” to combat appeals of angry
parents. He also notes, however, that the Jesuits had a sophisticated bag of tricks with
which to circumvent the law, which included relocating the child (a delaying tactic in the
legal process) and speeding up the admission process, “designed to present the parents with a
fait accompli.”

The main question is, if the Jesuits were obsessed with preserving their
reputation and avoiding scandal in order to receive legal sanction from Parlement to be able to
serve in France (as Martin suggests), why did they try to confront parents and in particular
Ayrault, instigating a big enough scandal to become the defining moment in the lifetime of
this influential barrister? Martin offers the explanation that “in defense of such activities

43 Martin, Jesuit Mind, 198.
44 Ibid., 188.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., part I.
Jesuits would have undoubtedly argued that parental authority must yield in cases where a son had a vocation to serve Christ.47 Nevertheless, for a group that was trying to negotiate a legal status with Parlement, antagonizing Ayrault probably did not ingratiate the already hostile legists. Such cases added fuel to Gallican fears of Jesuit attempts to undermine French sovereignty.

Furthermore, Ayrault uses an example from the book of Isis and Osiris to argue that even in the absence of parents to consent, clerics should not be involved in a child’s decision to take religious vows: “If he who made offer of it did not find himself father, it is similarly vulgar that the Priest take whichever one he pleased; but it was the Magistrate who drew lots for it so that it was the Gods themselves who chose their host, not the Priest…”48 Ayrault asserts that the Church should not be drafting members at their whim. This concern arose out of accusations like those of his friend Pasquier who claimed that the Jesuits targeted wealthy children in order to take advantage of their inheritances.49 However fantastic and exaggerated, this concern is not totally unwarranted and the accusation not wholly unjustified. Martin has shown that the Society favored children from wealthier families—who had influence in the area—to help fund the cash-strapped collèges, either seeking incomes or the inheritances of those inducted into the Society. While not actively preying on the wealthier children as Pasquier suggests, the Jesuits were attracted to bons moeurs and the potential influence of such children, making them particularly desirable candidates for the Society.50

Along a similar line, Barbara Diefendorf has shown that from the perspective of inheritance, monastic children raised two concerns: the family might not be continued, and

47 Martin, Jesuit Mind, 188.
48 “Que s’il ne se trouvoit pere qui en fist offre, il est pareillement vulgaire que le Prestre ne prenoit pas celuy ou celle qui luy plaisoit: mais que c’estoit le Magistrat qui les tiroit au sort, afin que fussent les Dieux qui choisissent eux-mesme leur hostie, non pas le Prestre…” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 40.
49 Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children.” See also Pasquier, “De la Secte des Jesuites,” and “Plaidoyé.”
50 Martin, Jesuit Mind.
monasteries might come into the family fortune. More personally, the parents would be deprived of the child’s company. Monastic children left the world, constituting a symbolic social death, which Ayrault to banishment and exile. That is, monastic vows ideally created a new identity independent of previous social standing and kinship networks. The dedication of a child and the taking of vows, then, according to Ayrault, was as much of a religious experience for the parents as for the child, in that, parents sacrificed said child to God. *Rapt*, then, according to Ayrault, was in a sense the usurpation of the right of life and death which fathers had customarily held. In any case, Ayrault rejected the Society’s privilege to pick and choose its members so discriminately and without considering the will of their parents. Ayrault argued that a child entering into a religious vocation should be an offering from the parents and not a recruit of the monks; monks should not be taking advantage of their position as educators to influence the impressionable young minds of the children in such matters.

This position of influence created a prime environment for *rapt de séduction*, recalling, again, the letter of St. Bernard of Clairvaux. However, whatever induced René to join the Jesuits, the decision was ultimately his own—a decision not only to join but to remain. Ayrault’s argument falls back on the Commandments: “[I]f the fault of this nephew, to change monastery only, was such (said St. Bernard) that he was going there to the damnation of his soul, what befalls the son who stomps under foot so arrogantly the commandment of God and the holy decretales?” Ayrault draws explicit attention to St. Bernard’s concern for his

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51 Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children.”
53 For theories of education that Ayrault may draw upon, see Pasquier “De la Secte des Jesuites,” and “Plaidoyé,” and those presented in George Huppert, *Public Schools in Renaissance France* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984).
54 “Et si la faute de ce nepveu, pour changer seulement de Monastere, est telle (dit S. Bernard) qu’il y aloit de la damnation de son ame: qu’est-ce au fils de fouler aux piedz si arrogamment le commandement de Dieu, & les
nephew’s salvation in order to suggest that what René did for salvation may in fact merit eternal damnation, for that supposed act of piety was in reality impious because of the willful arrogance against a commandment. However, it is plausible that if Ayrault identifies with St. Bernard, he expresses genuine paternal concern for his son’s salvation. Of course if that were the case, he could have consented.

As Chapter One noted, Ayrault compares the seductiveness of St. Bernard’s Cluniacs to the Jesuits, whom Ayrault accuses of purposefully creating a misleading incompatibility between reverence owed to God and reverence owed to parents in order to lure in recruits like his son. He claims that “the greatest evil in this is that it seems that our Religion…instead of establishing this domestic power, destroys it and that nothing dispenses much our children to the honor, reverence, and obedience that they owe,…the difficulty…to serve well both God and men conjointly, Precepts that agree…are reduced as contrary and incompatible.” 55 Ayrault acknowledges the apparent and unfortunate contradiction in “our Religion” which seems to set the reverence due to God and the reverence due to parents at odds. However, he tries to undermine this “evil” and impious incompatibility by reconciling spiritual and familial obligation. 56 Ayrault disagrees not only with the Jesuits’ methodology, but also with the content of their persuasive devices.

Ayrault concludes that, not only are reverence to God and reverence to parents linked, they are inseparable: one cannot honor and revere one without honoring and revering the

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55 “Mais le plus grand mal qui est en cecy, c’est qu’il semble que nostre Religion (comme nous avons dit) au lieu d’establir ceste puissance domestique, la destruire: & que rien ne dispense tant nos enfans de l’honneur, reverence & obeissance qu’ils doivent, que la difficulté qu’on veut dire estre à bien servir Dieu & les homes conjointement Preceptes qui s’accordoient & marchoient d’un pied, sont rendus comme contraires & incompatibles.” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 31.

56 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin, 28 and 32.
The commandments are interconnected and inseparable, and so, “[H]e holds [H]is first, second, third, and fourth commandments well accomplished when we serve him each one according to our vocation.” He adds that “[T]he first precept to which you run and the fifth that you despise are of God, are from the same Legislator and Author—either it is necessary that they each nullify each other and (contrary to human laws) that the first abolishes the one that follows, or they have to be maintained and observed together.”

Ayrault argues that the Commandments are not mutually exclusive; the first does not undo the second nor the second the third and so on. Because they all originate from God, people are not free to pick and choose and furthermore, a person cannot honor one while violating another. Spiritual and familial obligations are reconcilable, according to Ayrault, because they arise out of piety and so are manifestations of the same principal. By this same token, he concurs with the maxim that “He who honors his father, honors God and he who honors God, honors his father,” for “He esteems [H]imself served and obeyed when we revere and honor those gods that [H]e approves, that [H]e holds for true, natural, and second after [H]im.”

Not only is it permissible then for René to honor his parents as he honors God, it is required.

**False Monks**

Beyond trying to reconcile the apparent conflict between spiritual obligation and familial obligation, Ayrault goes to the source of his problem and works to undermine the credibility of the Jesuits themselves. He draws heavily on some of the anti-Jesuit rhetoric of peers such as Étienne Pasquier. This rhetoric fans the flames of fear, hatred, and suspicion of

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60 “Qui honore son pere, il honore Dieu: & qui honore Dieu, honore son pere.” Ibid., 28.
61 “il s’estime servy & obey, quand nous reverons & honorons ces Dieux là qu’il approuve: qu’il tient pour vrayes, naturels, &seconds après luy.” Ibid., 55.
the Society. It encompasses Gallican fears of Spanish and Roman intervention which reveals itself on a more fundamental level by the Jesuits’ refusal to acknowledge local French hierarchies, be they secular or ecclesiastic. For many critics, the novelty of the Society of Jesus both temporally and structurally became a major way to question the order’s legitimacy. From this developed an implicit accusation of illegitimacy and by extension heresy. Ayrault uses suggestions of heresy (very much an extension of his accusation of impiety) in order to argue not only that his son made a poor choice in clandestinely joining a religious order but that his choice of religious order was equally poor. It is the final feature of his argument which undermines René’s (imagined) religious excuses for defying paternal authority.

As a first point, heresy itself is a problematic word because it includes a broad range of ideas, whose definitions seem to change depending on the person or group defining it. Catholics and Protestants (equally general) mutually referred to each other as heretics in order to establish their legitimacy as the true form of Christianity and to denounce and discredit the other. In any case, heresy incorporates ideas of illegitimacy which are more useful for distinguishing a group of people as “other” than providing specific semantic distinctions. In the political landscape of the latter half of the sixteenth century in France, heresy was a word that people used loosely as compared with previous centuries. Protestantism, and Calvinism in particular, appears to have created a new sensitivity to heterodoxy, which then popularized discourses against heresy. “Heresy” recalled disdain for previous heretical movements reaching back to antiquity, each of which was unique in its own right. This return to antiquity not only coincided with humanist education but also with controversies surrounding reformers’ attempts to remain true to (or regain) the ancient, original (pure) Church.

Certainly, Ayrault does not accuse the Jesuits of being Calvinists—the typical object of accusations of heresy leveled by Catholics in France. Rather, he and Pasquier easily find
resonances between the Jesuits and any number of heterodoxies—with the Anabaptists as with Peter Abelard. 62 The concern which their rhetoric feeds on and adds to is one that is intensely suspicious of novelty, in a context in which Catholics (and Protestants) fought wars with those who carried this novelty and reform beyond its ambiguous boundary distinguishing orthodoxy from heterodoxy. 63 Therefore, heresy is no small accusation against the Jesuits, who in many instances represented a newly vampfed “orthodox” Catholicism.

Ayrault, perhaps because of his legal training, has an encyclopedic memory of examples at his disposal when constructing his argument that the Jesuits are heretics. In a discussion of children in the past who had left their parents for a religious calling, he suggests that “they did it to be true monks.” 64 Ayrault takes special issue here with René’s choice of religious order. By referring to the older orders as real or true, he suggests that the Jesuits are not: they are false monks and an illegitimate order. Older orders drew clearer distinctions between regular orders (removed from the world) and secular orders of priests (in the world). The Jesuits were a hybrid order, claiming the privileges of a regular order and of a secular order (specifically the right to administer the sacraments and to preach) without being constrained to the common rigors and hierarchy of each. Ayrault recalls previous religious movements (regular) as pious and venerable—and in contrast to the trouble-making Jesuits.

Pasquier elaborates ad nauseam on the illegitimacy of the Jesuits. In fact, while Ayrault comes across as overbearing and argumentative, Pasquier can be downright nasty. He dedicates several works to viciously railing on the Jesuits. In one, Les Recherches de la France, he devotes several chapters to the matter. He insists that not only are the Jesuits

62 Pasquier, Jesuites catechisme.
63 For an interesting analysis of these boundaries as they develop in sixteenth century France (and those negotiating a middle ground between the extremes), see Thierry Wanegffelen, Ni Rome Ni Genève: Des fidèles entre deux chaires en France au XVIe siècle (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1997).
64 “excepté qu’ils le faissoient pour estre vrays Moines.” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 75-76.
illegitimate, but that they are monstrous: “this Monster, who being neither secular nor regular, was both together, and from the start introduced within our Church, a Hermaphroditic order.”

This concern about how to categorize the Jesuits is much clearer in *The Jesuites catechisme* [sic]. In one chapter he has his advocate character describe a dream of a procession in which the apostles, popes, and the rest of the secular clergy went first; the hermits, monks, and the rest of the regular clergy went next; and university faculty (theologians) went last. The Jesuits tried to join the procession but St. Peter, representing the secular clergy, rejected them, declaring that the name of “Jesuit” was “arrogant” (he spends two and a half pages in this chapter alone explaining why) and that “although Chastitie, Obedience, and Contempt of the world, were familiar matters with us, yet did we not this by vow; that was brought into the Church after our time…and to say the troth, wee never tyed our devotion to povertie.” The vow here, although seemingly a technicality, is important because it puts them into the category of regular clergy. Next, St. Antony rejected them on behalf of the eremites (hermits), saying: “I commend your intention, but it is nothing like unto ours. Our devotion…was a solitarie life, without schollership or priestood.” Here the issue is the Jesuits’ privilege to say mass and pursue education. St. Benedict (Benet) on behalf of the cenobites (monks) also rejected them because they do not wear the proper habit or tonsure and they do not hold rigorous fasts. Finally, the university (represented by Jean Gerson) rejected them because they were “neither pure seculars, nor pure regulars,” (also a division within the university) and because “you be lying Sophisters, and verie bad Grammarians.” For good measure, the faculty adds that they do not acknowledge “the authoritie of your

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Their illegitimacy seems to center on an “unnatural” blend of privileges which other distinct groups of clergy enjoy in the sixteenth century.

Along a similar line, Pasquier advances a conspiracy theory. He claims that the Jesuits were “refused at Rome” and explains “by what cunning they were afterward received,” which amounted to them changing the object of the vow of absolute obedience from a general to the pope because Ignatius was “one of the most sharpe and worldly wise men our age afforded.” Thus, the Jesuits’ legitimacy was to be suspected because the pope did not immediately accept them and because somewhere in the negotiation they may have deceived the pope. These accusations are not substantiated, but these Gallican fantasies are important to explore because they help to explain the animosity in France toward the Jesuits, even if they only skim the surface of deeper problems.

This suggestion of illegitimacy paves the way for an accusation of heresy. To return to a point started above, Ayrault, while establishing Jesus as a model of obedience, emphasizes Trinitarian doctrine: “[T]his great Doctor [Tertullian], in the book of the trinity, wants to prove against the Heretics that Jesus Christ was not God the Father but God the Son. He said: I came to do the will of my father, not mine….He is therefore the Son.” In reviving an example of ancient heretics, Ayrault neatly implies that the Jesuits, too, are heretics. These ancient heretics (probably Arians) tried to interrupt the “family” dynamic of the Trinity by arguing that Jesus was not God the Son thereby dissolving the relationship between Father and Son. Along a similar line, Ayrault and Pasquier accused the Jesuits of working to interrupt the authoritative relationship between father and son which Ayrault

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66 Pasquier, *Jesuites catechisme*, book 1, chapter 15, pp. 48-56. The faculty in Paris were some of the fiercest opponents of the Jesuits and the Council of Trent.
67 Ibid., 20.
associates, by means of this passage, with Trinitarian (and therefore fundamentally orthodox Christian) doctrine.

Ayrault becomes more and more explicit in his accusation that the Jesuits are heretics. He questions their interpretations of Scripture: “Let us see if it is veritable that Jesus Christ…came to change the commandments of God his father…We will begin with his person and then we will come to the Church, which if your Theologians brought to it observations or interpretations more subtle, we will cede and acquiesce to them very willingly, for if we are all Christians, we are not however all interpreters of Christianity.” He implies that the Jesuits are at best in error and at worst heretics. Qualifying the Jesuits not as theologians but as “your” theologians, throws them into a much narrower and subjective category. By suggesting that “we are not all interpreters of Christianity,” he questions the Jesuits’ ability (especially under criticism of illiteracy) to furnish careful and subtle observations and interpretations which would permit the contradiction of a commandment. (“Subtle” also has a sinister connotation: deception frequently arises from subtle arguments.)

Pasquier similarly accused the Jesuits of not even being literate and thus not being qualified to interpret scripture at all. If they could not read Scripture, it would have been difficult for them to properly interpret scripture, making their ideas dangerous, and in this case erroneous or heretical. He argues that Ignatius not only dropped out of the study of Divinity (theology), but that he barely knew Latin: “for having (as he bragd) his mind wholly mounted up to heaven, he could not strike the wing to come downe, so low as the declensions

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It would be impossible for him to read and interpret scripture if he did not know Latin (unless he read one of the “heretical” translations into the vernacular). Pasquier elaborates on this point: “I leave it to your considerations, whether these books were fit for him to handle…who studied his Gramer but two yeeres.” Pasquier suggests that considering Ignatius’ low level of education, it was improper for him to try to interpret the sacred texts. He even implies danger: perhaps the books were too much for him to “handle.” However, Pasquier could not let his argument rest at ignorance. He suggests more sinister implications: “for all these pretended contemplations of Ignace, were meer mummeries of the devill, who desired to present us with such a man, as might by his ignorance trouble the whole state of the Church.” Pasquier sees the Devil behind Ignatius’ ignorance, the purpose of which was to cause trouble for the Church. Thus, the Jesuits were founded on ignorance, which could only bring trouble.

It is useful at this point to consider France’s education system during the sixteenth century. George Huppert has done extensive research on the beginnings of secular education in early modern French towns. He argues that townsmen, becoming increasingly frustrated with the quality of education provided by the clergy and freelance masters, worked to regulate education themselves. Tuition was to be free for all, and educators were to be qualified—preferably educated in Paris. They divided the students into six or seven classes, the lowest learning the ABCs and the highest, rhetoric (the numbering is opposite of modern America, so the lowest levels receive the highest numerical designation, counting down to graduation).

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70 The Latin language is a case system which relies on morphology to distinguish the function of words. It has five major groupings of endings (cases) for nouns, called declensions. These would have to be mastered at the elementary level to understand the language. Pasquier, *Jesuites catechisme*, 30.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Huppert, *Public Schools*, chapters 1-3. Huppert adopts French words to stand in for specialized terminology or a usage peculiar to this group of people and as such uses common sixteenth century spelling.
74 Ibid., chapter 4.
Judging by his breakdown, it would be doubtful, according to Pasquier, that Ignatius would have made it beyond the cinquième, that is the fifth level in a six level system—one above the ABCs.

Huppert continues by describing the Jesuit schools as primarily outposts against heresy (Calvinism). He argues that the townsmen were reluctant to hand control of their schools back over to the Church, in bitter remembrance of previous experience. Furthermore, he claims that “[t]he Jesuits’ failure to replace secular teachers in more than a handful of French cities was in no way due to the fathers’ [Jesuits] intellectual shortcomings; and their success in Paris, Lyon, or Toulouse cannot be ascribed to their competence as teachers either.” In short, the Jesuits may not have been the ignoramuses that Pasquier portrayed them to be, but they may not have put education first for its own sake. Thus, Pasquier, despite being well-informed of their educative backgrounds, still chose to characterize them as being founded on ignorance; this characterization therefore seems to be a cover for deeper animosity born toward the Society. As a final note on the Jesuits, Huppert admits that:

[T]heir notion of what the enfans [children] needed did not always coincide with the bourgeois’ view. Under the new regens [instructors], orthodoxy was strengthened in the schools and more enfans turned toward clerical careers. The bourgeois, however, had little interest in providing the Church with new recruits, and they particularly resented having horsains in the college—fledgling priests and monks trained at their expense.”

The resentment of the bourgeoisie, which included Ayrault and Pasquier, at having to pay for training new members for the Society—and members recruited from their own children at that, with or without permission—may explain part of the hostility toward the Society, especially if they felt that those who were not recruited were not receiving adequate education. They did

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75 Huppert, Public Schools, 108.
76 Ibid., 125.
not feel that they were getting their money’s worth.\textsuperscript{77} Pasquier and Ayrault take advantage of this tension.

After underscoring the ignorance of Ignatius, it was easy for Pasquier to launch an accusation of heresy against the Jesuits. He begins with a simple accusation: “this Sect is in its principles schismatic and consequently heretical.”\textsuperscript{78} He continues, though, by ranking them among heresies: “Ignatius of Loyola introduced an error into the milieu of our Church, as dangerous as that of Martin Luther….I support that Ignatius was no less biased and disruptive of our Religion than Luther.”\textsuperscript{79} To compare Ignatius to Luther is no small charge, since Luther was credited with many of the problems which arose out of the Reformation, the division of Christendom, political instability and war. The Jesuits are therefore heretics in Pasquier’s estimation, but they are also understood to be making the divisions within Christianity more pronounced and fervent. The perceived divisive nature of the Jesuits helps to explain why a country wracked by civil war and so concerned about its political weakness when facing the powerhouse that was Spain would give the Jesuits a cold welcome. The Jesuits, far from helping the situation in France, were seen only as making matters worse, making the enemy more resolved in its resistance. Add to this mixture the perceived disloyalty of the Jesuits to local secular and ecclesiastical hierarchies and one better understands why the Jesuits were viewed as trouble.

\textsuperscript{77} Huppert explains that public schools were tuition free for city residents; however, tax money went into paying for them. He argues that the Jesuits in some cases wanted to charge tuition to help cover costs, but this charge was a rarity because the school system was so well-developed by the time the Jesuits tried to take them over. It is also interesting to note that A. Lynn Martin argues that the collèges were a near constant headache for the Jesuits, causing numerous problems, the biggest being funding and facilities. He also notes that they were determined not to charge tuition, as part of their apostolic mission (and probably because of their concern to create goodwill toward the Society). Apparently, they also resisted teaching young children. Huppert, \textit{Public Schools}; and Martin, \textit{Jesuit Mind}.

\textsuperscript{78} “cette Secte est en ses principes schismatique, & consequement heretique.” Pasquier, “Plaidoyé,” 340. This work of Pasquier’s is more concise in the accusation of heresy, but the other book is no less useful.

\textsuperscript{79} “Ignace de Loyola introduisit un erreur au milieu de nostre Eglise, aussi dangereux que celuy de Martin Luther….je soutiens qu’Ignace n’a pas moins esté partial & perturbateur de nostre Religion que Luther.” Ibid., 340.
Ayrault himself not only accuses the Jesuits of being unable to interpret scripture, he suggests that they render selective readings for interpretation. Intentionally or not, he concludes that René has been confused and misguided: “But (my son) what St. Mathieu and St. Luc report there was too clear, for a truncated passage puts you in perplexities and labyrinths. Read the entire chapters…”80 Ayrault cites verses from Matthew and Luke which seem to contradict him—to not love parents more than God.81 He asserts however that these passages address martyrdom and shame to confess one’s religion rather than the question of obedience to parents because “otherwise God would be contrary to himself, which is impossible…what doctrine would that be that would stop at syllables and not sense? If he who hates him is a good disciple, by greater reason, he who would fight him would be a patriarch, and he who would kill him would be a good apostle. See what absurdities arise out of a speech misunderstood.”82 In essence, the devil can quote scripture. Ayrault suggests that René is being misled and manipulated by his “teachers,” who select certain passages out of context and more worrisome, misinterpret them too literally. His use of the word “labyrinth” provides a strong image of confusion and suggests that the Jesuits were the monsters at the center. Ayrault implicitly presents this confusion, coated in the rhetoric of rapt, as a deliberate ploy on the part of the Jesuits. That is, they lure children into their order with “evil,” reductionist arguments that make devotion to God and devotion to parents seem incompatible. But such deliberate manipulations require a literacy which has already been

80 “Mais (mon fils) ce que S. Matthieu & S. Luc raportent là, estoit trop clair, pour d’un passage trunqué, vous mettre en des perplexitez & labyrintes. Lisez les chapitres entiers…” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 65.
81 Mt 10.37: “Whoever loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me;” Luke 14.26-7: “Whoever comes to me and does not hate father and mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters, yes, and even life itself, cannot be my disciple. Whoever does not carry the cross and follow me cannot be my disciple.” Oxford Annotated Bible, New Testament, 27 and 126; Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 64.
82 “car autrement Dieu seroit contraire à luy-mesme: se qui est impossible…quelle doctrine seroit-ce la, qui s’arresteroit aux syllables, non pas au sens? Si qui le haïroit, seroit bon Disciple: à plus forte raison, qui le battroit, seroit Patriarche: & qui le tueroit, seroit bon Apostre. Voyez quelles absurditez d’une parole mal entendu.” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 64.
brought into question. Nevertheless, according to Ayrault, if the Jesuits were not malicious, they were mistaken and interfering where they had no place. \(^{83}\) Then again, Ayrault trusted them enough to send his eldest son to be educated by them in the first place.

In addition to misunderstanding scripture, Ayrault argues that the Jesuits promote heresy in others, particularly youths, by encouraging disobedience to parents: “[T]o take away honor and obedience from the children is to undermine nature…for atheism and heresy come of it.” He continues in this convoluted section by citing Plutarch’s treatise on fraternal friendship: “‘there is no more certain sign of an Atheist than to put them [father and mother] to coolness or to commit some fault against them.’” The second passage which he quotes from this section is from a “discourse of heresy in England” featuring a Jesuit:

> when he [the Jesuit] asks what made the English youths so prompt to succor heresy: ‘They were no longer (he [the protagonist] said) obedient to their preceptors and deviated from the honor and reverence that they owed to their fathers and mothers.’ Concluding from there that…they could depart easily from the faith and religion of their fathers, since they were beginning by irreverence and disobedience toward them. \(^{84}\)

In short, irreverence and disobedience to parents is not only a sign of, but also leads to, atheism and heresy. It is rather ironic that a group whose mission was to fight heresy, by the very rules of their order, would ultimately end up promoting it; at least, this is the way Pasquier and Ayrault present the situation. The real problem with the Jesuits is much more complex, but it suffices here to note that given the fear of heresy, Gallican Catholics like Ayrault nevertheless felt that the Jesuits’ mission was counterproductive, meddlesome, and unwelcome.

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\(^{83}\) Quarta affirms this by suggesting that Ayrault encouraged direct readings of the texts. *Ayrault e Bodin*, 26.

\(^{84}\) “[O]ster l’honneur & l’obeissance aux enfans, c’est saper la nature…car l’atheisme & l’heresie en vient, dit Plutarque au traite de l’amitié fraternelle: dit le Jesuite qui a faict le discours de l’heresie d’Angleterre….’il n’y a point de plus certain signe d’un Atheiste, que de les mettre à nonchaloir, ou commettre quelque faute contre eux.’ Pour le regard du Jesuite: quand il demande, que c’est qui re-doit les jeunes Anglois si prompts à sucer l’heresie: ‘Ils n’estoient plus (dit-il) obeissans à leurs Precepteurs, & delaissaient l’honneur & la reverence qu’ils devoient à leurs peres & meres.’ Concluant de là, qu’ils pouvoient bien se departir facilement de la foy & religion de leurs peres, puis qu’ils commençoient par l’irreverence & desobeissance vers eux.” Ayrault, *Puissance Paternelle*, 91-92.
Conclusion

The motto *une loi, un roi, une foi* had been severely undermined by the time Ayrault wrote his treatise. Bitter religious conflict and the disintegration of political order and stability all but completely destroyed it. Here is one of the major threads of an argument within a treatise in which a man, both father and judge, struggles to reorder, redefine, and reconcile his ideological universe. His attempts to create a dialogue with his son about religiosity and obligation reveal his conflicted and complex understandings of hierarchy and spirituality. On the one hand, he fits his concept of fatherhood within a hierarchical structure. On the other, he appeals to a sense of collectivity, but both of these structures inhabit the same thought-world without an acknowledged contradiction.

Ayrault frames his concept of fatherhood within the rhetoric of contemporary religious polemic, and it is not too much of a stretch to see a connection between his conflicted construction of fatherhood and a broader grappling with Gallicanism within society. The Jesuits are a convenient screen (or, rather, target) for religious debate over bigger issues. Gallicanism was very much a struggle and a negotiation over hierarchy and sovereignty. At the same time, those who would promote the autonomy of the French Church feared a split from Catholicism and adamantly insisted on a collective role within Catholicism. Of course, there were those who heavily criticized Gallicanism as being *politique* or even Machiavellian, but these concerns ran deeper for people who felt themselves caught in the middle between two extremes. It does not appear to be a lack of commitment but an emotionally-charged internal conflict, a desire to hold together the irreconcilable and to return to a time of simplicity forever remote, even if perhaps only a mirage.

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85 Wanegffelen, *Ni Rome Ni Genève*. 
Conclusion

But just as the girl abducted immature, as long as she remains with her abductor, does not reach adulthood, the majority that you acquired in the hands of those who hold you against my will, will never excuse you, nor them either, that what you will attempt thereafter does not proceed from induction and impression made at the improper place and time and what is more, by detainers and possessors of bad faith. The Holy Spirit is not where there is crime. As the furtive thing is always so until it be returned into the power of its lord, so as much of a major as you may be, you will always be grievously and plagiaristically where you are, until my will intervenes. To whomever will tell you the contrary, tell him that he does not have understanding. For Plato wrote thus: Neither God nor wise man would ever advise a child to scorn his father and mother.¹

It seems fitting to conclude this study with Ayrault’s own final statements and incidentally, the sentiment which prompted him to write his treatise: outrage at his son’s defiance of his paternal will. René was both the victim and the perpetrator of a serious crime which had implications for society as a whole. The stability of the state and royal power relied on constructions of paternal authority. This authority had legal, political, and religious facets, of which the sacred was sufficient to counter any religious vocation. But, the very foundations of the Christian religion were experiencing considerable strain.

However, it was not the Protestants, as any modern Catholic may expect, at whom Ayrault targeted his criticism. On the contrary, it was militant Catholics, embodied in the Jesuits, who posed the more immediate threat in the mind of the Angevin judge and so many other robins (despite the fact that they were operating in reaction to Protestant forces in many cases). Cynics may, as they did in the sixteenth century, attribute this hostility to Ayrault’s

¹ “Mais tout ainsi que la fille enlevée immatura, quandiu apud raptorem est, actatem non attingit, aussi la majorité que vous acquerriez entre les mains de ceux qui vous detiennent contre ma volonté, ne vous excusera jamais, ne eux aussi, que ce que vous attenteriez par apres, ne procede d’induction & impression faite en lieu, & en temps inconvenable, & qui plus est, par detenteurs & possesseurs de mauvaise foy. Le S. Esprit n’est point où il y a crime. Comme la chose furtive l’est toujours jusesques à ce qu’elle soit retournée en la puissance de son seigneur : aussi, ta-t majeur que vous puissez estre, vous serez toujours doleusement & plagiairement où vous estes, jusesques à ce que ma volonté y interviene. A quiconque vous dira le contraire, dites luy qu’il n’a point d’entendement. Car Platon escrit ainsi: Jamais Dieu, ny homme sage ne conseillera à enfant de mespriser ses pere & mere.” Pierre Ayrault, De La Puissance Paternelle: Contre ceux qui sous couleur de Religion vollennt les enfants à leurs peres & meres (Tours: Jamet Mettayer, 1593), 99-100.
lack of religious conviction. However, the reasoning was much more complex. Gallican fears and his royalist allegiances influenced his reaction. He was no less moved by religious concerns than the papacy was by secular ones.

Paternal authority was a means of establishing control. The promotion of paternal authority fit more or less neatly into *robin* ambitions during the sixteenth century. Regulating the vocation of sons was a duty fathers performed in the interests of a larger kin network loosely referred to as the family. Controlling religious vows became a logical extension of clandestine marriage controversies which involved substantial shifts in patrimony and thus significantly impacted family strategies. The sacramental nature of the two lent urgency to restricting efforts and sparked controversy in spectacular secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictional conflicts.

The Council of Trent landed in the middle of such controversies. It did little to allay *robin* concerns and firmly asserted the Church’s prerogative to annul marital vows independent of parental wishes; nor did it quell Gallican concerns. Gallicans adamantly promoted the privileges and relative autonomy which the French Church enjoyed, on behalf of the monarch. The international threat posed by the papacy and Spain could not be ignored even under a pretext of religion. The most Christian King also had a paternal duty to protect the interests of his kingdom and subjects.

Paternal authority was a means of maintaining order. En route to absolutism, paternal authority played a key role. As Robert Muchembled has suggested, paternal authority was a new means of extracting obedience from independently-minded local governments.2 The royal government, of which Ayrault was an important part, also became an important line of

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appeal, further undermining local rulings. Letters of remission helped in this regard as well.  

In the domestic sphere, as a model of the well-ordered and well-governed Commonwealth, paternal authority played the important role of reigning in the forces of youths who challenged all sources of authority. Those who would champion paternal authority capitalized on negative early modern stereotypes of youth.

Historians, to this point, have generally maintained, in J. P. Sommerville’s words, that “no fully developed patriarchalist theory of government was voiced in seventeenth-century France,” and, in Gordon J. Schochet’s words, that “[t]he combination of doctrines and interests that made possible a patriarchal theory of political obligation seems to have been peculiar to the England of the seventeenth century.” By patriarchalism they mean “royal and paternal power were not just similar (in that both were derived from God alone), but identical. In other words, the power of any independent father over his offspring was royal power. Conversely, the authority of a king over his subjects was patriarchal.” From this, these historians generally conclude that “By identifying royal with patriarchal power, writers were able to harness conventional social theory—which emphasized the divinely appointed duty of children to obey their fathers—to the king’s cause.”

While they concede that there were hints of patriarchalist thinking and that France became a power-house of divine right absolutism, this thesis has suggested that a bolder assertion can be made with a systematic

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8 Ibid.
study of the right sources. Patriarchalist theory in England has received much attention owing to Locke’s *Two Treatises of Government*, which was designed to refute Sir Robert Filmer’s *Patriarcha*. Nevertheless, although patriarchalist theory in England has overshadowed any counterpart in France, this theory may lay hidden in different sources for France, which include those pertaining to marriage and the Jesuits.

The motto *un roi une loi une foi* may never have been an achieved ideal, but it provided a useful means of conceptualizing unity and authority. While Ayrault never explicitly hearkens to this model, his treatise does lend itself to these categorizations because his main arguments unify the three elements into one source of authority—the father—with whom anyone claiming paternal authority can associate himself. It is precisely when instability brought about by the Wars of Religion threatens this unity that urgency develops to reassert it. Nevertheless, despite Ayrault’s fears, paternal authority continued to strengthen into the seventeenth century. In fact, Michel Foucault and Arlette Farge’s study of eighteenth-century families focuses in part on parents who requested that their children be thrown into the Bastille, suggesting that paternal authority, while still questioned, continued to enjoy immense legal and political authority. This authority extended to the regulation of marriages as well. In fact, as Gaudemet has noted, the crafty *robin* legists eventually found a way for parents to officially annul marital vows taken without their consent and “without doubt [with] some malign pleasure,” justified this annulment using the Council of Trent. Because vows were null between a woman and her abductor by the decrees of this Council,

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11 Arlette Farge and Michel Foucault, *Le désordre des familles: letters de cachet des Archives de la Bastille au XVIIIe siècle* (Julliard: Éditions Gallimard, 1982).
the legists effectively extended this solution for *rapt de violence* to *rapt de séduction*, arguing that vows taken without parental consent resulted from the same sort of coercion. Therefore, they claimed, the Council did not sanction vows taken without parental consent.\(^{13}\)

The absence of Philippe Ariès’ study on paternal sentiment and the discovery of childhood has perhaps been notable to this point.\(^{14}\) The reason was two-fold. First, while affection is certainly relevant to authority, especially regarding parents, the exploration of authority has been particularly rich, and the controversy surrounding Ariès’ study would have distracted readers from the primary focus of this study. Second, the nature of the treatise does not lend itself to such investigations easily. While it would be unfair to characterize the treatise as totally devoid of sentiment and Ayrault as a cold, methodical judge, the propagandist role of the work skews sentiment of disappointment to evoke outrage. Nonetheless, Ayrault’s direct addresses to his son provide a glimpse of genuine parental concern, especially when he speaks of forgiveness and urges his son’s return: “Now if you are afraid to fall into these inevitable chastisements of divine and human law, if this discourse can put you back into your natural sentiment, and that at this opportunity you wish to reshow yourself, defer no longer. The Church always has open arms to retake the penitents; she does it at the example of fathers and mothers.”\(^{15}\) This concern also reveals itself in discussions of damnation: “[T]he greatest punishment of God to his creature, from father to son, from Prince to subject, is to be banished from their presence, to be deprived of the good and contentment


\(^{15}\) “Or si vous avez peur de tomber en ces chastiemens inevitables de droit divin & humain: si ce discourse vous peut remettre en vostre naturel sentiment, & qu’à ceste occasion vous ayez anvie de vous reconnoistre: ne differez plus. Ce que l’Eglise a toujours les bras ouverts pour y reprendre les penitens, elle le fait à l’exemple des peres & des meres.” Ayrault, *Puissance Paternelle*, 98.
of seeing them. As for God, it is certain that damnation is not otherwise.”¹⁶ However, even these bits of sentiment focus on the transgressions of the son and on his lack of sentiment rather than Ayrault’s own sentiments. Even when Ayrault suggests that separation is painful, he constructs his sentence such that it implies that the separation may be more painful for the subordinate.

Regardless of his efforts, Ayrault lost his battle. No system of law could or would intervene, and Ayrault never saw or heard from his son again. He finally publicly disavowed, or, rather, disowned René in 1593, forbidding his other children from recognizing René as brother—a vow which he later recanted on his deathbed.¹⁷ René, on the other hand, had a brilliant career among the Jesuits. He first earned the “esteem of his superiors for his piety and erudition,”¹⁸ having been sent to Germany (where he was a prisoner of the Protestants for a while) and then to Rome after he left his father. He then served the Society as a teacher of rhetoric in Milan and Rome and as a rector in France. René had a nephew who was also a Jesuit. René’s younger brother Pierre continued where he had left off, succeeding his father as lieutenant criminel.¹⁹

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