An Inquiry into the Development of the Ethical Theory of Emotions
In the Analects and the Mencius

by

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To Ok-Young
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Abstract

How do we distinguish what is morally right from wrong? When we act morally, what motivates us to do so? And how do we grow so that there is no discrepancy between our moral knowledge and our moral action? My dissertation investigates the role emotions play in these three important ethical realms (viz. moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral cultivation) in the context of two ancient Chinese Confucian texts: Lúnyǔ (the Analects of Confucius) and Mèngzǐ (Mencius). Departing from much of the previous scholarship on ancient Chinese emotion which has exclusively focused on the single Chinese term ‘qíng’ 情 (“emotion”), I closely analyze a number of Chinese terms including “love,” “sorrow,” “fear,” “desire,” and “aversion” in the textual and historical contexts of Lúnyǔ, and reconstruct Kongzi’s conception of emotion from there. I argue that 1) although ‘qíng’ later comes to refer to particular emotions explicitly, it is best interpreted as “character” in Lúnyǔ, and that 2) moral emotions embodying correct ethical judgment and strong motivational power constitute an integral part of the virtuous character (Chapters 2 and 3).

The sentimentalist view of emotions has been a dominant position in the contemporary philosophical discourse on emotions. According to this view, one’s evaluative judgment is closely intertwined with the way one feels about things. For example, one can find a scoop of ice-cream likable because he likes ice-cream, and one can think that she should help out the victims of Katrina because she feels compassion for them. Applying this idea to the interpretation of Mengzi’s moral emotions (sìduān 四端), previous scholars have argued that 1) moral emotions provide a complete basis for correct moral judgment, and that 2) the virtuous person in Mengzi is the one who is happily carried away by the motivating power of his moral emotions. However, by closely analyzing a body of textual evidence, I argue that 1) moral emotions provide an important but only partial basis for “all-things-considered” ethical judgment, and that 2)
the notion of moral autonomy is never compromised even by moral emotions in Mengzi. In relation to these points, I propose an alternative interpretation of Mengzian moral agency, in which the faculty of normative rationality superintends the function of moral emotions (Chapters 4 and 5).

Previous scholars have debated much over the correct interpretation of “emotional extension (tuī推)—Mengzi’s famous theory of how to cultivate moral emotions. The basic idea is that one is endowed with a set of moral emotions that clearly indicate what the right things to do are in paradigmatic situations, and she can grow fully virtuous by “extending” her moral emotions to non-paradigmatic cases. (For example, think about people going to the rescue of an endangered baby out of compassion without a second thought, and “extending” their compassion to help out a homeless person.) The crucial issue is what “extending” really means in Mengzi’s theory, and three interpretive positions have been proposed: “logical extension,” “emotive extension,” and “developmental extension” interpretations. I argue that the shared mistake of these three positions is to neglect the crucial role of culture and society in shaping one’s emotional reactions in a way peculiar to the cultural tradition of a given society, and I show how much Mengzian extension of moral emotions is based on the cultural assumptions of Mengzi’s ideal Confucian society. This lets us rethink the traditional boundary between Mengzi and Xunzi as advocating respectively the internal and external grounds for morality (Chapter 6).
Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 General Goals of the Study

In the past several decades, emotion has become a focus of intensive scholarly discussion in a wide range of disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, anthropology, classical studies, and Sinology. Since Robert Solomon’s publication of *The Passions* in 1977,¹ a number of philosophers have tried to undermine the rigid dichotomy between reason and emotion that had been seldom doubted since Plato, and tried to view emotion differently from the traditional view that emotion is mainly irrational, uncontrollable, and therefore dangerous to the ethical life of human beings. A similar change in views on emotion in other disciplines is also found in a plethora of recently published secondary literature on emotions including the works by Antonio Damasio² and Catherine Lutz,³ and the fields of Chinese philosophy and Sinology in general were not an exception to this new phenomenon. Specifically, some Sinologists have focused on the ancient Chinese term ‘qing’ 情 as comparable to the Western conception of emotion and conducted a “cross-cultural comparison” of emotion,⁴ and some scholars in Chinese philosophy have also argued that there is no conceptual distinction between reason and emotion in ancient Chinese thought.⁵

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⁵ For example, see David Wong, “Is There a Distinction Between Reason and Emotion in Mencius?” *Philosophy East and West* 41, no. 1 (1991).
Given the rapidly growing interest in emotion in many humanistic fields and the possible contribution Chinese philosophy could make to the contemporary discourses on emotion in the humanities, previous scholarship on ancient Chinese views of emotions has not been satisfactory enough. Generally speaking, some Sinological works on emotion are not philosophically sophisticated enough to be found sufficiently intelligible by the student of philosophy, and some philosophical works on ancient Chinese emotion seem to pursue misguided questions such as what is the essential difference between Chinese and Western views of emotion, often implying one of the equally unproductive dogmas of the inferiority or the superiority of Chinese thought to Western philosophical traditions. Moreover, the latter kind of failure often comes with the lack of sufficient philological rigor in dealing with ancient Chinese texts. My dissertation tries to overcome these three kinds of difficulties in studying ancient Chinese emotions.

How do we distinguish what is morally right from wrong? When we act morally, what motivates us to do so? And how do we grow so that there is no discrepancy between our moral knowledge and our moral action? These are the three leading questions of my dissertation, and the primary goal of my work is to investigate the role emotions play in these three important ethical realms (viz. moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral cultivation) in the context of two ancient Chinese texts: Lúnyǔ 論語 (the Analects of Confucius) and Mèngzǐ 孟子 (Mencius). The Lúnyǔ or the Analects is an anthology of Kǒngzǐ’s 孔子 (551–479 B.C.E) teachings in the forms of aphorisms and dialogues, collected and edited after his death mainly by Kongzi’s first and second generations of disciples. Although containing some portions of possible later interpolation, the Analects still remains the primary source for studying the ethical view of emotions in Kongzi, the first substantial thinker in the history of Chinese philosophy. Another text to be intensively discussed in this study is the Mengzi, and it is said that the text was compiled by Mengzi himself (390–305 B.C.E.) and those led by Wàn Zhāng 萬章, one of Mengzi’s advanced disciples. The Mengzi is full of great insights on the relevance of emotions to our ethical life. This study aims to tease out Mengzi’s implicit theories on the place of

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6 Qián Mù 錢穆, Xiānqín zhūzǐ xìnián 先秦諸子系年 (Bēijīng 北京: Zhōnghuá shūjù 中華書局, 1956). The birth and death dates of other ancient Chinese thinkers and historical figures provided in the following are mostly according to this work.
emotions in moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral cultivation, and tries to identify some possible theoretical connections between Mengzi’s and Kongzi’s ideas on emotions.

1.2 Emotions in Ancient China?

But how can I propose to study emotions in ancient China in the first place? Did the ancient Chinese have emotions? At the first glance, this question seems easy to answer: Yes, of course they did! For there are countless passages in our target texts where the ancient Chinese seem to burst with joy, moan in sorrow, and blaze with anger. How could they lack emotions as long as they were humans? However, the question might not have been that simple. It could have been asking whether the ancient Chinese had any conception of emotion that approximates that of ours. And if they did not have any similar conception of emotion to our own, one might think, we have to say the ancient Chinese did not have any emotions at all, because the English term ‘emotion’ only makes sense in a particular intellectual and historical context of the West.7

However, I would like to point out that we ourselves have no consensus about what emotions really are; what we actually have is only a series of very general and vague definitions of emotion. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary contains several definitions of the term, among which two are relevant here: 1) “Any agitation or disturbance of mind, feeling, passion; any vehement or excited mental state”; 2) “A mental ‘feeling’ or ‘affection’ (e.g. of pleasure or pain, desire or aversion, surprise, hope or fear, etc.), as distinguished from cognitive or volitional states of consciousness.”8

7 Chad Hansen seems to hold this position. He understands emotion as part of the dichotomy between reason and emotion, which is “popularly linked” with other dichotomies such as belief/desire, intellect/passion, and mind/body and is passed on to us as a Greek philosophical legacy. He argues that we cannot find any of these dichotomies in the ancient Chinese philosophical context, and consequently we cannot attribute the conception of emotion as we find in the “Western folk psychology” to the ancient Chinese. See Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 18–28, and “Qing (Emotions) 情 in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought,” chap. in Emotions in Asian Thought: A Dialogue in Comparative Philosophy, ed. Joel Marks and Roger T. Ames (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1995), pp. 183–186.

Here we can see how difficult it is to define emotion even for one of the most authoritative English dictionaries, at least from a philosopher’s perspective. As for the first definition of emotion, what is “agitation or disturbance of mind, feeling, passion” exactly? More specifically, we take “mind,” “feeling,” and “passion” to be different entities or phenomena, but shall we still call all of the three kinds of disturbances equally emotions? What is the ground for that? And as for the second definition, is emotion only a mental phenomenon? Does it not also involve a physiological change in our body, especially when we “feel” something? In addition, is emotion sharply distinguishable from cognition and volition? Does desire or aversion not contain any volitional aspect? And does fear not necessarily involve a cognition that something fearful is near, whether or not this cognition is wrong?

None of us would readily claim to have satisfactory answers to all of these questions when we use the term emotion. It is no wonder though, because “What is emotion?” has been one of the perennial philosophical questions, and it is still undergoing heated debates with many disciplines involved. Nevertheless, we normally do not encounter any serious objections to using that term to refer to such phenomena as joy, anger, sorrow, fear, affection (in the sense of warm liking or fondness), aversion, and desire. And some ancient Chinese authors singled out this very set of emotions from their larger repertoire of emotional phenomena and collectively called them “seven emotions” (qī qíng 七情). Based on this fact that we hardly share any settled view of emotions (or at least have several competing views of emotions) while experiencing virtually no difficulty in referring to a set of psychological phenomena as “emotions,” we could safely assume that the ancient Chinese also had a certain view or views of emotions that may or may not overlap with our views of emotions. And what we need to do now is to find out about the ancient Chinese views of emotions by analyzing the passages containing

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diverse insights on emotions in our target texts.\textsuperscript{11}

1.3 Methodological Issues

1.3.1 \textit{Qíng} 情 and the Ancient Chinese Conception of Emotions

Then, how shall we study the ancient Chinese emotions? There could be many ways to do so, but one way would be to postulate that the authors of our target texts had some general conception or conceptions of emotions as I have proposed in the previous section, and then to search for an umbrella term in those texts that their authors might have used to refer to this general conception(s) of emotions. The almost unanimous candidate for this term among Sinologists and scholars of Chinese philosophy has been “\textit{qíng}” 情; it is translated as “emotions” or “passions” whenever the context allows, and “\textit{qíng}” is sometimes compared to the English term ‘emotion’ in comparative research on emotions.\textsuperscript{12} However, the scholarship to date on emotions in ancient China focusing on the concept of \textit{qíng} 情 is highly unsatisfactory for two reasons.

First, I find some ideas previously suggested concerning the ancient Chinese

\textsuperscript{11} However, I should not be misunderstood to be saying that the ancient Chinese counterparts to these emotions—viz. \textit{xì} 喜, \textit{nù} 怒, \textit{ài} 喜, \textit{jù} 慘, \textit{ài} 恨, \textit{wù} 恨, and \textit{yù} 欲—are exactly the same emotions as our joy, anger, sorrow, fear, and so forth. As the advocates of the social constructionism of emotions convincingly argue, an emotion from a culture sharing certain cognitive and physiological elements with its approximate counterpart in a different culture can turn out to be a very different emotion from its counterpart if it lacks some of the important social factors that usually interact with its emotional counterpart (Griffiths 1997, p. 137). For example, even if fear and \textit{wèikǒng} 畏恐 (a classical Chinese compound whose meaning is close to fear) are equally accompanied by a cognition of a certain worrisome situation involving oneself and any common physiological symptoms, they still may turn out to be very different emotions from each other in the following case: that is, if fear is generally regarded as a disturbing and unpleasant emotion that hinders one from functioning properly, \textit{wèikǒng} 畏恐 is generally welcomed as a psychological factor contributing to the overall welfare of the person who feels it due to its allowing that person more carefully to deliberate on how to escape the problematic situation he is in. Hánfēi 韓非 (280–233 B.C.E.) provides a very explicit explanation of the benefit of being in the state of \textit{wèikǒng} 畏恐. For this point, see \textit{Hánfēizì} 韓非子, “\textit{Jiēlǎo}” 解老. Chén Qiyóu 陳奇猷, \textit{Hánfēizì xīn jiàozhù} 韓非子新校注 (Shànghǎi: Shànghǎi gùjí chūbānshè 上海古籍出版社, 2000), p. 386. In any event, my point that the ancient Chinese had some psychological phenomena that can be roughly referred to as emotions and probably also had some views of them is not threatened by this social constructionist argument on emotions.

\textsuperscript{12} A typical example of this type of research is Eifring, “Introduction: Emotions and the Conceptual History of \textit{Qíng}.”
conception of emotions deeply perplexing. The dominant trend in the research concerning ancient Chinese emotions in general has been to identify a wide spectrum of meanings in the term “qing” and then to make some suggestions about the postulated ancient Chinese conception of emotion. Those suggestions often amount to saying that the ancient Chinese conception of emotion has evolved from the term “qing” while keeping the special connotations implied in the non-emotional usages of the term. And this innocent-looking view of the evolution of qing sometimes develops into very strange ideas.

For example, Christoph Harbsmeier proposed that we can make a rough division of the semantic range of qing into the following seven categories: 1) the basic facts of a matter, 2) underlying and basic dynamic factors, 3) basic popular sentiments/responses, 4) general basic instincts/propensities, 5) essential sensibilities and sentiments viewed as commendable, 6) basic motivation/attitude, 7) personal deep convictions, responses, and feelings.\textsuperscript{13} Relying on Harbsmeier’s sensible distinctions, Halvor Eifring proposes a case of “multi-tiered semantic specialization” for qing, in which the concept of emotions evolves from the older sense of the term as basic instincts, and then further specializes itself to mean positive feelings of intimacy and then love.\textsuperscript{14}

It is all right so far. However, Eifring goes further and argues that while “qing” had come to designate emotions in its later stage of semantic sharpening, the term “qing” had never lost its original meaning of basic human instincts. In other words, to the writers of the classical period, emotions were basic instincts and basic instincts were nothing but emotions.\textsuperscript{15} However, this generalization of uses of “qing” only makes us raise more questions. Is every emotion really a basic human instinct? If so, can there be any distinction between a human emotion and an animal emotion (if any)? In addition, we already know that certain emotions such as fear and envy involve some propositional


\textsuperscript{14} Eifring, “Introduction: Emotions and the Conceptual History of Qing,” p. 11. Angus C. Graham also suggests a similar idea. According to him, the basic meaning of “qing” is “what is essential” or “genuine” of things, but in the Xunzi and the Liji 礼记 “the word [i.e. “qing”] refers only to the genuine in man which it is polite to disguise, and therefore to his feelings.” However, he also argues that it is only in the Song 宋 period (960–1279) that the meaning of “qing” as ‘passions’ develops. See Angus C. Graham, “The Background of the Mencian [Mengzian] Theory of Human Nature,” chap. in Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi, ed. Xiusheng Liu and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2002), p. 49 and p. 53.

thought that, e.g., the right engine of the flight I am on is broken or my colleague inferior to me in ability got a promotion before me. Given that this is also very probable a case for some of the emotions in ancient China, how could we accept that emotions are nothing but basic instincts without any further explanation?

The second and more important reason why the previous scholarship on the ancient Chinese emotions seems disappointing to me is the following: As I see it, even though we have several passages from the *Lǐjì* and the *Xúnzì*\(^ {16} \) that make us think that the classical Chinese term “qing” represents all the emotions mentioned in our target texts, there is always some room for doubt about the seriousness and comprehensiveness of this representation, and consequently it is still an open question whether the discussion of “qing” as the proposed umbrella term for emotions in those texts would completely and justly explain every important aspect of these ancient Chinese thinkers’ ideas on emotions. In this situation, speculations mainly grounded on the concordance-based analysis of the term “qing” are unlikely to reveal enough aspects of these thinkers’ views of emotions.

The limitation of the exclusive study of “qing” for understanding ancient Chinese emotions is very conspicuous in one of our target texts, *Lùnyù* or the *Analects*. As we will see in Chapter 2 below, there are only two instances of “qing” throughout the *Analects*, and they seem to mean respectively “facts about a certain situation” and “sincerity.” Although in Chapter 2 I argue for a strong affinity between these two uses of “qing” in the *Analects* and the later use of the same term in other texts for referring to prima facie emotions such as “joy,” “anger,” “sorrow,” and so forth, what enables me to do so is deep contextual study of a number of passages from diverse texts containing many emotion terms besides “qing.” It is almost impossible to identify the important theoretical relationship between the concept of qing and a number of ancient Chinese emotions only by studying the two instances of “qing” occurring in the *Analects*.

1.3.2 An Alternative Approach—Analysis of Concrete Emotion Terms

Then, what is a better way of studying the ancient Chinese emotions? What I would like to suggest here is not a fancy method, but a necessary one: As I have just alluded to in the previous section, I think that in order to study ancient Chinese emotions properly, we need to collect and analyze as many passages from our target texts as possible that either contain concrete emotion terms, or do not contain any emotion terms but still shed some significant light on our authors’ ways of thinking about emotions. Specifically, this method can be implemented more concretely in the following three steps:

First, read the original texts closely and collect all of the emotion-related passages within context. In this way, we can be sensitive to the subtle contexts in which those emotion terms are used and discussed. Second, group those passages according to the particular, indigenous emotion terms those passages contain or implicitly refer to. For example, once we put all of the passages containing “jù” 懼 at one place, we could determine what are the typical situations where this term is used and whether or not we could safely translate it as “fear.” Finally, based on these grass-roots groups create second-order groups, each of which corresponds to a large category of emotions and in turn contains a set of different indigenous emotion terms that are used for describing similar but possibly distinct emotional states. For example, as we will see in Chapter 3, the related emotional states in ancient China that can be roughly labeled as “fear” are referred to in the Analects by diverse terms such as “jù” 懼, “kǒng” 恐, and “wèi” 畏, and searching for rationales that led the authors of the Analects to make these sub-distinctions in “fear” will allow us a better idea of the ancient Chinese conception of fear as presented in the Analects. Moreover, if we repeat the same process for the other emotions in the Analects, we could also make some conjectures about Kongzi’s and his contemporaries’ view of emotions.

One of the merits of this “bottom-up” approach is that it is fully compatible with the so-called attributional theory of emotions, which makes cross-cultural comparison of emotions or the study of emotions in a remote culture—remote both in time and geography in our case—often a difficult and doubtful business. The attributional theorists of emotions argue that the distinct emotions a person can have are chiefly a matter of his own conceptions, and these conceptions vary sharply from culture to culture. So, according to this theory, the differentiations we can make interculturally concerning a
person’s emotions are only 1) whether the person feels a slight or great degree of physiological arousal and 2) whether his feeling toward its object is con or pro; but finer distinctions such as anger, fear, or contempt are culturally idiosyncratic. On this view, a person is angry only if he is strongly aroused in a negative way and thinks of himself as angry, but we cannot say that a scowling man in an exotic land is angry until we learn enough about the conventional significance of grimaces in his society. However, the concrete steps that I specified above for studying ancient Chinese emotion terms will keep us sensitive enough to the theoretic concerns expressed by the attributional theory of emotions, because our contextual analysis of the relevant passages will involve a massive effort to understand our target emotions in the rich context of ancient Chinese history, culture, and thought.

1.4 Philosophical Agenda

1.4.1 Competing Theories of Emotions and the Interpretation of Mengzi

For the past several decades, a wide variety of competing theories of emotions have been proposed. One of the most dominant kinds among them is sometimes called “judgmentalism” or “judgmental theories of emotion,” and it argues that an emotion is basically a combination of some cognitive component with an affect such as pain or pleasure and some kind of desire. For example, fear can be analyzed on this view as a belief that something fearful is present or forthcoming, combined with an unpleasant feeling and a desire to flee. This view is usually considered to provide a “cognitive” account of emotions, and what characterizes this view is the idea that “some aspect of thought, usually a belief,” is “central to the concept of emotion and, at least in some

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18 This explanation of judgmentalism on emotion is from Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, “The significance of recalcitrant emotion (or, anti-quasijudgmentalism),” in *Philosophy and the Emotions*, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52, ed. Anthony Hatzimoysis (Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 2003), p. 128.
cognitive theories, essential to distinguishing different emotions from one another.”¹⁹ For example, Robert Solomon, a prime advocate of this view, proposes that “to have an emotion is to hold a normative judgment about one’s situation”, and in this light my anger for John’s stealing my car is basically “my judgment that John has wronged me.”²⁰

However, critics of the judgmentalist theories of emotion argue that this view does not explain the existence of the so-called recalcitrant emotions very well. That is, it is a well-known psychological phenomenon that we sometimes feel certain emotions like fear, anger, or jealousy while thinking that those emotions are not justified or warranted. What is probably going on in such a case is that the evaluation of the situation in question embodied in our emotion is in conflict with our best judgment about the situation; for example, some people cannot suppress their fear of traveling by the flight while sincerely believing that the airplane is one of the safest means of travel, and I might keep feeling jealous about my colleague’s promotion while sincerely thinking that his promotion is well deserved. This poses a serious problem for judgmentalist theorists of emotion, because it is very hard for them to explain why unjustified emotions do not yield to one’s best judgments about the situations in question, if those emotions were a form of judgments or beliefs. As an alternative, some scholars have proposed that the cognitive or propositional content of an emotion does not have to be a belief or judgment. In Robert Roberts’ terms, emotions are “concern-based construals”²¹ that are some sort of propositional attitudes short of beliefs or judgments. For example, “in order to be afraid, an agent need only construe or perceive the situation as dangerous; she need not believe it to be dangerous.”²²

However, this alternative approach to emotions in turn faces its own critics, some of them belonging to the so-called sentimentalist tradition. Sentimentalist theorists of value treat evaluative judgments as somehow dependent on human emotional capacities, and one of their goals is to explain evaluative concepts such as moral wrong, shamefulness, amusingness, and so forth by way of more basic emotional reactions rather

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²² This is D’Arms and Jacobson’s description of Roberts’ view of emotions in their “The significance of recalcitrant emotion,” p. 130. Emphasis is original.
than the other way around. So, Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, two strong proponents of contemporary sentimentalism, propose that “to think that X has some evaluative property \( \Phi \) is to think it appropriate to feel F in response to X.”\(^{23}\) For example, judgments of wrongness should be analyzed in terms of such emotions as guilt and disapproval, and the concept of danger should be explicated in the light of fear.\(^{24}\) Now, the previous two kinds of theories of emotion—viz. judgmentalism and its alternative which D’Arms and Jacobson call “quasi-judgmentalism”—pose a serious challenge for the sentimentalist view of evaluative judgment, because both judgmentalism and quasi-judgmentalism postulate that evaluative concepts are explicable in terms of the propositional contents of emotions, whether they be fully committed judgments, construals, or some sort of “emotionally held thoughts”.\(^{25}\)

In response to this theoretical threat, D’Arms and Jacobson clarify that they are primarily concerned with what they consider to be “paradigmatic emotion kinds,” such as amusement, anger, contempt, disgust, embarrassment, envy, fear, guilt, jealousy, joy, pity, pride, shame, and sorrow. According to them, most of these emotions are “pan-cultural emotions” or “natural emotion kinds,” which are “products of relatively discrete special-purpose mechanisms that are sensitive to some important aspect of human life.” In other words, “[e]motions evolved for their adaptive value in dealing with what psychologists have called ‘fundamental life tasks,’ ‘universal human predicaments,’ or ‘recurrent adaptive situations’—especially but not exclusively social situations.”\(^{26}\) This view of emotions highly resembles Paul Ekman’s “affect program” theory: In Paul Griffiths’ description, “the affect program theory deals with a range of emotions corresponding very roughly to the occurrent instances of the English terms ‘surprise,’ ‘fear,’ ‘anger,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘contempt,’ ‘sadness,’ and ‘joy.’ The affect programs are short-term, stereotypical responses involving facial expression, autonomic nervous system arousal, and other elements….These patterns [of response] are triggered by a cognitive system which is ‘modular’ in the sense that it does not freely exchange information with other

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cognitive processes. This system learns when to produce emotions by associating stimuli with broad, functional categories such as danger or loss. To do this it uses the organism’s past experience and some specialized learning algorithms…"

In short, emotions on this view are primarily distinct sets of responses whose “evaluations” of the relevant situations are more of direct perception than some sort of higher cognitive processes mediated by human language, and evaluative concepts such as slights, contamination, or incongruity are explicable by directly appealing to their corresponding emotions of anger, contempt, and amusement.

Affect program theory and other theories of similar kind seem to be well established especially for explaining basic, natural emotions such as fear, anger, disgust, contempt, sadness, and joy. We can identify some form of these emotions across cultures and even in the animal kingdom, and it is no wonder that the aforementioned list of seven emotions in the $\text{Lǐjì}$—viz. $xì$ 喜 ("joy"), $nù$ 怒 ("anger"), $aī$ 哀 ("sorrow"), $jù$ 懼 ("fear"), $ài$ 愛 ("love"), $wù$ 惡 ("aversion"), and $yù$ 欲 ("desire")—overlaps to a large extent with Ekman’s list of seven affect programs. However, these six or seven basic emotions are not the only emotions we feel as human beings, nor is it the case that we feel these basic emotions only as adaptive syndromes—i.e. only in relation to “universal human predicaments” or “recurrent adaptive situations,” in the form of short-term responses not mediated by human language partly consisting of abstract concepts. As Griffiths has put it, “the functional situations that elicit the six or seven affect programs do not cover the whole range of functional situations which seem to elicit emotions…. [M]any of the states currently included under the label ‘emotion’ are sustained responses, not brief responses like the affect programs,…[and s]ome emotions seem to be highly integrated with complex, often conscious cognitive processes in a way that is quite alien to the affect program model. These emotions play a role in motivating considered plans of action rather than in triggering rapid, reflexlike responses.”

Then, it is quite doubtful that D’Arms and Jacobson enlist such emotions as

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29 Neil McNaughton provides a thoughtful alternative to Ekman’s affect program theory. For a good introduction to the affect program theory and its alternatives, see Griffiths, *What Emotions Really Are*, pp. 77–99.
amusement, embarrassment, guilt, pity, pride, and shame with other more basic or natural emotions as if they all belonged to the same category. As I see it, the typical situations stimulating such emotions as amusement, embarrassment, pity, or pride might vary considerably from culture to culture, and the occurrence of these emotions highly depends on what kinds of things the members of each culture believe to be funny, embarrassing, pitiable, and deserving pride respectively. Moreover, as we will see in Chapter 3, there can be disagreement, even in the same society, about what the proper objects of more basic emotions like fear are, and perhaps it is because the members of the society belong to different sub-cultures or hold different evaluative standards. In my view, these cultural or other kinds of difference in evaluative standards are hardly accountable without recourse to some sort of higher cognitive thinking of human beings mediated by their capacity to use language, and it seems to me that the second kind of view of emotions, labeled somewhat negatively as “quasi-judgmentalism” by D’Arms and Jacobson, could provide a very promising theory for explaining the types of emotions that some scholars call “higher cognitive emotions.”

What, then, is the relevance of all these contemporary theories of emotions to my study of the ancient Chinese view of emotions in Kongzi and Mengzi? I believe that many ancient Chinese emotions discussed in the Analects and the Mencius are best described as belonging to the category of “higher cognitive emotions,” and that the best view of emotions with which to interpret these thinkers’ ideas on emotions is the second of the three kinds of contemporary theories of emotions summarized above. Many versions of this theory have been proposed so far, but I find Robert Roberts’ seminal theory of emotions as concern-based construals published in 1988 especially insightful and useful for my study of Mengzi’s view of emotions. In a nutshell, emotions in Roberts are particular ways in which things present themselves to the person who feels those emotions, and one’s construal of things in a certain situation—i.e. the particular way in which one interprets the situation one is in—is largely determined by what one’s primary long-term or short-term concern is in the situation in question. For example, if a

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31 Ibid., p. 100.
32 Bennett Helm also provides a similar view of emotions in his Emotional Reason (Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 2001), and Roberts develops his “sketch” to a full-fledged theory of emotions in his Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology (Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 2003).
person felt some sort of painful distress at the sight of a baby about to fall into a well and ran to the rescue of it, that person’s feeling of distress is primarily her construal of the situation as one where an innocent being is endangered, and such a construal is possible only when she is concerned about the welfare of the baby in particular or the welfare of other beings in general. This example is discussed by Mengzi himself when he explains his first ethical “sprout” (duān 端) cèyǐn zhī xīn 創隱之心 (“familial affection” or “sympathy”), and in Chapter 4 below I argue that this view of emotion as a concern-based construal provides us with the best interpretation of Mengzi’s view emotions.

1.4.2 Reason and Emotion in Mengzi’s Ethical Thought

As I have briefly mentioned above, the burst of research on emotions during the past several decades has much to do with the new appreciation of the positive roles emotions are supposed to play in our everyday life. This new attitude toward emotions is most explicit in Robert Solomon, one of the earliest proponents of the judgmentalist view of emotions:

Against the near-platitude “emotions are irrational,” we want to argue that emotions are rational. This is not only to say that they fit into one’s overall behavior in a significant way, that they follow a regular pattern (one’s “personality”), that they can be explained in terms of a coherent set of causes. No doubt this is all true. But emotions...are judgments, and so emotions can be rational in the same sense in which judgments can be rational....Judgments are actions. Like all actions, they are aimed at changing the world....[And] if emotions are judgments, and judgments are actions, though covert, emotions too are actions, aimed at changing the world....In other words, emotions are purposive, serve the ends of the subject, and consequently can be explained by reasons or “in order to” explanations.33

That is, Solomon argues that emotions are not passive occurrences but active judgments that one purposively makes with an intention to change the world, and such emotions are fully explicable in terms of reasons or what goals of the subject they are supposed to serve. However, judgmentalists are not the only proponents of the “rationality of emotions” thesis. Although based on different kinds of data and with diverse

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philosophical agendas in mind, many scholars tend to agree that emotions are analogous to perception, and that emotions can be considered to be rational in the sense that they often provide us with an indispensable basis for more conventional way of reasoning such as calculation or means-ends reasoning, by letting us perceptively focus on a set of features of the situation in question that are relevant to us in terms of our goals and concerns at the moment while safely neglecting the other irrelevant features. Moreover, scholars in evolutionary psychology of emotion point out that certain emotions that seem to conflict with calculative rationality can be considered to be rational from a larger perspective. For example, one’s resentment at an unfair bargain and consequently drawing out of it altogether may be locally irrational in the light of the gain one could still make by participating in the bargain, but such irrationality can be globally rational if it can prevent one’s bargaining partner from making further exploitations in the future bargaining situations.

Along with these positive views of emotions recently proposed in the contemporary Western discourse on emotions, we find a series of scholars in Chinese philosophy making similar claims, especially on Mengzi’s view of emotions. The most pronounced among such scholars is David Wong, who proposed that there is no distinction between reason and emotion in Mengzi’s ethical thought. According to Wong, emotions in Mengzi have essential cognitive function built in, due to their having an intentional object. For example, when one sees a child about to fall into a well, the observer of the disquieting scene would normally feel compassion for the child. And her compassion, in Wong’s view, besides the phenomenal quality of alarm and distress and its accompanying physiological changes, also contains the perception of the child in suffering or in danger. In other words, one’s compassion for the endangered child as its intentional object, and makes the child’s suffering, whether actual or forthcoming, appear to be the salient feature of the situation. However, Wong argues, the cognitive function of compassion has more to contribute to one’s moral deliberation, because one’s compassion for the endangered child recognizes the child’s suffering as a reason to act to prevent or stop the suffering. In other words, “[t]he intentional object of

compassion identifies the suffering of a sentient being not only as the salient feature of
the situation, but as a reason for acting in helping ways.”

Wong’s view of Mengzian emotion as non-distinguishable from reason apparently
reflects the new direction of contemporary discourse on emotions summarized above, but
this view is by no means a new one. Traditionally, it has been an undisputable assumption
among Sinologists and scholars in Chinese philosophy that the faculty of the human mind
in ancient China, referred to by the character “xīn 心, contains both the cognitive
function and the affective or emotional function due to the etymological origin of the
character “xīn 心 as referring to the heart, arguably the most important body part of a
human being but also the locus of a variety of mental activities for the ancient Chinese.
Taking this assumption one step further, most scholars translate “xīn 心 as either “heart-
mind” or “heart-and-mind,” implying that the cognitive mental activity of thinking
and the affective activity of feeling occur in an interrelated manner in the same faculty of
xīn 心. This assumption of no rigid distinction between mind and body, thinking and
feeling, and reason and emotion in ancient China is so deeply ingrained in the minds of
many Sinologists and scholars in Chinese philosophy that even David Nivison, one of the
finest scholars in Chinese philosophy, holds that Mengzi postulated only one source of
morality, viz. his four moral sprouts in the form of emotion, and that such emotions
embody correct moral judgments and reside in one’s xīn 心.

However, this view of ancient Chinese psychology in general and more
specifically of the relationship between “reason” and emotion in Mengzi is as dubious
and potentially misleading as it is fascinating. It is dubious, because this view of
“embodied mind” or “emotional reason” seems to coincide a little too nicely with the
heightened attention on the positive aspect of the body and emotion in the West for the
past several decades. And it is potentially misleading, because such an emphasis on the
blurred boundaries between mind and body or reason and emotion in ancient China tends

36 Wong, “Is There a Distinction Between Reason and Emotion in Mencius?” p. 32.
37 For example, Kwong-loi Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
38 For example, Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Confucian Self Cultivation and Mengzi’s Notion of Extension,” chap. in
Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi, ed. Xiusheng Liu and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Indianapolis, IN:
39 David S. Nivison, “Two Roots or One?” chap. in The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese
to make us overlook a large part of the ancient Chinese philosophical discourse that was devoted to answering such questions as 1) how one could arrive at a correct moral judgment when multiple moral emotions or ethical concerns conflict with each other, 2) what kinds of psychological resources are available for one to overcome one’s pathological desires and carry out one’s ethical judgment successfully, and 3) what kind of self-cultivation practice one should engage in to become a desirable moral agent who not only thinks and acts properly but also feels in the right way. These questions respectively correspond to the three important ethical realms of moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral cultivation that I mentioned earlier, and I believe that these topics cannot be adequately explored without postulating a serious degree of “disembodied mind” or meaningful distance between reason and emotion in ancient Chinese thought. The following chapters are my efforts to draw a balanced picture of Kongzi’s and Mengzi’s view of emotions on these matters.
Chapter Two

Qíng 情, Hàowù 好惡, and Kongzi’s Conception of Emotion

The main purpose of Chapters 2 and 3 is to provide a background research of some of the ethically important emotions in ancient China. The following three Chapters (Chs.4–6) are devoted to the study of the development of ethical theories of emotions mainly in Mengzi, and this and the next chapter (Chs.2 and 3) are intended to explore the theoretical background of this development by a study of the Analects. This chapter, specifically, investigates Kongzi’s conception of emotion by elaborating insightful implications embodied primarily in his remarks on the concepts of qíng 情 and hàowù 好惡.

The Analects is the most trusted anthology of Kongzi’s teachings, and Kongzi is not only the founder of the Confucian tradition but also the first substantial thinker in the history of Chinese philosophy, whose ideas are further developed by his theoretical descendents and severely criticized by many of his later opponents. In addition, as will be clear in the following, the Analects is an extremely rich text in terms of the number of particular emotion terms it contains as well as of the great influence it had on the later development of diverse views of emotions in different schools. In this light, it will be most reasonable to start our investigation of emotions in ancient China from the Analects.

2.1 Qing 情

When one proposes to study emotions in a certain text, the first question she encounters could be whether there is any general conception of emotion in the text, which binds all of the particular emotion terms occurring in the text together and give them a meaningful
structure. One might start searching for such a generic conception of emotion in the *Analects* by seeing whether there is any single term in the text that roughly corresponds to certain generic English words such as ‘emotion,’ ‘passion,’ or ‘sentiment,’ but unfortunately we do not have any such term in the *Analects*. We do have a number of passages in later texts (from 4th to 2nd centuries B.C.E.) in which ‘qing’ 情 explicitly refers to prima facie emotions such as hào 好 (“liking”), wù 恶 (“disliking”), xǐ 喜 (“joy”), nù 怒 (“anger”), āi 哀 (“sorrow”), and lè 樂 (“pleasure,” i.e. the feeling of happiness, satisfaction, or enjoyment). However, one can doubt that this is also the case in the *Analects*, thinking that qíng in the *Analects* (and the other roughly contemporaneous texts also) designates primarily “facts about a situation” rather than referring to particular emotions.

This is a reasonable view, and I agree with it to a large extent. However, although we cannot equate ‘qing’ in the *Analects* directly with particular emotions, I think that we can find a substantial link between the later usage of qing as referring to emotions and the two instances of qíng in the *Analects*. As I see it, this link is not merely a coincidence but a sign of an important theoretical aspect of the conception of qíng, which is commonly found in later theories of emotions. In this section I try to clarify this link just mentioned, and my discussion of qíng below takes the following three steps. First, I briefly introduce the two instances of qíng in the *Analects*. Second, I summarize two of the dominant interpretations of qíng in the early Chinese texts, which I think tend to overemphasize the factual aspect of qíng at the expense of its emotional or affective aspect. Third, I try to balance this traditional interpretation of qíng through my analysis of several important instances of qíng from the *Guóyǔ* 国語, and propose an alternative, more comprehensive interpretation of qíng that reconciles the so-called factual and affective aspects of qíng more successfully than other interpretations.

2.1.1 *Qíng* 情 in the *Analects*

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1 For example, “性之好惡喜怒哀樂，謂之情.” *Xúnzǐ* 荀子, “Zhèngmíng” 正名. Lǐ Dīshēng, *Xúnzǐ jíshì*, p. 506.
2 This phrase is from Shun, *Mencius and Early Chinese Thought*, p. 184. Also see pp. 183–187 of this book for a detailed explanation of the meaning of qíng 情 in various early Chinese texts. His analysis of qíng will be discussed shortly.
First, the two instances of *qing* in the *Analects*: (1) When a disciple of Zēngzǐ 曾子 (Zēngzǐ himself was one of Kongzi’s disciples) became a judge (shìshī 士師) in the Lǔ dukedom, Zēngzǐ thus advises him: “Those above have lost their way, and the commoners [consequently] have been drifting digressively for a long time. If you could extract any truth from them [in interrogation], then be sorrowful and pitiful instead of being joyful [about your ability]!” In this passage, *qing* probably means the facts about a case under interrogation, and it seems to have nothing to do with one’s emotions or feelings that could be regarded as internal in contrast to the external facts about a criminal case.

(2) On the other hand, in another passage Kongzi says that “If those in the above like rituals, then none of the commoners will dare to be disrespectful; if those in the above like righteousness, then none of the commoners will dare to be disobedient; if those in the above like trustworthiness, then none of the commoners will dare to be insincere.” In this passage, the phrase “yòngqíng” 用情 describes the way commoners deal with their superiors—they are sincere and never deceive their superiors. However, it is not clear here whether *qing* refers to the facts about a certain situation as in the previous passage or it could be broad enough to include the way one really feels and sees things—i.e. one’s feelings and opinions in a certain situation. If the latter were the case, “yòngqíng” 用情, literally “using [one's] *qing,*” could mean that the commoners are honest in informing their superiors not only of what they did wrong in interrogations but also of their opinions and affective reactions in politically important situations, so that the superiors could not only make correct judicial judgments but also come up with reasonable policies based on a realistic basis.

2.1.2 Two Interpretations of *Qíng* 情 in Early Chinese Texts and Beyond

According to Kwong-loi Shun’s analysis of *qing* in the early Chinese texts, *qing* seems to

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3 “上失其道，民散久矣，如得其情，則哀矜而勿喜!” *Lunyu* 19:19. The underlined words correspond to ‘*qing*’ in the original text. Same for the translation of the next passage.

be used in roughly two related but distinct ways.\(^5\) First, it is often used to refer to the facts about a situation or certain facts about an object of observation. For example, in making a judicial judgment, one should be guided by the \textit{qing} or the facts about the situation;\(^6\) and in governing a country, it is important for the superiors to understand the \textit{qing} of their subordinates, or to know who are the good people and who are bad.\(^7\) Second, when \textit{qing} is used for a certain object in the context of ‘\textit{X} zhī qíng (\textit{X} 之情), the \textit{qing} of \textit{X}),’ then it often refers to certain characteristic features of \textit{X}’s as a class, revealing what things of this kind really are or do. For example, it is said in the \textit{Lǔshì chūnqiū} 吕氏春秋 that the \textit{qing} of the sense organs is to desire their proper objects,\(^8\) and the \textit{qing} of human beings is to desire longevity, safety, honor, and comfort, and to hate short life, danger, shame, and hardship.\(^9\)

Shun provides a detailed and very useful analysis of \textit{qing}, and at the same time he carefully avoids making a suspicious theoretical commitment to Aristotelian metaphysics that Angus Graham is often accused of having made.\(^{10}\) In any event, in his seminal study of \textit{qing}, Graham seems to understand \textit{qing} in a similar way to Shun’s. That is, he also seems to think that \textit{qing} means ‘facts’ or ‘what is genuine’ when used of situations, but it means ‘essence’ when used of things. For after pointing out that \textit{qing} in many early Chinese texts means ‘the facts’ as a noun, ‘genuine’ as an adjective, and ‘genuinely’ as an adverb,\(^{11}\) Graham argues:

\textit{In philosophy qing is generally used not of situations (‘the facts’) but of things. The qing of \textit{X} is ‘what is genuinely \textit{X} in it’, ‘what \textit{X} essentially is’, often contrasted with its xing 形}

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9 “人之情，欲壽而惡夭，欲安而惡危，欲榮而惡辱，欲逸而惡勞．” Ibid.
10 For example, see Shun, \textit{Mencius and Early Chinese Thought}, p. 185, and Hansen, “Qing (Emotions) in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought,” p. 195.

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‘shape’ or mao 貌 ‘guise, demeanor’…Qing is common in definitions and quasi-definitions; the most convenient equivalent, but with dangerous Aristotelian associations, is “essence.”\textsuperscript{12}

And from a close analysis of a passage from the Zhuāngzǐ, he “deduce[s] a definition of qíng”:

*The qing of X is what X cannot lack if it is to be called “X”.*\textsuperscript{13}

However, there is another important usage of qíng that seems to have been given relatively less attention by Shun and Graham. As I see it, qíng is not only used to refer to characteristic features of things belonging to the same kind; for when it is used of human beings, qíng can also refer to certain psychological items in an individual’s mind, the contents of which might characterize the individual in one way or another and possibly distinguish him from others. These “psychological items” can include one’s goals and aspirations, one’s opinions about a politically important situation, emotional or affective reactions toward a certain object, deep-seated evaluative judgments of things, and so forth. And all of these psychological items can contribute to one’s character and reveal what kind of person she is. Let me take several examples from the Guóyǔ 國語.

(1) Before waging war against the neighboring country Wú 吳,\textsuperscript{14} Gōu Jiàn 句踐—the king of Yuè 越—summons his five ministers and asks what would bring about victory. And Gōu Jiàn, asking for their opinions, urges them to speak their qíng instead of just flattering him, because he will make an important decision based on their opinions. The five ministers take turns and say what they think is most important to prevail in the war, and qíng here could be best translated as ‘genuine opinions.’ And that the qíng or genuine opinions of these five ministers are all different from each other shows that qíng in this case can vary from person to person and does not refer to either facts about a situation or characteristic features of a species, or even “essence” of the species.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 50.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 52.
\textsuperscript{14} This war between Wú 吳 and Yuè 越 was in 473 B.C.E., and it resulted in the destruction of Wú 吳.
(2) In 655 B.C.E., Chóng’ěr 重耳—a prince of the Jin 晉 dukedom who later becomes the famous Jin wēngōng 晉文公—flees to a neighboring country Dí 狄, having been unjustly accused of being part of the alleged trial of regicide. One year later his brother Yíwú 尹吾, who was under the same false accusation and also had to flee, considers following his elder brother to Dí 狄 and staying together with him there. At this, one of Yíwú’s vassals Ji Rúì 冀芮 objects to this idea and suggests going to a different country for several reasons, and one of those reasons involves qíng: “Also, [even if two parties] went into exile together, it is difficult for them to return hand in hand. For if two parties stay together with different hearts, then they [definitely] come to hate each other. It is better [for us] to go to Liáng 梁.”16

Here we have the expression ‘yìqíng (異情)’ which literally means ‘make one’s qíng different,’ and I suggest interpreting qíng here as referring broadly to some of the following things: 1) Yíwú’s desire or aspiration to become the ruler of his home country, which can be difficult to fulfill and possibly conflicts with Chóng’ěr’s if Chóng’ěr also had the same desire; and 2) Yíwú’s relative indifference to the well-being of Chóng’ěr or even hostility to him, which is likely to be fermented by his awareness that the existence of Chóng’ěr can be a big obstacle for advancing his interest, viz. achieving the dukedom.

In my translation above, I used ‘heart’ as a term embracing these desiderative and affective elements of qíng. And this interpretation of mine is partly corroborated by the facts that these two brothers both returned to their home country later at different times and succeeded to the dukedom one after the other, and that Yíwú, who became the ruler of his country before his elder brother, tried to kill Chóng’ěr so that he could not challenge his rulership in the future.17

(3) A certain Yíng 嬴 happens to host a person named Yáng Chùfǔ 陽處父 as an overnight guest to his house. By the elegant manner and magnificent appearance of Yáng Chùfǔ, Yíng takes Yang as the kind of nobleman he has been longing for meeting, and

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decides to follow and serve him. However, before long Ying departs from Yáng Chùfŭ and comes back home disappointed, and says the following to his wife:

I wanted him after seeing his appearance, but hated him after listening to his words. In general, appearance is the flowering of [one’s] qíng, and words are the most crucial of [one’s] appearance. Qíng originates in oneself, and matures inside; and words are ornamental patterns of oneself. Ornate words can initiate it [i.e. an action], but an action can be complete only when [one’s qíng, words, and appearance] are united; otherwise [the action will be] defective...Now, Master Yáng’s qíng is clear to me: He is covering his defects with rounded manner; he is stubborn and places high value on ability; and he does not care about the fundamentals [of morality] and trespasses against other people—[this way,] he is [making himself] the target of [everyone’s] rancor. I am afraid that I will get in trouble before reaping any benefit from his company; this is why I parted from him.18

This passage reveals us several important aspects of qíng. First, qíng is considered as deep-seated in the innermost place of one’s mind. Although it is expressed through one’s words and manners to a certain extent, one’s external manners and speeches do not always represent one’s inner qíng correctly; careful observation over a substantial period of time is needed to know about a person’s qíng correctly. Second, qíng in this passage refers to the peculiar character of a person, which distinguishes him from others. Specifically, Yáng Chùfŭ’s qíng or his character revealed afterwards to Ying includes such things as temper, evaluative judgment, and certain tendency or habitual way of behaving: Yáng’s stubbornness, his high esteem on people’s abilities (presumably as opposed to their virtues), and his frequent infringement on other people’s authorities. Third, Ying’s affective response to Yáng’s defective character in turn reveals Ying’s qíng or his character: Ying likes or desires [to be with] noblemen, and hates or despises those of low character. It is clear here also that Ying’s qíng comprises the elements of evaluative judgments and affective responses of liking and disliking.

So far, I have argued based on the three Guóyǔ passages above that in addition to ‘facts’ of a situation and ‘characteristic features’ of a certain category of things, qíng also refers to what is sitting deeply in an individual’s mind in the forms of sincere opinions,

goals or aspirations, desires for certain objects, a certain kind of temper, evaluative judgments, or certain characteristic behavioral patterns. And I have also emphasized that this last sense of qíng is not the features belonging to a certain species in general but to an individual human being, thus often distinguishing the possessor of those features from others. Now resuming my previous discussion of the two instances of qíng in the Analects, this last sense of qíng seems to support the interpretation that I suggested above for the second Analects passage in question (i.e. Lunyu 13:4). That is, 1) as long as qíng can be reasonably understood as referring to some of the various psychological items enumerated above when it is used for individual human beings, and 2) since the phrase ‘yòngqíng (用情)’ can be a shortened form of ‘yòng qíqíng (用其情),’ i.e. “using their qíng” as opposed to “using the neutral facts” so to speak, I think it is reasonable to interpret the phrase ‘yòngqíng (用情)’ as not only telling the truth in interrogation but also being broadly sincere about the way one feels and sees various things.

2.1.3 A More Comprehensive Interpretation of Qíng 情

At this point, it should be made clear where I am going with this point. What I would like to ultimately derive from this point is that the use of qíng 情 in Lunyu 13:4 makes one of the earliest cases in which qíng can refer to emotions among other things, thus letting us anticipate the more explicit use of qíng for emotions in later texts. However, in order to make this point convincing, I need to address the following two questions first: 1) What is the relationship between the two instances of qíng in the Analects; or more broadly, what is the relationship between the qíng in the sense of ‘facts’ or ‘characteristic features’ on one hand and the qíng as diverse psychological items including emotions? I need to answer this question because one would expect that as long as qíng is not a word of drastically different meanings, there be some link between these two senses of qíng, and my interpretation of the qíng 情 in Lunyu 13:4 as referring to emotions will be more convincing if I could explain the semantic link between the two instances of qíng in the Analects. 2) As I have raised an example above, qíng refers explicitly to emotions in later texts such as the Xùnzì and the Lìjì. Then, again, what is the relationship between the qíng
as referring to emotions in these texts and the qìng as referring to diverse psychological items having volitional, affective, or even sometimes judgmental aspects as in the Guóyǔ? Since I base my ultimate point that the use of qìng 情 in Lunyu 13:4 makes one of the earliest cases in which qìng can refer to emotions on the previous three Guóyǔ passages, it will make my point more convincing if I could establish a strong connection between the conception of qìng in these Guóyǔ passages and the qìng in later texts such as the Xúnzǐ and the Lǐjì in which it refers more explicitly to emotions.

As an answer for the first question, I would like to modify Graham’s hypothesis about the meaning change of qìng from ‘facts’ or ‘essence’ in the pre-Han literature to ‘passions’ in later times. According to him, the meaning of qìng in the pre-Han literature is only ‘facts’ or ‘what a thing genuinely is,’ but it comes to mean ‘passions’ in later times, especially since the neo-Confucianism of the Sòng 宋 dynasty (960–1279 C.E.), because passions were considered by the so-called ritualistic Confucian school as what is genuine in human beings and not imposed from the outside. Graham says:

We find a slightly different use of ch’ing [qìng] in the ritualistic school of Confucianism, in Hsün-tzu [Xúnzǐ] and the Li chi [Lǐjì], where ch’ing is the genuine and unassumed, in contrast with the mao 貌 ‘guise, demeanour’ which is wen 文 ‘patterned, refined’ in obedience to the rites. In these texts, but nowhere else in pre-Han literature, the word refers only to the genuine in man which it is polite to disguise, and therefore to his feelings. ¹⁹

As I see it, this hypothesis contains two important points, and I would like to keep one point while rejecting the other. First, I agree with Graham that the qìng as originally meaning ‘what a thing genuinely is’ is very likely to have come to refer to what Graham calls “passions.”³² For passions, or what I would prefer to call emotions, are considered as indispensable for human life in many early Chinese philosophical texts such as the Analects and the Zhuāngzǐ, and in that sense emotions are what make a human being genuinely a human being. In this sense, I find a firm continuation of meaning between

³² Graham’s “passions” refer to the same things as what I would call “emotions.” An example is the following list of emotions in the Xúnzǐ: 好 好 (“liking”), 勝 (“disliking”), 喜 喜 (“joy”), 怒 怒 (“anger”), 哀 哀 (“sorrow”), and 樂 樂 (“pleasure,” i.e. the feeling of happiness, satisfaction, or enjoyment). Xúnzǐ 荀子 “Zhèngmíng” 正名. Li Dishēng, Xúnzǐ jīshì, p. 506.
‘what a thing genuinely is’ and ‘emotions,’ because the former is a formal definition of qíng which is substantiated by the latter in the case of human beings. Moreover, this continuum could be extended a little further towards both ends: At one end, if qíng is what makes a certain thing genuinely that thing, then qíng is what reveals the true reality of that thing. Likewise, when qíng is used for a situation, then the qíng of that situation is what reveals the reality about that situation, namely the facts about the situation. And at the other end of the continuum, even if emotions are what make humans really humans, this fact does not preclude that such emotions vary from person to person in terms of their degree and objects, and this in turn allows that the qíng of an individual can be the characteristic features of that person which might distinguish him from others.

However, I do not agree with Graham that qíng came to mean “passions” or emotions only in the post-Han period. For I have already shown previously that the use of qíng as referring to various inner psychological items including emotions is a quite established linguistic phenomenon in the Guóyù, which is definitely a pre-Han text. At this, Graham might want to distinguish between qíng’s referring to passions (or emotions in my term) and its meaning passions, and say that although qíng in the Xúnzǐ and the Lǐjì refers to passions, it is doubtful that the word yet means ‘passion.’ However, this distinction between meaning and reference does not seem to make much sense, because if we could identify a strong semantic continuum between ‘what a thing genuinely is’ and ‘emotions’ as I have just argued, then we hardly need any such distinction.

The second question that I raised above was about the relationship between the qíng as referring to emotions (as found in such texts as the Xúnzǐ and the Lǐjì) and the qíng as referring to diverse psychological items from volitions and affections to evaluative judgments (as in the Guóyù). In other words, the question is whether there is a strong connection between the qíng as emotions (the Xúnzǐ and the Lǐjì) and the qíng as the “various psychological items” (the Guóyù), and my answer is very positive. There are several reasons for my thinking in this way.

First, one of the most crucial characteristics of qíng is that it is considered as originally maturing inside before receiving any kind of influence from the outside, and this feature is equally true for both the instance of qíng in the Xúnzǐ and the Lǐjì and the

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“qing” in the *Guóyǔ*. Examine the following two passages respectively from the *Xúnzǐ* and the *Lǐjì* first:

*Our nature’s liking and disliking, joy and anger, sorrow and pleasure, is called ‘the genuine in us.’ … ‘[Our] nature’ is the tendency which is from Heaven [i.e. Nature], and ‘the genuine in us’ is the substance of our nature.*

*What is meant by ‘the genuine in man’? Joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hatred, and desire—we are capable of these seven [emotions] without learning.*

In the first passage, Xunzi is clear that the six emotions of human beings are the materialization of natural human tendency in response to external objects, and the following *Lǐjì* passage says that such emotional responses of human beings to external objects are completely spontaneous and natural, at least in the earlier stage of human life, or before one launches on moral self-cultivation. Now let us look back at the three *Guóyǔ* passages quoted above. As I said, the ‘qing’ in the first passage of the three refers to ‘genuine opinions,’ and it is contrasted with flattering words which conceal one’s sincere, innermost thoughts. And in the second *Guóyǔ* passage, one’s aspiration to and desire for dukedom and hostility towards a rival who is pursuing the same goal are definitely inside, originating from one’s inherent desire for honor and power. And finally in the third passage, it is said that “qing originates in oneself and matures inside.” Combining these three and comparing them with the two *Xúnzǐ* and *Lǐjì* passages above, we could see that both the *Xúnzǐ* and *Lǐjì* passages and the *Guóyǔ* passages implicitly share the inside/outside dichotomy and considers qing as concerning the former, which is the realm of absolute freedom and spontaneity and whose response is originally free from the external influence such as a need to please authorities or dress up oneself by concealing one’s desires according to social norms.

Second, in both the *Xúnzǐ* and *Lǐjì* passages and the *Guóyǔ* passages, hàowù 好惡 (liking and disliking, or desire and aversion, or preference), which can be considered as

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emotions, equally occupy the most important place among the instances of qíng, or play the most crucial role in the workings of qíng. Let us start from the Guóyǔ passages this time. Unfortunately, it is not clear how hàowù are related to the qíng in the first Guóyǔ passage as ‘genuine opinions.’ For the ‘genuine opinion’ in that passage is one’s sincere thought about what is the best way to win in a war, and one’s judgment about the best means to the victory seems to have hardly anything to do with one’s personal preference. However, the situation is much different in the second and the third passages. For if Yiwú’s qíng in the second Guóyǔ passage can be interpreted as his aspiration to or desire for the dukedom and his hatred for his elder brother who could turn out to be the biggest obstacle for achieving his goal later, then the very contents of Yiwú’s qíng becomes his liking (hào 好) of the dukedom and disliking (wù 恶) of his elder brother. And in the third passage from the Guóyǔ above, Yang’s problematic high esteem on people’s abilities as opposed to virtues and his frequent infringement on other people’s authorities tell us enough about what would be the primary objects of his desires, and Yíng’s desire to be with well-cultivated noblemen and his aversion to Yang’s low character constitute the very contents of Yíng’s qíng.

Now as for the Xúnzǐ and Lǐjì passages, those passages themselves do not tell us the same point as straightforwardly. For both passages seem simply to enumerate six or seven emotions without making any apparent effort to single out hàowù from others. However, considering that the beginning of a list is usually more important than the end of the list and the end than the middle, we could say that hàowù are the most important emotions in Xunzi’s list (footnote 22), and xīnù 喜怒 the most representative in the list from the Líjì (footnote 23). And we can also see in the Líjì passage that hàowù, in the form of ‘wùyù (惡欲),’ still occupy the second important place in the list. Then, what do all these mean? As I see it, combined with the evidence provided in the next several paragraphs, they mean that 1) hàowù 好惡 are distinguished in kind from other emotions such as xī nù ài lè 喜怒哀樂, and that 2) xīnù 喜怒 represent all of the particular emotions except for hàowù 好惡. Now let us examine some evidence for these theses.

(1) To begin with, take a look at the following two passages from the Huáinánzǐ

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24 Hào 好, ài 愛, and yù 欲 are sometimes interchangeable in some of the important ancient Chinese philosophical texts. This point will be argued more explicitly in a later section (2.2.2.1).
It is one’s nature from Heaven that one is born tranquil, and it is harmful to one’s nature that [one’s mind] is to move after being stimulated. When an object approaches, one’s spirit responds, and this is the movement of one’s intellect. And when one’s intellect contacts [external] objects, liking and hatred consequently arise. However, when liking and hatred once formed their shapes, if one’s intellect is attracted away to the outside and one cannot put oneself back [to its original position], then one’s heavenly principles are destroyed.  

It is one’s nature from Heaven that one is born tranquil, and it is [according to] one’s nature’s desire that [one’s mind] moves when it is stimulated by [external] objects. And liking and disliking shape after objects have arrived and one’s intellect has grasped them. However, if liking and disliking are not moderated inside and one’s intellect is attracted away to the outside, and [in addition] one fails to turn oneself back, then one’s heavenly principles are destroyed.

These two passages are very similar not only in content but also in form, and typically represent people’s dominant view about human nature, desire, intellect, emotion, and external objects from the late Warring States period, say, 3rd century B.C.E., throughout the Qin and Han times (221 B.C.E. — 220 C.E.). According to this view, the originally tranquil human nature comes to respond to the stimulation of external objects by generating two gross types of emotional responses, viz. liking and disliking (or desire and aversion), and one is supposed to moderate one’s desire and aversion in order to keep one’s heavenly nature intact. In any event, what is important to us in this psychological picture is that 1) liking and disliking or desire and aversion are two primary responses that one’s nature issues in reaction to external objects, and 2) from the fact that other

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27 The second of these two passages is also found almost verbatim in Shìjì 史記, “Yuèshū” 業書. Zhōng-huá ed., p. 1186, and another similar passage is found in Lǎshí chūnqiū 呂氏春秋, “Chíyuè” 賦樂. Chén Qíyuó, Lǎshí chūnqiū jíāoshì, p. 266. The observation of the similarity among the two translated passages in the text and the just mentioned Lǎshí chūnqiū passage has been originally made in Chang Won-Tae, “Ch’ŏng’guksidae insŏngnon ŭi hyŏngsong gwa chŏng’gae e gwahan yŏng’gu” [A study on the formation and development of the theories of human nature in the Warring States period] (Ph. D diss., Seoul National University, 2005), pp. 91–92.
emotional responses such as joy or anger are not mentioned, we could assume that 齊好惡
have priority to other emotional responses in this picture. And this assumption will
be confirmed right in the next paragraph by examining a passage from the 左傳.

(2) The following passage is an excerpt from the conversation between 子大叔 and 趙簡子, two nobles respectively from 鄭 and 晉 dukedoms. In this conversation 子大叔 explains the meanings and functions of the
rituals, and his explanation involves presenting a folk-psychological view of the
emotional structure of people’s mind, which 子大叔 ascribes to 趙簡子, a
renowned previous minister of his home country:

People have desire and aversion, joy and anger, sorrow and pleasure, which originate
[respectively] from the six types of qi [i.e. yin and yang, wind and rain, darkness and
brightness]…When sad, [people] cry and weep; when happy, they sing and dance; when
pleased, they distribute goods; when angry, they fight. Joy comes from [the satisfaction
of] desire, and anger comes from [the feeling of] aversion. For this reason, [the ruler]
controls [people’s] life and death by recourse to careful action and faithful order, fortune
and misfortune, and reward and punishment. Life is a good thing and death is a bad
ing, and pleasure [comes from encountering] a good thing, and sorrow [comes from
encountering] a bad thing. And if one does not make any mistake concerning joy and
sorrow, then he can take part in the nature of Heaven and Earth and enjoy a long life.28

What we have to extract for now from this rich and occasionally unclear remark is that
the two pairs of emotions, i.e. joy and anger on one hand and sorrow and pleasure on the
other, are considered as respectively originating from one’s liking and disliking, or desire
and aversion (齊好惡). However, concerning the two immediately previous passages,
I notified that 齊好惡 are two gross types of emotional responses to the stimulation of
external objects. Now, given that emotions are a certain kind of responses to their various
objects, how are we to understand the saying that joy and anger, and sorrow and pleasure
are all derived from 齊好惡? In other words, how can emotions originate from another set

28 “民有好惡喜怒哀樂，生于六氣…哀有哭泣，樂有歌舞，喜有施舍，怒有戰鬪，喜生於好，怒生於惡，是
故審行信令，禍福賞罰，以制死生。生，好物也，死，惡物也。好物，樂也，惡物，哀也。哀樂不失，
of emotions? Is this not some sort of category mistake?

In my view, we might be able to solve this problem by distinguishing broad and narrow conceptions of emotion and postulating that in ancient Chinese philosophy, hàowù are emotions of different kind (broad ones) from the other emotions (narrow ones). In order to substantiate this interpretive hypothesis, I would like to introduce John Rawls’s conception of attitude and venture to interpret hàowù as a set of opposite attitudes in Rawls’s sense. According to him, an attitude is a set of ordered families of dispositions,\(^\text{29}\) and love is a good example of such a natural attitude. For love, which is often no doubt considered as an emotion, consists of a set of dispositions such as the disposition to feel joy at the presence of the person one loves and the disposition to feel sorrow when one’s loved one suffers.\(^\text{30}\) Perhaps we could regard attitudes of this type as emotions broadly conceived. Now, this natural attitude of love seems to me very similar in kind to hào 好, and I would like to regard hào 好 as one of such natural attitudes of human beings. For we have already seen in the Zūozhuàn passage above that 1) xǐ 喜 (“joy”) and nù 怒 (“anger”) derive respectively from hào 好 and wù 恶, and that 2) lè 樂 (“pleasure”) and ēi 哀 (“sorrow”) arise respectively by encountering good and bad things. Based on these two statements and also considering that joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure are all on an equal status, it is quite clear that hàowù or desire and aversion are two opposite attitudes consisting of dispositions to be expressed as joy or pleasure and anger or sorrow respectively, depending on the object one encounters.

(3) In many Warring States period philosophical texts, xǐnù 喜怒 seem to be often used as a general representative of emotions. However, hàowù 好惡 do not seem to be part of the emotions represented by xǐnù. Rather, they often enjoy a special status. First, compare the following two passages:

You [i.e. Kongzi] are studying between benevolence and righteousness,…trying to make your desire and aversion in accordance with your principles, and trying to make your moderated joy and anger harmonious. However, you are almost doomed to fail.\(^\text{31}\)

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\(^\text{30}\) Ibid., p. 426.

\(^\text{31}\) “子審仁義之間…理好惡之情，和喜怒之節，而幾於不免矣.” *Zhuāngzǐ*, “Yūfū” 漁夫. Guō Qingfān 郭
It is called equanimity that joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure have not yet arisen; and it is called harmony that those emotions are all expressed to the moderate degree.  

Moderation and harmony of emotions were an important philosophical topic in the Warring States period and throughout the Han times. And we see in these passages that emotions are sometimes referred to by enumerating joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure, but sometimes mentioning only the first two of them is enough. Now look at the following two passages:

*People have the attitudes of desire and aversion; but [if they] have no [means to generate] the responses of joy and anger, then [they fall into] disorder.*

*Rituals...are [the means with which one can] moderate one’s desire and aversion and make one’s joy and anger appropriate.*

In these two passages, desire and aversion (hàowù) clearly stand outside the boundary of particular emotions represented by joy and anger (xīnù). We might reasonably try to understand these passages through the distinction between attitudes as a broad conception of emotion and emotions per se that I sketched above.

My lengthy discussion so far throughout a number of passages provided in groups (1), (2), and (3) above boils down to the point that hàowù occupy a crucial place among the emotions mentioned in the original Xúnzǐ and Lìjì passages, such that particular emotions, primarily joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure, are different expressions of human’s two general attitudes toward external objects, viz. hàowù. This point in turn establishes strong affinity between the Xúnzǐ and Lìjì passages in question and the three Guóyù passages discussed above, and the importance of hàowù in these three Guóyù passages and its connection with the later use of qíng in the Xúnzǐ and Lìjì passages as referring to emotions support my claim that Lunyu 13:4 is one of the earlier cases in

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33 “夫民有好惡之情而無喜怒之應，則亂．” Xúnzǐ, “Yuélùn” 業論, Lǐ Díshēng 劉狄聖, Xúnzǐ jíshì, p. 460.

which *qing* can refer to emotions. Nevertheless, *qing* still occurs only twice in the *Analects*, and it is very difficult to illuminate Kongzi’s ethical view of emotion by analyzing these two instances of *qing*. However, as I have established in this section, *hàowù* or desire and aversion constitute an important part of *qing*’s contents, and Kongzi’s view of emotion can still be clarified to some extent by analyzing his use of *hàowù* in the *Analects*. This is the task that I turn to in the next section.

2.2 *Hàowù* 好惡

*Hàowù* 好惡 are complex concepts in several ways. First, their meanings are interrelated with those of another pair, namely *hǎo’è* 好惡, which share the same characters as *hàowù* but are pronounced slightly differently in modern Chinese. Second, *hǎo’è* 好惡 designate primarily good or bad things in rough terms, and *hàowù* 好惡 are emotional attitudes of liking and disliking expressed towards those good and bad things. However, since the things that are either *hǎo* or *è* are good or bad in several different kinds, one’s emotional attitudes of *hàowù* to those things are distinguished accordingly, and sometimes compete with each other in one person’s mind. In the following two sections, I analyze various uses of *hàowù*, *hǎo’è*, and some other related terms in the *Analects* and other ancient Chinese texts, and try to extract some themes and questions that later thinkers discuss hotly and in a more sophisticated manner.

2.2.1 The Semantic Range of *Hàowù* 好惡 in Early Chinese Texts

According to the *Hànyǔ dà cídian* 漢語大詞典 and the *Daikanwajiten* 大漢和辭典, *hào* 好 and *è* 惡 in the pre-Han literature each have several related but distinct meanings.35 First, *hào* means ‘beautiful’ or the beauty of a woman. According to Duàn Yùcái 段玉裁,
hǎo 好 originally referred to women (nǚzi 女子), but it came to mean beauty in general.\(^{36}\) As a related sense, hǎo can mean ‘fine’ in terms of texture of things. Supposing that one of the qualifications for a beautiful woman will be her fine and soft skin, the relationship between these two senses of hǎo is obvious, and people are naturally attracted to (hǎo 好) things that are hǎo in this sense. On the other hand, è means ‘ugly’ or ‘coarse’ as an adjective, and various kinds of filth as a noun. And it is obvious that things that are è become the natural objects of people’s repugnance or aversion (wù 惡).

Second, hǎo can mean ‘good’ in a material sense or ‘fine’ in terms of the quality of things, and refers to valuable things or things of good quality. In contrast, things that are è are of bad quality and consequently considered as less valuable. As in the previous case of hǎo ‘è, things that are hǎo ‘è in this second sense are also the objects of people’s opposite attitudes of hàowù. However, if the things that are either hǎo or è in the first case (such as a person’s beauty or a piece of dung that does not require a highly refined aesthetic sense for their perception) elicit people’s immediate response by stirring up their appetitive desire or corresponding aversion, people’s response to things that are hǎo or è in the second case seems to me less immediate. For one’s response of hàowù to these things will be often mediated by his evaluative judgment involving such concept as utility or the activity of weighing things of value. For example, a warrior would not like a sword made of coarse steel because it easily breaks and is consequently less useful, and one would desire a roll of silk more than a roll of cotton because she could barter the former for more things than she could get with the latter.

Third, hǎo means a good relationship between two (or sometimes more than two) parties, whether it be between countries, between rivaling clans or families within a country, or even between the members of a single family. This use of hǎo is one of the most frequently found in the Zúozhuan 左傳 and the Guóyǔ 國語, and in those texts it often refers to the relationship of amity between two countries. Correspondingly, è sometimes refers to the bad relationship per se between any two parties, but more often it also refers either to misconduct or bad act of one party to another\(^ {37}\) or to the enmity

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\(^{36}\) Quoted in Morohashi Tetsuji, Daikanwajiten, vol. 3, p. 627.

\(^{37}\) For example, in 561 B.C.E. the Zhèng 郑 dukedom provokes a battle at her border with the Sòng 宋 dukedom in order to make Sòng invade Zhèng in response and get into trouble. The Zúozhuan vaguely
between two parties, which hinder them from being in a good relationship. Now, what is the relationship between this sense of hǎo’è and the attitudes of hàowù? When two countries (or sometimes several noble families within a country) agree to come into a friendly relationship in the Spring and Autumn period, they form a league by making a covenant. The covenant of this type describes the duties of the participants in the league, and this description of duties includes such things as mutual relief of famine, no monopoly of profit, no protection of criminal-refugees, and so forth.39

What is noteworthy here is that this type of covenant almost always includes such phrase as “make one’s desire and aversion the same [as the other’s],” i.e. ‘tóng hàowù (同好惡)’ or ‘hàowù tóngzhī (好惡同之).’40 As I see it, this phrase seems to generalize the other particular duty descriptions nicely, because if one country helps the other country recover from famine instead of invading that country by taking advantage of it, or if one country shares the profit from her natural resources with the other, or if one country sends criminal refugees back to their home country for punishment instead of protecting them, then these two countries can be said to share the same interests and respond to things in the same way. That is, establishing a good (hǎo) relationship with another party involves a certain axiological process of setting the same standard as the other party with which to judge what is good and bad for oneself, and this in turn requires one to think that what is good or bad for the other party also deserves one’s response of liking (hào) or disliking (wù) respectively, even when one occasionally finds betraying the other party more profitable for oneself and is accordingly tempted to do so.41

Fourth and most important, one’s responses of hào and wù can be directed to what is morally good and bad in a broad sense. This implies that as long as one is a person of

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38 Which describes this provocation of war as “[Zhèng] inflicted harm on Sòng (è yú sòng 惡於宋).” Zuo zhuan, Chapter 11. Yang Bojun, Chǔqiū Zuo zhuan zhì, p. 988.
39 For example, the Zuo zhuan, Chapter 7 mentions the enmity between two clans of the Zhèng 鄭 dukedom, viz. Māshī 马师氏 and Zipishi 子皮氏. The word for enmity here is ‘è’ 惡, presumably deriving from its verbal use of ‘wù’ (惡, to hate). See Yang Bojun, Chǔqiū Zuo zhuan zhì, p. 1293.
40 The use of hàowù in this way is originally observed and explained in Chang Won-Tae, “Chôn’guksidae insôngnon ü hyêngsong gwa chön’gag,” pp. 8–14.
41 Compare this discussion of ‘tóng hàowù (同好惡)’ with my previous discussion ‘yìqíng (異情)’ around footnote 16.
moral character to a certain extent, she can desire moral good and feel averse to moral evil at least to that extent. However, unlike the case of è 惡 that often very clearly designates either 1) misdeed or harm done to someone else or 2) various kinds of vices, it seems to be very hard to find a case in which hǎo exclusively refers to moral good. As I suspect, in cases where hǎo can mean moral goodness, it might mean moral goodness only inclusively. In other words, when a usage of hǎo seems capable of being regarded as referring to moral goodness or virtues, the context is often unclear whether the term hǎo designates moral goodness only or it could also include various kinds of non-moral goods. For example, the “Hóngfàn” 洪範 chapter of the Shāngshū 尚書 contains the following passage:

As for the head officials, they [tend to] be good only after they are given [enough] riches. If you cannot make [them] bring about good to your country [by giving them enough motivation], then they will consider their failure as their own fault. [But at the same time, if] they are not good [to begin with], they will do wrong to you even if you endow them with fortune.

In this passage, we have two instances of hǎo, and the second one seems to mean ‘being a good person in character.’ However, the first usage of it seems to refer to good things that these good people can bring about, and those “good things” do not necessarily mean only moral good. For it could mean, say, wealth and prosperity of the society as a result of the clean and conscientious government consisting of these good people. In addition, a chapter in the Lìjì 里記 ascribes a story to Kongzi where he is asked whether the purpose of the rituals is to regulate evils (è 惡) and make the good (hǎo 好) perfect. In that story, Kongzi

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43 For example, at a disciple’s question of whether a nobleman also hates something, Kongzi says that the nobleman hates those who [like to] talk about other people’s vices: “子貢曰：‘君子亦有惡乎?’ 子曰：‘有惡。惡稱人之惡者...’” *Lunyu* 17:24. For similar examples, see *Lunyu* 4:4, 12:16, 12:21, and 20:2.

44 “凡厥正人，既富方穀。汝弗能使有好于而家，時人斯其辜。于其無好德，汝雖錫之福，其作汝用咎...” *Shāngshū* 尚書, “Hóngfàn” 洪範. Sūn Xīngyān 孫星衍, *Shāngshū jīnguò wénzhú shāngshū* 尚書今古文注疏, 2nd ed. (Bēijīng: Zhōnghuá shūjū 中華書局, 2004), pp. 304–305. My translation of this passage is along the lines of Sūn’s view and the views of the traditional commentators that Sūn cites. The underlining is mine.

45 Based on the same text that Sūn Xīngyān 孫星衍 used in his Sòng Wēizǐ shì jiā 宋微子世家 and the edition of the same text that Zhèng Xuán 郑玄 commented on, Sūn Xīngyān deletes ‘dé (德)’ from the original ‘hǎodé (好德)’ phrase. See ibid for further discussion of this matter.

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gives an affirmative answer to this question, and further specifies the list of goods that are completed by the rituals. What is noteworthy in this Lǐjì passage is that this list does not only include moral goodness in a broad sense or virtues such as harmony in the family (“sānzú hé” 三族和) or the demarcation between the elders and the youngsters (“zhāngyòu biàn” 長幼辨), which entails the youngsters’ respect for the elders and the elders’ love for the youngsters. For as Kongzi in this passage sees it, the rituals appropriately performed in certain areas of human life can bring about certain goods that are specific in those areas, and those goods can include non-moral goods such as skillfulness in the hunt (“róngshì xián” 戰事閑) or military success (“wǔgōng chéng”武功成). In short, although these examples do not represent all of the usages of hǎo in early Chinese texts, they make a quite plausible case that hǎo in itself or things that are hǎo might not be exclusive objects of one’s desire for morality.

Nevertheless, there is a near-synonym for hǎo, viz. shàn 善, which has as wide a semantic range as hǎo. And while meaning various kinds of ‘good’ just as hǎo does, when shàn is used in a moral sense it does not tend to include other non-moral senses in it, thus making itself a perfect object of one’s moral desire hǎo. To take examples from the Analects: Kongzi says, “Even in any [random] group of three people walking on the street, I could definitely find my teacher in it. I will select their good qualities and emulate them, and [discern] their bad qualities and correct them in myself [if I had them].” Although the ‘good qualities’ in this passage are not confined to moral ones by definition, given that Kongzi’s main concern is moral cultivation of himself and others, we have to interpret shàn here as referring exclusively to moral qualities. And according to Kongzi, one is supposed to reach out at the moral good as if it might elude him, and avoid what is morally bad as [one would do] if he [accidentally] stirred boiling water with his bare hand. In short, my point here is that shàn 善, instead of hǎo, often clearly refers to moral goodness and thus makes the primary object of one’s hào desire for moral good or virtues. And we already have seen that è can refer to misdeeds, harm, or vices, thus becoming the primary object of one’s moral aversion.

47 “三人行，必有我師焉，擇其善者而從之，其不善者而改之.” Lunyu 7:22.
48 “見善如不及，見不善如探湯.” Lunyu 16:11.
2.2.2 好惡 在 the Analects

In the previous section, we have seen that 好 好 and 恶 恶 are respectively one’s liking and disliking or desire and aversion for diverse objects. We have also seen that these objects range widely from things that deserve natural, immediate, and relatively universal responses from all kinds of people, to the kind of things that only those of proper moral cultivation could respond to appropriately. Now turning to the analysis of 好惡 in the Analects, one of the recurring themes in Kongzi’s treatment of 好惡 is that people’s liking and disliking or desire and aversion are different from person to person, and that people very rarely like morality or virtues more than the objects of their appetitive desires. For example, in his biographical remark Kongzi says that it was only at seventy that he could follow what his mind’s (心) desires without overstepping the boundaries of the right, and he repeatedly makes a disappointed remark that he has never seen one who likes the virtuous as much as the beautiful.

There seem to be embodied roughly three questions in this observation. Namely, they are 1) how one could judge what are the correct objects of one’s desire and aversion; 2) how one could enact one’s judgment about what to desire and what not to, sometimes against the stream of his other desires; and 3) how one could get to desire what he does not but is supposed to desire. In other words, when there is a disagreement about whether something is desirable or not, then there needs to be some sort of desiderative standard that everyone should look to. And when one already knows what is really desirable, he has to have enough motivation for enacting his judgment, quelling down all possible resistance from any other pathological desires of his mind. However, sometimes one can find that he does not have enough motivation to implement his judgment, or does not desire yet what he is supposed to desire. In those cases, one could want to cultivate his emotional attitudes and strengthen up one’s already existing moral desires, or develop new desires for the right things. These are the questions that I deal with consecutively in the following several subsections.

49 “吾...七十而從心所欲，不踰矩．” Lunyu 2:4.
50 “已矣乎! 吾未見好德如好色者也．” Lunyu 15:13. Also see Lunyu 9:18.
2.2.2.1 Hàowù 好惡 and Evaluative Judgment

As we have seen above, hào 好 and wù 惡 are basically one’s emotional responses of liking and disliking toward what are good (hào 好 or shàn 善) and bad (è 惡). And given that what are good and bad constitute the primary objects of one’s desire and aversion respectively, it would be very plausible to think that hào and wù do not only refer to one’s feelings of liking and disliking but also sometimes to one’s more deep-seated attitudes of desire and aversion. For this reason I have been using liking/disliking and desire/aversion somewhat interchangeably for the rendering of hàowù so far, but there is also textual evidence for this indiscriminate use of ‘hàowù (好惡)’ in the Analects. Take a look at the following two passages:

Wealth and high status are what men desire; [but if] they are not attainable with the right way, then I would not remain in them. Poverty and low status are what men dislike; [but if] they are not removable with the right way, then I would not leave them.\(^{51}\)

If wealth can be pursued [in a proper way], then even the work of a marketplace gatekeeper with a whip, I will do it. But if not, then I will follow what I like.\(^{52}\)

In the first passage, Kongzi acknowledges that wealth and high rank are what human beings, including himself, commonly desire (yù 欲). And for their opposite, i.e. poverty and low rank that human beings normally hate, he uses the word ‘wù (惡, “dislike”).’ This makes a clear case that wù can refer not only to one’s occurrent emotional response of dislike for certain things as we have seen in the Huáinánzǐ and the Lǐjì passages above,\(^{53}\) but also to one’s long-term tendency to avoid those things. Now as for the case of hào, it is noteworthy that in the second passage Kongzi says he will “follow” (cóng 從) what he hào. For from the facts that 1) Kongzi already mentioned wealth as what human beings commonly desire in the first passage and that 2) he now uses a similar term to “follow,” viz. “pursue (qiú 求),” for wealth, we can conclude that Kongzi’s hào here

\(^{51}\) “富與貴, 是人之所欲也, 不以其道得之, 不處也. 貧與賤, 是人之所惡也, 不以其道得之, 不去也...” Lunyu 4:5.

\(^{52}\) “富而可求也, 雖執鞭之士, 吾亦為之. 如不可求, 從吾所好.” Lunyu 7:12.

\(^{53}\) See footnotes 25 and 26 above.
specifically refers to his *desire* for things that he can legitimately pursue. In short, *hào* and *wù*, while sometimes referring to one’s emotional response of liking and disliking to various things, can sometimes also refer to desire and aversion.

Now, if people have desire (*hào*) for good things (*hǎo*) and aversion (*wù*) for bad things (*è*), and they experience emotions of liking and disliking (*hàowù*) for good and bad things (*hǎo’è*) respectively, then how do people sometimes come apart from each other in desideration? In other words, besides the simple and clear cases mentioned earlier as belonging to the first category of *hǎo’è* in 1.2.1 above, why do people often conflict concerning what to desire and what to avoid? As I have alluded to while explaining the second category of *hǎo’è* in 1.2.1, *hàowù* seem to be somehow related to one’s evaluative judgment, i.e. the judgment of what is valuable or what is more valuable than others. And in relatively complex cases such as involving deliberation among several different choices or involving some sort of conflict between the demand of morality (whatever it is) and other non-moral values, it seems that people’s evaluative judgments are easily misguided, and consequently they come to have different emotional attitudes from others’ for the same objects.

The statement that I just made could imply that 1) one’s evaluative judgment precedes one’s emotional attitudes of *hàowù* and that 2) how one judges the relative values of things determines how he would emotionally respond to those things. However, is it really the case? In 1.2.1 above, we have seen that there are certain things (e.g. a person’s beauty or a malodorous object) that draw immediate and quite universal emotional responses from many people. For such cases, there is no clear distinction between one’s judgment that this is a beautiful person and thus is lovable and one’s positive emotional attitude of liking for that object. If this view were plausible, one might think that we could postulate the same kind of theoretical relationship between the evaluative judgment and one’s emotional response in other less clear cases. That is, one might think that one’s liking for honor or dislike of one’s family member’s misfortune are not clearly distinguishable from his thinking that his honor or the well-being of his family members are highly valuable.

I shall not try to provide a complete answer for this question now, because this issue is very complicated and requires a lengthy and more sophisticated discussion that I
will provide in Chapter 4. Instead, for now I will quote a passage from the *Analects* which seems to testify to the close relationship between hàowù 好惡 and evaluative judgment. However, before doing so, I have to make a preliminary point. Earlier in this section, I have shown that hàowù 好惡 are sometimes used interchangeably with yùwù 欲惡 and mean one’s desire and aversion. Now let me submit another point that hàowù, when used for a human being, can refer to one’s love and hatred (àiwù 愛惡) for that person. For example, Kongzi says that one is still supposed carefully to study about a person even if he is loved (hào) by the multitude or if he is hated (wù) by the multitude; and he also says that it is only those who are possessed of the highest Confucian virtue rén 仁 that can love and hate (hàowù) other people correctly. Now, look at the following passage:

*If you* love someone, then *you will* want him to live; *and if you* hate someone, then *you will* want him to die. *But if you* want someone to die, having already wanted him to live, this is a delusion.

In this passage, Kongzi comments on the negative aspect of capricious affection. Specifically, he names it delusion or misguidedness, and by doing so he seems to be alert to the tendency of our affection to carry us astray and let us make a wrong judgment of the object in question. That is, when one feels inconsistent desires simultaneously for the same object, he is probably making contradicting evaluative assessments of that object, hastily basing one of his incompatible assessments on the positive aspect of the object and the other on the negative aspect. And perhaps his capricious feeling of affection and hatred for that object is to blame in this case, because once in the strong grip of affection or hatred toward an object, one seldom sees anything but what he likes (for the case of affection) or what he hates (for the case of hatred) in that object. In this light, Kongzi might be thinking either that 1) one’s evaluative judgment of things is affected by one’s emotional attitudes of liking and disliking, or that 2) the latter is a rather imperfect form of the former.

This close relationship between one’s evaluative judgment and the emotional

54 “衆惡之，必察焉，衆好之，必察焉．” *Lunyu* 15:28.
55 “唯仁者能好人，能惡人．” *Lunyu* 4:3.
responses of 好惡 is more explicitly and even humorously illustrated by Zhuāngzī (365–290 B.C.E.), roughly two centuries after Kongzi. Look at the following passage:

To weary one’s spiritual intelligence by trying to unify things without knowing that they are already identical is called “three in the morning.” Why is it called “three in the morning”? A monkey keeper handing out nuts said, “I will give you three in the morning and four in the evening.” At this, all the monkeys were angry. So he said, “All right, then I will give you four in the morning and three in the evening.” The monkeys were all pleased this time. There was nothing chipped off either in name [i.e. number seven] or in reality [i.e. seven nuts], but anger and joy were [alternately] exerted; this was also due to [the aforementioned mistake].

It is a very clever satire that Zhuāngzī chose monkeys as the protagonists of his story. As he has clearly thought, primates share many things with human beings to a less number and degree: They have certain basic emotions such as joy and anger; they have their own unique preference about things; and they also have some amount of intelligence. In this story, the monkeys got angry at the keeper’s offer to give three nuts in the morning and four in the evening, apparently because they wanted (好 好 or 欲 欲) to get more in the nearer future, and thought getting less in the morning was bad (惡 惡). And they got happy for the same reason when the keeper offered to give four in the morning and three in the evening instead, but they were not smart enough to know that there was no real difference either in name or in substance. And also recall my previous explanation of the relationship between 好惡 好惡 and 喜 喜 (“joy”), 怒 怒 (“anger”), 哀 哀 (“sorrow”), 樂 樂 (“pleasure”) in 1.1.3 above (specifically around the Zuòzhùn passage quoted in footnote 28). Combining my explanation in that section and my explanation of 好惡 so far, many ancient Chinese thinkers seem to have thought that “joy” or “pleasure” arises when one encounters an object that he likes (好), and thinks good (好), whereas “anger” or “sorrow” arises when one faces an object that he dislikes (惡), and thinks bad (惡). And Zhuāngzī on this passage would be one of those thinkers.

57 "努神明為一而不知其同也，謂之朝三。何謂朝三？狙公賦芧曰：‘朝三而暮四。’衆狙皆怒。曰：‘然則朝四而暮三。’衆狙皆悅。名實未虧而喜怒為用，亦因是也。" Zhuāngzī, “Qiwùlùn” 齊物論. Guō Qìngfān 郭慶藩, Zhuāngzī jíshì, p. 70. The translation is a slight modification of Victor Mair’s. However, one might notice that I significantly disagree with him in translating the last sentence. See Victor H. Mair, Wandering on the Way (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1998), pp. 16–17.
2.2.2.2 The Standards of Hao-wu 好惡

In the previous section, we have seen that one’s hòowù (i.e. desire and aversion or liking and disliking) are closely related to one’s evaluative judgment, and that one’s peculiar kind of hòowù can affect one’s evaluative judgment of things. We have also seen that Kongzi calls both the problematic value judgment influenced by passionate affection or hatred and the consequent inconsistent desires deriving from it “delusion” or “misguidedness,” and that Zhuängzī mocks those people whose hòowù result in defective evaluative judgment as well as inappropriate expression of emotions (such as joy and anger directed alternatingly to the same thing) by comparing them to monkeys. In contrast to this problematic situation of many human beings, Kongzi and Zhuängzī both propose their own ideal types of human beings, whose hòowù either embody correct evaluative judgments of things (in Kongzi) or do not lead to endangering oneself by misjudging the relative values of things and to exhausting one’s spiritual life by abusing one’s intellect (in Zhuängzī). Zhuängzī’s view is well illustrated in a passage from the “Signs of fullness of power” (Dèchōngfǔ 德充符) chapter of the Zhuängzī, but I will not discuss it here. In this section, I focus only on Kongzi’s ideal type of person jūnzǐ 君子 and his hòowù.

Throughout the Analects, Kongzi often contrasts the character of the nobleman (jūnzǐ 君子) with that of the petty man (xiǎorén 小人). The word “jūn” 君 means “ruler” or “lord” and “zǐ” 子 means “son,” so “jūnzǐ” may have originally meant “sons of lords.” According to Hsu Cho-yun, jūnzǐ gradually came to refer to all the persons related to the ruling group by kinship, and during the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 B.C.E.) the term was mainly used to mean the following three categories of people: 1) lord, sovereign; 2) son of a ruler, princely man, gentleman, nobleman, or officer; and 3) host, husband. These uses of “jūnzǐ” tell us that until the end of the Spring and Autumn period, “jūnzǐ” mainly referred to the hereditary nobility that constituted the ruling class of society in general, and it was also used by wives who would have considered their husbands as their masters and by guests who might have wanted to use a grateful and polite form of address.
for their hosts’ hospitality. On the other hand, “xiăorén” 小人 seems to have originally referred to mǐn 民, who were ruled by the nobility and were mainly engaging in physical labors such as agriculture and handicraft. For we find many passages from various ancient Chinese texts, which seem to be descriptions of the historical situation of Western Zhou or at least idealizations of it as follows: “The nobility (jūnzǐ 君子) are diligent in government, and the commoners (xiăorén 小人) are diligent in physical labors;” or “The nobility exert their intellect, and the commoners exert their physical strength. This is the institution of the ancient Kings.”

However, by Kongzi’s time “xiăorén” 小人 came to refer to those who had previously belonged to the mǐn 民 class but now were newly establishing themselves as the lower strata of the ruling class. They could make their way up the social scale partly thanks to their own ability and diligence but also more importantly to the various socioeconomic changes that occurred over the Spring and Autumn period. Two of the most important changes in this period were the private ownership of land widely acknowledged for the peasantry and the introduction of the taxation based on the amount of land owned instead of the previous labor service system. For these new institutions made some of the peasants work more efficiently in the fields that were their own now and consequently enabled them to produce surplus materials that they could dispose of at will. In this way they could accumulate some wealth, which in turn allowed some of them enough leisure to engage in various studies that were traditionally allowed only for the aristocracy and turn themselves into “intellectuals.” These intellectuals of the

61 Cho-yun Hsu provides detailed explanations for the nature of the private land-ownership by peasants in the Chūnqiū and the Zhāngguó periods and for the several different ways in which the ancient Chinese peasantry could come to have their own lands, in his book Ancient China in Transition, pp. 110–116.
62 Under the labor service system, the peasants had to devote a fixed amount of time to working on the manorial lands of the local rulers on whom they were dependent, instead of having private lands to cultivate and paying tax or rent for what they produced. But the problem with this system was that the peasants were not disposed to work hard on the “public land” unless they were supervised, and this system was gradually replaced by the taxation system based either on the amount of land or the amount of total product, as the general agricultural productivity in this period increased by such factors as the use of ox and iron tools for cultivating land. See Hsu, Ancient China in Transition, pp. 107–110.
xiāorén background often studied together with the traditional shì 士 class under the same teacher, and some of them held positions at their local governments. And consequently, they constituted an important social “interest group” in the politics of each state who had their own independent political opinions that the nobility could not simply neglect.

This newly arisen xiāorén class is viewed in a very negative light in the Analects. Kongzī tells his disciples to become an intellectual (shì 士) who represents not the xiāorén class but the jūnzǐ class, and he criticizes one of his disciples as being a petty man because he wanted to have agricultural knowledge that would bring him immediate profit, instead of wanting to engage in the noble study including the learning of the rituals. It seems that in Kongzī’s eyes, what was most problematic about this xiāorén class was the fact that these petty people were so concerned about making personal profit that they cared neither about observing social norms in their material pursuit, nor maintaining social harmony by sharing what they earned with other members of the society. According to Kongzī, the petty people are always concerned about land (as an important profitable resource), and they look at things only from the perspective of profit. And since they, especially those intellectuals who represent the interest of the xiāorén class, hate poverty and think it shameful to wear coarse clothes and eat poor food, they dare to do anything to escape such situations, and often end up going far beyond the boundary of social norms and turning themselves into a source of social disorder.

In contrast, jūnzǐ, which had traditionally referred to the hereditary aristocracy, started to be widely used in the Analects for a virtuous person regardless of his social

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63 Kongzī was the typical case of such a teacher.
64 We can find a very illustrative example of this case in the Zuozhuan, Xīgōng僖公 15.
67 “君子懷德, 小人懷土.” Lunyu 4:11.
68 “君子喻於義, 小人喻於利.” Lunyu 4:16. So, for example, having found the same size of tin block on the road, a legendary thief Zhī 跖 would think of casting a key to the rich’s storehouse, whereas a sage king Yáo 堯 would think of feeding the old. Yasui Kō 安井 衡, Rongo shōsetsu 論語集說 (Tokyo 東京: Fuzanbō 富山房, 1972), 卷二, p. 11.
70 “君子固窮, 小人窮斯濫矣.” Lunyu 15:2.
71 “君子有勇而無義為亂, 小人有勇而無義為盜.” Lunyu 17:23.
origin or status. Throughout the *Analects*, jūnzǐ or the nobleman is praised as virtuous in many ways, and his character is sharply contrasted with that of the petty man (xiǎorén). For example, if the petty man is concerned about land, the nobleman cherishes virtue;\(^\text{72}\) and if the petty man looks at things only in terms of profit, the nobleman’s mind is set to right.\(^\text{73}\) Among the many characteristics of the nobleman that are highly praised by Kongzi, what is important concerning our current topic of hàowù is this: Whereas the desires for wealth, beauty, fame, and so forth mainly govern the thinking and behavior of the petty men and many other ordinary people belonging to the min 民 (commoners) class, the nobleman (and other levels of virtuous people mentioned in the *Analects* such as rénzhě 仁者 “benevolent man” or shànrén 善人 “good man”) really likes virtue (dé 德) and learning (xué 學), and these two are among the most important factors that govern the nobleman’s thinking and action.

The term that I just rendered as ‘virtue’ is ‘dé (德).’ According to David Nivison’s analysis of a series of inscriptions on oracle bones, turtle shells, and a bronze vessel,\(^\text{74}\) during the late Shāng 商 and the Zhōu 周 dynasties ‘dé (德)’ referred to the properties primarily of the ruler but also of any good person, including being generous, not self-indulgent, self-sacrificing (in a rare and extreme situation), dutiful in performing religious ceremonies, humble and polite (in the sense of ego-denying and being open to advice), and so forth.\(^\text{75}\) In other words, the virtuoso in the Shāng and the Zhōu period China is the person of generosity or benevolence, self-restraint or self-sacrifice, piety, humility, and politeness among others. And in this light, Nivison argues that it is proper to call dé 德 virtue or a collection of virtues.\(^\text{76}\) Now, carefully looking at these qualities of the virtuoso, what stands out about the virtuoso’s behavioral pattern or character trait

\(^{72}\) See footnote 67 above.

\(^{73}\) See footnote 68 above.

\(^{74}\) According to Nivison, the dates of these materials are from about 1200 B.C.E. to a little after 1031 B.C.E., i.e. from the late Shāng 商 to the early years of the Zhōu 周 dynasty. David S. Nivison, ““Virtue” in Bone and Bronze,” chap. in *The Ways of Confucianism*, p. 19 and p. 27. (In this article Nivison discusses ancient Chinese uses of “dé” 德, which he wants to refer to by using “virtue” with double quotation marks; hence “virtue” left unchanged into ‘virtue’ in the reference.)

\(^{75}\) For illustrative examples and explanations for each of these virtuous characteristics, see especially pp. 21–24 (self-sacrifice), p. 26 (generosity and religious piety), pp. 27–29 (humility, politeness, and various kinds of self-restraints).

\(^{76}\) Ibid., p. 29.
is that not only does he not advance himself at the expense of others, but he is even willing to sacrifice himself if necessary. Let us examine this aspect of dé further through the Analects and other ancient Chinese texts.

According to Nivison again, we from time to time encounter a simple idiomatic expression common in classical Chinese, viz. “A yǒu dé yú B” (A有德於 B). Literally it is “A has dé with B,” and it means that A has done something for B, and B consequently feels a debt of gratitude to A. This sense of dé is very common in the Zuòzhuan. Bryan Van Norden points to a phrase of the same grammatical structure from Zhāogōng 昭公 year 14, where Zi qí 子旗, the prime minister of Chǔ 楚, has done a service to the Zhōu 君 king and makes an excessive request for repayment. This sense of dé is also found in the form of verb, and the structure “A dé B (A 德 B)” means A thinks that he owes to B, or that A feels gratitude to B. And in the Analects, we find a passage where someone asks Kongzi about a traditional saying or a principle of action, viz. “Meet resentment (yuàn 怨) with kindness (dé 德).” To this question, Kongzi asks back: “[Then] what are you going to repay kindness with? Meet resentment with straightness and respond to kindness with kindness.” This remark of Kongzi’s implies that the attitude of dé in ancient China, for all its humble and ego-denying characteristics, is not close to turning the other cheek to an angry neighbor. In addition, it should be noted that “resentment (yuàn 怨)” is mentioned in opposition to “kindness” or benefit (dé 德), and that the same verb “bào 報 (“repay” or “respond”) is used for both types of attitudes (“resentment” and “kindness”) or acts (“harm” and “benefit”).

According to Chang Won-tae, in ancient Chinese texts such as the Zuòzhuan and the Guóyǔ we can find not only the structure of “A dé B” (A 德 B) but “A yuàn B” (A 怨 B), and in both cases A thinks that he owes something to B and feels that he has to do something to repay or compensate for (bào, 報) what B has done to him. What B has

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77 Ibid., p. 25.
79 Chang Won-tae, “Chŏnggusidae insŏngnon ŭi hyŏngsŏng gwa chŏn’gae,” p. 33. One example is from the Zuòzhua, Xīgōng 僖公 24: “The king felt grateful to the Dí people, so he was going to marry a Dí princess.” “王德狄人，將以其女為后。”Yáng Bójùn, Chūnqì Zhù, p. 425.
80 “或曰：‘以德報怨，何如?’ 子曰：‘何以報德? 以直報怨, 以德報德。’” Lunyu 14:34.
done to A will be benefit in the case of dé, and it will be harm or injury in the case of yuàn. In both cases, Chang argues, the benefit or harm initiated by B to A makes both B and A enter particular types of relationships, and A’s respective ways of responding to B are very much determined by the nature of those relationships. So, in the case of benefit, A will try to repay B’s kindness in a certain way, and in the case of harm, A will try to return B’s ill-will eye for eye or in some other way. According to Chang, the importance of dé in the ancient Chinese political context is that through the exercise of dé, the benefactor initiates a friendly relationship with his beneficiaries, hopefully anticipating that such relationship is established and continued by the beneficiaries’ initial favorable response and the subsequent on-going reciprocal relationship among them. And this dé-based relationship can be between equals, but more often it is between rich and powerful countries and small and relatively weak countries in an international setting, or between the ruler or high officials and their subjects within a country.81

However, as Nivison has already pointed out, the contents of such dé are not merely confined to material benefit or providing bounties. By examining the usages of dé in the Analects, we find that dé more or less refers to such attitudes or actions as 1) forsaking one’s interest for the greater benefit of the society in general, 2) modesty or unwillingness to offend others relying on one’s power, and 3) performing a service without considering the reward first. For example, Kongzi highly praises Tài Bó 泰伯 as having possessed a great dé. He was the eldest son of the Old Duke (gǔgōng 古公), who came to be recognized by his later generations as the dynastic founder of Zhōu. Tài Bó knew about his father’s great esteem for his younger brother’s son Chāng 昌, and decided to cede the throne entitled to him by primogeniture to his younger brother Jì Lì 季歷, so that the kingship could be eventually transmitted to Jì Lì’s son, who became later the great King Wén (Wén wáng 文王).82 Originally the Zhōu dynasty was a small clan governing a limited territory, but during the reign of the King Wén it came to be able to exert influence over two thirds of China. However, although having overpowered the Yīn 殷 dynasty, King Wén still respected the ruler of Yīn as his superior, and Kongzi again

82 "泰伯, 其可謂至德也已矣. 三以天下讓, 民無得而稱焉.” Lunyu 8:1.
praises him as having had a great dé. Finally, Kongzi repeatedly emphasizes that a virtuous person always engages in a difficult service for others first and think about the reward from it afterwards.

All of these examples and the previous discussion of dé as “benefit” or “kindness” clearly illustrate jūnzǐ or the Confucian nobleman as the person who initiates and tries to maintain a harmonious relationship among the members of the society. He does so by generously providing bounties when capable, but more importantly his power to attract people toward himself comes from his playing a virtuous role model, which moves people in the deepest of their hearts and elicit respectful and voluntary support from them. So Kongzi says, “[If you] guide them by edicts and keep them in line with punishments, the common people will stay out of trouble but will have no sense of shame. [But if you] guide them by virtue and keep them in line with the rites, they will have a sense of shame and [willingly] come [to you to be your subjects].” However, according to Kongzi, petty people are hardly susceptible to the nobleman’s moral influence. They are not respectful to noblemen (in the sense of their social superiors) and make fun of sages’ words; and they become disrespectful when closely associated with, whereas getting resentful when kept at a distance.

My long discussion so far of the ancient Chinese concept dé 德 and the sporadic contrast between the nobleman’s and the petty man’s characters in Kongzi clearly indicate that (1) dé or the ethical attributes embodied in it is the primary object of the nobleman’s hào 好, and that (2) the petty man’s hào greatly digresses from that of the nobleman’s in pursuing profit as the top priority. Here we witness a clash of preference, but it is not really a matter of “preference” but a matter of great importance concerning the correct evaluative judgment and social harmony deriving from the sharing of such a judgment. It is exactly at this point that the question of the standard of hàowù is to arise;

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83 “三分天下有其二，以服事殷．周之德，其可谓至德也已矣．” Lunyu 8:20.
84 “樊遲...曰：‘敢問崇德...’子曰：‘善哉問！先事後得，非崇德與？...’” Lunyu 12:21; “仁者先難而後獲．” Lunyu 6:22.
86 “小人...狎大人，侮聖人之言．” Lunyu 16:8.
87 “唯女子與小人爲難養也．近之則不孫，遠之則怨．” Lunyu 17:25.

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that is, how does one know that the nobleman’s desire and aversion or his liking and disliking are directed to the correct objects? Disappointingly, though, this question is never raised explicitly in the *Analects*. However, Kongzi’s thesis implied throughout the *Analects* that the nobleman’s hàowù are toward the correct objects can be taken as addressing a more basic question that I have raised myself above, viz. how one could judge what are the correct objects of one’s desire and aversion. In other words, to this question Kongzi is basically saying that in order to know what is the right object of one’s desire and aversion, one is supposed to look at what the nobleman likes and dislikes for himself and others.

For example, Kongzi says that only those possessed of the supreme Confucian virtue rén 仁 (“benevolence”) can like and hate other people properly,\(^88\) and he recommends to study carefully a person’s case even if he is loved (hào) by the multitude or if he is hated (wù) by the multitude.\(^89\) And additionally, at Zigòng’s 子貢 (a disciple of Kongzi’s) question of how one has to find a person’s character who is loved by everyone in town, Kongzi expresses the view that being liked by everyone does not make his character good or estimable; one can be considered as deserving esteem only when he is liked by good people and hated by bad people in the village.\(^90\) These several remarks of Kongzi’s clearly suggest some sort of elitist view of moral judgment: The judgment of the masses is not reliable; they might judge something good or right if they like it, and judge something bad or wrong if they hate it. In this light, we have to say that the nobleman’s judgment is not affected by passionate desire and aversion. On the other hand, it is not the case that all of those belonging to the nobility group judge things correctly. According to Kongzi, among the nobility there are people who are not “benevolent” (rén 仁)\(^91\), and only the morally cultivated nobleman can see things from the correct perspective.

Now, what does it mean exactly to “see things from the correct perspective”? Since we have seen that the nobleman’s judgment is different from that of the masses and

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\(^88\) “唯仁者能好人，能惡人.” *Lunyu* 4:3

\(^89\) “衆惡之，必察焉，衆好之，必察焉.” *Lunyu* 15:28.


\(^91\) “君子而不仁者有矣夫，未有小人而仁者也．” *Lunyu* 14:6.
some petty-minded nobles, one might think that the nobleman judges in a very sober state of mind free of the binding grips of emotions. This could be true to the extent that the nobleman is not affected by egoistic desires for profit and comfort which the petty man is very much vulnerable to, but the passages quoted in footnote 88 and 90 seem to indicate that the nobleman’s hàowù or liking and disliking embody the very standard of correct evaluative judgment. The point that moral judgment and emotions or feelings are strongly intertwined is made in a number of passages throughout the Analects. Let me take an example. Kongzi is supposed to be the first private teacher in Chinese history, whose education was actually quite profitable. His disciples served in many countries as officials of diverse capacities, and one day he complained that it was hard to find a man who could study for three years without wanting to have a paid appointment in the government.92 To Kongzi in such a situation, Qīdiāo Kāi’s 漆雕開 modesty would have been greatly admirable. Qīdiāo Kāi was one of Kongzi’s disciples, who Kongzi thought had learned enough to serve in the government. But he declined Kongzi’s recommendation to serve in a government by saying that he was not confident about his learning yet, and the authors of the Analects write “the master was pleased.”93

If pleasure (yuè 說) is one way of how you would respond to an admirable character or act in the Analects, disgust is expressed at a morally wrong or unacceptable behavior. For example, when Kongzi was visiting the Wèi 卫 dukedom, the duke’s beautiful but disreputable concubine Nánzǐ 南子 invited him to her place. Kongzi wanted to avoid this meeting but could not refuse, and when Kongzi was off from his meeting with Nánzǐ, Kongzi’s disciple Zīlù 子路 expressed displeasure (búyuè 不說) about this event. As an intellectual aspiring to become a nobleman and further to be a rénzhě 仁者 (“humane person”) himself, Zīlù perhaps have thought that it was wrong for Kongzi to meet such a wicked woman. But as the text stands, we have no way clearly to distinguish

92 “三年學, 不至於穀, 不易得也.” Lunyu 8:12.
93 “子使漆雕開仕. 對曰: ‘吾斯之未能信.’ 子説.” Lunyu 5:6 (Italic is mine). A related passage is Lunyu 6:12. In that passage Rǎn Qiú 冉求, another disciple of Kongzi’s, complains that although he does not dislike Kongzi’s teaching, he lacks enough strength to carry it out completely (“冉求曰: ‘非不說子之道, 力不足也.’”). His saying is an acknowledgment that Kongzi’s teaching has merits, and Rǎn Qiú makes this point by saying that he is pleased by Kongzi’s teaching.
between his moral judgment of Kongzi’s (mis)deed and his feeling of displeasure. Moreover, the exchange between Kongzi and Zilu culminates in Kongzi’s reaction: At his disciple’s displeasure, Kongzi swears that if he had committed any adultery, Heaven will feel disgusted at it. Here we see not only the apex of Kongzi’s elitist view of moral judgment, but also the so-called sentimentalist view of moral judgment. That is, the morally cultivated nobleman’s hàowù embody the standard of what to like and dislike, but his liking and disliking should be in turn assessed against Heaven’s emotional attitudes toward things, which constitute the ultimate standard of hàowù for human beings. But admittedly, Kongzi mentions Heaven’s preference only to convince Zilu that he has done nothing wrong; Kongzi makes no systematic or substantial effort to know about Heaven’s opinion and follow it in every situation.

So far, I have argued that the nobleman’s emotional attitudes of hàowù embody the correct standard for liking and disliking things, and I also said that there is not explicitly raised in the Analects the question of what is the further standard with which to judge whether the nobleman’s desire and aversion or liking and disliking are directed to the correct objects. However, we have already seen that Kongzi rejects hasty and inconsistent desires for the same object as “misguidedness” or “delusion” (huò 惑), and Kongzi makes some further remarks that would shed some light on the special character of the nobleman’s hàowù. For one thing, courage (yǒng 勇) is often regarded as one of the most important virtues in Kongzi, but he seems to recommend not to pursue it excessively. For example, one day Kongzi comments on Zilu’s character that he surpasses Kongzi in liking courage, but his excessive fondness of courage is of no use. Kongzi also makes a general remark, again when commenting on two disciples’ relative drawbacks, that exceeding the appropriate degree (in liking and trying to enact virtues, e.g.) is as defective as falling short of it. Here Kongzi seems to have in mind some conception of the mean or appropriateness, and when applied to one’s hàowù, Kongzi might say that one must like and dislike things, even virtue and vice, only to the

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appropriate degree.

In addition, Kongzi also warns that unbalanced fondness of a particular virtue or a positive character trait can turn itself into a vice, which is, paradoxically, uniquely characteristic of that virtue or character trait. Kongzi points out six such cases in the following passage:

*If one likes benevolence without liking learning, its harm is foolishness; if one likes smartness without liking learning, its harm is groundlessness; if one likes to keep promises without liking learning, its harm is harmfulness [to other people and righteousness]; if one likes uprightness without liking learning, its harm is harshness; if one likes courage without liking learning, its harm is social disorder; if one likes resolution [i.e. firm determination] without liking learning, its harm is extravagance.*

That is, Kongzi thinks that if not balanced and rounded out by love of learning, the aforementioned six virtues or positive character traits can turn into six related vices (*bì*蔽). To elaborate, 1) if one likes practicing benevolence without being properly informed and sophisticated by learning, one can end up being foolish and cause difficulty for oneself; 2) if one likes only the brilliance of mind and does not have constant reference points to frame his mind by studying correct materials, the harm deriving from it is lack of foundation; 3) if one likes to keep promises blindly without proper study that would allow one to have flexible attentiveness to other considerations besides the demand of keeping one’s promise, such a person is a petty man who tends to harm others and prevent the Way from being realized; 4) if one likes to straighten oneself according to the norms but does not round oneself out by learning good manners, such a person tends to be very harsh about pointing out and criticizing other people’ mistakes; 5) if one likes courage (i.e. likes to do what other people are afraid of doing) but is not guided by proper study, such a person would often find himself in a socially disruptive activity; 6) and finally, if one likes one’s resolution and does not hold it back through the learning of good manners, such a person’s extravagance will result in frequent conflict with others.

In my translation of this passage above I rendered the Chinese character “*bì*”蔽.
as “vice,” according to several commentators’ view that “bì” 蔽 stands for its homophone “bì” 弊, which means “evil” or “harm.” 101 While thinking that this makes good sense, I also think that keeping the original character will reveal an important aspect of Kongzi’s view on emotions and evaluative judgment. That is, “bì” 蔽 literally means ‘to block’ or ‘to cover,’ and when used in the context of value judgment, it refers to the unclear state of mind. 102 And in this passage bi 蔽 apparently refers to the clouding of one’s mind due to one’s single-minded or unbalanced fondness for one of the six different virtues or character traits. In other words, if one has strong and unbalanced fondness for benevolence, for instance, he tends to see things primarily from the perspective of benevolence and act mainly in accordance with the spirit of benevolence. It is granted that benevolence is the most important virtue for the nobleman to have, and also that one who acts out of benevolence in a proper situation has a good reason for his action. However, at the same time if that person is too much preoccupied with benevolence, his benevolence plays the evil role of clouding his mind so that he is blind to other important considerations for morality. This probably is what Kongzi meant by “bì” 蔽, and the nobleman’s mind is free of this kind of vice (bi 弊).

To summarize, although it is Kongzi’s main thesis that the nobleman’s emotional attitudes of hàowù embody the correct standard of liking and disliking things for human beings in general, this thesis is arguably supplemented by sporadic insights throughout the Analects into the existence of standards of hàowù that are quite independent of the nobleman’s hàowù. They are 1) the psychological demand of consistency in one’s desire and aversion for the same object, 2) the concern for the appropriate degree within which one’s liking and disliking of things are to be kept, and 3) the importance of correcting one’s possible obsession with a particular virtue by engaging in the proper study. Perhaps Kongzi proposes the nobleman’s hàowù as the proper standard of hàowù for all human beings because he thinks that the nobleman’s hàowù are impeccable even in terms of these independent standards, and in this light the nobleman’s hàowù seem to be

101 For example, see Waley, The Analects, p. 250 and Yáng Bójùn, Lúnyǔ yìzhù, p. 184.
102 In his collection of traditional commentaries on this passage, Yasui Kō quotes Wáng Bì’s 王弼 saying that “bì” 蔽 is failing to see one’s mistake [because one’s mind is clouded]. See Yasui Kō, Rongo shûetsu, 卷六, p. 10.
enlightened hà owed, so to speak.

2.2.2.3 Hà owed 好恶 and Moral Motivation

This section deals with the second of the three questions that I raised above at the beginning of 2.2.2, namely how one could enact one’s judgment about what to desire and what not to, sometimes against the stream of his other desires. As I have mentioned above, even for Kongzi it was not until the age of seventy that he could follow what his mind (xīn 心) desires without overstepping the boundaries of the right.103 And according to Kongzi, the nobleman has to guard himself against three things throughout his lifetime. He says:

The nobleman has three things to guard against. When young, one’s blood and qi are not settled down, and the caution should be taken against [one’s lust for] the beauty. When in the prime of life, the blood and qi have become strong, and the caution should be taken against fighting with others. And when old, the blood and qi have already declined, and caution should be taken against [one’s] acquisitiveness.104

This passage views three kinds of primary human desires—viz. for sex, honor, and wealth—as rooted on the basic constituents of human body in three different stages of human life. Regardless of its details, the passage tells us that it is very natural for humans (men in this passage) to be lured by beauty, to fight with others in order to preserve one’s honor, and to try to satisfy one’s desire for gain, and even the nobleman is not totally free from such desires. In this light, it is very natural for people to pursue the satisfaction of their appetitive desires. However, Kongzi does not approve this kind of natural life. For if not regulated properly, that kind of natural behaviors would only incur rancor in others and lead to social disorder, and they are the primary object of the nobleman’s disapprobation.

In contrast, Kongzi’s nobleman, although not completely free from his own appetitive desires, is supposed to like virtue as much as he would like the beauty, honor,

103 “吾...七十而從心所欲, 不踰矩.” Lunyu 2:4.
and so forth.105 And we have seen that he cultivates his virtuous character mainly by happily engaging in the proper study of various subjects. Kongzi’s teaching seems to have covered diverse materials. Kongzi and his disciples engaged in 1) the learning of the Rituals (lǐ 禮), 2) the study of the Documents (shū 書), 3) the study of the Poetry (shī 詩), and 4) the learning of the Music (yuè 樂), and they are also very likely have studied the histories of the previous dynasties as well as that of the Zhōu dynasty.106 Rituals prescribe proper behavior for human beings who are interrelated with each other in different roles and ranks within the society, and through the learning of the rituals one can get a firm footing [in one’s behavior].107 The Documents concerns what would be called the ancient Chinese political thought, including dialogues and instructions on royal virtues a ruler should have, desirable policies such a ruler should adopt, and proper principles or manner of behaviors for politicians to participate in the government with.108

On the other hand, studying the Poetry provides one with the command of powerful affective imagery. By citing poetry properly, one can incite other people’s sentiments, and by observing the poems other people cite one can read their thoughts and feelings. This in turn facilitates one’s socialization with others, and helps one criticize others elegantly and gently when one needs to. In addition, by studying the poetry one can accumulate extensive knowledge on the names of various animals and plants!109 And finally, the Music includes playing an instrument, singing the poems along the tunes, and dancing. Kongzi says, “One gets aroused by the Poetry, is given a firm footing by the Rituals, and becomes perfect by the Music.”110 That is, the music composed by the ancient sage kings inspires one to the noblest thoughts and actions, and learning to play them and contemplating the spirits embodied make the culmination of the self-cultivation process.

Now, since the unorchestrated pursuit of appetitive desires by everyone in the society would certainly bring about social disorder, it was beyond question that the

unbridled satisfaction of desires and accompanying conflicts and crimes must be regulated. What was among the questions instead for the ancient Chinese in this kind of social turmoil was how to regulate people, or how to make the members of the society act properly. As we have seen above, the members of the ancient Chinese society were traditionally divided into two groups, viz. the ruling and the ruled respectively represented by the jūnzǐ 君子 and the xiàorén 小人 classes (not in the moral sense as proposed by Kongzǐ). Although we do not have to assume that those belonging to the xiàorén 小人 class are morally inferior by nature, the jūnzǐ 君子 and the xiàorén are still very different types of people coming from different social backgrounds with different privileges and duties, and in this light we could postulate legitimately that the answers to the question of how to regulate people’s act might depend on which kind of people the question addresses. And regarding the second group of people (i.e. the xiàorén class), the question specifically raised in the Analects is whether they should be kept in line through force or can be persuaded into order.

Many rulers and powerful officials during Kongzǐ’s time thought that the masses would be best controlled by forceful means such as edicts (zhèng 政) and criminal law (xíng 刑). Ji Kāngzǐ 季康子, for example, who was the head of the noble Ji 季 family and the powerful minister of Lǔ 魯, asked for Kongzǐ’s opinion about killing bad people as an effective means for guiding the masses toward the right way. However, Kongzǐ stands firmly against such a trend of political practice that manipulates people’s fear. According to him, trying to keep the multitude in line by forceful means would make them stay out of trouble, but they will do so only reluctantly and will feel no shame at all for violating the rules, as long as they do not get caught. However, Kongzǐ suggests, the effects of virtue and rituals on the human soul are more deep and far-reaching than the effects of edicts and penal laws, and those guided by virtue and rituals would not only have a sense of shame but also become sincere and faithful subjects of the virtuous ruler.

This position of Kongzǐ’s clearly suggests two points. First, not only the commoners’ acts but even their character can be shaped in the right way; and second, it

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111 See my discussion of each class in 2.2.2.2 above.
113 See footnote 85 above.
does not have to be done by forceful means. Now, if one wonders how it is possible, she might want to look at the following passage. It is Kongzi’s answer to Ji Kāngzǐ’s question above about killing people to keep order:

*In governing your country, why do you have to kill? If you desire to be good, the commoners will become good. The nobleman’s virtue is like the wind, and the petty man’s virtue is like the grass. The grass will surely bend when the wind blows over it.*

In this passage, Kongzi seems to think that the commoners have the ability to appreciate their ruler’s virtue and emulate it. As we have seen above, dé 德 not only refers to the bounties bestowed onto the commoners by the ruler or high officials but also to what we would usually regard as virtuous behaviors or attitudes such as modesty or benevolence. However, here we notice that Kongzi uses the term dé 德 in a slightly different way. According to him, if the ruler desires to be good, then his subjects will emulate their ruler’s liking (hào 好), so that they will desire to be good themselves and eventually become good. And Kongzi calls the commoners’ passive power of such emulation also ‘dé 德’.

Here, though, remains an important question to be asked. Namely, what is the extent of becoming good for the commoners in the *Analects*? That is, does ‘becoming good’ only refer to the acquisition of certain behavioral characteristics such as the compliance to the rule or harmoniousness with other people, or does it go so far as to involve some sort of deep moral understanding? To this question, Kongzi says flatly:

*The commoners can be made to follow it, but cannot be made to understand it.*

‘It’ here probably refers to the Way (dào 道), or the correct way of life. And this passage seems to say that after all, the commoners are like the blades of the grass; they do not bend themselves on their own terms, and once bent, would not remain like that for long. That is, the commoners will conform to the rule of virtue and rituals only as long as they

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115 For the interchangeability between yù 欲 and hào 好, see 2.2.2.1 above.

are exposed to the influence of the moral authorities; without those authorities’ moral charisma imposed upon from the outside, they are liable to resume their problematic way of life and pursue the satisfaction of their desires in unorganized manners. But as long as the ruler takes the initiative of playing the virtuous role model himself, convinces the commoners that he is genuinely interested in their well-being, and assumes appropriate degree of authority when dealing with them, it is often the case that the commoners would dare not to digress from the rule of morality. So Kongzi says to Ji Kāngzǐ’s question about how to govern the country: “To govern is to rectify. If you set an example by rectifying [yourself], who would dare not to rectify [themselves]?\footnote{Lunyu 12:17. Italic is mine.}"

Admittedly, then, Kongzi does not seem to answer this section’s main question clearly for the case of the commoners. For if the desires for sex, honor, and wealth among others are biological facts about human beings such that even the nobleman should guard himself against those desires throughout his lifetime, then it remains very mysterious for Kongzi to say that the commoners who lack the chance of extensive moral training would not digress from the moral standards only by being under the influence of the well-meaning virtuous ruler. Moreover, as we will see in the following, even two of the most talented and advanced disciples of Kongzi’s fail to place their desires for morality over the desires for non-moral goods, and Kongzi himself often complains of those who do not really care about the moral teachings.\footnote{For example, see Lunyu 9:24.} Presumably, for all these reasons, Kongzi has to admit that what he could genuinely expect from the commoners are their compliance with the rule of morality on the level of behavior and their trust, as opposed to knowledge or understanding that doing so is good in itself as well as for their best interest.\footnote{This optimistic view that the populace are prone to emulate their superior’s hàowù is also found in the Mèngzǐ. But more interestingly, Mózǐ picks up this idea before Mèngzǐ and reinterprets it in terms of his own view of human action and motivation. And Hánfēizǐ further develops Mózǐ’s thought around this idea and suggests an alternative theory of human action and motivation to that of Mèngzǐ’s.}

In contrast, Kongzi’s ethical expectation of the traditional nobility or the jūnzhī class is quite demanding. As we have seen above, ‘jūnzhī’ originally referred to the hereditary aristocrats related to the royal house by blood, without having any ethical connotations implied in its definition. However, in the Analects it became to be used
widely to refer to the Confucian moral ideal, and Kongzi’s use of the term in this way can be interpreted as a serious proposal to the hereditary nobility that the ruling class of the society (jūnzǐ) deserves to remain the ruling class only when they struggle to transform themselves into the noblemen (jūnzi) through self-cultivation. Then, what are the qualifications for being a nobleman? We already know the answer to this question. The nobleman, as opposed to the petty man who is only concerned with material benefit, sets his mind primarily to the right. The conception of the right broadly conceived by the nobleman includes commonsensical and intuitive moral norms such as the golden rule and prohibitions on killing, stealing, and so forth, but the aforementioned four subjects of learning—i.e. the Rituals, the Documents, the Poetry, and the Music—provide the rich contents for the concept of the right in Kongzi. And most importantly in the light of this section, the cultivated nobleman is the one who loves the learning of these subjects and the ethical principles embodied in them, as much as or even more than he likes non-moral goods such as wealth, honor, beauty, and so forth.

Now, just as I discussed above how the masses come to emulate the virtuous ruler’s ethical preference, the question to be asked concerning the traditional jūnzǐ class is likewise what psychological resources they have in order to be motivated to the right way of thinking and action as prescribed in the high cultural legacy of the “great” Zhōu dynasty. As I see it, there seem to be two routes through which one can be attracted to the life of morality and the project of self-cultivation. One is that as long as one has a sufficient degree of calculative intelligence, he can see the overall benefit for himself of acting in accordance with the social norms or the picture of the moral ideal embodied in the Zhōu cultural tradition. In other words, this type of person is attracted to the moral way of life due to the instrumental value it has for furthering his self-interest. Given that those belonging to the traditional jūnzi class were not born the morally cultivated noblemen only by having “noble” blood, and also considering that their primary goal was certainly to keep their rank and privilege as long as possible, it is understandable that they might have been attracted to the Confucian ethical ideal of “benevolent” or “humane” man mainly for this prudential reason, if they were attracted to the Confucian ideal at all.

120 The reader might be reminded of Kongzi’s theory of the rectification of names (zhèngmíng 正名) by this and read Lunyu 12:11 in this light.
Indeed, we do find several passages in the *Analects* where Kongzi preaches to live or govern the country according to virtue and ritual, by appealing to the advantages that such a way of living and governance can bring about. For example, in *Lunyu* 13:4 one of Kongzi’s disciples Fán Chí 樊遲 asks Kongzi to teach how to grow crops and vegetables, apparently interested in making profit by growing and selling them. However, Kongzi criticizes him as being a petty man, and says thus:

If those in the above like rituals, none of the commoners will dare to be disrespectful; if those in the above like righteousness, none of the commoners will dare to be disobedient; if those in the above like trustworthiness, none of the commoners will dare to be insincere. If [those above behave] like this, people from the four directions will arrive carrying their children on their backs; why [do the superiors] need [to learn] farming?¹²¹

And in *Lunyu* 14:41 Kongzi advises the ruling class in general to develop 好 (liking or desire) for the rituals by pointing to its immediate benefits. He says, “If those above like the rituals, the commoners become easy to manage.”¹²²

However, those who like virtue and ritual primarily for their instrumental value can easily depart from the moral way of life, if they find themselves in adverse situations a little too long. In Kongzi’s eyes, the traditional jūnžǐ class of his time included many people who were to be considered petty men from the moral point of view,¹²³ and he thought that such people tended to do digressing behaviors from the social norms if they had been put into hardships.¹²⁴ However, this kind of moral precariousness was not the problem only of the “petty” members of the jūnžǐ class. According to Kongzi, zhīzhě 知者 (“the person of wisdom”), one of the three types of virtuosos he occasionally discusses in juxtaposition to the other two—i.e. rénzhě 仁者 (“the person of benevolence”) and yǒngzhě 勇者 (“the person of courage”), also tends to suffer the same problem. Kongzi says:

¹²² “上好禮，則民易使也。” *Lunyu* 14:41.
¹²⁴ “小人窮斯濫矣。” *Lunyu* 15:2.
Those who are not humane cannot endure hardship for long, and cannot enjoy pleasure for long. The person who is humane feels at home in humaneness, while the wise person finds humaneness [merely] advantageous.\textsuperscript{125}

What I have translated here as ‘humane’ or ‘humaneness’ is \textit{rén} 仁. \textit{Rén} 仁 in the \textit{Analects} seems to be used roughly in two senses. First, when used in a narrower sense, it refers to such qualities as benevolence, kindness, or goodwill for others.\textsuperscript{126} And secondly, when it is used in a broader sense, it designates the highest Confucian moral ideal that encompasses all of the positive ethical qualities such as deference, respect, loyalty, generosity, trustworthiness, and so forth.\textsuperscript{127} In whichever way \textit{rén} is interpreted in this passage, the point of contrast is clear: Unlike the humane person who finds enacting humaneness highly pleasant and comfortable in itself, the wise person adopts \textit{rén} or humaneness mainly because she understands how it will benefit her. But her motivation is not strong enough to endure hardships caused by practicing humaneness or even to remain pleased in performing humaneness in the face of such troubles and difficulties.

This motivational inferiority of the “wise person” to the “humane person” is well illustrated also in the following passage:

\textit{If your humaneness cannot keep what you have reached by understanding, you will definitely lose it even if you have acquired it. If you do not approach with dignity what you have reached through understanding and your humaneness can keep, the commoners will not respect [you]. If you do not move according to the rituals what you have reached through understanding, your humaneness can keep, and you approach with dignity, it is not yet perfect.}\textsuperscript{128}

In this passage it is not entirely clear what ‘it’ (\textit{zhī} 之) refers to exactly; ‘it’ seems to be equivocal in referring at least to two different things. First, as the objects of the verbs ‘approach’ (\textit{lì} 液) and ‘move’ (\textit{dòng} 動), it definitely refers to the commoners. But the ‘commoners’ can seem, at least at a quick glance, not to make a very good sense as the objects of the other verbs in the original passage such as ‘acquire’ (\textit{dé} 得), ‘keep’

\textsuperscript{125}“不仁者不可以久處約, 不可以長處樂. 仁者安仁, 知者利仁.” \textit{Lunyu} 4:2.
\textsuperscript{126}For example, see \textit{Lunyu} 6:30 and 12:22.
\textsuperscript{127}For example, see \textit{Lunyu} 13:19 and 17:6.
\textsuperscript{128}“知及之, 仁不能守之, 雖得之, 必失之. 知及之, 仁能守之, 不莊以涖之, 則民不敬. 知及之, 仁能守之, 莊以涖之, 動之不以禮, 未善也.” \textit{Lunyu} 15:33.
(shǒu 守), or ‘lose’ (shī 失), and this might be the reason why Arthur Waley rendered ‘it’ as ‘[political] power’ and Yáng Bójùn ‘the office in the government’ or even ‘the entire world.’ However, it remains still strange that the same ‘it’ should refer to such diverse things as political power or office on one hand and the commoners on the other. What I would like to suggest for this interpretive difficulty is to keep the rendering of ‘it’ as the ‘commoners’ consistently throughout the passage, while extending the semantic boundary of the ‘commoners’ a little bit for such verbs as ‘acquire’ (dé 得), ‘keep’ (shǒu 守), or ‘lose’ (shī 失), so that ‘it’ could actually mean ‘the political support of the commoners’ when used with these verbs. In this way, without significantly hurting the consistency in the interpretation of the word ‘zhī 之), it is fully understandable that what is meant by “acquiring people” through one’s intelligence or wisdom, for example, is actually to “get people’s hearts” by knowing how to appeal to their hearts.

Interpreted this way, the beginning part of this passage could be rendered in the following way: “If your humaneness cannot keep the people’s support that you have reached by understanding, you will definitely lose it even if you have acquired it.” And this means the following: If you have enough intelligence, it is possible for you to acquire the people’s support. For you might know that appealing to them with benevolent attitudes will get you their hearts, and you will behave according to the guidance of your understanding. However, it is more difficult to continue to keep those people around you rather than getting their initial support. For if you are not the right person who likes to practice benevolence for its own sake, you will occasionally happen to show your ulterior motive in pretending to be benevolent, and they will eventually turn their backs to you.

Unlike the person of wisdom (zhīzhě 知者), the well-cultivated nobleman’s commitment to morality is not easily compromised at the sight of difficulties, and the prime example of such a person in the Analects, besides Kongzi, is Yán Yuān 顏淵. Kongzi sometimes distinguishes himself from others as fond of learning (hàoxué 好

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129 Waley, The Analects, p. 188.
130 Yáng Bójùn, Lúnyǔ yízhù, p. 169.
131 Here I am interpreting rěn 仁 in a narrower sense.
but Yán Yuān is the only person throughout the *Analects* whom Kongzi praises for the same reason. According to Kongzi, living in a shabby street on a bowlful of rice and a gourdful of water is an unbearably depressing condition for many people. But Yán Yuān was not only indifferent to his extreme poverty but was pleasant all the time, because he had a genuine source of pleasure: learning. Kongzi’s estimation of Yán Yuān for his fondness of learning was so great that when Ji Kāngzī asked Kongzi who was most fond of learning among his disciples, Kongzi said, “There was one named Yán Huí who was eager to learn, but since he has died unfortunately at a young age, there is no one now who likes learning.”

From the fact that such people as Kongzi or Yán Yuān are very much indifferent to their material well-being as long as they can entertain themselves by leading the life of learning and moral cultivation, we could conclude that in contrast to the case of the “wise person” (zhīzhè 知者), the fully cultivated nobleman’s (rènzhè 仁者) motivation toward morality seems to come from the attractiveness that the moral way of life itself possesses. However, the main question in this subsection on hàowù and moral motivation still remains partly unanswered—namely, what psychological resources does the fully cultivated nobleman uniquely have in order to be attracted to the moral way of life for its own sake? At the beginning of this subsection, we have seen Kongzi saying that every human being, including the nobleman, commonly has desire for sex, honor, and wealth among others. And from my discussion so far of the motivational structure of the “wise person,” it would plausibly derive that the “wise person” in Kongzi is the one who has a keen understanding of how pursuing the moral way of life would best serve the satisfaction of his basic desires. However, given the difference we have identified above in motivational structure between the “wise person” and the fully cultivated nobleman in Kongzi, we could suspect that Kongzi’s nobleman has additional desires or likings (hào 好) for things that constitute the realm of morality in the *Analects*.

This being the case, what we have to investigate at this point is precisely the

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133 “賢哉, 回也! 一簞食, 一瓢飮, 在陋巷, 人不堪其憂, 回也不改其樂. 賢哉, 回也!” *Lunyu* 6:11.
135 The reader should be reminded that I use the concept of morality here very broadly so that it could be interchangeable with a quite broad conception of good life or ethical ideal.
nature of the nobleman’s *hào* for morality in terms of motivation. In other words, given that Kongzi’s nobleman has additional source of pleasure to the satisfaction of his basic desires, and since we have seen in a previous section (2.2.2.1) that there is a close relationship between one’s emotional response of *hàowù* and evaluative judgment, it is highly probable that the fully cultivated nobleman’s desire or liking (*hào* 好) for morality embodies some sort of knowledge or cognition that morality is valuable and worth pursuing. On the other hand, though, the cognition of morality’s value does not automatically motivate the nobleman towards the wholehearted practice of morality because, as we have seen above, Kongzi warns that the nobleman should guard himself against his own desires for sex, honor, and wealth throughout his lifetime. In this light, the cognition of morality’s value embodied in the nobleman’s liking for morality seems to be in a strained relationship with his basic desires. Alternatively, the fact that the nobleman has desires for such things as sex, honor, and wealth indicates his acknowledgement that those things have value to a certain extent, and this in turn reveals that the tension in question might be actually between the nobleman’s *hào* for morality and his *hào* for the objects of his basic needs, respectively based on his recognition (whether explicit or implicit) of both kinds of values.

In that case, there arises an interesting question in moral psychology: Given this picture of the nobleman’s *hào* for morality and the objects of his basic needs, how is it explained in the *Analects* that the fully cultivated nobleman likes morality or virtue and ritual more than he likes the beauty? In answering this kind of question, sometimes examining a case of moral failure or imperfection seems to shed more light; I would like to analyze two such passages from the *Analects*. The first passage is an exchange between Kongzi and Rǎn Qiú 冉求, one of the most talented disciples of Kongzi’s:

*Rǎn Qiú said, “It is not that I do not delight in your teaching, but my strength is insufficient.” The Master said, “Those whose strength is insufficient [just] collapse midway. But you are now drawing a line.”*136

In this passage, complaining to his master about the difficulty in pursuing the correct way of life, Rǎn Qiú introduces two important points concerning our current inquiry. First, he

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acknowledges that he feels pleased in practicing the Way Kongzi preaches. This means that he finds Kongzi’s moral teaching valuable, and is attracted to it. Second, however, Rǎn Qiú also mentions that he does not have enough moral strength. This reveals Rǎn Qiú’s implicit view that although the recognition of morality as valuable comes with one’s being attracted to it to a certain extent, the morality’s attraction is not necessarily strong enough to motivate one all the way to moral perfection. Would Kongzi agree to this view? Yes, he would. For in this passage, he seems to acknowledge the existence of those who are genuinely short of moral strength and would give out during the course of their moral journey, although he disagrees strongly that Rǎn Qiú is one of them.  

In contrast to Kongzi’s scornful encouragement for Rǎn Qiú, Kongzi seems to “draw a line” himself for another of his disciples, Zǐgòng 子貢. Look at the following passage:

Zǐgòng said, “What I do not want others to do to me, I also want not to do to them.” The Master said, “Ci 賜, this is not what you can reach [yet].”

Here we see a Kongzian version of the golden rule, viz. the idea that “my behavior or attitude affecting another person should in some sense be the kind of thing that I would find acceptable if I were the person affected.” In the Confucian tradition this had been called “šù” (恕, “consideration”), and sometimes Kongzi seems to view it as an important constituent of rén 仁 (“humaneness”), the highest moral ideal in the Analects. For example, when Zhònggōng 仲弓 (an advanced disciple of Kongzi’s famous for his virtuous acts) asks about rén 仁 in Lunyu 12:2, Kongzi includes this maxim in the list of things for him to act on, and when Zǐgòng 子貢 asks for one maxim worth practicing

137 On another occasion Kongzi also says, although very reluctantly, that there could be people who are short of moral strength: “有能一日用其力於仁矣乎? 我未見力不足者. 蓋有之矣, 我未之見也.” Lunyu 4:6.
until the end of his life, Kongzi again recommends this maxim. In any event, it is curious that Kongzi seems to take Zìgòng down in the passage above when he says that he desires not to do to others what he does not want others to do to him. What is going on? What is it exactly that Kongzi says Zìgòng cannot reach yet? I will suggest an answer to this question shortly, but I would like the reader to compare the following two statements first, as possible interpretations of what Zìgòng says in this passage. These statements are identical but differently emphasized:

(i) I desire not to do to others what I do not want them to do to myself.

(ii) I desire not to do to others what I do not want them to do to myself.

The first statement can be taken as a description of what kind of person the agent is in general in terms of the things that she normally desires. That is, when a person makes this statement for herself, she can be saying that she is the type of person who desires not to do to others what she does not want others to do to herself. On the other hand, the second statement can be considered as an indication of what kind of act the agent is willing to perform, among a range of choices she could voluntarily make. In other words, the speaker of the second statement can be simply saying that she is willing to act in accordance with this maxim rather than against it, insofar as it is under her control to do so. Now, I propose, the second statement as I just interpreted cannot be what Zìgòng meant or what Kongzi thought Zìgòng to mean in this passage, because in Lunyu 15:24 (quoted in footnote 141 above), Kongzi recommends this maxim to Zìgòng as what he is supposed to practice until death. If Kongzi thought that not doing to others what one does not want others to do to oneself is totally what Zìgòng cannot make himself do, why would Kongzi recommend it to him? So, we are left only with the first

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142 Another interpretive possibility is to take this statement as a description of the agent's occurrent desiderative state. In other words, when a person makes this statement, she can be commenting on her emotional state that she is currently desiring not to do to others what she does not want others to do to herself. However, this interpretation is trivial and subject to what I just suggested in the text, in the sense that she can be desiring to act in accordance with this maxim only because she is the kind of person who would act in accordance with this maxim. Of course this excludes the possibility that she suffers a mental illness in which she occasionally feels this particular desire against her will.
interpretation open—i.e. Kongzi is denying that Zìgòng has acquired the character of the person who would normally desire to adopt the attitudes or behaviors that this maxim would dictate, no matter how many times he could actually manage to act in accordance with that maxim.

Now, in order to show how my discussion of this Zìgòng passage contributes to making a larger point concerning our current question that I raised several paragraphs ago (i.e. how is it explained in the Analects that the fully cultivated nobleman likes morality more than he likes the beauty?), I need to discuss briefly what kind of person Zìgòng was. First of all, Zìgòng was a highly gifted person in commerce, and he was very much interested in making profit throughout his life. According to Sīmǎ Qiān’s biographical remark on him, after learning under Kongzi he left his master to serve in the government of the Wèi dukedom, and there he became the richest among Kongzi’s disciples by engaging in some sort of international trade—buying goods when cheap and selling them when expensive between the Cáo and Lǔ dukedoms.143 In addition, Kongzi once made a comparing remark between Yán Huí and Zìgòng. He said, “Huí has nearly [completed his moral training], but he is often in want. Cì was not content with his lot, and increased his wealth; he often hits the mark when he predicts [the price of goods].” According to this remark of Kongzi’s, unlike Yán Huí who did not care about his material well-being as long as he could pursue his moral and spiritual perfection, Zìgòng had a perpetual desire for wealth, and perhaps the satisfaction of it was part of his conception of happy life. And perhaps this was the reason why Zìgòng tried to remove the sacrificial sheep from the gàoshùo ritual in Lunyu 3:17: Traditionally, the rulers of the Lǔ dukedom had practiced a custom called “gàoshùo” ritual, in which the duke sacrifice a sheep to the spirits of his ancestors and announce them a new moon on the first day of every lunar month. However, by the time of Kongzi and Zìgòng this practice became almost dormant but that a sacrificial sheep was still being killed every month. Zìgòng, apparently focused on the material value of the sheep, wanted to stop the wasteful killing of it, and to such Zìgòng Kongzi said: “Cì 賜! You care about the sheep,

143 *Shǐjì* 史記, “Huòzhí lièzhuàn” 貨殖列傳, p. 3258.
but I care about the ritual!”¹⁴⁴

The point of Kongzi’s retort here might be that Zìgòng did not see the high value of the gàoshùo ritual, being obsessed with the inferior material value of the sacrificial sheep. However, Zìgòng was not a petty man to the bone. On the contrary, he greatly valued Kongzi’s teaching, comparing himself to a beautiful house that can be peered over a shoulder-high wall and Kongzi to a great palace whose beauty and wealth cannot be fathomed due to the high wall around it, which is many times a person’s height.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, after all, Zìgòng had enough intelligence to apprehend the bindingness of the golden rule—or the reasonableness of the maxim that one should treat others as one wants to be treated by them—and wanted to live up to it. Taking all of these into consideration, we can see that Zìgòng’s problem is exactly the same as (or at least a very similar one to) Rǎn Qiú’s, viz. that one’s grasp of morality’s value is not strong enough so that 1) one is not motivated toward morality sufficiently (Rǎn Qiú), or that 2) one’s attention is often diverted from morality to other things (Zìgòng). The only difference between Rǎn Qiú and Zìgòng is that one thinks he is short of moral strength when his master thinks he actually has enough of it, and the other thinks he can reach what his master thinks is actually not within his reach yet.

In short, the picture of motivational malfunction we could derive from both cases is that the strength of one’s recognition of morality’s value is not proportionate to the degree in which one is supposed to like (hào 好) morality. And based on this picture, we could postulate that the ideal nobleman’s recognition of morality’s value is such that 1) he gives the top priority to morality over other things of value, and that 2) the order of priority among morality and other valuable things is proportionate to the more and less degrees in which he likes morality and other things respectively. However, we still do not know how exactly one could straighten things up and acquire the fully cultivated nobleman’s character in the Analects. This is the question that I turn to in the next section.

¹⁴⁴ “賜也！爾愛其羊，我愛其禮!” Lunyu 3:17. I provide a much detailed discussion of this passage from another angle in the next chapter.
¹⁴⁵ “譬之宮牆，賜之牆也及肩，窺見室家之好。夫子之牆數仞，不得其門而入，不見宗廟之美，百官之富。” Lunyu 19:23. Note that Zìgòng uses here a metaphor of wealth and goods in comparing his moral worthiness and Kongzi’s. In another passage, we witness him using a metaphor of commerce for probing Kongzi about serving in a government. See Lunyu 9:13.
The Cultivation of **Hàowù 好惡**

So, the question that concerns us now is specifically how one could shorten the gap between the strength of one’s recognition of morality’s value and the degree in which he should like morality, and our task is to see whether we can find any answers to this question (or at least the beginning of it) in the *Analects*. However, before delving into this question, let me try again to explain more clearly what is the problematic situation that this question poses. In a previous section, we have seen that Kongzi postulates a close relationship between one’s emotional response of liking and disliking (hàowù) to a certain thing and one’s evaluative judgment of that thing. On this view, when two kinds of valuable things (morality and wealth, e.g.) are in competition, one is expected to like those things as much as she finds them valuable. Now, the problematic situation is that one’s recognition of the value of morality is not translated into one’s fondness of morality in *due* degree, and what I mean by the ‘due degree’ here is invested in the two problematic cases that we have just examined above.

That is, on one hand, it could be the case that one has not yet fully savored the deep meaning and value of morality, so while being attracted to morality to a certain degree, morality’s attraction for him is not sufficient enough to overcome the attraction of other valuable things. In other words, one’s liking for morality has not yet reached the *sufficient* degree where she would not be tempted away by the value of those things other than morality. In this case, although one might think that one has exhausted the meaning and value of virtue and ritual, often it is merely a case of self-deception and one has yet to dig further deep into the mine (Rān Qiú’s case). On the other hand, it could be the case that although one sincerely thinks (or thinks oneself as sincere in thinking) that morality is of the utmost value, one is not infrequently distracted from the value of morality and pursue other things. This is a little paradoxical, because one’s evaluative judgment embodied in one’s action fails to accord with what one consciously thinks as of the highest value. In this case, the ‘due degree’ will be the *proper* degree of motivational power into which one’s sincere and conscious value judgment *should have* been transformed (Zīgòng’s case). In any event, these two cases seem to share an important point, viz. that both cases require the invigoration of one’s liking for morality and
disliking for what is harmful to morality.

Then, what we have to look for now in the *Analects* is Kongzi’s method for strengthening one’s liking (*hào*) for morality and disliking (*wù*) for what is against morality. However, concerning this matter things do not look very promising at least on the surface. For throughout the *Analects*, Kongzi does not seem to suggest any particular method for cultivating *hàowù*, which makes a direct reference either to the concept of *hào* or to the concept of *wù*. For instance, Kongzi says that “Liking it (i.e. morality or the correct way of life) is better than understanding it, and delighting in it is better than liking it;”\(^{146}\) and when Zigòng asks his opinion about the maxim “Poor without fawning, rich without swagger,” Kongzi suggests a better version: “Poor, yet joyful; rich, yet fond of rituals.”\(^{147}\) It is clear in both cases that Kongzi’s nobleman of the highest moral cultivation almost naturally pursues morality taking delight in it, but Kongzi does not seem to provide any concrete method for altering one’s *hàowù* according to this moral ideal.

This lack of concrete methodology for cultivating one’s *hàowù* in the *Analects* is markedly contrasted with Mengzi’s elaborate discussion of emotional cultivation over a century later. For example, *Mengzi* 1B3 and 1B5 contain Mengzi’s dialogues with King Xuān of the Qi ducedom concerning how the king could transform his desires (*hào*) for small courage, beauty, and wealth and become fond of morality. Being fond of morality, according to Mengzi, the king will like great courage and want to share the beauty and wealth previously in his possession with all of the people in his country. It is very important, though, to construe correctly what is meant by this lack of concrete methodology for cultivating one’s *hàowù* in the *Analects*. Certainly, for one thing, it can never mean that Kongzi was not interested in the question of how to cultivate one’s *hàowù*. For it is clear from my discussion of the *Analects* so far that correct judgment and properly motivated action are closely intertwined with one’s correct emotional responses of *hàowù*, and Kongzi’s moral education based primarily on the curricula of the Rituals, the *Documents*, the Poetry, and the Music is all about producing the person of good character.


However, on the other hand, the specific problem under our consideration in this section belongs to those who have already engaged themselves in the noble study for a substantial period of time, and their problem is that they still either complain about not having strong enough motivation for morality (such as Rǎn Qiú), or wrongly think that they have enough motivation for morality when they actually have not (such as Zǐgòng). And Kongzi does not seem to handle this problem very well—for such people as Rǎn Qiú, he simply encourages them to study and practice harder by telling them they have not yet used up their moral energy; and for those like Zǐgòng, he would provide the same advice, telling them not to be complacent until they will have reached the highest plane of moral character. Perhaps then it might be the case, as David Nivison has pointed out more than twenty years ago, that Kongzi never solved this problem of “how to get at the unmotivated student” (or more appropriately here, insufficiently motivated student) successfully;\(^\text{148}\) perhaps we shall wait for later thinkers such as Mengzi and Xunzi to take up this problem centuries later and address it more consciously and in more sophisticated ways.

2.3 Kongzi’s Conception of Emotion

In Section 2.1 above, I suggested that we could have some ideas of Kongzi’s general conception of emotion by pondering the implications of various usages of ‘qing’ 情 in the Analects as well as in other ancient Chinese texts. According to my argument, the ancient Chinese concept of qing 情 has the following characteristics:

(1) In addition to ‘facts’ of a situation and ‘characteristic features’ of a certain category of things, qing also refers to what is sitting deeply in an individual’s mind in the forms of sincere opinions, goals or aspirations, desires for certain objects, certain kinds of temper, emotional or affective reactions toward a certain object, evaluative judgments, or certain characteristic behavioral patterns. (2) Such qing, being considered as deep-seated in the innermost place of one’s mind, are partly expressed through one’s words and

manners. However, one’s external manners and speeches do not always represent one’s inner qíng correctly, and consequently careful observation over a substantial period of time is needed to know about a person’s qíng correctly. (3) The qíng conceived in this way are not the features commonly found in the species of human being in general, but the features uniquely belonging to an individual human being. And given the nature of the aforementioned elements of qíng (such as goals, desires, emotional reactions, and evaluative judgments), qíng is roughly equivalent to the concept of character that distinguishes its possessor from others.

Besides making these points, I have also argued that (4) this sense of qíng as referring to various “psychological items” can be ascribed to one of the two usages of qíng in the Analects (i.e. Lunyu 13:4), and that (5) this sense of qíng is semantically commensurable with another dominant sense of qíng as referring to “facts” about a situation or “characteristic features” of a certain category of things. Moreover, I have also shown that (6) there exists a strong connection between these earlier senses of qíng and its later use as referring to prima facie emotions such as 好 好 (“liking”), 恶, 嫌 (“disliking”), 喜 ("joy"), 怒 ("anger"), 哀 ("sorrow"), 樂 ("pleasure"), and I argued that (7) these earlier and later senses of qíng are held together by the concept of 好惡, which I proposed to interpret as a broad conception of emotions or some sort of attitudes that are expressed as particular emotions depending on what kind of object one encounters.

Now, from these characteristics of qíng we could derive two important points about Kongzi’s general conception of emotion. First, we could ascribe to Kongzi the view that emotion is an important part of qíng; and given the point (3) above (i.e. the rough equivalence between an individual’s qíng and her character), we could regard Kongzi as thinking that one’s emotion or one’s particular way of emotional reaction in a certain situation is an important constituent of one’s character. Second, based on the points (6) and (7) above (i.e. the close relationship between the earlier and later senses of qíng, which is made possible through the concept of 好惡), we could find some sort of structure in the Analects among the emotions occurring in the text. Specifically, I would like to ascribe to Kongzi a peculiar type of hierarchical relationship between 好惡 (liking and disliking) and other particular emotions such as “joy,” “anger,” “sorrow,” and
I discuss these two points respectively in the following two subsections. Concerning the first point that emotion is an important element of one’s character, I first argue that the cultivation of good character is a primary ethical and political concern for Kongzi, and then show that emotions or feelings constitute the most important and revealing element of a person’s character by analyzing a passage from the *Analects*. And then finally, I discuss how a person’s character is intertwined with, expressed by, and can be cultivated through his particular emotions or feelings. Concerning the second point about the importance of hàowù in combining the earlier and later senses of qíng (i.e. character and emotion respectively), I focus on delineating the relationship between hàowù and other particular emotions in the *Analects*. Specifically, I emphasize the non-hedonistic aspect of Kongzi’s picture of this relationship by contrasting it with the picture we have already examined in Section 2.1.3 above, namely the account in the *Zuozhuàn* of how particular emotions such as joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure arise from one’s attitudes of liking and disliking (hàowù) towards different objects. I also elaborate the subtle but significant theoretical difference between the Zuozhuàn and the Analects models concerning how hàowù organize the other particular emotions.

### 2.3.1 Character Cultivation and Emotions in the *Analects*

Throughout the *Analects*, we can easily observe that good character and the cultivation of it are among the greatest ethical and political concerns of Kongzi’s. First of all, Kongzi’s following remark clearly shows how much importance he places on knowing about people’s character correctly:

*Look at what he does, see what he acts through, and observe what he feels content with. [If so,] how could people conceal [their character]? How could people conceal [their character]?

— *Analects* 2:10

As James Legge has aptly pointed out, this passage consists of two corresponding sets of gradually heightening or deepening steps—i.e. on one hand (a) one’s ostensible act, one’s motive behind that act, and one’s innermost feeling about one’s own act and motive; and on the other hand (b) the gradual heightening of the observer’s attention corresponding to the gradually lowering degree of each object’s observability. And although we do not find in this passage any explicit term matching the English word ‘character,’ what Kongzi is talking about here is doubtless character, because we come to know a person’s character mainly by observing how she behaves in a certain situation, what is her motive for behaving in that way, and whether she feels comfortable or not about her motive as well as her behavior coming out of that motive.

Then, why is character such an important topic in Kongzi’s thought? There might be two reasons, closely related to each other. First, we have previously distinguished between two large social groups in the ancient Chinese society, viz. the xiǎorén 小人 and the jūnzǐ 君子 classes. And for the xiǎorén class, we have seen Kongzi arguing that (1) while not being able to understand things properly, the commoners can still be made to pursue the correct way of life, and that (2) they can be made to do so not by forceful means but by some sort of persuasion or moral influence. Once Kongzi acknowledges this point, he is logically to face such questions as what is the nature of the commoners’ character in general and how their character can be shaped into a moral one. On the other hand, for the jūnzǐ 君子 class Kongzi also argues that every member of the ruling class must cultivate himself into a nobleman, and Kongzi’s nobleman is the person of noble character who does the right thing only from the correct motive. In this light, it is out of question that character also occupies the central place in Kongzi’s theory of moral cultivation for the jūnzǐ 君子 class.

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150 Legge, ibid. The similar point can be observed between one’s intentions or goals (zhì 志) and behaviors (xíng 行) in Lunyu 1:11, and between one’s acts (xíng 行) and words (yán 言) in Lunyu 5:10. In these two passages, the former are less observable than the latter respectively; and by combining these two passages, we acquire another interesting sequence, i.e. one’s words → behaviors or acts → intentions or goals (in the order of decreasing observability), which in turn reminds us of the third Qiūyuán passage (quoted in footnote 18 above) on the relationship between one’s internal qíng and external words and appearance of that person.

151 Presumably for this reason, both Lau and Legge supply the word ‘character’ in their translations. See Lau, The Analects, p. 64 and Legge, ibid.

152 The reader can be reminded of my discussion of the humane person (rénzhě 仁者) in contrast to the wise person (zhīzhě 知者) in Section 2.2.2.3 above.
However, this seemingly individual moral concern of character cultivation is actually an important element of Kongzi’s political thought too, because in the *Analects* we often find the idea that good character is the very foundation of good government. For example, in response to someone’s question of why Kongzi does not participate in government, Kongzi quotes a passage from the *Documents*: “Filial piety! [Be] filial [to your parents] and loving to your brothers; only then [these virtues] will be reflected in the governing of the country.”¹⁵³ That is, serving as an official in the ruler’s court is not the only way to participate in government, because such virtues as filial piety and kindness to one’s brothers constitute the very foundation of the good and harmonious government, and consequently practicing those virtues in the private realm is one of the important ways of participating in government. On the other hand, it is also true that good government is crucial for maintaining and improving people’s good character, because Kongzi thinks that the most effective means for moral transformation of the commoners is to recommend good people for governmental offices and let them play the active role-model in moral action and moral cultivation.¹⁵⁴ And this is the reason why Kongzi takes it so important to know other people’s character correctly in the previously quoted passage (i.e. *Lunyu* 2:10).

Now that the ethical and political importance of character cultivation in Kongzi’s thought is clarified, what I would like to do next is to highlight the importance of emotions in Kongzi’s implicit theory of character cultivation. Specifically, I would like to argue that Kongzi thinks the most important as well as the most revealing element in a person’s character is her feelings or emotions. This point can be proven by further analyzing *Lunyu* 2:10, which was just quoted in footnote 149 above. That is, from Kongzi’s recommendation in *Lunyu* 2:10 to pay more and more attention for observing another person’s character as one moves one’s gaze from his obvert behavior to his covert motive and further to his innermost feeling, we could derive the following thought of Kongzi’s: Although one might do a right thing for some reason, he does not necessarily do so with a right motive; and even if one does a right thing from a right motive, he is always liable to relapse from the correct way of life, as long as he is not

¹⁵⁴ For example, see *Lunyu* 12:22. I provide a detailed explanation of this passage in the next chapter, specifically when I explain Kongzi’s view of ài 爱 (“love”).
completely happy with his own action (i.e. the combination of his behavior and motive). In this light, Kongzi seems to think that (1) character cultivation culminates in making oneself feel in the right way, and that (2) one’s emotions or feelings arising in various situations, despite their extremely private character, are the most revealing indicator of one’s character when properly observed.

Supposing that my general point of emotions’ importance in the *Analects* for character cultivation is clear, I would like to cite now a couple of passages from the *Analects* that will illustrate Kongzi’s concrete view of how a person’s character is intertwined with, expressed by, and can be cultivated through his particular emotions or feelings. Specifically, the following three consecutive passages contain Kongzi’s remarks on what kinds of emotions a filial son, or the person possessed of the virtue *xiao* 孝 (“filial piety”), should and should not feel:

1) *The Master said, “In serving one’s parents, [one should] counsel them gently; [if one] sees that one’s advice gets ignored, [one should be] more reverent and never disobedient; and [even if they get angry and] give one a hard time, one should not conceive any rancor.”*¹⁵⁵

2) *The Master said, “While one’s parents are alive, one should not go too far afield in one’s travels. If one does, one’s whereabouts should always be known.”*¹⁵⁶

3) *The Master said, “One should not be ignorant of one’s parents’ age. On one hand one gets joyful by [knowing it], but on the other hand one gets worried by [knowing it].”*¹⁵⁷

Just as many virtues in general involve lack of certain emotions or at least control of them (e.g. courage involving fearlessness or control of fear), so we can see in the first passage above that Kongzi’s filial son is characterized by lack of anger or at least control of it when dealing with his parents. That is, it is very normal for human beings to get angry when slighted or given a hard time unjustly, and we can guess from the prescriptive tone of the original passage that this might be also the case for ancient Chinese, even between parents and children. However, as Kongzi prescribes, the person of filial piety in the

¹⁵⁵“子曰：‘事父母幾諫，見志不從，又敬不違，勞而不怨。’” *Lunyu* 4:18. The underlining is mine.
¹⁵⁷“子曰：‘父母之年，不可不知也，一則以喜，一則以懼。’” *Lunyu* 4:21. The underlining is mine.
Analects overcomes this normal inclination of human beings; he meets his parents’ slight with respectful obedience, and does not feel indignant at his parents’ unjustified punishment.

However, this does not mean that Kongzi’s filial son does not feel any emotions at all. On the contrary, the second and third passages above clearly show that the person of filial piety in the Analects is characterized by rich emotional experience involving several particular emotions. First, despite no explicit mention of any particular emotion terms, the second passage above is clearly about one’s loving concern for one’s parents, especially for their emotional well-being. That is, parents normally get worried when their child goes too far on a travel, and Kongzi’s filial son is the one whose loving concern for his parents makes himself concerned that his parents will be worried when he goes on a far travel. The filial son informs his parents of his whereabouts in order to alleviate his parents’ worry, and behind this action is his filial love combined with the deep belief that serving one’s parents does not stop with fulfilling their material need but requires thoughtful care for their emotional welfare.  

Moreover, Kongzi’s filial son is not merely a person who is attentively concerned about his parents’ feelings while staying calm on his part, but a person who is emotionally susceptible to circumstances that affect general well-being of his parents. So, Kongzi recommends in the third passage above that one should not forget one’s parents’ age, because knowing the age of one’s parents is an important source of joy and fear. That is, being aware of one’s parents’ age, Kongzi’s filial son is happy that his old parents survived another year; but at the same time, he is also afraid and worried that his parents got one step further to their death.

To summarize, (1) Kongzi’s filial son is the one whose loving concern for his parents makes him stay attentive to his parents’ feelings. In addition, (2) Kongzi’s filial son does not feel, or at least restrains himself from indulging in, certain disassociating emotions such as anger or indignation toward his parents, even if they were usually justifiable or at least understandable when provoked by other members of the society. On the other hand, (3) Kongzi’s filial son cultivates certain positive emotions such as

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158 The importance of paying attention to parents’ feelings when serving them is well illustrated in Lunyu 2:7 and 2:8.
reverence for his parents, and voluntarily leaves himself vulnerable to the uneasy sweep of emotions, including the agony of fear or worry about his parents’ misfortune.

2.3.2 Hàowù and the Structure of Emotions in the Analects

In Section 2.1.3 above, I have discussed a passage from the Zúozhuàn that suggests an interesting view of the relationship between hàowù and particular emotions. According to this view, human beings have two pairs of basic emotions, viz. “joy” (xǐ 喜) and “anger” (nù 怒) on one hand and “pleasure” (lè 樂) and “sorrow” (āi 哀) on the other, and they respectively originate from another set of broad conception of emotions, namely liking and disliking or desire and aversion (hàowù 好惡). In addition, I have also suggested assimilating hàowù 好惡 to John Rawls’s conception of attitude, which he defines as “a set of ordered families of dispositions.” A good example of Rawls’s conception of attitude is love; according to him, love consists of a set of dispositions such as the disposition to feel joy at the presence of the person one loves and the disposition to feel sorrow when one’s loved one suffers. And I have argued, since the Zúozhuàn passage in question says that 1) xǐ 喜 (“joy”) and nù 怒 (“anger”) derive respectively from hào 好 and wù 惡 and that 2) lè 樂 (“pleasure”) and āi 哀 (“sorrow”) arise respectively by encountering good and bad things, we could likewise conclude that hàowù 好惡 or desire and aversion are two opposite attitudes consisting of dispositions to be expressed as joy or pleasure and anger or sorrow respectively, depending on the object one encounters.

In addition to providing a picture of the hierarchical structure of emotions between hàowù 好惡 and other particular emotions, this Zúozhuàn passage also deserves a special attention in suggesting a monolithic view of human motivation. According to this passage, positive emotions such as joy and pleasure result from the satisfaction of one’s desires (hào), whereas negative emotions such as anger and sorrow result from experiencing frustration of one’s desires or encountering bad things that one do not like at all (wù). Furthermore, the passage points out that life and death are two primary examples of good and bad things that people respectively pursue and avoid, and it also recommends that the ruler manipulate people’s behavior by taking advantage of this general
inclinations of human beings. In other words, given that it is a general human tendency to pursue what is conducive to one’s life and prosperity and avoid what will bring about suffering and death, the ruler can make his people act in one way rather than the other by deploying rewards and punishments accordingly.

Now concerning Kongzi’s general conception of the structure of emotions, I think we can ascribe to Kongzi this Zǔozhuàn picture to some extent, viz. the picture that particular emotions arise as the results of one’s emotional response of liking and disliking to various objects. To take an example from the two passages quoted at the end of the previous section (footnote 155 and 157), people usually get angry when they are slighted, remain joyful when their loved ones are well, and stay worried when they anticipate bad things for their loved ones. And apparently, they would not have these feelings unless they believe that slight on their self-esteem from others and misfortunes for their loved ones are also bad things for themselves, whereas the welfare of their loved ones is also a good thing for themselves.

However, this cannot mean that people’s general attitudes of desire and aversion or liking and disliking (hàowù) are the sufficient conditions for people to feel particular emotions such as anger, sorrow, fear, shame, resentment, and so forth. For even if one desires (hào) that only good things happen to one’s loved ones, this does not make one necessarily feel sorrow among other emotions when misfortune hits one’s loved ones; and even if one does not like (wù) to be slighted, one would not necessarily feel anger when slighted, say, as opposed to frustration. However, the Zǔozhuàn passage in question explicitly says that “joy” and “pleasure” come from the satisfaction of desire, while “anger” and “sorrow” come from the feeling of aversion, without further specifying under which conditions one’s equally positive or negative emotional reactions are subdivided into “joy” and “pleasure” or “anger” and “sorrow.” Perhaps the author of the passage did not think carefully enough about this issue. Then, what about Kongzi? Would he suffer the same problem?

As I see it, an important difference between this Zǔozhuàn passage and Kongzi’s remarks on hàowù and other emotions in the Analects is that the latter is theoretically much more flexible and seemingly reluctant to propose any strong doctrinal theses about

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159 Stephen Darwall pointed this out to me in a private discussion on 10/3/06.
emotions. For example, Kongzi does not make any explicit claim that particular emotions are generated (shēng 生) from two fundamental human attitudes of liking and disliking. His theoretical flexibility of this kind enables us to interpret his view of the relationship between hàowù and other particular emotions in a more plausible way. In a nutshell, I would like to ascribe to Kongzi a view that one’s opposite attitudes of liking and disliking represent one’s emotional reactions to diverse stimuli in the most general and basic way, and one’s particular emotions can be further distinguished out of these two basic categories by specifying the conditions and evaluative beliefs involved in the occurrence of the respective particular emotions.

In other words, in my view Kongzi thinks that human beings experience emotions on two different levels: on the lower level of the generic responses of liking and disliking, and on the higher level of particular emotions. For example, if one feels particular emotions such as joy, pride, and admiration for distinct objects, one also finds those objects likable (hào) and simultaneously likes (hào) those objects. On the other hand, if one feels distinct emotions such as anger, sorrow, and shame toward the respective objects of these emotions, one also finds the objects of these emotions dislikable or bad (è) and simultaneously dislikes (wù) those objects. Analyzing Kongzi’s use of “hào” in Lunyu 9:18 can prove this point: Among the usual emotions one can feel about having a beautiful woman (sè 色) as one’s wife are included joy and pride, and about a virtuous person (dé 德) one can feel admiration or respect. And the ancient Chinese terms for these particular emotions are part of Kongzi’s usual vocabulary. In Lunyu 9:18, though, Kongzi also uses the verb “hào” for both objects (i.e. a beautiful woman and a virtuoso), and this clearly shows that the general emotional response of liking (hào) permeates the particular positive emotions like joy, pride, admiration, respect, and so forth in Kongzi’s view of emotions.

In addition, we have already seen that people’s general attitudes of liking and disliking are closely intertwined with their evaluative thinking in the Analects, and in

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160 This could be a sign that the Zíozhùān passage in question was written in a later period than most of the relevant remarks on hàowù in the Analects.
162 The same point can be easily made about wù (dislike) and particular negative emotions such as anger, sorrow, shame, resentment, disgust, and so forth.
principle people’s evaluative thinking can be concerned not only with general assessments of whether something is likable or dislikable but also with more concrete assessments such as whether certain things or situations deserve the responses of joy, pride, admiration, anger, fear, shame, and so forth respectively. In this light, we could also project a two-level structure of evaluative thinking to Kongzi which corresponds to the two-level structure of emotions just described. That is, just as the generic human responses of liking and disliking are further concretized as we examine the particular circumstantial conditions and evaluative beliefs involved in the occurrence of particular emotions, so the generic evaluative assessments of certain things’ favorable or unfavorable attributes get further specified as we examine the distinct factors for each of the situations. And particular evaluative attitudes—e.g. “I have been unjustly slighted,” “My grandmother, who loved me so much, is no longer with me,” “Tom made such a great sacrifice for his football team.”—provide the most crucial elements for the occurrence of particular emotions corresponding to those attitudes respectively.

Besides this difference between the Zúozhuàn and the Analects on the relationship between hàowù and other particular emotions, I also see another significant area of discrepancy between Kongzi’s conception of emotion and this Zúozhuàn picture: I think that Kongzi’s conception of hàowù involves a much more complex view of human desire than what is delineated in the Zúozhuàn passage. As I have just said, 1) Kongzi postulates a strong relationship between one’s emotional responses of hàowù and one’s evaluative attitudes, and 2) the crucial difference between the cultivated nobleman and the petty or ordinary man in Kongzi is that they take different things as the objects of their respective desires and aversions. For example, Kongzi’s nobleman, who is a filial son to his parents, goes against the general human tendency to get angry when slighted or unjustly punished, when the slight or punishment is from his parents. For in the eye of this Confucian nobleman, the slight or punishment occasionally given by his parents are nothing compared to the great parental love his parents have continuously showed for his well-being. In addition, Kongzi’s filial son does not simply follow the general tendency of human beings to feel fear and worry when their parents’ well-being is threatened; he actually tends to exceed the ordinary degree in feeling these emotions about his parents. In other words, Kongzi’s filial son places the highest value on the welfare of his parents,
and consequently he becomes especially susceptible to these feelings when his parents’ well-being is threatened.

So far, I have discussed Kongzi’s conception of emotion focusing on two aspects: 1) the importance of emotion in his view of character cultivation, and 2) how one’s desire and aversion (hàowù) intertwined with one’s evaluative attitudes play a pivotal role in organizing particular emotional reactions in various situations. And based on my analysis of Kongzi’s remarks on the emotional states of the filial son, I have also argued that the cultivated nobleman in the Analects is not merely a person of equanimity who is calmly concerned about the well-being of oneself as well as of others, but a person of rich emotional experiences that reveal his character. In the next chapter, I elaborate this picture of Kongzi’s emotional ideal by discussing a number of passages in the Analects that contain Kongzi’s and his immediate disciples’ views of concrete emotion terms. Specifically, I focus my attention on several ancient Chinese emotion terms that might be roughly translated as “love,” “sorrow,” and “fear.”
Chapter Three

Love, Sorrow, and Fear in the Analects

In this chapter, I discuss three sets of ancient Chinese emotion terms that could be very roughly rendered as “love,” “sorrow,” and “fear” respectively. What I discuss under the category of “love” is “ài” 愛, and I interpret this concept to consist mainly of 1) one’s natural affection for close people and 2) one’s universal caring attitude adopted towards those who are not the primary objects of one’s natural affection. This sub-distinction of “love” nicely matches that of “sorrow”—“āi” 哀 in ancient Chinese: I interpret the emotion of āi 哀 to comprise 1) one’s deep sadness at the loss of close people and 2) one’s sympathy at the misfortune of others. As I will argue later in Chapter 6, one’s natural affection for close people is expressed as sorrow when misfortune befalls them, and the caring attitude one adopts for everyone can be based on her sympathy at the suffering of others. Finally, I divide the category of “fear” in the Analects further into 1) natural fear for things that directly threaten one’s existence, 2) apprehension or anxiety that bad things might happen to oneself or one’s loved ones, and 3) a kind of moral or religious awe and reverence. I discuss “jù” 懼, “kǒng” 恐, and “wèi” 畏 for these topics.

In the Analects, the well-cultivated nobleman is often presented to have three cardinal virtues: rén 仁 ("benevolence"), zhī 知 ("wisdom"), and yǒng 勇 ("courage"). Among these, the nobleman’s ài 愛 and āi 哀 constitute the core of his rén 仁, and the nobleman cultivates courage by working on his various kinds of fear. In this sense, understanding Kongzi’s view of “love,” “sorrow,” and “fear” is the key to understanding the character of Kongzi’s virtuoso.

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1 For example, see Lunyu 9:29, 14:4, and 14:28.
3.1 “Love” (Ài 愛)

Love is no doubt one of the most complex emotions to analyze, and this is not the case only in the Analects. In general, love sometimes seems to mean our feeling of affection for our family members and other beloved ones, but we are also often exposed to religious sermons that recommend us to love our neighbors as much as ourselves, and even to love our “enemies.” Apparently these two kinds of love are different from each other; one is our natural affection that we are born with as normal human beings, whereas the other is a moral or religious virtue that is not naturally given to us but needs to be cultivated one way or another. The ancient Chinese term that I discuss in this section under the category of “love” is “ài” 愛, and we seem to find a roughly similar distinction in the Analects: on one hand ài 愛 as natural affection for close people, and on the other hand ài as an indiscriminate attitude of care that any virtuous person is supposed to assume universally toward all human beings.

In addition to these two, we have another sense of ài. This third sense of ài is traditionally glossed as xī 惜 and sometimes translated as “grudging,” in the sense of being stingy or feeling reluctant to forsake or give up something. A typical example of such usage of “ài” can be seen in Mengzi 1A:7: One day, the ruler of the Qi 齊 dukedom happened to see an ox being led to slaughter to be killed for a sacrifice, and he ordered the ox to be replaced by a sheep. He gave this order because he felt compassion for the miserable situation of that ox, but other people mistook him to be merely stingy about the ox. This passage tells us that ài in this sense has to do with cherishing the material value of certain things, but based on my analysis of a similar passage in the Analects which will be presented below, I think that ài in this third sense is some sort of valuing in a broad sense, and one’s valuing (ài) does not have to be a response only to one kind of value, especially the material value of things.

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2 For example, see Zhū Xī’s 朱熹 (1130–1200) commentary on Lunyu 3:17, in his Lúnyù jízhù 論語集註.
3 For example, see Waley, The Analects, p. 90.
However, although distinguishing three senses of ‘ài’ here, I do not think that there are three distinct meanings of the term “ài” in the Analects. Linguists often distinguish between meaning and interpretation or semantics and pragmatics, and point out that what a word means can be different from what it is used for in a particular situation. In other words, a word of the same meaning can be interpreted differently depending on the situations in which it is used. According to this view, we could postulate that the basic meaning of ‘ài’ is valuing or placing value on diverse kinds of objects, and ‘ài’ is interpreted as natural affection for close people, universal caring for everyone, or stinginess about material goods depending on what kind of value or valuing is involved in one’s ‘ài’ 締．In the following, I explicate these three “senses” of ‘ài’ in the Analects by closely analyzing concrete passages in which the term is used, and conclude this section by making a brief suggestion of how the one meaning of ‘ài’ as “valuing” could weave through these three senses of ‘ài’.

(1) We have two primary instances of the first kind of ‘ài’ in the Analects. One is the affection or loving care of parents for their children, and the other is the feeling of fondness between two people (the Analects does not specify what kind of relationship it exactly is in this case.). The former instance, namely parental affection, is discussed in a conversation between Kongzi and one of his eloquent disciples Zǎi Wǒ 宰我. One day, Zǎi Wǒ complains to Kongzi that the three years of mourning for deceased parents is too long, and that only one year would be sufficient. To this complaint, Kongzi asks whether Zǎi Wǒ would feel comfortable with living a normal life, eating rice (a luxury food at the time) and wearing silk, only one year after the death of his parent. Zǎi Wǒ says he will be comfortable with that, and Kongzi tells him he may go ahead and observe only one year’s mourning if it would be comfortable to him. However, after Zǎi Wǒ went out of Kongzi’s room, he severely criticizes Zǎi Wǒ by saying this:

How inhuman [rén 仁] Yú 子 is! A child does not leave his parents’ bosom until three years after his birth. The three years of mourning is a universal institution [that everyone] under the heaven [follows]. Did Yú get three years of love from his parents?  

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5 I owe this idea to William H. Baxter.
6 “予之不仁也! 子生三年, 然後免於父母之懷, 夫三年之喪, 天下之通喪也. 子也有三年之愛於其父母
And the second instance of affection can be found in Kongzi’s answer to Zîzhăng 子張, another disciple of Kongzi’s, who asked about a good example of being in delusion (hùo 惑), or how to know whether one is in delusion or not:

"If you love someone, you will want him to live; and if you hate someone, you will want him to die. But if you want someone to die, having already wanted him to live, then this is a delusion." 7

As I have briefly mentioned above, ài 愛 here is used as a feeling of affection or fondness that everyone can have, but people usually do not share their objects of fondness. In other words, people may equally feel similar type of affection for their own children and beloved ones, but these special people are different from person to person. In that sense I would like to call it a private emotion, 8 i.e. an emotion that is felt only within the private domain, which involves oneself and only a small number of people tied in personal or familial relationships. As a private emotion of this kind, the affection for one’s child or one’s lover is seldom criticized; there can hardly be anybody who will say you are wrong in feeling affection for your son or your dear friend, because every normal person would do so.

However, this characteristic of affection as a private emotion does not make affection an irrelevant emotion to the ethical life of human beings in the Analects. As can be seen in the passage quoted above (Lunyu 17:21), Kongzi thinks that constant parental affection and caring given to the child for a considerable amount of time provide the very foundation for three years of mourning for one’s deceased parents, which had remained one of the most important social institutions throughout Chinese history. That is, the feeling of affection that the parents naturally feel toward their children makes the parents take loving care of their children for many years, and this in turn generates filial affection

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8 This could seem a somewhat awkward label, because every emotion is private in a more familiar sense. That is, emotion is primarily a personal psychological phenomenon, to which the external observer has no direct access. In other words, you could tell that I feel an affection for my two-year-old daughter by observing some of my behavioral signs such as my tender look at her and my running a hand gently on her cheek, but you never know how I feel exactly when I do such behaviors, because you have no direct access to my feelings. However, this is not the sense of ‘private’ that I am interested in here.
and gratitude in the children’s hearts. In Kongzi’s view, having this kind of affective bond is one of the essential conditions for normal human existence, and indulging in one’s filial affection to the appropriate degree is one aspect of 仁— the most important virtue in Kongzi and his later followers. And Kongzi thought that spending three years in mourning for one’s deceased parents makes the full expression of one’s filial affection possible. In short, parental affection and by extension the mutual affective bond between the parent and the child, despite its remaining in the private domain, is considered by Kongzi to be highly conducive to the ethical life of human beings.

Now turning to our second passage quoted above (Lunyu 12:10), we immediately notice that Kongzi comments on the negative aspect of affection too, and it is very important that he specifies this negative aspect of affection as delusion or misguidedness. In this passage, Kongzi seems to be alert to the tendency of our affection to carry us astray and let us make a wrong judgment of the object in question. That is, when one feels inconsistent desires simultaneously for the same object, he is probably making contradicting evaluative assessments of that object, basing hastily one of his incompatible assessments on the positive aspect of the object and the other on the negative aspect. And perhaps his capricious feeling of affection and hatred for that object is to blame in this case, because once in the strong grip of affection or hatred toward an object, one seldom sees anything but what he likes (for the case of affection) or what he hates (for the case of hatred) in that object. And it might have been in a similar context that Kongzi also said the following:

If [you] love someone, can [you] not make him work hard? If [you] are loyal to someone, can [you] not advise [him well]?9

It is not that you cannot love or be loyal to anybody at all without making him toil or guiding him well, insofar as you sincerely think that you love him or you care about his best interest. However, without being combined with or guided by some sort of wisdom or at least good sense that tells you what to do about the person you love or you are loyal

9 “愛之，能勿勞乎？忠焉，能勿誨乎？” Lunyu 14:7.
to, your affection and loyalty towards him is either imperfect or even foolish ones that do not work for the best interest of him.

(2) The second kind of ài 爱, which I roughly rendered above as a “cultivated indiscriminate attitude of care,” is expressed three times in the Analects by a set phrase that roughly means “to love fellow men,” namely “ài rén 爱人. For example, when Fán Chí 樊迟 (a disciple of Kongzi’s) asked about rén 仁 (the highest Confucian virtue), Kongzi said:

Love your fellow men.\(^{10}\)

It is not clear yet what it means to love one’s fellow men, especially what is the boundary of “fellow men.” I will turn to this question shortly, but even before answering this question, it seems clear that the “fellow men” here designates a larger group of people than those persons one would feel natural and special affection for (e.g. one’s children, friends, and lovers). For otherwise, everyone, as long as they have this natural affective bond with whatever people they personally find close and special to themselves, would be automatically qualified for 仁, the highest Kongzian virtue that Kongzi often denied not only for many otherwise virtuous persons of his time and in the history\(^{11}\) but also once for himself.\(^{12}\) We have seen that the affective bond between the parent and the child is an important aspect of rén 仁, but it is no more than one strand of attitude that contributes to the entire fabric of rén 仁. Consequently, it derives that “ài rén 爱人 or “loving one’s fellow men” might possibly involve conscious or non-spontaneous efforts to expand the boundary of one’s natural affection. In other words, what Kongzi tells Fán Chí to do here is to somehow expand his natural and “private” love and rise to the more “lofty” state of loving his fellow men.

But first, what does it mean to love one’s fellow men? And second, who are the fellow men? I would like to deal with the second question first, because once we have a

\(^{10}\) “樊遲問仁. 子曰: ‘愛人.’” Lunyu 12:22.
\(^{11}\) For example, Lunyu 5:5, 5:8, and 5:19.
\(^{12}\) “子曰: ‘若聖與仁, 則吾豈敢?’” Lunyu 7:34.
clearer idea of who the “fellow men” are, then we will know more clearly how one is supposed to “love” his fellow men in the Analects. In a nutshell, what I do in the following several paragraphs is basically to persuade the reader to pay fairer and more careful attention than previous scholars have done to the possibility that 1) “rén” 人 in the Analects often designates persons of the upper social strata who belonged to the ruling class in general, and that 2) ài rén 愛人 in the Analects had a particular sociopolitical sense of taking special care for this group of people so that many of them could play a leading role in restoring the harmonious state of society as had been realized in the Western Zhou (Xīzhōu 西周, 1122–771 B.C.E.). Kongzi thought this was possible by giving positions of political power and social eminence to noblemen (jūnzǐ 君子), i.e. mainly those among the traditional nobility, who were supposed to cultivate themselves morally through the training in the traditional curricula such as the Poetry (shī 詩), the Documents (shū 書), the Rituals (lǐ 禮), and the Music (yuè 樂).  

What I translated above as “fellow men” is “rén” 人 in the original, and this character seems to have a quite broad semantic range. 1) In its broadest usage “rén” refers to “humankind,” a generic term for individual human beings who constitute the species of humanity; 16 2) it also frequently refers to “others” as opposed to oneself (jī 己 or wú 吾) or “others” around a particular person who evaluates things and behaves in a different way from many other ordinary people around him. 17 In addition, 3) there is a

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15 My thesis that rén 人 in ancient China designated persons of the upper social strata is basically a modified or moderated version of Zhào Jībīn’s 趙紀彬 proposal that rén 人 and mín 民 in the Spring and Autumn period China (770–476 B.C.E.) referred to the slave-master class and the slave class respectively. Zhào Jībīn’s claim is based on too schematic an application of historical materialism to the history of ancient China, and the textual evidence he cites from the Analects and other ancient Chinese texts to support his claim is often inconclusive. Nevertheless, I believe that having pared off all of the suspicious assumptions and unconvincing evidence from his work, we are still left with this arguably sound, minimalist view of the social status of rén 人 in ancient China. In the following, I defend this minimalist version of his thesis by citing mainly what I think is the most convincing textual evidence he provides in his book, Lùnyǔ xīntàn 論語新探 (Beijing: Rénmín chūbānshè 人民出版社, 1976), pp. 1–59.

16 For some exclusive examples of this sense, see Lunyu 4:5 and 6:19.

17 For some examples that do not also refer to humanity in general, see Lunyu 1:1, 1:10, 1:16, 2:10, 3:18, 5:5, 5:10, 5:12, 6:11, and 6:30.
third sense of *rén*人, viz. those belonging to the ruling class as opposed to the ruled (*mín*民), and I think that this is the most important sense of ‘rén’ for clarifying the meaning of the phrase ‘ài rén’愛人 in the Analects.\(^\text{18}\) Throughout the Analects, we encounter two most conspicuous passages that seem to use *rén*人 and *mín*民 as if they belonged to two distinct social classes in a broad sense. For example, in *Lunyu* 1:5 Kongzi says the following:

The master said, “[In order to] govern [well] a country that could mobilize a thousand war-chariots [at a time], [one should] attend the [administrative] business carefully, keep one’s promises faithfully, be frugal in expenditure, love the people [who belong to the ruling class in general], and conscript the commoners for public services at the proper times of the year [i.e. outside the busy seasons of planting and harvesting].\(^\text{19}\)

This passage discriminates “loving people (愛人)” and “conscripting commoners (使民)” as two different kinds of matters, and a Qing 清 dynasty commentator Liú Fènglù 劉逢祿 (1776–1829) said that “rén” here refers to prime minister and other vassals,\(^\text{20}\) who apparently belong to the ruling class. And concerning this same passage, Huáng Kǎn 皇侃 (488–545) clearly distinguishes *rén* and *mín* by saying that “‘Rén’ 人 [here] refers to the people who have an intelligent eye (i.e. intelligence to understand things), and “ài rén”愛人 means to share the court [with these people]. [On the other hand,] “mín”民 designates [those who have] troubled or darkened eyesight (thus who are foolish), and [when Kongzi said] ‘Conscript them (*shǐ zhī* 使之),’ [he] only meant that black-headed crowd.”\(^\text{21}\) Also consider *Lunyu* 3:21:

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\(^\text{18}\) Again, the aforementioned distinction between meaning and interpretation or semantics and pragmatics also applies to the interpretation of “rén”人 here. According to this view, we might suppose that the basic meaning of “rén”人 is “human beings,” but “rén” can be also interpreted as “others” or “those belonging to the ruling class” based on the context in which the term is used. As I see it, although both senses of “rén” as “other people” and “the ruling class” presuppose that they must be groups of human beings, it is not only insufficient but also misleading to interpret “rén” as human beings in general regardless of its particular context.

\(^\text{19}\) “子曰：‘道千乘之國, 敬事而信, 節用而愛人, 使民以時.’” *Lunyu* 1:5. The underlining is mine.


Duke Āi 哀 asked Zǎi Wǒ 宰我 about the wooden altar to the god of the earth. Zǎi Wǒ replied: ‘The rulers of the Xià 夏 dynasty used the pine, the people of the Yīn 殷 dynasty used the cedar, and the people of the Zhōu 周 dynasty used the chestnut, saying that [this will] make the commoners tremble.’

In this passage, Zǎi Wǒ takes advantage of the fact that the character “lì” 栗 means both ‘chestnut’ as a noun and ‘to fear’ or ‘to tremble’ as a verb, and interprets that the Zhōu people tried to instill fear in their subjects’ hearts by making their altar with chestnut trees, exploiting the semantic ambiguity of the term “lì” 栗. In any event, from Zǎi Wǒ’s remark we can derive the point that the ancient Chinese upper class people like Zǎi Wǒ himself sometimes used “rén” in opposition to “mín” in order to distinguish themselves from the commoners, and this particular use of “rén” is further confirmed by the fact that he uses “xiàhòushì” 夏后氏, “yīnrén” 殷人, and “zhōurén” 周人 exactly in parallel (i.e. a dynasty name followed by a term for a certain kind of people), indicating that what he means by “rén” here is “rulers” or at least “the ruling class in general.”

So far, I have distinguished three different senses of rén 人 in the Analects. Now, I am going to argue that among these three references of rén, the third one (i.e. rén as the people belonging to the ruling class in general) is what most pertains to our interpretation of ài rén 愛人. I will also argue, following Zhào Jǐbīn, that the nobleman’s (jūnzǐ 君子) activity of ài rén 愛人 in the Analects should be primarily taken as politically and socially taking care of those people who belong to the ruling class in general. However, as we have noted above, rén 人 in the Analects also has the other two references: 1) the species of human beings in general and 2) “others” in contrast to oneself or a particular person in question. So, while arguing that ài rén 愛人 in the Analects mainly means

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23 Note that his surname is Zǎi 宰, which meant different levels of officials in different periods and contexts of Chinese history. According to the “Yiguān wěishi” 以官爲氏 section of the “Shizūlǐ” 氏族略 in the Tōngzhì 通志, the people of the surname Zǎi 宰 belonged to the Jī 頓 clan (the same clan as the Zhōu emperors and the dukes of the Lǔ dukedom), and they are descendants of those who had served the Zhōu emperors as prime minister through generations and eventually came to take up their office name as their surname. See Daikanwajiten 大漢和辭典, p. 3289.
24 I will later raise and discuss questions such as the following: 1) What is the goal of this caring action? 2) Is ài rén 愛人 here no more than a set of behavioral tendencies to take care of rén 人, or is it more than that? And 3) does ài rén 愛人 have any interesting relation to the various instances of affection that we have discussed above?
taking special care of the members of the ruling class in general, I need to consider at the
same time whether or not these two references of rén 人 would affect my interpretation of
ài rén 愛人. 25

To begin with, I would like to say that my interpretation of ài rén 愛人 in the
Analects as taking special sociopolitical care of the members of the ruling class in general
makes a good case. This can be seen by considering three Analects passages in
conjunction. First, let us be reminded that in Lunyu 1:5 above, Kongzi distinguishes
“loving people (愛人)” and “conscripting commoners (使民)” as two distinct matters,
implying that ài rén 愛人 has little to do with the commoners-related business. Then, in
Lunyu 12:22, after being told to love fellow men as an important way to enact rén 仁, Fán
Chí 樊遲 also asks Kongzi about zhī 知 (“knowledge” or “wisdom”) and gets told to
“know about fellow men.” Fán Chí gets perplexed at these answers as the reader might be
right now, and Kongzi kindly provides him with a further explanation: “Elevate the
upright [people] and set them on the crooked [people]; this could make the crooked
upright.” 26

Combining Lunyu 1:5 and 12:22, Kongzi’s message might be this: an important
way for a nobleman (jūnzhī 君子) to enact rén 仁 is to love one’s fellow men, i.e. those
who belong to the ruling class in general as he does (Lunyu 1:5). And the nobleman’s
love for his fellow men is to be expressed mainly through a certain type of sociopolitical
action, viz. elevating—or recommending one’s superior to elevate—the upright among
his fellow men for various administrative positions, so that the chosen upright people
could lead and transform those “crooked” people. In order to do so, the nobleman needs a
certain type of knowledge or wisdom, i.e. the knowledge of who are “upright” and who
are “crooked” among the people of the upper social strata, or the wisdom that enables
him to have this knowledge (Lunyu 12:22). In short, here we can see that loving one’s
fellow men is an important aspect of rén 仁, and rén 仁 is manifested primarily through
sharing political power and high social status with the right persons among those who

25 Again, my interpretation of ài rén 愛人 is a minimalized version of what was originally argued by Zhào
Jìbīn, in his Lúnyǔ xīn tàn, pp. 27–59.
26 “樊遲問仁。子曰：‘愛人。’ 問知。子曰：‘知人。’ 樊遲未達。子曰：‘舉直錯諸枉，能使枉者直。’” Lunyu
12:22.
belong to the upper social strata. And these “upright” people chosen for political power and social eminence will best benefit the rest of the rén 人 group as well as the entire mín 民 group. Now, let us compare Lunyu 12:22 with Kongzi’s definition of rén 仁 in Lunyu 6:30:

Rén 仁 is this: If you want a position [in the government], help others have such positions; if you want to have a successful political career, help others build such careers. [If you] could take analogy from what is near, it can be called a method of rén 仁.27

Following Zhào Jìbin, I interpret the two crucial characters in the original text of this passage, viz. “lì 立 and “dá 達, to have strong political connotations. These two terms literally mean “to stand” and “to reach a certain destination (whether it be a place or a goal)” respectively, and they were often treated somewhat abstractly or regarded to carry figurative senses in this passage. For example, Lau translates the first sentence of the passage as follows: “[A] benevolent man helps others to take their stand in so far as he himself wishes to take his stand, and gets others there in so far as he himself wishes to get there.”28 This is not an impossible translation, but it is widely accepted that “lì 立 (“to stand”) in ancient China was used often interchangeably with “wèi 位, which either meant a particular spot in the court where one as a vassal was supposed to stand in the presence of the ruler, or more abstractly, a certain rank in the government including the ruler’s throne. For example, Duàn Yǔcái 段玉裁 quotes two passages from the Zhōulǐ 周禮 and the Gǔwén Chūnqiū 古文春秋 in which “wèi 位 was written as “lì 立, and concludes that these two characters were one and the same character in antiquity.29

Moreover, the way “lì 立 and “wèi 位 are used in the Analects attests to the close relationship between these two characters. For example, Kongzi says to his disciples, “Do not worry about not having an official position, but worry about how to

28 Lau, The Analects, p. 85. Also compare this with Legge, Confucian Analects, p. 194: “Now the man of perfect virtue, wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others.”

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stand [at the court].” This is an example where lì (立) and wèi (位) are semantically related with each other. Consider also the following remark of Kongzi’s: “Zāng Wénzhòng 臧文仲 must be a thief of positions! Knowing Liǔ Xiàhuì’s 柳下惠 worthiness, [Zāng] did not give him a position (or alternatively, did not stand together [with him at the court]).” Regretfully, though, there is no convincing textual evidence in the Analects for “dá” 達 to mean a successful political career. But we see that a century later Mengzi uses “dá” exactly in this sense: “The intellectual (shì 士) does not lose righteousness in a predicament and does not deviate from the Way in a prosperous [political career]. It is because he does not lose righteousness [even] in predicament that he [can] preserve himself (i.e. stay untainted), and the commoners are not disappointed with him because he does not deviate from the Way in a prosperous [political career].”

And given our evidence for the strong political connotation of lì (立) and wèi (位), we could also legitimately interpret dá in this passage to mean a successful career.

Then, what is the message of this passage? It seems to convey the following: A good way to enact rén 仁 is 1) to acknowledge that other people will feel analogously to how you would feel in many circumstances and 2) to take fulfilling their need to be as important and urgent a task as fulfilling your own need. Now, pondering this message in conjunction with the previous passage (Lunyu 12:22) that relates rén 仁 to loving one’s fellow men, we can derive the following theses: 1) “loving one’s fellow men” can be rephrased as judging and acting with “oneself put into another person’s shoes;” and 2) Kongzi’s recurring example of this reciprocal action is to let the “upright” members of the upper social strata have appropriate political power and social authority.

Then, how would the other two senses of rén 人 affect my interpretation of ài rén 愛人? In his seminal book The Concept of Man in Early China, Donald Munro mentions Zhào Jìbīn’s view that rén 人 and mín 民 in ancient China were hierarchically

31 “臧文仲其竊位者與！知柳下惠之賢而不與立也.” Lunyu 15:14. This and the previous passage are originally quoted as textual evidence for the interchangeability between “lì” 立 and “wèi” 位 by Zhào Jìbīn. He also quotes many traditional exegetical notes on “lì” 立 and “wèi” 位, which say that in the antiquity there was no distinct character “wèi” 位 besides “lì” 立. See Zhào Jìbīn, Lúnyǔ xīntàn, p. 20.
distinguished. But he seems to think that there is little evidence for this view, and defends his thesis that rén 人 in ancient China referred to human beings in general, by pointing out that “rén” 人 in some of the Shāng 商 (ca. 1570–1045 B.C.) oracle bones and Zhōu 周 bronze inscriptions referred not only to the people of upper social strata such as “men of king’s clan” and “members of the slave-master class” but also to “common agricultural workers” or even numerous “serfs.” 33 However, as I have argued thus far, my interpretation of ài rén 愛人 in the Analects as taking special sociopolitical care of the members of the ruling class in general makes a good case, because it is based on the strong interrelationship among the concepts of rén 仁, ài rén 愛人, and rén 人 as contradistinguished from mín 民. We do have instances of rén 人 in the Analects that refer to humankind in general, but merely pointing out this fact does not by itself undermine the strong conceptual interrelations between rén 仁, ài rén 愛人, and rén 人 as the people of the upper social strata in the Analects.

On the other hand, it seems to me that for every single case of rén 人 in the Analects that primarily means “others,” we could also interpret it to mean “people of the upper social strata” simultaneously. To see this is the case, take any of the Analects passages that I suggested in the footnote 17 above as clear cases of rén 人 that is used in the sense of “others” (and pick more such Analects passages if you like), and try to interpret the character “rén” 人 in that passage as “people of the upper social strata” and see whether that interpretation makes sense. You will see that rén 人 in any of those passages can have both meanings at the same time. However, now, take a passage from the same pool, interpret the character “rén” 人 in the passage as people of the lower social strata (i.e. mín 民), and see whether it makes sense. You will see that some passages make sense but some do not. I take this to show that among the three references of rén 人, rén as human beings in general (i.e. people from all of the social strata) is the least frequently used one in the Analects.

Let us consider *Lunyu* 1:1 for example. In this passage, Kongzi says that the nobleman (*jūnzǐ 君子*) is not resentful even if others do not appreciate one’s merits. What is meant by “appreciating one’s merits” is mainly to acknowledge that the person in question has met relevant qualifications for an office in the government and give him an opportunity to perform his sociopolitical roles as a responsible member of the ruling class. This being the general background of the passage, it is clear that those who can appreciate one’s merits _properly_ are only the peer group of the nobleman, who hold certain ranks in the power structure and are capable of exerting a significant degree of influence for the employment of the nobleman. Seen in this light, it is also clear that the _mín 民_ or those of the lower social strata, who are considered in the *Analects* as having little agency on the political affairs such as the employment of the nobleman, cannot be a sound candidate for “_rén_ 人” in this passage. In short, the instances of _rén_ 人 as “others” go perfectly well with the interpretation of _rén_ 人 as the persons of the upper social strata, and pose no obstacle for my interpretation of _ài rén 愛人_ in the *Analects* as taking special sociopolitical care of the members of the ruling class in general.

Thus far, we have traveled a long way to determine the meaning of our second kind of _ài 爱_ in the *Analects*. I have argued that “loving one’s fellow men (_ài rén 愛人_)” is giving the positions of political power and social eminence to the noblemen, i.e. those who belong to the ruling class in general and are morally and professionally qualified for such positions, so that they could bring about the maximum benefit to the other members of the society by realizing a harmonious society in accordance with the political ideal of the Western Zhōu. I have also showed that Munro’s sweeping interpretation of _rén_ 人 as referring to human beings in general in ancient China does not fit the *Analects* very well.

Now, having determined the second sense of _ài 爱_ in the *Analects*, I would like to spend a couple of paragraphs reflecting on it. As we have seen so far, _ài rén_ is a loving or caring attitude that one consciously assumes towards other people who are not necessarily connected with oneself biologically or by some other kinds of natural affective bond. Because this second kind of _ài_ is applied to those who stand far beyond the circle of one’s family members, relatives, or close friends, we can say that “loving

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34 “人不知而不慍，不亦君子乎?” *Lunyu* 1:1.
one’s fellow men” in the Analects might involve either 1) a conscious effort to go against the drive of one’s strong natural affection for those who are close to oneself, or 2) an equally non-spontaneous or voluntary effort to “extend one’s natural feeling of affection” to what are not originally its natural objects, viz. those people who are not one’s relatives or close friends, and so forth. In this sense, Kongzi’s ài rén seems to be quite similar to Mòzǐ’s doctrine of “universal care” (jiānài 兼愛). For example, Kongzi says the following in Lunyu 1:6:

Younger brothers and sons must be filial [to their parents] at home and respectful [to the elders] outside. [They] must be discreet in speaking and faithful to their words, love the multitude widely, and treat those who are rén 仁 as if those people were their family members or relatives. It [should be only when they have extra [time and] energy after fully engaging in all of these activities that they devote themselves to learning the Culture [wén 文].

In this passage, Kongzi recommends the youth in his society to “love the multitude” (àizhòng 愛衆) widely, and loving the multitude clearly involves the effort to go beyond the boundary of one’s natural affection. This can be shown by pointing out that “zhòng” 衆, which literally means “many people,” designates in the Analects either 1) “others” who live in the same community and interact with oneself in one way or another, or 2) the multitude in general living in the world. Let me take examples of these two cases respectively. In Lunyu 15:28, Kongzi recommends not to follow the sentiments of the multitude blindly in judging a case. That is, he says, “Even if the multitude hates a person, [you should] carefully examine his case [independently]; and even if the multitude likes a person, [you should also] carefully examine his case [independently].” This is the case for those “others” who live in one’s community and whose opinions one needs to heed (even if one eventually rejects them) before judging a case. And for the generic multitude in the world, Lunyu 12:22 provides a good case. This is the very passage in which Kongzi recommended Fán Chí to “love his fellow men” and “know about his fellow men.”
Kongzi himself explained these dicta as “Elevating the upright [people] and setting them on the crooked [people],” but Zǐxià 子夏 (a disciple of Kongzi’s) explains this remark even further by raising the historical examples of this act. According to him, the ancient sage kings Shùn 舜 and Tāng 汤 chose respectively Gāo Yáo 皋陶 and Yī Yǐn 伊尹 from the multitude in the world as their vassals, so that the “crooked” or those who are not rén 仁 could not but stay away from the kings. In other words, these sage kings chose the right persons from the crowd so that these chosen people could help them bring about peace and order to the world. In short, interpreted either way, zhòng 衆 in the Analects means “others” or “the multitude” who are closer to strangers than to one’s relatives or close friends, and àizhòng 愛衆 involves going beyond the natural boundary of one’s affection that usually takes as its objects one’s family members, relatives, lovers, and so forth.

Moreover, this point is also confirmed by the fact that Kongzi views loving the multitude, along with other things that he recommends for youngsters, as conscious activities (xíng 行). That is, often it is not naturally the case that one is respectful to the elders on the street, punctual in keeping one’s promises, and cares for people widely enough. And even as for one’s parents, with whom one is connected with such a strong affective bond, one often treats them in a wrong way and disappoints them. This being the usual circumstance, how could we expect him to treat the virtuous persons as if they were his family members? It is clear that all of these things recommended by Kongzi are activities, which the youngsters in Kongzi’s society are supposed to voluntarily engage in, for the purpose of the betterment of themselves. Xíng 行 literally means walking on the road (dào 道), and moral self-cultivation is often compared in the Analects to walking on a long way with heavy burdens. This journey to the perfection of one’s character or the attainment of rén 仁 is so hard that even one of the most talented disciples of Kongzi’s once complained that he is short of strength to finish this journey, and another disciple remarked that one aspiring to achieving rén 仁 must be strong and resolute in order to make it on this long and arduous trip.

We will have a chance later to think about what psychological resources are involved in Confucian moral self-cultivation, but the only point I want to emphasize here is that loving the multitude and other activities Kongzi recommends for youngsters of his society are not things that they can do naturally. Although these activities require feelings such as respect (tì 悌), familial affection (qīn 親), and care (ài 愛), and although Kongzi’s youngsters might be already capable of applying these feelings to some of their natural but limited objects (i.e. their parents and other elders in the household and some of the members of the community), these feelings do not naturally find their fully prescribed objects (i.e. the elders of the community, those who are rén 仁, and the multitude of the society in general), and there needs to be some sort of conscious efforts to narrow this gap. In Chapter 6, I turn to the question of what is the nature of these “conscious efforts” that enable one to go beyond the boundary of natural affection and “love the multitude.”

(3) Now, let us turn to our third and the final sense of ài. What we have concerning this type of ài in the Analects is a passage about two competing instances of ài 愛, one for the sacrificial sheep and the other for the ritual of sacrificing this sheep. In ancient China, there had been an old practice that each year, when the autumn turns into winter, the Zhōu 周 emperor should distribute the new year’s calendar among his subordinate rulers of various dukedoms; and each ruler of the dukedoms, once given this calendar, store it in his ancestral temple and then sacrifice a sheep at the temple on the first day of each lunar month, before considering and making decisions about the administrative affairs of that month. This practice of sacrificing a sheep and announcing a new moon to the spirits of one’s ancestors is called “the announcement of the new moon” (gàoshùo 告朔), and the dealing with the administrative affairs of the month following this announcement ceremony is called tīngshùo 聽朔, literally “being briefed about [the matters of the month, each cycle of every month starting from] the new moon.” By Kongzi’s time, though, the dukes of Lǔ 魯 were no longer participating in both activities, 40 but they were still having the sacrificial sheep killed at each day of the new

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40 Specifically, starting from 620 B.C.E., the 6th year of duke Wén’s 文 reign (625–608 B.C.E.).
It is in this historical context that Kongzi says the following remark to Zigòng, one of his disciples, who wanted to stop the killing of the sheep for this now almost empty ritual:

Ci 賜! You care about the sheep, but I care about the ritual! ④²

As I have briefly mentioned above, “ài” 愛 in this passage has been traditionally glossed as xiē 惜, which means one’s feeling of reluctance to use something for a certain purpose or to give it to somebody else because one thinks that that thing is too valuable to use for such a purpose or too valuable to give to such a person. Sometimes this case of ài is translated as “grudge” (e.g. Waley 2000, p. 90), but ài here is not to be considered to contain the affective element of resentment, which usually accompanies grudge. ④³ That is, although Zigòng might “grudge” the sheep and Kongzi “grudge” the ritual, they do not grudge them to any particular person out of resentment against that person. Rather, it should be the case that this third sense of ài 愛 primarily arises from or involves some sort of value assessment of its object. We are not fully certain about what was exactly Zigòng’s motivation for trying to save the sheep in this now dormant ceremony, but partly based on Kongzi’s saying that Zigòng grudged the sheep, we could cautiously accept Zhū Xī’s 朱熹 opinion that Zigòng could not see the sheep being wasted for no purpose. ④⁴ We also know that Zigòng was a very successful merchant of his time, ④⁵ so it seems quite likely that he focused on the material value of the sheep, which he might have thought to be wastefully sacrificed for the no longer properly observed gàoshùo 告朔 ritual.

However, Kongzi objects to Zigòng’s “caring about” or grudge for the sheep, and what is deeply interesting and significant in his move is that Kongzi seems to ground his...

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① This account is based on Yáng Bójūn’s explanation. See his Lúnyǔ yízhù, p. 29, and Chūnqìz ù zōožhuàn zhù, pp. 543–544.
② “賜也! 惜愛其羊, 我愛其禮!” Lúnyǔ 3:17. Ci 賜 is Zigong’s personal name.
③ David Caron (Associate Professor of French in the department of Romance Languages and Literatures, the University of Michigan) pointed this out to me in our conversation on 2/15/06.
④ Zhū Xī 朱熹, Lúnyǔ jízhù 論語集註, in Yasui Kō, Rongo shūsetsu, 卷 1, p. 44.
objection on the same kind of valuing that takes a different thing as its object. That is, we see here a conflict between two instances of the same kind of valuing, which insist to take different things as their appropriate objects. One person feels reluctant to let the valuable sheep be wasted in a no longer meaningful sacrifice, and the other person feels reluctant to see the valuable sacrificial ritual retreat completely to oblivion for the petty cause of saving the sheep. In the previous paragraph, I hypothesized that Zigong’s act was probably motivated by the material benefit the saved sheep would bring about. Then, what is the rationale on Kongzi’s part? What makes Kongzi argue that his feeling of “caring” about the ancient ritual is the right emotion to feel for the case in question? In order to see Kongzi’s rationale, we need to understand to some extent the historical situation of his time and how he viewed this situation.

Kongzi lived during the time of tumultuous social transition between the Spring and Autumn period (chūnqiū shídài 春秋時代 770–476 B.C.E.) and the Warring States period (zhànguó shídài 戰國時代 475–221 B.C.E.).46 The Spring and Autumn period was the time when the Western Zhōu feudal system (fēngjiàn zhídù 封建制度), combined with the zōngfǎ 宗法 system, was falling apart swiftly. (The rest of this paragraph and the following paragraph are brief explanations of these systems respectively.) After finally overthrowing Shāng in the late 12th century B.C.E., the Zhōu house developed a garrison system to effectively control the newly acquired vast territory along the lower Yellow River, and enfeoffed Zhōu princes and royal kinsmen at the various sites of military importance in the region to protect the Zhōu house against its enemies.47 Ideally, according to Mengzi, there were five descending ranks under the Zhōu emperor, viz. gōng 公, hóu 侯, bó 伯, zǐ 子, nán 男, and they were given different sizes of fiefs between one hundred to fifty square Chinese miles (lǐ 里; one li is about five hundred meters.) and became the rulers of their states.48

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46 The periodization of these two periods slightly varies from scholar to scholar. I follow here Endymion Wilkinson. He also provides some explanations for this “modern convention” that he himself adopts. See his Chinese History: A Manual (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000), p. 10.
47 Hsu, Ancient China in Transition, p. 3. And also see, Záozhùàn, Zhènggōng 定公 4: “昔武王克商，成王定之，遷建明德，以蕃屏周。” Yáng Bójùn, Chūnqiū Záozhùàn zhù, p. 1536.
48 Mengzi 10:2.
Most of these feudal lords belonged to the same clan as the Zhōu emperor, and they obeyed and respected the Zhōu emperor not only as their political leader but also as the head of their big family. For example, among the seventy one states established by King Wǔ 武, fifteen countries were ruled by King Wǔ’s brothers and forty by his relatives. This hierarchical familial structure between the Zhōu emperor and his subordinate rulers found its exact replicas in each of the states ruled by these rulers. That is, each of these rulers appointed his brothers and older sons as the prime ministers (qīng 卿) of his country, and let his (i.e. the ruler’s) younger sons and the older sons of the prime ministers assist those ministers as “great officers (dàfū 大夫).” Each of these ministers and “great officers” could establish their own noble houses, because they were enfeoffed with different sizes of fiefs by their ruler, and most of their positions were hereditary. If the Zhōu emperor was regarded as the head of the big family (dàzōng 大宗) from which the families of his subordinate rulers (xiǎozōng 小宗) branched, these prime ministers and “great officers” regarded their ruler as the head of the family (dàzōng) from which their own families (xiǎozōng) branched off. The younger sons of the “great officers” constituted the lowest rank of the ruling class, viz. the shì 士 (“knights” or “officers”), and the same hierarchical familial relationship obtained between the prime ministers and the “great officers” on one hand and the shì 士 class on the other hand. In short, “[t]he familial network embraced all of China, with the feudal structure as the political counterpart of the family structure.”

So far we have seen that the fēngjiàn 封建 system of Western Zhōu was established according to the principle of the zōngfǎ 宗法 system. And this principle of the zōngfǎ system is nothing but that of qīnqīn 親親, i.e. “Treat close people as close” or “Give primary consideration to those who are close to you.” It was according to this qīnqīn principle that the Zhōu house distributed its political power, and it is also this qīnqīn principle that explains why filial piety (xiào 孝) and respect for elders (tì 悌) are

50 A more detailed explanation of the feudal lord system and the zōngfǎ system of Western Zhōu can be found in Hsu, Ancient China in Transition, pp. 2–8.
51 Ibid., p. 7.
often compared to one’s allegiance for the king and the subordinates’ obedience to their superiors in the *Analects*. For example, Yǒu Ruò 有若 (one of Kongzi’s disciples) says that “It is rarely the case that one is filial [to his parents] and respectful [to the elders] in character but likes to challenge the authority of his superior; and there has been no one who does not like to challenge his superior’s authority but at the same time likes to stir up a rebellion.”

In addition, in response to someone’s question of why Kongzi does not participate in government, Kongzi quotes the *Documents* that says, “Filial piety! [Be] filial [to your parents] and kind to your brothers; only then [these virtues] will be reflected in the governing of the country.” According to Kongzi, serving as an official in the ruler’s court is not the only way to participate in government. Being filial to one’s parents and kind to one’s brothers at home is also an important way of participating in government, because the close family ties and the accompanying “virtuous” affections such as filial piety and respect for elders were considered by the founding fathers of Western Zhōu to provide the very foundation of the stable political structure.

It was in this context that Kongzi thought by his time there was no order any more in the world (“tiānxià wúdào” 天下無道). After losing its capital to the barbarians of the west in 770 B.C.E. (Note that this is the beginning of the Spring and Autumn period), the Zhōu house had to move to the east, and the Zhōu emperor no longer had as strong a military and political control over his subordinate rulers of the states outside the imperial territory as before. At the same time, the kinship ties that once strongly bound the Zhōu emperor and his vassals-cum-relatives together became devoid of the familial affections gradually and naturally generation by generation. This situation of the lack of the absolute political authority and the general weakening of the kinship ties in the interstate relationship led to the endless competition for power and wealth among the states and the ever-increasing wars among them both in frequency and size. However, it was not only at the level of the interstate relationship that this lack of authority and the weakened kinship ties took effect. For we also witness continuous intrastate conflicts between the

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52 “其爲人也孝弟，而好犯上者，鮮矣。不好犯上，而好作亂者，未之有也。” *Lunyu* 1:2.
54 *Lunyu* 16:2.
56 Ibid., Chapter 3.
ruler and the noble families as well as among the noble families themselves in several countries of this period, the situations of which are relatively well recorded. It is generally said that thirty-six rulers were killed by their subordinates and seventy-two states were destroyed and annexed to the other stronger countries throughout the Spring and Autumn period, and Mengzi comments that it was in this disastrous situation of the [rampant] regicide and patricide that Kongzi felt fear and wrote the Spring and Autumn Annals (chūnqiū 春秋).  

Now let us resume our discussion of Kongzi’s “caring” about the sacrificial ritual. What was Kongzi’s rationale for wanting to save the ritual at the expense of the sheep being apparently wasted? One thing I might be able to extract from my previous description of this ritual is that the monthly practice of announcing a new moon to the spirits of one’s ancestors is supposed to inculcate filial piety and respect for elders in the performers as well as the beholders of this ritual, so that those who participate in this ritual (including both the performers and the audience) can cooperate with each other in their daily lives to maintain social harmony as if they were members of a big hierarchically organized family bound together by familial affections. Probably it was in this context that Yǒu Ruò (one of Kongzi’s disciples mentioned above) said, “Among the usages of the rituals, it is most valuable that they bring about harmony.”

However, although maintaining the gàoshùo ritual would contribute significantly to bringing about a harmonious, and thus to a certain extent well-governed and flourishing, society, the source of Kongzi’s valuing of this ritual seems to lie much deeper than the prospect of this important political benefit this gàoshùo ritual is supposed to bring about. In other words, it does not seem to be the case that Kongzi’s “caring” about or high evaluation of the ritual is the result of his calculative inference that 1) preserving the gàoshùo ritual would cultivate certain politically useful attitudes such as obedience or deference to domestic and social authorities and 2) these attitudes would in turn help bring about a harmonious or a well-governed society. Rather, it seems to be the case that

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57 Ibid., pp. 78–92.
59 “世衰道微，邪說暴行有作，臣弑其君者有之，子弑其父者有之。孔子懼，作春秋。” Mengzi 3B:9.
60 “禮之用，和為貴。” Lunyu 1:12.
certain affective bonds in familial relationships, sometimes expressed as filial piety and respect for elders, were deemed *intrinsically valuable* by Kongzi. For as we have seen above, Kongzi says that knowing the age of one’s parents puts one in fear and joy at the same time, and this terse remark of his does not allow any room for the thought that people have these feelings because of the political benefits they could reap with those affective attitudes. On the contrary, the affection-imbued familial relationships seem to be of fundamental value for Kongzi, and he colors the picture of his ideal polity much in this light. Given this being the way Kongzi views things, his annoyance at Zigòng’s removal of the sacrificial sheep is intelligible.

Now, I would like to conclude this lengthy discussion of ài 爱 in the Analects by making some comments on an important theme that seems to weave through these three senses of ài that I have been distinguishing so far. The theme that I see as common to these three senses of ài is, *valuing.* Children are intrinsically valuable beings for many of their parents, and that is why those parents lovingly care for their children throughout their lives, especially during the early formative age of their children. And it is normally during this age and through this type of parental care that one learns about the intrinsic rewardingness of certain human relationships, comes to value such relationships for the sake of themselves, and forms a deep motivation for maintaining and enriching those relationships. And one comes to develop the same attitude in one’s relationships with friends and lover(s), and such development or extension is very natural (the first sense of ài). However, people “love” or ài a diverse array of objects because they find them valuable, but they often disagree about what are the right things to ài. Plausibly many human beings who grow up under the loving care of their parents also grow strong affective bond with their parents, and consider their parents and their interactions with them invaluable; but some do not do so for one reason or another, like Zài Wō. People are attracted by many things, and sometimes they even value different aspects of the same thing (We have just seen such a case in my discussion of the third sense of ài). This clash of valuable and therefore “lovable” objects, though, is not the only problem concerning ài

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61 The idea of valuing as a theme shared by these three senses of ài significantly comes from my discussion of this matter with William H. Baxter on 3/21/06.
愛 in the *Analects*. One can also ask: If we naturally value and love those who are close to us, how much value should we place on those who are relatively far from us? And, if we ever place as much value on strangers as we do on friends, could we love them as much as we value them (the second sense of ăi)? Mòzǐ’s challenge to the Confucian ideal of rèn 仁 can be interpreted in terms of these questions, and I fully discuss them in the section on ăi 愛 and moral cultivation in Chapter 6.

3.2 “Sorrow” (Āi 哀)

According to the *Collins COBUILD English Language Dictionary*, sorrow is defined as “a feeling of deep sadness or regret, caused for example by the death of someone you love or because of your sympathy for the sufferings of someone else.”62 This definition, and especially the examples given in the definition, nicely capture the two senses of ăi 哀 that I will discuss under the category of “sorrow” in this section. In the *Analects*, ăi 哀 seems to be used in two ways. On one hand, it refers to the feeling of deep sadness at the loss of close people; on the other hand, it refers to the feeling of pity or sympathy at the suffering of others. In the following, I first discuss Kongzi’s use of ăi 哀 as referring to deep sadness at the death of those close to oneself, and then move on to discuss the second sense of ăi 哀—pity or sympathy, combining it with my discussion of jūn 矜, another term that also falls under the category of pity.

(1) Most frequently, ăi 哀 is used in the *Analects* as the feeling of great sadness at the death of the people who are close and important to oneself, the death of parents being the most illustrating case. Out of the total seven occurrences of ăi 哀 throughout the text, five of them are related with death, and in four of them (*Lunyu* 3:26, 19:1, 19:14, and 19:25) ăi 哀 or “sorrow” is viewed as the proper emotional state to be in when one performs funerary and mourning rituals at the death of those who are close to oneself. I

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have previously argued at several occasions for the importance of familial and other kinds of close relationships in a desirable human life for Kongzi, and this point is once again underscored here by seeing how much importance Kongzi and his disciples assign to the feeling of sorrow at the deathbeds of their family members, friends, disciples, and so forth. For example, Zǐzhāng 子張, one of Kongzi’s disciples, enlists the capacity to feel [enough degree of] sorrow in mourning as one of the most important character traits of the Confucian “intellectuals”:

An intellectual, [willing to carry out his duty] even by sacrificing his life in the face of danger, reminding himself of the right at the sight of gain, thinking of reverence while performing a sacrificial ceremony, and thinking of sorrow in a mourning ritual, would be not a bad one indeed.\(^{63}\)

The term that I translated above as ‘intellectual’ is shì 士. As I have briefly mentioned earlier, shì 士 originally consisted of the lowest stratum of the ruling class in the Western Zhōu period, being in charge of ceremonial, military, scribal, divinatory, and fiscal activities of the local and imperial governments as the lower functionaries of the administrative structures.\(^{64}\) By Kongzi’s time, though, the traditional shì 士 class got much expanded by the influx of people from above and below, primarily by the joining of the declining nobility whose countries were destroyed by and annexed to their powerful neighbors and many commoners who could procure themselves enough leisure for study by successfully adapting to the changing social circumstances. As a result, there came to be a big group of people with different social origins, who tried to promote their social statuses and make their living first by wholeheartedly engaging themselves in the study of classics and the art of governance under such teachers as Kongzi and Mòzǐ and then by seeking an office at a local ruler’s court. Following Schwartz\(^ {65}\) and Yū Ying-shih,\(^ {66}\) we could call this large element of the shì 士 class “intellectuals” (and specifically “rú” 儒 for those belonging to the Confucian schools), as distinguished from the other constituent

\(^{63}\) “士見危致命, 見得思義, 祭思敬, 喪思哀, 其可已矣.” 《論語》19:1.

\(^{64}\) Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China*, pp. 57–58.

\(^{65}\) Ibid., p. 58.

of the shì 士 class, viz. “warriors” (xiá 俠). In the Analects, the picture of the ideal shì 士 often overlaps with that of jūnzǐ 君子, the ethical ideal of Kongzī.\(^{67}\) And this being the case, we might be able to say quite safely that the death of a close person is an important ethical situation for both shì 士 and jūnzǐ 君子 as the ideal type of Kongzian agents, and that sorrowful mourning is an important type of action for them in such a situation.

Now, before engaging in a full discussion of the last thesis that sorrowful mourning is an important type of action in Kongzī, I would like first to elaborate one aspect of it by saying that sorrow at the deathbed of and throughout the mourning period for close people is often cast in a very positive light in the Analects. In other words, sorrow of this kind seems often described as intrinsically good or almost fully warranted. This can be partly seen in the current passage because it equally ranks sorrow, or the capacity to feel sorrow in the right circumstance, with other virtues such as fortitude in front of danger, righteousness over self-interest, and reverence for the spirits of deceased ancestors. However, we can see the high esteem of sorrow in the Analects more clearly in the following two passages:

- The master said, “Holding a high office without generosity, performing rituals without reverence, being in mourning without sorrow—how can I [bear to] see these things?”\(^{68}\)

- Ziyóu 子游 said, “One may dispense with [the trappings of] mourning, as long as he can fully express his sorrow.”\(^{69}\)

It is clear in the first passage that Kongzī wants to see one performing an act or his duty in the right or virtuous state of mind, and sorrow in mourning is one of such states of mind. Moreover, it is also implied here that Kongzī would have some sort of negative, second-order sentiment such as disgust, disappointment, or aversion (wù 恶) in general, if one fails to be in the correct state of mind when performing his duties. What I mean by “second-order sentiment” here is the way one would feel at one’s own or someone else’s

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character, acts, motives, and so forth which will be considered to be “first-order” in the sense that they become the objects of one’s second-order sentiments. So, for example, if Kongzi felt averse to a mindless performance of a mourning ritual, then his aversion is a second-order sentiment directed at the lack of sorrow in the poor performance of the mourning ritual. And if the mindless performer somehow came to be aware of the bad quality of his own ritual performance due to his lack of sorrow and consequently felt ashamed about it, then his emotion of shame is also a second-order sentiment about his own lack of sorrow in the mourning ritual. One of the important characteristics of these second-order sentiments is that they carry certain kind of evaluation with them, either positive or negative,\textsuperscript{70} and the minimal point I want to make regarding this passage here is that Kongzi’s negative second-order sentiment about the mindless performance of a mourning ritual marks sorrow as a highly valuable quality to be found in any mourning rituals.

While Kongzi valued sorrow as the correct emotional state for a mourner to be in, and thus he viewed sorrow as the correct motivational foundation for any performance of the mourning ritual, we witness in the second passage above that Zìyóu 子游, one of Kongzi’s distinguished disciples, goes one step further and puts the richness of the emotional foundation of a ritual—sorrow in this case—over the elegant form of expression of the emotion—the elaborated mourning ritual for the current case. This position of Zìyóu’s is not the orthodox Confucian picture of the ideal combination of the ritual and the emotional foundation of it, because the best way to combine them is the one in which one expresses one’s rich feeling with full elegance of the relevant ritual.\textsuperscript{71} However, this ideal state is rarely found in many ordinary people, and when it comes to the question of what is the second-best and more realizable option, the answer is unequivocally rich emotion with less embellished rituals, rather than scanty emotion with overly elaborate rituals. So at Lín Fàng’s 林放 question about the foundation of the rituals, Kongzi says that “As for the rituals in general, they should be frugal rather than

\textsuperscript{70} See also Section 2.2.2.1 of the previous chapter.

exuberant; as for the mourning rituals in particular, sorrow is valued over well-manneredness.”

72 And Zǐlù 子路, one of Kongzi’s disciples mentioned above, says in the Liji 禮記, “I heard this from the Master: As for the mourning rituals, one had better be excessive in sorrow and short of rituals rather than being excessive in rituals and short of sorrow; as for the sacrificial rituals, one had better be excessive in reverence and short of rituals rather than being excessive in rituals and short of reverence.”

73 In my opinion, all of these sayings testify sufficiently to Kongzi’s and his disciples’ high evaluation of sorrow.

This importance of sorrow in a desirable human life, though, is not a feature emphasized only in philosophical texts like the Analects. For we can find a similar view in the Zúozhuàn 左傳, the chronicle of the Lǔ dukedom covering the period from 721 to 463 B.C.E. Since Lǔ is Kongzi’s home country, and Kongzi died in 479 B.C.E.,

74 studying the use of āi 哀 in the Zúozhuàn would reveal us what were Kongzi’s predecessors’ as well as his contemporaries’ thoughts on āi 哀. Significantly, the predominant two-fold use of āi 哀 in the Analects as sorrow at the death of close people on one hand and pity for other people’s sufferings on the other is nicely mirrored by the usage of āi 哀 in the Zúozhuàn. For except a couple of ambiguous cases,

75 āi 哀 in the Zúozhuàn is dominantly used either as sorrow at the death of one’s parents, relatives, colleagues, and so forth

76 or as pity at the misfortune or suffering of others.

What should interest us more for now, though, is the fact that the first cases of āi 哀 in the Zúozhuàn (i.e. the sorrow at the loss of close people) include some interesting cases of emotional failure. In those cases, the protagonists do not feel sorrow at all, or at least do not feel it to the appropriate


74 This is a widely accepted dating of Kongzi’s death, but according to the Zúozhuàn, Kongzi died in the 16th year of Āigōng’s 哀公 reign, which is 480. B.C.E.

75 For example, Xiānggōng 襄公 29, Yáng Bójùn, Chūnqiū Zúozhuàn zhù, p. 1164; Zhāogōng 昭公 25, ibid., p. 1456; Zhāogōng 昭公 25, ibid., pp. 1458–1459.

76 For example, Wēngōng 文公 15, ibid., p. 611; Chēnggōng 成公 14, ibid., p. 870; Xiānggōng 襄公19, ibid., p. 1051; Xiānggōng 襄公 23, ibid., p. 1081; and Xiānggōng 襄公 31, ibid., p. 1185.

77 For example, Zhuānggōng 莊公 20, ibid., p. 215; Xīgōng 倖公 33, ibid., p. 497; Wēngōng 文公 5, ibid., p. 540; Wēngōng 文公 6, ibid., p. 547; Xuānggōng 宣公 12, ibid., p. 722; and Chēnggōng 成公 13, ibid., p. 865.
degree while in mourning for their parents or close relatives. As I see it, examining how these cases were interpreted and responded to by the people of this period will tell us what the attitude of Kongzi’s predecessors and contemporaries was about sorrow at the loss of close people, and what the place of close familial (and other important kinds of) relationships was in their communal life.

I encountered four accounts of emotional failure of this kind in the Zuozhuàn, and three of them equally comprise the following three elements: 78 1) The father dies, and the son is in mourning for his father; 2) the son is not sorrowful (enough) while in mourning; and 3) people around him express disapprobation of his digressive emotional state, and predict that his emotional eccentricity will bring about great misfortune in the future not only to himself but often to other people, and even to his entire country. The aberrant sons in these accounts were very likely to harm not only themselves but also their countries, because they were heirs to the positions of great authority and power in their home countries—two of the positions were each the dukedom of Lù 魯 and the dukedom of Wèi 衛, and the third one was the position of the head of a powerful noble family in Wèi 衛. 79 In the following, I will focus on some important details of these stories and discuss their implications.

First, as in my translation of Lunyu 3:26 above, the sons’ indifference to their father’s death is faced with other people’s disapprobation. The most explicit case of these three stories is Chénggōng 成公 14: One day, the wife of the last duke happens to notice that the heir to the dukedom—a concubine’s son, not her own—is not sad at all about his deceased father. She gets so disgusted and disappointed at this that she cannot even drink a scoop of water, and predicts that not only will he fail his country, but the disaster will start by affecting her own life. 80 It is clear that her negative sentiment about him cannot be interpreted simply as hatred which has to do with the fact that her own son failed to

78 They can be found respectively in Chénggōng 成公 14, ibid., p. 870; Xiānggōng 襄公 19, ibid., p. 1051; and Xiānggōng 襄公 31, ibid., pp. 1185–1186.

79 The fourth story, which I will not discuss in this section, goes as follows: At the death of a cousin, the protagonist initially refuses to do the ceremonial weeping for him, because this person (the deceased) has done some harm to the protagonist in the past. But at a mild reproach and admonition from a third party, he is persuaded to participate willingly in the mourning ritual. See Wēng 文公 15, ibid., pp. 609–611.

succeed to the dukedom, because her involuntary and severe sickness about his emotional misconduct reveals her deep conviction that his emotional insensitivity is in itself blamable and utterly ominous.

Second, although their negative sentiments are not as explicit as the case just presented, those who comment on this type of emotional failure in the other two stories not only declare it to be wrong but also specify what kind of wrong it is. In Xiānggōng襄公19 Dàozǐ悼子 does not show any sorrow for his deceased father Shí Gòngzǐ石共子, and Kōng Chéngzǐ孔成子 (one of the prime ministers of Wèi衛) says that “This is called ‘uprooting (juéběn蹶本)’ one’s [tree of family]. Definitely he will not be maintaining his family line.”81 And in Xiānggōng襄公31, Gōngzǐ Chóu公子綢, who becomes Zhāogōng昭公 of the Lǔ dukedom later, is commented by Mūshū穆叔 that he does not qualify to succeed to the dukedom because, for one thing, he is not only not sorrowful at his father’s death but even playful while in mourning; this type of person is called “aberrant man (búdùzhīrén不度之人),” and it is rare that this kind of person does not bring about troubles later.82

From my discussion in the last two paragraphs the following picture emerges: For the ancient Chinese described in the Zōozhuàn, failing to feel sorrow in a sorrowful situation, especially while in mourning for one’s family members, is something deeply wrong and inauspicious. It is so specifically in three senses. First, failing to feel sorrow in a sorrowful situation is wrong, because it does not satisfy the general condition that one’s emotional response meet the emotional requirement of the situation. That is, the situation of one’s parent’s death requires one to feel sorrow, and one who does not feel sorrow in such a situation cannot be said to be a normal person. Second, failing to feel sorrow in a sorrowful situation is wrong in the sense that this type of emotional failure reveals a concrete flaw in one’s character. According to Kōng Chéngzǐ’s comment on Dàozǐ above that he is uprooting his family tree by not lamenting his father’s death, one who does not feel sorrow even at his own father’s death does not care about his root (bēn本), and this type of person is unlikely to care about one’s lineage and make it flourishing. Third, since

81 “是謂蹶其本, 必不有其宗.” Zōozhuàn, Xiānggōng襄公19, ibid., p. 1051.
82 “且是人也, 居喪而不哀, 在慽而有嘉容, 是謂不度. 不度之人, 鮮不為患.” Ibid., p. 1185. The heart radical of ‘慽’ is under ‘戚’ in the original.
this type of person does not grasp the situation correctly—failing to feel sorrow in a sorrowful situation is a good example, he is likely to make crucial mistakes at important turning points of his life by misinterpreting what he has to do in each situation. And the consequence of such misinterpretations is disastrous: he could endanger his life. Even worse, if this type of person were a ruler of a country or an otherwise politically influential person, he would endanger his country too. There would be hardly any more inauspicious thing than this.

There are two further details in these stories that deserve our special attention. The first concerns the family history of aforementioned Dàozǐ 悼子, who belonged to the Shí 石 family and whose indifference at his father’s death made Kǒng Chéngzǐ predict that he would not be able to maintain his family line. Nine years after the prediction, he happens to flee to a neighboring country Jin 晉 avoiding his political enemies’ attack, becoming no longer able to preside the sacrificial ceremonies for his ancestors as the head of his family. He does not seem to have had any children, or perhaps his children did not survive this political turmoil, because his political enemies who are now controlling his home country allow to establish his nephew as the new head of the Shí 石 family, so that the Shí 石 family could at least subsist.83 Interestingly enough, what procured this exceptional kindness from its enemies for the Shí 石 family was the political merit of Shí Què 石碏, an ancestor of the Shí 石 family, who helped stabilizing the country by killing the usurper Zhōu Yū 州吁84 and his supporter Shí Hòu 石厚, the latter being his own son. The author of the Zǔozhuàn praises Shí Què through the mouth of the nobleman (jūnzǐ 君子)—the general commentator on the historical events throughout the book—as a “pure vassal” or “vassal of utmost loyalty” (chúnchén 純臣), who acted on the ancient dictum that “great duty should override familial affection (dàyì mièqīn 大義滅親).”85

Now, we need to think about what is meant exactly by “great duty” (dàyì 大義) here. In the previous section, we have seen that “treating close people as close” or

84 There are three tones for this character (xū, yū, and yù), but I am not clear which one is used for personal name.
“giving primary consideration to close people” (qīnqīn 親親) is an important principle to organize ancient Chinese society. However, the case of Shí Què seems to imply that qīnqīn 親親 is not the only principle important in ancient China. Then, in order to find out what “great duty” refers to in Shí Què’s case, we need to know exactly why he killed his own son and the usurper Zhōu Yū. Zhōu Yū was Wèi Zhuānggōng’s 卫莊公 concubine’s son, and Duke Zhuāng liked him. Zhōu Yū, as a concubine’s son who was usually ineligible to become a ruler, liked military affairs (hàobīng 好兵), and one day Shí Què remonstrated with Duke Zhuāng about such Zhōu Yū. He said:

I heard that [if one] loves one’s son, [one should] teach him with right ways, [so that he] does not fall into wickedness. Arrogance, extravagance, lewdness, and dissipation are the sources of wickedness, and these four [vices] come from excessive favor and allowances. [If you] are going to establish him [as your heir], determine it soon. Otherwise, you are leading him to bring about a disaster. There are few who are favored but do not get arrogant, are arrogant but can lower their statuses, stay at low ranks but do not conceive rancor, and have rancor but can restrain from expressing it. Moreover, the humble harming the noble, the young presuming against the elder, the distant slandering the close, the new slandering the old, the small attacking the great, the lewd defeating the righteous—these are the so-called six kinds of insubordination....The ruler of men [is supposed to] make efforts to eradicate the disaster, but [you are instead] accelerating it. Is this not unacceptable?86

However, Duke Zhuāng did not listen to this advice, and later his wife’s sister’s son—far more eligible to become a ruler than Zhōu Yū—succeeded him as Duke Huán 桓. Sixteen years later, Zhōu Yū killed Duke Huán and usurped the dukedom. But he failed to harmonize the people of his country and get support from them, and eventually got killed by Shí Què.

Considering this story and Shí Què’s specific comments on Zhōu Yū’s character above together, the reason why Shí Què killed Zhōu Yū and his son Shí Hòu seems to be that Zhōu Yū broke the zōngfǎ 宗法 system, and consequently weakened his country by stirring up social disorder. Moreover, his fondness of military force and arrogant and

86 “臣聞愛子，敎之以義方，弗納於邪。驕，奢，淫，泆，所自邪也。四者之來，寵祿過也。將立州吁，乃定之矣；若猶未也，階之為禍。夫寵而不驕，驕而能降，降而不憾，憾而能眕者，鮮矣。且夫賤妨貴，少陵長，遠間親，新間舊，小加大，淫破義，所謂六逆也....君人者，將禍是務去，而速之，無乃不可乎?” Ibid., pp. 31–33.
brutal character did not gather many people around him, and he could not get the social turmoil he created under control. In short, Zhōu Yū’s usurpation of his ruler’s power was for nothing but realizing his personal ambition, and it was against almost everyone’s interest in the country. In this context, the injunction of “great duty” (dàiì 大義) would be to promote the overall benefit of the country and its people, even if it involves harming one’s own family members. However, as we have seen in the previous section, the core principle of the zōngfǎ 宗法 system is qīnqīn 親親 or giving priority to those closely related to oneself, and Zhōu Yū’s breaking of the zōngfǎ system was actually breaking this qīnqīn principle. For from the perspective of the Duke Zhuāng, the relationship between his two sons Zhōu Yū and Duke Huán was that between the humble and the noble, the young and the elder, the distant and the close, and so forth, and the former was supposed to be fully subordinate to the latter. Seen in this light, “great duty” refers to keeping the lineage of the royal house strong and undisturbed, and it requires one to sacrifice one’s family members if they were involved in the conspiracy against the royal house.

In short, the conceptual distinction between “great duty” and the qīnqīn principle in the Zúozhuàn indicates that family ties were not the only important principle for social organization in ancient China, although Shí Què’s killing his own son was in some aspect to protect another lineage. On the other hand, Shí Què’s sacrifice of his son was still an extremely difficult and extraordinary deed, and the way Dàozǐ’s 悼子 enemies treated Dàozǐ acknowledges it respectfully.

Now, I would like to go back to the story of Gōngzi Chóu 公子綢 and ponder the relationship between his emotional insensitivity and his unfortunate political failure. As we have seen above, he was not only not sad but also playful during the mourning period for his deceased father, and Mūshū 穆叔 complained that he was an aberrant man and would bring about troubles later to the Jì 季 family. However, Jì Wúzǐ 季武子—the head of the Jì 季 family at that time—did not listen to this advice, and Gōngzǐ Chóu 公子綢 became the duke of Lǔ (Zhāogōng 昭公 hereafter). As Mūshū predicted, twenty

87 The Jì family was one of the noble families of Lǔ, and had been actually dominating the Lǔ dukedom already for generations.
five years later he allied with other noble families of Lù and attacked the Ji 季 clan, and managed to capture the head of the Ji 季 family. One of his allies recommended allowing the captured head of the Ji 季 family to exile himself, but Zhāogōng decided to kill his influential captive. This reckless decision made other noble families of Lù fearful of their own fates, and they got together to protect their shared interests against the duke. Consequently, Zhāogōng 昭公 failed and was now himself forced to flee to neighboring countries and face lonely death in exile eight years later.\textsuperscript{88}

It is not very clear at the beginning how much relationship there could be between Zhāogōng’s emotional insensitivity as a teenager and his eventual political failure. However, the author of the \textit{Zuozhuàn} reports an episode of his mischievous conduct during the mourning period: Until the burial of his deceased father, he changed his funeral garments three times, but he saw to it that the lower part of his skirt looked as old as the previous one, so that nobody could notice the change of his garments.\textsuperscript{89} The author of the \textit{Zuozhuàn} comments on this:

\begin{quote}
At this time Zhāogōng 昭公 was already nineteen, but he still had a childish mind [tóngxīn 童心]. It was by seeing this that the nobleman knew Zhāogōng 昭公 would not be able to have a proper death.\textsuperscript{90}
\end{quote}

A charitable interpretation of this comment that could bridge Zhāogōng’s early episode of playfulness in mourning and his later political failure would be the following: While in mourning, one is normally drawn to such features as one’s parent’s death and the grave influence it will have on one’s future life, often experiencing a set of typical affective or physiological reactions that accompany sorrow. However, Zhāogōng 昭公 was different. He was instead concerned with his clothing and his appearance to others, and this revealed that his mind was still childish. For being distracted by trivial aspects of the mourning rituals and even playing with them is a good sign of emotional immaturity. And since he was not able to grasp the salient features of the situation correctly, it was not an

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Zuozhuàn}, Zhāogōng 昭公 25. Ibid., especially pp. 1462–1465.
\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Zuozhuàn}, Xiānggōng 襄公 31. Ibid., p. 1185.
\textsuperscript{90} “於是昭公十九年矣，猶有童心。君子是以知其不能終也。” \textit{Zuozhuàn}, Xiānggōng 襄公 31. Ibid., p. 1186.
unreasonable guess that as long as Zhāogōng was not going to correct this shortcoming, this flaw in character would be carried onto the later stages of his life and affect his life unfavorably. In short, the capacity to feel sorrow in a sorrowful situation constitutes a larger and more general ability to grasp the correct salient features of a situation with appropriate emotional response, and those who lack this ability can hardly lead a desirable life in the world. Moreover, the author of the Zōozhuàn seems to have thought that this capacity of emotional perception can grow by cultivation, because he called the emotional immaturity of Zhāogōng’s kind “tōngxīn” 童心 or “children’s mind.”

(2) The second sense of āi 哀 is the feeling of pity or sympathy at the suffering of others, and āi is used only once in this sense in the Analects:

*Those in authority have lost their way, and the commoners [consequently] have been drifting digressively for a long time. If you could extract any truth from them [in interrogation], be sorrowful and pitiful instead of being joyful [about your ability].* ⑨¹

This is Zēngzǐ’s 曾子 advice to one of his disciples when this disciple became a judge (shīshī 士師) in the Lǔ dukedom. According to Zēngzǐ, the ruling class of Lǔ had long since lost the proper way to govern its people, having the people of Lǔ suffer for long time and eventually end up committing crimes just to make their living. So, Zēngzǐ advises his disciple that even if he could solve a crime by successfully finding out what is true about the case, he should feel sad about or pity the criminals instead of feeling joyful about his ability as a judge. In this passage “āi 哀 seems to be used synonymously with “jīn” 矜, which means pity for the suffering of others, because the intentional object of both “āi 哀 and “jīn” 矜 is clearly the miserable situation of the commoners—the originally innocent people turned into criminals due to the ruling class’s misgovernment.

However, “āi 哀 is used in this sense only once in the Analects, and it is difficult to determine what is the correct semantic boundary of this term, especially whether there is any slight difference in meaning between “āi 哀 and “jīn” 矜. However, the usages of “āi 哀 in the sense of pity or sympathy abound in the Zōozhuàn, and there are more

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⑨¹ “上失其道, 民散久矣. 如得其情, 則哀矜而勿喜!” *Lunyu* 19:19. The underlining is mine.
usages of “jīn” in the Zūozhuàn than in the Analects. So, analyzing the instances of “āi” 哀 in the Zūozhuàn in comparison to the usages of “jīn”矜 in both the Analects and the Zūozhuàn might clarify how the term “āi” 哀 were used by Kongzi’s predecessors and contemporaries.

First, we need to determine whether “āi” 哀 and “jīn”矜 can be used interchangeably with each other, or there is any substantial semantic difference between them. Along with the passage just quoted above, “jīn” as a verb seems to mean “feeling sympathy for” or “pity” in Lunyu 19:3:

*The nobleman respects the worthy and tolerates the multitude, praises the good and pities the incapable.*

What is noteworthy about this passage is that the object of the nobleman’s pity is incapable people or their miserable situation—probably in the ethical context here, and the fact that they are morally inferior to the nobleman is what makes the nobleman jīn矜 or feel “pity” for them. In other words, in this passage the feeling of jīn矜 or “pity” is the nobleman’s feeling sorry that those people cannot make themselves better persons, and one’s jīn矜 or “pity” in general seems to involve the following two components: 1) the recognition that the object of one’s “pity” is in a bad situation, and 2) the evaluative attitude that being in such a situation is pitiful, in the sense that it deserves pity on the part of the observer. This generalization also applies to the case of the criminals who were originally innocent commoners in the previous passage.

At this point, one might wonder whether the feeling of jīn矜 possibly involves a modicum of contempt about its object, just as the English word “pitiful” can mean “despicable” or “deserving contempt,” and “pitiable” means “arousing or deserving pity, sometimes mixed with scorn or contempt.” Although it is not initially clear whether this is also the case for jīn矜, it is interesting to see that “jīn”矜 is used twice in the Analects

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92 “君子尊賢而容衆, 嘉善而矜不能.” *Lunyu* 19:3.

to mean something like “feel proud of oneself” or “self-conceit.” First, as a noun, “jīn” seems to mean “self-conceit” or “self-admiration” in the following passage:

The self-conceited in the antiquity was dignified, but the self-conceited today is merely irascible and quarrelsome.\(^{94}\)

As Yáng Bójùn points out, “lián” 廉 originally meant a sharp edge or point of a thing, and by analogy it came to mean a person’s correct and dignified behavior.\(^{95}\) In other words, the metaphor of the sharp edge conveys that the self-admiration of the person who is lián 廉 is based on his moral character, and his self-admiration does not allow himself to engage in lowly, immoral activities. However, “jīn” or “self-admiration” is not necessarily intertwined with the moral quality of lián 廉, and Kongzì says that the self-conceited people of his time are just self-conceited for whatever reason, and tend to fight with other people because of their self-conceit and quick temper.

In another passage from the Analects, “jīn” is used as a verb, and seems to mean “feel proud” without any negative connotation:

The nobleman is proud [of himself] but not quarrelsome, gets along well with others but does not form factions.\(^{96}\)

The character “jīn” in this passage is often interpreted as solemnness or seriousness expressed through one’s posture or countenance, probably because “jīn” as “self-conceit” carries a negative connotation which should not be found in the nobleman’s character.\(^{97}\) However, as we have just seen in Lunyu 17:16, “jīn,” even in the sense of “self-admiration,” does not always carry a negative connotation, and it is more consistent to interpret “jīn” in this passage as feeling proud of oneself rather than being serious in countenance and posture, although the latter is not totally unrelated with the former.

\(^{94}\) “古之矜也廉，今之矜也忿戾。”Lunyu 17:16.

\(^{95}\) Yáng Bójùn, Lúnyǔ yìzhù, p. 187.

\(^{96}\) “君子矜而不爭，羣而不黨。”Lunyu 15:22.

\(^{97}\) For example, see Hé Yàn’s 何晏 quotation of Bāo Xián’s 包成 gloss and Zhū Xí’s Zhū’s gloss on this character, which can be found in Chéng Shùdé 程樹德, Lúnyǔ jíshì 論語集釋 (Bēijīng 北京: Zhōnghuá shūjū 中華書局, 1990). Yáng Bójùn also seems to follow this view in his Lúnyǔ yìzhù, p. 166.
A speculation about the relationship between these two senses of “jīn”矜 is that they are like two sides of a coin. In other words, one might think that when a person feels “pity” for another person, she might feel proud of herself simultaneously, no matter how faint that feeling would be. For her pity for another person involves her recognition that that person is in a miserable situation, and this recognition is sometimes just the other side of the recognition that she—the one who feels pity—is not in that situation, or that she does not deserve to be in that situation. However, this speculation is wrong. For on one hand, one can still feel pity for another person even if she finds herself in the same situation as the other’s, as the victims of the Holocaust might have done for each other; on the other hand, one can feel pity for another person’s miserable situation even if, or especially when, that person does not deserve to be in that situation but nonetheless could not help falling into that situation, as it is the case in Lunyu 19:19 (footnote 91). So, we could conclude that although “jīn” sometimes means “self-conceit,” “self-admiration,” or “feel proud of oneself,” that meaning is not necessarily intertwined with “jīn” as “pity” or “sympathy” in the Analects.

This point seems to be also true in the Zuo zhuan, and it can be proven by citing a passage from the text. Earlier in this section, we have seen that Zhāogōng昭公, who was playful as a prince during the mourning period for his father’s death, was ousted out by the Jī family and fled to a neighboring country. Now in the 32nd year of his partly nominal reign, we witness his facing a shameful death in a foreign land. Concerning his death, Zhào Jiànzǐ趙簡子, a powerful minister of Jìn晉, asks Shǐ Mò史墨 why the people of Lǔ still obey the Jī family and no country punishes the Jī family. To this question, Shǐ Mò says that it is appropriate for the people of Lǔ to obey the Jī family, because the Jī family has helped the dukes of Lǔ for long time. Moreover, he continues, the dukes of Lǔ have been licentious and delinquent in governance for generations, while the Jī family has been sincere in performing their duties generation after generation. Consequently, Shǐ Mò says, “The people of Lǔ forgot about their ruler. Even if he died in a foreign country, who would feel sorry for (jīn矜) him?” This remark of Shǐ Mò’s shows that 1) jīn矜 or “pity” can be felt by subordinates for their superiors, and therefore that 2) “jīn” as “pity”

or “sympathy” is primarily an other-oriented emotion that does not always have the connotation of condescending or does not necessarily involve such emotions as pride or self-conceit.

Since the meaning of “矜” as “pity” or “sympathy” is quite clear now in the Analects and the Zuo zhuan, let us compare it to “哀” as “pity” or “sympathy” and see whether there is any semantic difference between them. Based on the pattern “哀” is used in the Zuo zhuan, it seems that “哀” and “矜” are used synonymously in this text too: Out of its total 30 instances (except for its use in proper names and titles such as “哀公”), “哀” is used at least nine times to mean “pity” or “sympathy.” And in most such cases, the “pitying” person and the “pitied” one are of equal social status, and the feeling of “pity” of the former is focused on the miserable situation or bad luck of the latter. For example, when the earl of Qin 秦 died in 620 B.C.E., many people were buried alive with him according to the ancient custom. Among the victims of this brutal custom were Yānxī 奄息, Zhōngháng 仲行, and Zhēnhù 鍼虎, who all belonged to the noble family Zǐjūshì 子車氏 and had been known as the three good men (sānliáng 三良) of Qin 秦. According to the author of the Zuo zhuan, people of the capital city (guó rén 国人) of Qin 秦 felt pity for (哀) them and composed a poem.99 The compound noun “guó rén” 国人 here refers to those who belonged to the ruling class living in the capital city, and no particular hierarchical relationship is mentioned between these people and the three sons of the Zǐjūshì 子車氏. Their dominant feelings about these three victims were most likely regret for the loss of good “fellow citizens” for no purpose and pity for their bad luck, and 哀 in this passage does not seem to have any connotation of condescending on the part of those who felt that emotion.

The Zuo zhuan contains an unclear case, though. In 596 B.C.E., the viscount of Chǔ 楚 invaded Zhèng 鄭. After fighting for three months, the earl of Zhèng surrendered. He declared himself to be the vassal of the viscount of Chǔ, speaking in humble words befitting his subordinate position, wishing that the viscount of Chǔ would withdraw his

soldiers and not destroy Zhèng. Against his vassals’ advice to annex Zhèng and not to forgive its ruler, the viscount of Chū granted the earl’s request to save Zhèng. A while later, Jin 晉, an ally country of Zhèng, sent troops to save Zhèng, but the generals of Jin 晉 army found out that Zhèng had already made peace with Chū. Having their troops return to Jin 晉 without battling with Chū, Shi Hui 士會, a general leading the Jin army, commented on the generosity of the viscount of Chū:

*I heard that [when] using military force, [one is supposed to] move [only] after finding a gap [in one’s enemy]. One cannot fight [an enemy] whose generosity and punishment...do not deviate [from the correct way]; it is not right to fight such an enemy. The ruler of Chū punished Zhèng [because] he felt anger for its double dealing, but he felt pity for the earl’s humbling himself. When betraying, he punished it; when submitting, he forgave it. [By doing so], his generosity and punishment were established.*

According to Shi Hui’s interpretation, the viscount of Chū saved Zhèng because he felt āi 哀 for the earl of Zhèng, and when feeling that emotion, he was responding to the earl’s humble manner and speech. Of course, anyone would feel pity for someone if that person, as a ruler of a country, knelt down before somebody else because he lost a war. However, what is at issue here is whether the viscount of Chū was looking at the humbled earl only from this third person’s point of view, when he felt the emotion of āi 哀. Perhaps not, because he was the very person in front of whom the earl knelt. That is, he might very well have felt noble in relation to the humbled earl, and it is not clear whether the feeling of importance or self-conceit the viscount of Chū might have felt was part of his āi 哀. However, based on my analysis, this is only one case throughout the Zuozhuàn. The other eight instances of āi 哀 tell us that the feeling of importance the viscount of Chū might have felt is not part of āi 哀, or at least that “āi” 哀 usually means “pity” or “sympathy” without having any connotation of condescending or involving such emotion as self-conceit. Since we have already seen that this is also the case with “jīn” 矜, we can now conclude that “āi” 哀 and “jīn” 矜 are synonyms, and both mean “pity” or “sympathy” in

100 Zuozhuàn, Xuāngōng 宣公 12. Ibid., pp. 718–720.
101 “會聞用師，觀釁而動。德，刑，…不易，不可敵也。不為是征。楚君討鄭，怒其貳而哀其卑。叛而伐之，服而舍之。德刑成矣。” Zuozhuàn, Xuāngōng 宣公 12. Ibid., p. 722.
the *Analects* and the *Zuozhuàn*.

3.3 “Fear” (*Jù* 惧, *Kǒng* 恐, and *Wèi* 畏)

Fear is primarily a feeling of terror or dread that we feel at the presence or nearness of danger. And we seem to share a large part of this emotion with other animals, although different species might find different situations especially fearful. For us human beings, though, direct physical threat to our existence is not the only cause of fear. A businessman might fear that the stock market will collapse tomorrow, and a religious person fears his god in a different way than he fears a bear. That is, we often use the concept of fear broadly so as to refer to a feeling of uneasiness or apprehension that something bad might happen, or a feeling of reverence or awe in front of awesome things.102 The three ancient Chinese emotion terms that I will discuss in this section fall into this broad category of fear, and they will turn out to cover roughly the same areas of fear that I just described.

As in the case of the English term “fear,” these ancient Chinese terms are often used for directly threatening situations in many ancient Chinese texts. For example, we find in the *Zuozhuàn* 左傳 that “kǒng” 恐 is used as the fear felt anticipating an interstate battle103 and the fear of one’s own death,104 “jù” 惧 as the fear of the enemy’s sudden attack105 and the fear of the deadly punishment for one’s misdeed,106 and “wèi” 畏 as the fear of the enemy’s invasion of one’s territory.107 However, I would not try to catalogue such fearful situations and find out which situations usually go with which of these terms in ancient Chinese texts. Such effort is not likely to be successful in general, because

102 I consulted the entry of “fear” in *Webster's New World Dictionary and Thesaurus* for delineating fear this way.
104 “聲伯夢涉洹…懼不敢占也…曰：‘余恐死，故不敢占也…’” *Zuozhuàn*, Chénggōng 成公 17. Ibid., p. 899. In this passage, we can also see that *jù* 惧 and *kǒng* 恐 share the same object, namely, one’s own death.
106 “宋督攻孔氏，殺孔父而取其妻，公怒，督懼，遂弑殤公。” *Zuozhuàn*, Huánggōng 桓公 2. Ibid., p. 85.
these three terms are largely interchangeable and often used in similar situations.\textsuperscript{108} Moreover, such effort does not serve a good purpose in this section, because it is often in one of the aforementioned extended senses that fear matters in the ethical context of the *Analects*, and even when fear is discussed in its primary sense, its detail does not matter very much.

In the following, I examine various passages from the *Analects* containing these three terms, and think about what is Kongzi’s view of the place of fear in ethical life. Specifically, Kongzi often says that the fully cultivated nobleman is courageous and consequently has no fear, but he also seems to think that certain kinds of fear are indispensable for leading a fully virtuous life. My following discussion, arranged by the three terms in question, partly aims to present this theoretical tension in detail and think about how it could be resolved consistently in the context of the *Analects*.

(1) \textit{Jù} 懼

In the *Analects*, two typical situations in which people feel, or are supposed to feel, fear are mentioned. First, in *Lunyu* 4:21 Kongzi says:

*One should not forget the age of one’s parents. [Of their old age,] one gets joyful on one hand, and fearful on the other.*\textsuperscript{109}

That is, Kongzi recommends not forgetting the age of one’s parents, because remembering the age of one’s parents is a source of joy and fear. Suppose that your parents are getting old, and you realize on a New Year’s day that they just turned, say, 75 and 72 respectively. You will be happy on the one hand that they survived another year, but at the same time you will be also afraid that they got one year closer to their death. This is a good case that Rawls’s conception of attitude, which I introduced in the previous chapter (Section 2.1.3), applies to. Rawls proposes that an attitude is a set of ordered families of dispositions, and that love is a good example of such an attitude. According to this view, love consists of a set of dispositions such as the disposition to feel joy at the

\textsuperscript{108} For example, see the entries for these three terms in *Hànyǔ dàcǐdiǎn*, vol. 7, p. 490, p. 798, and p. 1310.

presence of the person one loves and the disposition to feel sorrow when one’s loved one suffers, and now it is clear that the disposition to feel fear at the imminent misfortune of the person one loves is also an important constituent of one’s love. Seen in this light, and also considering the importance of one’s love for one’s parents in Kongzi’s ethics, fear (and other emotions such as joy and sorrow) directed at the right objects seems to be an important part of the nobleman’s moral character.

Second, in <i>Lunyu</i> 7:11 Zǐlù 子路 asks Kongzi whom he would lead the Three Armies (sānjūn 三軍) with, if he were given an opportunity to do so. Zǐlù was one of Kongzi’s advanced disciples, and he was always proud of his own courage and military prowess. To Zǐlù’s disappointment, though, Kongzi says the following:

I am not with one who would not regret to die while fighting a tiger with bare hands or [trying to] walk across the Yellow River. [The person to lead the Three Armies] should be one who is afraid of failure when given a task and manages to complete it successfully by careful deliberation.\(^\text{110}\)

Those who fight a tiger with bare hands or try to walk across a great river might be considered brave, but their courage hardly helps anything because it comes either from their overestimation of their strength or from their insufficient concern for themselves. Such people do not deserve to lead a great army in a battle, because they are not likely to collect all the information about the battle and analyze it correctly, and they would not take enough care about the welfare of their soldiers either. On the other hand, just as the virtuous (rén 仁) person would deal with the other nobles as if receiving an important guest and employ the commoners for a public service as if officiating at a great sacrifice,\(^\text{111}\) the person to lead the Three Armies would engage in his battle with great care, because the result of his battle will greatly affect not only the lives of his soldiers but also the future of his own country. A person in charge of such a great task should feel afraid of his failure, and this type of fear, rather than working as a debilitating factor, makes him stay alert to every possible mistake and be careful in deliberation and action.

\(^\text{110}\)“暴虎馮河, 死而無悔者, 吾不與也. 必也臨事而懼, 好謀而成者也.” <i>Lunyu</i> 7:11.

\(^\text{111}\)“仲弓問仁. 子曰: ‘出門如見大賓, 使民如承大祭...’” <i>Lunyu</i> 12:2.
What is noteworthy in these two passages is that fear is not delineated here as a harmful or painful feeling that one should remove from oneself. On the contrary, it contributes to the Confucian virtuoso’s character traits and is a useful guidance for how to lead one’s life. Ironically, though, Kongzi also says that fear has no room in a virtuous person’s mind. For example, Kongzi is quoted twice in the Analects saying that “A brave man has no fear,” and he also says that “The nobleman does not worry or fear anything.” What does he mean by these remarks? Apparently Kongzi cannot be contradicting what he said in the two previous passages and mean that a virtuous person, as a fragile creature vulnerable to various kinds of physical harm, does not fear anything; it would be insane to think that a virtuous person would not fear a natural predator or the overpowering stream of a great river. He does not dare to fight a tiger with his bare hands or try to cross the Yellow River without a proper device, and it is because he fears them. Then, what does Kongzi mean by these remarks exactly?

As I see it, Lunyu 12:4 might supply a clue for solving this puzzle. The passage is a conversation between Kongzi and Sima Niú 司馬牛, a disciple of Kongzi’s, about the nobleman’s (jūnzi 君子) characteristics. It goes as follows:

Sima Niú asked about the nobleman. The Master said, “The nobleman does not worry or fear.” [Sima Niú] said, “If one simply does not worry or fear, can he be called a nobleman?” The Master said, “[The nobleman] introspects and does not feel troubled; what would he worry about and fear?”

In this passage, Kongzi’s initial cryptic statement that the nobleman has no fear or worry gets clarified to some extent by his further remarks. According to him, the nobleman has no fear or worry because on introspection he does not find anything wrong or reproachable in himself, and this remark of Kongzi’s in turn implies two things. First, it is worrisome to a nobleman to have done anything wrong or reproachable or to have an intention or an inclination to do such things, and he tries to keep free of such worry and fear—fear in the sense of apprehension—by constantly monitoring himself and correcting

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himself if necessary. Second, the possibility to get morally defective is the only thing that
the nobleman should worry about or be afraid of; as long as the nobleman keeps away
from moral taints, he has nothing to worry about or fear.\footnote{One is reminded of Yán Yuān, a virtuous disciple of Kongzi’s, who was happy to live in a shabby street
on a bowlful of rice and a gourdful of water. See my discussion of this person and the character of the
nobleman in general in Section 2.2.2.3 of Chapter 2 above.} Admittedly, though, Kongzi’s
initial statement interpreted this way is still too strong, because it cannot explain away the
nobleman’s natural fear for such things as a tiger or a great river. Moreover, as we have
seen in \textit{Lunyu} 7:11 above, Kongzi clearly thinks that this kind of natural fear is
indispensable not only for a nobleman but also for any ordinary human beings, because
otherwise human beings would not survive. Then, again, how shall we interpret Kongzi’s
sweeping statement that the nobleman has no fear at all? If it were not merely a careless
overstatement, it remains to be explained what would be the nobleman’s state of mind
exactly when he happens to be in a naturally fearful situation.

Although not directly commenting on fear (jù 懼), \textit{Lunyu} 12:5 concerns worry
(yōu 憂) and provides a further clue to this problem. Specifically, this passage tells us
what kind of worry Sīmǎ Niú was subject to, and how he might deal with it:

\begin{quote}
[One day] Sīmǎ Niú said in worry, “Others all have brothers, but I alone have none.”
Zīxià 子夏 (another disciple of Kongzi’s) responded, “I heard this: Life and death is a
matter of destiny, and [achieving] wealth and high position depends on [the will of] Heaven. [If] a nobleman is reverent and makes no mistake, and is respectful towards
others and follows the rituals, all within the Four Seas are his brothers. Why would a
nobleman worry that he has no brothers?”
\end{quote}

\footnote{“司馬牛憂曰：‘人皆有兄弟, 我獨亡.’ 子夏曰：‘商聞之矣: 死生有命, 富貴在天. 君子敬而無失, 與人
g恭而有禮, 四海之內, 皆兄弟也. 君子何患乎無兄弟也? ’” \textit{Lunyu} 12:5. I slightly modified Lau’s
translation. See Lau, \textit{The Analects}, p. 113.}

According to Mark E. Lewis, men in early China mainly presented themselves and were
recognized by others as members of families or states, and the obligation to avenge any
offense done to one’s superiors by a different family or state was a basic element of the
bond between the members of these social groups, particularly between the lord and the
retainer or the father and the son (and presumably also between the elder and younger
brothers in a family). In addition, not only did any unrequited offense remove the bases of
ordinary social commerce or conviviality between members of the offended and
offending groups, but it also turned those groups into enemies who could not live together “under the same Heaven.”\textsuperscript{117} In this socio-historical situation, legal justice was secondary to familial justice, so to speak, and having no personal kinship ties that would protect oneself from frequent social violence would have been a great source of fear and worry: you are more vulnerable to constant physical threat and various types of social disadvantages if you do not belong to any current lineage. Perhaps Sīmǎ Niú was so worried about not having any brothers for this reason, and the point Zīxià was trying to make was something like this: “They won’t hurt you buddy, as long as you don’t make any mistake and are nice to them. And you shouldn’t worry too much about what is not fully under human control, such as the matter of life and death or social success.”

That is, as a nobleman one can keep away from much of the trouble by being nice and respectful in dealing with others, but if sometimes it does not help and one consequently gets in trouble, one should not worry about the misfortune. It might be terrible to be in such a trouble, but since it is not due to one’s moral fault, one should be able to face one’s misfortune without losing one’s composure. I will discuss this theme further when I discuss Wèi 畏 below.

(2) Kǒng 恐

According to Wáng Lì gūhányǔ zìdiǎn 王力古漢語字典, while often used as an intransitive verb, “kǒng” 恐 is also sometimes used as a transitive verb accompanied by a fairly long object (chángbīnyǔ 長賓語).\textsuperscript{118} If what is meant by “chángbīnyǔ” here is a sentential phrase as opposed to a single word, this observation applies well to the instances of “kǒng” 恐 in the Analects as we will see in this section. Moreover, it is also remarkable that three out of the total four usages of “kǒng” 恐 in the Analects are used in the sense of an anxiety or apprehension that is required to learn and practice the Confucian teaching properly. Look at the following three passages:

When Zìlù had any precept that he had not yet put into full practice, he was afraid of hearing [another].

The Master said, “Learn as though not capable of reaching it, [retain it] being afraid of losing it.”

Zìxià 子夏 said, “Even minor arts surely have their own worthwhile aspects, but [the person wanting to] go a long way fears that [they might] bog him down. This is why the nobleman does not practice them.

In the first passage, Zìlù, who was mentioned above for his courage, was afraid to be taught a new lesson from Kongzi whenever he had not fully mastered what he had previously learned from his teacher. In the second passage, Kongzi recommends his disciples to engage in learning as if they were on a hunt. That is, one should make a great effort in learning something, as if chasing an animal that is hard to catch; and once having learned it, one should keep oneself familiar with it by periodically practicing it, as if trying not to lose an animal that one has caught. Finally, in the third passage Zìxià (a disciple of Kongzi’s mentioned above) says that the nobleman does not practice minor arts such as pottery or chess-playing because he fears that despite their contribution to his moral cultivation in some aspects, they will generally hinder him from accomplishing a great task.

There are two points that deserve our attention here. First, we can notice that kǒng in these three passages equally arise at the thought of a somewhat abstract situation or fact (viz. learning a new thing, forgetting what is learned, or petty skills’ distracting one from pursuing a greater goal), and that those situations or facts as the intentional objects of kǒng are articulated in each of these passages as the grammatical objects of the verb “kǒng.” Furthermore, the objects of the verb “kǒng” in these three Analects passages are in the form of implicit sentences. That is, a student in the Confucian tradition is supposed to be afraid that he will learn a new thing very soon, afraid that he might lose what he has already learned, and afraid that practicing minor arts will hinder him from achieving
a far greater goal. In short, kŏng in the Analects is a “higher cognitive emotion” in the sense that it is a fear about highly abstract situations or observations rather than a fear coming from the visceral perception of physical threats, and the classical Chinese language had a linguistic tool to articulate this particular type of fear successfully through the usage of kŏng, in the case of the Analects.

(3) Wèi 畏

According to Wáng Li gūhányū zidiăn, “wèi” 畏 comes from the same root as “wēi” 威 (“awesome”), and one comes to feel wèi 畏 (“awe”) at awesome (wēi 威) things. As a ground for explaining “wèi” 畏 in terms of “wēi” 威 and vice versa, Wáng Li gūhányū zidiăn quotes the following passage from the Zūozhuan: “wēi” 威 is to have wēi 威 and deserve awe—in other words, “wēi” 威 is to have attributes of awesomeness and inspire awe.” However, with this tautological explanation of “wèi” 畏 and “wēi” 威 we cannot tell what kinds of things are generally considered awesome and what kinds are not in ancient China, unless we have an independent explanation of either “wēi” 威 or “wèi” 畏. Fortunately, though, this circular definition of “wēi” 威 in the Zūozhuan is part of a long conversation between the duke of Wèi 衛 and his vassal Bēigōng Wénzǐ 北宮文子 about the meaning of “wēiyí” 威儀, and Bēigōng Wénzǐ’s explanation of “wēi” 威 there is not totally circular. According to him, “wēi” 威 is “having attributes of awesomeness so as to

123 Interestingly, the fourth instance of kŏng in the Analects (Lunyu 16:1) takes a complete sentence as its object. However, although it could be still translated as “afraid that,” it does not seem to express an emotional state at all. Rather, as we sometimes use “I’m afraid that…” in order to disagree politely with someone else, Kongzi uses “kŏng” here to make his points modestly while scolding his two disciples, Zǐlù and Rǎnqiú 冉求, for serving his superior improperly.

124 This thesis, though, should not be taken to mean that only kŏng is used in the ancient Chinese texts to represent fear as a higher cognitive emotion. On the contrary, we find numerous examples of jù also taking somewhat abstract considerations in a sentential form as its intentional objects. For example, in the Zūozhuàn, A woman named Luánqí 欒祁, having committed adultery, fears that her son might take severe measures for that (qí jù qí tǎo 祇懼其討), and accuses him of hatching a conspiracy against her father. She also tells her father that she cannot but reveal this conspiracy, which was only invented by her, because she was worried that her son would harm him (jù hài yú zhǔ 懼害於主). See Zūozhuan, Xiānggōng 襄公 21. Yáng Bójùn, Chūnqiū Zūozhuan zhù, pp. 1058–1059.

125 Wáng Li gūhányū zidiăn, p. 193.

deserve awe” (as we have just seen), and his prime example of things that inspire awe is King Wén’s 文 military power. He quotes a passage praising King Wén’s virtue from the Documents that “Great countries fear his power, and small countries embrace his generosity,” and says that King Wén’s military expedition to Chóng 崇 deserves awe because it made all of the southern and eastern barbarian tribes surrender to him.

This view of wèi 畏 as primarily the feeling of fear at such things as brutal military force can also be found in the Analects. Kongzi traveled a lot from one country to another trying to persuade rulers of his time to adopt his moral and political vision, and one day Kongzi and his disciples came under siege at a border town called Kuāng 匡 between the Chén 陳 and Cài 蔡 dukedoms. According to Bāo Xián 包咸, the people of Kuāng surrounded them with arms and tried to starve them out because they had mistaken Kongzi for Yáng Huò 阳貨 of Lǔ 魯 who had plundered the region in the past, and coincidently one of Kongzi’s disciples who were driving Kongzi’s chariot had participated in Yáng Huò’s plunder before he became Kongzi’s disciple.

The Analects mentions this event three times, and two of them are the following:

The Master was threatened in Kuāng. He said, “[Since] King Wén has already died, isn’t the Culture here with me? [If] Heaven had wanted to throw this culture away, I would not have been able to partake in this culture; [since] Heaven has not thrown this culture away, what the people of Kuāng do to me?”

The Master was threatened in Kuāng, and Yán Yuān 颜渊 fell behind. [When they got together again] the Master said, “I thought you were dead!” Yán Yuān 颜渊 said, “You are still alive; how can I dare to die?”

At the beginning of the original text of both passages, the same phrase is used: “zǐ wèi yú kuāng” 子畏於匡. A literal translation of this phrase would be “The Master got

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127 “大國畏其力, 小國懷其德,” Ibid.
128 See ibid., p. 1195.
130 “子畏於匡，曰：‘文王既没，文不在兹乎？天之将丧斯文也，後死者不得与於斯文也；天之未丧斯文也，匡人其如予何？’” Lunyu 9:5.
131 “子畏於匡，颜渊后。子曰：‘吾以女为死矣，’曰：‘子在，回何敢死？’” Lunyu 11:23.
frightened at Kuāng” and I chose to translate it a little more modestly, but many scholars seem to prefer to translate it as something like “The master was under siege.” They provide different reasons for their rendering of “wèi” this way, but what they equally seem to want to avoid by doing so is to attribute the emotion of fear to Kongzi in that situation. For as we have seen above, it is a recurring theme in Kongzi’s teaching that a virtuous person has no fear, or is supposed to feel fear only for appropriate objects.

For example, Waley thinks that wèi 畏 as fear or awe does not make sense here, and he suggests that it could be a mistake of “wéi” 圍, ‘to be surrounded.’ For cross-reference he points out a passage in the Zhuāngzǐ that describes the same anecdote in more detail, but “wèi” 圍 in that passage is used in a different syntax from that of the two Analects passages in question that contains the character “wèi” 畏. Consequently, it is unlikely that the transcribers of the Analects have confused these two characters even twice due to their similarity in pronunciation. However, Chén Qiyóu 陈奇猷 makes a different but even stronger proposal. There is a passage in the Huáinánzǐ that mentions this anecdote of Kongzi’s, and that passage starts with the phrase “kǒngzǐ wéi yú kuāng” 孔子圍於匡. The syntax of this phrase is exactly the same as the beginning of the two Analects passages in question, and citing this passage Chén Qiyóu suggests that “wèi” 畏 and “wéi” 圍 were interchangeable in the antiquity. I think that this is possible, but the case would be more convincing if there were more textual evidence of this kind.

On the other hand, Yáng Bójùn argues—following Yú Yuè 俞樾—that wèi 畏 here means the situation of being under siege. He quotes two phrases mentioning Kongzi’s predicament in Kuāng, one from the Xúnzǐ 荀子 and the other from the Shìjì 史記. The former one is “kǒngzǐ jū kuāng” 孔子拘匡 (“Kongzi was arrested in Kuāng”), and the latter is “jū yān wūrì” 拘焉五日 (“[Kongzi] was arrested there for five days”). According to Yáng Bójùn, the use of “wèi” 畏 in the sense of “jū” 拘 (“to be arrested”) is

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134 This passage is in the “Autumn water” chapter of the Zhuāngzǐ, and it starts with the following phrase: “kǒngzǐ yǒu yú kuāng, sòngrén wéi zhī shù zā” 孔子遊於匡, 宋人圍之數坐. Zhuāngzǐ, “Qiūshuǐ” 秋水. Guō Qìngfān 郭慶藩, Zhuāngzǐ jīshì, p. 595.

the same as the way “畏” is used in the *Li ji* as one of the three situations for untimely death. That is, if one dies in a 畏 situation, people are not supposed to go to his funeral and express condolences for him, because he died when he was not supposed to die. Concerning the question of what is the distinctive characteristics of a 畏 situation, Zhèng Xuán (127–200) suggests that 畏 is a situation where A attacks B because A has mistakenly judged that B is guilty of some harm done to A, and B dies without being given a chance to prove his innocence. On the other hand, Sūn Xīdàn suggests that 畏 is a situation where somebody is severely threatened and eventually commits suicide out of fear and terror. These traditional commentators’ explanations of the 畏 situation in the *Li ji* seem to be based on their speculations on the story of Kongzi’s predicament in Kuāng, but they seem to support to some extent Yáng Bójún’s view that “畏” in the two *Analects* passages mean the situation of being under siege.

However, as I said earlier, many previous scholars’ interpretations of “畏” in the two *Analects* passages as either “being surrounded” or “being under siege” seem to be driven by their assumption that Kongzi, as a sage, should feel no fear at all. This assumption is well illustrated in Xíng Bǐng’s gloss on “畏” in *Lunyu* 9:5:

*The author described it [i.e. the event in Kuāng] from the ordinary people’s perspective, and that is why he wrote “The Master was frightened in Kuāng.” However, Kongzi actually had nothing to fear. The reason that he said “[Since] King Wén has already died, isn’t the Culture here with me?” was because his disciples were frightened; he wanted to address it [and assure them that there was nothing to fear].*

However, it is at least two centuries after Kongzi’s death that he started to be depicted as a sage, and the Kongzi that we meet in the *Analects* is a well-cultivated, but a very live, human being with full emotions. For example, we have seen above that when Yán Yuān

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137 Sūn Xīdàn, *Li ji ji ji xué*, p. 182.
138 Ibid.
顏淵—the most advanced disciple of Kongzi’s—joined Kongzi after being left behind in the turmoil at Kuāng, Kongzi exclaimed in tears that “I thought you had died!” In addition, when Yán Yuān later died young of a disease, Kongzi cried, “Alas! Heaven is ruining me! Heaven is ruining me!”

According to the authors of the Analects, Kongzi wailed for Yán Yuān so excessively (tòng 憂) that one of his followers at the funeral brought this point to his attention. But what Kongzi said was: “Have I? But if not excessive for him, for whom?”

We do not really know what Kongzi’s emotional state was when he was surrounded by the Kuāng people. Perhaps he was frightened, or perhaps not, or more significantly, both. On one hand, it is natural for humans to feel fear when they are threatened to be killed, and as we have seen above when discussing jù 懼, Kongzi does not think that humans should get rid of such natural fears. On the other hand, though, Kongzi’s remark that Kuāng people would be no harm to him because he is the transmitter of the Zhōu 周 culture that Heaven approves clearly shows Kongzi’s thinking that the fearful situation at Kuāng is not something to be afraid of. In this light, what is important in interpreting these two Analects passages is not determining whether to ascribe natural fear to Kongzi or not, but focusing on the fact that Kongzi dismisses his fear in Kuāng which would be very natural and even indispensable for the flourishing human life in many other situations. Some of the questions to be asked, then, will be 1) when one should judge one’s natural, therefore often appropriate, emotions to be inappropriate; 2) whether fear disappears instantly in one’s mind when dismissed as inappropriate; and 3) what should be done or could be done if it does not disappear immediately. These questions concern the general issues of emotions and moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral cultivation, and I discuss them in the following chapters.

If wèi 畏 discussed so far is a natural emotion of fear that everyone would feel in certain situations, the Analects is remarkable in presenting an emotion of quite distinct nature also by the same name. I would like to render it as “awe” because I think it is a kind of fear, but the feeling also seems to have some relations with respect. The first characteristic of this emotion is that it is a kind of fear which is not caused by any direct

threat to the existence of the person who feels it. For example, in *Lunyu* 20:2 Kongzi explains to his disciple Zīzhāng 子張 the nobleman's qualifications for participating in the government, and Kongzi includes dignity without fierceness (*wēi ér bù měng* 威而不猛) as one of the five beautiful virtues (*wǔměi* 五美) required for the nobleman. And at Zīzhāng's request for further explanation, Kongzi says the following:

*The nobleman straightens his robe and hat and maintains his gaze solemn, so that those who see his dignified [bearing] from afar will be afraid of him. Is this not being dignified but not fierce?*142

Previously we have seen that “*wèi*”畏 and “*wēi*”威 are usually defined in terms of each other, and we have also seen that a typical example of things that capture people in awe or fear (*wèi 畏*) in ancient China was King Wén’s military power. In other words, the crucial element of awesomeness (*wēi 威*) that made people fear King Wén was the fierceness (*měng 猛*) of his military power, and this relationship between fierceness and fear or awe is well illustrated in the following passage from the *Zūozhuàn*:

*Zīchān 子產 of the Zhèng dukedom was sick, and he said to Zīdàshū 子大叔, “If I die, you will be certainly in charge of the government. Only the man of virtue can control the commoners with mercy; for the second class [of rulers], the best [policy] is fierceness. In general, fire is blazing and the commoners rarely die from it because they see the fire afar and fear it; [on the other hand,] water looks weak and the commoners look down upon it, make sport of it, and consequently many of them die from it. This is the reason why mercy is difficult.”...Zhòngní 仲尼 [i.e. Kongzi] commented, “Good! If the government gets lenient, the commoners become haughty; [if they become] haughty, [the ruler needs to] tie them up with fierceness. If fierce, the commoners get harassed; when [they are] harassed, [the ruler should] give them bounties generously. Modulate one’s fierceness with mercy, and modulate one’s mercy with fierceness; it is through this way that government becomes balanced.”*143

According to this passage, the ruler’s awesomeness (*wēi 威*) comes from his fierceness

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142 “君子正其衣冠，尊其瞻視，儼然人望而畏之，斯不亦威而不猛乎?” *Lunyu* 20:2.

(měng 猛), and his fierceness is what makes people fearful and obedient. Perhaps this was the dominant view of the ruler’s awesomeness (wēi 威) and the subjects’ corresponding awe (wèi 畏) in ancient China. Interestingly, the author of this Zūozhuàn passage makes Kongzi concur to this view of the proper way of governing the commoners, but we have already seen in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.2.3) that Kongzi never recommends a forceful means such as killing for regulating the commoners. Moreover, the view that the awesomeness (wēi 威) of the socio-political authorities comes from the fierce exercising of their military power does not agree with Kongzi’s view of awesomeness just presented in Lunyu 20:2: According to Kongzi, the nobleman’s awesomeness comes from his dignified manners, but such manners are not coercive because they do not pose direct, forceful threat to other people.

The second characteristic of this wèi 畏 feeling is that this emotion is available only to those who have a properly cultivated sense of reverence. It seems to be a kind of moral or religious awe, and Kongzi suggests three typical objects of it:

**The nobleman fears three things: he fears the mandate of Heaven, fears persons in authority, and fears the words of the sages. The petty man is ignorant of the mandate of Heaven and therefore does not fear it, looks down upon those in authority, and insults the words of the sages.**

Heaven (tiān 天) was originally the name of the highest god of the Zhōu 周 tribe, but when the Zhōu people conquered the Shāng 商 dynasty, it came to be equated with Shàngdì 上帝, the highest god in the Shāng 商 pantheon. According to the founding fathers of the Zhōu 周 dynasty, Heaven or Shàngdì gives its mandate—the authorization to rule the world—only to the virtuous rulers, and this explains why the Shāng 商 dynasty that got degenerate during its last period was overthrown by the Zhōu 周 dynasty. Since then Heaven had long been considered as the utmost patron of the virtuous government, and the rulers who wanted to protect their royal lineage were supposed to be afraid of

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Heaven’s will.  

By Kongzi’s time, the mandate of Heaven started to be understood also at the level of an individual, and the mandate of Heaven understood at this level referred to the nobleman’s life-long task of moral self-cultivation and his effort to revive the ideal moral-political order embodied in the high culture of the Zhōu 周 dynasty. According to this picture of the ideal society, the nobility should govern the commoners with virtue and rituals rather than edicts and punishments, and the commoners are supposed to follow their superiors out of sincere respect rather than from the fear of punishment. However, according to Kongzi’s diagnosis, the petty men (xiǎorén 小人) of his time were so much obsessed with making profit that they did not know to fear Heaven while acting against Heaven’s will, and did not know to appreciate the dignity of their superiors and respond properly.

The contrast between the nobleman’s and the petty man’s attitudes toward Heaven and their social superiors is well illustrated in the following exchange between Kongzi and Wángsūn Jiǎ 王孫賈, a powerful minister of the Wèi 衛 dukedom:

Wángsūn Jiǎ asked, “Better to be obsequious to the kitchen stove than to the south-west corner of the house. What do you think of this saying?” The Master said, “The saying has got it wrong. When you have offended against Heaven, there is nowhere to pray [for the atonement of your crime].”

According to Yáng Bójùn, the ancient Chinese believed that the kitchen stove and the south-west corner of the house had their own gods residing inside, and people in ancient China made a periodical sacrifice to these gods. And according to Zhū Xī’s interpretation, the god of the south-west corner of the house referred to the duke of Wèi, and the god in the kitchen stove to Wángsūn Jiǎ, who was overpowering the duke and was really in charge of the government at the time. By quoting the popular saying in the Wèi representing the power-relationship between the duke of Wèi and Wángsūn Jiǎ

145 For example, one finds in the Shìjīng 詩經 the following phrase: “畏天之威, 于時保之.” For an insightful explication of the pre-Confucian notions of Heaven and the mandate of Heaven, see Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, pp. 46–55.
146 Cf. Lunyu 2:3.
148 Yáng Bójùn, Lún yü jìzhù 論語集註, p. 28.
149 Zhū Xī 朱熹, Lún yü jìzhù 論語集註, in Yasui Kō, Rongo shūsetsu 卷, p. 41.
himself, Wángsūn Jiǎ was implicitly telling Kongzi that if he had wanted to get an office in Wèi, he needed to get together with Wángsūn Jiǎ rather than going to the duke. This is exactly what Kongzi condemned as “looking down upon those in authority” (xiá dàrén 狎大人), and it is a source of great social disorder that Heaven would condemn too. So Kongzi extended the metaphor and warned him that Heaven would not forgive such a presumption.

In contrast, the nobleman does not only deeply understand Heaven’s mandate for himself, but can also appreciate other people’s moral merit and respond with appropriate feelings. For example, he feels wonder at a young man of great promise, and feels sublime when encountering a sage. Kongzi says:

_The young generation is wonderful! How do we know that they won’t be as good as us? But if they don’t distinguish themselves until the age of forty or fifty, they don’t deserve our awe._

While Kongzi feels wonder at his young disciples, his virtue hits sublime even his most advanced disciple. Yán Yuān 颜渊 says the following with a sigh:

_It gets higher as I look up at it, it gets harder as I bore into it. I see it before me, but suddenly it is behind me. The Master leads one well step by step; he broadens me with culture, restrains me with rites; I cannot give up even if I wanted to. [However] having already used up my resources, [I see him] as if standing magnificently. Although I want to follow him, I can’t find a way to._

Kongzi’s erudition, discipline, and pedagogical skills inherently attract good students like Yán Yuān to the study of his teachings, but Kongzi’s grandeur also raises a kind of “imaginative vertigo” in the student’s mind. As Yán Yuān describes, the student makes great efforts to improve oneself by emulating Kongzi and reflecting on his teachings, but as one goes deeper and deeper in study, Kongzi’s unfathomable greatness gets more and

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151 “仰之彌高, 鑽之彌堅. 瞻之在前, 忽焉在後. 夫子循循然善誘人; 博我以文, 約我以禮; 欲罷不能. 旣竭吾才, 如有所立卓爾. 雖欲從之, 末由也已.” _Lunyu_ 9:11.

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more clear. In front of Kongzi, the student feels as if looking up at a soaring mountain without finding a pathway to get to its peak. As Kant describes the experience of the sublime, experience of this kind “raise[s] the soul’s fortitude above its usual middle range,”153 and makes the student feel great awe and respect for the moral qualities of his teacher. Moreover, this feeling of awe and respect can be among the greatest motivations for the student to continue on the path of moral self-cultivation, believing that he can be a match for his virtuous teacher someday.

In short, unlike the first kind of wèi 畏 feeling which is felt at things that directly threaten one’s existence, the second kind of wèi 畏 discussed so far includes such feelings as religious awe for Heaven as the utmost supporter of morality and moral awe or respect for the virtues of a well-cultivated nobleman. We have seen that a point distinguishing the second kind of wèi 畏 from the first kind is that it is not a natural emotion shared by everyone, but a special kind of emotion that is available only to those having a properly cultivated sensibility. In this light, we have to say that as in the case of certain kinds of jù 懼 and kǒng 恐, Kongzi also recommends the second type of wèi 畏 as an important constituent of the nobleman’s character. Consequently, we also have to say that Kongzi’s famous dictum that “the nobleman has no worry or fear” actually applies to a narrower domain of cases than it appears to. That domain covers only the situations where one’s natural feeling of fear or apprehension becomes ethically inappropriate. Once in such a situation, the nobleman judges his natural fear to be ethically wrong and tries to dismiss it, and his feeling of the other kind of fear provides the necessary criteria and motivation for his doing so. That is, paradoxically, the courage Kongzi shows in Kuāng comes from his fear of Heaven: Kongzi’s fear of Heaven, based on his understanding of Heaven’s mandate for him, tells him that he has been a faithful practitioner of Heaven’s will, and that as long as he remains faithful to Heaven’s moral project, there is nothing to fear.

Chapter Four

Qíng 情, Hàowù 好惡, and Sìduān 四端 in Mengzi

4.1 Qíng 情 in the Mengzi

In Chapter 2 above (Section 2.1), I have argued that in addition to 1) ‘facts’ of a situation and 2) ‘characteristic features’ of a certain category of things, “qíng” in early Chinese texts also sometimes refers to 3) what is sitting deeply in an individual’s mind in the forms of sincere opinions, goals or aspirations, desires for certain objects, emotional or affective reactions toward a certain object, evaluative judgments, or certain characteristic behavioral patterns. I have also argued that the qíng conceived this way are not the features commonly found in the species of human beings in general but the features uniquely belonging to an individual human being, and consequently qíng in this third sense seems roughly equivalent to the concept of character that distinguishes its possessor from others.

Besides making these points, I have also argued that this sense of qíng as referring to various “psychological items” can be ascribed to one of the two usages of “qíng” in the Analects (Lunyu 13:4), and that this sense of qíng is semantically commensurable with the other two senses of qíng as referring to ‘facts’ about a situation or ‘characteristic features’ of a certain category of things. Moreover, I have also showed that there exists a strong connection between these earlier senses of qíng and its later use as referring to prima facie emotions such as hào 好 (“liking”), wù 惡 (“disliking”), xǐ 喜 (“joy”), nù 怒 (“anger”), āi 哀 (“sorrow”), and lè 樂 (“pleasure”), and I argued that these earlier and later senses of qíng are held together by the concept of hàowù 好惡, which I
proposed to interpret as a broad conception of emotions or some sort of attitudes that are expressed as particular emotions depending on what kind of object one encounters.

The character “qing” 情 is used four times in the Mengzi, and Mengzi’s usage of the term is quite consistent with the way “qing” is used in other early Chinese texts, which I just summarized. First, take a look at the following two passages:

*It is an essential characteristic of things that they are unequal. Some are twice or five times, some ten or a hundred times, some a thousand or a myriad times [as valuable as other things].*¹

*The nobleman feels shameful when his reputation goes beyond the reality.*²

The first remark is what Mengzi said to Chén Xiāng 陳相, who advocated an economic policy that things of the equal amount (e.g. rice and barley), of the equal length (e.g. cotton and silk), of the equal size (e.g. roughly and finely made shoes), and so forth should be priced equally. The motivation for this policy is to prevent fraud in the market place, but Mengzi points out that natural inequality is one of the characteristic features of things, and that pricing things of different value equally will cause great confusion in commerce and make people lose the motivation for making good things. While the “qing” in the first passage refers to ‘characteristic features’ of a certain category of things, the same term in the second passage seems to refer to ‘facts’ or ‘reality’ about a certain thing or a situation, because Mengzi says that the nobleman feels shameful when his reputation is exaggerated beyond what is real (qing 情), viz. his true character. It is significant and interesting in this second passage that “qing” refers to both reality and a person’s character at the same time; it seems to corroborate my previous argument about “qing” that the sense of “qing” as referring to various “psychological items” that constitute a person’s character is connected with the sense of the term as referring to ‘reality’ about a situation or ‘characteristic features’ of a certain category of things.

However, Mengzi does not just remain with these earlier senses of qing. As I have argued in Chapter 2, an instance of “qing” in the Analects can be interpreted to refer to

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² “聲聞過情, 君子恥之.” *Mengzi* 4B:18.
certain “psychological items” that constitute a person’s character, and I have showed in Section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2 that emotions make an important constituent of a person’s character in Kongzi’s ethical thought. Now, in the following passage, we see Mengzi going one step further and using the word “qíng” to designate his famous “four sprouts” (sìduān 四端) or four types of moral emotions explicitly. The passage is very long, but let me quote it in its entirety:

Gōngdūzǐ 公都子 [a disciple of Mengzi’s] said, “Gàozǐ 告子 [a theoretical rival of Mengzi’s] says, ‘Human nature is neither good nor bad.’ Some say, ‘Human nature can become good, and can become bad. Therefore, when the sage kings Wén 文 and Wǔ 武 arose, their people were fond of goodness; when the bad kings Yōu 幽 and Lì 厭 arose, their people were fond of atrocity.’ Others say, ‘Some people are good by nature, and some are bad by nature. Therefore, with Yáo 堯 as ruler, there was a wicked vassal Xiàng 象; with the Blind Man as father, there was an extremely filial son Shùn 舜; and with Zhòu 玺 as nephew, and also as ruler, there were righteous uncle-cum-vassals Viscount Qǐ 啓 of Wēi 微 and Prince Bǐgān 比干.’ Now you say that human nature is good. Then are those others all wrong?”

Mengzi said, “If one follows one’s qíng, one can do what is good; hence the dictum that human nature is good. As for doing what is not good, it is not the fault of one’s natural endowment. The feeling of compassion, everyone has it; the feeling of shame and disgust, everyone has it; the feeling of respect, everyone has it; the feeling of approval and disapproval, everyone has it. The feeling of compassion is humaneness, the feeling of shame and disgust is righteousness, the feeling of respect is propriety, and the feeling of approval and disapproval is wisdom. Humaneness, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are not welded to us from the outside, we originally have them. It is just that people do not really pay attention to them. Hence it is said, ‘Seek and you will get it, abandon and you will lose it.’ Those who do not see that others become twice or five times [as worthy as themselves] are those who cannot exhaust their natural endowment. The Poetry says, ‘Heaven gave birth to the numerous people, and there is a principle to go by in each case. People have grasped this unchanging principle, and this is why they like this beautiful virtue.’ Kongzi said, ‘The person who wrote this poem, perhaps he understood the Way!’ So, if there is a thing, there definitely is a principle. It is because those people have grasped the unchanging principle that they liked beautiful virtue.”3

What we are interested in for now in this rich passage is that the character “qing” in Mengzi’s remark clearly refers to the four types of moral emotions, namely the feeling of compassion (cèyǐn zhī xīn 惴隱之心), the feeling of shame and disgust (xiūwù zhī xīn 羞惡之心), the feeling of respect (gōngjìng zhī xīn 恭敬之心), and the feeling of approval and disapproval (shìfēi zhī xīn 是非之心). According to Mengzi, it is by following the guidance of these four ethical emotions that one can do what is good and become good. Human beings are equally endowed with these emotions by nature, but some people are not even aware of having this good endowment (cái 才), whereas some people become good by carrying it through to the utmost degree (jìn 竭). In the following passage, which is also quite long, Mengzi says that this good natural endowment is what distinguishes humans from the other animals:

The trees of Ox Mountain were once beautiful, but being at the suburb of a great city, hatchets and axes cut them down. Could it remain beautiful? [Due to] the rest it got during the day or night and the moistening of rain and dew, it is not that there are no sprouts or shoots growing there. But oxen and sheep time and again come and graze on them, so that it is barren like that. People see its being barren, and think that there had never been any timber, but how could this be the nature of the mountain? [It is also the case] even for what resides in humans; how could there be no heart of humaneness and righteousness? [However,] the way that people discard their good heart is like hatchets and axes to the trees; with its trees being cut down day by day, could it remain beautiful? Thanks to the rest they get during the day or night and the qi of the calm morning, people have a modicum of liking and disliking that are close to [those of] others. But what they do during the day fetters and destroys those [feelings]. If the fettering is repeated, then their nocturnal qi is insufficient to preserve [those feelings]. If their nocturnal qi is insufficient to preserve, then they become not far from birds and beasts. People see their being [like] birds and beasts, and think that the natural endowment has never been in their mind, but how could this be the characteristic feature of human beings? So, with the right nourishment, there is nothing that would not grow; without the right nourishment, there is nothing that would not diminish. Kongzi said, “Grasp then preserved, abandon

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a lot to Bryan W. Van Norden’s translation, but mine digresses from his over several important interpretive issues. For example, I interpret the first “ruò” 若 in Mengzi’s remark as “to follow,” whereas Van Norden interprets it as part of the compound “nàiruò” 乃若, which is sometimes used in the Mengzi to introduce a subject matter and thus can be rendered as “as for.” I also interpret both instances of “wéishàn” 善 in Mengzi’s remark as “doing what is good,” as opposed to Van Norden’s “becoming good.” There is no conclusive evidence favoring one interpretation over the other, but I prefer my interpretation because it supports the philosophical view of emotions that I want to attribute to Mengzi later. For a detailed discussion of a number of interpretive issues in this passage, see Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, pp. 212–222. For Van Norden’s translation of the passage, see Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, ed., Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (New York, NY: Seven Bridges Press, 2001), pp. 143–144.
then lost. It comes and goes at no fixed time, nobody knows its home.” Wasn’t he talking about the mind?\(^4\)

In this passage, Mengzi says that the characteristic feature (qíng 情) of human beings is to have proper affective attitudes of liking and disliking (hàowù 好惡) in various situations of everyday life. Mengzi seems to equate these attitudes with the heart of humaneness and righteousness (rén yì 仁義之心), which is apparently a generic term referring to the first two of the four moral emotions suggested in the previous passage, and he says that these feelings grow naturally in the human mind just as the sprouts and shoots grow naturally in the mountains. It is not immediately clear how one’s affective attitudes of liking and disliking can be equated with one’s particular feelings such as compassion, shame, or disgust, and we do not know yet what Mengzi means exactly by his statement that these attitudes or feelings grow naturally in one’s mind. However, the point that I would like to make here by combining this and the previous passage about the usage of “qíng 情” in the *Mengzi* is the following: First, “qíng 情” in Mengzi sometimes explicitly refers to the aforementioned four moral emotions or the proper affective attitudes of liking and disliking, and in this sense Mengzi’s use of the term anticipates the more frequent and explicit reference of the term to typical emotions like joy, anger, sorrow, and fear in later texts such as the *Xúnzǐ* and the *Lǐjì*. Second, while referring to moral emotions or proper affective attitudes, “qíng 情” in the *Mengzi* still retains its earlier sense of ‘characteristic features of a certain category of things,’ and consequently makes one’s moral emotions or proper affective attitudes the unique feature of the human beings.

Now, if “qíng 情” in Mengzi refers to moral emotions such as the four sprouts or one’s proper affective attitudes of hàowù 好惡 as the crucial characteristic of human beings, what is the relationship between the four sprouts and the attitudes of hàowù in Mengzi’s

ethical thought? Are they merely two different labels referring to the same category of things, or is there any important difference between them? In the next section, I turn to this question and try to make it clear why this question is important in understanding Mengzi’s moral psychology and his ethical thought correctly.

4.2 Hàowù 好惡 and Sìduān 四端: A Problematic Relationship

We have seen in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.2) above that what distinguishes the character of the nobleman (jūnzǐ 君子) from that of the petty person (xiǎorén 小人) in the Analects is primarily their distinctive affective responses of liking and disliking or long-term desire and aversion for different kinds of things. That is, whereas the nobleman likes virtue and hates pursuing profits by immoral means, the petty person is keen to promote his personal interests and ready to violate social norms to avoid living in poverty and distress. We have also seen that the nobleman’s affective attitudes of hàowù 好惡 are deeply intertwined with his evaluative judgments, and that as long as he stays away from the passionate effects of his own desires and aversions, the nobleman’s emotional attitudes of hàowù can be said to embody the correct standard of liking and disliking things for human beings in general.

This view of hàowù in the Analects as embodying one’s evaluative judgment of things and thus revealing one’s character is also conspicuous in Mengzi. For example, Mengzi 1B:1 records the conversation between King Xuān 宣 of the Qí 齊 dukedom and Mengzi about liking music (hào yuè 好樂), and it starts as follows: One day Zhuāng Bào 莊暴, a vassal of King Xuān’s, visits Mengzi to ask about liking music. He tells Mengzi that he was at a loss in a previous meeting with King Xuān, where the king wanted to discuss liking music. Mengzi comments that if the king likes music so much, then he will govern his country well (i.e., govern the country according to the spirit of the good music composed by the ancient sage kings), and a few days later he has an audience with King Xuān. However, when Mengzi brings this topic on, the king blushes and confesses that the music he likes is not that of the ancient sage kings but merely the
vulgar music of the world.\(^5\) The king's embarrassment here shows an interesting point: King Xuān likes the vulgar music, and to that extent he is a petty man valuing the satisfaction of his sensual desires. However, he also expresses his evaluative belief that being fond of such music is shameful by blushing, and in that sense he has some element of the nobleman’s character.

What is new about Mengzi’s view of hàowù, though, is that whereas Kongzi regards the nobleman’s correct hàowù to be primarily the result of his life-long moral self-cultivation, Mengzi believes that the correct affective attitudes of liking and disliking are not unique to the cultivated noblemen but inherent in every human being by nature. According to Mengzi, as we have seen in Mengzi 6A:8 above (footnote 4), what distinguishes humans from lower animals is the modicum (jīxī 几希) of proper affective attitudes of hàowù shared by everyone, and humans should nourish this natural affective endowment properly in order to become creatures of full moral integrity and remain such. However, what I am particularly interested in exploring in this chapter is not what Mengzi’s metaphysical claim that human beings have inherent moral traits by nature means; I am interested in clarifying what is the relationship between one’s proper affective attitudes of hàowù 好惡 and her “four moral sprouts,” no matter what their origin.

As we have noticed in Mengzi 6A:8 above, after comparing the heart of humaneness and righteousness (rén yì zhī xīn 仁義之心)—i.e. the feeling of compassion and the feeling of shame and disgust—to the naturally growing shoots and sprouts of Ox Mountain, Mengzi says that humans can remain human only by nurturing their proper affective attitudes of hàowù 好惡. As I have pointed out in the previous section, Mengzi here seems to think that one’s proper affective attitudes of liking and disliking and one’s moral emotions such as compassion and the feeling of shame and disgust equally grow naturally in the human mind, and are equally to be nourished. However, does this also mean that the formation of a good character by nurturing one’s proper attitudes of hàowù is the same process as nurturing one’s four sprouts? In other words, does Mengzi think that one’s proper affective attitudes of hàowù are equivalent to her four moral sprouts?

\(^5\) “莊暴見孟子，曰：‘暴見於王，王語暴以好樂，暴未有以對也。’ 曰：‘好樂何如?’ 孟子曰：‘王之好樂甚，則齊國其庶幾乎!’ 他日見於王曰：‘王嘗語莊子以好樂，有諸?’ 王變乎色，曰：‘寡人非能好先王之樂也，直好世俗之樂耳。’” Mengzi 1B:1.
This is a highly important question for understanding Mengzi’s view of moral emotions and his theory of moral psychology correctly, but unfortunately many scholars in Chinese philosophy did not give the right answer to this question, and this in turn led them to propose either incomplete or mistaken interpretations of Mengzi’s theory of emotions and moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral cultivation. As I will present in the next section in more detail, previous scholars seem to regard the four sprouts as similar to hàowù; they interpret Mengzi’s four sprouts as some sort of desires or behavioral tendencies, and equivocate on how one’s hàowù and the four sprouts are related in Mengzi’s thought exactly. However, we have seen in Chapter 2 that one’s hàowù (liking and disliking or desire and aversion) are distinct from other particular emotions such as joy, sorrow, anger, and fear in two ways: First, hàowù can be considered as emotions in a broad sense or as “attitudes” in Rawls’s terms, from which particular types of emotions arise in various situations. For example, one feels joyful when one gets what one wants, feels angry when one’s desire is frustrated, or can sometimes feel fear that one might not get what one wants, and so forth. Second, hàowù as occurrent feelings of liking and disliking for diverse objects can be considered as one’s emotional response to those objects at the most generic level, from which we could further identify a range of particular emotions by specifying the conditions and evaluative beliefs involved in the occurrence of these emotions. If this view of the relationship between one’s hàowù and particular emotions had been inherited to Mengzi and further developed into a more or less self-contained theory of moral emotions, it is an important task to bring this theory to light as clear as possible.

In order to accomplish this task successfully, we first need to know what Mengzi’s four sprouts really are. Specifically, I devote the next section to analyzing the first three of Mengzi’s four sprouts, and propose a partial picture of the relationship between hàowù 好惡 and siduān 四端 in my discussion of xiūwù zhī xīn 賢惡之心 or the feeling of shame and disgust in Mengzi.

4.3 The Four Sprouts
Previous scholarship on Mengzi has much focused on clarifying what his conception of human nature is, especially what his thesis that human nature is good (xing shan 性善) means in comparison to the other competing theses on human nature in ancient China.\(^6\)

As we have seen in Mengzi 6A:6 above, Mengzi’s argument against these alternative theses is based on his view of the four sprouts or the four types of feelings or emotions (xin 心), namely that they are inherent in every human being, and humans can do what is morally good by following their guidance. For this reason, Mengzi’s four sprouts have been an indispensable topic in the previous scholarship on Mengzi’s arguments about human nature, and the question of how one could cultivate these sprouts into four cardinal virtues has also been widely discussed. At the same time, though, it is also true that given the central place of the four sprouts in Mengzi’s theory of human nature and moral self-cultivation, Mengzi’s concept of four sprouts has not been given as thorough and consistent a treatment as it deserves.

Specifically, the previous scholarship on Mengzi’s four sprouts is not fully satisfactory at least in two aspects. First, previous scholars seem to assume that Mengzi’s four sprouts are more or less homogeneous in nature. Their discussion is often focused on Mengzi’s first sprout, ceyin zhi xin 傷隱之心, thus failing to do justice to the special character of the second sprout, xiuwu zhi xin 羞惡之心, or the fourth sprout, shifei zhi xin 是非之心.\(^7\) Second, the four sprouts are often viewed as some sort of desires for or instinctive inclinations toward virtues or virtuous acts. This view is not only incompatible with the recently proposed more sound views (e.g. Wong 1991) that regard Mengzi’s four sprouts as a particular type of emotions or feelings having some “cognitive” or “rational” aspects, but it also somehow influences these latter views so that they fail to reach what I think to be the correct picture of moral cultivation of emotions in Mengzi’s thought.

Angus C. Graham’s account of the four sprouts well represents this “inclinational view” of the four sprouts. In his seminal paper on the philosophical development of the

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\(^6\) For a paradigmatic work on this topic in English, see Graham, “The Background of the Mencian [Mengzian] Theory of Human Nature.”

\(^7\) An important exception is Donald J. Munro. He says that whereas the first and the third sprout (“commiseration” and “respect” in his terms) are behavioral tendencies, the other two sprouts (“shame and dislike” and the “sense of right and wrong”) denote covert evaluative activities of the mind. See Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China, pp. 74–75. I elaborate and modify this insight of Munro’s in later sections of this chapter.
Mengzian theory of human nature in ancient China, Graham interprets “sìduān 四端” as “incipient moral impulses”⁸ to do what is morally good or right, or “spontaneous inclinations”⁹ toward virtues or moral good. According to Graham, such inclinations to moral good are “desires”¹⁰ that we come to prefer to all other desires as we approach moral maturity, and the “moral energy”¹¹ in those inclinations which inspires us to do good grows naturally as we do right acts while taking pleasure in those actions. In other words, the four sprouts in Mengzi as interpreted by Graham are basically one’s natural inclinations or even long-term desires for humaneness, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom. Such desires or inclinations for these four cardinal virtues urge one to do humane, right, ritually appropriate, or wise acts, and the strength of the moral power that enables one to do virtuous acts is proportionate to the degree of one’s “craving” for virtues. Moreover, there exists a certain kind of feedback system between one’s moral inclinations and her virtuous acts: One’s virtuous acts nurture their corresponding moral inclinations by satisfying the moral appetites of those inclinations, and as one’s moral inclinations grow bigger and bigger through the accumulation of virtuous acts, they provide stronger and stronger motivations for virtuous acts.

Although quite plausible, Graham’s account of the four sprouts remains equivocal by its loose use of such concepts as desire, inclination, or impulse for describing the four sprouts, and it is important to note that this view of the four sprouts as desires or inclinations for virtues or virtuous acts is largely shared by many scholars in the history of Chinese philosophy in varying degrees and manners. For example, while Donald J. Munro considers Mengzi’s first and third sprout—“commiseration” and “respect” in his terms—to denote behavioral tendencies, saying that “commiseration and respect both emerge in behavioral forms”,¹² Chad Hansen proposes a more radical claim that all of the four sprouts are innate, morally discriminatory inclinations or dispositions to certain actions.¹³ On the other hand, while correctly regarding the four sprouts as “moral feelings” that collectively constitute one’s “innate moral sense,” Philip J. Ivanhoe also

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⁹ Ibid., p. 19.
¹⁰ Ibid., p. 23.
¹¹ Ibid., p. 22.
¹² Munro, *The Concept of Man in Early China*, p. 75.
regards the four sprouts as one’s “nascent moral tendencies” manifesting themselves as “spontaneous reactive attitudes and actions.”\(^\text{14}\) In addition, while referring to the four sprouts as “moral senses” and “feelings,” Bryan Van Norden also uses “moral impulses” and “dispositions” for the four sprouts,\(^\text{15}\) and Kwong-loi Shun renders the four sprouts as “ethical predispositions” that enable human beings to be ethical and point in the direction of the ethical ideal.\(^\text{16}\)

Of course, given the great difference between ancient China and the modern West in terms of culture, language, history, geography, and time, there should be some “slippage” between the aforementioned psychological concepts and Mengzi’s four sprouts. In addition, it is also understood that the previously mentioned scholars and others were dealing with their own important agenda in interpreting Mengzi, and using such terms as “impulse,” “inclination,” “disposition,” “tendency,” or “desire” the way they used them might have been sufficient for their purposes. Nevertheless, interpreting Mengzi or any other ancient Chinese thinkers in a Western language is not an “all or nothing” task; while using the same set of concepts in contemporary moral psychology, we could get a clearer view of Mengzi’s four sprouts by using these concepts in a more systematic way, and we can test such a way of using these concepts against the relevant textual evidence from the *Mengzi* to some extent. Moreover, considering the great importance of the four sprouts in Mengzi’s theory of moral agency and moral cultivation, understanding Mengzi’s view of the four sprouts more clearly will also enable us to have a better understanding of Mengzi’s ethical thought in general.

In the following, I provide a new account of Mengzi’s four sprouts, especially of the first three in this section in the order of *cèyín zhī xīn* (“compassion”), *gōngjīng zhī xīn* (“respect”), and *xiūwù zhī xīn* (“shame and disgust”). A general thesis that I defend throughout this section is that moral emotions like compassion or respect in Mengzi are basically construals of certain situations in the light of particular concerns. Specifically, in Section 4.3.1 I argue that *cèyín zhī xīn* is primarily construing another being’s


misfortune with sympathetic concern, and show that cèyǐn zhī xīn is neither to be identified with certain physiological reactions one might have when observing another being’s misery nor with one’s feeling of empathy at the suffering of others. After making these points I introduce Robert Roberts’s view of emotions as concern-based construals with the appearance of truth (Section 4.3.1.2), and explain in Section 4.3.2 how Roberts’s view of emotions as concern-based construals works well for interpreting Mengzi’s conception of respect. Besides doing so, I also critically examine David Nivison’s view of respect as a desire for respectful action and Donald Munro’s view of respect as a behavioral tendency to act respectfully, and show that respect in Mengzi is a distinct psychological entity from both desire and behavioral disposition. And finally in Section 4.3.3, I discuss two aspects of xiūwù zhī xīn. I argue that xiūwù zhī xīn is the mixture of two distinct emotional components of shame and dislike, and try to show that 1) the shame element of xiūwù zhī xīn can be interpreted as a construal of the relevant situation as disgraceful, whereas 2) the dislike (wù 惡) element responds more broadly to what one finds to be ethically undesirable or unacceptable. I hope that my discussion of wù 惡 in xiūwù zhī xīn will also illuminate the hierarchical relationship between hàowù and other particular moral emotions in Mengzi.

4.3.1 Cèyǐn zhī xīn 傷隱之心 and the Construal View of Emotion

4.3.1.1 Cèyǐn zhī xīn 傷隱之心

In this section, I analyze Mengzi’s conception of cèyǐn zhī xīn 傷隱之心. The term “cèyǐn zhī xīn” is used five times throughout the Mengzi,¹⁷ and it is the most standard term that Mengzi uses to refer to his first moral sprout. It is often translated as the “feeling of compassion” or simply “compassion” (or “sympathy” or “commiseration” to the same effect), but we should remain careful about the important discrepancy in denotation between cèyǐn zhī xīn and compassion (or sympathy or commiseration). An important difference between cèyǐn zhī xīn and compassion is that although both refer to

¹⁷ Three times in Mengzi 2A:6 and two times in Mengzi 6A:6.
the painful feelings that one feels at the misfortune of others, cèyǐn zhī xīn can also denote one’s familial affection toward one’s family members, especially the filial affection a child has towards her parents. Mengzi declares that “cèyǐn zhī xīn is the sprout of the virtue of rěn 仁”18—or even that “cèyǐn zhī xīn is the virtue of rěn 仁,”19 and rěn 仁 in Mengzi sometimes denotes one’s affection for family members20 or one’s serving one’s parents.21 In short, cèyǐn zhī xīn as (the foundation of) the virtue of humaneness has both elements of familial affection and general sympathy, and one can anticipate a theoretical tension between the partialistic and universalistic tendencies contained in these two components of cèyǐn zhī xīn.22

Another important point that we should keep in mind to understand cèyǐn zhī xīn correctly is that besides “cèyǐn zhī xīn,” Mengzi also uses other terms such as “bùrěnrěn 不忍人之心, “chùtì cèyǐn zhī xīn” 恐惕惻隱之心, and “ēn” 恩 quite a few times, and these terms shed light on different aspects of Mengzi’s first sprout that we usually refer to by “cèyǐn zhī xīn” or “compassion.” This means that the proper understanding of cèyǐn zhī xīn or Mengzi’s first sprout can be acquired not by merely discussing one or two relevant anecdotes such as “the baby falling into a well” (Mengzi 2A:6) or “King Xuān and his ox” (Mengzi 1A:7) by way of rephrasing what Mengzi says, but by interpreting these stories in the light of the philosophical implications of the terms just mentioned and combining such implications of these terms across passages into a consistent picture of cèyǐn zhī xīn. For this purpose I examine three passages from the Mengzi consecutively, and my analysis of these passages will show that 1) cèyǐn zhī xīn is a painful feeling based on one’s sympathetic or filial concern for the object of cèyǐn zhī xīn, and 2) the painfulness of cèyǐn zhī xīn comes from the fact that cèyǐn zhī xīn is basically a construal of relevant situations in a way peculiar to sympathy or filial affection.

20 “吾弟則愛之, 秦人之弟則不愛也. 是以我為悅者也, 故謂之內.” Mengzi 6A:4. This is the reason Gàozi gives for his thesis that rěn 仁 is internal or part of the human nature (rěn nèi 仁內), and Mengzi does not object to it.
22 I discuss this issue later in Chapter 6.
Our first passage is *Mengzi* 2A:6, and I deal with the first half of it in this section. This part contains Mengzi’s famous thought experiment about a baby about to fall into a well:

*Mengzi* said, “Humans all have the feeling of not being able to endure other people’s [suffering harm]. The former kings had the government not indifferent to people’s [harm], probably because they had the feeling of not being able to endure other people’s [suffering harm]. [If one] runs a government that is not indifferent to people’s [harm] with the feeling of not being able to endure other people’s [harm], [one could] rule the world as if moving it on one’s palm. The reason that I say humans all have the feeling of not being able to endure other people’s [suffering harm] is this: Now [suppose that] someone suddenly saw a child about to fall into a well. Anyone seeing this would have the feeling of alarm and pain, and [one’s running to the well to save the child] is not to get in good relationship with the child’s parents, not to seek fame in the neighborhood and among friends, or not because one would hate the crying sound of the child. From this, we can see that anyone who lacks the feeling of compassion is not a human being.”

In this passage, “cèyīn zhī xīn” is used four times out of its total five usages throughout the *Mengzi*, and Mengzi provides us with two clues to the meaning of the term: On one hand, Mengzi uses “cèyīn zhī xīn” interchangeably with “bùrěnrén zhī xīn” 不忍人之心; on the other hand, he rephrases “cèyīn zhī xīn” as “chùtì cèyīn zhī xīn” 怵惕惻隱之心 in the context of the story of the baby falling into a well. First, concerning “bùrěnrén zhī xīn” 不忍人之心, although “rěn” 忍 in the phrase means “to endure,” the character can also mean “brutal” or “cruel.” So, the phrase “bùrěnrén zhī xīn,” which I translated above as “the feeling of not being able to endure other people’s [suffering harm],” can be alternatively rendered as “the heart of not being cruel to others,” or “tenderheartedness” for short. The connotation of this alternative rendering is that one is not cruel so as to inflict harm on others personally, but it is not clear on this reading what would be one’s response if one were to see other people’s suffering from a third-personal standpoint. In other words, this reading of the phrase does not exclude the possibility that one is not

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cruel enough to harm others personally, but remain indifferent to others’ suffering when one is not directly responsible for their suffering. On the other hand, my translation of the phrase above—“the feeling of not being able to endure other people’s [suffering harm]”—makes the following reading possible: Not only does one find it unbearable to inflict harm on others oneself, but one cannot bear to see others suffering no matter what the cause of their suffering. Between these two readings, Mengzi’s story about the baby falling into a well supports the latter, more inclusive interpretation, because it is clear in the story that it is not the fault of the person going to the rescue of the baby that the baby was crawling to the well in the first place.

Now, switching to our second clue, we find Mengzi saying that anyone suddenly seeing a baby about to fall into a well has “chù tì cèyǐn zhī xīn” 怵惕惻隱之心. According to traditional commentators, “chù” 怵 and “tì” 惇 both mean the spontaneous reactions of alarm and surprise, whereas “cè” 惻 and “yǐn” 隱 equally mean some sort of pain, presumably at the sight of the baby endangered in the current case. This phrase (“chù tì cèyǐn zhī xīn”) indicates that Mengzi’s first sprout is an emotion consisting of two parts, but previous scholars seem to have rarely given careful, balanced attention to both constituents of cèyǐn zhī xīn. Some focus on the first element of cèyǐn zhī xīn (alarm and surprise) and emphasize its spontaneity untainted by the agent’s ulterior motives, and others consider cèyǐn zhī xīn primarily as a kind of vicarious knowledge or perception of the suffering of another sentient being combined with a judgment of what is the right thing to do in that situation. The latter group of scholars does mention the first element of cèyǐn zhī xīn (alarm and surprise), but they do not take those spontaneous responses seriously into their account of cèyǐn zhī xīn.

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25 For example, see Jiāo Xún 焦循, Mèngzǐ zhèngyì 孟子正義 (Bēijīng 北京: Zhōnghuá shūjū 中華書局, 1987), p. 233; Yáng Bōjùn, Mèngzǐ yìzhù 孟子譯注 (Bēijīng 北京: Zhōnghuá shūjū 中華書局, 1960; reprint, 1992), p. 81. Both commentators quote various traditional glosses that take “chù tì” 怵惕 to be either “kǒngjù” 恐懼 (fear and alarm) or “jīnghài” 驚懼 (alarm and surprise), and they do not bother to distinguish “kǒngjù” and “jīnghài” clearly from each other.

26 My use of “cèyǐn zhī xīn” in this section is equivalent to “Mengzi’s first sprout.” I do not mean it to designate only the pain (cèyǐn) element of the chù tì cèyǐn zhī xīn. When I want to refer to the “pain” element of the chù tì cèyǐn zhī xīn, I use “compassion” or “sympathy” with “cèyǐn” in parentheses.
Many traditional commentators and 宋 dynasty Confucians belong to the first group of scholars, and Kwong-loi Shun’s view of the four sprouts is one of the clearest examples well representing this first group. He renders the four sprouts as “ethical predispositions” and makes the following comments:

[Mencius argues] that our recognition of yi [yì, righteousness] derives from certain features of the heart/mind, more specifically, from shared predispositions that already point in the direction of the ethical ideal....How do these ethical predispositions indicate an ethical direction?...Consider first the spontaneous reactions that Mencius highlighted, such as King Hsüan’s compassion for the ox (1A:7), one’s alarm at seeing an infant about to fall into a well (2A:6), one’s response to the sight of the bodies of deceased parents being devoured by wild animals (3A:5)....Unlike ongoing activities shaped by pre-existing goals, such as King Hsüan’s oppressing the people (1A:7) or someone accepting ten thousand bushels of grain contrary to propriety (6A:10), such reactions reveal something deep in the heart/mind and show one the kind of person one really is. Since one is caught unprepared, the reactions are not guided by ulterior motives but come directly from the heart/mind....The reactions under consideration not only lead one to see what is proper in an immediate context of action but also can guide one’s future behavior or behavior in other contexts.

A problem that I find in this otherwise well-thought and highly insightful description of Mengzi’s four sprouts is that Shun seems to confuse the spontaneity of such reactions as alarm and surprise at the sight of the baby falling into a well with the purity of motive in one’s compassion for that baby. In other words, Shun seems to think that the motivational purity of one’s compassion for the baby—in the sense that it is not tainted by one’s selfish desires to take advantage of one’s act of rescuing the baby—comes from the purported suddenness or spontaneity of one’s compassionate response to the endangered baby accompanied by one’s alarm and surprise in the situation. However, as I will argue later, compassion (cèyín 懲隱) in Mengzi has to be neither sudden nor fully spontaneous, whereas one’s responses of alarm and surprise at the falling baby are so by definition. As I see it, one’s responses of alarm and surprise (chùtì 怵惕) at the baby about to fall into a well are close to what some psychologists call “affect programs.” According to Paul

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27 For example, see Zhào Qí’s 趙岐 (?–201) and Sūn Shì’s 孫奭 commentaries on this passage in Sūn Shi, Mèngzǐ zhūshū, pp. 112–114; and also see Xiè Liángzuǒ’s 謝良佐 (1050–1103) and Zhū Xī’s 朱熹 views on this matter in Yasui Kō 安井衡, Mōshi teihon 孟子定本 (Tokyo 東京: Fuzanbō 富山房, 1972), 卷三, p. 28.

28 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, pp. 138–140.
The central idea of affect program theory is that emotional responses are complex, coordinated, and automated. They are complex because they involve several elements. These are usually taken to include (a) expressive facial changes, (b) musculoskeletal responses such as flinching and orienting, (c) expressive vocal changes, (d) endocrine system changes and consequent changes in the level of hormones, and (e) autonomic nervous system changes. The affect program responses are coordinated because the various elements occur together in recognizable patterns or sequences. They are automatic because they unfold in this coordinated fashion without the need for conscious direction.

[Paul Ekman] claims to have uncovered six species-typical human affect programs. He has called these surprise, anger, fear, disgust, sadness, and joy. Affect programs are adaptive responses to events that have a particular ecological significance for the organism. The fear response is adapted to dangers, the disgust response to noxious stimuli, the anger response to challenges, the surprise response to novel stimuli. If affect programs are to be of significant adaptive advantage to an organism over an evolutionarily significant time period, it might well have been advantageous for them to be linked to some mechanism which can interpret the broad ecological categories of danger, novelty, and so forth, in the light of local conditions. So it is unsurprising that organisms have to learn which events in their particular environment should trigger the affect programs.

According to this description, we could regard one’s responses of alarm and surprise (怵惕) at the baby falling into a well to be close to Paul Ekman’s affect programs of fear and surprise. For怵惕, or alarm and surprise, would certainly involve initial flinching and subsequent bodily orientation and movement toward the baby, certain hormonal changes and more rapid heartbeat and so forth, and these symptoms occur in a coordinated manner without being directed by one’s conscious mind. Moreover, one’s responses of alarm and surprise at the endangered baby in Mengzi’s story seem to be the expression of affect programs naturally encoded in mature human beings of ancient China, because being behaviorally protective of the younger and therefore weaker members of human species has clear adaptive advantage to the species in general. The peculiar responses of alarm and surprise at the baby falling into a well might have been the result of ancient Chinese’s learning to interpret being near at a well (especially one without a fence around it) to be a dangerous situation.

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However, I think that compassion (cèyǐn 懷隱) in Mengzi is markedly distinct from spontaneous reactions of alarm and surprise, and consequently that it is not the kind of spontaneity these latter responses embody as a kind of affect programs that provides compassion with its motivational purity. The main reason that I think this is the following: These responses are probably the result of biological adaptations of human organisms to their environmental hazards. They are largely pre-linguistic, they do not involve such concepts as self versus others or selfishness as opposed to altruism, and they express themselves spontaneously or even automatically. In this light, those spontaneous responses are reactions but not actions whose motives are subject to ethical approval or disapproval, and consequently they cannot be contributing to the motivational purity of compassion. As I see it, what provides compassion with its motivational purity is not its concomitant spontaneous reactions but the special character of compassion, which Mengzi sometimes refers to by “bùrěnrén zhī xīn” or “the feeling of not being able to endure other people’s [suffering harm],” or sometimes by the feeling of “pain” (cèyǐn) which is part of his “chùtì cèyǐn zhī xīn” 恐惕惻隱之心. What is clear to us so far is that this feeling of “pain” is caused by the danger of the baby in Mengzi’s story quoted above, but we are not yet clear what is the nature of this feeling of “pain” exactly. In order to have the answer to this question, we need to analyze another passage from the Mengzi.

The next passage to look at is Mengzi 1A:7, and it contains Mengzi’s dialogue with King Xuān 宣 of the Qi 齊 dukedom about how to become a benevolent king. Again, I quote here only a half of the long passage which I think is most relevant to our purpose:

[King Xuān] asked, “What must one’s virtue be like in order to be the king [of the world]?” [Mengzi] answered, “If one becomes a king by taking care of his people, no one can stop it.” Asked, “Can someone like me take care of the people?” Answered, “Yes, you can.” Asked, “How do you know that I can?” Answered, “I heard it from Hú Hé 胡齕 [King Xuān’s attendant]. He said, ‘The king was sitting up in his hall, and there was a

30 In addition, there are certainly some spontaneous human reactions that are detrimental to maintaining harmonious, flourishing society, when not properly regulated. For example, everyone has natural desires for food, sex, warm and safe shelter, and so forth, and it is possible that one’s urge to satisfy such desires is the first thing occurring in one’s mind, and one’s efforts to satisfy those desires are the first behavioral responses one shows in an ethically relevant situation. However, apparently, this does not make one’s efforts to satisfy such desires motivationally “pure” or altruistic.
person passing below leading an ox. The king saw it and asked, "Where is the ox going?"
Answered, "I am going to consecrate a bell with its blood." The king said, "Spare it! I
cannot bear [to see] it cowering, like an innocent [man] going to the execution ground."
Asked, "Then, shall I abandon the consecrating of the bell?" [The king] said, "How can it
be abandoned? Replace it with a sheep!" 'I'm not sure, was there such an event?" [The
king] said, "Yes, there was." [Mengzi] said, "This feeling is sufficient to become a king.
People all think that your majesty were stingy, but I surely know that your majesty were
not able to bear [the sight]. The king said, "Right. There really were some people [who
thought so]. But although Qi is a small country, how could I be stingy about an ox? I just
couldn't bear [to see] it cowering, like an innocent [man] going to the execution ground;
that's why I replaced it with a sheep." [Mengzi] said, "Your majesty shouldn't surprise at
people's taking you to be stingy. You replaced a big one with a small one; how could they
know it [i.e. your true motive]? If your majesty were pained at its going to the execution
ground while being innocent, what is there to choose between an ox and a sheep?" The
king laughed and said, "What is this mind really? I didn't care about its material value
and replace it with a sheep. [But] it certainly makes sense for people to say that I was
being stingy." [Mengzi] said, "It doesn't hurt [your being humane]; it is a [proper] way of
practicing humaneness. You saw the ox but didn't see the sheep. As for the nobleman to
beasts, once he sees them alive, he cannot bear to see them die; once he hears their
sounds, he cannot bear to eat their meat. This is the reason that the nobleman keeps away
from the kitchen." The king was pleased and said, "The saying in the Poetry that
'sounds, he cannot bear to eat their meat. This is the reason that the nobleman keeps away
from the kitchen." The king was pleased and said, "The saying in the Poetry that
'Another person's motive, I measure it,' this is just for you. It's me who did it, but I

"[齊宣王問]曰：'德何如則可以王矣?' 曰：'保民而王，莫之能禦也。' 曰：'若寡人者，可以保民乎哉?' 曰：'可。' 曰：'何由知吾可也?' 曰：'臣聞之胡服。' 曰：'王坐於堂上，有牽牛而過堂下者。王見之，
曰：'牛何之?' 對曰：'將以釁鐘。' 王曰：'舍之! 吾不忍其觳觫，若無罪而就死地。' 對曰：'然則廢釁鐘
與?' 曰：'何可廢也?以羊易之!' 不識，有諸?' 曰：'有之。' 曰：'是心足以王矣。百姓皆以王為愛也，
臣固知王之不忍也。' 王曰：'然，誠有百姓者。齊國雖褊小，吾何愛一牛？豈不忍其觳觫，
若無罪而就死地，故以羊易之也。' 曰：'王無異於百姓之以王為愛也。以小易大，彼惡知之？王若隱其無罪而就死
地，則牛羊何殊焉？' 王笑曰：'是誠何心哉？我非愛其財而易之以羊也。宜乎百姓之謂我愛也。' 曰：
'無傷也，是乃仁術也；見牛未見羊也。君子之於禽獸也，見其生，不忍見其死；聞其聲，不忍食其肉。是以君子遠庖
廬也。' 王說曰：'詩云，'他人有心，予忖度之。' 君子之謂也。夫我乃行之，反而求之，不
得吾心。夫子言之，於我心有戚戚焉。此心之所以合於王者，何也?' 曰：'有復於王者曰：'吾力足以舉
百鈞，而不足以舉一羽；明足以察秋毫之末，而不見臈菅。' 則王許之乎？' 曰：'否。' 现恵王及禽獸，
而功不至於百姓者，猶何與？然則一羽之不舉，爲不用力焉；臈菅之不見，爲不用明焉；百姓之不見

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Two points are initially relevant to our purpose of clarifying the nature of Mengzi’s compassion. First, unlike the previous passage where Mengzi uses the phrase “bùrēn rēn zhī xīn” 不忍人之心, the author of this passage uses “bùrēn 不忍 instead, and four of its five usages in this passage take an image of a suffering creature as their intentional object. That is, King Xuān says twice that he saved the ox because he could not bear (bùrēn 不忍) to see the ox cowering like an innocent man going to the execution ground, and Mengzi says that the nobleman cannot bear to see animals die once he saw them alive, and the nobleman cannot bear his eating the meat of an animal once he heard its crying sound. Second, we see in this passage that the character “yǐn 隱, which we have seen above is some sort of pain, takes the same intentional object as “bùrēn” does. That is, Mengzi asks King Xuān, “If your majesty were pained (yǐn 隱) at its going to the execution ground while being innocent, what is there to choose between an ox and a sheep?”

It is very tempting to interpret these data to indicate that Mengzi’s compassion (bùrēn 不忍 or cèyǐn 悌隱) is a kind of empathy-based concern for the object of one’s compassion. What I mean by “empathy” is a kind of sharing of the other’s mental states, and Stephen Darwall points out that there are several different kinds of simple and advanced types of empathy. Darwall calls his first kind of empathy “emotional contagion,” because it denotes our capacity to share another person’s emotion or feeling in a direct manner. Some examples are people tending to feel an emotion by assuming facial positions that are characteristic of that emotion (facial mimicry), or babies tending to cry in response to the recording of other babies’ crying. The second kind of empathy is called “projective empathy”; it denotes our capacity to put ourselves into another person’s situation and work out what to feel from that person’s perspective. According to Darwall, we can have this kind of empathy in different levels or degrees, but I think that citing an example illustrating a low-level projective empathy is sufficient for my discussion of the current Mengzi passage: Suppose that two men, Mr. Crane and Mr. Tees, both missed their flight due to a traffic jam on their way to the airport, but were informed...
that Mr. Crane’s flight departed as scheduled whereas Mr. Tees’s flight was delayed and departed right before his arrival at the airport. For such a case we normally think that Mr. Tees should feel more frustrated than Mr. Crane, and we would feel the same way if we put ourselves in Mr. Tees’s situation.\textsuperscript{34}

Among the previous scholars writing on the topic of compassion in Mengzi, Shirong Luo explicitly argues that King Xuān’s feeling of pain or distress at the ox’s apparent suffering and fear is triggered by his capacity for both primitive and advanced modes of empathy.\textsuperscript{35} Luo spends no time explaining how King Xuān’s feeling of pain or distress is caused by his capacity for a simple form of empathy, but Luo might think that just as people can have the same kind of feeling as the subject of a feeling (say, joy) by mimicking the facial expression of that person (say, smile), King Xuān can have a painful feeling mirroring that of the ox’s by his (imaginative) mimicking of the ox’s cowering behavior. On the part of advanced empathy, Luo suggests that the king could have heard a story in the past about an innocent man wrongly put to death, and now puts himself in the situation of the wronged man in the story helped by recalling his memory in youth of being wrongly punished by his father. So, King Xuān’s feeling of distress actually represents the way the innocent man in the story would feel as imagined by King Xuān, but this feeling can be transferred to the case of the ox by the king’s initial association of the ox with an innocent man wrongly put to death.\textsuperscript{36}

The convolutions of this explanation should not make it fully unlikely, because in the current passage Mengzi says that the nobleman controls his feeling of distress for dying animals by keeping a distance from them. If not seeing an animal that is about to be killed or avoiding hearing a dying animal’s crying sound helps one reduce one’s feeling of distress at those animals, then King Xuān’s crying sound helps one reduce one’s feeling of distress at the ox should also be considered, at least partly, as a feeling acquired through empathy. For as Luo correctly points out following Michael Slote, empathy is characterized by “perceptual immediacy”: We are more compelled to save a child drowning in front of us than to save a child dying

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p. 268.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., pp. 78–79.
of a disease in a third-world country, and King Xuān replaced the ox with a sheep because he did not feel, or felt little, empathy for the sheep.\(^{37}\)

However, there is an issue of whether King Xuān’s feeling of distress at the ox’s suffering is wholly empathy or is also to be considered as sympathy. According to Darwall’s definition, sympathy is “a feeling or emotion that (a) corresponds to some apparent threat or obstacle to an individual’s good or well-being, (b) has that individual himself as object, and (c) involves concern for him, and thus for his well-being, for his sake.”\(^{38}\) On the other hand, empathy merely consists in feeling what one imagines another person feels, or perhaps should feel, or in some imagined copy of these feelings in a certain situation, and one may or may not come thereby to be concerned for that person.\(^{39}\) Based on Luo’s account of King Xuān’s feeling summarized above, King Xuān’s feeling of distress at the ox seems to fit this narrow sense of empathy: He came to have this feeling by initially associating the ox with an innocent man wrongly put to death, and then by projecting himself into the position of this wronged man and working out what this man would feel. Moreover, he did not feel this painful feeling for the sheep that was not present, and he did not bother to care about its welfare. However, if this were what King Xuān’s feeling of distress at the ox is all about, that feeling of King Xuān’s remains to be empathy as distinct from sympathy, and it is hard to consider King Xuān’s saving the ox to be a genuinely altruistic action aiming at the removal of the ox’s suffering rather than a self-directed action to remove the source of his own mental pain.

However, at the beginning of the current passage Mengzi says that this feeling of King Xuān’s is sufficient to motivate him to take care of his people and eventually become a true king, and Mengzi is apparently talking about the genuine feeling of care and not merely about a self-directed uneasy or painful feeling the resolution of which can happen to bring some benefits to his people. Two things support the view that King Xuān’s feeling of distress at the ox can be considered as sympathy as opposed to empathy. First, at the end of the current passage Mengzi asks King Xuān how come his benefits do not reach his people when he can show kindness to mere animals. The Chinese character standing for “kindness” in the original passage is “ēn” 恩, and it can mean benefit or

\(^{37}\) Ibid., p. 34 and p. 81.  
^{39}\) Ibid.
bounty but more importantly the benevolence of the person who gives the bounty. This indicates that King Xuān saved the ox not merely because he did not like his uneasy feeling at the sight of the frightened ox (empathy) but because he cared about the ox (sympathy).  

Second, King Xuān’s painful feeling (bùrěn 不忍 or yǐn 隱) does not seem to be merely a representation of what the king imagines to be the ox’s feelings, but the feeling of some sort of motivational resistance. That is, earlier I said that King Xuān’s feeling of unbearableness (bùrěn 不忍) takes the image of the ox cowering like an innocent man going to the execution ground as its intentional object, and I believe that this feeling of the king’s is focused not on the imagined fear and despair of the wronged man but on the fact that he was innocent. In other words, I think that the king’s feeling of distress comes from his construal of the situation in terms of an innocent creature facing undeserved death, and this construal of the situation is made possible in the first place by the king’s concern for a sentient being, no matter how incomplete and capricious it could be at the current stage of the king’s moral cultivation.

This last point can also be made by Mengzi 2A:6 interpreted in the light of Mengzi 3A:5, a passage to be quoted below shortly. That is, although one’s bùrěnrén zhī xīn 不忍人之心 or compassion for the baby at the well is sometimes interpreted as empathy, i.e. one’s vicarious knowledge of the baby’s imminent fear and pain, 41 I think that what is at the core of one’s compassion for the baby is one’s construal of the situation as one in which an innocent sentient being is endangered. As Mengzi clearly says in the passage to be quoted in full length below, “it is not the fault of the baby that it crawls toward a well [and eventually drowns in it],” 42 and anyone who sees the situation this way and cares about the welfare of the baby cannot bear (bùrěn 不忍), or would find it painful (yǐn 隱), to let this disaster happen. In short, I think that Mengzi’s compassion (cèyīn 愁隱, bùrěn

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40 Also consider Mengzi’s saying in 2A:6 above that it is not because one hates the crying sound of the endangered baby that he goes to the rescue of the baby.
41 For example, see Luo, “Early Confucian Ethics,” pp. 72–75. In addition, although strongly denying that compassion in Mengzi is not a form of empathy, Sin yee Chan says that compassion embodies the judgment that the object of compassion is in suffering, and this judgment results from our vicarious knowledge of the others’ mental states. See Sin yee Chan, “An Ethic of Loving: Ethical Particularism and the Engaged Perspective in Confucian Role-Ethics,” (Ph. D. diss., University of Michigan, 1993), pp. 201–202.
42 “赤子匍匐將入井，非赤子之罪也.” Mengzi 3A:5.
不忍，or yǐn 隱) is essentially an uneasy or even painful feeling at the thought of imminent harm to another sentient being whose welfare one cares about, and it is misguided to interpret compassion in Mengzi as merely a form of empathy.

Now, let us turn to our third and the final passage, Mengzi 3A:5, which contains a conversation between Mengzi and a Mohist named Yí Zhī 夷之. Unlike the two passages previously discussed, this passage is not about compassion but the question of what the proper degree of one’s love for parents should be in proportion to one’s love for others. However, the emotion to be discussed in the following passage is crucial for clarifying Mengzi’s concept of cèyǐn zhī xīn, because 1) it is an emotion grounded on one’s care for its object (i.e. one’s parents) just like compassion, and 2) it is grouped together with compassion as an important constituent of humaneness (rén 仁) in Mengzi’s thought. Read the following passage focusing on Mengzi’s account of how the practice of burying the deceased parents has started in the antiquity:

_A Mohist Yí Zhī sought to see Mengzi through [the help of] Xú Bì 徐辟. Mengzi said, “I am definitely willing to see [him], but today I am still ill. I will go and see [him] when my illness gets better. [Tell] Master Yí not to come!”_

_Another day, [Yí Zhī] sought to see Mengzi again. Mengzi said, “Today I can see [him]. [However,] without being straightforward, the Way will not be manifest; so, I will put it straightforward. I heard that Master Yí is a Mohist. Mohists, when conducting a funeral, take frugality as their proper way [to do it]. [If] Master Yí aspires to change the world with [this principle], he must not be regarding it as wrong and despicable. But Master Yí buried his parents lavishly, and this is serving one’s parents with what one despises.”_

_Master Xú reported this to Master Yí. Master Yí said, “As for the way of the Confucians, [they often say that] the ancients [took care of others] as if taking care of a baby. What does this saying mean? I take it to mean that although there is no gradation in love, its application starts from one’s parents.”_

_Master Xú reported this to Mengzi. Mengzi said, “Does Master Yí really think that one’s affection for one’s brother’s child is like one’s affection for one’s neighbor’s baby? [It is a different point that we should] glean from that [saying]: When a baby crawls [toward a well] and is about to fall into the well, it is not the baby’s fault. Moreover, when Heaven was giving birth to things, it had [each of] them [come from only] one source; [Master Yí’s misunderstanding is] due to his [considering them to have] two sources. Probably in the antiquity there were some who did not inter their parents. [Suppose that] when their parents died, they just took them up and abandoned them in a ditch. Days later they were passing by their dead parents, and [happened to see that] foxes and wildcats were devouring them, and flies and gnats biting on them. Sweat broke on their foreheads, and they [only] squinted at them without being able to look at them directly._
That sweat, it was not the kind for others [to see], but [the result of] their innermost feelings reaching their faces and eyes. Probably they went home and came back with baskets and spades and covered the bodies. Covering them is correct indeed, and [this shows that] there is also definitely a reason for filial sons and humane people to inter their parents.”

Master Xú reported that to Master Yí. Master Yí looked lost for a while, and said, “[I appreciate] his teaching me.”

In response to Yí Zhī’s attempt to ground the Mohist doctrine of “universal love” on a Confucian saying, Mengzi argues that although general compassion for others is an important part of the Confucian moral ideal, one’s love for kin cannot be the same as one’s love for non-kin. Mengzi provides a speculative account of the origin of the practice of burying one’s deceased parents as a ground for this view, and his point seems to be that 1) the spontaneous deceased parents described in the quoted passage made the ancient people invent the burial practice, and 2) these special feelings are what one feels only for those with whom one stands in a special relationship. As Kwong-loi Shun points out, such feelings are felt only for those one loves and values, and one would have merely felt disgusted and wanted to stay away from the corpses if they were those of strangers.

It is acceptable that the feelings in question are what one would exclusively feel for the case of parents and the other family members, and in that sense these feelings are different from compassion that is felt for the misfortune of others indiscriminately. Despite the difference between these two constituents of cèyīn zhīxīn, though, there seems to be an important similarity between the feelings based on one’s familial affection and those on one’s universal caring attitude toward others, and I think that discussing this similarity will further clarify the nature of cèyīn zhīxīn as an emotion.

Comparison of the current passage with Mengzi 2A:6 will be especially illuminating for this purpose. In my previous discussion of the passage, we have seen that

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43 “墨者夷之因徐辟而求見孟子。孟子曰：‘吾固願見，今吾病。病愈，我且往見，夷子不來!’ 他日，又求見孟子。孟子曰：‘吾今則可以見矣。不直，則道不見，我且直之。吾聞夷子墨者。墨之治喪也，以薄爲其道也。夷子思以易天下，豈以爲非是而不貴也？然而夷子葬其親厚，則是以所賤事親也。’徐子以告夷子。夷子曰：‘儒者之道，古之人若保赤子，此言何謂也？之則以爲愛無差等，施由親始。’徐子以告孟子。孟子曰：‘夫夷子信以爲人之親其兄之子爲若親其隣之赤子乎？彼有取爾也。赤子匍匐將入井，非赤子之罪也。且天之生物也，使之一本。而夷子二本故也。蓋上世嘗有不葬其親者。其親死，則擧而委之於壑。他日過之，狐狸食之，蠅蚋姑嘬之。其顙有泚，睨而不視。夫泚也，非爲人泚，中心達於面目。蓋歸反蘽梩而掩之。掩之誠是也，則孝子仁人之掩其親，亦必有道矣。’徐子以告夷子。夷子憮然為閒曰：‘命之矣。’” Mengzi 3A:5.

44 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, p. 133 and p. 134.
one’s cèyīn zhī xīn at the baby falling into a well consists of spontaneous responses of alarm and fear (chùtì 惧惕) on one hand and one’s sympathy or compassion for the baby (cèyìn 惹隱) on the other. I argued that the motivational purity of one’s saving the baby comes from the element of sympathy rather than from the spontaneous reactions of alarm and fear, because what makes the action in question motivationally “pure” should be the compassion springing from the altruistic concern of a human agent, rather than certain spontaneous reactions biologically encoded in a human organism. When discussing King Xuān and his ox, I have further argued that the core of compassion is the construal of a relevant situation in terms of an innocent being wrongly endangered, and what makes one construe the situation this way is one’s concern for the endangered being. Now in Mengzi 3A:5, we seem to find some similar patterns: Just as one feels alarm and fear when suddenly seeing a baby on the verge of falling into a well, so a person who dumped the corpses of his parents in a ditch sweats and squints at the bodies feasted on by wild creatures; just as one goes to the rescue of the baby because she cares about the welfare of the baby, so the one who initially dumped his parents’ bodies in a ditch comes back to bury his deceased parents because he cares for his parents even after they have passed away.

Now, besides the physiological and behavioral components and the action components common to both instances of cèyīn zhī xīn, we know that for the former case what motivates one’s action of saving the baby is primarily one’s feeling of sympathy, which construes the situation as one where an innocent being’s life is at stake. Then, based on the parallel between these two instances of cèyīn zhī xīn, could we also find some emotion in the latter case corresponding to the sympathy in the former? In Mengzi 3A:5 no emotion like sympathy is specified besides certain physiological or behavioral changes such as sweating and squinting, but Mengzi does say that those physiological changes and spontaneous behaviors are the expression of the innermost feelings (zhōng xīn 中心, literally “inner heart”). We have seen earlier in Chapter 2 that “qíng” in early Chinese texts can refer to what is sitting deeply in an individual’s mind in the forms of sincere opinions, goals or aspirations, desires for certain objects, emotional or affective reactions toward a certain object, or evaluative judgments, and I propose that there is a
significant overlap between the meaning of zhōng xīn 中心, or just xīn 心, sometimes, and that of qīng. For example, look at the following passage from the Analects:

[One day] the Master was playing stone-chimes in the Wèi 衛 dukedom, and a person with a basket passing by the gate of Kongzi’s house said, “How meaningful, [his] playing the stone-chimes!” And shortly he added, “How petty, the stubborn sound! If no one knows oneself, one should give it up. If [the water is] deep, cross it by wading [and never mind getting wet]; if shallow, just hold up your skirt and cross it.” The Master said, “How resolute! No dispute with such a man.”

It seems from his comments that the passer-by not only knew about Kongzi’s frustration at his repeated failure to get an office in the government but also was sensitive to the sounds of the stone-chimes indirectly conveying Kongzi’s mental states. The original phrase that I translated as “how meaningful!” is “yǒu xīn zāi” 有心哉 (literally, “[The music] is full of mind!”), and xīn 心 here apparently refers to Kongzi’s frustrated aspiration to political recognition and the realization of his political vision. Likewise, it seems that zhōng xīn 中心 of the dead people’s child in Mengzi 3A:5 refers to some sort of feeling or emotion, specifically the feeling of unbearableness at the sight of one’s parents’ bodies devoured by wild animals and filthy insects. Furthermore, in parallel to the case of sympathy that sees the baby at the well as an innocent being endangered, I suggest that the uneasy feeling based on one’s filial affection in Mengzi 3A:5 also involves the construal of the situation in question as one in which one’s parents—not merely unconscious lumps of flesh—are eaten by animals and insects, and this concern-based construal is the source of one’s uneasiness. In short, I propose that what characterizes both instances of cèyīn zhī xīn—i.e. sympathy and familial affection—is this concern-based construal of the situation in question, and I think that this is the core characteristic of cèyīn zhī xīn as an emotion.

45 “子擊磬於衛，有荷蕢而過孔氏之門者，曰：‘有心哉，擊磬乎!’ 既而曰：‘鄙哉，硜硜乎！莫己知也，斯己而已矣。深則厲，淺則揭。’ 子曰：‘果哉！末之難矣。’” Lunyu 14:39. The underlining is mine.

46 The author(s) of the “frugal funeral” (jièsàng 节丧) chapter of Lǚshì chúnqū 呂氏春秋 writes that the ritual of burying the deceased was invented because by nature human beings cannot bear to abandon those they love and value (i.e. their parents and children) in a ditch when they are dead: “所重所愛，死而棄之溝壑，人之情不忍為也，故有葬死之義。” Chén Qíyóu, Lǚshì chúnqū jiàoshì, p. 524. This passage has been originally mentioned and discussed in relation to Mengzi 3A:5 in Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, p. 134.
The final topic to discuss about cèyīn zhī xīn is the relationship between one’s sympathy or filial affection, which construes a relevant situation in a special way, and the physiological or behavioral responses such as sweating and squinting or surprise and alarm. As we have already seen above, these spontaneous physiological or behavioral reactions do not contribute to the motivational purity of the actions motivated by the emotions they accompany. Those responses sometimes seem to be part of the affect programs that are much closer to reflexes than deliberate actions (thus we cannot ascribe a motive to them which requires the concept of agency), and when these responses are not part of the affect programs, it is the peculiar way of emotional construal of a certain situation rather than these spontaneous reactions that makes one’s action motivated by the emotion in question distinct from an action based on a prudential concern or self-interest. (One’s burial of the dead parents due to the construal that wild creatures are a serious threat to the welfare of one’s parents is a good illustration of this case.) Then, what is Mengzi’s view of the place of these involuntary responses in one’s emotional life?

Unlike the alarm and surprise in Mengzi 2A:6 that I regarded as affect programs which are parallel with but arising independently of one’s construal of the baby to be facing an undeserved death, Mengzi seems to think that the reactions of sweating and squinting in Mengzi 3A:5 are consequent on or expressive of one’s construal of the wild creatures eating the corpses of one’s parents—which are no longer conscious—as though harming one’s parents. We have similar cases throughout the Mengzi. For example, besides Mengzi 1B:1 cited above (footnote 5) where King Xuān 宣 of Qi 齊 revealed his view that it was shameful to like vulgar music by 1) blushing, the authors of the Mengzi observe that the ancient Chinese express their anger by 2) an angry countenance (nù...jiàn yú qímiàn 怒...見於其面)\(^{47}\) such as 3) glancing sideways (juànjuàn 睨眄),\(^{48}\) 4) frowning (cù’è 蹙頞),\(^{49}\) or 5) blushing (fùrán 脅然); express uneasiness by 6) assuming uneasy countenance or posture (cùrán 蹷然); express embarrassment by certain behaviors such as 7) looking around and saying something off the topic (gù\(^{51}\))
zuòyòu èr yán tā 顧左右而言他), and express joy by 8) a happy countenance (xīnxīnrán yǒu xīsè 欣欣然有喜色).

In *Mengzi* 1B:1 and 1B:4 (cases 3, 4, and 8) people get angry or joyful depending on whether or not the ruler shares his source of pleasure such as good music and hunting parks with his people, and people’s anger and joy accompanied by their angry or happy countenance seem to involve the concept of fairness or desert at least in an implicit manner. On the other hand, the rest of the cases are related with a certain conception of honor or shame: In *Mengzi* 1B:1 (case 1) King Xuān blushes because he finds his fondness of vulgar music shameful; in *Mengzi* 2B:12 (case 2) Mengzi says that he is not a petty man whose anger gets written all over his face when the king slights his advice; in *Mengzi* 2A:1 (case 5 and 6) Zēng Xī expresses anger by blushing when compared with Guān Zhòng whom he greatly despises, and assumes an uneasy posture or countenance when compared with Zīlù whom he greatly admires; and finally in *Mengzi* 1B:6 (case 7) Mengzi forces King Xuān with logic to adopt that he misgoverned his country and therefore does not deserve to rule his country, and King Xuān makes an embarrassed gesture betraying his agreement to Mengzi’s point. In short, the emotions that construe various social situations in the light of such concepts as fairness, desert, shame, dignity, or honor seem to entail the involuntary physiological or behavioral responses enumerated above. In addition, Mengzi is unlikely to have singled out the responses of alarm and surprise in *Mengzi* 2A:6 as distinguished in kind from the other spontaneous reactions.

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52 *Mengzi* 1B:6.
53 *Mengzi* 1B:1.
54 For example, Mengzi says to King Xuān that it is wrong for the ruler not to share music (or pleasure) with his people: “為民上而不與民同樂者，亦非也.” *Mengzi* 1B:4.
55 “予豈若是小丈夫然哉？諫於其君而不受，則怒，悻悻然見於其面，去則窮日之力而後宿哉?” *Mengzi* 2B:12.
56 “或問乎曾西曰：‘吾子與子路孰賢？’曾西蹴然曰：‘吾先子之所畏也.’ 曰：‘然則吾子與管仲孰賢?’ 曾西艴然不悅，曰：‘爾何曾比予於管仲？管仲得君如彼其專也，行乎國政如彼其久也，功烈如彼其卑也．爾何曾比予於是？’” *Mengzi* 2A:1. A further discussion of this passage can be found in Section 4.2.2.2 above.
57 “孟子謂齊宣王曰：‘王之臣有託其妻子於其友而之楚遊者，比其反也，凍餒其妻子，則如之何？’王曰：‘棄之．’ 曰：‘士師不能治士，則如之何？’王顧左右而言他．” *Mengzi* 1B:6.
discussed above; he is more likely to have considered all of them as expressions of their corresponding emotional construal. Then, what would Mengzi think the implications of these involuntary reactions are in one’s emotional life?

Mengzi does not say much about this topic, but we can speculate on a clue found again in *Mengzi* 3A:5: Commenting on the sweating of the person who happened to see wild animals devouring his parents’ bodies in a ditch, Mengzi makes it clear that that person’s sweat was not to show to others. In other words, that person did not sweat because he was afraid of other people’s criticism for his inhumanity, for dumping dead parents was an accepted custom of that time. That person’s sweat and squinting behavior must have rather come from the sudden and unexpected realization, against his contemporaries’ as well as his own belief, that he has done something heinous to his parents and he should do something about it. Mengzi’s saying that “burying them is correct indeed”\(^5\) also implies that this was the way the person now started to see the bodies of his parents in a ditch, and it is possible for Mengzi to think that there is a close relationship between one’s physiological or behavioral responses in a certain situation and the way things look to one in that situation. That is, the physiological and behavioral responses the man had at the sight of his parents’ corpses originally came from his sudden realization that he harmed his parents greatly, but his awareness of his own spontaneous responses might have in turn made the way things started to look to him now more convincing. Moreover, if other people had been observing his spontaneous responses and his consequent action of burying his parents, they might have suspected that his action was motivated by something deeper and more powerful than the widely accepted parents-dumping custom and the evaluative belief behind it, namely that it is all right to abandon one’s parents once they have passed away.

4.3.1.2 The Construal View of Emotion

When discussing *Mengzi* 2A:6 in the previous section, I have pointed out that Mengzi’s first sprout consists of two parts: spontaneous reactions of alarm and surprise (\(\text{chùtì} \) 怵惕) and some sort of painful feeling (\(\text{cèyǐn} \) 惆悵) at the sight of the baby falling into a well.

\(^5\) “掩之誠是也.” *Mengzi* 3A:5.
Against Kwong-loi Shun and some traditional Chinese commentators on Mengzi who emphasize the spontaneity of alarm and surprise as the locus of one’s altruistic motive, I argued that the motivational purity of cèyìn zhī xīn comes from the painful feeling at the sight of the endangered baby, and I proposed to interpret this painful feeling as primarily one’s construal of the situation in question that the welfare of an innocent being is threatened. I also argued that since this construal is based on one’s caring for the welfare of the baby, one’s feeling of unbearableness should be interpreted as one’s finding it hard to let the baby drown in the well rather than one’s vicarious feeling of pain and fear that the drowning baby is anticipating. I suggested a similar view for interpreting Mengzi 3A:5: I proposed that the feeling of unbearableness at the sight of one’s parents’ bodies eaten by wild animals is mainly one’s construal that those wild animals are harming one’s parents, and that this construal is in turn based on one’s love for parents.

My view of cèyìn zhī xīn as a concern-based construal relies on Robert Roberts’s theory of emotions, which I think is closest to Mengzi’s implicit theory of emotions and therefore the best tool for explaining Mengzi’s view of emotions. Roberts summarizes his theory of emotions as follows:

A construal, as I use the word, is a mental event or state in which one thing is grasped in terms of something else. The “in terms of” relation can have as its terms any of the following: A perception, a thought, an image, a concept....Most of our experiences, as well as most of our unconscious states of mind, are a hard-to-specify structure of percept, concept, image, and thought. All such synthetic crossings of percepts, images, thoughts, and concepts are construals; only some of these, however, are emotions. My formula is that emotions are concern-based construals or...serious concern-based construals or, to speak more precisely but less well, verisimilar concernful construals—that is, construals imbued, flavored, colored, drenched, suffused, laden, informed, or permeated with concern and possessing a certain verisimilitude. By “verisimilar” I mean to say that the construal has, for the construer, the appearance of truth, whether or not she would affirm the truth of the construal.59

Three terms are important in this quotation: (1) construal, (2) concern, and (3) verisimilitude. First, Roberts explains emotional construal partly by comparing it to Wittgenstein’s seeing a duck-rabbit picture either as duck or as rabbit. According to Roberts, seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck is not simply knowing or judging that it can be

seen as a duck, but construing the picture as one of a duck. It reveals that construing involves dwelling on or attending to some aspect of the object in question, namely the “duckiness of the duck-rabbit” so to speak, and this in turn means that construing is “bringing some perceived paradigm, or some concept or image or thought, to bear.”

This idea applies well to the three instances of 耳 in zhī xīn discussed above: One goes to the rescue of the baby falling into a well thinking that it is unbearable for an innocent being to be harmed (Mengzi 2A:6); King Xuān saves the ox because he saw the image of an innocent man to be killed (Mengzi 1A:7) in the fearful ox; and one prevents wild animals from reaching the corpses of his parents by burying them, perhaps because he sees his deceased parents as if still alive (Mengzi 3A:5).

Second, though, construing a situation in a particular way is not sufficient to become an emotion until it is combined with a concern for the object or the subject of a related emotion. For example, seeing a baby about to fall into a well as an innocent being encountering a danger due to nothing of his fault is compatible not only with sympathy but also with cruel sadism, and it is one’s concern for the welfare of the baby that makes one feel sympathy instead of joy or excitement at the sight of the baby crawling toward the well. Similarly, feeling guilty is not merely construing oneself as culpable; the feeling of guilt comes from one’s having “a concern about being in the condition [of guilt] one construes oneself to be in”, and the concern here can be a number of things ranging from a desire to stay free of blame or an aversion to violating other people’s rights. Roberts suggests that this “concern” can denote “desires and aversions, and the attachments and interests from which many of our desires and aversions derive”; these concerns can be instinctive or learned, general or specific, ultimate or derivative, and dispositional or occurrent, and all these categories of concerns except for dispositional ones can ground emotions.

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60 Ibid., p. 187.
61 I owe this point to Darwall, “Empathy,” p. 261.
62 Roberts, “What an Emotion Is,” p. 188.
64 Ibid. Among these concerns, Roberts specifies love and revulsion or disgust as two typical kinds of concern. He says as follows on love: “[I]f we mean [by “love”] the kind of attachment that lovers have for one another, and parents for their children and children for their parents, and good friends for one another, love is not an emotion. The responses characteristic of such attachment are too various and conflicting for it to be an emotion. They can be joy when the beloved is flourishing, indignation when she is insulted, gratitude when she is benefited, fear when she is threatened, hope when her prospects are good, grief when...
Third, emotions as concern-based construals have a compelling degree of verisimilitude or the appearance of truth. According to Roberts, this is partly because emotions share a propositional content with beliefs, and the seriousness of this propositional content of an emotion is often confused with the truth-asserting character of a belief. For example, a person $B$ who is angry at $A$ usually believes that $A$ has culpably offended, but sometimes $B$ can be angry at $A$ while thinking that his anger does not make any sense. In such a case $B$ does not believe that $A$ has wronged him, but as long as he is angry at $A$, he is still compelled to see $A$ as if having culpably offended.\footnote{Ibid., p. 201.} According to Roberts, $A$’s appearing to be culpable to $B$ is more like an optical illusion by which $B$ is not taken in than like an affirmation $B$ would make about how things are,\footnote{Ibid., p. 196.} and this seriousness of construal is a crucial characteristic of emotions.

It seems that besides cèyìn zhī xīn, respect and the feeling of shame and disgust—Mengzi’s second and third sprout—can also be explained in terms of this construal view of emotion. In the following section, I show that respect is a concern-based construal of another person as deserving one’s respect due to his social status or merit, and also discuss how this view of respect works better than the so-called “inclinational” or “dispositional” explanations of respect proposed by David S. Nivison and Donald J. Munro. Specifically, in Section 4.3.2.1 below I introduce and examine Nivison’s interpretation of *Mengzi 6A:5*, and argue that one’s respect for an admirable person is a distinct psychological entity from one’s desire for respectful action. In Section 4.3.2.2, I introduce Munro’s thesis that respect is a behavioral disposition to act respectfully, and argue that respect in Mengzi is not merely a behavioral tendency but an emotional sensibility responding to a person’s social status or merit that makes that person respectable. And finally in Section 4.3.2.3, I show that the view of respect as a kind of emotional sensibility is highly compatible with the view of respect as a concern-based construal.

she dies, and much more. Love in this sense is not an emotion, but a disposition to a range of emotions. Which emotion occurs is a function of how the beloved is construed.” (Ibid., p. 203) Note that this view of love coincides to be exactly the same as Rawls’s view of love as a natural attitude, which I introduced in Chapter 2 above to explain the relationship between hàowù (desire and aversion or liking and disliking) and particular emotions in the *Analects* and other early Chinese texts.
4.3.2 Respect, Desire, and Behavioral Disposition

4.3.2.1 Desire and Respect

In *Mengzi* 6A:5, Mèngjīzǐ 孟季子, a disciple of Gàozǐ, and Gōngdūzǐ 公都子, a disciple of Mengzi, dispute whether *yì* 義 (the virtue of righteousness or the right act) is internal or external. As has been mentioned in *Mengzi* 6A:6 above, Gaozi was Mengzi’s theoretical rival who argued that human nature is neither good nor bad originally, and morality (*yì* 義) is imposed upon human beings from the outside. On the other hand, we have seen Mengzi arguing that human nature is good; he thinks that humans are born with the four moral sprouts that can develop into four cardinal virtues, and in this sense the virtue of righteousness, or the capacity to enact what is right, is inherent in every human being. Now, treating elders respectfully is considered as a right thing to do, and Mèngjīzǐ and Gōngdūzǐ disagree about what makes one treat elders respectfully and whether the thing that causes a respectful act is internal (i.e. part of human nature) or external (i.e. imposed upon human nature from the outside). The passage starts as follows:

Mèngjīzǐ asked Gōngdūzǐ, “Why do you say that morality is internal?” [Gōngdūzǐ] said, “I enact my respect, so I say it’s internal.” “If a villager is a year older than your eldest brother, whom do you respect?” [Gōngdūzǐ] said, “I respect my eldest brother.” “When you serve wine, whom [do you serve] first?” [Gōngdūzǐ] said, “I serve the villager first.” “The one to respect is here, and the one to treat as elder is there. [This shows that morality] is obviously on the outside, not from the inside.”

Gōngdūzǐ’s act of serving wine to the villager first at a village ceremony is a right act prescribed by morality or social norms, but as Mèngjīzǐ points out, what makes him do so is not his feeling of respect for his brother, but the fact that the villager is older than Gōngdūzǐ’s brother and the social consensus that that fact makes the villager deserve being served first. Gōngdūzǐ fails to handle this attack properly, and tells Mengzi what happened. So, now in the rest of the passage, we have Mengzi coaching his disciple about how to win the second round of the battle:

67 “孟季子問公都子曰：‘何以謂義內也?’ 曰：‘行吾敬，故謂之內也．’‘鄕人長於伯兄一歲，則誰敬?’ 曰：‘敬兄．’‘酌則誰先?’ 曰：‘先酌鄕人．’‘所敬在此，所長在彼，果在外，非由內也．’” *Mengzi* 6A:5.
Mengzi said, “[If you ask him] whether he respects his uncle or his younger brother, he will say, ‘I respect my uncle.’ [Then you] say, ‘If your brother is an impersonator (of an ancestor at a sacrificial ceremony), whom do you respect?’ He will say, ‘I respect my brother.’ [Then] you say, ‘Where is your respecting of your uncle?’ He will say, ‘It is because [my brother] is in a [special] position.’ [Then] you also say, ‘It was [also] because [the villager] was in a [special] position. [My] ordinary respect is for my elder brother; but [my] temporary respect was for the villager.’” Mèngjìzǐ, having heard this, said, “[When having to] respect one’s uncle, one respects [one’s uncle]; [when having to] respect one’s brother, one respects [one’s brother]. [This shows that morality] is obviously on the outside, not from the inside.” Gōngdūzǐ said, “[One] drinks hot water in winter, and drinks cool water in summer. Then are drinking and eating also on the outside?”

Mèngjìzǐ’s point here again is that morality should be considered to be external, because the right person to respect in a certain situation is determined by considering the most relevant factor of that situation—for example, who the eldest person is when serving wine at a village ceremony, or who the impersonator of an ancestor is at a sacrifice. However, this time Gōngdūzǐ argues back by saying that drinking hot water in winter and drinking cool water in summer does not make one’s drinking activity fully external, i.e. depending on the external condition of the weather that makes hot water preferable in winter and cool water preferable in summer. In other words, Gōngdūzǐ seems to think that what is more important about the act of drinking water is that it quenches one’s thirst, not the fact that one had better drink hot water in winter and cool water in summer. Moreover, by comparing the act of drinking water to the act of respecting people, he also seems to imply that what is more important about respecting people is one’s inner feeling of respect for them rather than how one’s respect is expressed toward them.

Now, instead of participating in this debate myself and trying to decide whose view is right, I would like to focus on Gōngdūzǐ’s analogy between drinking water and respecting people, and think about what is really meant by this analogy. For as I said earlier, this passage, especially this analogy, seems to be interpreted to support the view that Mengzi’s four sprouts are some sort of inclination or disposition to do four types of ethical behaviors. For example, David S. Nivison interprets this passage as follows:

68 “孟子曰：‘敬叔父乎？敬弟乎？’ 彼將曰，‘敬叔父。’ 曰，‘弟爲尸，則誰敬？’ 彼將曰，‘敬弟。’ 子 曰，‘惡在其敬叔父也？’ 彼將曰，‘在位故也。’ 子亦曰，‘在位故也。’ 子 曰，‘敬叔父則敬，敬弟則敬，果在外，非由內也。’ 公都子曰：‘冬日則飲湯，夏日則飲水，然 則飲食亦在外也？’” Ibid.
The Mencius party looks at the dispositional cause, and the Gaozi party looks at the occasional cause: The latter insists that the disposition (“inside”) counts only if it makes a difference in different situations; if it does not, then it must be that the occasion (“outside”), involving what is socially required, is the significant factor....[On the other hand, the former insists that] though how we satisfy the “inner” disposition of thirst is determined by the (specious) occasion, winter vs. summer, satisfying it in some way is demanded by my being thirsty. Similarly with respect (Mencius hopes): the objects may differ in different situations, but respect is shown anyway, because I feel respectful.\(^{69}\)

In this remark, Nivison clearly takes Gōngdūzǐ to think that respect, Mengzi’s third sprout, is similar in kind to thirst. As Nivison sees it, Gōngdūzǐ thinks that just as thirst is one’s inner disposition to drink something to satisfy one’s thirst, respect is basically one’s inner disposition to respect those who deserve one’s respect. One might need to drink hot water when cold and cool water when hot to satisfy one’s thirst better, but the act of drinking itself is demanded by one’s thirst, the inner disposition, or even desire, to drink something good for one’s thirst. Likewise, one might need to shift one’s respect from one’s uncle to one’s younger brother as the changing circumstances require, but one’s respectful act is primarily the expression of one’s inner desire to act respectfully when the situation requires.

However, if Nivison is right in saying that Gōngdūzǐ’s metaphor of drinking water implies the view of respect as a kind of desire, this analogy between thirst and respect should be rejected as a mistake that does not fit Mengzi’s general picture of the relationship between the four sprouts and one’s proper attitudes of hàowù 好惡. For as I will argue below, what befits the metaphor of thirst well in Mengzi’s thought is not the four sprouts but hào 好 or yù 欲, one’s affective attitude of liking or long-term desire for what one finds good. In addition, as an alternative interpretation to Nivison’s, it is possible that Gōngdūzǐ’s metaphor of drinking water is not to view respect as a kind of desire but merely to point out that respect, which I will argue below to be some sort of emotional sensibility responsive to another person’s dignity or merit, always involves a

\(^{69}\) David S. Nivison, “Problems in the Mengzi: 6A3–5,” in The Ways of Confucianism, p. 165; emphasis is original. The omitted part is Nivison’s personal comment on this debate: “But of course, any instance of yi behavior needs both an adequate disposition (“inside”) and an appropriate occasion (“outside”). The Mencius party, insisting on the priority of the former, and the Gaozi party, insisting on the priority of the latter, are both begging the question whether yi is “inside” or “outside.”” For my current purpose of analyzing Gōngdūzǐ’s analogy between drinking and respecting, I do not need to defend either of the positions presented in this debate, and consequently I omitted this part to avoid any unnecessary confusion.
disposition to act respectfully toward the person in question. In order to prove this point, in the following I first take a closer look at Mengzi’s view of desire (好 好 or 欲 欲) by discussing two passages from the Mengzi, and then resume my discussion of Mengzi 6A:5 and show how one’s respect cannot be identified with any desiderative elements that might well be still closely related to one’s respect.

Then, let us first look at the following passage, where Mengzi compares sensory desires and one’s desire for morality:

There are some among flavors that mouths commonly like. Yì Yá 易牙 was the first to discover what our mouths like. If it were the case that the natures of mouths regarding flavors varied among people—just as dogs and horses are different species from us—then why is it that throughout the world all likings follow Yì Yá in flavors? The fact that, when it comes to flavors, the whole world looks to Yì Yá is due to the fact that mouths throughout the world are similar. Ears are like this too....Eyes are like this too....Hence, I say that there are some among flavors that mouths commonly like, there are some among sounds that ears commonly [like to] listen to, there are some among colors that eyes commonly regard to be beautiful. When it comes to minds, would they alone have nothing to approve in common? What is it that minds approve in common? They are principles and righteousness. Sages are no other than those who first found what our minds commonly approve. So, it is just as the meat of grass-fed or grain-fed animals delight our mouths that principles and righteousness delight our minds.

In this passage, Mengzi says that the delight one feels at the satisfaction of her sensory desires is similar to the delight one feels at the satisfaction of her moral desires. According to him, just as people’s palates normally find the foods made by a great cook preferable to those made by mediocre ones, people’s minds normally find acts that are in accordance with principles and righteousness preferable to those that are against principles and righteousness. The character used in the Mengzi for people’s liking of good food is “shì” 喜 (same as 嗜 “like”), and he also says that the meat of grass-fed or grain-fed animals delights (yuè 悅) people’s mouths. On the other hand, while Mengzi also uses “yuè” 悅 for people’s delight at principles and righteousness, he uses the word

70 “口之於味，有同耆者也，易牙先得我口之所耆者也。如使口之於味也，其性與人殊，若犬馬之與我不同類也，則天下何耆皆從易牙之於味也？至於味，天下期於易牙，是天下之口相似也。惟耳亦然，...惟目亦然，...故曰，口之於味也，有同耆焉；耳之於聲也，有同聽焉；目之於色也，有同美焉。至於心，獨無所同然乎？心之所同然者何也？謂理也，義也。聖人先得我心之所同然耳。故理義之悅我心，猶芻豢之悅我口。” Mengzi 6A:7.
“rán” 然 for the common attitude people take about principles and righteousness. Nivison seems to take “rán” as an adjective meaning “so” and renders the phrase “xīn zhī suǒ tóngrán” 心之所同然 as “the way in which our hearts are alike,” providing Zhū Xī’s 朱熹 alternative reading of the character as a verb meaning “to approve” (kě 可), which renders the same phrase as “what all hearts (or minds in my translation) alike approve.”71 However, as Kwong-loi Shun points out, there is a parallelism between “tóngshì” 同是, “tóngtīng” 同聽, “tóngměi” 同美, and “tóngrán” 同然, and this makes it likely that “rán” 然 is also used here as a verb referring to a special function of the mind.72 Moreover, translating “rán” as “to approve” following Zhū Xī reveals an important philosophical point of the passage: Just as the meat of grass-fed or grain-fed animals delights (yuè 悅) people’s mouths because people enjoy (shì 興) it, principles and righteousness delight people’s minds because people approve (rán 然) them.

This point might remind the reader of my suggestion in Chapter 2 above (Section 2.2.2.1) that one’s liking (hào 好) and disliking (wù 惡) in the Analects are directed at what one finds good (hào 好) or bad (è 惡), and that these emotional attitudes involve one’s evaluative thoughts of what is valuable or what is more valuable than other things. Now, Mengzi also seems to think in a similar way, because in the current passage he says that the sense organs and the mind are alike in appreciating the relative value of their respective objects and taking pleasure in relishing or contemplating what they find good. In addition, I have also pointed out in Chapter 2 that there can be some complex cases where the demand of morality conflicts with some important non-moral values, and I submitted that Kongzi’s solution to this problem was the view that the nobleman’s emotional attitudes of háowù 好惡, which always give priority to morality over other non-moral values, provide the affective standard that the other members of the society should follow. This point raises an interesting issue of comparing values of things not only within a category of the same kind but across categories, and in the following passage Mengzi provides some interesting ideas:

72 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, p. 137.
Fish is something I want, and bear’s paw is also something I want. But if I cannot have both, I forsake fish and choose bear’s paw. Life is something I desire, and honor is also something I desire. But if I cannot have both, I forsake life and choose honor. Life is what I want, but there is something that I want more than life, so I do not do anything to get it [i.e. life]. Death is what I hate, but there is something that I hate more than death, so there are some troubles that I do not avoid. If there were nothing that people desire more than life, why do they [sometimes] not use those means that could save their life? If there were nothing that people hate more than death, why do they [sometimes] not do what could let them avoid troubles? [But] there are [definitely] things that people can use and save their lives but do not do so, and there are things that people can use and avoid troubles but do not do so. Therefore, [it is clear that] there are things that people desire more than life, and there are things that people hate more than death. It is not that only the worthy person has this heart; everyone has it, but [only] the worthy person is able to not lose it.  

In this passage, we see it more clearly that one’s sensory desire can involve a calculation of the relative value of things, and one desires what one finds of more value more than what one finds of less value. However, the passage also shows that one can desire things across categories at the same time, and sometimes the situation can be such that those objects of one’s now generic desire compete with each other and demand one to choose one of them at the expense of the others. For example, life is among the primary objects of people’s desire, and death is among the things that people dislike most. However, given that honor is also an extremely important thing for human beings as it was for Mengzi and his contemporaries, people from time to time face the situation where they can save their life by sacrificing their honor and vice versa, but not save both. In such a situation, Mengzi’s ideal agent would always choose honor over life, and Mengzi even argues that this is the way human beings originally, and also normally, feel. The only difference between Mengzi’s ideal agent—the worthy person or the nobleman—and the ordinary people is that the former keeps this feeling and constantly nourishes it, whereas the latter does not.

Now, the first point that I would like to make concerning Mengzi’s conception of desire (hào 好 or yù 欲) to highlight the special character of respect is that one’s desire,

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73 “魚，我所欲也，熊掌亦我所欲也。二者不可得兼，舍魚而取熊掌者也。生亦我所欲也，義亦我所欲也。二者不可得兼，舍生而取義者也。生亦我所欲，所欲有甚於生者，故不為苟得也。死亦我所惡，所惡有甚於死者，故患有所不辟也。如使人之所欲莫甚於生，則凡可以得生者，何不用也？使人之所惡莫甚於死者，則凡可以辟患者，何不為也？由是則生而有不用也，由是則可以辟患而有不為也。是故所欲有甚於生者，所惡有甚於死者。非獨賢者有是心也；人皆有之，賢者能勿喪耳。” *Mengzi* 6A:10.
whether it is towards material things or the proper way of dealing with those material things, always involves 1) the evaluative belief about the goodness or desirability of its intentional object and 2) the wish that that object should come into one’s possession or continue to be in one’s possession. In contrast, the feeling of respect for elders or those who are respectable otherwise involves a different kind of evaluative belief (and attitude), and therefore respect is not a kind of desire or inclination toward its intentional object as hào 好 or yù 欲 is. Based on the similarity between respect and the other three sprouts (or at least compassion and the feeling of shame and disgust) in nature, this difference between desire and respect applies also to the case of the other sprouts, and it gives us a good reason to think that Mengzi’s four sprouts are a special kind of emotions but are not desires themselves.

To illustrate this point, I would like to go back to *Mengzi* 6A:5 introduced above (see especially footnote 68) and further discuss Mengzi’s remark there. According to him, one is usually supposed to respect one’s uncle rather than one’s younger brother, apparently because the former is older and the latter is younger than oneself. However, on a special occasion where one’s younger brother performs the role of the impersonator of a dead ancestor at a sacrificial ceremony, one is supposed to respect one’s younger brother more than one’s uncle because one’s younger brother is considered as one’s ancestor at the moment. Mèngjìzhǐ takes this point to support Gàozǐ’s doctrine that righteousness is external (yì wài 义外), but it is not clear whether Mengzi would have granted it. For Mengzi’s view that righteousness is somehow inherent in human beings may very well take this seemingly external factor about respect into its theoretical scheme. That is, Mengzi can be interpreted to hold that respect is essentially an emotional capacity inherent in everyone that enables one to focus on the respect-invoking features of the situation and respond to them appropriately.

Interpreted this way, respect in Mengzi can remain significantly internal without being forced to downplay the role the salient features of the “external” situations play in one’s emotional life. Moreover, respect viewed this way distinguishes itself clearly from desire: Whereas one’s desire, say, for a good food is one’s wish that one had that food accompanied by one’s evaluative belief that this food is good, one’s respect for an elderly man in the village involves one’s evaluative belief that this man deserves respect, which
is also one's evaluative attitude about the elderly man, expressed by one's treating him respectfully. In other words, the kind of value that one’s desire finds in its intentional object—goodness or desirability—is different from that found by respect—the quality of deserving respect, and this shows that respect is a different kind of emotion from desire.

The second point about Mengzi’s conception of desire that would also show the difference between desire and respect is that one’s desire can take righteousness or a right action (yi 義) as its intentional object. As we have seen in Mengzi 6A:7 (footnote 70) and 6A:10 (footnote 73) quoted above, Mengzi says that one can have a long-term desire for righteousness and feel pleasant approbation when she contemplates righteousness expressed in one’s or another person’s character or action. In addition, we have seen in Mengzi 6A:5 (footnotes 67 and 68) that Mèngjìzǐ and Gōngdūzǐ discuss respecting people as an example of a right action, and this means that both Mèngjìzǐ and Gōngdūzǐ consider respect as a constituent or a subcategory of righteousness. Now, by combining these points we see that one can want to be a respectful person in appropriate situations and feel pleasant approbation contemplating one’s or another person’s respectful character expressed by appropriate actions, and this again shows that one’s moral desire, which takes the feeling of respect and respectful acts as its intentional objects, cannot be identified with respect.

4.3.2.2 Respect and Behavioral Disposition

So far, I have argued that respect in Mengzi is not a kind of desire but emotion conceived in a narrow sense, and my argument was based on the assumption that Nivison interprets Gōngdūzǐ’s last remark in Mengzi 6A:5 to be an analogy between respect and thirst, which is a typical desire. Nivison talks about acting with respect in Mengzi as if it were similar to satisfying one’s thirst, and for this reason, my assumption that Nivison takes Gōngdūzǐ to consider respect as a kind of desire is warranted. However, Gōngdūzǐ actually never mentions thirst in his remark; he only talks about the activity of drinking hot water in winter and drinking cool water in summer. As I see it, this implies the possibility that Gōngdūzǐ was basing the thesis of internality of morality not on the similarity between respect and desire but on the close relationship between respect and
one’s behavioral disposition to act respectfully.\textsuperscript{74} Nivison actually uses the word “disposition” three times (including the adjective “dispositional”) in his short remark cited above (footnote 69), and I suspect that he was inclined to use “disposition” in the place of “desire” because he, as one of the most perceptive readers of the \textit{Mengzi}, saw the connection between respect and the behavioral disposition to act with respect. However, Nivison does not elaborate this point, and it may well have been overshadowed by his alternative reading that Gōngdūzǐ considered respect as a kind of desire. In this section I consider this second possibility, and argue that although respect certainly involves a behavioral tendency to act respectfully, respect is not itself a kind of behavioral tendency or disposition.

In his influential book \textit{The Concept of Man in Early China}, Munro introduces “constancy” as a convenient term for referring to regularly appearing actions or acts in an organism. According to him, eating is a constant in every human being and growing leaves is a constant of trees, and such “constants” of an organism partly constitute the nature (\textit{xìng} 性) of that organism.\textsuperscript{75} In addition, Munro distinguishes between the constancies human beings share with other animals or plants and those unique to humans, and says that respect or “showing honor to the aged” is one of such uniquely human constancies.\textsuperscript{76} Furthermore, Munro proposes that those constancies designate not only acts but also behavioral tendencies toward such acts:

\begin{quote}
In the ancient Chinese texts words indicating constant acts were sometimes preceded by terms expressing desire or ability—e.g., man “desires to eat,” a tree “can grow leaves.” Use of a term like “desire” was largely a way of indicating potentiality or behavioral tendency, of showing that if the individual in question were unimpeded he would repeatedly perform the action or type of action….Therefore, in a secondary sense, I will use “constancy” to mean the potentiality for repeated action, action that will emerge if conditions permit.\textsuperscript{77}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{74} One might object that there is no real distinction between desire and behavioral disposition here, because one’s desire can be a desire to act in a certain way, and this desire would be nothing but a behavioral disposition. However, Mengzi’s concept of desire that I discussed in the previous section is in a much narrower sense, which involves some sort of conscious appraisal of the object of one’s desire. This kind of desire can take respect or even one’s behavioral tendency to act respectfully as its intentional object, and is not identical with a desire to act in a certain way as we casually say.

\textsuperscript{75} Munro, \textit{The Concept of Man in Early China}, p. 67.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., pp. 68–70.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., p. 67.
And he further comments on the distinctively human constancies:

[These phenomena were described sometimes as overt activities, sometimes as tendencies. They were among the constants characterizing human “life”; but like all constants, their existence was chiefly potential, since, although they were practiced regularly, they were not continually being performed. A constant action distinctive in the life of man, such as “showing honor to the aged,” was rooted in a permanent tendency, the “font” (tuan [端]) of reverence and respect. When a man gave honor to another, he could say, “I implement my tendency of reverence” (hsing wu ching [行吾敬]).

That is, Munro thinks that respect, as a uniquely human constancy, does not only refer to respectful acts but more often to one’s tendency to do such acts, and his conception of desire is indistinguishable from the concept of behavioral tendency or disposition.

Moreover, according to Munro, there is an important distinction between Mengzi’s first and third sprout (“commiseration” and “respect”) and his second and fourth sprout (“shame and dislike” and the “sense of right and wrong”):

“Mind” in the first two cases denoted potentiality or behavioral tendency, since commiseration and respect both emerge in behavioral forms; but the other two “minds” denoted purely covert evaluative activity. “Shame and dislike” (the third mind) are associated with i [yi 義], the innate moral sense—that is, the sense of what is proper and improper; together with the feeling of an obligation to act accordingly. As for the roots of this innate moral sense, “dislike” suggests an innate sense of repugnance at some acts, and “shame” suggests the feelings (considered to be universal) that follow transgressions. Mencius spoke of i as man’s straight path, meaning that obedience to its judgments keeps a person from abandoning the moral way. The fourth mind, the “sense of right and wrong” (shih-fei-chih-hsin [shīfēi zhī xīn 誠是非之心]), manifests itself as “knowledge” (chih [zhī 知]).

In this remark, Munro seems to think that Mengzi’s first and third sprout, compassion and respect, are simply behavioral tendencies without containing any elements of evaluative judgment. What judges whether one’s behavioral tendency of compassion or respect is appropriate or not in a certain situation is the function of the other two sprouts, “shame and dislike” and the “sense of right and wrong” in Munro’s terms. He continues:

78 Ibid., p. 70.
79 The second sprout in Mengzi’s original order. For example, see Mengzi 2A:6 and 6A:6.
80 Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China, p. 75.
These two types of activity, the covert evaluative and the overt social, go hand in hand, inasmuch as the evaluations of the mind are necessary to guide the social behavior (commiseration and respectfulness) in specific manifestations. The evaluating mind determines what response is right for a particular situation, and when the behavior actually occurs, humanheartedness [rén 仁] and good form [li 礼] are realized. Thus it is that one often finds in the texts phrases combining the terms for the overt social behavior and the covert evaluative sense—jen-i [rén-yì 仁義] and li-i [lǐ-yì 礼義], for example. “Morality” requires the innate social tendencies to be guided by the discriminations of the evaluating mind.81

According to this view, respect is simply a behavioral tendency to act deferentially to the aged, and nothing guarantees that one’s deference to an elderly person is a correct action in a certain situation unless it is combined with one’s “evaluation” of the situation. As Munro sees it, it is one’s evaluating mind that examines the situation in question and guides one’s behavioral tendency so that it is expressed as an appropriate action in the situation, and it is not that one’s deference is either ethically right or wrong in itself. One’s social tendencies such as commiseration and respect are different from ordinary biological drives in that they always require the function of the evaluating mind,82 but commiseration and respect are not different from the animal biological drives in that they are also natural urges to achieve the goals that are naturally encoded in them—helping out people in need and respecting the elders. To reiterate, the question of whether one’s commiseration and respect are right or wrong can be raised only in terms of whether it is appropriate for one to implement one’s tendency of commiseration or respect in a certain situation, and to what degree and in which manner one is supposed to do so. However, it is illegitimate to ask whether one should react compassionately or respectfully in a certain situation, as much as it is wrong to ask whether one should feel hungry when he has not eaten anything for days.

However, this seems to be a wrong view of respect (and compassion) to ascribe to Mengzi at least for two reasons. First, this view postulates only one generic motive for a person’s respectful act, namely one’s tendency to behave respectfully, but this view conflicts with the fact that there are a variety of possible motives for one’s deferential

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81 Ibid., p. 76.
82 Ibid.
behavior, and respect is only one of them. Let me explain this point further by discussing the following passage:

*Mengzi had an audience with King Xiāng of Liáng 梁. Having come out [of the king’s place], Mengzi told someone, “When I looked at him from afar, he didn’t look like a ruler; when I drew near to him, I didn’t see anything to be afraid of....”*83

“To be afraid of” here is the translation of “wèi 畏. As we have seen in the previous chapter, wèi 畏 in this passage is not the kind of fear that one feels at a directly threatening thing, but the feeling of awe or reverence that corresponds to the dignity of a royal person. Now, Mengzi’s remark just quoted should be interpreted to mean that the king of Liáng did not look like a ruler at all and did not have any royal dignity that would raise a feeling of respect and awe in Mengzi’s heart, rather than that Mengzi had an innate tendency to act deferentially toward a ruler but this tendency of Mengzi’s was frustrated due to the king’s lack of royal dignity. Although we cannot tell by looking at the passage, it goes without saying that Mengzi showed his deference to King Xiāng properly as the social norms and etiquette of his time prescribed, but Mengzi clearly did not do so with sincere respect for the king. On the contrary, as Mengzi makes it clear, Mengzi’s deference to the king lacked sincere respect that the king did not deserve; his deference to the king was not motivated by his respect for the king, but his desire to conform to the social norms governing the proper manner of addressing one’s ruler. This shows that one’s respectful behavior does not have to be always grounded in one’s respect, and this is good proof that respect in its full sense (i.e. not merely at the behavioral level) is not the behavioral tendency to act respectfully, if there were any such a generic, mysterious tendency in human beings.

Second, Munro’s view of respect (and compassion) as a behavioral tendency cannot accommodate the full conception of action that we can find in Mengzi’s thought. According to Munro, one’s respect and compassion denote one’s deferential and compassionate behaviors towards others as well as one’s tendencies or dispositions to do such behaviors, and it is only when these behaviors are regulated by “evaluating mind”

that they become actions. In other words, just as sometimes it can be an appropriate action to satisfy one’s hunger to a moderate degree so that everyone in one’s group can have something to eat, Munro’s “evaluating mind” examines the situation in question and guides one’s tendency to deferential or compassionate behaviors so that it is expressed as an appropriate action in that situation. However, just as one’s inclinational behavior such as eating or sleeping cannot be judged as either right or wrong in itself, one’s deference or compassion cannot be an either ethically right or wrong action in itself. As I see it, though, this view of respect and compassion is not well supported by textual evidence from the Mengzi. For example, in his famous thought experiment about a baby falling into a well (Mengzi 2A:6), Mengzi says the following:

Now [suppose that] someone suddenly saw a child about to fall into a well. Anyone seeing this would have the feeling of alarm and pain, and [one’s running to the well to save the child] is not to get in good relationship with the child’s parents, not to seek fame in the neighborhood and among friends, or not because one hates the crying sound of a child. From this, we can see that anyone who lacks the feeling of compassion is not a human being.84

This passage shows that one’s behavior of saving the baby from the danger of falling can be done with a range of motives, and this behavior of saving the baby becomes a different kind of action depending on what kind of motive it is combined with. As Mengzi says in this quotation, it could be a prudential action to promote one’s interests by taking advantage of the social standing and power of the baby’s parents, or an action to satisfy one’s desire to be known as a compassionate person, or a yet another kind of egoistic action to remove the source of one’s mental pain, but Mengzi makes it clear that saving the baby out of compassion for that baby is a kind of action distinct from all of these.

Now, the Mengzi does not provide us with a good similar example for the case of respect. However, based on the characteristics compassion and respect share as emotions, we could infer that respect is also one among many possible motives that can motivate one’s deferential behavior. This point in turn shows that 1) Mengzi’s conception of action is much broader than what Munro ascribes to him, i.e., the proper degree and manner of

actualization of one’s behavioral tendency in a certain situation; and it also reiterates the point that I made in the previous paragraph that 2) respect (and compassion) should not be equated with behavioral tendencies.

For these reasons, I think that Munro’s view of respect (and compassion) as a behavioral tendency is misguided. As an alternative to Munro’s view, I submit that respect in Mengzi is an emotion or emotional sensibility primarily responsive to 1) a person’s worth as a person, 2) a person’s worth deriving from his social status or his role in society, and 3) a person’s merit due to his ethical or political accomplishment. For these reasons, I think that Munro’s view of respect (and compassion) as a behavioral tendency is misguided. As an alternative to Munro’s view, I submit that respect in Mengzi is an emotion or emotional sensibility primarily responsive to 1) a person’s worth as a person, 2) a person’s worth deriving from his social status or his role in society, and 3) a person’s merit due to his ethical or political accomplishment.

First, Mengzi often recommends the rulers of his time not to take innocent people’s lives even if doing so would benefit them greatly. For example, Mengzi says that what the ancient sages Bó Yí 伯夷 and Yī Yǐn 伊尹 shared with Kongzi in character was that although they were equally capable of taking possession of the entire world if they had governed only a territory of a hundred Chinese square miles (lǐ 里), they would have refused to gain the world if doing so had required them to do a single wrong act or kill one innocent life. In addition, after commenting on King Xiāng’s lack of royal dignity in Mengzi 2A:1 Mengzi says he told the king that the world could be unified by the ruler who does not like killing people, and Mengzi also recommends Prince Diàn 墊 of the Qi dukedom to follow humaneness and righteousness, which he codifies.

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85 This thesis is informed by Stephen Darwall’s distinction between recognition respect and appraisal respect. According to him, recognition respect consists in a disposition to weigh appropriately in one’s deliberations some feature of the object of one’s respect and to act accordingly. So, “to say that persons as such are entitled to respect is to say that they are entitled to have other persons take seriously and weigh appropriately the fact that they are persons in deliberating about what to do” (Stephen Darwall, “Two Kinds of Respect,” Ethics 88, no. 1 [October, 1977], p. 38), and recognition respect in the context of morality is “to regard [the object of one’s respect] as requiring restrictions on the moral acceptability of actions connected with it.” (Ibid., p. 40) In addition, what is important about moral recognition respect, as Darwall emphasizes, is to regard such a restriction as not incidental but as arising because of the feature or fact itself. That is, respecting persons as such is to regard them as deserving to be not treated in certain ways, due to the fact that they are persons (Ibid.). On the other hand, appraisal respect “consists in an attitude of positive appraisal of that person either as a person or as engaged in some particular pursuit.” For example, “one may have such respect for someone’s integrity, for someone’s good qualities on the whole, or for someone as a musician.” (Ibid., p. 38) I believe that respect (jìng 敬) in Mengzi can arguably accommodate both kinds of respect, at least to some extent.

86 得百里之地而君之，皆能以朝諸侯，有天下；行一不義，殺一不辜，而得天下，皆不為也。是則同。” Mengzi 2A.2.

respectively as not killing an innocent person (rén 仁) and not taking what is not one’s own (yì 義)\(^8\).

Mengzi’s classification of not taking an innocent life to the realm of rén 仁 (mainly benevolence or caring in this context) reveals his thinking that the ruler’s refraining from taking his people’s lives is to be based on his benevolence for his people, and this benevolence could be seen as mono-directional in the sense that whether to treat people benevolently or not is up to the ruler, and that the people have no demand on it. However, this is actually a wrong view, because what is important in Mengzi’s advice is people’s innocence. That is, Mengzi’s thought underlying his recommendation not to take innocent lives seems to be that the ruler should view people’s innocence as a factor making them beings at least *worthy* of not being killed for no fault, and that the ancient sages’ refusing to accept the entire world at the expense of one innocent life shows that these sages were responsive to the factor of people’s innocence and acted according to its requirements. This seems to show that respect is basically being responsive to certain relevant factors the object of one’s respect has, and viewing these factors as imposing some restrictions on one’s treatment of that object.

Second, in *Mengzi* 6A:5 discussed above, at a village ceremony one respects a villager who is a year older than one’s elder brother by pouring wine to him first, and at a sacrificial ceremony for ancestors one shows respect to one’s younger brother who acts as the impersonator of an ancestor. Mengzi says that one’s respect (jing 敬) changes its proper object from one’s uncle to one’s younger brother as the situation changes, and it is one’s respect that at least partly tells one whether a person deserves respect in a certain situation, and if he does, how much respect he deserves in that situation.

I said only “partly,” though, and it is important to note that respect as an emotional sensibility can be often inaccurate about what is the proper degree to which one is supposed to feel and express one’s respect toward a person who clearly deserves one’s respect. For example, Yǒuzì 有子, a disciple of Kongzi’s, says that “one can stay away from shame and disgrace if one’s [expression of] respect closely [follows the

\(^{88}\) “仁義而已矣. 殺一無罪，非仁也；非其有而取之，非義也。居惡在？仁是也；路惡在？義是也。居仁由義，大人之事備矣.” *Mengzi* 13:33.
prescription of] the rituals.” I take this saying to mean the following: Even if it were correct for one to feel respect toward another person, one can be uncertain about to what degree exactly one should feel respect for that person, and consequently one can express one’s respect for that person too much or too little in terms of the appropriate manner of expressing one’s respect prescribed by the social norms. This social “prescriptions” take into consideration not only the status and merit of that person but also one’s relationship to that person in society, and make sure that one’s expression of respect is always appropriate in a certain situation. If one fails to follow such social norms and happens to express one’s respect for a person “too much,” that person might misinterpret one’s intention and respond with domineering behaviors or unjust requests of favor. On the other hand, if one happens to express her respect for that person “too little,” that person might feel offended and try to pay her back, say, by insulting her. In the sense that one’s feeling of respect is not sufficient guidance for proper expression of one’s respect, Munro is definitely right in pointing out that proper expression of respect needs to follow the guidance of one’s evaluating mind that considers all of the fine factors contributing to the merit and status of the person to be respected and the social norms concerning the proper manner and degree of expressing one’s respect to that person in a certain situation. However, as I argued above, respect as an action is significantly different from respect as a mere behavior, and one’s feeling of respect for another person’s status or merit is what distinguishes a respectful action from other kinds of actions, which can still be equally respectful or deferential at the level of behavior.

Moreover, I think that although respect as an emotional sensibility can be inaccurate about the fine degree to which one should feel respect, it is still reliably responsive to clear enough distinctions in the quality of respectability. For example, Mengzi tells the following episode:

Someone asked Zēng Xī 曾西, “Between you and Zǐlù 子路, who is more worthy?” Zēng Xī said uneasily, “[Even my late father] was afraid of him.” “Then, who is more worthy between you and Guān Zhòng 管仲?” Zēng Xī, expressing displeasure [this time], said, “How can you ever compare me to Guān Zhòng? Guān Zhòng enjoyed his ruler’s confidence so exclusively and governed the country for so long, but his achievements are

so insignificant. How dare you compare me to this man?"\(^{90}\)

Zēng Xī  曾西 is the son of Zēng Shēn  曾參, a worthy disciple of Kongzi’s who is even sometimes addressed as “Master Zēng” 曾子 in the Analects. Zīlù 子路, another advanced disciple of Kongzi’s, was much senior to Zēng Shēn,\(^{91}\) and according to his son (Zēng Xī), Zēng Shēn had great reverence (wèi 畏) for Zīlù presumably not just for his seniority but more importantly for his great moral character. Now, Zēng Xī’s uneasiness at the thought of comparing himself to Zīlù whom even his worthy father showed great respect reveals that he feels greater respect for Zīlù than his father, and one can imagine how much respect Zēng Xī would feel for Kongzi, the great teacher of both Zīlù and his father. On the other hand, Zēng Xī’s displeasure at the question of who is more worthy, he or Guān Zhòng, the famous seventh century minister of the Qi 齊 dukedom, shows his deep-seated disrespect for Guān Zhòng. In short, this passage shows the point that one can feel different degrees of respect (and disrespect) towards different people’s corresponding merits. And I think that this “rational” or “cognitive” aspect of respect—i.e. one’s feeling of respect more or less correctly representing different grades of people’s merits—constitutes the core of respect as an emotion, which Munro’s view of respect as merely a behavioral tendency cannot explain.

4.3.2.3 Respect as a Concern-Based Construal

So far, I have argued that respect in Mengzi is basically an emotional sensibility responsive to a person’s worth or merit, and I also explained how respect conceived this way is different both from desire for respectful action (Nivison) and from a behavioral tendency to act respectfully (Munro). As I see it, respect in this sense can be also well explained in the light of the construal view of emotion introduced earlier, and in this section I try to explain how it is so. As has been said in Mengzi 6A:5, at a village

\(^{90}\) “或問乎曾西日：‘吾子與子路孰賢？’ 曾西蹴然日：‘吾先子之所畏也’。”日：‘然則吾子與管仲孰賢？’ 曾西艴然不悅，曰：‘爾何曾比予於管仲？管仲得君如彼其專也，行乎國政如彼其久也，功烈如彼其卑也。爾何曾比予於是？’” Mengzi 2A:1. In the original text, the foot radical (zú 足) of “cù 蹴” is at the bottom of the character rather than its left-side.

\(^{91}\) According to Qián Mù's 錢穆 calculation, Zīlù (542–480 B.C.E.) was thirty seven years older than Zēng Shēn (505–436 B.C.E.). See his Xiāngqīn zhūzǐ xīnliàn, vol. 2, pp. 615–616.
ceremony one respects a villager who is a year older than one’s elder brother by pouring wine to him first, and at a sacrificial ceremony for ancestors one shows respect to one’s younger brother who acts as the impersonator of an ancestor. It can be said that one’s feeling of respect toward the villager in the first occasion is basically one’s construal of the villager as deserving a respectful treatment due to his age. This construal is not merely a neutral-minded acknowledgment of the villager’s elderliness (Gàozǐ-Mèngjízǐ’s position) but seeing the villager as really deserving respect. The villager can appear to be so to one if, among many other reasons, one thinks that the elders are the backbone of society—they set the role-models for the younger members of society and know what to do in social or natural emergencies, and therefore that it is important for them to be treated respectfully. In the second occasion, one can find it a marvelous and grateful fact that one’s ancestors are the source of one’s existence here and now, and this in turn makes one think that one’s younger brother, presently an impersonator of one’s ancestors at the ceremony, really deserves one’s most sincere respect.

In addition, while arguing against Munro’s behaviorist interpretation of respect in the previous section, I proposed that respect has some “rational” or “cognitive” aspect in the sense that respect is a kind of emotional sensibility responsive to people’s merit and social status in varying degrees. For example, we have earlier seen in Mengzi 1A:6 that after his audience with King Xiāng of Liáng, Mengzi reported that the king did not look like a ruler at all and seemed to have nothing to be afraid of or respectful about.92 This remark of Mengzi’s can be interpreted that 1) Mengzi’s sense of respect detected nothing in King Xiāng of Liáng that would make him construe the king to deserve respect, and that 2) the fact that he was a king without any corresponding merit exacerbated the situation and made it more convincing that he did not command Mengzi’s sincere respect.

On the other hand, we have also seen in Mengzi 2A:1 that Zēng Xī felt increasing degree of respect toward his father Zēng Shēn, his father’s senior colleague Zīlù, and presumably Kongzi who taught both Zēng Shēn and Zīlù, whereas he felt great disrespect for Guán Zhòng who made his country Qí dukedom the most powerful country and the center of the international politics for decades in seventh century China. For this case too,

92 “孟子見梁襄王，出，語人曰：‘望之不似人君，就之而不見所畏焉…’” Mengzi 1A:6. For a detailed discussion of this passage, see Section 4.3.2.2 of this chapter.
it could be said that the reasons Zēng Xī gave for both his increasing respect toward his father, Zǐlù, and Kongzi and his great disrespect for Guān Zhòng were basically his construals, or his particular way of assessing the merits of these figures. This point is especially conspicuous with the case of Guān Zhòng: His merit was so great that even Kongzi highly praised him in the Analects, but both Mengzi and Zēng Xī are not described to think so highly of him in the Mengzi. For example, Kongzi says that Guān Zhòng might be a humane (rén 仁) person because he helped Duke Huán of Qí convene the other rulers of his time without recourse to forceful means, and Kongzi also says that it is thanks to Guān Zhòng who helped Duke Huán become the leader of the feudal lords and protect China from the barbarians that China could preserve its high culture. However, Kongzi also once severely criticized Guān Zhòng for having violated the Rituals (lǐ 禮) which Kongzi thought to be the foundation of his ideal, harmonious society, and this might have contributed to Mengzi’s and Zēng Xī’s—both the sincere followers of Kongzi—negative appraisal of Guān Zhòng.

In other words, if Kongzi’s positive appraisal of Guān Zhòng was focused on the benefits people had reaped from his maintaining a stable political system in seventh century China mainly through the military power of the Qí dukedom, Zēng Xī’s (and also Kongzi and Mengzi’s) negative appraisal of Guān Zhòng was focused on his lack of moral character that would have enabled Duke Huán of Qí to practice benevolent government (xíng rénzhèng 行仁政) and consequently become a true king of the world (wáng 王) instead of remaining merely a leader of the feudal lords (bà 霸). In short, the fact that different people (or even a single person like Kongzi) gave seemingly

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93 “桓公九合諸侯，不以兵車，管仲之力也。如其仁，如其仁。” Lunyu 14:16.
94 “管仲桓公，霸諸侯，一匡天下，民到于今受其賜。微管仲，吾其被癲矣。” Lunyu 14:17.
95 “邦君樹塞門，管氏亦樹塞門。邦君為兩君之好，有反坫，管氏亦有反坫。管氏而知禮，孰不知禮?” Lunyu 3:22.
96 We have already seen how contemptuous Zēng Xī was of Guān Zhòng in my previous discussion of Mengzi 2A:1. As for Mengzi, we find at the beginning of the same passage that it was Mengzi himself who told the story of Zēng Xī to one of his disciples when this disciple asked whether Mengzi would be able to equal Guān Zhòng if he were given a chance to govern the Qí dukedom: “公孫丑問曰：‘夫子當路於齊，管仲晏子之功，可復許乎?’ 孟子曰：‘子誠齊人也。知管仲晏子而已矣。或問乎曾西曰…’” Mengzi 2A:1.
conflicting but not unlikely appraisals of Guǎn Zhòng seems to show the following two points: 1) Zēng Xī’s sense of respect and disrespect responding to each figure’s merit or demerit is significantly informed by Zēng Xī’s conception of what is really valuable or estimable, and that 2) Zēng Xī’s conviction that his feeling of respect or disrespect toward each of these figures is warranted can be nothing more than an indication of how firmly Zēng Xī holds to his value system.

4.3.3 Xiūwù zhī xīn 羞恥之心, Sìduān 四端, and Hàowù 好惡

In the previous sections, we have seen that cèyǐn zhī xīn and respect, Mengzi’s first and third sprout, can be well explained by the construal view of emotion. According to this view, emotions are concern-based construals having the appearance of truth, and I argued that cèyǐn zhī xīn is construing another being’s misfortune with sympathetic concern (or finding it unbearable for one’s family members to be harmed), whereas respect is construing another person as deserving respect due to her worth or merit. In this section, I turn to the discussion of Mengzi’s second sprout, namely xiūwù zhī xīn 羞恥之心. “Xiū” 羞 is similar in meaning to another term “chǐ” 恥 (“shame”), and both terms often mean the emotion of shame that one feels in a disgraceful or humiliating situation (“rǔ” 辱). On the other hand, we have seen earlier in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.2) that wù 惡 is one’s affective response of dislike or long-term aversion for various objects, and a person’s character can be known by observing what kinds of things the person in question feels averse to—together with his hào (liking or desire) response. My following discussion focuses on these two aspects of xiūwù zhī xīn: First, in Section 4.3.3.1, I discuss several key passages from the Mengzi concerning this concept and argue that shame (xiū 羞 or chǐ 恥) in Mengzi is well explained by the construal view of emotion, just as we have earlier seen it to be the case for compassion and respect. Second, I devote Section 4.3.3.2 to discussing the hierarchical relationship between the four sprouts and hàowù by conducting a conceptual analysis of the term “xiūwù zhī xīn.”

4.3.3.1 Shame (Xiū 羞 or Chǐ 恥) and Emotional Control in Mengzi

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The term “xiūwù zhī xīn” is used four times throughout the *Mengzi*, twice each in *Mengzi* 2A:6 and 6A:6. What its usage in these two passages tells us is that *xiūwù zhī xīn* is deeply related with the virtue of *yì*. 98 *Yì* is often rendered as “righteousness” both in the sense of a quality of a moral person and a quality of a moral action, and *Mengzi*’s prime example of right act is not taking another person’s property. 99 So, *Mengzi* says, “If people can extend their intention not to bore holes [to peep through] or climb over walls, there will be an over-abundance of righteousness.” 100 However, *yì* sometimes seems to mean “honor” in some ancient Chinese texts. For example, the *Mòzǐ* contains a passage where Mòzī observes that honor is the most valued for human beings. According to him, no one would let his life be taken in exchange for the whole world, but human beings often fight over a single word (i.e. insult) risking their lives; this shows that they value honor more than their lives. 101 We find a similar thought in the *Mengzi* too. Look at the following passage, which has been already quoted partly above:

Fish is something I want, and bear’s paw is also something I want. But if I cannot have both, I forsake fish and choose bear’s paw. Life is something I desire, and honor is also something I desire. But if I cannot have both, I forsake life and choose honor. Life is what I want, but there is something that I want more than life, so I do not do anything to get it [i.e. life]. Death is what I hate, but there is something that I hate more than death, so there are some troubles that I do not avoid. If there were nothing that people desire more than life, why do they [sometimes] not use those means that could save their life? If there were nothing that people hate more than death, why do they [sometimes] not do what could let them avoid troubles? [But] there are [definitely] things that people can use and save their lives but do not do so, and there are things that people can use and avoid troubles but do not do so. Therefore, [it is clear that] there are things that people desire

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100 “人能充無穿踰之心，而義不可勝用也.” *Mengzi* 7B:31.
101 “子墨子曰：‘萬事莫貴於義。今謂人曰：’予子冠履，而斷子之手足，子為之乎?’ 必不為。何故？則冠履不若手足之貴也。又曰：’予子天下而殺子之身，子為之乎?’ 必不為。何故？則天下不若身之貴也。爭一言以相殺，是貴義於其身也。故曰：萬事莫貴於義也.’” *Mòzǐ*, “Guiyi” 高義. Sūn Yírāng, *Mòzǐ xiángū*, p. 439. Of course, the point Mòzǐ wants to make in this passage is that the correct principle (*yì*) with which one conducts oneself is more important than one’s life. However, as Nivison correctly points out, no ancient Chinese philosopher would have wanted to settle a dispute by sword-fighting. This shows that the original sense of “*yì*” in this passage was “honor” rather than “righteousness” or “principle,” and Mòzǐ could make his point only by taking advantage of the semantic ambiguity of the character “*yì*.” Nivison also quotes a passage from the *Shìjī* 史記 where “gāoyì” 高義 is used in the sense of “high honor” or “a lofty sense of honor.” See David S. Nivison, “The Classical Philosophical Writings,” in *The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C.*, ed. Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 765–766.
more than life, and there are things that people hate more than death. It is not that only
the worthy person has this heart; everyone has it, but [only] the worthy person is able to
not lose it.

A basket of rice, and a bowl of soup—[suppose that] one can live by getting them,
but otherwise one will die. But if they are given with a humiliating voice, even a wayfarer
will not accept them; if given by kicking the bowls, even a beggar will not be happy [to
take them]. However, when it comes to ten-thousand bushels [of grain], many people will
accept it without seeing whether ritual propriety and righteousness [would allow to do
so]. What do ten-thousand bushels [of grain] add to me? Is it for the sake of the beauty of
houses, the service of a wife and concubines, and the gratitude my needy acquaintances
will show me? But earlier I did not accept [the offer] despite my own death, but now I do
it because of the beauty of houses; earlier I did not accept it despite my own death, but
now I do it for the service of my wife and concubines; earlier I did not accept it despite
my own death, but now I do it for the gratitude my needy acquaintances will show me—is
this indeed something that I cannot help quitting? This is called losing one's original
heart.102

In the first paragraph of this passage, Mengzi says that he desires yi more than his life,
and I translated “yi” as “honor.” Furthermore, Mengzi also says that his preference for
honor to life is actually shared by everyone, and in the second paragraph of the passage
he illustrates this point by saying that even a beggar would refuse to accept foods if they
were given in an insulting manner. This shows that my translation of “yi” as “honor” here
is warranted. However, in the second paragraph we find another instance of yi concerning
the acceptance of ten-thousand bushels of grain, and since accepting this is not either
right or wrong in itself, Mengzi says that one needs to check whether accepting it would
be in accordance with ritual propriety (li 礼) and righteousness (yi 義). The use of “li”
(ritual propriety) here implies that it would be wrong to accept things that were given
in violation of ritual prescriptions, and since the rituals or social norms do not cover the
whole span of proper behavior, one should also consult the standard of righteousness as
necessary in order to see whether accepting a gift would be appropriate in a certain

102 “魚，我所欲也，熊掌亦我所欲也。二者不可得兼，舍魚而取熊掌者也。生亦我所欲也，義亦我所欲
也。二者不可得兼，舍生而取義者也。生亦我所欲，所欲有甚於生者，故不為苟得也。死亦我所惡，所
惡有甚於死者，故患有所不辟也。如使人之所欲莫甚於生，則凡可以得生者，何不用也？使人之所
惡莫甚於死者，則凡可以辟患者，何不為也？由是則生而有不用也，由是則可以辟患而有不為也。是
故所欲有甚於生者，所惡有甚於死者。非獨賢者有是心也；人皆有之，賢者能勿喪耳。”

《孟子》6A:10.
situation. This makes us translate the second instance of “yì” in the passage as “righteousness.” As I see it, the fact that yì is used both in the sense of honor and righteousness in one passage implies that acting in accordance with righteousness (yì 義) is an important source of one’s dignity or honor (yì 義). And it must be in this light that Mengzi says the following: “If one can extend [one’s unwillingness to provide others with] grounds for addressing oneself by ‘thou’ or ‘thee’ (an insulting way of addressing the second person in ancient China), there is no place where he goes and not do what is right.”  

As we are now clear that 1) the virtue of righteousness in Mengzi is deeply related with honor and that 2) an important source of honor for the nobleman is conducting himself according to the demand of righteousness, it is not hard to understand why “xiūwù zhī xīn,” the sprout of righteousness, contains a character (i.e. “xiū” 羞) that denotes the feeling of shame. Except for its four times of usage in Mengzi 2A:6 and 6A:6 as part of the term “xiūwù zhī xīn,” “xiū” 羞 is used three times throughout the Mengzi. It is used to describe the character of Liúxià Hùi 柳下惠, an ancient sage who did not feel ashamed of serving a corrupt ruler in a low office, and that of Wáng Liáng 王良, an ancient chariot driver who found it shameful to break the proper rules of driving to help an inexperienced archer cheat in a ritual hunt. In addition, Mengzi 4B:33 tells a story of a man who was returning home everyday full of meat and wine, telling his wife and concubine that he dined with rich and eminent people. The wife and concubine thought it strange, and one day they followed their husband secretly to find out that their husband had been filling his stomach by begging remnants of sacrificial offerings here and there at a graveyard. The wife and concubine came back home full of shame and wept together, but the husband, not knowing this, came home pleasantly and behaved arrogantly toward his wife and concubine. The author of the passage concludes with a remark that “in the view of the nobleman, among the means by which people pursue
wealth, honor, profit, and promotion, there are few that their wives and concubines do not weep together feeling shameful about.”\textsuperscript{106}

As is clear in the last example, the feeling of shame (\textit{xiū} 羞) in Mengzi is directed at shameful situations not only of oneself but also of others who stand “in some special relation to oneself.”\textsuperscript{107} In addition, the last example also shows that people often disagree about whether one should feel shameful in a certain situation, and people feel shame only when they construe certain features of the situation in question as deserving shame. So, while the husband in \textit{Mengzi} 4B:33 apparently thought it all right to have food and wine by begging them at a graveyard, the wife and concubine felt shameful about their husband’s deed because they found it disgraceful.\textsuperscript{108} However, as we have seen in Section 4.3.1.2 above, one’s construing oneself or someone closely related to oneself to be in a shameful situation does not necessarily make one feel shame; in order to feel shame, one needs to be concerned about being in a humiliating situation oneself, or concerned about the other person’s being in a similar situation. So, again we have the wife in \textit{Mengzi} 4B:33 saying the following to the concubine: “A husband is what [people like us] are supposed to look up to until the end of our lives, but now [we have one] like this.” After saying this, the wife reviled her husband with the concubine and wept together with her.\textsuperscript{109} In the phrase “like this” (\textit{rǔ cǐ} 如此) is implied their deep contempt and frustration about their husband who did not care about conducting himself \textit{like that}, and the wife and concubine’s shame, contempt, and frustration about their husband show how much they were concerned about being in such a humiliating situation, whether it was either of themselves or their husband who was found in that kind of situation.

Besides “\textit{xiū}” 羞, “\textit{chǐ}” 耻 is another term frequently used in the \textit{Mengzi} to denote what we would normally call the feeling of shame. It is sometimes used with “\textit{rǔ}” 辱 (“disgrace”), and makes it conspicuous that the feeling of shame (\textit{xiū} 羞 or \textit{chǐ} 耻) in Mengzi involves construing the relevant features of a certain situation as bringing

\textsuperscript{106} “由君子觀之，則人之所以求富貴利達者，其妻妾不羞也，而不相泣者，幾希矣.” \textit{Mengzi} 4B:33.
\textsuperscript{107} Shun, \textit{Mencius and Early Chinese Thought}, p. 60.
\textsuperscript{108} Or alternatively, the husband might have thought that begging foods was a shameful deed, but he did not care much about acting shamefully as long as he could have good foods, and did not care about looking disgraceful to others as long as those ‘others’ did not include his wife and concubine.
\textsuperscript{109} “其妻歸，告其妾，曰：‘良人者，所仰望而終身也，今若此.’與其妾訕其良人，而相泣於中庭.” \textit{Mengzi} 4B:33.
disgrace (辱) to oneself or those closely related to oneself. For example, in *Mengzi* 1A:5 King Huì 惠 of Liáng 梁 talks about a series of military defeats his country has recently suffered. Specifically, he says that he was humiliated by Chǔ 楚 in the south and feels shameful about those defeats. In addition to defeat in a battle, the author of the *Mengzi* observes that one can find it disgraceful to serve other people or to receive orders from a big country (as the ruler of a small state) and feel shameful about them, and these instances of shame seem to be of the same kind as being shameful of one’s poor clothes and coarse foods or asking questions of one’s subordinates in the *Analects*. What is common to all of these instances of shame seems to be the thought that it is disgraceful to be in an inferior position in terms of power, social status, or knowledge, and it is often the case that one’s assuming an inferior position in these aspects is observable by the public. Bryan Van Norden calls this kind of shame “conventional shame”, and Kwong-loi Shun calls the standards by which people judge the aforementioned situations to be shameful “social standards.”

On the other hand, we can find another kind of shame in the *Mengzi*. The standards of this shame are not necessarily shared by everyone, and one does not need to be in the presence of others to feel this kind of shame. For example, King Wǔ 武 feeling of shame at the outrageous behaviors of Zhòu 紂 (the last, wicked ruler of the Shāng 商 dynasty who was dethroned by King Wǔ), the nobleman’s shame at his reputation exceeding his real merits, feeling shameful about taking an office without being able to put the Way into practice, and feeling shameful about not being as worthy as others—all of these could be grouped into one category, and Van Norden

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100 “東敗於齊，長子死焉；西喪地於秦七百里；南辱於楚，寡人恥之…” *Mengzi* 1A:5.
104 “恥下問，” *Lunyu* 5:15.
107 “一人行於天下，武王恥之。” *Mengzi* 1B:3.
109 “立乎人之本朝，而道不行，恥也。” *Mengzi* 5B:5.
calls it “ethical shame.” According to Van Norden, one feels this kind of shame when one believes that one has some significant character flaw, and Shun proposes to call the standards for this type of shame “ethical standards” to distinguish them from the “social standards” corresponding to the “conventional shame.” Although arguing against the possibility that human beings are subject only to ethical shame but not to conventional shame, Van Norden is correct to point out that “early Confucians are at pains to minimize the significance of conventional shame and to emphasize the importance of ethical shame.” Similarly, Shun is also correct in saying that the social and ethical standards for assessing the propriety of one’s shameful feeling often diverge from each other, and that the nobleman’s primary concern in Mengzi is with the ethical standards of shame.

However, both Shun and Van Norden are silent about how Mengzi’s nobleman achieves his goal, viz. minimizing the significance of conventional shame and making himself not vulnerable to ethical shame. Van Norden does talk about several ways in which one could cope with one’s feeling of conventional shame: A person suffering from conventional shame can try to feel differently by telling herself that 1) ‘others do not really look down upon me,’ 2) ‘the opinions of those who look down upon me do not really matter,’ or 3) ‘I should not share the standard of appearance that makes them look down upon me,’ and the like. However, for some reason Van Norden does not further develop this idea in the context of the Mengzi, and in the following I will explain how Mengzi’s nobleman would deal with his feeling of conventional shame and develop his sense of ethical shame. What I mean by “sense of ethical shame” is some sort of emotional sensibility that is responsive to actions or situations prone to bring shame on the agent, and developing this kind of emotional sensibility is supposed to help the ideal Mengzian agent avoid doing ethically embarrassing acts. After all, my discussion of this topic in the following several paragraphs—i.e. how Mengzi’s nobleman would cope with

122 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, pp. 61–62.
124 Ibid., p. 168.
125 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, p. 61.
his conventional shame and develop the sense of ethical shame—should show that the construal view of emotions is a highly useful tool to interpret Mengzi’s view of emotions.

In Mengzi 1B3, we find a conversation between King Xuān 宣 of Qi 齊 and Mengzi about courage and shame. The king asks Mengzi about how to maintain a good relationship with other states, and Mengzi suggests two models. One is the model of the humane ruler (rénzhě 仁者) who is willing to serve a smaller country than his own, and the other is the wise ruler (zhīzhě 智者) who serves another country if it is bigger than his own. According to Mengzi, the person who can serve a smaller country than his own is joyful in [following the way of] Heaven (lètiān 樂天), and the one who serves a bigger country than his own is in awe of Heaven (wèitiān 畏天); and the person who delights in [the way of] Heaven protects the whole world, while the one who stands in awe of Heaven protects his country. In other words, the humane ruler prefers to keep the peace of the world by not invading smaller countries even when he has the capacity to do so, while the wise ruler manages to protect his country by acting appropriately in the power relationship with bigger countries. However, although approving Mengzi’s suggestions, the king also says that he cannot follow Mengzi’s advice because of his pathological fondness of courage. That is, the king means that he cannot adopt either of the suggested models because he wants to conquer the other countries with his military power. Mengzi responds to this by saying the following:

I beg your majesty not to be fond of small courage. To put one’s hand on a sword with a furious look [at the enemy] and say “how dare he stand in my way!”—this is the courage of an ordinary man, which can meet only a single person. Your majesty should make it bigger please!...The Documents says, “Heaven populated the earth with the ordinary people, and it made them a ruler, and made them a teacher. They [i.e. the ruler and the teacher] are only supposed to assist Shàngdì 上帝 [the highest deity in the Shāng 商 pantheon] in loving them [i.e. the people]. All the culpable and the innocent in the four directions are only in my [responsibility]; how dare anyone under the heaven resist His will?” There was a man [i.e. King Zhòu 紂 of Shāng 商] doing outrageous things in the
world, and King Wǔ 武 felt shame about it. This was the courage of King Wǔ. By a burst of wrath, King Wǔ also brought peace to the people under the heaven. Now if your majesty also bring peace to the people of the world by a burst of wrath, people will be afraid only of your majesty’s not being fond of courage.130

The author of this passage seems to postulate a close relationship between shame, anger, and courage. As has been briefly mentioned above (Mengzi 1A:5 quoted in footnote 110), frequent battles in the Warring States period China often led to the defeated country being humiliated by the victorious one, and the shamed ruler of the former often conceived anger at the ruler of the latter. The expression of this anger often meant another war for revenge, and it was understood that engaging in a vengeful activity required some sort of courage (yǒng 勇). It seems that despite the difference in scale, the rancorous transactions between states were not different in nature from the vengeful dealings between individuals, and Mengzi is explicit that the kind of courage that is mustered up for fighting private battles, whether between ordinary people or between rulers of different states, is petty courage (xiǎoyǒng 小勇). This being the case, it was natural for Mengzi to view both the shame and anger related to this “petty courage” to be petty ones too, and Mengzi’s exhortation to the king to enlarge his courage (dà zhī 大之) must postulate that 1) there are great or admirable kind of shame and anger, and that 2) the king can transform his petty shame and anger to great or admirable ones. Now, it seems that what Mengzi regards as petty shame and anger are equivalent to conventional shame and anger, and the admirable kind of shame and anger to ethical shame and anger. For whereas many people would find it appropriate to feel shameful and angry if they were beaten (in public) by their enemy, it is not even easy for many to have the admirable kind of shame and anger that Mengzi exhorts the king to cultivate.

Then, how could the king minimize the influence of his ordinary shame and anger on himself and cultivate the ethical shame and anger instead? We find a clue to this question in Mengzi 2A:2, where Mengzi discusses the difference between small courage

and great courage. In that passage he mentions a warrior named Běigōng Yǒu 北宮黝 as exemplary of small courage, and Mengzi describes this man’s character as follows:

Běigōng Yǒu’s [way of] cultivating courage: He never flinched [from being stabbed on] his body, and never turned his eyes from any thrusts at them. He thought of the tiniest bit of slight from another person as if being beaten in the market place; and he would not tolerate [any insult] from a common fellow coarsely clad, as he would not tolerate [any insult] from a ruler who could summon ten-thousand war-chariots. He viewed stabbing a ruler of ten-thousand chariots as if stabbing a person poorly clad; he was not afraid of feudal lords, and made sure to return any obscenities coming his way.¹³¹

And Mengzi compares this “method” of cultivating courage with another person’s method, which he comments as not necessarily better but more simple than Běigōng Yǒu’s method:

[As for] Mèng Shīshè’s 孟施舍 way of cultivating courage, [he] said, “I look on defeat as victory. To advance after measuring the enemy, and to engage after calculating [the chances of] victory—this is to stand in awe of the three armies. How could I always win [every battle]? All I can do is to remain without fear.” Mèng Shīshè is similar to Zēngzǐ 曾子, and Běigōng Yǒu is similar to Zīxià 子夏. Between these two men’s courage, I don’t know which one is better, but Mèng Shīshè kept [the method] simple.¹³²

Despite the difference in style between these two methods of courage-cultivation, we can see that both methods also share a significant commonality by focusing on the underlined part of the text. What I wanted to highlight above is the psychological activity of “thinking of A as B” or “regarding A as B,” and this is expressed by such patterns as “思 A ruò 若 B” or “視 A yǒu 猶 B” in the original text. As should be already clear to the perceptive reader, this is exactly the method of construing something in terms of something else which I described in Section 4.3.1.2 above, viz. attending to some aspect of the object in question so that some image, concept, or thought is brought to bear as an interpretive paradigm. So, it is by this method that Běigōng Yǒu interpreted any insult

¹³¹ “不膚橈, 不目逃, 思以一毫挫於人, 若撻之於市朝. 不受於褐寬博, 亦不受於萬乘之君; 視刺萬乘之君, 若刺褐夫. 無嚴諸侯, 惡聲至, 必反之.” Mengzi 2A:2. The underlining is mine.

from other people as grave as being beaten in public, so that the feeling of shame emerging thereby could fuel his corresponding anger, and the anger thus aroused in turn provide the motivational energy for engaging in vengeful actions. Likewise, besides his prudent strategic analysis of the situation in every battle, Mèng Shīshè could remain fearless and calm also by adopting the attitude of regarding defeat as victory and vice versa. This shows that both Bēigōng Yǒu and Mèng Shīshè used basically the same method for different purposes, and it also seems to derive that one can control one’s shame and anger or develop a special kind of shame and anger by practicing to see things in a different light.

Let us return to Mengzi 1B:3 (quoted in footnote 130) and pursue this point a little further. In that passage we have seen Mengzi saying that looking furiously at one’s enemy and saying “how dare he challenge me!” is an ordinary man’s courage useful only for fighting against a single person, and we now know from the example of Bēigōng Yǒu that behind this kind of “courage” is the feeling of conventional shame and anger that find any kinds of slights from other people disgraceful and intolerable. However, Mengzi contrasts this kind of shame and anger with those of King Wū’s, which found the misgovernment of Zhòu, the last flagrant ruler of the Shāng dynasty, disgraceful and intolerable. King Wū’s shame comes from his considering the entire world as his responsibility—“all the culpable and the innocent in the four directions are only in my responsibility,” and he might have felt shameful about his failure to protect the people from the misgovernment of the Shāng king. And his anger, or wrath, is apparently directed at this wicked Shāng king—“how dare anyone under the heaven resist His will?” Besides Mengzi 1B:3, there are two more passages from the Mengzi that describe the ancient sage kings as considering their people’s misfortune to be due to their faults using the grammatical structure of “sī 思 A yóu 由 B”, and passages like these show that it is by practicing to see things in a different light that one can mitigate the force of one’s conventional shame and develop a proper sense of shame.

133 Mengzi 4B:29 writes that Yǔ 禹, an ancient sage entrusted with the task of preventing big rivers from flooding, thought of any drowning of a person in the world as due to his fault; and Ji 稷, another sage in charge of teaching agriculture to the people, thought of any starving of a person in the world as due to his fault. Note that in the following text “yóu” 由 is used interchangeably with “yóu” 比: “禹思天下有溺者，由己溺之也；稷思天下有飢者，由己飢之也.” Mengzi 4B:29. The same idea is conveyed by the construction “sī 思 A ruò 若 B” in Mengzi 5A:7.
4.3.3.2 Xiūwù zhī xīn 羞惡之心 and the Hierarchical Structure of Moral Emotions

So far, I have discussed Mengzi’s conception of shame as part of the sprout of xiūwù zhī xīn 羞惡之心. However, as it is clear from its name “xiūwù zhī xīn,” Mengzi’s second sprout is not a homogeneous emotional response of shame (xiū) but a mixture of shame and dislike (wù 惡), and previous scholars have occasionally tried to reach the correct understanding of the distinction between xiū 羞 and wù 惡. Zhū Xī 朱熹 proposed that “xiū 羞 is feeling shameful (chǐ 恥) about one’s badness whereas wù 惡 is hating other people’s badness”,\(^{134}\) and Kwong-loi Shun corrects this view by pointing out that wù 惡 can be also directed at one’s own moral failure such as one’s ethical inferiority to others (Mengzi 6A:12), one’s getting a government job through improper means (Mengzi 3B:3), and one’s failing to act in accordance with righteousness (Mengzi 6A:10).\(^{135}\) According to Shun, the response of wù 惡 can be directed at any object of dislike including one’s own and other people’s misdeeds or character flaws, whereas xiū 羞 and chǐ 恥 can be directed only at “things that one regards as reflecting adversely on oneself” or those who stand “in some special relation to oneself.”\(^{136}\) In objection to these efforts to clarify the distinction between xiū 羞 and wù 惡, though, Bryan Van Norden says that “any effort to make a precise distinction between xiū and wù is doomed to fail because Mencius sometimes uses the terms interchangeably.”\(^{137}\) For evidence, he points out that Mengzi 2A:9 and 5B:1 write that Liùxià Hui was not shameful of (xiū) serving a corrupt ruler, whereas Mengzi 6B:6 writes that Liùxià Hui did not dislike (wù) serving a corrupt ruler.\(^{138}\) Van Norden argues that besides the ordinary sense of dislike as in dislike of dampness (Mengzi 2A:4) or dislike of death (Mengzi 4A:3 and 6A:10), one’s response of wù sometimes involves regarding something to be ethically condemnable as opposed to just undesirable, as in disdaining disgrace (Mengzi 2A:4) or disdaining the violation of

\(^{134}\) “羞, 耻己之不善也; 惡憎人之不善也.” Zhū Xī 朱熹, Mèngzǐ jìzhù 孟子集註, in Yasui Kō, Mōshi teihan, 卷三, p. 28.

\(^{135}\) Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, p. 60.

\(^{136}\) Ibid.


\(^{138}\) Ibid.
ritual (*Mengzi* 3B:7).\(^{139}\) In addition, Van Norden distinguishes between two senses of shame. According to his definition, a sense of shame in a narrow sense is “a disposition to feel shame in situations that one recognizes are shameful for oneself or for those with whom one identifies,” whereas a sense of shame in a broad sense is “a disposition to recognize when actions or situations are shameful…, and to have appropriate emotional and behavioral reaction to this recognition.”\(^ {140}\) Although rejecting any clear-cut distinction between *xiū* 羞 and *wù* 恶, Van Norden agrees with Shun in thinking that *xiū* 羞 is basically concerning oneself or those closely related to oneself whereas *wù* 恶 can be about oneself as well as unrelated others. Based on this idea, Van Norden proposes that by using the binome “*xiūwù*” 羞悪 instead of inventing “*xiūchì*” 羞恥 for the attitude corresponding to the virtue of righteousness, Mengzi intended to mean that the virtue of righteousness is a sense of shame in a broad sense rather than in a narrow sense, which is responsive not only to one’s own but also other people’s moral failure.\(^ {141}\)

However, it seems that Van Norden’s view of *xiūwù* 羞惡 as a sense of shame in a broad sense cannot be fully correct to the extent that he characterizes *wù* 恶 as particularly a shame response. For as I have argued in Chapter 2 above, Mengzi’s predecessors like Kongzi and the authors of the *Zǔozhuàn* postulate a hierarchical relationship between *hào wù* 好惡 and other particular emotions, and this makes it unlikely that *wù* 恶 in Mengzi is at the same level as *xiū* 羞 or *chì* 恥. More specifically, we have examined in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1.3) an account of emotions from the *Zǔozhuàn*, which proposes that particular emotions such as “joy” (*xǐ* 喜), “anger” (*nù* 怒), “pleasure” (*lè* 樂), and “sorrow” (*āi* 哀) originate from another set of broad conception of emotions, namely liking and disliking or desire and aversion (*hào wù* 好惡). In addition, dealing with Kongzi’s conception of emotions in Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2, I have argued that we could ascribe to Kongzi the view that one’s opposite attitudes of liking and disliking represent one’s emotional reactions to diverse stimuli in the most general and basic way, and one’s particular emotions can be further distinguished out of

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\(^{139}\) Ibid., p. 167.

\(^{140}\) Ibid., p. 153.

\(^{141}\) Ibid., p. 167.
these two basic categories by specifying the conditions and evaluative beliefs involved in the occurrence of the respective particular emotions. In other words, Kongzi seems to hold that human beings experience emotions on two different levels, i.e. on the lower level of the generic responses of liking and disliking and on the higher level of particular emotions, and this again makes it hard to accept that the response of \( wù \) 惡 in \( xiūwù zhī xīn \) 羞惡之心 is simply reducible to a sense of shame in a broad sense.

Then, what is the distinctive function of \( wù \) 惡 in \( xiūwù zhī xīn \) 羞惡之心, and how shall we interpret it? I think that just as we have seen it to be the case in Kongzi, so the response of \( wù \) 惡 in Mengzi denotes one's negative emotional response to diverse objects in the most general way, and in the ethical context it denotes specifically one's aversion to what is morally undesirable or wrong in a broad sense. For instance, we can see from a number of passages in the Mengzi that ordinary people’s dislike or aversion (\( wù \)) in Mengzi is directed at a wide range of things such as disgrace, dampness,\(^{142}\) the crying sound of a drowning child,\(^{143}\) the benevolent government of a neighboring country,\(^{144}\) death, drunkenness,\(^{145}\) and even one’s own child for some parents.\(^{146}\) But in the broadly ethical context \( wù \) is felt about not only being in ethically disgraceful situations such as not being as worthy as others\(^{147}\) and taking office in the government through improper means,\(^{148}\) but the suffering or misery of other beings such as famine,\(^{149}\) other people’s vice,\(^{150}\) the breach of a social norm about requesting an audience with another person,\(^{151}\) hair-splitting scrutiny of intelligence for no purpose,\(^{152}\) and ethically specious entities such as a glib person who can be mistaken as righteous or faithful and

\(^{142}\) "仁則榮，不仁則辱。今惡辱而居不仁，是猶惡溺而居下也。” 寧世 2A:4.
\(^{143}\) "今人乍見孺子將入於井，皆有 恐懼側隱之心…非惡其聲而然也。” 寧世 2A:6.
\(^{144}\) "宋，小國也。今將行王政，齊楚惡而伐之，則如之何?” 寧世 3B:5.
\(^{145}\) "今惡死亡而樂不仁，是猶惡醉而強酒。” 寧世 4A:3.
\(^{146}\) "父母愛之，喜而不忘；父母惡之，勞而不怨。” 寧世 5A:1.
\(^{147}\) “指不若人，則知惡之，心不若人，則不知惡。” 寧世 6A:12. “xīn” 心 here refers to the heart and mind that embody certain ethical character traits, and Mengzi is saying that for one’s heart and mind to be not as good as others’ is a bad thing to feel averse to.
\(^{148}\) “古之大者不欲仕也，又惡不由其道。” 寧世 3B:3.
\(^{149}\) "庖有肥肉，廩有肥馬，民有餓色，野有餓莩，此率獸而食人也。獸相食，且人惡之，為民父母，行政，不免於率獸而食人，惡在其為民父母也?” 寧世 1A:4.
\(^{150}\) “伯夷，非其君，不仕；非其友，不友。不立於惡仁之朝，不與惡人言；立於惡人之朝，與惡人言，若以朝衣朝冠坐於塗炭。推惡惡之心，思與鄰人立，其冠不正，望望然去之，若將浼焉。” 寧世 2A:9.
\(^{151}\) “陽貨欲見孔子而惡無禮。” 寧世 3B:7.
\(^{152}\) “所惡於智者，為其鑽也。如智者若狄之行也，則無惡於智矣。” 寧世 4B:26.
those known as good and sincere among the villagers who are wrongly considered as virtuous.\textsuperscript{153} So far, though, there might seem to be little difference between Van Norden’s position and mine, because 1) the examples that I just cited as instances of the ethically undesirable or wrong largely overlap with Van Norden’s examples of the ethically condemnable in oneself or others, and 2) we have seen in the previous section that an important source of shame for the nobleman is failing to act in accordance with what is right (\textit{yì} \ 善). In other words, Mengzi’s nobleman finds it shameful for one’s character traits to be morally defective or one’s doing anything morally wrong, and in this light it seems that the nobleman’s sense of ethical shame in a broad sense seems to coincide to be his moral sense that distinguishes what is morally right from wrong.

However, I think that despite the strong connotation of \textit{yì} \ 善 as “honor,” we still need to pay balanced attention to the concern of \textit{yì} \ 善 with righteousness or what is right, and I also think that although the nobleman would find it most shameful to fail to live up to the standards of righteousness, disgracefulness is only a vague or at most secondary feature to ethical wrongness or undesirability in many of the objects of one’s ethical \textit{wù} \ 惡 response cited above. Let me prove this point by going through each of those examples. First, the following two passages are favorable to Van Norden’s view:

\begin{quote}
Now [\textit{if}] a person’s fourth finger is bent and does not stretch straight, [\textit{even if}] it does not hurt or cause harm to one’s work, if there is anyone who could make it straight, [\textit{the person would go to him}] without finding it far to travel from Qin to Chù; this is because of the finger that is not like others’. [\textit{However, many people} know to hate it when one’s finger is not like others’, but do not know to hate it when one’s heart and mind are not like others’—this is called not knowing the categories.\textsuperscript{154}]
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
When a boy is born, [his parents] wish to find a wife for him [someday]; and when a girl is born, [her parents] wish to find a husband for her [in the future]. [\textit{This is} how parents feel [about their children], and everyone has that feeling. However, if [some couple] should wait for neither their parents’ orders nor the matchmakers’ arrangements and bore holes [in the wall] to see each other or climb over the wall to meet illicitly, not only their parents but also others in town would all despise them. It’s not that people in the antiquity didn’t want to serve in the government, but they also disliked not going through
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{153} “孔子曰：‘惡似而非者: 惡佞，恐其亂義也；惡利口，恐其亂信也；...惡鄉原，恐其亂德也．’” \textit{Mengzi 7B:37}.

\textsuperscript{154} “今有無名之指屈而不信，非疾痛害事也，如有能信之者，則不遠秦楚之路，為指之不若人也。指不若人，則知惡之；心不若人，則不知惡，此之謂不知類也．” \textit{Mengzi 6A:12}.
the proper means. [For] advancing without recourse to the proper means is of the same category as boring holes [in the wall].\textsuperscript{155}

In the first passage none of Mengzi’s shame terms is used, but Mengzi’s message there is clearly that the reason that one seeks to cure one’s bent finger is because he finds it shameful for one’s finger to be worse than others’. However, Mengzi makes it also clear that if one knows it to be shameful to have a malfunctioning finger, one should know that having malfunctioning heart and mind is also a shameful thing, because a malfunctioning finger and malfunctioning heart and mind are of the same category. Likewise, in the second passage Mengzi says that taking an office by recourse to improper means is as despicable as premarital sex, because both equally belong to the category of shameful deeds. As I see it, these two passages provide clear cases where one’s response of \textit{wù} 恶 in the ethical context is directed at the disgracefulness of its objects as the primary characteristic, but the following two passages would tell a different story:

\begin{quote}
There is fat meat in your kitchen and there are well-fed horses in your stables, but your people look hungry and your fields are scattered with people who died of famine; this is driving animals to devour humans. Even animals’ eating each other is repugnant; [but if your majesty,] as the parent of your people, govern your country and fail to avoid driving animals to devour human beings, where is your being the parent of your people?\textsuperscript{156}
\end{quote}

What is brought to the fore in this passage is the miserable situation where animals are fed well at the expense of human beings starving to death, and the first emotions one is expected to feel in response to this situation should be empathy and sympathy for the starving people. However, Mengzi says that this kind of situation also provokes some sort of repugnance (\textit{wù} 恶), which probably derives from the painful feeling one empathically feels at the suffering of the people, and this kind of repugnance is similar to what one would feel when seeing animals brutally devoured by other kinds of animals. Or alternatively, the repugnance could come from one’s sympathy, which involves the

\textsuperscript{155} "丈夫生而願為之有室，女子生而願為之有家；父母之心，人皆有之。不待父母之命，媒妁之言，鑽穴隙相窺，踰牆相從，則父母國人皆賤之。古之人未嘗不欲仕也，又惡不由其道。不由其道而往者，與鑽穴隙之類也。” Mengzi 3B:3.

\textsuperscript{156} "庖有肥肉，廐有肥馬，民有飢色，野有餓莩，此率獸而食人也。獸相食，且人惡之；為民父母，行政，不免於率獸而食人，惡在其為民父母也?” Mengzi 1A:4.
thought that the suffering of the people is terrible, undeserved, and therefore unacceptable. Admittedly, Mengzi could have urged his interlocutor (the king) to cultivate ethical shame by trying to see the starving of his people as his responsibility; but in this passage Mengzi does not do so, and neither do we find any apparent connection here between the feeling of repugnance and disgracefulness. The feeling of 工委  here rather seems to be a form of disapproval, which is grounded on one’s sympathy or empathy at the misery of the people and finds that situation morally undesirable or unacceptable.

Master Wàn asked, “The whole village calls [them] good and sincere people, and there is no place where they go and are not considered as good and sincere people. But Kongzi regarded them as thieves of virtue. Why is that so?” [Mengzi] said, “[You want to] blame them but there [seems to] be no ground, [you want to] criticize them but there [seems to] be nothing to criticize. They agree with the current customs, and are in harmony with the impure age. They seem to abide by sincerity and trustworthiness, and seem to conduct themselves with moral dignity and purity. The multitude all likes them, and they themselves think they are right, but it is impossible to get on the way of Yao and Shün with them. So we say [they are] thieves of virtues. Kongzi said, “I hate the specious: I hate the darnel, because they might be confused with the rice plant; I hate the adroit, because they might be confused with the righteous; I hate the glib, because they might be confused with the trustworthy; I hate the sound of Zhèng, because it might replace the [proper] Music; I hate purple, because it might be confused with vermilion; I hate those known as good and sincere in the village, because they might be confused with the virtuous.”

In this passage, Kongzi and Mengzi’s feeling of 工委 at the people known as good and sincere among the villagers (鄉愿) is focused on their bad effect as “thieves of virtue.” According to Mengzi, their hypocrisy leaves no trace of vice to blame them for, and their claim to sincerity, trustworthiness, and moral purity deceives not only the villagers but even themselves, so that the genuinely virtuous like Kongzi and Mengzi has little room for moral influence and honor among the villagers. Kongzi’s repetitive usage of “kǒng” 恐 (“I’m afraid that”) throughout the passage reveals his fear for the bad influence of those people in their villages, and we can guess from the phrase “thieves

157 “萬子曰：‘一鄉皆稱原人焉，無所往而不為原人，孔子以為德之賊，何哉?’ 曰：‘非之無舉也，刺之無刺也；同乎流俗，合乎污世；居之似忠信，行之似廉絜；眾皆悅之，自以為是，而不可與入堯舜之道；故曰德之賊也。孔子曰：‘惡似而非者：惡莠，恐其亂苗也；惡佞，恐其亂義也；惡利口，恐其亂信也；惡鄭聲，恐其亂樂也；惡紫，恐其亂朱也；惡鄉原，恐其亂德也。’’” Mengzi 7B:37.
of virtue” (dé zhī zéi 德之賊) that Kongzi (or the author of the passage) might have felt a bit of jealousy about those people. Apparently, Kongzi and Mengzi’s wù 恶 at them is predominantly hatred of their viciousness tinged with some degree of fear and jealousy, but it is hard to say that it also carries a sign of contempt.

So far, we have seen two passages (Mengzi 6A:12 and 3B:3) where wù 恶 is used for things that one find despicable, and two other passages where wù 恶 is used for things that are hard to describe as despicable or disgraceful but equally undesirable for other reasons, such as that they are unacceptable from the perspective of sympathy or empathy (Mengzi 1A:4) or that they are vicious and morally dangerous (Mengzi 7B:37). The fact that wù 恶 is used for things that are hardly disgraceful seems to make Van Norden’s position that “wù” 恶 and “xiū” 羞 are interchangeable untenable. But then, how shall we understand the fact that “wù” 恶 and “xiū” 羞 are sometimes used for the same objects? Earlier in this section, I have reminded the reader of my argument in Chapter 2 that Kongzi postulates two levels of emotional experience for human beings, namely the generic responses of liking and disliking (hàowù 好惡) at the lower level and the particular emotions at the higher level. According to this view, wù 恶 or “dislike” is a negative kind of “blanket” response to various objects, and one’s wù 恶 response can be re-described as sympathy, empathy, or morally grounded hatred and worry, and so forth by looking at what kinds of objects it is responding to and what kinds of evaluative beliefs are involved. However, I do not think that this is the whole picture of the relationship between wù 恶 and other particular emotions like xiū 羞. As I see it, there exists a more complex relationship between hàowù 好惡 (liking and disliking) and other particular emotions in Mengzi, namely the hierarchical relationship in which one’s liking and disliking function as some sort of second-order emotions accompanying either the approval or the disapproval of one’s particular emotional responses in various situations. According to this view, for example, it is possible that one feels averse (wù 恶) to the commoners’ suffering from famine because she feels sympathy about it, but at the same time likes (hào 好) the fact that she can feel sympathetic concern for the welfare of the
people. And her liking of this fact means that she approves her sympathetic concern for the people.

There is convincing evidence to support this view throughout the *Mengzi*. First, look at the following passage:

*Mengzi* said, “伯夷 伯夷 would not serve a ruler if he was not the right ruler, and would not befriend a person if he was not the right person to associate with. He would not take a position at a wicked man’s court, nor would he speak with a wicked man. Standing in a wicked man’s court and speaking with a wicked man would have been to him as if sitting in mire and pitch wearing court robes and hat. [He] extended his aversion to vice [to the extent that] if he happened to stand together with a villager whose hat was awry, he would move away from that man in disgust as if he were going to be polluted by that man. So, even though there were some rulers who offered an office in polite words, he would not accept them. [The reason] that he did not accept [their offers] was because he was not glad to go to them.

‘柳下惠 柳下惠 did not feel shameful about [serving] a corrupt ruler, and did not find a low office debasing. When advanced to employment, he did not conceal his talent, and made sure to do as he was supposed to; he did not conceive rancor when neglected and staying without office, and did not worry when straitened by poverty. So he said, “You are you, I am I; even if you stand naked beside me, how could you defile me?” That’s how he did not lose himself while gladly associating with others, and why he would stay in office when he was insisted to stay. [His] staying in office when insisted to do so was also because he was not glad to leave.”

*Mengzi* [again] said, “伯夷 was narrow-minded, and 柳下惠 was not solemn. Narrow-mindedness and lack of solemnness, the nobleman does not go by.”

This passage contrasts two types of attitudes toward ethical or political corruptness. On one hand we have 伯夷 who was almost paranoid about being affected by the villainy of the time, and on the other hand there is 柳下惠 who was happy to do his best to realize his ideal political vision in whatever place he was given by the rulers of his time.

It also seems that this passage is about 羞恥之心, for the authors of this passage use 恶 as 伯夷’s response to the “wicked people” (èrén 惡人), whereas they use 羞 as a possible response one might have about the corrupt rulers of the

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158 "孟子曰：‘伯夷，非其君，不事；非其友，不交。不立於惡人之朝，不與惡人言；立於惡人之朝，與惡人言，如以朝衣朝冠坐於塗炭。推惡惡之心，思與鄉人立，其冠不正，望望然去之，若將浼焉。是故諸侯雖有善其辭命而至者，不受也。不受者，是亦不屑就已。柳下惠不羞汙君，不卑小官。進不隱賢，必以其道；遺佚而不怨，阨窮而不憫。故曰：‘爾為爾，我為我；雖袒裼裸裎於我側，爾焉能浼我哉？’故由由然與之偕而不自失焉，援而止之而止。援而止之而止者，是亦不屑去已。’" *Mengzi* 2A:9.
time. This passage provides a good case where “wù 惡” and “xiū 羞” are used for the same kind of objects (wicked rulers), and the distinction between wù 惡 and xiū 羞 seems to get murky when Bó Yí’s hatred of wicked people is described in terms of his thought that serving in a wicked ruler’s court and speaking with a wicked man are like sitting in mire and pitch wearing court robes and hat. In other words, Bó Yí hates wicked people because he thinks that associating with them blemishes his reputation, and one might think that at least in this passage we cannot draw a clear distinction between Bó Yí’s aversion to the wicked people of his time and his finding it disgraceful to associate with them.

However, we can avoid this interpretation by looking at the same passage more closely. Besides the character “wù 惡”, the author of this passage also uses “bú xiè 不屑 (“not eager to,” “do not like,” or “do not approve”) to designate one’s general negative emotional response to certain objects. Both Zhào Qí 趙岐 and Jiāo Xún 焦循 give a concrete meaning to the term “xiè 屑 by interpreting it as “jié 絜 (“pure” or “to consider to be pure”), and render the phrase “bú xiè jiù yǐ 不屑就已 as “[Bó Yí] did not consider the rulers to be pure and so did not go to them.” According to this interpretation, the reason that Bó Yí did not accept the offers from the rulers of his time was specifically because he considered accepting those offers to be ethically impure or polluting, rather than just because he did not like (i.e., did not approve) accepting them. However, the same interpretation does not work very well for interpreting Liǔxià Huì’s case: They interpret “bú xiè qù 已不屑去 as “[Liǔxià Huì] did not consider leaving his office to be pure”—that is, the reason that Liǔxià Huì did not leave his office was because he thought that doing so is ethically impure, or because he thought that leaving the corrupt rulers is not really the right way to keep himself pure. However, this interpretation is too strained, because Liǔxià Huì’s concern was not to keep himself clean in the first place. He did not worry about being polluted by the bad rulers, because he did not think it possible for someone to pollute another. This makes us interpret “bú xiè” as a more general kind of aversion, and consequently the correct interpretation of “bú xiè qù

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159 Jiāo Xún, Mèngzǐ zhēngyì, pp. 243–244.
160 Ibid., pp. 247–249.
should be “[Lüxià Hui] did not like (i.e. did not approve) leaving [his office].” In short, the fact that “bù xiè 不屑 can take an object unrelated to ethical impurity shows that wù 惡, a general negative emotional response like bú xiè 不屑, can take a broad range of objects that are not always disgraceful; and this in turn makes it possible that Bó Yí’s dislike (wù 惡) of the wicked people was directed not specifically to their ethical foulness but more abstractly to their badness (è 惡).

Moreover, Mengzi’s critical comment on Bó Yí’s and Lüxià Hui’s attitudes to moral corruption at the end of the passage clearly shows that wù 惡 can be a second-order emotion directed at what one judges to be a misguided emotional response. In Mengzì 3B:3 quoted above (footnote 155), we have seen Mengzi saying that although it is not that people in the antiquity did not want to serve in the government, they also disliked not going through the proper means (yòu wù bù yóu qí dào 又惡不由其道). What I want to get out of this passage is the point that one’s dislike (wù 惡) can take not going through (bù yóu 不由) the proper means as its intentional object, and this allows us to infer that Mengzi’s remark in Mengzì 2A:9 that the nobleman does not go by narrow-mindedness and lack of solemnness (ài yù bùgōng jūnzhì bù yóu 隘與不恭, 君子不由) implies his disgust at both Bó Yí’s and Lüxià Hui’s attitudes towards moral corruption. In other words, Mengzi says that the nobleman rejects both Bó Yí’s extreme hatred of vice (wù’è 惡惡) and Lüxià Hui’s indifference to corruptness as either too narrow-minded or as lacking any self-respect, and this shows that the nobleman’s dislike (wù 惡) can take another person’s misguided aversion (wù 惡) or lack of aversion to vice as its intentional object.

As I see it, this hierarchical relationship between the second-order dislike (wù 惡) and the first-order emotions or the lack of them for certain objects could be easily extended to a similar relationship between the second-order liking (hào 好) and its target emotions. Throughout the Mengzì, one’s proper attitudes of hào and wù, as much as they are in the Analects, seem to be used as one’s liking and disliking or long-term desire and aversion for virtues and vices respectively, or things that represent those virtues or vices. For example, in Mengzì 6A:6 quoted above Gōngdūzǐ 公都子 reports a view that people
like what is morally good (好善 hàoshàn) when their nature is good, and in the same passage Mengzi says that people like virtue (好德 hàodé) because they grasped an unchanging principle. In addition, Mengzi advises the rulers of his time to like humaneness (好仁 hàorén) in Mengzi 4A:7 and 4A:9, and he praises people’s liking moral good (好善 hàoshàn) in Mengzi 6B:13 and 7A:8. Furthermore, in Mengzi 4B:20 Mengzi contrasts the ancient sage king Yǔ’s fondness of good advice (好善言 hàoshàn yán) with his disliking of good wine (惡旨酒 wùzhǐjiǔ), and we have just seen in Mengzi 2A:9 that he talks about the ancient sage Bó Yí’s hatred of vice (惡惡 wù’è). Now, since we know Mengzi’s view that the four moral sprouts respectively constitute the virtues of humaneness, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom (Mengzi 6A:6), by combining this view and Mengzi’s usage of “好” and “惡” just described, we come to see that the four moral sprouts—compassion, the feeling of shame and disgust, respect, and the feeling of approval and disapproval—can be the desiderative objects of one’s proper attitudes of 好惡 hàowù in Mengzi. In other words, we could postulate a rough kind of hierarchical relationship between one’s 好惡 hàowù and her four moral sprouts, such that one likes (好 hào) the four cardinal virtues and feels pleasant (說 yuè) when one finds the emotional constituents of these virtues in one’s or another person’s mind.

However, it does not seem to be the case that one only feels pleasant approbation for one’s (or another person’s) moral emotions; one can feel disapprobation for one’s (or another person’s) moral emotions if they are not fully appropriate in a certain situation. Mengzi 2A:9, which we have just examined, provides an illustrative example of this case. In that passage, Bó Yí’s aversion to vice (惡惡之心 wù’è zhīxīn) seems to be a form of Mengzi’s second sprout (the feeling of shame and disgust), because Mengzi says that Bó

162 “有物必有則；民之秉彛也，故好是懿德。” Ibid.
163 “夫國君好仁，天下無敵。” This is Mengzi’s quotation of Kongzi’s remark. See Mengzi 4A:7.
164 “今天下之君有好仁者，則諸侯皆爲之覂矣。雖欲無王，不可得已。” Mengzi 4A:9.
165 “魯欲使樂正子爲政。孟子曰：‘吾聞之，喜而不寐。’…曰：‘其爲人也好善。’” Mengzi 6B:13.
166 “古之賢王好善而忘勢。” Mengzi 7A:8.
167 “禹惡旨酒而好善言。” Mengzi 4B:20. It might have been just that Yǔ liked good advice more than good wine, but the use of “惡” for good wine (旨酒 zhǐjiǔ) in the passage suggests that Yǔ might have disliked good wine because it hindered him from making sober judgments.
Yí extended (tuī 推) his hatred of vice even to a counterfactual case of standing together with a villager whose hat was askew. As we will see later, Mengzi is famous for proposing a theory of emotional cultivation where he says that one can become fully virtuous by “extending” one’s four moral sprouts, and “tuī 推 is one of Mengzi’s technical terms that he uses for cultivation of one’s four moral sprouts. And we have also seen that unlike Bó Yí, Liǔxià Hui was not ashamed of (xiū 羞) serving a corrupt ruler, and we know that xiū 羞 is a crucial component of xiūwù zhī xīn 羞惡之心. Now, Mengzi’s criticism of Bó Yí and Liǔxià Hui could be re-described as that the nobleman disapproves it when one’s feeling of shame and disgust gets too rigid or too loose, and this in turn reveals the following point: Although one likes (hào 好) the four cardinal virtues and usually feels pleasant (yuè 说) about one’s (or another person’s) emotional constituents of these virtues, one also dislikes (wù 恶) vices and feels disapprobation when one’s (or another person’s) moral emotions are not fully appropriate.

So far, I have argued for the distinctive characteristic of xiūwù zhī xīn. Similarly to cèyǐn zhī xīn and respect, xiūwù zhī xīn has the element of shame that is basically construing a certain situation to be disgraceful, but unlike cèyǐn zhī xīn and respect, xiūwù zhī xīn has the element of dislike (wù 恶) that is a general negative response to a certain object or a kind of second-order emotion directed at one’s or another person’s emotional response. I have argued that one can have this kind of wù 恶 response for what one finds to be morally undesirable or unacceptable, but moral undesirability or unacceptability in a broad sense is not reducible to ethical disgracefulness in Mengzi’s thought. For as we have seen above, Mengzi says that one’s ethical dislike can take a wide range of objects such as people’s suffering from famine, the viciousness of the xiāngyuàn 鄉愿 (“good and sincere people in the village”) and the moral danger they bring about, and the narrow-mindedness or lack of self-respect in dealing with moral corruptness. My argument that one can have this wù 恶 response for what one finds to be morally undesirable or unacceptable implies a close relationship between one’s ethical dislike of a certain object and one’s assessment of it in terms of morality, or between xiūwù zhī xīn (the feeling of shame and disgust) and shìfēi zhī xīn (the feeling of approval and
disapproval). However, this does not mean that one’s ethical dislike is always grounded on a correct moral judgment. As we have seen in Mengzi 2A:9 above, Bó Yí’s ethical dislike of moral corruptness and Liùxià Hui’s indifference to it are both based on wrong or excessive assessment of their ethical situations, and are thus subject to the nobleman’s dislike which is free of such ethical defects. This means that despite its close relationship with shífēi zhī xīn or the correct moral judgment, xiūwù zhī xīn belongs with the other two moral emotions of cēyīn zhī xīn and respect, in the sense that the feeling of ethical dislike in one’s xiūwù zhī xīn is directed at what one finds or construes to be morally undesirable or unacceptable. However, since nothing guarantees that what one finds to be morally undesirable or unacceptable are always really so, we need to know what the criteria are that make one’s ethical dislike appropriate, and what the relationship is exactly between one’s moral emotions including one’s ethical dislike and her correct moral judgment. This is one of the questions that I turn to in the next chapter.
Chapter Five
Emotions and Moral Agency in Mengzi

My aim in this chapter is to investigate what role emotions play in moral judgment and moral motivation in Mengzi’s ethical thought. What I mean by ‘moral judgment’ is basically a judgment of what is morally right and wrong, but my use of both ‘moral’ and ‘right’ in this work is much broader than their common usage in contemporary ethics. So, I will use ‘morality’ or ‘moral’ throughout this and the next chapter not only as referring to “universal norms of right and wrong conduct that are held to obligate all persons,”¹ but also as involving broader ethical concerns such as what kinds of actions and characters are worthy, virtuous, or good. In addition, I think that ‘righteousness’ or ‘right’ (as an adjective) in a broad sense is the best rendering of the ancient Chinese term yì (義). For example, yì is perfectly translatable as ‘what is right’ in a broad sense in the following Analects passage: “In his dealings with [the affairs of] the world, the nobleman considers nothing as absolutely right or absolutely wrong. He follows only what is right [in a given circumstance].”² And the author of the Zhōngyōng 中庸 glosses righteousness (yì 義) as propriety (yí 宜)³ and says that respecting the worthy is one of the most important

² “君子之於天下也，無適也，無莫也，義之與比.” Lunyu 4:10. Lau translates the last part as “He is on the side of what is moral.” (Lau, The Analects, p. 73) However, his translating yì as ‘moral’ is not well supported by the context of the sentence, because yì is contrasted here with the problematic attitude of taking something to be invariably right or wrong.
³ Basically this gloss is based on the similarity between yì 義 and yí 宜 in their pronunciation. According to Guàngyùn 康頌 (a rhyme dictionary compiled in 1008 C.E.), these characters were pronounced exactly the same except for tone: “ngje” (“H” indicating the “departing tone” or qūshēng 去聲) for yì 義 and “ngje” in a level tone or píngshēng 平聲 for yí 宜. Their similarity in pronunciation indicates that they are cognates coming from the same root; according to William H. Baxter, the departing tone (qūshēng 去聲) of yì 義 indicates that its Old Chinese (from eleventh to seventh centuries B.C.E.) pronunciation might have included an *-s suffix (*ŋ(r)aj-s) that was used for making a derived noun. This explains the fact that yì 義
among right actions,\(^4\) and we also know from *Mengzi* 6A:5 discussed in the previous chapter that respecting the elders was considered as a typical instance of righteousness (\(yì\) 義) by both Mengzi and his contemporaries.\(^5\) This implies that righteousness or what is right (\(yì\)) in ancient China could refer to not only what one is morally required to do in a narrow sense but also virtuous actions or characters that one should do or adopt in order to live a fully virtuous life. And in a deliberative context, this kind of judgment becomes the judgment of what is the right thing to do in a certain situation and gets connected with the issue of moral motivation.

The questions that I am specifically interested in answering in this chapter are the following: First, do ethical emotions like Mengzi’s three sprouts discussed in Chapter 4 constitute the sole source of moral judgment and moral motivation? Second, if such emotions are not the only ground for one’s moral judgment and are not the only source of moral motivation, what else would there be, besides those ethical emotions, that contributes to the making of a moral judgment and motivates one to act according to that judgment? And third, if there are additional sources of moral judgment and moral motivation besides ethical emotions, how are these extra sources related with one’s ethical emotions in the process of moral judgment and concerning moral motivation?

My formulation of the chapter’s leading questions this way is both informed by and responding to the recent trend in the scholarship on Mengzi that emphasizes the positive roles emotions play in one’s ethical life and argues for “no distinction between reason and emotion” in Mengzi’s thought. For example, David B. Wong says:

\begin{quote}
*Mencius does not, as Plato and Aristotle do, employ the contrast between reason and emotion to assert the need for the primacy of reason. He takes neither the Humean position of denying nor the Kantian position of affirming the motivational efficacy of pure practical reason. What stands out in Mencius’ work is the absence of any to-do about the*
\end{quote}


\(^5\) “孟季子問公都子曰：‘何以謂義內也?’ 曰：‘行吾敬，故謂之內也。’ 仲人長於伯兄一歲，則誰敬?’ 曰：‘敬兄。’ 酌則誰先?’ 曰：‘先酌仲人。’ ’所敬在此，所長在彼，果在外，非由內也’.” *Mengzi* 6A:5.
issue of reason versus emotion….Mencius held a picture of the role of emotion in moral motivation that militates against a general separation of reason from emotion.6

According to Wong, having an emotion such as compassion in Mengzi involves the recognition of reasons to act in certain ways, and this connection between emotion and recognizing reasons for certain actions has important implications for the question of what would be the correct conception of practical reason we ought to have.7

In a similar vein, David S. Nivison identifies two “sources” of morality in ancient Chinese ethical thought—i.e. “maxims” or “doctrines” acquired through moral reasoning and the “heart” as the locus of moral emotions or feelings, and argues that the only source of morality in Mengzi is “heart.”8 Nivison says:

...“Two Roots or One?” Mencius’s answer was, “One.” And I take him to mean that my right judgments about what I ought to do, if I probe, and how I really feel about such things, if I dig, both turn out to have their source or “root” in the “heart,” which is at the same time for him the mind.9

That is, Nivison here seems to think that the “heart” as the source of one’s ethical feelings provides the only and sufficient grounds for one’s correct moral judgments, and therefore the “heart” is also the only source of moral motivation in Mengzi. And Nivison seems to support his thesis of “one-source morality” in Mengzi by endorsing the long-held belief among Sinologists that xīn 心—which is often translated as something like “heart-mind,”10 “heart/mind,”11 or “heart and mind”12—is the faculty in charge of both cognition and affection.

Besides Wong and Nivison, a number of scholars in Chinese philosophy have written on the positive roles, or even the primacy, of emotions in Kongzi and Mengzi’s ethical thought13 and in some excavated ancient Confucian materials such as Xīng zī mìng

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6 Wong, “Is There a Distinction Between Reason and Emotion in Mencius?” p. 31. Emphasis is original.
7 Ibid.
9 Nivison, “Two Roots or One?” ibid., p. 147.
10 For example, see ibid., p. 141.
11 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, p. 48.
13 For example, see Amy Olberding, “The Consummation of Sorrow: An Analysis of Confucius’ Grief for Yan Hui,” Philosophy East and West 54, no. 3 (2004). In this article, Olberding describes “the way in which
Confucius valorizes grief as a constituent of a flourishing life” (p. 279). For an argument for the primary role emotions play in moral judgment in Mengzi, see Eric L. Hutton, “Moral connoisseurship in Mengzi,” chap. in Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi, ed. Xiusheng Liu and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2002). See also Franklin Perkins, “Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 29, no. 2 (June 2002) for the view that the “Western tension between emotion and autonomy” fails to arise in Mengzi’s thought (p. 207).

14 Xìng zì mìng chū has been found in 1993 with other bamboo manuscripts in an elite tomb at Guōdiàn 郭店 in Húběi 湖北 province of China, and it is often considered to be datable to around 300 B.C.E. For a partial translation of the Xìng zì mìng chū and a discussion of the concept of qíng 情 there, see Michael Puett, “The Ethics of Responding Properly: The Notion of Qing in Early Chinese Thought,” chap. in Love and Emotions in Traditional Chinese Literature, ed. Halvor Eifring (Brill; Leiden, 2004).

15 Xìngqínglùn is one of the bamboo texts that Shanghai Museum has bought in 1994 at a market in Hong Kong, and it is considered to be a text in circulation in Chū 楚 area sometime during the Warring States period (475–221 B.C.E.). For a further description of this text, see Mā Chéngyuán 馬承源, ed., Shānhuài bówígùwǎn cāng Zhānguó Chū zhūshì 上海博物館藏戰國楚竹書, vol. 1 (Shānhuái 上海: Shānhuái gǔjí chūbānshè 上海古籍出版社, 2001).
5.1 Emotions and Moral Judgment

5.1.1 Is There No Distinction Between Reason and Emotion in Mengzi?

As I have briefly mentioned above, David Wong ambitiously proposes that the Mengzian conception of practical reason does not require a sharp contrast between reason and emotion as has been conceived in the West for so long. He introduces Ronald de Sousa’s theory of emotion as an example of a new kind of research that illuminates emotion in a positive light, and argues that Mengzi’s view of moral emotions can be interpreted to take de Sousa’s theory of emotion one step further and thus to contain a more advanced theory of emotion than de Sousa’s. According to Wong, de Sousa has argued for a positive role emotions play in our deliberation by pointing out that emotions have a cognitive function addressing the so-called “frame problem.” The frame problem is that we have too much information around us that may or may not be relevant to our deliberation of what to do in a certain situation, and we had better not be distracted or even paralyzed by unnecessary information to arrive at a sensible decision. According to de Sousa, reason cannot help us sort out the information we need from what we do not need, and emotions fill the gap left by reason through their capacity to make certain features of the situation in question appear more salient, and thus look more relevant to our deliberation, than other features of the same situation.\(^\text{16}\)

According to Wong, Mengzi’s picture of moral emotions takes de Sousa’s theory one step further, not only because moral emotions as conceived by Mengzi solve de Sousa’s frame problem by their influence on salience, but also because they recognize the salient features of the situations in question as compelling reasons to act in the ways characterized by those emotions.\(^\text{17}\) Wong takes compassion (cèyǐn zhī xīn 側隱之心) as described in Mengzi 2A:6 to illustrate this thesis: When one sees a child about to fall into a well, the observer of the disquieting scene would normally feel compassion for the child. And her compassion, as Wong sees it, besides the phenomenal quality of alarm and


\(^{17}\) Ibid.
distress and its accompanying physiological changes, contains also the perception of the child in suffering or in danger. In other words, one’s compassion for the child focuses on the endangered child as its intentional object, and makes the child’s suffering, whether actual or forthcoming, appear to be the salient feature of the situation (thus the frame problem is solved). However, Wong argues, the cognitive function of compassion has more to contribute to our moral deliberation, because one’s compassion for the endangered child recognizes the child’s suffering as a reason to act to prevent or stop the suffering. In other words, “[t]he intentional object of compassion identifies the suffering of a sentient being not only as the salient feature of the situation, but as a reason for acting in helping ways.”

The conception of practical reason that Wong argues to be found in Mengzi’s view of compassion is theoretically attractive in two respects, as Wong himself points out in comparison to the Humean means-ends reasoning model of practical reason. Under this model, the agent’s desires set the motivating ends of action, and practical reason simply tries to find out which action would serve as the best means to achieve the end set by one’s desire in a certain situation. And in the current case of compassion, this means-ends reasoning model of practical reason would have it that 1) one’s compassion for the child involves a desire to save the child, and that 2) the motivating reason to perform a compassionate action for an agent is not the fact that the child is endangered but the fact that the agent has a desire to save the child. However, Wong argues that the picture of practical reason he attributes to Mengzi is better than the means-ends reasoning model in two respects: First, phenomenologically, it is more likely that the mental focus of the compassionate person who recognizes a reason to act is focused on the suffering of the child rather than turned inward to his own desire. And second, it is truer to our conception of what a compassionate person should be like that such a person would try to justify his compassionate action by referring to the other’s suffering rather than to the contingent fact that he happens to have a desire to free the child of its suffering. In other words, it should be the case that “the other’s suffering is for compassionate persons a reason to desire to help.”

18 Ibid., p. 32.
19 Ibid., p. 33. Emphasis is original.
With all its attractiveness, though, there is a huge discrepancy between 1) Wong’s delineation of compassion in Mengzi as significantly “cognitive” on one hand and 2) what his proposal—viz. that there is no distinction between reason and emotion in Mengzi—amounts to on the other hand. For arguing that moral emotions in Mengzi have important cognitive aspects does not prove that there is no additional conception of reason playing a crucial role in Mengzi’s moral philosophy, which is of a different kind than what Wong would find as embodied in Mengzi’s four sprouts. Furthermore, as I will argue later, the authors of the Mengzi are aware of cases where competing moral emotions pull the agent in different directions with reasons each characteristic of their corresponding emotions, and such cases require a radically different conception of practical reason from what Wong finds in Mengzi, which could arbitrate between different emotions with their own ethical demands. This in turn reveals the possibility that this latter conception of practical reason might appeal to certain kinds of moral standards or ethical concerns that do not derive from moral emotions in adjudicating the competing demands of those emotions.

Moreover, I believe that it is not even true that all of Mengzi’s four sprouts are explicable as Wong explains compassion or cèyǐn zhī xīn. As I have argued in the previous chapter, the three moral emotions discussed there—compassion or familial affection (cèyǐn zhī xīn), respect (gōngjìng zhī xīn), and the feeling of shame and dislike (xiūwù zhī xīn)—are best interpreted as concern-based construals with the appearance of truth. The implication of ‘the appearance of truth’ here is that these emotions are not themselves beliefs or even judgments about how things are but merely a way in which things present themselves to the person who feels these emotions. In contrast, I think that shìfēi zhī xīn 是非之心, Mengzi’s fourth sprout, is largely equivalent to the psychological state we would call judgment, and that when shìfēi zhī xīn gets combined with any of Mengzi’s other three moral emotions, it elevates that emotion, previously a mere presentation of things to the person feeling that emotion, to the status of a kind of moral judgment that is subject to rational justification. In the following two sections, I argue for these points by discussing Mengzi’s conception of shìfēi zhī xīn 是非之心 and wisdom (zhì 智).
5.1.2 *Shìfēi zhī xīn* 是非之心 As Moral Judgment

It has been a seldom doubted assumption among the students of Chinese philosophy that Mengzi’s four sprouts are similar in nature to each other, differing only in terms of the kinds of excellences or virtues they are supposed to develop into. Consequently, it has also usually been assumed that they can be treated together as a homogeneous group when explaining their nature. This assumption is implicit in Wong’s treatment of compassion as if his discussion of the “cognitive” aspects of compassion were also applicable to the case of the other three sprouts, and most recently Franklin Perkins joins this long tradition by saying that the four sprouts are equally natural emotions, and therefore one way to understand *shìfēi zhī xīn* is viewing it as analogous to the other three sprouts.\(^20\) However, this is an erroneous assumption, and by examining various pieces of evidence from the *Mengzi* we will see in the following that *shìfēi zhī xīn* denotes a markedly different psychological state than the other three sprouts do.

Let us begin with the basic meaning and usage of the characters “*shì*” 是 and “*fēi*” 非: “*Shì*” usually means “this” (as either pronoun or adjective) and it is often used in the grammatical structure of “*shì* 是 A yě 也,” meaning “This is A.” On the other hand, “*fēi*” is a negative usually preceding a noun, and used in such a structure as “*shì* 是 *fēi* 非 A yě 也” that means “This is not A.”\(^21\) In addition, “*shì*” is sometimes used as a copula (like the be-verb in English) connecting two nouns and thus establishing some sort of relationship between the two things these two nouns refer to, and “*fēi*” used as a negative in the place of such a “*shì*” to deny the relationship between two nouns before and after “*fēi*.”\(^22\) Moreover, “*shì*” can also mean “right” as an adjective or “to regard

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\(^21\) For example, “挾太山以超北海，語人曰，‘我不能，’是誠不能也，為長者折枝，語人口，‘我不能，’是不為也，非不能也.” *Mengzi* 1A:7; “鄧文公問曰：‘鄧，小國也，間於齊楚，事齊乎？事楚乎？’ 孟子對曰：‘是謀非吾所能及也…’” *Mengzi* 1B:13. And alternatively, “*shì*” 是 is sometimes used as a pronominal predicate in the pattern of “A *shì* 是 yě 也,” meaning “A is this.” An example can be found in *Mengzi* 1B:10: “取之而燕民悅，則取之．古之人有行之者，武王是也．取之而燕民不悅，則勿取．古之人有行之者，文王是也．” I owe this point to William H. Baxter.

\(^22\) Against the common assumption that the usage of “*shì*” 是 as a copula is quite late, we find two instances of such a usage of “*shì*” in the *Mengzi*: “王之不王，非挾太山以超北海之類也；王之不王，是折枝之類也.” *Mengzi* 1A:7; “是則人也，或為大人，或為小人，何也？” *Mengzi* 6A:15. In the first
(something) as right” as a verb, corresponding to “fēi” that can mean “wrong” or “to regard (something) as wrong.” Based on the meaning of these words, we could tentatively say that Mengzi’s shìfēi zhī xīn might denote a function of the mind (xīn 心) that is concerned with judgment about the nature or identity of a certain thing (e.g., “This is A.” or “This is not A but B.”); and when applied to the matters of morality, we could consider shìfēi zhī xīn to be about distinguishing right actions from wrong ones, a benevolent character from a selfish one, a shameful deed from an estimable one, and so forth.

However, one might object, this explanation of shìfēi zhī xīn does not disprove previous scholars’ view of it as an ethical feeling that is similar in nature to the other three sprouts, because nothing said so far shows that shìfēi zhī xīn is really a judgment rather than some sort of special feeling or sensibility, or even a concern-based construal, that construes things in a particular way that may or may not represent the way things really are correctly. Moreover, as the objection might continue, if shìfēi zhī xīn is merely a moral feeling (i.e. a concern-based construal with the appearance of truth), it is highly possible that the person who feels shìfēi zhī xīn in a certain ethical situation sincerely holds a moral judgment that actually goes against what his shìfēi zhī xīn tells him. So, for example, a soldier can feel that his superior underestimated his services in a recent battle and consequently wronged him by not promoting him to the rank he deserves, while sincerely believing that his superior did not actually do anything wrong to him. Now, let me try to refute this objection.

Previous scholars have sometimes complained that Mengzi said too little about his fourth sprout, leaving his view of this concept largely in the dark. This is a reasonable complaint to some extent, but if we could legitimately assume that Mengzi’s

23 For example, “一人則一義, 二人則二義, 十人則十義. 其人眾矣, 其所謂義者亦眾矣. 是以人是其義, 以非人之義…” Mòzǐ 墨子, “Shàngtóng shàng” 尚同上. Sūn Yìráng, Mózǐ xiàngú, p. 74 (verb); “吾聞夫子重義者. 墨之治喪也, 以薄為其道也. 夫子以此論天下, 則以夫非是而不貴也?” Mengzi 3A:5 (noun); “掩之誠是也, 掩子仁人之掩其親, 亦必有道矣.” Mengzi 3A:5 (noun or adjective).

24 For further examples and explanation of these three uses of “shì” and “fēi,” see Wáng Lì et al. ed., Wáng Lì gǔ hànyǔ zìdiǎn, p. 430 and p. 1623. My description of “shì” and “fēi” in this paragraph is more based on the explanation on p. 430.

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shìfēi zhī xīn has much to do with his way of using the terms "shì" 是 and "fēi" 非 in the text, we actually have ample evidence to ground our understanding of shìfēi zhī xīn on, and our investigation of this evidence will show that shìfēi zhī xīn is a judgment, rather than merely a feeling about the way things are, with full commitment to truth. Now, let us examine the following passage first. In this passage, King Hui 惠 of Liáng 梁 asks Mengzi why the population of his country does not grow and that of the neighboring countries does not diminish, despite his governing his country with more benevolent policies than the other countries. Mengzi responds as follows:

Mengzi said, "Since your majesty like war, let me explain by [an analogy to] war: Drums are thundering, weapons have already crossed, and [soldiers] are fleeing, having thrown away their armor, and dragging their weapons. One stops after [running] a hundred paces, and another stops after fifty paces. What would you think if the latter, having run fifty paces, laughed at the one who ran a hundred paces?" [The king] said, "Unacceptable. He merely didn't run a hundred paces, but this is also fleeing." [Mengzi] said, "If your majesty know this, you shouldn’t wish that your subjects were more numerous than those of the neighboring countries….Your dogs and swine eat the foods for humans, but you don’t know to put constraints on it; there are people dying of famine on the roads, but you don’t know to open your granaries; and when people die, you merely say ‘It’s not me, [it’s the bad] year.' How is this different from killing a person by stabbing him and then saying that it’s not me, [it’s the weapon]? Don’t blame the year, your majesty; then all the people under the heaven will arrive at your place." 25

This passage contains two related facts to be discussed below that make shìfēi zhī xīn a kind of judgment. First, at Mengzi’s question of whether it is appropriate for the soldier who ran away fifty paces to laugh at the other one who went fifty paces more, the king says adamantly “No!” and supports his position by pointing out that the latter’s fleeing farther than the former does not make the former a non-coward, because both fled after all no matter how far they fled, and fleeing from the battlefield is an act of cowardice regardless of its distance. To make this point the king uses the aforementioned pattern “shì 是 A yě 也 (This is A)” —i.e. “this is also fleeing” (shì yì zǒu yě 是亦走也); and from the fact that he utters this sentence as a reason for his negative attitude

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toward the runaway soldier who laughed at another of his kind, we can see that this utterance of his—“This is also fleeing”—is a judgment fully loaded with commitment to truth rather than a mere feeling that the king may reject in the end as a mistaken thought. Or, we could alternatively say, this thought of the king’s becomes a judgment once the king regards it as a reason for his disapproval of the runaway soldier in question.

Second, the phrase “shì 是 A yē 也” seems to be used in this passage not only for making a simple judgment but, with a little variance in form, also used for comparing more than two things and categorizing them according to their characteristic features. That is, at the king’s response that fleeing fifty paces and fleeing one hundred paces from the battlefield equally make acts of cowardice, Mengzi says that carrying out some benevolent policies such as moving the victims of famine to a region of relatively good harvest and bringing grain from that region to feed those struck by famine would not attract people towards the king, until he stops feeding his animals with the food for his people and opens his granaries for those starving in the streets. In doing this, Mengzi presses the king by asking him a rhetorical question how his blaming the year (i.e. the bad luck of the year) instead of blaming himself for his people’s suffering is different from someone’s blaming his weapon after killing a person using that weapon. In this question Mengzi uses “shì” 是 in the phrase “shì hé yì yú 是何異於… (how is this different from…),” and what Mengzi is doing here is to challenge the king to provide a reason that could refute Mengzi’s categorization of things. In other words, Mengzi here is judging that the king’s blaming bad luck for his people’s suffering is basically the same as blaming a mere instrument for one’s crime based on the consideration that both the king and the killer intentionally ignore their accountability for their misgovernment and murder respectively, and the word “shì” 是, which literally means “this” but which I also take to carry in its wake “the characteristic features” of “this thing”, is used by Mengzi in the categorization of or discrimination among things.

26 “河內凶，則移其民於河東，移其粟於河內，河東凶亦然.” Ibid.
27 That is, I think that when I point to a car and say to you “Tell me how this is different from the car over there,” your attention is not just drawn to the car in front of you (“this object”) but more importantly, at the same time, to the characteristic features of that car which may or may not distinguish it from the other one it is compared with.
Before moving on to the third factor that makes shìfēi zhī xīn a kind of judgment, I would like to elaborate this last point by quoting a portion of Mengzi 1A:7, which partly overlaps with what I quoted earlier when explaining cèyǐn zhī xīn. In this passage, Mengzi has now just pointed out to King Xuān that his compassion for the suffering of a mere ox is sufficient for him to become the king of the whole world, and now explains why it is so:

[Mengzi] said, “If there were someone reporting to you that 'my strength is sufficient to lift a hundred jūn, but not enough to lift a feather; my eyesight is sufficient to examine the tip of an autumn hair, but I cannot see a cartload of firewood,' would your majesty accept that?” [The king] said, “No, I wouldn’t.” “Now, your kindness is sufficient to reach animals, but your benefits do not reach your people; why should this case alone be an exception? Therefore, not lifting a feather is due to not using [one's] power; not seeing a cartload of firewood is due to not using [one's] eyesight; people’s not getting taken care of is due to not using [one's] kindness. So, your majesty’s not becoming the king [of the world] is [due to] your refusal to act, not due to your inability [to act].”

The king said, “What is the difference in form between refusal to act and inability to act?” [Mengzi] said, “[Concerning such a case like] holding Mount Tài under an arm and leaping over the North Sea, if one says to others ‘I'm not capable [of this],’ this is [a case of] real incapability. But as for cutting a branch [off a tree to make a walking stick] for an elderly person, if one says to others ‘I cannot,’ this is [a case of] refusing to act, not a case of being unable [to act].” Therefore, your majesty’s not becoming a [true] king is not of the [same] kind as holding Mount Tài under an arm and leaping over the North Sea; your majesty’s not becoming a [true] king is of the [same] kind as cutting a branch [off a tree to make a walking stick].”

In this passage, we see that Mengzi uses yet another variant of the “shì 是 A yě 也” pattern: “A shì 是 B zhī 之 lèi 類 yě 也” (A is of the same category as B) and “A fēi 非 C zhī 之 lèi 類 yě 也” (A is not of the same category as C). And we also notice that in the first phrase “shì” 是 is used as a copula that affirms the relationship between A

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28 The original text for “cutting a branch for an elderly person” can be alternatively interpreted as “bending one’s body for [bowing to] an elderly person” or “massaging the stiff joints of an elderly person.” Yáng Bójùn, Mengzi yízhù, p. 24. However, since bowing to an elder and massaging an elder’s body are also things that one can do voluntarily, Mengzi’s point remains intact with these alternative interpretations.

29 “[孟子]曰：‘有復於王者曰：吾力足以舉百鈞，而不足以舉一羽；明足以察秋毫之末，而不見輿薪，’則王許之乎？”曰：‘否。’‘今恩足以及禽獸，而功不至於百姓者，獨何與？然則一羽之不舉，為不用力焉；與薪之不見，為不用明焉；百姓之不見保，為不用恩焉。故王之不王，不為也，非不能也。’曰：‘不為者與不能者之形，何以異？”曰：‘挾太山以超北海，語人曰，‘我不能，’是誠不能也。為長者折枝，語人曰，‘我不能，’是不為也，非不能也。故王之不王，非挾太山以超北海之類也；王之不王，是折枝之類也。’” Mengzi 1A:7.
and B, whereas in the second phrase “fēi” 非 is used to deny the relationship between A and C. Using these patterns, and based on his conviction that the king’s failing to show benevolence to his people is not because of his lacking the relevant capacity but because of his not making up his mind to do so, Mengzi says to the king that his not becoming the true king of the world does not belong to the category of impossible tasks such as leaping over the North Sea with Mount Tài under an arm, but to the category of highly possible tasks such as taking a branch from a tree to make a walking stick for an elderly person. And we see here that Mengzi’s categorization of things based on their similarity or dissimilarity acquires the status of judgment by his use of the affirmative form of copula (“shì” 是) and its negation (“fēi” 非).

Now, let us turn to the third factor that makes shìfēi zhī xīn a kind of judgment: the use of “shì” and “fēi” as respectively “right” and “wrong” or “what is right” and “what is wrong,” and the rational or normative demand behind it to act consistently so that these terms could be consistently applied to one’s actions. Look at the following passage:

Chén Zhēn 陈臻 asked: “Earlier [when you were] in Qí 齐, the king sent [you] a hundred yì 鎰 of metal, but you didn’t accept it; but in Sòng 宋, [the king] sent seventy yì [of metal] and you accepted it, and while in Xuē 薛, they sent fifty yì and you [also] accepted it. [However,] if your refusal on an earlier day were right, your accepting [a gift] recently should be wrong; and if your accepting it recently were right, your declining it on an earlier day should be wrong. I’m afraid the Master should have acted consistently for this matter.”

Mengzi said, “[My actions were] right in all of these cases. While staying in Sòng, I was about to go on a long journey; travelers are supposed to be greeted with a parting gift; and the message [accompanying the gift] was, ‘Presented as a parting gift.’ For what reason should I have refused it? While staying in Xuē I was apprehensive [of my safety], and the message was ‘I heard about your taking precautions [for your safety], so I send this for [helping you purchase some] arms.’ For what reason should I have refused it? But as for [my staying] in Qí, I had no justification [for accepting a gift], and sending something [to a person] for no reason is bribing him. How could there be a nobleman who could be bought with a bribe?”

30 “陳臻問曰：‘前日於齊，王餽兼金一百，而不受；於宋，餽七十鎰而受；於薛，餽五十鎰而受。前日之不受是，則今日之受非也；今日之受是，則前日之不受非也。夫子必居一於此矣。’ 孟子曰：‘皆是也。當在宋也，予將有遠行，行者必以贐，辭曰：‘餽贐。’予何為不受？當在薛也，予恐為亂，辭曰：‘聞戒，故為兵贐之。’予何為不受？若於齊，則未有處也。無處而餽之，是貨之也。焉有君子而可以貨取乎？’” Mengzi 2B:3.
In this passage, Mengzi’s disciple Chén Zhēn is asking his teacher whether there was any underlying principle behind Mengzi’s seemingly inconsistent actions on several occasions—accepting royal gifts here but declining them there. Chén Zhēn thinks that if Mengzi’s declining gifts on an earlier occasion were right (shì 是), his accepting them more recently should be wrong (fēi 非), and vice versa. And thinking this, Chén Zhēn seems to assume that one should act consistently (jū 居一) throughout all similar occasions; otherwise, one’s actions in such occasions cannot be all right, and this is problematic especially for a nobleman like Mengzi. However, Mengzi assures his disciple that there was nothing wrong or inconsistent in his actions. According to Mengzi, his actions on those three occasions were all right, but the reasons that made them right do not have to be the same throughout the occasions: Metal was given on one occasion as a parting gift when Mengzi was about to leave for a long journey, so it was right to accept it; on another occasion, Mengzi was facing a threat of attack, and the gift was sent to meet the expense for purchasing arms, so it was also right to accept it; but on the last occasion, Mengzi had no reason—or pretext as Mengzi’s critics might say—to accept a gift, so it was right not to accept it.

However, we could also say that although the reasons behind Mengzi’s actions on those occasions were different from each other, Mengzi still acted according to a single principle, viz. the principle of rightness, and I think that Kongzi’s following remark, already once quoted above, would illustrate this point nicely: “In his dealings with [the affairs of] the world, the nobleman considers nothing as absolutely right or absolutely wrong. He follows only what is right [in a given circumstance].”31 Moreover, I also think that this “principle of rightness” is equivalent to the normative demand to follow whatever is judged to be right in a certain circumstance, and it is met in the current case by Mengzi’s willingness to do so. Furthermore, whether one is following this principle of rightness consistently or not should be checked by examining the reasons behind his actions, and Mengzi successfully proves that his actions were all consistent with this principle by providing persuasive reasons for his actions. And what all of these amount to concerning my discussion of shīfēi zhī xīn is that by declaring that one’s action in a

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certain situation is right (是) or that another person’s action is wrong (非), one is required or at least reasonably expected to provide a reason for declaring so, and this reason-giving activity makes one’s shi-ing and fēi-ing activity a judgment with full commitment to truth rather than a mere construal or a feeling.

To summarize, I have argued that Mengzi’s shīfēi zhī xīn is a kind of judgment rather than a mere feeling by examining the way “shī” is and “fēi” are used in the Mengzi. We have first seen that “shī” is used in the sense of “this” in the basic pattern of “shī 是 A yě 也” (This is A), which refers to the activity of making a judgment about the nature or identity of an object and submitting it as a reason for one’s evaluative attitude toward a certain event or a state of affairs. Next, we have seen that “shī” and “fēi” sometimes function as a copula and its negation in such grammatical patterns as “A shī 是 B zhī 之 lèi 類 yě 也” (A is of the same category as B) and “A fēi 非 C zhī 之 lèi 類 yě 也” (A is not of the same category as C), and that their usage in these patterns shows that Mengzian moral reasoning involves a more complicated judgmental activity of comparing more than two things and making discriminations among them according to their characteristic features. And finally, we have seen that “shī” and “fēi” can refer to the quality of rightness or wrongness of certain actions, and that when one declares one’s or someone else’s action to be right or wrong, one is reasonably expected to provide a reason for holding that view. And this fact that one is expected to provide a reason for taking a position about whether an action is right or wrong, and normally provides one’s best reason when requested to do so, in turn shows that shīfēi zhī xīn, or one’s taking a position about the rightness (shī 是) or wrongness (fēi 非) of a certain action, is a voluntary judgment rather than a feeling.32

32 My argument so far that Mengzi’s shīfēi zhī xīn is a kind of judgment has been based on the so-called “internal” evidence from the text of Mengzi. However, although the term “shīfēi zhī xīn” is rarely found in the other ancient Chinese texts, the terms “shī,” “fēi,” and “shīfēi” seem to have been widely used across the philosophical “schools” in ancient China in the context of judgment and disputation. Among the extant writings on this topic, we find a lucid discussion in the Zhuāngzǐ that presents an interesting view that fuses “shī” 是 as an indexical (i.e. “this”) and “shī” in the sense of “right” (adjective) or “to consider (something) as right,” and I think that Zhuāngzǐ’s discussion of shī 是 and fēi 非 nicely echoes Mengzi’s philosophical use of the same terms. I would not delve into the discussion of the Zhuāngzǐ passages here, but an interested reader can find a good discussion of the relevant passages and translation of them in Chad Hansen, Language and Logic in Ancient China (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1983), pp. 91–95.
In principle, it seems that the usage of “shì” and “fēi” does not have to be confined only to the ethical realm, or to the realm of “prescription” as opposed to “description.” And it seems especially so when “shì” and “fēi” are used in the first two ways just summarized, i.e. as an indexical (“this”) and its negation (“not this”) on one hand and as a copula (“is”) and its negation (“is not”) on the other. For example, at the question of Duke Wén of Dèng 鄧文公 which country to serve in order to survive between two superpowers of Qí 齊 and Chǔ 楚, Mengzi simply confesses that this kind of deliberation is not what he is good at; and the later Mohist logicians (roughly contemporaneous with Mengzi), probably concerned about the fallacy in reasoning due to confusion of categories, cautiously suggest that “Neither the oxen nor the horses are two [different categories,] but the oxen and the horses are two. Then, with the oxen being not non-oxen and the horses being not non-horses, there is no difficulty in [saying] that ‘the oxen and the horses [as grouped together] are neither oxen nor horses.’”

However, in the classical Chinese texts in general “shì” and “fēi” used in the third way, i.e. as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ or ‘to regard (something) as right’ and ‘to regard (something) as wrong,’ predominantly refer to the qualities that actions or moral teachings have; and the later Mohist logicians’ seemingly purely theoretical interest in proper categorization of things is arguably driven in large part by their practical need to provide a guidance for proper action in everyday life and to win ethical debates with their rival thinkers. So, for example, the later Mohist logicians say: “Even though a thief is a person, there is no difficulty in [saying] that loving a thief is not loving a person, not loving a thief is not not loving a person, and killing a thief is not killing a person.”

33 “鄧文公問曰：‘鄧，小國也，問於齊楚。事齊乎？事楚乎？’孟子對曰：‘是謀非吾所能及也…’” Mengzi 1B:13.
35 For example, in the “Fēiming” 非命 ("Criticizing Fatalism") chapter of the Mòzǐ, Mòzǐ provides three criteria to examine a given doctrine with, and argues that such criteria are necessary for clearly determining whether a doctrine is right or wrong, and beneficial or harmful (Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ xiāngǔ, pp. 265–266). A similar point is raised more frequently and explicitly in various places of Xǔn zì 荀子 too.
36 “雖盜人也，愛盜非愛人也，不愛盜非不愛人也，殺盜非殺人也，無難矣。” Mòzǐ, “Xiǎoqū” 小取 ("Smaller Pick"). Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ xiāngǔ, p. 418. The correction in the text follows Sūn’s emendation.
This use of the terms “shì” and “fēi” in the ethical context is very clear and frequent in the Mengzi too. For example, we have just seen a case above (Mengzi 2B:3) where “shì” and “fēi” respectively refer to the rightness and wrongness of certain actions, and a similar case can be found in Mengzi 7B:37 where Mengzi complains that the people known to be sincere and good among the villagers (xiāngyuàn 鄉愿) mistakenly consider themselves to be right (zì yī wéi shì 自以為是).\(^{37}\) In addition, in various places of the Mengzi we observe that “shì” as an indexical (“this”) is used for classifying various kinds of actions, doctrines, or ethical positions into different categories of mistakes or vices. For example, Mengzi tells a hypothetical anecdote in Mengzi 3B:8 where someone’s stealing his neighbor’s chicken everyday is criticized by somebody else to be not the way of the nobleman.\(^{38}\) And in Mengzi 3B:9, Mengzi says that Yáng Zhū’s ethical position of egoism amounts to denying the importance of the ruler (shì wú jūn yě 以君之也), and the Mohist doctrine of universal care ends up denying the importance of father (shì wú fù yě 以父之也). In other words, Mengzi’s point is that Yáng Zhū’s exclusive promotion of self-interest fails to see the importance of social values—represented by one’s duties to the ruler—in one’s ethical life, whereas Mòzǐ’s utmost altruism fails to appreciate the importance of family values—represented by one’s relationship with his father—in one’s ethical deliberation; and he concludes that those who deny the importance of these two kinds of values are not different from beasts (shì qínshòu yě 以禽獸之也).\(^{39}\)

I believe that combined with my initial assumption about the close relationship between the particular way “shì” and “fēi” are used in the Mengzi and Mengzi’s conception of shìfēi zhī xīn, the numerous instances of “shì” and “fēi” used in the Mengzi in the ethical context shows that shìfēi zhī xīn is not just any kind of judgment but primarily a kind of moral judgment. Then, my next task is to clarify what kind of moral judgment shìfēi zhī xīn is in Mengzi’s ethical thought.

\(^{37}\) Also consider Mengzi 3A:5 on the same point.

\(^{38}\) “今有人日攘其鄰之雞者，或告之曰：‘是非君子之道.’…” Mengzi 3B:8.

\(^{39}\) “楊氏為我，是無君也；墨氏兼愛，是無父也。無父無君，是禽獸也。” Mengzi 3B:9. The same point could have been made by citing Mengzi 11:10, 13:39, 13:46, 14:1, 14:23, 14:31, and 14:37.
5.1.3 Emotions and Wisdom (Zhì 智)

According to Mengzi, *shìfēi zhī xīn* is the sprout of wisdom (*zhì* 智)\(^{40}\), and in order to acquire this intellectual virtue, one needs to “enlarge” (*kuò* 擴) and “feed on” (*chōng* 充) one’s *shìfēi zhī xīn*\(^{41}\). What “enlarging” and “feeding on” exactly mean in Mengzi’s theory of moral cultivation is a question to be discussed in the next chapter; but since “zhī” 智 refers to the intellectual excellence that *shìfēi zhī xīn* is supposed to develop into, we could clarify to some extent what kind of moral judgment *shìfēi zhī xīn* is by studying the primary contents of this Mengzian wisdom and some examples showing how Mengzi tried to help his disciples develop their *zhī* 智. By doing this, in this section I ultimately aim to show that 1) Mengzi’s conception of practical reason deals with not only the reasons for action recognized by moral emotions such as compassion, but also other kinds of ethical concerns that can hardly be detected by moral emotions; and that 2) when making an all-things-considered moral judgment, the ideal Mengzian agent takes into consideration both kinds of reasons for action—i.e., those detected by moral emotions and those that are not—and arbitrates between them as appropriate. This will in turn show that 3) Mengzi’s conception of practical reason is not to be confined to the “cognitive” aspects of certain ethical emotions, and consequently that there is a clear distinction between reason and emotion in Mengzi’s ethical thought.

I just rendered “zhī” 智 as “wisdom,” but “zhī” 智 is actually used in a more complicated way in the *Mengzī*. So, in order to understand Mengzi’s conception of wisdom properly, we need to know the various ways “zhī” is used in the *Mengzī* and how they contribute to the meaning of “zhī” as wisdom. First of all, when used as a noun, “zhī” can refer to “intelligence,” i.e. the intellectual capacity of human beings that makes knowledge or the learning of a skill possible. For example, in *Mengzī* 2A:2 Mengzi comments that Kongzi’s three disciples Zǎi Wǒ 戽我, Zīgōng 子貢, and Yǒu Ruò 有若 had enough intelligence (*zhī* 智) to appreciate Kongzi’s virtue properly.\(^{42}\) And in *Mengzī*

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\(^{41}\)“凡有四端於我者，知皆搆而充之矣…苟能充之，足以保四海；苟不充之，不足以事父母.” Ibid.

\(^{42}\)“宰我，子貢，有若，智足以知聖人.” *Mengzī* 2A:2.
6A:9, Mengzi talks about two hypothetical people learning together to play a game called \( yi \) 弈: Both learn from the best player of the game in the whole country, but one fully concentrates on his teacher’s instructions whereas the other, though listening to his teacher, at the same time thinks about shooting with his bow a swan that he thinks might come to their place shortly. Mengzi says that the latter person can never get as good at playing \( yi \) as the former one, and this is not because the latter’s intelligence (\( zhì \) 智) falls short of that of the former’s.\(^{43}\)

These two passages already tell us many things about wisdom in Mengzi. From the first passage (Mengzi 2A:2) we see that being able to appreciate a sage’s virtuous character (literally “knowing the sage” (\( zhī shèngrén \) 知聖人)) is part of what Mengzi conceives as wisdom (\( zhì \) 智), and this ability requires some degree of intelligence as a necessary condition. However, the second passage makes it clear that one’s having intelligence does not make one good at anything by itself; one also needs to exert one’s intelligence to the utmost to achieve anything. This is also true for the case of achieving wisdom, because Mengzi originally takes the example of the two people learning the \( yi \) game just to illustrate this point:

No wonder that the king is not wise. Even a plant that most easily grows cannot survive if you expose it to the sun for one day and leave it in the cold for ten days. I [have the opportunity to] meet with him only rarely, and once I leave, those who make him cold arrive; what could I do if he had some sprout [of wisdom]? Now as for the game of \( yi \) 弈, it is a small art; but you cannot master it if you don’t [engage in it] with full concentration...\(^{44}\)

Mengzi is clear in this passage that wisdom is not what one is fully born with, but what one should cultivate and grow through a long period of incessant training.

Second, Mengzi is aware of the possibility that intelligence can be misused or abused. He seems to think that intelligence can easily get off the track and fiddle with wrong things, and only the proper use of intelligence leads to “great” wisdom:


\(^{44}\) “無或乎王之不智也. 雖有天下易生之物也, 一日暴之, 十日寒之, 未有能生者也. 吾見亦罕矣, 吾退而寒之者至矣, 吾如有萌焉何哉? 今夫奕之為數, 小數也, 不專心致志, 則不得也.” Ibid.
The discourses on the nature of things in the world are after all the pursuit of the underlying principles. What I call the “underlying principles” take ease to be their fundamental characteristic. What is to be hated about intelligence is its potentiality to investigate [things and making changes] against the nature of things. If a smart person [could use his intelligence] as Yǔ 禹 directed the waters, there is nothing to hate about intelligence. Yǔ directed the waters by doing things that could be done without much trouble. If a smart person could do [only] what can be done without much trouble, [his] wisdom would be great. Despite the height of the heaven and the distance of the stars, one can calculate the solstice of a thousand years hence while sitting in his seat [only] if he sought [and got] the underlying principles.45

What I rendered as “underlying principles” above is “gù 故. According to Graham’s observation, “gù 故 is phonetically and graphically descended from “gǔ 古 (“antiquity” or “the past”), and refers to what lies behind something either in its past or at its basis. And specifically in the later Mohist writings, gù 故 can refer to the further facts behind certain facts, which provide reasons or justifications for what one says about the latter group of facts, or to the facts behind certain facts, which constitute the causes from which the latter group of facts come about.46 Mengzi would probably agree to these general descriptions of “gù 故, but Mengzi adds that gù 故 (“reasons” or “causes”) can be found only by those with great wisdom, and the understanding of them makes one’s work nice and easy (lì 利). Mengzi’s example of ease in working with one’s intelligence is the legendary sage king Yǔ’s 禹 treatment of the great flood. According to the description in the “Gāo Yáo mó” 高陶謨 chapter of the Book of Documents, Yǔ deepened the channels and canals so that extra water could get into the rivers, and cut passages for the nine rivers so that they could [naturally] flow to the seas.47 As Legge has perceptively pointed out, Mengzi describes Yǔ’s treatment of the flood as “xíngshuǐ 行水 (“guiding the waters” or “letting the waters move”) rather than “zhishuǐ 治水

(“controlling the waters”)⁴⁸, and this description emphasizes that Yù’s work was done smoothly because Yù investigated water properly and got the underlying principles behind its movement.

It follows from this passage that Mengzi’s wisdom involves certain amount of knowledge of gu 故 (reasons or causes). And in the passage just quoted above, the kind of knowledge involved is scientific. However, gu 故 or reasons and causes do not have to be confined to the realm of natural philosophy, because in the Mengzi we often find them meaningfully discussed in the context of moral philosophy too. For example, at King Hui’s 惠 response in Mengzi 1A:3 (quoted in the previous section) that there is no difference between running away from the battlefield fifty paces and one hundred paces, Mengzi says that “If your majesty know this, you shouldn’t wish that your subjects were more than those of your neighboring countries.” The point Mengzi is trying to make here is that if the king knows that running away fifty paces and running away one hundred paces are equally cowardly actions, the king should also know, through analogical reasoning, that adopting some benevolent policies in the governing of his country does not make his government benevolent enough to attract people in the world to his country; and if the king realizes this, this fact should also function as a reason for the king to stop wishing to have more subjects than his rivaling countries. In this light, despite no mentioning of “gu 故 at all in this passage, we can clearly see that this fact—i.e. adopting a couple of benevolent policies does not make the king’s government benevolent enough—clearly plays the role of gu 故, which is the proper object of the king’s knowledge and the knowledge of which enables the king to assess his situation wisely.

Finally, there are two miscellaneous uses of “zhì 智 in the Mengzi. On one hand, in Mengzi 2A:2 Mengzi delivers a conversation purportedly between Kongzi and his disciple Zigòng 子貢, where “zhì 智 seems to refer to love of learning. According to Mengzi, when Zigòng asked Kongzi whether he was a sage, Kongzi replied that merely being not sick of learning and not tired of teaching, he was not able to become a sage.

Despite this reply, Zìgòng still concluded that Kongzi must be a sage, saying that not being sick of learning is nothing but zhì 智, and not being tired of teaching is nothing but benevolence (rèn 仁). On the other hand, in *Mengzi* 4A:4 “zhì” 智 seems to be used as an effort to use one’s intelligence sincerely so as to achieve one’s desired goal. Mengzi says that “If others do not love you when you love them, turn inward and see whether you were benevolent enough; if people are not governed well when you [try to] govern them, turn inward and see whether you were wise enough; and if others do not return your courtesy [in a proper manner], turn inward and see whether you were respectful enough.” That is, Mengzi says that benevolence and respect could get more effective by one’s voluntary effort to be sincere in enacting or expressing them, and the parallel between zhì 智, benevolence, and respect in this passage makes it likely that Mengzi is also commenting on the voluntary aspect of zhì 智. As I see it, Mengzi’s point about zhì 智 here is that when one fails to govern one’s country well, one should blame one’s not thinking carefully through all of the factors relevant to governing it, and this in turn makes the “zhì” 智 in the original text be interpreted not as the perfect virtue of wisdom but as a proper intellectual attitude required of whoever wants to become, or is already, wise: carefully considering all the relevant factors in a certain situation. In short, together with love of learning, sincerity in using one’s intellectual power constitutes an important character trait of anyone aspiring to wisdom.

My analysis of “zhì” 智 in the *Mengzi* so far shows that wisdom (zhì 智) in Mengzi can be acquired by using one’s intelligence in full concentration and over a long period of time; those aspiring to wisdom are also fond of learning and thorough in deliberation considering all of the relevant factors; and “great wisdom” (dàzhì 大智) or wisdom in the proper sense can be acquired when one grasps gù 故 (“reasons” or “causes”) of things. We have also seen that in the realm of natural philosophy or practical science, wisdom seems to grow from the knowledge of the underlying principles (gù 故) behind things; but in the realm of moral philosophy, the nature of gù 故 in the ethical

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49 “昔者子貢問於孔子曰：‘夫子聖矣乎?’ 孔子曰：‘聖則吾不能，我學不厭而敎不倦也．’ 子貢曰：‘學不厭，智也；敎不倦，仁也．仁且智，夫子既聖矣．’” *Mengzi* 2A:2.
context makes wisdom primarily 1) the capacity to focus on the crucial features of a
certain situation that characterize the situation one way or another in ethical terms—e.g.
judging that fleeing fifty paces and fleeing one hundred paces are equally cowardly
actions without being distracted by their difference in distance of fleeing, 2) the capacity
of analogical reasoning through which one can move from one case to another of a
similar kind in ethical terms—e.g. deriving from the case of two runaway soldiers that
adopting some benevolent policies does not make one’s government really benevolent,
and 3) the capacity to see what kind of action or attitude one is required to do or take by
having the knowledge of the previous two kinds—e.g. seeing that one should not expect
to have more subjects than other countries as long as one acknowledges that adopting a
couple of benevolent policies does not make one’s government really benevolent, just as
fleeing fifty paces less than another does not make one less cowardly.

Then, it is clear that the cultivation of wisdom in Mengzi’s moral philosophy at
least involves cultivating the three kinds of intellectual capacities just described, and we
need to see at this point whether there would be other kinds of intellectual activities that
one should also engage in to acquire wisdom, and what the place of moral emotions is in
all of these activities that would eventually form wisdom in one’s mind when
successfully done over a long period of time. In the following, I will first discuss a couple
of passages in the Mengzi that testify to the importance of emotions in moral judgment,
but then I will argue that the activity of weighing (quán 權) different reasons for action
in a deliberative context requires that there be certain ethical concerns in Mengzi’s
thought that are not adequately captured by his conception of moral emotions. This will
in turn show that Mengzi’s conception of practical reason cannot be confined to the
“cognitive” aspects of moral emotions, and consequently that there is a clear distinction
between reason and emotion in Mengzi’s ethical thought.

In Mengzi 4A:27, Mengzi specifies the core behaviors of his four cardinal virtues.
He says:

*The core of humaneness is to serve one’s parents; the core of righteousness is to obey
one’s elder brothers; the core of wisdom is to know [the value of] these two and hold fast
to them; and the core of propriety is to adjust and adorn [the manner of implementing]*
By comparing this passage to a similar one from elsewhere in the *Mengzi*, we know that “serving one’s parents” could stand for “treating one’s kin with affection” or more literally “treating close people as close” (qīnqīn 親親), and “obeying one’s elder brothers” could represent more broadly “respecting the elders in general” (jìngzhǎng 敬長).\(^{52}\) Apparently, such elements as benevolence, self-respect, or sense of honor that we have previously seen constituting important components of Mengzi’s conception of humaneness (rén 仁) and righteousness (yì 義) are missing from his description of these virtues here; but it should not affect my discussion of zhì 智 below, because what I am trying to do for now is not to determine the full contents of rén 仁 and yì 義 in Mengzi, but to understand a specific way that zhì 智 relates to rén 仁 and yì 義 no matter what their full contents are. In the passage above, Mengzi says that the core of wisdom is “to know the two [virtues of humaneness and righteousness] and hold fast to them,” and the phrase “holding fast to them”—or literally “not abandoning them” (fúqù 弗去)—reveals that the kind of knowing involved here is to appreciate the values that such activities as serving one’s parents and obeying one’s elder brothers embody.\(^{53}\) And from the fact (discussed in the previous chapter) that these activities are not merely motivationally neutral behaviors but actions whose motives are expressed by the accompanying emotions of familial affection and respect for elders, we could also see that the kind of appreciation occurring here is not just of the value of these activities but the value of the motives carried by the relevant emotions. In other words, Mengzi is declaring in this passage that the core of wisdom is the capacity to appreciate the value of the humane and righteous motives involved in certain activities; and from the fact that such motives are felt in the form of emotions like familial affection and respect for elders, wisdom’s appreciation of the values revealed by these motives simultaneously involves its

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\(^{51}\) “仁之實，事親是也；義之實，從兄是也；智之實，知斯二者弗去是也；禮之實，節文斯二者是也.” *Mengzi* 4A:27.

\(^{52}\) “親親，仁也；敬長，義也.” *Mengzi* 7A:15.

\(^{53}\) For my interpretation of zhì 智 as involving appreciation of values embodied in certain activities, I owe a lot to Stephen Darwall. See his *Welfare and Rational Care* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), especially Chapter IV.
affirmation of the related moral emotions as providing reasons for action.

We notice that this point is corroborated in several places of the *Mengzi*, in relation to several different moral emotions and desire. First, in *Mengzi* 1A:7, we see that King Xuān 宣 of Qi 齊 tells Mengzi he saved an ox from being killed for a sacrificial ceremony because he felt compassion for it, and the king uses the word “gù 故” to specify his reason for action: “I couldn’t bear [to see] it cowering, like an innocent [man] going to the execution ground; that’s why I replaced it with a sheep.”54 We find similar examples concerning xiūwù zhī xīn 羞惡之心 and desire for honor too: In *Mengzi* 2A:9, Bó Yí is described to have declined contemporary rulers’ offers of an office based on his aversion to vice,55 and Mengzi says in *Mengzi* 6A:10 that he would choose honor over life when situation requires a choice between these two, because he desires the former more than the latter and this is also how human beings in general actually desire things sometimes and would always do in their original and ideal state of mind.56 Since Mengzi’s choice of what is honorable is based on his strong desire that finds a lofty kind of value in honor, and also because he claims that this is the normal way of human action, we could say that besides particular moral emotions such as compassion, respect, and shame, desire for morality in a broad sense and aversion to vice can also guide one’s choice behavior, and consequently are important contributors to wisdom in Mengzi’s ethical thought.

However, this is not the end of the story. For in several places of the *Mengzi* we find Mengzi and his interlocutors discussing hard cases of deliberation where different moral emotions conflict with each other with their own characteristic ethical demands, or a certain ethical value embodied in an emotion competes with another ethical value which is not grounded in an emotion. In such cases a special function of the mind (xīn 心) is required that would make the final decision about what to do by weighing the competing ethical demands (either emotionally or non-emotionally grounded), and this activity is sometimes called “quán 權” by Mengzi. In the following, I examine several

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54 “卽不忍其觳觫，若無罪而就死地，故以羊易之也.” *Mengzi* 1A:7. Italic is mine.
55 “伯夷，非其君，不事，非其友，不友…推惡惡之心，思與鄉人立，其冠不正，望望然去之，若將浼焉。是故諸侯雖有善其辭命而至者，不受也.” *Mengzi* 2A:9. The underlining is mine.
important passages from the *Mengzi* where Mengzi shows his disciples and theoretical rivals how to engage in this activity correctly, and I will argue that Mengzi’s discussion of the activity of *quán* 權 requires that his conception of practical rationality go beyond the “rationality of emotions.”

In *Mengzi* 4A:17, a person named Chún yú Kūn 淳于髡 challenges Mengzi by asking what should be done when one’s sister-in-law is drowning. Before asking this question he secures the point from Mengzi that according to the social norms (lǐ 禮) men and women are not supposed to make a physical contact when giving and receiving things, and he presses Mengzi by asking whether one should rescue one’s drowning sister-in-law by giving a hand in violation of the social norm. At this question, Mengzi says that it would be a beast who just stands and lets his sister-in-law drown; according to Mengzi, “it is according to the social norms for men and women not to touch each other in giving and receiving, but it is responding to the demand of the exigency for one to rescue his sister-in-law with the hand when she drowns.”

This passage can be interpreted in terms of the conflict between a rule which is meant to contribute to maintaining social order by discouraging unnecessary physical contacts between the sexes and one’s moral emotion which construes one’s relative to be valuable either as a human being or as a member of one’s family. In other words, this passage is about the conflict between the ethical demand of an inculcated social norm and the demand of cēyǐn zhī xīn 惇隱之心, and Mengzi says that it is “responding to the demand of the exigency” that one finally judges the latter should have the upper hand in this situation.

What I rendered above as “responding to the demand of the exigency” is “quán” 權. Zhào Qí 趙岐 says that ‘quán’ 權 means ‘[bringing about] good by going against the normal way [of acting],’ and probably this gloss can be traced back to the saying in the *Chūnqīū Gōngyáng zhuàn 春秋公羊傳* that “what is called ‘quán’ 權 is to have a good result after going against what is normal.”

However, any reasonable decision to go

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57 “男女授受不親，禮也；嫂溺，援之以手者，權也.” *Mengzi* 4A:17. My translation of “quán” 權 this way is based on some traditional commentaries on the term. I discuss these commentaries and the full meaning of “quán” in the next paragraph.


against what is a normal way of acting in a certain situation postulates a preceding assessment of the situation taking all of its relevant factors into consideration, and this leads us to exploring a more fundamental meaning of the term. According to Zhū Xī, “quán” 權 refers to the weight hanging from a scale; when measuring the weight of a certain thing, we move it back and forth on the scale until we get the point of balance. In this light, “quán” 權 can also refer to the activity of weighing things using a scale (chèng 稱) and a weight (quán 權), and in the context of deliberation it refers to the activity of considering all of the relevant factors in a certain situation and responding to them appropriately by making an all-things-considered ethical judgment.

Now back in Mengzi 4A:17, what are being weighed are the importance of one’s sister-in-law’s life that is registered through one’s cèyīn zhī xīn and the importance of a rule that is inculcated in oneself as a means to maintain social order. This shows that besides cèyīn zhī xīn, which Mengzi claims to be a natural sprout of virtue growing in the heart of every individual, Mengzi also accepts the need to maintain social order by regulating the number of physical contacts between sexes as an important moral consideration. As I see it, this need to segregate different sexes according to some criteria originates from the observation that many humans are prone to be attracted by the opposite sex and can bring about problematic consequences, and in this light it could be said that the ancient Chinese rule discussed in this passage is grounded in the practical need to control this problematic human condition rather than in any spontaneous moral emotions. If this is correct, we could also say that Mengzi’s conception of practical reason is not confined to the “cognitive” aspect of moral emotions, because the Mengzian agent considers not only the reasons for action embodied in moral emotions like cèyīn zhī xīn but also the non-emotionally grounded reasons for action such as the need to regulate the problematic sexual desire of human beings.

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60 “權，稱錘也。稱物輕重而往來以取中者也.” Zhū Xī 朱熹, Mèngzǐ jízhù 孟子集註, in Yasui Kō, Mōshi teihon, 卷七, p. 20.
61 For example, “權，然後知輕重.” ([One] knows the weight [of a thing] after weighing [it.]) Mengzi 1A:7.
62 In his recent book, Mark Csikszentmihalyi discusses an interesting theoretical possibility that virtues in Mengzi could be “reducible to a common quasi-materia substance” so that one can resolve seemingly conflicting demands of different virtues by measuring their pulls on a common scale. See his Material Virtue: Ethics and the Body in Early China (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004), p. 6 and Chapter 3, especially pp. 113–127.
One might argue, though, that the rule prohibiting physical contact between men and women in certain circumstances in ancient China is actually grounded on a moral emotion, and therefore the agent in *Mengzi* 4A:17 is dealing with nothing but emotionally grounded reasons for action. For Mengzi says in *Mengzi* 3B:3 that a couple having premarital sex without waiting for their parents’ orders or the matchmakers’ arrangements are despised not only by the people in town but also by their own parents, and the kind of contempt or disgust going on here could be what also grounds the ban on physical contact between the sexes in certain situations. This is a reasonable objection, but it still fails to refute my thesis, for two reasons.

First, I will discuss a passage below that is about the conflict between filial piety and legal justice, and the fact that the concept of legal justice or fairness is hardly grounded in any emotions will once again prove my thesis that Mengzi’s conception of practical reason is more than the “rational” aspect of emotions. Second, even if we grant that *Mengzi* 4A:17 is about the conflict between two competing moral emotions, one still needs to accept my thesis. For when the Mengzian agent eventually decides to act on his *céyín zhī xīn* for his drowning sister-in-law rather than the rule supported by his aversion to touching his sister-in-law illegitimately, the rationale behind his decision is different from the kind of reason embodied in his *céyín zhī xīn*. In other words, what makes the agent choose to act on his *céyín zhī xīn* instead of the rule is the consideration that the former is a concern of greater significance than the latter in that situation, and this consideration is markedly different from his *céyín zhī xīn*’s construal of the situation that his drowning sister-in-law deserves to be saved with whatever means available.

Before moving on to our next passage, I need to consider Eric Hutton’s interpretation of the current passage. For he views the situation in question as a conflict between two kinds of desires—i.e., emotions in a broad sense—and argues that the deliberative conflict involving two competing desires can be resolved at the level of those desires without appealing to a higher faculty or function of the mind that could assess the situation from a perspective different from that of either desire. According to Hutton, *Mengzi* 4A:17 could be interpreted to be about the conflict between “a desire to adhere to

63 “丈夫生而願為之有室，女子生而願為之有家；父母之心，人皆有之。不待父母之命，媒妁之言，鑽穴隙相窺，踰牆相從，則父母國人皆賤之...” *Mengzi* 3B:3. For the full translation and discussion of this passage, see Section 4.3.3.2 of the previous chapter.
the dictates of ritual” and “a desire to save one’s relative” (the latter possibly being an instance of cèyīn zhī xīn, as Hutton suggests), and it is by the weighing (quán 權) of these desires that the Mengzian agent comes to judge that the latter desire is more important to act on in the situation. Hutton acknowledges that this activity of weighing is a kind of deliberative reasoning, but he denies that reasoning itself decides which of these two impulses should have the upper hand in the situation. Instead, he argues that reasoning can only aid in the decision: “Reasoning does not per se provide judgments of right and wrong, but through analyzing and comparing the two alternatives and their consequences it clarifies the circumstances so that the agent can assess which of them ultimately engages her intuitive reactions more strongly.”

However, the last part of this remark sounds somewhat equivocal, because Hutton uses a term with evaluative connotation (viz. “assess”) in a plain descriptive structure (“engages”). It could have been something like “…so that the agent can assess which of them should ultimately engage her intuitive reactions more strongly,” but Hutton would not allow this kind of rendering because in his view, reasoning or reflective thinking in Mengzi cannot produce the final judgment of which impulse is right to act on in the situation. Alternatively, and perhaps more charitably, what Hutton meant by this remark could be that once the agent understands his situation clearly in terms of the relative importance of his preferences’ objects and the consequences resulting from his acting on either of the desires, the agent’s original desires are transformed into informed ones, whose strengths now correspond exactly to the relative importance the agent sees in the objects of his desires. In other words, the role of reasoning or reflective thinking in Mengzi is to help the agent understand the situation in question clearly, and this understanding of the situation results in the readjustment of the relative strengths of desires. And the important point is that this readjustment occurs among the desires spontaneously or without the interference of any authoritative conception of practical reason, and as long as one has a dispassionate understanding of the situation, one can

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64 Hutton, “Moral connoisseurship in Mengzi,” p. 178.
65 Ibid.
66 I borrow the term “dispassionate” from Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 94–96. What Darwall means by “dispassionate” is not that the agent is immune to the attractiveness of his desires’ objects, but that he can make an unprejudiced judgment between them by taking an impartial standpoint.
judge which desire to act on merely by observing which (informed) desire he feels more strongly in the situation as he understands now.

However, if this is what Hutton meant, I am afraid that this is not the correct picture of deliberative reasoning and moral judgment that we could attribute to Mengzi. As I see it, this picture is too optimistic to be a description of the situations we often find ourselves in, and therefore we could legitimately suspect that the view of moral judgment just delineated, if Mengzi ever held such a view, would also be only true for the case of sages or highly cultivated noblemen. In other words, we often find it to be the case that the very thing which is in the way of our cool, dispassionate understanding of a certain situation is our desire that makes its object more attractive than it should look to us, and it is in no other than such a situation that we turn to our reasoning or reflective thinking as a corrective measure independent of the ways that we are compelled to see things by our desires. Moreover, it is often observed in the philosophical literature and sometimes articulated as the problem of akrasia or the weakness of will that one’s desires are generally too stubborn to obey one’s best judgment, and I think it unlikely that Mengzi would have thought very differently.

Admittedly, in *Mengzi* 6A:10 Mengzi says that he would choose honor over life in a situation where he is allowed only to choose one because he wants the former more than the latter, just as he likes both a bear’s paw and fish but would choose the bear’s paw if he had to choose between them.\(^{67}\) However, as Mengzi makes it clear in the same passage, most people want honor more than life only sporadically or only in their original—which is also ideal in Mengzi—state of mind,\(^{68}\) and this implies that in order for an ordinary person (in terms of moral cultivation) to want things properly against his habitual stream of desires, he needs to be able to take a standpoint outside of his desires and weigh things differently from the way he would do if he were following either of his desires.

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\(^{67}\) “魚，我所欲也，熊掌亦我所欲也。二者不可得兼，舍魚而取熊掌者也。生亦我所欲也，義亦我所欲也。二者不可得兼，舍生而取義者也。生亦我所欲，所欲有甚於生者，故不為苟得也。死亦我所惡，所惡有甚於死者，故患有所不辟也。” *Mengzi* 6A:10.

\(^{68}\) “由是則生而有不用也，由是則可以辟患而有不為也。是故所欲有甚於生者，所惡有甚於死者，非獨賢者有是心也，人皆有之，賢者能勿喪耳。” *Ibid.*
In addition, we can find in the *Mengzi* a good example of emotional backsliding, or the situation where a person of some degree of moral cultivation falls back to succumb to his old temptation and do what is not morally desirable: Once there was a famine in齐, and Mengzi’s disciple Chén Zhēn 陈臻 asked Mengzi whether he would try to have a national granary open to the people once again (Mengzi did this before) so that the people could avoid starving. At this question, Mengzi said:

[Doing] this would be becoming a Féng Fù 馮婦. There was a person from Jin 晉 whose name was Féng Fù. He was good at seizing tigers with his bare hands, but he eventually became a well-cultivated gentleman. One day he happened to go out to a field where a crowd was chasing a tiger. The tiger ended up in a corner of a hill, and no one dared to approach it. On seeing Féng Fù afar, the crowd ran toward him to receive him, and Féng Fù got off his carriage rolling up his sleeves. The crowd was all delighted, but the gentlemen laughed at him.69

Although it is not clear in the passage, Mengzi would have probably judged that it was not a good idea for him to persuade the king to open up the granary for his subjects at the time. And by the analogy to a person named Féng Fù, he makes it clear that if he tried to persuade the king to open up his granary against his best decision not to persuade the king, it would be for fulfilling an ulterior motive such as having a good reputation among the masses, just as Féng Fù had backslid and fell for his petty old desire to stay famous for his boldness and skillfulness in catching tigers with bare hands. In short, this passage shows that it is very hard to transform a desire completely or make it obedient to one’s best judgment about what to do once and for all; and together with Mengzi 6A:10 that points out the discrepancy between people’s usual order of preference and the order of preference in their ideal state of mind, this passage shows that one’s desire to save his sister-in-law and his desire not to touch a female relative with the hand in *Mengzi* 4A:17 would still be there conflicting with each other, even after the agent has finished reflective, all-aspect assessment of the situation. And this in turn shows, against Hutton’s thesis, that the final judgment of what to do in a certain situation is made at a higher level than that of desires and from the perspective that takes the competing desires in view.70

69 是為馮婦也. 晉人有馮婦者, 善搏虎, 卒爲善士. 有眾逐虎, 虎負嵎, 莫之敢攖. 望見馮婦, 趨而迎之. 馮婦攘臂下車. 皆悅之, 其為士者笑之.” *Mengzi* 7B:23.
70 My last five paragraphs draw upon Stephen Darwall’s insights presented in his book, *Impartial Reason,*
Now, let us move on to our next passage that deals with the conflict between filial piety and the demand of legal justice. First, look at the following passage:

*Táo Yīng* 桃應 asked, “When Shùn was emperor and Gāo Yáo 高陶 was chief minister of justice, if Gŭ Sǒu 盲瞍 had killed a man, what would have been done?” *Mengzi* said, “[Gāo Yáo] would have arrested him; that’s all.” “Then, wouldn’t Shùn have stopped it?” [Mengzi] said, “How could Shùn have stopped it? He [i.e., Gŭ Sǒu] had [done] something that justifies his receiving that [kind of treatment].” “Then, what would Shùn have done [in such a situation]?” [Mengzi] said, “Shùn would have regarded abandoning the world as throwing away a worn shoe. He would have secretly fled carrying [his father] on his back, and having reached a seashore, would have lived there happily until the end of his life, being joyful and not caring about [the affairs of] the world.”

In this passage, *Mengzi*’s disciple Táo Yīng postulates a hypothetical situation where Gŭ Sǒu—the notorious father of the legendary sage king Shùn—commits a murder, and asks *Mengzi* what Shùn, an ideal *Mengzian* agent, would do in such a situation. Shùn is praised several times in the *Mengzi* as the paragon of filial piety and fraternal love, and we have previously seen that familial love is an important component of *cèyīn zhī xīn*. Nevertheless, *Mengzi*’s answer to his disciple’s question was that Shùn would let Gāo Yáo—his fair-minded minister of justice—arrest his father, because this would be what his murderous father deserves based on what he did. We could say that this passage is about the conflict between *cèyīn zhī xīn*, an important moral emotion in *Mengzi*’s thought, and the demand of legal justice that law should be enforced impartially. And from the fact that *Mengzi* acknowledges the weight of legal justice or criminal desert as an important reason to consider in deliberation, we could also say that the ideal *Mengzian* agent takes into account both emotionally and non-emotionally grounded reasons.

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71 “桃應問曰：‘舜為天子，皋陶為士，瞽瞍殺人，則如之何?’ 孟子曰：‘執之而已矣。’‘然則舜不禁與?’ 曰：‘夫舜惡得而禁之？夫有所受之也。’‘然則舜如之何？’ 曰：‘舜視棄天下猶棄敝蹝也。竊負而逃，遵海濱而處，終身訢然，樂而忘天下。’” *Mengzi* 7A:35.

72 For example, see *Mengzi* 4A:28, 5A:1, and 5A:2.

73 Alternatively, “fū” 夫 and “zhī” 之 in the phrase “fū yǒu suǒ shòu zhī yě” 夫有所受之也 can be respectively taken to refer to Gāo Yáo and the penal law, and the whole phrase could be interpreted that Gāo Yáo had the proper source (probably the Heaven) from which he received his law, so that he was bound to enforce the law justly. For such an interpretation, see Zhū Xi’s commentary on this passage in *Yasui Kō, Mōshi teihon*, 卷十三, p. 26; Legge, *The Works of Mencius*, p. 470; and Lau, *Mencius*, p. 190. Although emphasizing the authority of the law rather than the demand of criminal justice, this interpretation does not affect the general point of the passage that the law should be administered impartially. I personally prefer Yáng Bójùn’s rendering of the passage. See his *Mèngzǐ yīzhù*, p. 317.
However, the ultimate action Mengzi seems to suggest as exemplary in the passage is not simply letting one’s culpable father be arrested and punished. For Shùn, according to Mengzi, abandoning the world was no more difficult than throwing away a worn shoe, because protecting his father was much more important to Shùn than being able to govern the entire world. As Mengzi imagines, Shùn would have fled to a far corner of the world and enjoyed a private life serving his father, forgetting all about his imperial wealth, privileges, and duties. In other words, despite his initial suggestion that Shùn was supposed to have his father arrested, Mengzi now seems to suggest that a virtuous person would not let his family members suffer in a prison regardless of whether they deserve it or not. Is there any contradiction going on here? I suspect not, at least on the surface, because Shùn’s letting his guilty father be arrested was due to his viewing the situation from the impartial perspective or the standpoint of a public man (emperor), whereas now by deciding to run away with his father, Shùn chooses to resign from his public duties and see things from the partialistic perspective or the standpoint of a private man (son).

Interestingly, although the demand of justice based on the impartial perspective carries significant weight in Shùn’s deliberation, Shùn eventually endorses his private motive to protect his father at the expense of public justice. This might be controversial because the person killed by Shùn’s father could have been someone else’s father, but the aspect of Shùn’s decision that I am interested in focusing on here is that Shùn seems to weigh the (personal) value of public justice against the value of protecting his father, and comes to choose the latter by taking a third perspective that seems to transcend both the impartial and partial perspectives, in the sense that he holds both perspectives in view and decides which perspective is more appropriate or better to take in the situation in question. There still remains the question whether Shùn’s value judgment placing private welfare over public justice is really recommendable for everyone else to emulate; one might think that the result of doing so would be a great disaster where people try to hide their family members who are guilty of harm and the family members of the harmed seek for private vengeance. This is an important question, but I would leave it unanswered at this point. For now, I think it suffices to see that the demand of public justice, although ultimately rejected, gets seriously considered in the process of Shùn’s deliberation of what to do
about his father, and this reveals the structural complexity of Mengzi’s conception of practical reason which is not explicable only in terms of the “rationality of emotions” as Wong argues.

So far, I have examined two passages from the *Mengzi* where Mengzi shows how to engage in a deliberation involving competing ethical considerations. This is quite different from another function of the intellect or wisdom (zhì 智) that we have noticed above, viz. appreciating the values revealed by the motives certain moral emotions embody and affirming them as important reasons for action, because the kind of intellectual activity going on in the last two passages is not just affirming a single ethical concern as an important reason for action but assessing competing reasons side-by-side and judging which one is a better reason to act upon all-things-considered. In *Mengzi* 4A:17 (and also in 1A:7) Mengzi explicitly calls such an activity “quán” 權, and we have just seen that this quán 權 activity—a kind of reflective thinking that takes into consideration all of the relevant factors in a certain situation—deals with both emotionally and non-emotionally grounded reasons for action. And from the fact that quán 權 activity constitutes a crucial part of Mengzi’s conception of moral judgment (shìfēi zhī xīn 是非之心), we can see that moral emotions provide only partial basis for all-things-considered ethical judgment in Mengzi’s thought, and Wong’s thesis that there is no distinction between reason and emotion in Mengzi should be rejected accordingly.

5.2 Emotions and Moral Motivation

5.2.1 Sources of Moral Action: Two Roots or One?

Previously in Chapter 2, I have argued that the proper way of desiring things for Kongzi’s ideal nobleman is such that he gives the top priority to morality over other things of value, and the order of priority among morality and other valuable things is proportionate to the greater and lesser degrees to which he likes morality and other things respectively. On the other hand, we have seen that many people who are still in the process of moral self-
cultivation could suffer some sort of motivational malfunction, viz. that the strength of their recognition of morality’s value is not proportionate to the degree in which they like (hào 好) morality. In other words, many people know about morality’s supreme value and also think that they should give the highest priority to morality, but they often end up actually not doing so. It is not that they are not attracted to morality at all; the problem is that they feel they are not attracted to morality enough to choose it at the expense of other valuable objects (e.g. wealth, beauty, or fame). And in the context of moral action, they think that they are short of moral stamina that would enable them to act in accordance with morality in the face of various kinds of temptations, and consequently their recognition of the high value of morality or their thinking that they should act according to morality fails to help them escape their ethical predicament.

Concerning this issue, we have considered the cases of Rǎn Qiú 冉求 and Zǐgòng 子貢—Kongzi’s two advanced disciples. In Lunyu 6:12, we have seen Rǎn Qiú complaining to Kongzi that although being delighted by his master’s teaching, he lacked enough strength (lì 力) to carry it through. At this, Kongzi reproached him by saying that those whose strength is insufficient just collapse midway, but Rǎn Qiú was now merely drawing a line.74 On the other hand, we have seen Zǐgòng once saying to Kongzi that he did not want to do things to others that he did not want others to do to him, and Kongzi put Zǐgòng down by saying that this stage was not what he (Zǐgòng) was capable of reaching yet.75 According to the interpretation that I have suggested in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.2.3) above, what Kongzi meant by this was not that Zǐgòng was not often successful in refraining from doing harm to others that he himself did not want to suffer, but that Zǐgòng had not yet made himself into the kind of person who would normally desire to act as this maxim dictates. In short, both Rǎn Qiú and Zǐgòng were mistaken about their moral strength: Rǎn Qiú thought that he had not enough power to practice his master’s moral teaching when he really had, whereas Zǐgòng thought that his moral cultivation was sufficient to make him desire, by character, to act according to the Kongzian version of golden rule.

74 “冉求曰：‘非不說子之道，力不足也.’ 子曰：‘力不足者，中道而廢，今女畵.’” Lunyu 6:12.
75 “子貢曰：‘我不欲人之加諸我也，吾亦欲無加諸人.’ 子曰：‘賜也，非爾所及也.’” Lunyu 5:12.
A key term that deserves our attention here is “lì 力”, which literally means “strength” but apparently connotes some sort of moral strength. So, when one says that he does not have enough power (lì 力) to practice a moral teaching, what he means is probably not that he is short of physical strength to do the recommended action, but that he is not motivated enough to do it. Now, let us suppose that the recommended action is to treat others benevolently, and also suppose that a person denies that he has enough power to do this. If the person is not simply mistaken about himself, then he might be either trying to deceive himself and others that he is incapable of acting benevolently towards others, or he sincerely means that he is incapable of such an act. Kongzi’s saying in Lunyu 6:12 that “those who are short of (moral) strength just collapse midway” also seems to acknowledge that the second possibility—i.e. genuine shortage of moral strength—is real at least for some people; but what is it exactly that such people do not have enough of?

For such thinkers as Mózǐ (480–390 B.C.E.) who was primarily concerned with the behavioral aspect of benevolent action that was supposed to bring benefits to people’s life in general, it would have been very difficult to understand someone saying that he understood Mózǐ’s point about benevolent act but was nevertheless not sufficiently motivated to act benevolently toward others. For in Mózǐ’s view, human beings are basically creatures of self-love who are prone to pursue benefit and avoid harm, and as long as they recognize another general tendency of human beings to return benevolence by acting benevolently and return harm by acting harmfully, they have no reason not to treat others benevolently. So, if there had been people who said that they were incapable of acting benevolently toward others while being convinced of Mózǐ’s argument that benevolent act is the best policy for promoting their own self-interests, Mózǐ would have found such people highly confused and unintelligible, having nothing to recommend to them for a remedy.

On the other hand, later thinkers such as Mengzi (and even the later Mohist Yí Zhī 畢之, who was Mengzi’s contemporary) seem to have held a quite different philosophical position from Mózǐ’s. As Nivison has aptly pointed out, Mengzi’s concern was not simply making people behave in a certain way, but making them grow into the kind of people who will always do certain actions with “the right feelings and
dispositions.” For example, Mengzi once comments on the virtuous sage king Shùn’s character as follows:

It is only a modicum by which humans are distinguished from the beasts; the commoners abandon it, whereas the nobleman preserves it. Shùn was clear about the multitude of things, closely observed the relationships among humanity, and acted from humaneness and righteousness rather than [just] doing what is humane and what is right.

In this passage Mengzi contrasts “acting from humaneness and righteousness” (yóu rényì xíng 由仁義行) with “doing what is humane and what is right” (xíng rényì 行仁義), and the point of contrast is that the former refers to the kind of actions whose motives are humaneness or righteousness, whereas the latter designates one’s doing certain types of acts because he finds them humane or right, but not necessarily out of a humane or righteous motive. In order to see more clearly exactly what is meant by doing something out of a humane or righteous motive, we need to consider the phrase “a modicum by which humans are distinguished from the beasts.” Earlier in Chapter 4 (Section 4.1), we have seen a very similar phrase:

Thanks to the rest they get during the day or night and the qi of the calm morning, people have a modicum of liking and disliking that are close to [those of] others. But what they do during the day fetters and destroys those [feelings]. If the fettering is repeated, then their nocturnal qi is insufficient to preserve [those feelings]. If their nocturnal qi is insufficient to preserve [those feelings], then they become not far from birds and beasts.

In this passage, Mengzi makes it clear that “the modicum” (jǐ xī 几希) by which human beings are considered as close to each other while being distinguished from the lower animals refers to one’s proper affective attitudes of liking and disliking (hàowù 好惡); and in the unquoted part of the same passage, Mengzi also speaks as if “the modicum” here could also refer to the “heart” of humaneness and righteousness (rén yì zhī xīn 仁義之心), which we know in turn refers to Mengzi’s first two sprouts, cèyǐn zhī xīn 恻隱之心.

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76 Nivison, “Motivation and Moral Action in Mencius,” p. 94.
77 “人之所以異於禽獸者幾希，庶民去之，君子存之。舜明於庶物，察於人倫，由仁義行，非行仁義也。” Mengzi 8:19.
78 “其日夜之所息，平旦之氣，其好惡與人相近也者幾希；則其旦晝之所為，有梏亡之矣。梏之反覆，則其夜氣不足以存。夜氣不足以存，則其違禽獸不遠矣。” Mengzi 6A:8.
Now, from all of these points we could infer that what distinguishes human beings from the other animals is their having a set of moral feelings such as fondness of virtue, aversion to vice, compassion, and sense of honor, and what Mengzi meant by “acting from humaneness and righteousness” (yóu rényì xíng 由仁義行) in *Mengzi* 8:19 was probably acting out of these ethical feelings as proper motives for action.

Then, we could tentatively say the following: as Mengzi sees it, what people are missing when they say they are incapable of doing certain moral actions would be enough motivations for doing those actions, and the motivations in question would be in the form of what Nivison calls “the right feelings and dispositions,” such as fondness of virtue, compassion, familial affection, sense of honor, or respect. In other words, when people say that they are short of moral strength required for doing moral actions, Mengzi might interpret them to be saying that they do not feel, say, enough compassion for the starving people on the street to share food with them, do not find it especially humiliating when they are offered ten-thousand bushels of grain in a manner which is compromising their moral dignity, and so forth. This sounds a very plausible view of Mengzi’s conception of moral strength or moral motivation, but actually this view gets problematic when it is combined with David Nivison’s specific thesis that moral emotions (or “feelings and dispositions” in Nivison’s terms) constitute the only source of moral motivation. According to Nivison, Mengzi postulates only one source of moral motivation (“heart” as the locus of moral emotions or feelings), whereas Mengzi’s rival thinkers additionally postulate “maxims” or “doctrines” that are produced by some sort of moral reasoning. As I will eventually argue later, though, this is a mistaken view: Mengzi should be interpreted also to postulate two sources of moral motivation, and we will see that this nicely echoes the important role reflective thinking (quán 權) plays in one’s moral judgment apart from and sometimes even overriding the workings of moral emotions.

In order to understand Nivison’s one-source morality thesis clearly, we first need to know how Nivison interprets Mengzi’s concept of “emotional extension.” In the previous chapter (Section 4.3.1.1), we have considered *Mengzi* 1A:7 where Mengzi says

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79 For a full translation and discussion of this passage, see Chapter 4, Section 4.1.
to King Xuán 宣 of Qi 齊 that the compassion the king showed for an ox that was about to be killed for a sacrificial ceremony can make him the ruler of all of China. According to Mengzi, no one can stop a person from becoming a ruler if he becomes one by protecting his people, and even a person like King Xuán, who has pathologically strong desires for wealth and women, can become a true king who cares about the welfare of his people. Mengzi says that this is possible by “extending” (tuī 推) his compassion for the ox to his people, and Nivison interprets this process of emotional extension as analogous to some sort of logical extension or inference. As Nivison has aptly pointed out, “tuī 推 was originally a technical term in the Later Mohist logic, and it is defined as follows in the Mòzǐ:

Extending (tuī) is [getting someone to] grant what that person has not accepted by [pointing out] that it is the same as something that that person does accept.  

For example, in order to make the points that disliking robbers is not equivalent to disliking humans and killing robbers is not equivalent to killing humans (so that eventually disliking and killing robbers do not contradict the Mohist policy of impartial concern), Mohists first make the uncontroversial points that disliking there being many robbers is different from disliking there being many people, and desiring there being no robber is different from desiring there being no human being. For both sets of points are equally supported by the fact that one’s negative attitude toward a robber is not due to the robber’s being a human being but due to his being a robber, and as long as one sees this fact, it is logically impossible for one to accept the second set of points while rejecting the first.

80 “王曰：‘寡人有疾，寡人好貨.’…”寡人有疾，寡人好色.” Mengzi 1B:5.
82 “惡多盜，非惡多人也；欲無盜，非欲無人也。世相與共是之。若若是，則雖盜人也，愛盜非愛人也，不愛盜非不愛人也，殺盜人非殺人也，無難矣.” Mòzǐ 墨子, “Xiǎoqǔ” 小取. Sūn Yìràng, Mòzǐ xiǎngǔ, p. 418. The same point has been made with the same example in a slightly different way in Nivison, “Motivation and Moral Action in Mencius,” p. 97. See also Graham, Later Mohist Logic, pp. 484–485.
Then, how does Mengzi appropriate this logical sense of “tuī”推 for explicating his concept of emotional extension? Look at the following passage first, where Mengzi advises King Xuān on how to “extend” his compassion for the ox to his people:

_Treat your elders as befitting their age, and then reach out to other people’s elders; treat your youngsters as befitting their age, and then reach out to other people’s youngsters. [If you could do so, then] you would be able to [govern] the world [as if] moving it on your palm. The Poetry says, “[He] set the model for his consort, and [the model] reached his brothers, so that he could govern the fiefs and his country [accordingly].” That is, all you have to do is merely to take this feeling and apply it to other cases. So, [if you] extend your compassion, it will be sufficient for protecting [all the people] within the Four Seas; but [if you] don’t extend your compassion, you won’t have enough even for protecting your wife and children. That by which the ancients greatly surpassed others is nothing else; they were good at extending what they did, and that was all. Now, your compassion is sufficient to reach animals, but your benefits do not reach your people; why is it so?”_83

This passage is complicated, and I will need to come back to it in the next chapter to provide a full analysis of it and propose my own interpretation of Mengzi’s concept of emotional extension. For our purpose in this section, though, it will be sufficient to summarize Nivison’s view of emotional extension around this and some other related passages from the _Mengzi_ and see how Nivison derives his “one-source morality” thesis in Mengzi’s thought from his view of the Mengzian extension of moral emotions. According to Nivison, in this passage Mengzi urges King Xuān to think as follows:

1) I ought to be compassionate toward my people if I can be; but I just can’t. But, 2) it is easier to be compassionate toward human beings than toward animals. And 3) here I am, compassionate toward this animal. Thus, 4) I can be compassionate toward animals. Thus, 5) I can be compassionate toward my people. Thus, 6) I ought to be compassionate toward my people. I have no excuse for not being.84

That is, from the fact that King Xuān is naturally capable of feeling compassion toward an animal in a poor situation, and also by pointing out that it is easier for one to feel compassion toward a human being in a similarly poor situation than toward a mere

83 老吾老，以及人之老，幼吾幼，以及人之幼，天下可運於掌。詩云：‘刑于寡妻，至于兄弟，以御于家邦。’言舉斯心加諸彼而已。故推恩足以保四海，不推恩無以保妻子。古之人所以大過人者，無他焉；善推其所為而已矣。今恩足以及禽獸，而功不至於百姓者，獨何與?” _Mengzi_ 1A:7.

animal, Mengzi derives that King Xuān should also feel compassion for his people who frequently suffer from natural and human disasters such as famine and irregular labor conscriptions.

According to Nivison, we find a similar case in *Mengzi* 2A:9. Let me quote the relevant part of the passage first:

_Mengzi* said, "Bó Yí 伯夷 would not serve a ruler if he was not the right ruler, and would not befriend a person if he was not the right person to associate with. He would not take a position at a wicked man’s court, nor would he speak with a wicked man. Standing in a wicked man’s court and speaking with a wicked man would have been to him as if sitting in mire and pitch wearing court robes and hat. [He] extended his aversion to vice [to the extent that] if he happened to stand together with a villager whose hat was awry, he would move away from that man in disgust as if he were going to be polluted by that man. So, even though there were some rulers who offered an office in polite words, he would not accept them. [The reason] that he did not accept [their offers] was because he was not glad to go to them." 85

As Nivison sees it, this passage provides a typical case of emotional extension in Mengzi. According to Nivison, 1) there are paradigm cases of “evil” where I would find it appropriate to feel disgusted and naturally feel so when encountering a certain kind of objects, 86 and 2) when I face a case that I would find similar enough in nature to the paradigm cases of “evil,” 3) I am required to “apply” my disgust (“disliking heart” in Nivison’s terms) to this case too, and feel disgusted in the situation. For example, in the passage above Bó Yí extended his disgust at wicked rulers and people of incorrect political allegiance so far as to the case of a person whose hat was not on right, and avoided standing together with that person as if his incorrect attire were going to pollute him.

What I am interested in discussing here concerning Nivison’s interpretation of emotional extension as presented in these two *Mengzi* passages is the analogical connection one comes to make between the paradigm cases and the extended cases. That

85 “孟子曰：‘伯夷，非其君，不事，非其友，不友。不立於惡人之朝，不與惡人言；立於惡人之朝，與惡人言，如以朝衣朝冠坐於塗炭。推惡惡之心，思與鄉人立，其冠不正，望望然去之，若將浼焉。是故諸侯雖有善其辭命而至者，不受也。不受也者，是亦不屑就已。’ *Mengzi* 2A:9.

86 Against Nivison who says that such a paradigm case for Bó Yí is not specified in this passage, I think that Bó Yí’s disgust at serving in a wicked man’s court and conversing with an evil man can be considered as a paradigmatic case of disgust. But this does not affect Nivison’s general interpretation of this passage.
is, in *Mengzi* 1A:7 it was pointed out to King Xuān that his people deserve (at least) as much sympathy as he feels for an ox based on the similarity in nature between the situations that his people and his ox are respectively in, and in *Mengzi* 2A:9 Bó Yí thinks that a person who did not put on a hat correctly is not very different from the wicked rulers of his time in deserving his disgust; and I am interested in seeing whether one’s awareness of the connection in similarity between the paradigm cases and the extended cases has any role to play in motivating moral actions in Mengzi’s thought.

Mengzi calls the activity of drawing connections between related cases of action “filling the categories” (chōng qí lèi 充其類), and knowing the connection between related cases “understanding categories” (zhī lèi 知類).\(^{87}\) As a noun “lèi 類” is sometimes used for distinguishing various species of animals including humans\(^{88}\), but it can also generally refer to “kinds” or “categories.” The usual criterion for judging whether certain things belong to the same category or not is their similarity in appearance. So Mengzi says, “In general, things belonging to the same category all look similar to each other. Why shall we doubt this when it comes to the case of human beings, as if human beings were a solitary exception to this? Sages are of the same kind as we are.”\(^{89}\)

However, the criterion of similarity in shape is by no means confined to the external appearance of things; similarity in shape is actually conceived quite broadly in Mengzi, and used for talking about the similarity of various kinds of things in various respects. For example, Mengzi says that the ancients did not serve in the government unless the office was given them in a proper way, because they thought that serving in the government through improper means fell under the same category as such a shameful deed (in their view) as premarital sex.\(^{90}\) In addition, Mengzi says that those who are ashamed of their inferiority to others in physical appearance but do not know to be

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\(^{87}\) This echoes what Mohists say about how properly to engage in disputation: “In disputation…one uses names to designate objects, uses propositions to explain ideas, and uses explanations to bring out reasons. One [should] argue according to the categories and concede [points] according to the categories.” "夫辯者...以名舉實，以辭抒意，以說出故。以類取，以類予。” *Mózì 墨子*, “Xiǎo qǔ 小取.” Sūn Yíráng, *Mózì xiángǔ*, p. 415.

\(^{88}\) For example, see *Mengzi* 6A:7, especially such phrase as this: “Dogs and horses’ being of different species from us...” (犬馬之與我不同類也...).


\(^{90}\) “古之人未嘗不欲仕也，又惡不由其道。不由其道而往者，與鑽穴隙之類也。” *Mengzi* 3B:3.
ashamed of their inferiority to others in character are ignorant of the categories (bù zhī lèi 不知類), because being inferior to others morally is an equally shameful, or even more shameful state of affairs than having a bent finger that would not stretch straight.\textsuperscript{91}

Now back to our examples of emotional extension, Nivison correctly points out that drawing connections between paradigmatic cases and extended cases, or making a logical move from the former to the latter in deliberative reasoning, can be considered “filling the categories” (chōng qí lèi 充其類) in Mengzi’s terms.\textsuperscript{92} According to Nivison, just as we could get a horse to water but still have a problem in getting it to drink, so one can feel not motivated enough to do a moral action even though he clearly sees that it ought to be done. And in terms of Mengzi’s emotional extension, this problematic situation could be re-described as one where a person, while seeing that he ought to do a certain moral action based on its similarity to a paradigmatic case of moral action which he would do naturally and with full motivation, suffers from insufficient motivation to do the action that he thinks ought to be done. For example, as a ruler you felt natural compassion for an ox and saved it from being killed for a sacrificial ceremony, and you clearly see the connection between saving the ox and saving your people from famine, and judge that you should open your granary to feed the starving people; but at the same time you do not feel enough motivation for doing so, and end up turning your back to your people.\textsuperscript{93}

One might ask, though, how this is possible at all. For one might think that as long as a person is convinced that an act ought to be done, that conviction itself should provide the required motivation for doing the act in question. And from this perspective, it would be unnecessary to postulate an additional source of motivation for doing the act besides the ‘pro-attitude’ toward doing it.\textsuperscript{94} However, Nivison argues that doing an act out of the pro-attitude for doing it, or the conviction that it has to be done for some reason, falls short of being the right kind of action that Mengzi had in mind. For as Mengzi sees

\textsuperscript{91} “指不若人，則知惡之，心不若人，則不知惡，此之謂不知類也.” \textit{Mengzi} 6A:12.

\textsuperscript{92} Nivison, “Motivation and Moral Action in Mencius,” p. 100.

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., p. 99.

\textsuperscript{94} According to Donald Davidson, one’s pro-attitude toward a certain kind of action can be generated by a number of factors including one’s desires, urges, promptings, moral views, aesthetic principles, economic prejudices, social conventions, or public and private goals and values. See his \textit{Essays on Actions and Events} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 3.
it (Nivison argues), opening one’s granary for starving people because it is a benevolent act should be distinguished from doing the same act with “a lively and animated concern for the suffering” of one’s people, and this distinction is exactly what Mengzi tries to make when he contrasts “doing what is humane and what is right” (xíng rényì 行仁義) with “acting from humaneness and righteousness” (yóu rényì xíng 由仁義行)\(^95\).

According to Nivison, this distinction between doing something because it is a right thing to do for some reason and doing something with a particular type of affective motive is crucial for understanding Mengzi’s ethical thought, and what makes Mengzi unique among the ethical thinkers of his time is his “one-source morality” thesis that the latter type of motive is to be the sole source of moral motivation. In other words, in the light of Mengzi’s emotional extension, 1) the decision of what to do in an “extended” case of moral action should be made on the basis of which paradigm case of moral action is most relevant to one’s current ethical situation in terms of the affective motive they might share; 2) and one’s act in the extended case must be supported, not merely by one’s pro-attitude that the act in question should be done, but specifically by the same kind of affective motive that would also support one’s paradigmatic case of moral action. In contrast, Nivison argues that Mengzi’s rival thinkers such as Gàozǐ 告子 and the Mohist Yí Zhī 夷之 postulate two sources of morality: the “basic affection-capacity” on one hand and ethical beliefs or doctrines about how to apply one’s affection-capacity in various situations on the other hand. In other words, Nivison says, “Morality on this view depends on two things, which are independent of each other: what I think I should do, and could state in words and reason about; and my capacity to feel certain emotions, which I can steer and shape so as to be moved to do what my principles tell me I should.”\(^96\)

According to Nivison, this contrast between Mengzi and his opponents on the sources of morality is well illustrated in Mengzi 3A:5, where Mengzi debates with the Mohist Yí Zhī about what is the appropriate degree to which one should extend one’s filial affection toward others and treat them benevolently. I have discussed this passage extensively in the previous chapter (Section 4.3.1.1) in order to clarify the nature of cèyīn zhī xīn, but I would like to have it in full again to facilitate my following discussion of it:

\(^{95}\) Ibid.
\(^{96}\) Ibid., p. 102. Emphasis is original.
A Mohist Yí Zhī sought to see Mengzi through [the help of] Xú Bì 徐辟. Mengzi said, “I am definitely willing to see [him], but today I am still ill. I will go and see [him] when my illness gets better. [Tell] Master Yí not to come!”

Another day, [Yí Zhī] sought to see Mengzi again. Mengzi said, “Today I can see [him]. However, without being straightforward, the Way will not be manifest; so, I will put it straightforward. I heard that Master Yí is a Mohist. Mohists, when conducting a funeral, take frugality as their proper way [to do it]. [If] Master Yí aspires to change the world with [this principle], he must not be regarding it as wrong and desppicable. But Master Yí buried his parents lavishly, and this is serving one’s parents with what one despises.”

Master Xú reported this to Master Yí. Master Yí said, “As for the way of the Confucians, they often say that the ancients [took care of others] as if taking care of a baby. What does this saying mean? I take it to mean that although there is no gradation in love, its application starts from one’s parents.”

Master Xú reported this to Mengzi. Mengzi said, “Does Master Yí really think that one’s affection for one’s brother’s child is like one’s affection for one’s neighbor’s baby? [It is a different point that we should] glean from that [saying]: When a baby crawls [toward a well] and is about to fall into the well, it is not the baby’s fault. Moreover, when Heaven was giving birth to things, it had [each of] them [come from only] one root; [Master Yí’s misunderstanding is] due to his [considering them to have] two roots. Probably in antiquity there were some who did not inter their parents. [Suppose that] when their parents died, they just took them up and abandoned them in a ditch. Days later they were passing by their dead parents, and [happened to see that] foxes and wildcats were devouring them, and flies and gnats biting on them. Sweat broke on their foreheads, and they only squinted at them without being able to look at them directly. That sweat, it was not the kind for others [to see], but [the result of] their innermost feelings reaching their faces and eyes. Probably they went home and came back with baskets and spades and covered the bodies. Covering them is correct indeed, and [this shows that] there is also definitely a reason for filial sons and humane people to inter their parents.”

Master Xú reported that to Master Yí. Master Yí looked lost for a while, and said, “I appreciate his teaching me.”

Frugal or modest burial of dead people is one of the important doctrines Mòzǐ proposed against the Confucians or the followers of Kongzi. Mòzǐ advocated this policy because he
believed that frugal burial could save enormous social resources from being wasted and make them be used instead for the real benefit of the living people. However, the later Mohist Yí Zhī violated this policy and gave a lavish funeral for his mother, and Mengzi criticizes him for doing so. Against Mengzi’s criticism, Yí Zhī partly defends himself by saying that his violation of the policy of frugal burial is at least consistent with impartial concern or universal love—Mózǐ’s doctrine of the highest importance, and therefore should not be considered as a serious departure from Mózǐ’s teaching. According to Yí Zhī, there should be no gradation in one’s love for human beings, although its application may start from one’s parents (ài wú chàděng, shī yòu qīn shǐ 愛無差等，施由親始). And he also says that his position is justified by the Confucian saying that the ancients took care of others as if taking care of a baby. Applying Nivison’s “two-source morality” view to this position, Yí Zhī can be interpreted to be saying that one’s natural affection for one’s parents should be channeled to other people, and the degree and extent to which one is supposed to extend his filial affection is to be determined by the ethical principle one approves—universal love or impartial caring for the case of Yí Zhī.

However, according to Nivison, Mengzi criticizes Yí Zhī for postulating “two roots” (èr běn 二本)—or two sources—of moral action. Mengzi says that when Heaven gave birth to various creatures, it made them originate from only one source, or “one root” (yī běn 一本). Although the character “běn” 本 here seems to refer to the biological origin of each creature, Nivison suggests that it is “entirely possible” that Mengzi is criticizing the basis of Yí Zhī’s moral system as being double by insisting that human beings have only one source of moral action, viz. heart (xīn 心). To support this suggestion, Nivison cites Mengzi 6A:10 where Mengzi says that “if one accepts a gift without caring whether it is right to do so, one has ‘lost one’s root heart’ (běn xīn 本心).” No matter how charitably we interpret this passage (Mengzi 6A:10), though, it does not seem to show that such a “heart” (xīn 心)—specifically the sense of honor or

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99 An alternative, more positive interpretation of Yí Zhī’s lavish burial of his mother can be found in Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, p. 132.
xiūwù zhī xīn 羞惡之心, here—is the only source (bèn 本) of moral action. What it shows is only, at most, that refusing an inappropriate gift is the way human beings are originally (bèn 本) supposed to act. In other words, although Mengzi 6A:10 might tell us that one’s paradigmatic feelings such as sympathy for a baby falling into a well, feeling of humiliation at a gift offered in an inappropriate manner, or respect for elders and worthy people are the affective guidance human beings are originally supposed to have, the passage is silent about whether such feelings are the only source of moral action in Mengzi.

However, Kwong-loi Shun develops Nivison’s “one-source morality” thesis further, and provides stronger and thoughtful arguments for Nivison’s original idea. According to Shun, previous interpretations of the character “bèn” 本 in Mengzi 3A:5 can be classified into three kinds, and only one of them is worth developing. First, Shun introduces the interpretation proposed by Zhào Qí 赵岐 (ca. 108–201 C.E.), Zhū Xī 朱熹 (1130–1200), and Zhāng Shì 张栻 (1133–1180). According to this view, the character “bèn” 本 in Mengzi 3A:5 refers to one’s biological origin, viz. one’s parents, and Mengzi’s criticism of Yí Zhī is that advocating universal love or impartial caring is treating other people as if they were one’s parents. Treating others as if they were one’s parents, though, is acknowledging that one has two biological origins, and this makes Yí Zhī’s position absurd. 101 Second, Shun cites Zhū Xī’s alternative interpretation, which regards the character “bèn” 本 in question “as referring to the basis for cultivating the proper form of affection for people.” 102 According to this view, “the basis for cultivating the proper form of affection for people” in turn refers to one’s love for parents, because it is by consulting one’s love for parents that one comes to realize that there should be gradation in one’s love for others. And Yí Zhī’s error in this view is not to consider one’s love for parents as the sole guidance in practicing benevolence to others. 103 The third type of interpretation Shun introduces has been proposed by some contemporary scholars on Mengzi. According to this view, the character “bèn” 本 means a principle of conduct. And by advocating both impartial caring and treating one’s parents in a special way, Yí

102 Ibid., p. 129.
103 Ibid., pp. 129–130.
Zhī adopts two incompatible principles of conduct and is criticized by Mengzi as having two roots.

Among these three interpretations, Shun rejects the first and the third as inadequate, and advocates an advanced version of the second view. According to him, interpreting “bēn” 本 as biological origin is unacceptable for two reasons. First, after criticizing Yí Zhī as having “two roots,” Mengzi introduces the account of the origin of the burial practice in antiquity. This story is supposed to illustrate why Yí Zhī is wrong in postulating two roots, but if the “root” (bēn 本) refers to one’s biological origin, it is not clear how Mengzi’s point that every creature has only one biological origin is illustrated by his account of the beginning of the burial practice in antiquity. Second, if postulating a certain number of “roots” is equivalent to postulating the same number of biological origins, it is not clear in what sense Yí Zhī thought that everyone had two biological origins. For if the Mohist doctrine of impartial caring involves treating everyone as if they were one’s parent, Yí Zhī should have said that everyone had millions of roots. Or, in the other way around, if impartial caring involves caring one’s parents as if they were no different from others, Yí Zhī should have said that everyone had no root. On the other hand, in order to refute the third interpretation of “bēn” 本 as a principle of conduct, Shun also provides two reasons. First, just as in the case of the view of “bēn” as a biological origin, Shun argues that it is not clear how Mengzi’s criticism that Yí Zhī postulates two incompatible principles of conduct is illustrated by his account of how the ancients came to consider burying their deceased parents as an appropriate practice. Second, Shun points out that Mengzi’s reference to tiān 天 (Heaven) as producing things in such a way that they have only one “root” seems to be too heavy a device to make the point that one should be guided by consistent principles of conduct.

Having rejected these two interpretations, Shun defends an elaborate version of the second type of interpretation presented above. According to him, Mengzi can be interpreted to postulate two kinds of ethical predispositions for human beings in Mengzi 3A:5. One kind is compassionate reactions such as for an infant falling into a well, and a typical instance of the other kind is one’s love for parents. As is well illustrated in

104 Ibid., p. 130.
105 Ibid., p. 131.
Mengzi’s remark quoted above that “when a baby crawls toward a well and is about to fall into the well, it is not the baby’s fault,” one does not have to be in a special relationship with those in a miserable situation in order to treat them benevolently. On the other hand, filial love is by definition a kind of love directed toward those standing in a special relationship to oneself, viz. parents, and this type of love is an important constituent of the Confucian virtue 仁 (humaneness). Now, according to Shun, Yí Zhī was so much preoccupied with the first type of predisposition that he totally neglected the importance of filial or familial love in one’s ethical life. And Mengzi’s account of the origin of the burial practice in antiquity was supposed to show that human beings have special feelings in a situation that affects the welfare of their parents (even after their death), and these special feelings, based on their filial love, should guide their benevolent treatment of others too. Furthermore, as illustrated by Mengzi’s rhetorical question quoted above whether Yí Zhī really thinks that one’s affection for one’s brother’s child is like one’s affection for one’s neighbor’s baby, one’s benevolence or compassion toward others is to be expressed in different degrees, corresponding to the closeness of their relationship to oneself. In short, Shun’s interpretation of Mengzi 3A:5 could be summarized as follows: 1) What Mengzi meant by the term “root” (běn 本) was the source of moral action. 2) By saying that human beings are endowed with only one “root,” Mengzi was making the point that certain ethical predispositions such as compassion, familial love, shame, or respect are the only source of moral action. 3) Concerning the relationship between familial love and compassion, one’s familial love naturally influences the way one responds to other people’s suffering, so that one’s compassion or sympathy to others is expressed in different degrees corresponding to the closeness of their relationship to oneself.

However, Shun’s interpretation does not seem tenable, because it suffers an important theoretical difficulty concerning the nature of emotions and their limit in moral deliberation. What Shun calls “ethical predispositions” are Mengzi’s four moral sprouts (sìduān 四端), and in the previous chapter I have shown that the first three of these four sprouts—viz. familial love and compassion (cèyīn zhī xīn), shame and dislike (xiūwù zhī xīn), and respect (gōngjìng zhī xīn)—are neither desires nor behavioral dispositions but

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106 Ibid., pp. 132–135.
full-fledged emotions embodying certain motives for action. Now, developing Nivison’s original idea, Shun argues that these ethical sprouts are the only source of moral action in Mengzi; and he also argues that certain of these sprouts naturally take precedence over the others and influence the way the latter group of emotions are acted on, hence, for example, one’s filial love influencing one’s general sympathy so that the latter is expressed toward others in ever-decreasing degrees as their relationship to oneself gets farther and farther. However, Shun does not clearly explain how this could be so. He says:

According to Mencius, it is indeed the case that Confucians regarded one’s compassion toward an infant crawling toward a well as having a bearing on the proper form of affection for people, and that extending such reactions does not involve a gradation in affection. What Yi Chih [i.e. Yí Zhī] had done is to draw upon this aspect of Confucian teachings to criticize the Confucian idea of love with distinctions.

But, according to Mencius, this criticism fails because Confucians also regarded another kind of predispositions, those directed specifically toward immediate family members, as having a bearing on the proper form of affection for others. An example is one’s affection for one’s elder brother’s child, which differs from one’s affection for a neighbor’s child. ¹⁰⁷

What this remark of Shun’s tells us, though, is only that 1) Confucians like Mengzi identified general sympathy and familial love as two distinct types of affection for others, and that 2) both emotions have a bearing on the question of what is the proper form of affection for others. Now, it would be a mistake for Yi Zhī to fix his attention on the first kind of affection and declare that there should be no gradation in love for human beings, but it seems equally problematic if Mengzi had fixated on the second kind of affection and said that familial love, or love with distinctions, should guide one’s general dealing with others in sympathetic terms. For this—i.e. the thesis of the dominance of familial love over general sympathy—does not logically follow from what Shun says about Confucians including Mengzi, viz. that in their thought both general sympathy and familial love have a bearing on what is the proper form of affection for others. In other words, given that sympathy and familial love occupy an equal status in Mengzi’s ethical system and thus have an equal vote for determining the proper form of affection for others, it does not make sense for Shun to ascribe to Mengzi the view that 1) familial love

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 133.
is more important than general sympathy and thus 2) one needs to consult the former in determining how much benevolence one should show for others who are in difficult situations.

However, Mengzi is very firm and explicit about what kinds of emotions or feelings one should have when interacting with others in different social and familial relationships, and how much of such emotions or feelings are appropriate for one to have in different situations. For example, we have already seen Mengzi approvingly saying that one’s affection for one’s brother’s child cannot be the same as one’s affection for one’s neighbor’s baby (Mengzi 3A:5), and the same view is also well expressed in Mengzi 7A:45, where Mengzi says that “The nobleman is sparing with things but shows no benevolence towards them; he shows benevolence towards the people but does not treat them as close. He treats his parents as close but is [merely] benevolent to the people; he is benevolent to the people but is [merely] sparing with things.” In addition, in Mengzi 4B:29 Mengzi says that when one’s housemate is fighting with someone else, it is all right to rush to his aid even with one’s hair unbound and merely with a cap on; but if it were merely a fellow villager who is in a fight, one needs to care about one’s appearance first before going to his aid; and if the situation allows, it is all right just to close one’s door and neglect them. And importantly, Mengzi adds, “If you rush to his aid in such haste that you leave your hair unbound and merely have your cap on, it is being misguided.” It is clear in all of these passages that Mengzi advocates a partialistic morality: although he acknowledges that human beings are originally capable of responding to other people’s suffering with sympathy, Mengzi is also clear that there are some situations where one needs to be partial to one’s kin at the expense of others. But if one cannot reach this ethical position by simply following one’s emotions as Shun argues because at the level of emotions nothing warrants that familial affection always have priority over general sympathy, how shall we interpret Mengzi 3A:5 in order to let Mengzi reach this position?

108 “君子之於物也, 愛之而弗仁; 於民也, 仁之而弗親。親親而仁民, 仁民而愛物。” Mengzi 7A:45. The translation is slightly modified from Lau’s in Lau, Mencius, p. 192.

As I see it, as long as Shun agrees with Nivison in interpreting Mengzi to postulate moral emotions (ethical predispositions in Shun’s terms) as the sole source of moral action in Mengzi, a good solution to this problem is hardly available. For insofar as one allows no more than one source of moral action for Mengzi which is moral emotions or “ethical predispositions” in Shun’s terms, and given that other things being equal an emotion qua emotion cannot claim to a higher place than another emotion in one’s deliberation, there is no means for one to justify Mengzi’s position that familial love, at least in some cases, should override general sympathy and provide guidance on how to treat others who are not one’s kin but in difficult situations. I think that in order to find some theoretical grounding for Mengzi to hold a partialistic ethical position and for him to base this position somehow on the natural, familial affection of human beings, we need to ascribe some version of Nivison’s “two-source morality” view to Mengzi by reinterpreting the problematic character “běn” 本 and Mengzi’s related account of the origin of the burial practice in Mengzi 3A:5. In the following, I argue that the best interpretation of the character “běn” in Mengzi 3A:5 is to take it to refer to one’s biological origin rather than any abstract source of moral motivation or moral action. This view is based on the first kind of interpretation rejected by Shun above, but I will show that Shun’s original charges against that interpretation do not make a real threat as long as we correctly view Mengzi’s moral emotions as concern-based construals (explained in Section 4.3.1.2 of the previous chapter). Once we view Mengzi’s moral emotions this way, the infrequent competition or conflict between familial love and general sympathy, which posed a big problem for Shun and Nivison’s philosophical positions, is only natural and well-expected. Moreover, in the previous section we have seen that in order to resolve this kind of emotional conflict, Mengzi postulates reflective thinking (quán 權) and the subsequent making of a moral judgment as a function of the mind that could arbitrate between the emotions in conflict; now in my following discussion, we will see that this function of the mind can also provide an important additional source of moral motivation to moral emotions in Mengzi’s thought.

Then, let me first revisit the interpretation of “běn” 本 as one’s biological origin and defend it against Shun’s criticism. To quote the relevant part of the passage again as a reminder, in Mengzi 3A:5 Mengzi says the following:
When Heaven was giving birth to things, it had [each of] them [come from only] one root; [Master Yī’s misunderstanding is] due to his [considering them to have] two roots.\textsuperscript{110}

As has been mentioned above, traditional commentators including Zhào Qí 趙岐 and Zhū Xī 朱熹 interpret “běn” 本 here to refer to one’s biological origin, but Kwong-loi Shun rejects this view for two reasons. First, Shun argues that if the character “běn” refers to one’s biological origin, it is not clear how that point is illustrated by Mengzi’s subsequent account of the origin of the burial practice in antiquity. According to Shun, this account is supposed to show that Yī Zhī was wrong in postulating two sources of moral action, viz. his doctrinal position of impartial concern and his natural familial affection; and Yī Zhī’s error can be pointed out effectively only when Mengzi meant to refer to a source of moral action by the character “běn.” This argument looks plausible initially, because one’s special treatment of deceased parents (i.e. burying them) in Mengzi’s burial account is based on one’s filial affection, which construes the wild animals and insects on one’s parent’s corpse not as merely devouring an unconscious lump of flesh but as seriously compromising the welfare of one’s parent.\textsuperscript{111} In this sense, it is legitimate for Shun to say that Mengzi finds the special treatment of one’s parents as grounded on one’s filial affection.

However, if we look at the passage more closely, it will become clear that one’s filial affection is even insufficient as a motivation for the action of burying one’s parents, because what Mengzi’s story in the passage is talking about is how the burial practice was first introduced among the ancients who had been taking it for granted to abandon one’s deceased parents in an open place. In other words, the person who discarded his deceased parents in a ditch in Mengzi’s story might have grown up watching his live parents abandoning his grandparents’ bodies in ditches or valleys and other adults in his village doing the same thing, and the members of this village might have collectively developed rational justifications for their practice or a cluster of positive feelings associated with the fact that they perform the same funerary practice. In such a situation, a bout of bad feelings one might have when seeing one’s parent’s body decaying or being

\textsuperscript{110}“天之生物也，使之一本，而夷子二本故也.”  \textit{Mengzi} 3A:5.

\textsuperscript{111} For a further explanation of filial affection as a concern-based construal, see Section 4.3.1.1 of the previous chapter.
eaten by wild creatures does not necessarily motivate any action to stop it. For one might regard one’s bad feelings as unwarranted and suppress them by thinking that it is just the way things should go or that letting the corpses of one’s parents be eaten by wild creatures would help them return to Mother Nature, or alternatively by concentrating on one’s positive feelings such as the sense of belongingness or even pride associated with conforming to the socially-approved funerary practice. In such a situation, in order for one to manage to bury one’s dead parents, one first needs to undo the rational justifications for or counteract one’s positive feelings about discarding one’s dead parents. However, one’s filial affection, merely as a concern-based construal, does not enable one to overcome these rational and emotional obstacles for the action of burial. For as we have seen in the previous chapter, an emotion as a concern-based construal is merely the way things present themselves to the person experiencing the emotion, and an emotion as such does not have the power to dismiss the claims of another emotion or to make one renounce beliefs that one has firmly held for a long time. This makes it clear that in *Mengzi* 3A:5, one needs some additional source of moral motivation to complete the action of burying one’s deceased parents.

In my view, this additional motivation comes from one’s appreciation of the importance of one’s parents, and this appreciation of one’s parents’ value—or their invaluable importance to oneself—starts from vividly recognizing that it is thanks to one’s parents that one came into existence, and that for this reason one’s parents are not interchangeable with any other human beings. I think that this was the point of Mengzi’s remark “when Heaven was giving birth to things, it had them each come from one root (*yì běn* 一本),” and that by saying this, Mengzi was urging Yi Zhī to come to be aware of this important fact. Zhào Qí glosses this remark as follows:

> *When Heaven was producing myriad things, it had each creature come out of one root. Now Master Yi [mistakenly] considers other people’s parents as equal to his own parents, and this is why he wanted to make his love the same [for everyone].*[^112]

biological origin, viz. its parents, and that this fact not only explains one’s natural
tendency to love and value one’s parents more than anybody else but also makes it one’s
duty to love and value one’s parents more than anybody else. And once one is convinced
of the absolute value of one’s parents to oneself, this conviction makes it possible for one
systematically to counteract the false rational justifications and positive feelings
accumulated over generations around the practice of abandoning deceased parents.

Moreover, I think that the psychological energy that enables one to surmount
false rational justifications and distractive positive feelings involved in the parent-
dumping practice comes from one’s conviction or judgment that burying one’s parents,
partially motivated by one’s filial affection, is a correct (shi 是) thing to do. The end of
Mengzi 3A:5, quoted below, could be interpreted this way:

*Probably they went home and came back with baskets and spades and covered the bodies.
Covering them is correct indeed, and [this shows that] there is also definitely a reason for
filial sons and humane people to inter their parents.*

In this passage Mengzi seems quite convinced that the act of covering the bodies of one’s
deceased parents is a correct thing to do, but it is less clear whether he also thinks that the
ancestors who initiated the burial practice would have buried their deceased parents with
the same degree of conviction that they were doing the right thing. However, we have
seen in Section 5.1.3 above that wisdom in Mengzi is sometimes expressed as 1)
appreciating the value of the humane and righteous motives involved in certain activities
and 2) holding fast to those motives as providing reasons for moral action. Now, in the
passage just quoted above Mengzi says that “There is definitely a reason for filial sons
and humane people to inter their parents,” and in combination with Mengzi’s conception
of wisdom as accompanying one’s appreciation of virtuous motives, this remark does not
make it unlikely to interpret Mengzi to think that the filial sons and humane people in
antiquity—who could appreciate the invaluable importance of their parents to
themselves—initiated and maintained the burial practice for a good reason.

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113 “蓋歸反取塋而掩之。掩之誠是也，則孝子仁人之掩其親，亦必有道矣。” Mengzi 3A:5. Emphasis is
mine.
114 “仁之實，事親是也；義之實，從兄是也；智之實，知斯二者弗去是也。” Mengzi 4A:27. For further
explanation of this passage, see Section 5.1.3 of this chapter.
Now that we are clear about what the significance of interpreting “běn” as referring to one’s biological origin is concerning Mengzi’s account of the origin of the burial practice in antiquity, let us turn to Shun’s second criticism that it is not clear what Yí Zhī’s “two roots” refer to if the character “běn” means one’s biological origin. According to Shun, if the Mohist doctrine of impartial caring involves treating everyone as if they were one’s parent, Mengzi should have said that Yí Zhī advocated everyone’s having millions of roots; or in the other way around, if impartial caring involves caring one’s parents as if they were no different from others, Mengzi should have said that Yí Zhī advocated everyone’s having no root. But what Mengzi actually said was that Yí Zhī postulated two roots, and it is not clear what Yí Zhī’s “two roots” refer to if it does not refer to his two sources of moral action, viz. his Mohist doctrine of impartial concern and one’s familial affection shared by everyone. However, this criticism takes the Chinese character “èr” 二 (“two”) so literally that it fails to notice that Mengzi’s purpose for using the word “two” here was to criticize Yí Zhī for denying the unique status and value one’s parents have to oneself. In other words, the special status of one’s parents in their value to oneself can be denied either by postulating multiple parties who have equal status to one’s parents or by postulating no party at all who has any special status or value to oneself, and Mengzi uses the word “two” in this passage so as to encompass both ways of denying one’s parents their special status to oneself.

For an example of the first way of denying one’s parents their special status to oneself, take a look at Zhū Xi’s conversation with one of his disciples on how to understand the phrase “two roots” (èr běn 二本):

[Zhū Xi’s disciple] asked: ‘‘There are gradations in love’: this is [the meaning] of the so-called ‘one root.’ For the root and the branch are established [only when] one treats one’s parents as close, is benevolent toward the people, and uses things sparingly. Then, what about the so-called ‘two roots’?’ [Zhū Xi] answered: ‘If there were no gradations in love, why would it just stop at there being two roots? Probably there [could be] one-thousand, or even ten-thousand, roots.”

In this passage Zhū Xī’s disciple makes a connection between the doctrine of graded love and the thesis of “one root.” He understands the “root” in relation to the “branch”; the root alludes to what is foundational, central, and important, whereas the branch to what is dispensable, in the periphery, and less important. And as long as one understands the relationship between kin and non-kin or parents and others in these terms, it is only natural for one to love them in different degrees. Now, the disciple asks Zhū Xī about the meaning of believing that there are “two roots,” and Zhū Xī says that if one loves everyone equally, it does not matter whether one postulates two roots, thousand roots, or even ten-thousand roots. For no matter how many roots one postulates, one equally comes to deny the special status of one’s parents, who are supposed to be one’s single root from the Confucian perspective. And it should be clear now that what Mengzi meant by ascribing the thesis of “two roots” to Yī Zhī was not that Yī Zhī postulated two roots literally but that he postulated more than one root and consequently denied the inexchangeable importance of one’s parents to oneself.

As for the second usage of the word “two” (èr 二) that denies or challenges the unique value or status of a certain thing, see the following two passages from the Zúozhuàn 左傳:

In the inner court [a concubine in the ruler’s] favor equals the royal consort; in the outer court [a vassal in the ruler’s] favor equals [the prime minister in charge of] the government; concubines’ sons rival the consort’s son, and a big city compares with the capital—[these are] the root of disorder.116

The viscount of Chū 楚 went to the state of Xī 息 to hold a feast [for the ruler of Xī and his consort, but he actually attacked them and] eventually destroyed Xī. He returned with Guī 媘 of Xī [i.e. the royal consort of Xī], and Dū’āo 堵敖 and King Chéng 成 were born from her. [However,] she never initiated any conversation with the viscount of Chū, and [one day] he asked her why. She answered, “I am one woman, but I served two husbands. Although I cannot die, what things could I say?”117

116 “內寵並后, 外寵二政, 嫔子配嫡, 大都偶國, 亂之本也.” Zúozhuàn, Mingōng 明公 2, Yáng Bójùn, Chüngqū Zúozhuàn zhù, p. 272. The underlining is mine.

117 “楚子如息, 以食入享, 遂滅息. 以息媘歸, 生堵敖及成王焉. 未言. 楚子問之. 對曰: ‘吾一婦人,而事二夫, 繼弗能死, 其又奚言?’” Zúozhuàn, Zhuānggōng 莊公 14, Ibid., pp. 198–199. The underlining is mine.
In the first passage, the character “èr” 二 is used as a transitive verb meaning “to equal” or “to compare with,” in parallel with other similar terms that also mean “to equal” (bìng 並), “to match up with” (pèi 配), and “to compare with” (ǒu 橋—originally “to make a pair to plow the field together”). From the usage of the other three terms in the passage, it is clear that “èr” 二 is also used in such a way that the subject of the verb “èr” 二 challenges the special status of the object either in authority or capacity. However, one might say that this usage of “èr” 二 as a verb is not a good example for making my point, because it is not in a good parallel with the term “èr běn” 二本 (“two roots”) where “èr” is used as an adjective. To respond to this objection, we need to examine the second passage. The second passage is a story about a viscount of Chǔ who invaded a neighboring country Xī and took its ruler’s consort as his wife. The wife bore two sons for her new husband, but it is said that she was so ashamed of having to serve two husbands that she never started a conversation with the viscount of Chǔ. As I see it, the significance of the word “two” in this story can be found only in relation to the word “one” (yī 一). That is, the disgraced royal consort said that she was one woman (yī fùrén 一婦人), and this means that she was supposed to be faithful to only one man. However, unfortunately, she happened to serve two husbands, and what she meant by “serving two husbands” was not that she served two rather than three or four husbands but that she happened to deny the unique status of the ruler of Xī as her husband. The usage of “èr” 二 in the phrase “two husbands” (èr fū 二夫) is in perfect grammatical parallel with “two roots” (èr běn 二本), and “two husbands” in this sense is not different from saying “no husband” (wú fū 無夫).118

So far, I have argued against Nivison’s “one-source morality” view of moral action in Mengzi. According to this view, the only proper source of motivation for moral action is in the form of what Nivison calls “the right feelings and dispositions” such as fondness of virtue, compassion, familial affection, sense of honor, or respect, and Nivison

118 It is noteworthy that Mengzi once used the phrase “wú fū” 無父 (literally “no father”) to criticize Mòzì for denying the invaluable importance of one’s parents to oneself. “楊氏為我，是無君也；墨氏兼愛，是無父也。無父無君，是禽獸也.” Mengzi 3B:9.
argues that Mengzi clearly distinguishes this type of affective motivation from other kinds of pro-attitudes towards moral action. For example, Nivison cites Mengzi’s distinction between doing what is humane and righteous \( (\text{xing rényì 行仁義}) \) and acting from humane and righteous motives \( (\text{yóu rényì xíng 由仁義行}) \), and argues that the latter type of motive is the sole source of moral action in Mengzi’s thought. Shun inherits this view and tries to find its textual ground in *Mengzi* 3A:5. According to Shun, the phrase “two roots” \( (\text{èr běn 二本}) \) in the passage refers to the Mohist Yí Zhī’s two sources of moral action, specifically one’s natural filial affection and the Mohist doctrine of impartial concern; and by saying that Yí Zhī holds that there are two roots, Mengzi was criticizing Yí Zhī for postulating two incompatible sources of moral action. However, we have seen that this interpretation of *Mengzi* 3A:5 is mistaken: 1) I have argued that there are problematic cases where the ethical demands of familial affection and general sympathy pull the agent in different directions, and in such cases a complete moral action is impossible until a higher function of the mind—reflective thinking or 圈 權—takes both emotions and the respective ethical demands in them in view and makes a decision of what is the correct emotion to act on in the situation in question. 2) This reveals an important philosophical point about the status of emotions in moral action: emotions are basically concern-based construals or the particular ways of interpreting things depending on what one is concerned about in the situations in question; and an additional source of moral motivation to ethical emotions, specifically a conviction or judgment of what is the right thing to do in a certain situation which is reached by reflective thinking, is often necessary for one to complete a moral action. 3) This means that in order for Mengzi to have a correct theory of moral action, he is required to hold a kind of “two-source morality” view in Nivison’s terms. In the last several paragraphs above, I partially argued that Mengzi held such a view by analyzing his usage of the term “běn 本 (“root”) in *Mengzi* 3A:5. Against Shun’s argument that the character “běn 本 in the passage refers to the motivational source of moral action, I have argued that “běn 本 in *Mengzi* 3A:5 actually refers to one’s parents as one’s biological origin by discussing relevant textual evidence from the *Zhūzǐ yǔlèi 朱子語類* and *Zuozhuan 左傳* on the one hand, and by explaining how this interpretation of the character “běn” makes it plausible to ascribe
“two-source morality” view to Mengzi on the other hand. Specifically, I have argued that once one realizes that one’s parents are one’s single biological origin (yì běn 一本), this realization leads one to appreciate the inexchangeable importance of one’s parents, and this appreciation of the special value of one’s parents in comparison to others in turn makes Mengzi’s agent take a partialistic stance in an ethical situation where his filial affection conflicts with his general sympathy.

Seen in this light, it becomes clear that the two sources of moral action, moral emotions on one hand and doctrinal belief or judgment on the other, are often indispensable for a complete moral action. In a simple case where just one emotion (and the ethical concern embodied in it) is correctly salient, the function of the latter source of moral action does not have to be on the surface of one’s mind. However, in the case where one’s filial affection and general sympathy conflict with each other and leave the agent undecided about what to do (suppose the situation is whether to give food first to one’s parents or to an acquaintance in the village during an endemic famine), it is clearly when one makes a judgment or approves a doctrinal belief about who should be taken care of first in such a situation that the agent can act in one way or another.

In the next section, I would like to provide further arguments for my position, but I also intend them to serve an independent purpose at the same time. Specifically, I try to provide a solution to a philosophical problem that Nivison argues Mengzi could not solve within his theoretical scheme, viz. the “immediate action problem.” My treatment of this problem aims at resolving Nivison’s worry about a dilemmatic situation where one should act in full accordance with morality while not feeling completely ready for it, but it is also supposed to show once again that the “two-source morality” view of moral action is a correct view to ascribe to Mengzi.

5.2.2 The Problem of Immediate Action

In Mengzi 1A:7 which has been quoted several times by now, Mengzi compares King Xuān’s saving an ox out of compassion but failing to do the same thing for his people to someone who claims to be incapable of seeing a cartload of firewood when he can see the tip of an autumn hair. Mengzi’s point in doing this is that King Xuān is capable of
reaching out to his people and making their living better, but he is simply refusing to do so; as Mengzi says, what hinders King Xuān from becoming the king of all China is not his incapacity, but his refusal, to enact morality. However, we also find a very different vein of thought in *Mengzi* 2A:2, where Mengzi compares moral cultivation to growing a plant:

[In cultivating moral energy, you] should [constantly] work at it, but should not set a fixed timeline [about it]; you should not let the task slip out of your mind, but neither should you help its growing. So, do not be like the man from Sòng 宋: There was a man from Sòng who was so worried about his seedlings’ not growing that [one day] he pulled at them. Having returned home very tired, he told his family members, “I’m very tired today, I helped the seedlings grow!” His son rushed out [to the field] to check it, but the seedlings were already shriveled up. There are few in the world who do not help their seedlings grow. [There are] some who think their work to be useless and leave their seedlings unattended; they are those who do not weed their plants. [On the other hand,] there are some who help their seedlings grow; they are those who pull at their plants. [The latter act] is not only useless but also harmful to the plants.  

In this passage, Mengzi draws an analogy between cultivating a moral character and growing a plant; just as plants grow into maturity according to their proper course of development and one should follow this course in growing them, so the cultivation of a virtuous character takes time and there is a proper course of moral development one should follow in order to grow into a virtuous person.

According to Nivison, these two passages reveal that Mengzi adopted two incompatible ethical positions that respectively address two horns of a genuine dilemma of moral life: Sometimes we feel that we are not motivationally ready to do a certain moral action, but that action is one of our important moral obligations, and it is simply unacceptable for us to postpone the fulfillment of it until we feel ready. For example, in *Mengzi* 3B:8 we see Mengzi urge an official of Sòng 宋 to reduce the tax immediately to ten percent of people’s gross income, when that person initially suggests gradual tax reduction over two years:

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Dài Yingzhī 戴盈之 said, “A tax of one in ten and abolishing the duties at passes and markets, we are not capable of doing it this year. What do you think if we were to make some reductions [this year] and wait until next year, when we will put an end to [these taxes?]” Mengzi said, “Suppose there is a person who steals his neighbor’s chicken every day. Someone tells him, ‘This is not the way of the nobleman.’ [He] responds, ‘Let me reduce it to stealing one chicken per month [for now]; I would like to wait until next year before quitting it.’—If you know that something is not a right thing [to do], then [you should] quit it as quickly as possible; why wait until next year?”

Mengzi’s position in this passage is clearly that one should do a right thing to do in its entirety and stop wrong conduct immediately; and there is no excuse for postponing them. However, Nivison correctly draws our attention to a very important point:

“Acting rightly requires a process, which may take much time, of “extending” my embryonic emotions in directions that are delimited by their (hence my) nature. Meanwhile simply forcing myself to do the act because it is “right” may injure my self-development….The ruler who is hesitant about slashing his tax rate right off might of course be right in a much more disturbing way: He might size himself up, conclude that the kind of ruler-role Mencius urges on him is one he would in the end make a mess of, with the result that not just he but everyone would be worse off.”

And Nivison concludes that “[i]t is to be regretted that Mencius, and other Confucians, do not seem to have the sophistication to consider problems of this kind—which are thus abandoned to Daoists and a very different treatment.” In short, Nivison suggests that while urging immediate action for fundamental ethical issues such as the welfare of people and the protection of people’s property rights, Mengzi also acknowledged, at the expense of self-contradiction, the legitimacy of the claim that moral maturation takes time and it could be disastrous to force one to act in full accordance with morality when he is not yet ready.

Plausible as it is, though, I think we could find some theoretical grounds in the Mengzi that would allow us to find enough of the “sophistication” in question in Mengzi. In other words, I think that we could develop a satisfactory solution to reconcile these

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121 “戴盈之曰：‘什一，去關市之征，今玆未能；請輕之，以為來年，然後已，何如?’ 孟子曰：‘今有人日攘其鄰之雞者，或告之曰：‘是非君子之道。” 曰：‘請損之，月攘一雞，以待來年，然後已。” —《孟子》3B:8.
123 Ibid., p. 110.
seemingly incompatible ethical positions that Mengzi adopts, and that such a solution can be developed from the “two-source morality” view of moral action that is held by Mengzi as I have argued above. Now, it seems to me that the working out of such a solution should start with examining Nivison’s interpretation of Mengzi’s view of four sprouts in *Mengzi* 2A:6, and the relevant part of the passage goes as follows:

*The feeling of compassion is the sprout of humaneness; the feeling of shame and dislike is the sprout of righteousness; the feeling of deference is the sprout of ritual propriety; the feeling of approval and disapproval is the sprout of wisdom. A human’s having these four sprouts is like his having four limbs. Anyone who has these four sprouts but says that he is incapable [of moral life] is the one who cripples himself; [anyone who] says that his ruler is incapable [of moral life] is the one who cripples his ruler. As for those who have four sprouts in themselves, [if they] know how to develop all of them, then it would be like a fire starting up or a spring coming through. If one could develop them, they would be sufficient to protect the whole world; but if one does not develop them, they would be insufficient [even] to serve one’s parents.*

In this passage, Mengzi compares one’s having four moral sprouts to one’s having four limbs, and says that as long as one has these four sprouts, there is no excuse for one not to act in accordance with morality. As we have seen earlier, Nivison considers Mengzi’s four sprouts as “feelings and dispositions,” and he seems to take Mengzi’s analogy between four sprouts and four limbs quite literally. That is, Nivison interprets Mengzi to think that just as one can move one’s arms and legs as one wishes, so can one reshape oneself emotionally so as deliberately to feel the way one thinks appropriate in a certain situation. (And feeling this way would in turn provide the proper motivation for a moral action in Nivison’s view.)

This interpretation of Nivison’s seems to be in accordance with his view that Mengzi could not solve the aforementioned dilemma, because Nivison further points out that even if one could shape oneself emotionally as one wishes, there is further requisite for one’s being able to do so: although I have these four affective or dispositional capacities and am aware of my having them, I also need to be *moved* to

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activate those capacities. If I am not moved, on the other hand, the proper affections or
dispositions to be activated will remain inactive in me, and consequently I have no
motivation for a moral action. This means that I need moral cultivation to feel moved to
use my affective and dispositional capacities, and until then I am not capable of any
moral action except for such spontaneous actions as saving a baby (Mengzi 2A:6) or
saving an ox (Mengzi 1A:7) from difficulties that are motivated by my originally active
ethical emotions.

However, Nivison’s view of Mengzi’s four sprouts as the sole medium of moral
action seems to be too narrow an interpretation, and it is closely interrelated with his own
“one-source morality” view of moral action. That is, by holding the latter view Nivison
argues that the four sprouts as feelings or dispositions provide the sole motivational
source of moral action in Mengzi; and in his interpretation of Mengzi 2A:6 just presented
above Nivison says that it is only by activating the proper feelings or dispositions in one’s
mind that one is capable of moral action, and that one cannot act morally in certain
circumstances until she develops proper moral dispositions. The issue is again whether
moral actions in Mengzi are to be motivated only by moral emotions (or feelings and
dispositions in Nivison’s terms), or whether there can be another kind of moral action in
Mengzi that does not have to be mediated by ethical emotions. In the previous section, I
have argued that moral emotions and doctrinal beliefs or judgments are often two
indispensable components of moral action; in the following, I argue that Mengzi
acknowledges the existence of yet another kind of moral action, which is solely based on
one’s conviction of what is right and wrong.

A piece of textual evidence seems to be available in Mengzi 3B:8 (quoted above).
In that passage, Mengzi says that if one knows that something is not a right thing to do,
one should stop doing it immediately. And Mengzi would not have said this if he does
not think that one’s knowledge of right and wrong can enable one to do a right thing to do
and avoid the opposite, at least to some extent, or under normal conditions. However,
Nivison might say that this point does not undermine his position, because his position is
not that Mengzi does not have this train of thought but that this conflicts with another

127 “如知其非義，斯速已矣.” Mengzi 3B:8.
train of thought in Mengzi, viz. that moral action is not to be recommended or sometimes is not even possible at all unless it is properly motivated by a relevant affection or disposition, and any attempt of moral action that is not emotionally backed up would only hurt one’s moral development in the long-run. In order to meet this kind of objection, then, we need some passages in the Mengzi that could show that Mengzi acknowledged the existence of moral actions that are not motivationally grounded on affections or dispositions, and that this kind of non-emotionally grounded moral actions are not detrimental to but actually indispensable for one’s moral self-cultivation in Mengzi’s thought. As I see it, a close analysis of Mengzi 1A:4 and 1A:7 can prove the first point, and Mengzi 2A:2 provides some theoretical framework that could support the second point. Then, let me start by first quoting part of Mengzi 1A:7 that is relevant to our current problem:

[King Xuān] asked, “What must one’s virtue be like in order to be the king [of the world]?” [Mengzi] answered, “If one becomes a king by taking care of his people, no one can stop it.” [King Xuān] asked, “Can someone like me take care of the people?” [Mengzi] answered, “Yes, you can.” [King Xuān] asked, “How do you know that I can?” [Mengzi] answered, “I heard it from Hú Hé 胡龁…[In the omitted part, Mengzi mentions the previous event where King Xuān saved an ox from being killed for a sacrificial ceremony, leads King Xuān to see that he did this out of his compassion for the ox, and says that King Xuān’s compassion for the ox is sufficient for him to become the king of all China.]

The king was pleased and said, “The saying in the Poetry that ‘another person’s motive, I measure it,’ this is just for you. It’s me who did it, but I couldn’t get my motive when I sought it out in introspection. [It’s only when] you said it that [the motive] became clear in my mind. [Now,] why is it that this feeling is fitting for [someone to be] a [true] king?”

[Mengzi] said, “If there were someone reporting to you that ‘my strength is sufficient to lift a hundred jūn 鈞, but not enough to lift a feather; my eyesight is sufficient to examine the tip of an autumn hair, but I cannot see a cartload of firewood,’ would your majesty accept that?” [The king] said, “No, I wouldn’t.” “Now, your kindness is sufficient to reach animals, but your benefits do not reach your people; why [should this case] alone [be an exception]? Therefore, not lifting a feather is due to not using [one’s] power; not seeing a cartload of firewood is due to not using [one’s] eyesight; people’s not getting taken care of is due to not using [your] kindness. So, your majesty’s not becoming the king [of the world] is [due to] your refusal to act, not due to your inability [to act].”

128 “[齊宣王問]曰：‘德何如則可以王矣?’ 曰：‘保民而王，莫之能禦也。’ 曰：‘若寡人者，可以保民乎哉?’ 曰：‘可。’ 曰：‘何由知吾可也?’ 曰：‘臣聞之胡龁….王說曰：‘詩云，‘他人有心，予忖度之，’ 夫子
In the first part of the passage quoted above King Xuān asks Mengzi what one’s virtue should be like in order to become a king who could rule the whole world, and Mengzi says that one can become such a king by protecting one’s people. What is noteworthy in Mengzi’s answer is that he characterizes the virtuous king as someone who protects his people, not as someone whose virtue (dé 德) motivates him to protect his people. In other words, at least in the first part of the passage quoted above, Mengzi seems to view the possessing of virtue not as having a special kind of motivation for moral action (specifically a sympathetic feeling or a disposition to act sympathetically) but as being capable of acting sympathetically no matter what kind of moral motivation is behind one’s acting so (i.e., one’s moral motivation in that case does not have to be in the form of affection or disposition). However, Nivison interprets the same part of the passage in a quite different way:

Mencius steers Xuan—“king” of the former dukedom of Qi—into the question, What sort of “virtue” must he acquire to become the sort of ruler who will, as the natural result of the way he will be naturally disposed to act, eventually become king in fact, i.e. of all China.\(^\text{129}\)

It is clear in this remark that Nivison interprets virtue (dé 德) in Mengzi 1A:7 as a disposition to act sympathetically in a relevant situation, because Nivison understands virtue (dé 德) here as the particular way one is “naturally disposed to act” that would lead one to become the king of all China. Apparently, also, what Nivison refers to by this “disposition” here is Mengzi’s first sprout, cèyǐn zhī xīn 惹隱之心. Now, Mengzi says in an omitted part of Mengzi 1A:7 that King Xuān can become the king of the whole world through his feeling of sympathy for the ox,\(^\text{130}\) and in the second part of the same passage quoted above King Xuān himself asks Mengzi how his feeling of sympathy for the ox is fitting for someone to be a true king. Then, would all these not mean that Nivison is

\(^{129}\) Nivison, “Motivation and Moral Action in Mencius,” p. 95. Emphasis is mine.

\(^{130}\) “是心足以王矣.” Mengzi 1A:7.
right—i.e. Mengzi thinks that one’s dispositions like cèyǐn zhī xīn are the only motivational source of moral action, and that one can be considered to be virtuous only when one’s action springs from such dispositions?

My answer to this question is that I do not think so, partly because we have seen in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.2.1) that Nivison’s interpretation of Mengzi’s four sprouts as dispositions in the sense of desires for certain moral actions is mistaken. I have instead argued that Mengzi’s first three sprouts are a subset of emotions that should be considered as concern-based construals with the appearance of truth, and in Section 5.1.2 of this chapter I have shown that the fourth sprout in Mengzi, viz. shìfēi zhī xīn, is not merely a construal of the situation one is in but a fully committed moral judgment of what is the right thing for one to do in the situation. This means that the way is closed for Nivison to argue that Mengzi’s four sprouts are ethical dispositions or desires constituting the sole motivational source of moral action, and in the previous section I have also argued that moral action in Mengzi often requires both the affective (e.g. sympathy, respect, shame) and the judgmental aspect (e.g. one’s conviction that one’s feeling of sympathy, respect, or shame in a certain situation is warranted), and that the latter element is indispensable for a complete moral action whether that element (i.e. moral judgment) is on the surface of one’s mind or not.

However, we might still have a problem: If my view were right, how do I explain Mengzi’s saying that King Xuān’s feeling of sympathy for the ox is sufficient to make him act benevolently toward his people so as to become the king of all China? In other words, why does Mengzi not say anything explicit to the effect that King Xuān’s sympathy is not sufficient to motivate him toward benevolent action to his people unless it is combined with his judgment that helping out his people is the right thing to do? Would this not mean that Mengzi still somehow thinks that moral emotions constitute the sufficient motivational ground for moral action?

It might be unfortunate for us that Mengzi does not always put things clearly, but we are fortunate enough to find some clues to the solving of this question in a related passage from the Mengzi:

*King Hui惠 of Liáng梁 said, “I would love to receive your instructions.”* Mengzi
responded, “Is there any difference between killing a person with a staff and [killing a person] with a knife?” [King Hui of Liáng] said, “There is no difference.” [Mengzi said,] “Is there any difference between using a knife and using misgovernment [to kill someone]?” [King Hui of Liáng] said, “There is no difference.” [Mengzi said,] “There is fat meat in your kitchen, and there are fat horses in your stables; but your people look hungry, and your fields are dispersed with the corpses of those who died of starvation—this is leading on beasts to devour humans. Even beasts devouring each other, human beings hate [to see] that; you, then, being the parent of your people, in governing [them], cannot avoid leading on beasts to devour humans. How can you be considered as the parent of your people? Zhòngní 仲尼 [i.e. Kongzi] said, ‘The one who first created burial figures in human form must not have had any offspring!’ [Kongzi condemned that man] because his figurines resembled human beings but he still used them [as company of the dead into the underworld]. Then, how shall the one [be considered] who makes his people die of hunger?”

This passage can be considered to be in parallel with Mengzi 1A:7 in several ways: both passages are about Mengzi trying to persuade rulers to act benevolently toward their people; if Mengzi tries to persuade the king into benevolent action by appealing to his sympathy in Mengzi 1A:7, in this passage he does the same thing by recourse to the general human feeling of disgust at other beings’ misfortune or contempt for those who bring about such a state of affairs; and finally, if we see these passages closely, we find out that the kings in both passages feel their respective ethical emotion for a certain object naturally, but do not feel the same way for another object that equally deserves a similar response. In other words, just as King Xuān in Mengzi 1A:7 naturally feels compassion for the ox but does not feel the same way about his people, so does King Hui in Mengzi 1A:4 feel disgusted about an animal devouring another animal (or so assumes Mengzi) but does not know that his misgovernment causing his people’s suffering deserves greater disgust or contempt.

On the surface Mengzi can seem, as Nivison interprets him, to be exhorting the kings to activate their capacity to feel appropriately in relevant situations, or at least to engage in moral self-cultivation so as to feel motivated to activate their four sprouts in right situations, so that eventually they could act benevolently toward their people. This

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131 “梁惠王曰：‘寡人願安承敎．’ 孟子對曰：‘殺人以梃與刃，有以異乎？’ 曰：‘無以異也．’ ‘以刃與政，有以異乎？’ 曰：‘無以異也．’ 曰：‘庖有肥肉，廐有肥馬，民有飢色，野有餓莩，此率獸而食人也．獸相食，且人惡之，為民父母，行政，不免於率獸而食人，惡在其為民父母也？仲尼曰：‘始作俑者，其無後乎！’ 爲其象人而用之也．如之何其使斯民飢而死也？’” Mengzi 1A:4.
interpretation naturally leads us to one end of the aforementioned moral dilemma, viz. that the cultivation of ethical emotional capacity takes time, and that in the long run it would be best for the kings not to disrupt this developmental process by hastily adopting benevolent policies that they are not ready for. However, this interpretation should be ruled out in both passages, because the urgency of the situation in these passages—especially the starvation of people in *Mengzi* 1A:4—makes it unacceptable for Mengzi to think that the kings can wait without doing anything until they feel inclined to help their people out. Nivison says that there is no solution to this problem because this is a dilemma, but I think that the solution can be found if we analyze the metaphor used in *Mengzi* 1A:4 carefully.

In terms of the degree of their seriousness, I think that Mengzi would have considered an animal’s eating another animal to be a less serious case comparable to burying clay (or wooden) figures in human form as underground servants to the deceased, and leading on animals to devour human beings to be a more serious case comparable to the more ancient custom of burying people alive as company of the deceased into the underworld. Apparently, the degree of ‘seriousness’ here is determined by how close the victims are to us human beings: from the anthropocentric perspective, animals and clay human figures are less important than real human beings, and so the harm done to animals devoured by other animals or to clay figures buried as a substitute for actual humans can be considered as less serious than any harm done to real human beings in similar situations. Likewise, it can be considered legitimate to think that the situations where animals are eaten by other animals or the clay figures are buried as a substitute for real humans deserve less disgust and uneasiness from us than more serious situations where animals are led to eat our fellow human beings or human beings are buried alive for serving their master in the underground. And it seems that this is probably the way Mengzi thinks in drawing all these parallels, and also the way he wants King Hui to look at things. Then, what is Mengzi’s point in drawing the analogy between leading on animals to devour human beings and making people starve to death by misgovernment, and what role does the pan-human feeling of disgust at animals devoured by other animals play in Mengzi’s exhorting the king to implement benevolent policies?
As I see it, the view of emotions as concern-based construals, which I have previously argued to be attributable to Mengzi’s first three sprouts, could provide us with an answer to these questions. According to the construal view of emotions, an emotion is basically a construal, i.e. a particular way in which things present themselves to the person who feels that emotion in a certain situation, and that person’s construal of the situation in question is largely colored by her long-term and short-term concerns—i.e. what kinds of values she considers to be important in general and what kinds of things make her concerned in a particular situation at a particular moment. So, for example, if a person feels disgusted at the sight of a young deer torn apart and eaten by a jaguar, it reveals that she is concerned about the welfare of the young deer so to speak and finds it unfortunate and unbearable for the poor creature to meet such a violent death. Now Mengzi, assuming that this is the way everyone would feel in such a situation, asks King Hui: “How come, as the parent of your people, can you starve them out while your horses are so fat in your stables?” What Mengzi is trying to do here, I believe, is not urging the king to activate or cultivate a desire to help his people out as Nivison says, but pointing out to the king that he should be more concerned about the welfare of his people than he is about the fate of mere animals, and otherwise he is not making any sense at all.

In other words, as a sentient being sensitive to other creature’s suffering, the king is likely to feel disgusted when seeing an animal violently killed by another animal. At the same time, though, he is also a human being, and from Mengzi’s perspective this means that the king is supposed to adopt an anthropocentric viewpoint that regards humans as more important than other lower creatures. Moreover, according to the traditional Chinese notion of the ruler as the people’s parent, King Hui is also supposed to regard his people as if they were his children, and it is out of question that a parent would consider his children to be more important than lower animals. Now, the king’s tendency to feel upset about an animal’s violent death shows that he is considerate enough even to care about an animal’s well-being. Then, as not being a Daoist skeptic, the king has no reason to doubt that humans are more important than other lower animals, and that his own children (i.e. his people) are even more valuable than mere animals. This being the case, the king’s indifference to the suffering of his people does not make sense at all. By the force of logic and by the fact of being human and a ruler, he is required to take care of
his people. And as long as he can be made aware of the importance of his people and act accordingly, his benevolent action remains fully complete and virtuous, in terms of both its motive and effect. And it does not matter much, insofar as the welfare of his people is concerned, whether the king currently has an appropriate feeling that properly reflects the people’s value or not.

It goes exactly the same way for *Mengzi* 1A:7, where Mengzi tries to persuade King Xuān into benevolent action towards his people by appealing to the king’s sympathy for the ox. In that passage Mengzi says that King Xuān’s sympathy for the ox is sufficient for him to act benevolently toward his people, and asks the king a rhetorical question “Why is it that your kindness is sufficient to reach animals, but your benefits do not reach your people?” As I see it, the point Mengzi is trying to make by these remarks is exactly the same as in *Mengzi* 1A:4: 1) The fact that King Xuān saved an ox about to be killed out of compassion shows that King Xuān is considerate enough in character to be concerned about the well-being of a mere animal. 2) As a human being, it would be easier for King Xuān to empathize with other human beings than with mere beasts when they are suffering misfortune, and as a human being King Xuān is actually supposed to value humans more than beasts. 3) Now, King Xuān’s people are apparently human beings suffering difficulties, and King Xuān already showed himself to be capable of reaching out even to an animal, which is of less value but more difficult to empathize with than a human being in a similar situation. 4) Then, it follows that King Xuān has really no excuse for not taking care of his people. If he says he lacks the ability to do so, it is like someone claiming to be unable to lift a feather when he can lift a heavy weight; he is either suffering irrationality or deceiving himself and others on purpose for an ulterior motive.

Then, it is clear now why Mengzi says that King Xuān’s sympathy is sufficient to make him a true king of the world, and why Mengzi mentions the pan-human emotion of disgust at an animal devoured by another animal in order to make King Hui act benevolently toward his people. It is not because such emotions, or the cultivation of the capacity to feel similar emotions at the misfortune of the people, provide the sole motivation for the kings to act benevolently towards their people. It is because, unlike

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132 “今恩足以及禽獸，而功不至於百姓者，獨何與?” *Mengzi* 1A:7.
Nivison’s interpretation, such emotions reveal what kinds of things King Xuān and King Hui actually value, and help the kings realize what kinds of things they are supposed to value more than other things as both human beings and rulers; and their value system, which now came to their vivid awareness through Mengzi’s help, in turn requires them to act in accordance with its injunctions at the expense of violating the norms of reason and the norms of morality. Of course it is possible that they do not listen to the voice of reason or follow the command of morality while being aware of their force. However, this is an anomaly that needs a special treatment, and I discuss this matter in the next chapter in the context of moral self-cultivation. What should be clear for now, though, is that Mengzi thinks certain moral actions originate from one’s belief about what things are valuable and what things are more valuable than others, and one can reach such a belief or judgment by thinking about the significance of one’s emotions like compassion or ethical disgust that one naturally feels in related situations. In this light, Mengzi’s emphasis on moral emotions in *Mengzi* 1A:4 and 1A:7 in the context of moral action is compatible with my thesis that Mengzi acknowledges the existence of the kind of moral action that is solely based on one’s conviction of what is right and wrong or what is more valuable than others, and this once again shows that Nivison’s “one-source morality” thesis of moral motivation is mistaken.

Then, how shall we deal with Nivison’s worry that a moral action, when forced on someone who feels not yet ready for it, can actually harm that person’s long-term moral development? According to Nivison, this is not only his worry but also Mengzi’s, and it is well illustrated in passages like *Mengzi* 2A:2: As we have seen above, in that passage Mengzi compares the process of moral self-cultivation to the growth of a plant, and Mengzi’s point in this comparison seems to be that just as a plant grows into maturity according to its own course of development and cannot be forced to grow faster, so the cultivation of a virtuous character takes time and one should gradually move on by taking every necessary step on the proper course of moral development.

However, I think that Mengzi does not share Nivison’s worry, and this can be shown, again, by analyzing the relevant passages more carefully. First of all, I agree with Nivison that the gradualist approach to moral cultivation is probably what Mengzi meant by his plant metaphor in *Mengzi* 2A:2, but I also believe that this analogy does not entail
Nivison’s interpretation that a moral action in Mengzi needs to be postponed or only partially performed until one feels ready to do the whole of it. For as we have just seen, a person like King Xuān or King Huì who came vividly to see the normative force of a moral action would not find that action as forced but only as rightly required, because his own value system or the way he prioritizes things in terms of their value, which is implicit in his feeling of ethical emotions for certain objects, tells him that he has enough motivation to do the moral action in question and has really no excuse for not doing it.

Moreover, I think that Mengzi does not consider a compromised moral action as moral action at all, and his view of moral cultivation is such that one can build a virtuous character only by performing a great number of fully complete moral actions over a long period of time. For example, in Mengzi 3B:8 quoted above Mengzi makes it clear that he does not consider any partially-performed moral action to be acceptable, by saying that stealing a neighbor’s chicken once a month (rather than stealing them everyday) is still stealing which one should quit as quickly as possible; and in a portion of Mengzi 2A:2 to be quoted below, Mengzi seems to think that one can never attain virtue no matter how many times he performs incomplete moral action:

“May I ask what flood-like qì 氣 is?” [Mengzi] said, “It’s difficult to explain. Its nature as qì is such that it is extremely big and extremely solid; and if you nourish it with rectitude and do not injure it, it can fill the whole space between Heaven and Earth. Its nature as qì is such that it accompanies righteousness and the Way; without these, it shrinks. It is produced by accumulating righteous deeds, and is not what you can obtain by incidental performance of righteousness. If you feel dissatisfaction about your deeds, it shrinks up.”

The flood-like qì Mengzi talks about in this passage is a kind of moral energy that enables one to act morally. Although it is not clear at this point what kind of moral energy flood-like qì exactly is and how it is related with Mengzi’s four moral sprouts, the purpose of this section makes it suffice to know that according to Mengzi, the moral energy contained in flood-like qì can be nourished by accumulating rectitude or righteous deeds over a long period of time. What I translated as “rectitude” here is originally “zhí”

133 “敢問何謂浩然之氣?” 曰: ‘難言也。其為氣也，至大至剛，以直養而無害，則塞於天地之間。其為氣也，配義與道，無是，餒也。是集義所生者，非義襲而取之也。 行有不慊於心，則餒矣。’” Mengzi 2A:2.
直, which literally means “straight” or “straightforward,” and an important connotation of this term is that when applied to action or a person’s character, a straight (zhí 直) action or a straight person would not accommodate any compromise. What I mean by “compromise” here is the act of bending one’s course of action due to non-moral considerations such as the prospect of profit or other kinds of opportunities to fulfill one’s non-moral desires, and such a compromise makes one fail to act in full accordance with the demand of morality or one’s ethical ideal. According to Mengzi, this kind of compromise is especially detrimental to the cultivation of a virtuous character, because it is the source of ethical dissatisfaction (bú qiè 不慊) that leaves one’s flood-like qi in the state of want (néi 艱) and makes it shrink. In other words, the character “qiè” 慾 in the original passage refers to one’s feeling of satisfaction, and “bú qiè” 不慊 means that one feels somehow dissatisfied or spiritually “hungry.” And since Mengzi thinks that the feeling of dissatisfaction resulting from one’s failure to live up to morality is what hinders one from cultivating his moral energy, it is clear that any compromised moral action has no room in Mengzi’s theory of moral cultivation.
Chapter Six
Emotions and Moral Cultivation

In the previous chapter, we have seen that ethical emotions in Mengzi neither provide a complete basis for ethical judgment nor constitute the sole motivational source of moral action. As I have previously argued, emotions in Mengzi can be considered as concern-based construals with the appearance of truth, and one’s reflective thinking (quán 權) and the subsequent judgment about what is morally right or ethically desirable in a certain situation remains one’s highest authority in moral judgment and the most powerful source of moral motivation. Nevertheless, ancient Chinese Confucians did not consider it to be an ideal situation when one’s ethical judgment constantly generates friction with one’s feelings and desires; for them, an ideal moral agent was one who would act spontaneously as he feels fitting in every situation without transgressing moral norms. So, Kongzi says that it was only at the age of seventy that he could follow what his mind desired without violating the norms\(^1\); and Mengzi says that one can cultivate humaneness (rén 仁) by gradually extending the boundary of the objects of one’s sympathy, and develop righteousness (yì 義) by making one’s moral sense more and more sensitive in distinguishing what is morally right from wrong.\(^2\)

Then, Nivison was not mistaken at all in thinking that Mengzi exhorts people to become the sort of person who will always naturally and effectively do virtuous acts, and that being such a person involves having the right feelings and dispositions. In other words, although Nivison was mistaken in thinking that ethical emotions are the only source of moral motivation in Mengzi and that fully complete moral action can be

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\(^1\) “吾…七十而從心所欲，不踰矩.” *Lunyu* 2:4.

\(^2\) “人皆有所不忍，達之於其所忍， 仁也；人皆有所不為，達之於其所為，義也。人能充無欲害人之心，而仁不可勝用也；人能充無穿踰之心，而義不可勝用也.” *Mengzi* 7B:31. This passage will be explained in detail later.
postponed until one develops strong enough affective motivation, it still remains highly likely that the ideal Mengzian agent would not experience any discrepancy or tension between the way she judges things and the way she feels about things. Then, how could such a perfect moral character be developed? This is the main question of this chapter, and I am specifically interested in clarifying Mengzi’s theory of emotional extension (tuī or chōng 充).

Many major scholars in Chinese philosophy have been writing on Mengzi’s notion of emotional extension. However, in my view, the most advanced interpretations of the Mengzian extension in the field still seem to be equally unsatisfactory in explaining how the Mengzian extension of moral emotion really occurs, or what the real mechanism behind the Mengzian extension is. In the following, I provide a brief summary of the three major interpretations of Mengzi’s concept of emotional extension proposed so far and discuss their respective problems. Next, I argue that this ubiquitous failure in explaining the exact mechanism of the Mengzian extension of moral emotions in most previously proposed interpretations is due to their lack of consideration for the huge role played by culture or social norms in the Mengzian emotional extension.

That is, I argue that the social norms in ancient China such as the Confucian rituals embody certain cultural assumptions concerning which emotions are more important than others and what the appropriate boundaries for their applications are, and propose that the process of Mengzian emotional extension is mainly the process in which culture plays an important role in shaping our emotional reactions in a particular way. In my opinion, our due attention to the important role culture plays in the Mengzian extension of moral emotions will let us radically rethink Mengzi’s project of moral cultivation in general from a totally new perspective, which will turn out to be consistent with other rival thinkers’ models of moral cultivation (such as Xunzi’s) to a surprising extent.

6.1 Mengzi’s Emotional Extension—a Problematic Concept

6.1.1 Two Interpretations of Mengzi’s Emotional Extension
In Section 5.2.1 of the previous chapter, I have briefly introduced Mengzi’s concept of emotional extension (tuī 推) and Nivison’s interpretation of it. As has been already mentioned there, the term “tuī 推 was originally a technical term in the Later Mohist logic referring to an effort to get someone to grant what that person has not originally accepted by pointing out that it is the same as something that that person does accept, and we have also seen that Mengzi appropriates this term in Mengzi 1A:7 to explain his notion of emotional extension. To quote the relevant portion of the passage again to facilitate my discussion, it goes as follows:

Treat your elders as befitting their age, and then reach out to other people’s elders; treat your youngsters as befitting their age, and then reach out to other people’s youngsters. [If you could do so, then] you would be able to [govern] the world [as if] moving it on your palm….That is, all you have to do is merely to take this feeling and apply it to other cases. So, [if you] extend your compassion, it will be sufficient for protecting [all the people] within the Four Seas; but [if you] don’t extend your compassion, you won’t have enough even for protecting your wife and children. That by which the ancients greatly surpassed others is nothing else: they were good at extending what they did, and that was all. Now, your compassion is sufficient to reach animals, but your benefits do not reach your people; why is it so?”

As might be very familiar to the reader by now, in the omitted part of the passage Mengzi discusses with King Xuān a past incident in which the king spared an ox being led to the slaughter for a sacrificial ritual. He commanded that the ox be replaced with a sheep, but the real motive for his saving the ox, as Mengzi helps him realize, was his compassion for the poor creature that was terrified with the fear of death and resembled so much an innocent man going to execution. Once the king understood his compassion as the real motive behind his action, Mengzi goes on to argue that the king’s bad governance of his country that recently brought great harm to his people is actually because he did not “take this feeling” of compassion for the ox and “apply it” to the case of his people, when he apparently could. For the reason why King Xuān saved the ox is that the terrified ox reminded him of a human being about to be executed, and the fact that his benevolence reached a mere animal shows how much more he could have been benevolent to his

3 “老吾老，以及人之老，幼吾幼，以及人之幼，天下可運於掌，言舉斯心加諸彼而已。故推恩足以保四海，不推恩無以保妻子。古之人所以大過人者，無他焉；善推其所為而已矣。今恩足以及禽獸，而功不至於百姓者，獨何與？” Mengzi 1A:7. The underlining is mine.
fellow human beings.

However, what matters in Mengzi is not merely the king’s showing benevolence toward his people by taking care of their difficulties but also eventually his feeling sympathy for their suffering, because the ideal agent in Mengzi is the one who acts virtuously from the correct motives with the right feelings. In this light, what is crucial and problematic in the current story is that King Xuān could have felt sympathy for his subjects but actually did not, and an important question concerning Mengzi’s theory of emotional cultivation suggested in this passage is what makes the king “take up the feeling [of compassion] in one case” and “apply it to another.” Based on the fact that King Xuān could naturally feel compassion for the ox but found it difficult to feel the same way for his people, we could label the former type of cases “paradigmatic cases” (following Nivison⁴) and the latter type “extended cases.” In other words, according to this distinction, whereas paradigmatic cases of a moral emotion refer to those where one finds it appropriate to feel a certain emotion (e.g. compassion) and naturally feels so when encountering a certain kind of objects (e.g. the ox), extended cases of the same emotion refer to the situations where one does not spontaneously feel the same emotion in question about certain objects (e.g. the suffering people) while finding it appropriate to feel so. Then, our current question about Mengzi’s theory of emotional cultivation could be rephrased as follows: How could one come to feel proper ethical emotions in extended cases as naturally as he does in paradigmatic cases?

In his article “Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi,” David Wong proposes that Mengzian extension can be conceived as an extension of both judgment and feeling.⁵ For example, when King Xuān comes to recognize that there are significant similarities between the ox that he saved from being killed and his subjects suffering from his misgovernment, and subsequently realizes that the latter deserve as much sympathy from him as the former, King Xuān can be considered to have achieved an extension in ethical judgment. However, the problem under consideration in this chapter is that such an understanding does not necessarily come hand in hand with the extension in another respect—King Xuān remains emotionally unmoved while recognizing that his

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⁴ For example, see Nivison, “Motivation and Moral Action in Mengzi,” p. 100.
people in difficulty are a proper object of his compassion. According to Wong, most of the solutions to this problem proposed previously to him can be classified into two groups, one being a “logical extension” interpretation and the other an “emotive extension” interpretation, as he calls them. Basically he argues against both interpretations and proposes his own “developmental extension” interpretation. In the following, I briefly summarize and critically discuss the “logical” and “emotive” interpretations of Mengzi’s emotional extension; and then in Section 6.1.2, I examine whether Wong’s own interpretation could make any better theoretical alternative.

A seminal version of the logical extension interpretation had been originally suggested by Nivison himself, and it was greatly elaborated by Kwong-loi Shun. As we have seen in the previous chapter, concerning Mengzi 2A:9 where the ancient sage Bó Yí extended his disgust at wicked rulers and people of incorrect political allegiance as far as to the case of a person whose hat was not on right, Nivison cautiously suggests that the similarity between the paradigm cases (e.g. wicked rulers) and the extended case (the man whose hat was awry) might have required Bó Yí to make such a quasi-logical move and “extend” his feeling of disgust. But Nivison eventually rejects this view as not the one Mengzi would have taken seriously, saying that Mengzi was fully aware of the possible discrepancy between one’s seeing something to be done and having proper affective motivation for doing it. However, Kwong-loi Shun accepts Nivison’s original suggestion and further develops it into a careful argument. According to him, the incident of saving the ox in Mengzi 1A:7 is a clear case of suffering in which King Xuān’s sympathy successfully motivated a proper action. And what Mengzi is trying to do by reminding him of his people’s plight, Shun argues, is to let the king see his lack of consistency in treating the two similar cases. As Shun sees it, Mengzi thinks that the king’s recognition of his own inconsistency will somehow generate in him the appropriate sympathetic reaction to the second case.

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However, this interpretation is problematic for several reasons. First, it is very difficult to understand how the intellectual recognition of inconsistency in one’s emotional reactions to two similar cases could lead to actually having the same emotion for both cases. For it is a well-known phenomenon that we seem to have little control over our emotions—some people feel fear when flying while clearly knowing that flight is the safest means of travel, and like King Xuān, we often find ourselves failing to feel sympathy for our fellow human beings who are clearly in miserable situations.\(^9\) Second, as Bryan Van Norden has pointed out, the maintenance of emotional consistency does not seem to be Mengzi’s primary concern here, because it would have been equally consistent if the king had revoked his order to save the ox and eliminated his initial compassion for that ox from his mind. However, Mengzi did not recommend this, and this shows that mere emotional consistency was not what Mengzi wanted the king to achieve.\(^10\) Third, concurring with Shun’s worry about his own interpretation, Wong points out that the logical extension interpretation significantly distorts our understanding of what the truly compassionate person should look like. For according to this view the justification of King Xuān’s compassionate treatment of his people is contingent on the existence of his desire to be consistent with his compassionate reaction to the ox, but a sounder picture of the compassionate person would expect him to look for the justifying reason for his benevolent treatment of others in those people’s suffering itself.\(^11\)

The second interpretation of Mengzian extension that Wong distinguishes his view from is the emotive extension interpretation. According to this view, normal human adults possess a naturally developed full faculty of moral emotions, which only needs to be stimulated with sufficient force and vividness of certain relevant images for it to function properly. King Xuān is not an exception, and Mengzi’s urge to “take this heart and apply it to that case (of his people’s suffering)” is interpreted as an exhortation to tap into his fully developed natural sympathy through vivid imagination of his people’s suffering. A number of scholars can be considered to hold this view\(^12\), but the most

\(^9\) A similar concern seems to be found in Wong, “Is There a Distinction Between Reason and Emotion in Mengzi?” p. 40.


\(^11\) Wong, “Is There a Distinction Between Reason and Emotion in Mengzi?” pp. 41–42.

\(^12\) For example, Wong lists Bryan Van Norden, Craig Ihara, and Manyul Im under this group. See Wong,
elaborate version of it has been proposed by Manyul Im, and we also find some interesting supplemental ideas in Franklin Perkins’s work. So, my explanation of the emotive extension interpretation provided below will be focused on some of the works recently published by these two scholars.

In his article “Emotional Control and Virtue in the Mengzi,” Manyul Im argues for his Natural Development Model (NDM hereafter) and his thesis of the unperfected nature of the nobleman’s (君子) character. According to the NDM, full human moral development occurs naturally, i.e. without the need of strengthening by practice, if certain minimal conditions like the satisfaction of the economic needs and the existence of stable social conditions are met. In other words, as long as “the minimal conditions have been met, one can be expected naturally to be able to feel and act in the morally proper ways.” In addition, Im also argues that the ideal of a morally good person in Mengzi does not require the perfection of one’s psychological capacities and dispositions. According to him, the nobleman, the Mengzian moral ideal, does suffer from the uncontrollability of his emotions once they are engaged; and the nobleman is also sometimes vulnerable to motivational conflict resulting from the presence of competing inclinations that pull the agent in different directions. For an example of the nobleman’s difficulty in emotional control, Im cites Mengzi 4A:18 where Mengzi says that the nobleman does not teach his own son because he can get angry when his son does not follow his instructions very well; and as a typical example of motivational conflict among the nobleman’s different inclinations, Im cites the case of the sage king Shùn, whose affection and loyalty to his family members were in severe tension with his public duties as ruler.

Im pits his interpretation against what he calls the perfectibility model. According to him, a typical proponent of this model is Aristotle, and it advises us that active emotional cultivation is desirable and necessary for full moral development. On this model, As Im sees it, emotional responses are to be perfected through practice and habituation, and it postulates that 1) the strength of an emotional disposition may be

“Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi,” p. 191.


14 Ibid., p. 7.

15 Ibid., pp. 7–8.
modulated through habituation, and that 2) new sources of moral motivation may be acquired through habituation. On this model, a virtuous agent not only acts correctly but also feels aright. According to Im, this Aristotelian virtue theory became very popular in contemporary literature on Mengzi in the West, but unfortunately it is a wrong interpretation to ascribe to Mengzi. The moral education in Mengzi and other Confucians, Im argues, aims at “teaching the proper forms of behavior that express the attitudes essential to being a good person,” and it does not concern “the business of perfecting the students’ emotional responses.” To elaborate, the learning of morally proper behavior is a process of habituation that is analogous to the acquisition of a skill in using an ability we already possess. For example, one habituates oneself to certain deferential ritual behaviors through which she expresses her sense of respect for elders that has been already naturally developed prior to this habituation process.

Wong’s criticism of Im’s view is brief, and it is mainly focused on refuting his Natural Development Thesis. According to Wong, the merit of the emotive extension interpretation is to be able to explain why Mengzi expects King Xuān immediately to treat his people benevolently and why he considers the king’s failure to do so to be due to simple refusal to act rather than incapacity to act. However, Wong also argues that the emotive extension interpretation does not go well with certain passages from the Mengzi which suggest that moral development is not merely a matter of a simple recovery or reinforcement of what is innately in the human mind. For example, following Nivison, Wong cites Mengzi 7B:11 as an important counterexample to Im’s thesis that emotional cultivation is unnecessary in Mengzi: “A person fond of [good] reputation can give away a state of a thousand chariots, but if one is not the sort of person to do it, reluctance would be written all over one’s face if one had to give away merely a basketful of rice and a bowlful of soup.” That is, Mengzi’s observation here is that a seemingly great act of sacrifice sometimes turns out to be motivated by a subtler kind of selfish desire, and such a desire often hinders one from even making a very small amount of sacrifice for

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16 Ibid., p. 1.
17 Ibid., pp. 3–4.
18 Ibid., p. 15.
other people’s benefit. This means that Mengzi might have felt a need for a theory of transforming or systematically suppressing such problematic desires as an integral part of his ethical thought, and Im seems to need a good argument to explain such passages away.

In addition to Wong’s argument, I would like to provide further arguments for the need of emotional cultivation in Mengzi’s thought, and that involves a critical discussion of Im’s view. First, there seems to be a little contradiction between Im’s two theses presented above. As I see it, Im cannot hold his NDM and the thesis of the unperfected nature of the nobleman’s character at the same time, because I believe that natural development of a person’s character necessarily involves the development of the agent’s emotional capacity. The capacity of proper emotional responses in various ethical situations is a crucial constituent of a person’s character, and Im has also said himself that “If the minimal conditions have been met, one can be expected naturally to be able to feel and act in the morally proper ways.” Moreover, one of Im’s main points is that one is capable of emotional engagement at will—for example, Im holds the view that King Xuān’s failure to feel compassion for his people in misery is due to his unwillingness, not inability to do so. He could feel compassion as easily and immediately as he could lift a feather or see a cartload of firewood. However, on the NDM the emotion that a person makes himself feel as he wishes should be at least a morally approvable one, if not perfect, and otherwise the NDM loses its significance. For if the Mengzian agent with naturally developed virtue is vulnerable to morally problematic or inappropriate emotions, what is it that is naturally developed in him?

Then, how could this difficulty be resolved? Before pressing my argument any further against Im, I would like to consider how Im would try to solve this problem if he shared my worry. In my view, he might try to solve it by introducing a particular conception of emotional control and arguing that the deliberation and volition involved in one’s emotional control is what mainly accounts for one’s moral character. For Im, that King Xuān can engage in compassion at will for his people, as he interprets Mengzi to be arguing, is good evidence that emotion is under one’s control. However, as we have seen above, Im also holds that the Mengzian nobleman is not free from the surge of inappropriate emotions and the motivational conflict due to the presence of competing emotions.

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20 Im, “Emotional Control and Virtue in the Mencius,” p. 10.
emotions in his mind. And then in order to reconcile these two seemingly contradicting stances about the human control of emotions in his interpretation of Mengzi, Im suggests a peculiar conception of emotional control by saying the following:

*The perfecting of one’s psychological capacities and dispositions...is not what is important to being a good person. Instead, the manipulation of one’s external circumstances is important, so that certain kinds of feelings and their associated motivations arise—or do not arise—in certain situations. So at the height of moral development, what have not been developed or tutored are the capacities that produce one’s motivations to act. Rather, one’s deliberative activity and will—the things required to see the need for, to pose, and to carry out the indirectly motivating, self-manipulative strategies—are what bear the burden of moral character.*

It becomes clear by these remarks that Im does not really think that under proper economic and social conditions one can naturally develop the capacities both to act and feel *in morally proper ways*. Im’s genuine view now rather seems to be that what naturally develops in one’s mind is the motivational power of one’s emotions, which do not always direct one to ethically good or morally correct actions and thus often need to be controlled through one’s manipulation of the external circumstances. But what is meant exactly by the “manipulation of external circumstances”?

Franklin Perkins provides a nice explanation of it. Against several scholars’ recent claim that emotions or feelings in Mengzi can be commanded by will or changed by rational arguments directly (e.g. Kwong-Loi Shun’s logical extension interpretation), he argues that reason cannot directly control feelings but can indirectly control by training them. Then, how is the training of feelings possible? According to Perkins, two psychological facts about feelings or emotions are relevant here: First, feelings are evoked by experiences, not by choice or reason. For example, the sight of a suffering ox evokes sympathy whether we want it or not. Second, feelings shift by association, just as sympathy evoked by the sight of a particular ox’s suffering can be transferred to other oxen, and possibly to other kinds of sentient beings too. Given these two psychological facts, Perkins proposes a complex view of emotional control. That is, since our emotions are not evoked by rational choice but by circumstances, we need to control our

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21 Ibid., p. 7.
circumstances in order to control our emotions. In other words, “Moral cultivation depends on choosing to put ourselves in the circumstances that will evoke the proper feelings in us, and to do this in a way that transfers these feelings to analogous groups.”

And according to Perkins, we need two kinds of abilities to direct this training of emotions: on one hand the ability to pay attention (思) to the right kinds of experiences that evoke the right feelings, and on the other hand wisdom (智) that tells us what are the right kinds of things to pay attention to.

Now, let us return to Im’s NDM and think further about its implications in terms of this conception of emotional control. As I mentioned above, Im seems to hold that Mengzian emotions carry some sort of naturally developed motivational power towards certain actions, but those actions are not always ethically good or morally right; and even when certain emotions motivate one to act morally, they can sometimes get excessive or deficient and miss the target. So, on Im’s view, the criterion with which the relevant faculty of the mind judges whether one’s natural emotion is appropriate or not in a certain situation resides in large part outside of the emotion, and consequently Mengzian emotions, even those that tend to direct us towards moral actions, remain objects of constant check and indirect control through the manipulation of one’s circumstances. In addition, in describing Mengzian emotions and the purported motivational power they embody, Im often uses such words as “deficiency,” “excess,” “strength,” and “continuum,” and argues that the purpose of the willful manipulation of one’s situations is to engage deficient emotions more actively and to prevent certain emotions from being engaged excessively.

And what is noteworthy in this description of Mengzian emotions is that Im seems to attribute to Mengzi a kind of hydraulic model of emotions and motivation. In other words, on Im’s view an emotion is understood as a continuum of motivational power that naturally reaches a substantial degree of strength or intensity, but needs to be directed to right objects and expressed in an appropriate manner through one’s manipulation of the external circumstances.

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23 Ibid., p. 215.
24 Ibid., pp. 214–217. Bryan Van Norden, based on a careful analysis of all the usages of the term “思” in the Mengzi, has proposed that “思” is a technical term in Mengzian psychology which can be translated as “concentration” and is related with its non-technical uses to mean “to recall,” “to long for,” “to think fondly of,” or “to think anxiously about.” See Van Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi,” p. 112.
25 For example, see Im, “Emotional Control and Virtue in the Mencius,” p. 8.
However, these implications of the NDM seem to have some theoretical drawback, specifically concerning the correct picture of the ideal Mengzian agent and Mengzi’s conception of emotions. First, Im’s view of the Mengzian nobleman as normally suffering from uncontrollable emotions and vulnerable to motivational conflicts does not fit the general Confucian conception of the sage who does not desire against the moral norms (*Lunyu* 2:4), nor does it seem to explain very well some key passages from the *Mengzi* which place high value on the spontaneity in one’s feeling the right emotion in every situation and which emphasize the importance of cultivating one’s emotions. For example, as has been mentioned above, Mengzi says in *Mengzi* 7B:11 that although one could give away a state of a thousand chariots to someone else for the sake of one’s reputation, he would have a very hard time ceding merely a basketful of rice and a bowlful of soup to someone else if he is not the right kind of person.26 "The right kind of person" here definitely refers to no other than the nobleman, Mengzi’s ideal moral agent, and Mengzi contrasts the nobleman with another type of person who can successfully manage his own emotions to get the reputation of being indifferent to material goods but does not always succeed in controlling his true feelings. Now, is Mengzi suggesting here that his ideal agent is the one who never fails in managing his ugly emotions? I do not think so, because the correct point to be drawn from this contrast rather seems to be that Mengzi’s ideal agent is the type of person who would not begrudge his property at all when it is appropriate to cede things to others for their benefit.

In addition, Mengzi says in *Mengzi* 7B:1 that the highest Confucian virtue of humaneness (*rén*) involves getting to love or care about things that one was originally indifferent to, and this change in one’s attitude toward things seems to result from the cultivation of the relevant emotion:

> Mengzi said, “How inhumane King Hui 惠 of Liáng 梁 is! The humane person [extends his caring attitude in the way that he] starts from those he loves and reaches out to those he doesn’t love; [on the other hand,] the inhumane person [extends his ruthlessness in the way that he] starts from those he doesn’t love and reaches out to those he loves.” Gōngsūn Chōü 公孫丑 asked, “What do you mean?” [Mengzi answered,] “For the sake of territory, King Hui of Liáng led his people to battle to the point of making pulp out of them, but was greatly defeated. When he was about to engage in a

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26 “The right kind of person” here is a translation of “qí rén” 齊人, literally meaning “that person.”
In the previous chapter, we have seen King Huì of Liáng being criticized by Mengzi for letting his people starve to death while keeping fat horses in his stables (Mengzi 1A:4). Now in this passage, we see that King Huì not only jeopardizes the life of his people for whom he has no love, but also sacrifices to the war his own sons and brothers whom he does love. According to Mengzi, this is exactly the opposite of what the humane person would do—extending his caring affection from those he loves to those he does not originally love, and it seems that his “reaching out” (及) to the latter type of people not only involves benevolent treatment of them but also is accompanied by a proper affective attitude. In response to this, though, Im might argue that what Mengzi really recommends here is not any cultivation of new affection but merely a manipulation of the relevant situation so that the humane person’s latent caring affection gets stimulated and properly expressed towards the people’s suffering. However, I think that this way of understanding the passage is not correct, because of the similarity between the passage under consideration and Mengzi 3A:5. As we have seen earlier, in the latter passage Mengzi asks the Mohist Yí Zhī a rhetorical question of whether one’s affection for one’s brother’s child is like one’s affection for one’s neighbor’s baby. Mengzi’s point was that it is not only natural but also appropriate for one to love one’s brother’s child more than one’s neighbor’s baby, and from this point it further follows that originally one has no reason to be expected to have developed a substantial concern for strangers on the street. However, Confucian morality also requires that one develop such a concern for the welfare of others, and it is through the long-term cultivation of the capacity to feel such a concern, not through an instant activation of one’s latent benevolence, that one eventually becomes a humane person.

27 “孟子曰：‘不仁哉梁惠王也！仁者以其所愛及其所不愛，不仁者以其所不愛及其所愛。’公孫丑問曰：‘何謂也?’‘梁惠王以土地之故，糜爛其民而戰之，大敗。將復之，恐不能勝，故驅其所愛子弟以殉之，是之謂以其所不愛及其所愛也。’” Mengzi 7B:1.

28 This is the way Perkins argues in his “Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy,” pp. 211–215. However, a similar argument is also presented in Manyul Im, “Action, Emotion, and Inference in Mencius,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 29, no. 2 (June 2002).
The second implication of the NDM—viz. that emotions carry some sort of motivational power analogous to hydraulic pressure—is also problematic, because this understanding of emotions seems to blur the distinction between emotions and desires and give us the wrong impression that emotions can be directed virtually at any objects by practice. As we have previously seen in Chapter 4, emotions in Mengzi are best interpreted as concern-based construals with the appearance of truth, or the particular ways in which things present themselves to a person who is in the grip of the corresponding emotions. And we have also seen that emotions as a kind of construal of certain situations should be clearly distinguished from the related desires to act in certain ways in those situations. For example, respect in Mengzi is primarily one’s sincere regarding of an elderly or worthy person to be worthy of respect, but it is not the same thing as one’s desire to treat an elderly or worthy person respectfully whenever one encounters such a person. However, Im’s NDM seems to blur this distinction and postulate that there is such an entity as fully-developed respect existing as a disposition in one’s mind independently of any object, like whirling water that can be released in any direction depending on where it gets an outlet. This seems to be a mistaken view, though. For if emotions in Mengzi are a kind of construal, by definition they can only occur when there are things to be construed. In other words, emotions are primarily our spontaneous responses to things that stimulate our emotional sensibility, and the contents of Mengzian emotions are primarily a special kind of evaluative thoughts: the ox is pitiful, the offer is humiliating, the man is worthy of respect, and so forth. However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, these concern-based construals do not normally motivate any action until they get combined with implicit or explicit judgmental approval (*shìfēi zhī xīn* 是非之心) that they are indeed correct construals to act on in respective situations. In short, it is not only pointless but even impossible in Mengzi to direct one’s emotions (understood in Im’s terms) to new objects by artificial practice. It is pointless because Mengzian emotions are actually a kind of construals that do not motivate action by themselves, and it is impossible because there is no such a thing as an emotion as a stream of motivational energy with an unidentified object in the first place.

6.1.2 Wong’s Alternative Interpretation and Its Limitations
So far, we have critically reviewed two influential interpretations of Mengzian extension: the logical extension and emotive extension interpretations. As we have seen above, neither of these two views seems tenable as a correct interpretation of Mengzian extension due to their theoretical flaws, and for this reason Wong explores the conceptual space between these two models and proposes a third view: “developmental extension” interpretation. By giving the name “developmental extension interpretation” to his own view, Wong aspires to overcome both kinds of defects that he finds in the previous interpretations. He says:

My interpretation, unlike the logical extension interpretation, assumes no magical generation of motivationally effective compassion purely through logical argumentation. If the King had had no innate beginning of compassion, if there were no raw material of some natural feeling, no qi flowing in approximately the right direction already, no amount of logical argumentation would help to generate effective feeling for his people. My interpretation also differs from the emotive extension interpretation precisely because it recognizes real and substantial change in the composition of moral feelings as they are channeled and shaped by judgments about what there is reason to do.  

Then, how does Wong try to achieve his goals? A hint is already given in his remarks just quoted: Wong proposes that the innate moral feelings of human beings—such as King Xuān’s compassion for the ox—are instinctual feelings that to a significant degree are plastic and indeterminate. And he also proposes to understand the plasticity and indeterminateness of these emotions in the sense that these emotions have only partially formed intentional objects. The concept of intentional object captures an important aspect of emotions that I have presented in Chapter 4 (following Roberts) as concern-based construals: emotions are not merely brute sensations but perceptions of the salient features of the situations at hand; such perceptions are guided by what one’s primary concern is in each situation; and the features so perceived are the intentional objects of the respective emotions. Now according to Wong, the failure of emotional extension—viz. the phenomenon that one feels a certain ethical emotion for a set of objects very naturally (paradigmatic cases) but does not always feel the same way for other similar objects (extended cases)—results from the fact that one’s moral emotions do not have a complete list of intentional objects. Wong points out that this lack of a comprehensive list of

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intentional objects is what makes Mengzian moral emotions indeterminate, and he argues that those emotions are also plastic in the sense that further determination of their intentional objects can bring about the appropriate emotional responses in extended cases.\textsuperscript{30} Then, how does the “further determination” of an emotion’s intentional object exactly occur?

Let us consider an example, raised by Wong himself. There are paradigmatic cases of compassion where one would naturally shrink back or be appalled at the sight of something happening. For example, in such a case as a child about to fall into a well (\textit{Mengzi} 2A:6), anyone would feel spontaneous alarm and distress and run to the rescue of this innocent victim. However, when we come to the case of a homeless person asking for change on the roadside, it is possible that we feel some sort of emotional disturbance while not being clear what that feeling exactly is. According to Wong, that feeling could be annoyance at being accosted, or fear of being attacked, or indignation that this person is not working for a living, or compassion for his difficulties, or even all of a bit of each of these emotions. Now, if what we are feeling in this case is more than one beginnings of these emotions, Wong argues, our feeling is indeterminate and needs further determination of its intentional object before it could crystallize into one of these definite emotions on which we could act accordingly.\textsuperscript{31} As for the crucial question of how that kind of determination exactly occurs, Wong proposes that it happens “when one perceives the immediate situation as giving rise to a reason to help someone.”\textsuperscript{32} So, if we perceive the situation of the homeless person as giving rise to a reason to help him rather than ignore him, it is by such a perception that we could determine the proper intentional object of our initially indeterminate and plastic feeling of disturbance. Furthermore, Wong argues that such a perception of a reason to act in a certain situation is made possible by “fixing our attention” (\textit{sī 思}) on the relevant aspect of the situation.\textsuperscript{33} For example, what is required of King Xuān in order for him to extend his compassion for the ox to his people is only to focus on their suffering in such a way that he could perceive

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p. 192.  
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p. 193.  
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., p. 194.  
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 196.
their suffering as a compelling reason to help them.\textsuperscript{34}

This is the gist of Wong’s developmental extension interpretation. This interpretation, though, does not seem to provide an adequate answer to our current question. For our problem about the homeless person in the last paragraph was that we seemed to feel more than one incipient emotion about that person at the same time, and we did not know which emotion was really the right emotion to feel about that person. In other words, if an emotion is a kind of perception that tells us what features of a certain situation are the right ones that we should be concerned about in the situation, the fact that we felt more than one emotion about the homeless person means that we could not determine what were the right features to focus on as giving rise to a reason for our acting in one way rather than another. Then, it becomes clear that in a situation like this where different emotions compete with each other for the correct construal of the situation one is in, further determination of the intentional object of one’s vague feelings—or one’s perceiving the immediate situation as giving rise to a reason for acting in a particular way, in Wong’s terms—does not naturally occur. In response to this Wong would say that one can determine the correct intentional object of one’s vague, mixed feelings by fixing attention on reasons implicit in those emotions, but this explanation is not sufficient either, because one first needs to know what the real reasons are among the quasi-reasons that one’s conflicting emotions present to one as if they were the real reasons. This means that one’s attention-fixing cannot be an arbitrary activity, and it should be guided by a proper criterion to distinguish real reasons from pseudo-reasons. Then, what is such a criterion?

According to Wong, the necessary criterion can be found in one’s analogical reasoning. What Wong means by analogical reasoning is a process in which one takes the spontaneous moral judgments embedded in Mengzian moral emotions as “baseline” intuitions, and then compares non-paradigmatic unclear cases to those basic “paradigms” to determine whether it is appropriate to have an emotional response in a non-paradigmatic situation similar to the emotion that one had in a paradigmatic case. The criterion at work for such a kind of reasoning is the degree of similarity between paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic cases, and what enables one to determine the proper

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p. 193.
intentional object of one’s emotion in a non-paradigmatic or extended case is one’s willingness to treat similar cases similarly.\textsuperscript{35} For example, back to the case of King Xuān and his ox and people in Mengzi 1A:7, it is through this kind of analogical reasoning that the king can compare the situations of the ox and his people and come to realize that the similarity between the ox and his people in suffering makes it appropriate for him to feel compassion for his people by focusing on their suffering.\textsuperscript{36}

However, this explanation is highly problematic, because it does not seem to be very different from Shun’s logical extension interpretation that Wong has already criticized. As we have seen above, the point of Wong’s criticism was that the extension of one’s judgment from a paradigmatic case to an extended case based on the recognition of the similarity between the two cases is not necessarily accompanied by a similar extension in feeling, and it seems that exactly the same criticism can be applied to Wong’s current proposal. For if the proper intentional object of one’s emotion in a non-paradigmatic situation is to be determined by one’s analogical reasoning, it is not clear how this newly determined intentional object could be forced onto one’s vague and mixed feelings that would keep resisting the decision of one’s reasoning by recommending to the mind different features of the non-paradigmatic situation in question as the most proper intentional object to be focused on in that situation. In my view, this shows that Wong’s developmental interpretation of Mengzian extension based on his conception of analogical reasoning is vulnerable to the same kind of problem that the logical extension interpretation suffers.

According to Wong, what distinguishes his view of Mengzian extension from the logical extension interpretation is the fact that unlike the latter, his developmental extension interpretation postulates the existence of certain raw material of natural feelings that are largely indeterminate and plastic:

\textit{My interpretation, unlike the logical extension interpretation, assumes no magical generation of motivationally effective compassion purely through logical argumentation. If the King had had no innate beginning of compassion, if there were no raw material of some natural feeling, no qi flowing in approximately the right direction already, no}

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., pp. 199–203.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 197.
amount of logical argumentation would help to generate effective feeling for his people.\textsuperscript{37}

However, we have just seen in the last paragraph that Wong’s interpretation, despite his postulating the existence of certain plastic and indeterminate feelings, still suffers from the same kind of problem that plagues the logical extension interpretation. Now, Wong’s postulation of the “raw material of natural feeling[s]” seems to introduce another difficulty for his own interpretation, because by doing so he departs from his original understanding of Mengzian emotions as a special kind of perception of the salient features of certain situations and moves toward Manyul Im’s view of emotions in Mengzi as continua of motivational power that can be directed to certain objects and expressed in certain manners through the act of focusing one’s attention on whatever objects deemed appropriate. For example, while explaining the indeterminateness and plasticity of compassion Wong once says that “the sort of feeling we currently direct to the child [about to fall into a well] is directable towards the homeless person”,\textsuperscript{38} and Wong also tries to support his idea by interpreting Mengzi’s dichotomy of \textit{zhì} 志 (“aims” or “directions of the mind”) and \textit{qì} 氣 (“vital energy”) in his own way.

Let us first look at the original passage from \textit{Mengzi} 2A:2, which contains Mengzi’s explanation of this dichotomy:

\begin{quote}
The will is the commander of \textit{qì} 氣, and \textit{qì} is what fills up the body. Wherever the will arrives, \textit{qì} sets up camp there. So it is said, “Maintain your will, but do not abuse your \textit{qì}.” [Gōngsūn Chǒu 公孙丑 asked,] “Having already said, ‘Wherever the will arrives, \textit{qì} sets up camp there,’ why do you also say, ‘Maintain your will, but do not abuse your \textit{qì}?’” [Mengzi] said, “When your will is unified, it can move your \textit{qì}; and if your \textit{qì} is unified, it can move your will. Now [such events or activities as] stumbling or running have to do with \textit{qì}, but yet they [can] perturb one’s mind.” [Gōngsūn Chǒu 公孙丑 asked,] “May I ask wherein you excel?” [Mengzi] said, “I am good at understanding [people’s] speech, and I nurture my flood-like \textit{qì} well.”...\textsuperscript{39}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 196. Emphasis is mine.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., p. 193. Emphasis is original.
\textsuperscript{39} “‘夫志，氣之帥也；氣，體之充也。夫志至焉，氣次焉；故曰：‘持其志，無暴其氣。’” 既曰，“志至焉，氣次焉。”又曰，“持其志，無暴其氣’者，何也？”曰：‘志壹則動氣，氣壹則動志也。今夫蹶者趨者，足而反動其心。’‘敢問夫子惡乎長？’曰：‘我知言，我善養吾浩然之氣。’”... \textit{Mengzi} 2A:2. In translating this passage, I have consulted Van Norden’s translation in \textit{Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy}, pp. 122–123.
What I translated as “will” in this passage is originally “zhì 志,” and in Mengzi it often refers to specific aims or directions of the mind rather than the general faculty of volition. From Mengzi’s saying that when unified it can move qi 氣 that is responsible for the movement of one’s body, though, we could also see that in the context of moral action zhì 志 might be concerned with one’s ethical judgment and provides a relevant kind of motivation for moral action. On the other hand, from Mengzi’s saying that qi fills up the body and follows wherever one’s will is directed, qi in Mengzi seems to be some sort of material force or energy that constitutes one’s body and is responsible for its movement. However, Mengzi also mentions a special kind of qi (i.e. flood-like qi or hào rán zhī qi 浩然之氣), and we have seen in the previous chapter that it is a kind of moral energy and grows by accumulating righteous deeds over a long period of time. Now, what concerns us about Wong’s interpretation of this passage is that he seems to consider zhì, aims or directions of the mind, to involve the determination of the intentional object of feeling in non-paradigmatic situations, and qi, “material force” or “energy,” to be equivalent to emotions or feelings whose intentional objects are not yet formed.40 Wong says:

*It is through a certain kind of focusing on situational features such as the suffering of the King’s subjects, through further determination of the intentional object of feeling, that the heart-mind “aims” the energy of feeling that is constituted by qi, but on the other hand, its aim would accomplish no movement were it not for the momentum provided by qi.* 41

It is clear in this remark that Wong departs from his initial view of emotions in Mengzi as a special kind of perception of the salient features of certain situations and starts to view them primarily as some sort of motivational energy that can be directed toward any actions once the intentional objects of those emotions are identified. However, this not only reveals that Wong fails to keep a consistent view of emotions throughout his interpretation of Mengzian extension of emotions, but also shows that now his changed view of Mengzian emotions as some sort of motivational energy highly resembles Im’s hydraulic view of emotions in Mengzi, and faces similar theoretical problems that the emotive extension interpretation needs to explain. That is, by conflating two views of

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41 Ibid., p. 194.
emotion as some sort of perception or construal on one hand and as a kind of continuum of motivational energy on the other, Wong blurs the important distinction between emotion and desire in Mengzi and fails to maintain that Mengzian emotions are primarily spontaneous responses to things that stimulate one’s emotional sensibility rather than standing desires with unidentified objects that can be directed at any things by focusing attention on those objects.

In short, although having been proposed as an alternative interpretation to overcome the theoretical flaws of the logical extension and emotive extension interpretations, Wong’s developmental interpretation of Mengzian extension rather turns out to be an eclectic mixture of the other two interpretations, and doubly vulnerable to the same kinds of problems that plague its rival interpretations.

Then, what is the correct interpretation of Mengzi’s emotional extension? This is the question that I ultimately turn to in the final section of this chapter. However, before doing so, I would like to provide a broad overview of the ancient Chinese intellectual history in which the ethical ideal of spontaneous moral action based on proper emotions emerged and a primitive form of Mengzi’s question of how to achieve such an ideal by cultivating one’s emotions was first formulated. Specifically, I discuss the position of two primary ancient Chinese thinkers, Kongzi and Mòzǐ, on the relationship between their universalistic ethic and certain emotions like compassion and familial affection, hoping to show what the place of Mengzi’s view of emotional extension is in the broader context of the ancient Chinese intellectual discourse on ethics and emotions.

6.2 Familial Affection, Impartial Care, and The Cultivation of Rén 仁

In the first section of chapter 3, I have distinguished three senses of ài 爱 from Kongzi’s usage of the term in the Analects: 1) the feeling of affection or the affective bond between closely related people such as family members, relatives, lovers, and friends; 2) a loving or caring attitude that one consciously adopts for those who are relatively toward the outside of the concentric circles of people’s relationship to oneself; and 3) some sort of caring about animals or even inanimate things such as rituals, which would remain
around the farthest of these concentric circles. However, as I have briefly discussed at the end of Section 3.1 above, what I distinguished as three senses of ài could be just one meaning with various shades from the linguist’s point of view. Think about the word “enjoy.” When we hear someone saying “Sue enjoys this book,” we will naturally think that Sue enjoys reading the book. However, if Sue turns out to be a goat, then we will now think that Sue enjoys eating the book. Does this imply that “enjoy” has two meanings, viz. feeling pleasure in reading and feeling pleasure in eating? This is an untenable position, one might say, because one can also enjoy good music, walking in the mountain trail, and helping out sick people. Then, are there five meanings of “enjoy”? No. The right position should be that “enjoy” has just one meaning, but it is interpreted differently depending on which circumstances it is used in and what kinds of objects it takes.42

Then, it could be the case that the three senses of ài distinguished above share some core meaning—perhaps some sort of caring for valuable objects—that is expressed in different degrees for different objects. Moreover, if Mòzi’s theory of “impartial care” (jiān’ài 兼愛) or Mengzi’s theory of extending (tuī 推) moral emotions had been each an attempt to challenge or improve Kongzi’s ethical view of ài, we could also expect their theories to contain some tendency to understand Kongzi’s ài in a reductionistic way. However, ancient Greek distinguished at least three kinds of love and gave each of them a different name: 1) eros for a passionate, often sexual desire for one’s beloved; 2) agape for God’s unconditional love for us human beings and our love for God primarily in the Christian tradition; and 3) philia for affectionate regard or friendly feeling for one’s friends, family members, business partners, and one’s country.43 And in English, we often say such things as 1) “I love working with young philosophers,” 2) “I love my mother,” or even 3) “I love your haircut,” and arguably what are meant by “love” in these three cases are significantly different from each other. Given these linguistic phenomena, it could be merely an accident that Kongzi had only one word “ài” to refer to what I have distinguished earlier as three kinds of “love” or “care,” and it could be also the case that

42 William H. Baxter pointed this out to me in a conversation on 4/28/06.
when used for different kinds of objects, ài accordingly refer to different types of “love” or “care.”

But why care so much about the difference? As will be shown below, Kongzi’s complex view of ài, which makes a crucial component of Kongzi’s conception of humaneness (rén 仁), has been more or less neglected despite its great contribution to the later development in theories of moral action and moral cultivation. Specifically, previous scholars have viewed Kongzi’s conception of ài mainly through the lens of Mengzi’s doctrine of “graded love,” and did not pay enough attention to Kongzi’s significant influence on Mòzi’s theory of “impartial care” (jiān’ài 兼愛). Moreover, having understood Kongzi’s conception of ài only in terms of Mengzi’s partialistic proposal of graded love, previous scholars have failed to see an important theoretical tension between Mengzi’s doctrine of graded love and his universalistic tendency expressed in his recommendation gradually to broaden the boundary of one’s compassion. As I see it, this tension in Mengzi’s ethical theory parallels the tension among Kongzi’s three senses of ài—especially between his conceptions of familial affection and universal caring attitude, and examining the way Mengzi resolves this tension will provide us with an important clue to the correct view of Mengzi’s theory of emotional extension.

In Section 6.2.1 below, I discuss how Kongzi’s first two senses of ài—viz. familial affection and universal caring—are respectively related with sorrow at the misfortune of those close to oneself and one’s general sympathy for the misfortune of others, making a special effort to refute a recent attempt to assimilate Kongzi’s conception of ài (or rén 仁 by extension) to Nel Noddings’s partialistic conception of care. By doing so, I try to show that Kongzi’s conception of proper “love” (àì) contains not only partialistic but also universalistic elements, and this raises the important question of how one could go beyond the boundary of one’s natural affection for close people and extend one’s caring attitude to a larger group of people—a question which Kongzi left quite unanswered. Then, in Section 6.2.2, I discuss how the universalistic element of Kongzi’s conception of ài might have influenced Mòzi to propose the thesis of impartial care and his idiosyncratic theory of moral motivation. Specifically, I argue that self-love or one’s desire to promote one’s own interests provides the Mozian agent with a sufficient motivation for practicing impartial care, and basically this is Mòzǐ’s solution to Kongzi’s
unanswered question of how one could have a universalistic caring attitude despite one’s partialistic tendencies. However, Mòzī’s view of impartial care as an attitude that can be adopted without going through any change in emotions or affective cultivation did not satisfy Mengzi, and in the final section of this chapter we will see what Mengzi has to offer for this question.

6.2.1 Familial Affection, Universal Caring, and Kongzi’s Conception of Ài 愛

6.2.1.1 A Partialistic Interpretation of Kongzi’s Ài 愛

Recently, there have been some attempts to understand the Confucian ethical thought—especially that of Kongzi’s and Mengzi’s reflected in Lunyu and Mengzi—as a kind of care ethics. One of the crucial characteristics of care ethics is its strong particularistic view of ethics. According to the orthodox conception of morality, morality at the most fundamental level “assumes no particular connections between individuals other than equal membership in the moral community,” and morality does not distinguish between what I should do in a certain situation and what any other person should do in a situation like mine. In contrast, care ethics “is concerned with responsibility and responsiveness within relationships.” That is, one’s identity is defined to a large extent by the roles one plays in a complex web of relationships—one is somebody’s parent, somebody’s child, somebody’s spouse, somebody’s colleague or friend and so on, and the type of care one should take for the other is largely determined by what kind of relationship one is in with that other person. However, care ethics does not simply recommend one to care for one’s child, spouse, friend, and so forth in the appropriate manners dictated by one’s roles in these relationships. In other words, my love or concern for my child, spouse, or friend is not for anyone who might happen to be my child, spouse, or friend, but for those particular people who are my child, spouse, or friend. In this sense, the ethical questions in care ethics take strongly particularistic form: “What am I to do to respond adequately

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44 Darwall, *Philosophical Ethics*, p. 220.
45 Ibid., p. 221.
46 Ibid.
to Joan’s need? What is my responsibility to Harold?”

The difference between the contrasting demands of morality and of care ethics is well illustrated in Carol Gilligan’s interpretation of two children’s responses to the following situation: Heinz’s wife is very ill, and she would not survive without an expensive medicine. But Heinz does not have enough money to buy that medicine, and the pharmacist will not lower his price. What should Heinz do? To this question, Jake, an eleven-year-old boy, says that Heinz should steal the medicine, because “human life is worth more than money.” Jake thinks that this issue is “sort of like a math problem with humans”; he thinks that this issue is about “the relative value of life and property” and the solution to this problem can be imposed on any individual in a similar situation. However, Amy, an eleven-year-old girl, proposes a different view: “There might be other ways besides stealing it, like if he could borrow the money..., but he really shouldn’t steal the drug—but his wife shouldn’t die either.” “If he stole the drug,” Amy continues, “he might save his wife then, but if he did, he might have to go to jail, and then his wife might get sicker again...So, they should really just talk it out and find some other way to make the money.” Amy thinks that the issue should be approached from within the web of relationships involving Heinz, his wife, the pharmacist (and any other possibly relevant people), and the solution to this issue should express different forms of care suitable for each of these participants in this web of relationships as particular individuals.

Chenyang Li has argued that Confucian ethics of rén 仁 and feminist ethics of care “share philosophically significant common grounds.” According to Li, Kongzi used the concept of rén in two ways. On one hand, rén refers to “the tender aspect of human feelings and an altruistic concern for others,” but on the other hand rén also

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47 Ibid.
49 Gilligan, In a Different Voice, p. 26, quoted in Darwall, Philosophical Ethics, p. 222.
50 Darwall, Philosophical Ethics, p. 222.
52 Darwall, Philosophical Ethics, p. 222.
54 Ibid., p. 72.
refers to the general virtue that encompasses particular virtues such as respectfulness, tolerance, trustworthiness, generosity, and so forth as its constituents. However, Li emphasizes, in Confucian ethics one cannot attain this general virtue without first cultivating the tender feeling of sympathy, and this aspect of rén as the feeling of sympathy or altruistic concern resembles the concept of care in feminist care ethics.\textsuperscript{55} Furthermore, beyond this initial resemblance, Li also points out that both Confucian ethics of rén and care ethics recommend one to exert caring affection in a graded manner or to a limited number of people. To support this claim on the part of Kongzi, Li provides the following translation of Lunyu 6:30:

*Once [Confucius’] disciple Tzu-kung [Zìgōng] asked him, “If a person confers benefits on the people universally and is able to assist all, what would you say of him? Would you call him a person of Jen [rén 仁]? Confucius said, “Why only a person of Jen? He is without doubt a sage. Even (sage-emperors) Yao and Shun fell short of it.”*\textsuperscript{56}

According to Li’s interpretation, it is only sages who are capable of “universal love.” The highest moral ideal for ordinary people including Kongzi, on the other hand, is rén 仁: caring for people in a graded manner.\textsuperscript{57} Now, Li compares this position to that of care ethics. Li quotes this time Nel Noddings, another influential figure in care ethics:

"My caring is always characterized by a move away from self....I care deeply for those in my inner circles and more lightly for those farther removed from my personal life....The acts performed out of caring vary with both situational conditions and type of relationship....I shall reject the notion of universal love, finding it unattainable in any but the most abstract sense and thus a source of distraction."\textsuperscript{58}

That is, Li reads out of these remarks of Noddings’s a view similar to the Confucian doctrine of “graded love” or “care with gradations” (ài yǒu chādēng 愛有差等), which Mengzi explicitly advocated against Mózī’s doctrine of “universal love” or “impartial

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid. I will argue later that this is not fully the case.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p. 79.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
care” (jiān’ài 兼愛). According to Li, 1) this view of care with gradations provides both Confucian ethics of rén and care ethics with the common ground to explain why human beings are psychologically prone to care for those closely related to themselves more than others, and 2) this view also explains why both the Confucian agent and the “one-caring”—the ideal agent in care ethics (Noddings’s term)—think that those who are closely related to oneself should have a stronger ethical pull than others.

I do not want to participate in the recent debate over whether Confucian ethics is a kind of care ethics or something else, but I agree with Li that the concept of rén and the concept of care as conceived by Noddings have significant philosophical commonality, especially in terms of their shared emphasis on the priority of relations over strangers in some ethical situations. However, I also think that beneath this apparent similarity between “Confucian” ethics and care ethics resides a real distinction. As I see it, “Confucian” ethics, or preferably Kongzi’s ethical position which gets further developed in Mengzi, can be interpreted to provide a more sophisticated ethical position concerning the issue of partiality and justice than what Li suggests by assimilating Kongzi’s position to Noddings’s version of care ethics. And I believe that clarifying Kongzi’s complex position concerning this issue will let us have a better picture of Kongzi’s conception of ài 愛, which will in turn be more complicated than Li’s view of it only in terms of “care with gradations.”

6.2.1.2 Particularism and Universalism in Kongzi’s Ethics

Noddings’s view of care, which greatly resembles the “Confucian” view of care with gradations, has been exposed to severe criticism for its tendency to promote partiality and

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59 Unlike ‘jiān’ài (“universal love”) which was originally coined by Mózǐ, ‘ài yǒu chādēng’ (“There are gradations in love”) is not Mengzi’s original phrase. It is the Mohist Yí Zhī 義之 who said in Mengzi 3A:5 that “there are no gradations in love, but in applying it [one] starts with one’s parents” (愛無差等，施由親始), and it is based on this remark of Yí Zhī’s that the phrase “ài yǒu chādēng” was coined and ascribed to Mengzi later.

60 Li, “The Confucian Concept of Jen and the Feminist Ethics of Care,” pp. 81–82.

to neglect the demand of justice. For instance, Noddings argues that genuine caring, which has to be for persons in definite relations with the one-caring, involves such phenomena as 1) “engrossment,” 2) “displacement of interest,” and 3) “motivational shift” on the part of the one-caring. According to Noddings, engrossment is a state of mind in which the one-caring “feels with” the person who is cared for (hereafter “the cared-for” following Noddings), receives the cared-for into oneself, and views things through the eyes of the cared-for.\(^6^2\) In this frame of mind, the one-caring is interested not in the reality of oneself but in the reality of the other. The one-caring carefully considers the cared-for’s nature, way of life, needs, and desires, and tries to apprehend the reality of the cared-for as closely as possible.\(^6^3\) Moreover, when the one-caring receives the cared-for’s reality as nearly as possible without evaluation or assessment, the one-caring also feels impelled to act in behalf of the cared-for, as if her act were on behalf of the one-caring herself. The one-caring allows herself to be transformed, adopts the goals of the cared-for as if they were her own, and helps the cared-for realize those goals.\(^6^4\)

Noddings’s example of Ms. A, who would opt to fight on the side of her racist family against the blacks protesting for equal civil rights on the other side of the barricade, clearly shows how the one-caring would self-consciously neglect the demand of justice in order to protect those one loves.\(^6^5\) In this example, Ms. A clearly thinks that her racist father and aunt are wrong, and is “moved to tears”\(^6^6\) by Jim’s (one of Ms. A’s black classmates) eloquent speech on the prevalent injustice and inhumanity against blacks, but if there were a violent clash between whites and blacks, Ms. A would fight to protect her family. Although her gun will not aim at Jim because she also cares for him to some extent, she will definitely shoot other blacks who are less known to her. Noddings argues, Ms. A’s protection of her family at the expense of neglecting justice is “agonized fulfillment,” and there is no ethical diminution committed on the part of Ms. A.\(^6^7\)

We find a similar view in an exchange between Kongzi and the Magistrate of Shè (葉) concerning the proper conception of uprightness: One day, the Magistrate of Shè said

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\(^{6^3}\) Ibid., pp. 14–16.

\(^{6^4}\) Ibid., p. 16 and pp. 33–34.

\(^{6^5}\) Ibid., pp. 109–112.

\(^{6^6}\) Ibid., p. 109.

\(^{6^7}\) Ibid., p. 110.
to Kongzi: “In my district there is a person called ‘upright Gōng.’”68 His father took [another person’s] stray sheep and [this] son bore witness of it.” Kongzi retorted to the magistrate: “The upright people in my village are different from yours. Fathers cover up for their sons, and sons cover up for their fathers. Uprightness resides in such a behavior.”69 In this passage, Kongzi is not merely making a report on how his villagers behave when their fathers or sons infringe upon other people’s property rights: he is actually asserting that their covering up for each other against the law is the right thing to do from the ethical point of view. Kongzi’s emphasis on the importance of family relations is clear here, and it also seems clear that this emphasis on the value of family tends to promote partiality in ethical deliberation as much as Noddings’s version of care ethics would.

However, one who takes Kongzi’s position to be purely partialistic—whether it be Mòzǐ or a contemporary interpreter of Kongzi’s thought70—needs to consider other textual evidence in the Analects with more impartiality. As David Wong has correctly pointed out, Kongzi’s ethical view includes both particularistic and universalistic elements, and “[his view] holds to a thesis of ‘differential pull’ in such a way that everyone has at least some substantial pull as reflected in the idea that certain things are owed to all.”71 For instance, when Zhònggōng (仲弓, a disciple of Kongzi’s) became a steward of the Ji family who were actually ruling the Lǔ duchdom at the time, Kongzi advises him to promote worthy and talented people (“jǔ xiáncái” 擇賢才). In answer to Zhònggōng’s question of how to know all those people and promote them, Kongzi says, “Just promote those whom you know; as for those whom you do not know, would other people pass over them?”72 In this remark, Kongzi is not recommending his disciple to be partial in advancing the interest of those qualified individuals who happen to be close to him. Rather, Kongzi seems to have in mind some sort of political collaboration, in which

68 Gōng (躬) literally means body, and zhígōng (直躬) can mean behaving correctly according to some sort of standard, whether it be moral instructions or legal codes.
69 Lunyu 13:18.
70 Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, pp. 112–113.
72 “舉爾所知，爾所不知，人其舍諸?” Lunyu 13:2.
everyone in the government is supposed to recommend those whom they know very well to be qualified for certain offices.

Let me take another example. The traditional customs (lǐ 礼) of the Zhōu dynasty prohibit marriage within the same clan as a case of incest. And according to the same set of customs, a ruler’s wife was supposed to be addressed officially by her clan name preceded by the name of the country where she came from. So, if the wife belonged to the Jiāng 姜 clan and had grown up in the country of Qí 齊, she was supposed to go by “Qí Jiāng” 齊姜. However, Zhāogōng 昭公 (r. 540–509 B.C.E.), a ruler of the Lǔ dukedom during Kongzi’s time, not only took a wife from his own Jī 姬 clan in the dukedom of Wú 吳, but also addressed her as “Wú Mèngzi” 吳孟子 instead of the correct appellation “Wú Jī” 吳姬, in order to conceal the clan origin of his wife. This means that Zhāogōng violated two important traditional marital customs, and this is why a person named Chén Sībài 陳司败 asked Kongzi whether Zhāogōng understood the Customs. Kongzi, despite knowing very well why he got this question, still took part with Zhāogōng and said “Yes, he understood the Customs.” Having been given a highly unexpected answer, Chén complained to one of Kongzi’s disciples, “I heard that the nobleman is not partial; but is the nobleman partial after all?” And when the disciple informed Kongzi of this, Kongzi said, “I am fortunate; if I make a mistake, other people always notice it.”

What is going on here? In this passage, Kongzi is being partial with the ruler of his country Lǔ, and covers up his ruler’s fault against other people’s criticism. This passage nicely parallels Lunyu 13:18, in which Kongzi said that uprightness resides in fathers and sons covering up each other against the law. The relationship between the ruler and the subject and that between the father and the son are among the most important human relationships in Confucian tradition, and just as the father and the son cover up each other’s mistake, so the ruler and his subject should act in the same way to some extent. So far, Kongzi’s agent does not seem to act very differently from Noddings’s Ms. A, who chooses to stand on the side of her racist family despite knowing

73 “陳司敗問昭公知禮乎，孔子曰：‘知禮。’ 孔子退，揖巫馬期而進之，曰：‘吾聞君子不黨，君子亦黨乎？君取於吳，為同姓，謂之吳孟子。君而知禮，孰不知禮？’ 巫馬期以告。子曰：‘丘也幸；苟有過，人必知之。’” Lunyu 7:31.
that they are wrong. Moreover, just as Noddings’s Ms. A believes that there is no ethical diminution committed in her taking part with her racist family against the demand of justice, Kongzī argues that covering up one’s father or son against the law is an ethically right thing to do.

However, the parallel—both between Kongzī’s and Noddings’s agents and between Lunyu 13:18 and Lunyu 7:31—ends there. On one hand, unlike Noddings’s Ms. A, Kongzī in the episode of Lunyu 7:31 confesses that his covering up Zhāogōng’s misdeed was wrong. Most likely, Kongzī might have thought that his ruler’s incest and the ruler’s subsequent effort to conceal his misdeed were not only shameful in themselves but also harmful to realizing Kongzī’s vision of the ideal society, considering the ruler’s utmost importance as the ethical role-model for everyone in the country. In other words, if the ruler of a country committed incest and tried to avoid criticism by the means that only made his incest more conspicuous and shameful, what could Kongzī expect of the others? Then, why did Kongzī say to Chén Sībǎi that Zhāogōng understood the spirit of the Li? Kongzī might have thought, I would submit, that although Zhāogōng was wrong and shameless in violating important social customs, it was also wrong for Kongzī to admit his ruler’s misdeed and criticize it openly. It was not courteous, and therefore not right, to be that harsh to one’s ruler, and fortunately enough, everyone still knew that Zhāogōng was wrong despite Kongzī’s saying otherwise.

Applying this interpretation of Lunyu 7:31 to Lunyu 13:18, we come to see the new interpretive possibility that Kongzī’s conception of uprightness in Lunyu 13:18 is not an absolute one. In other words, as in Lunyu 7:31, Kongzī’s thought might have been that although every individual’s or every group’s property rights should be well protected in a good society, it should not be so strictly protected that it spoils people’s familial love and consequently hinders them from maintaining good familial relationships. As in the case of Lunyu 7:31 and 13:2, then, Kongzī was not recommending in this passage to promote the interest of one’s family at the expense of others actively and voluntarily. Kongzī’s message was rather that the affective bond between family members is so important that it can sometimes make the Kongzīian agent fail to respect other people’s property rights fully, as in the case of those in Kongzī’s village.
However, one might argue: “The person whose lamb went astray and got taken by my father is also someone’s father and someone’s son. And even if I failed to report my father’s appropriation of the lamb because I cannot bear to see my father arrested and suffering in the prison, my failure to report my father’s dishonesty still works against the interest of this other family while promoting my family’s interest. Moreover, even if we grant that my failure to report my father’s crime is forgivable as long as it was not driven by my desire for material benefit but by my compassion for my father’s prospective misery, Kongzi is not free from the so-called collective action problem or coordination problem. That is, if it were all right for me to cover up for my father due to my compassion for him, the same kind of act must be all right for everyone in a similar situation. However, where is justice or the protection of individual property rights if everyone hid a person like my father in their houses? Kongzi cannot solve this collective action problem, and his purported concern for justice can be no more than lip service.”

Mòzǐ argued against Kongzi’s followers of his time in a similar way. And it is possible that some of Kongzi’s theoretical descendants or some members of the broad rú group held such a partialistic view. However, I do not think that Kongzi’s ethical view implied in Lunyu 13:18 is vulnerable to this argument. For when Kongzi’s villagers fail to respect their neighbor’s property rights, they would do so not because they are interested in their neighbor’s goods, but because they do not want their family members to be hurt. Moreover, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the nobleman—Kongzi’s ideal agent—does not want to pursue wealth by improper means. This means that Kongzi’s villagers, representing Kongzi’s agent with sufficient moral integrity, would do their best to compensate for their neighbor’s material loss, once they have made sure that their family members are secure and well.

This speculation of mine is actually supported by the other two passages discussed above: In Lunyu 7:31, Kongzi says it is fortunate that other people always notice his mistake. As I see it, this remark of Kongzi’s implies that Kongzi feels guilty about his relational situation which forces him to take the part of his debased ruler, and Kongzi hopes that his intentional misrepresentation of his bad ruler does not mislead

74 For example, see Mòzǐ 墨子, “Jiān’ái xià” 兼愛下. Sūn Yìràng 孫詒讓, Mòzǐ xiángǔ 墨子閒詁 (Běijīng 北京: Zhōnghuá shùjú 中華書局, 2001), pp. 117–118.
others. And in *Lunyu* 13:18, Kongzi says that promoting one’s well-qualified acquaintances would not make a case of partiality in a political environment where everyone is expected to do the same thing. In such an environment, the best way to promote the public good is actually to select the best qualified people among one’s acquaintances impartially. In short, I think that Kongzi’s ethical position reflected in the three *Lunyu* passages discussed above—*Lunyu* 7:31, 13:2, and 13:18—is not purely partialistic but a hybrid one, in which particularistic concerns for one’s relations play an important role but are also restricted in important ways by universalistic concerns for human beings in general.

So far, I have discussed three *Lunyu* passages, some of which are sometimes quoted as evidence of Kongzi’s promoting partiality in ethical situations, and I have argued that the particularistic concerns in those passages are not emphasized out of proportion to the importance of universalistic or impartial concerns in the background. Now, before closing this section, I would like to consider one more passage that emphasizes universalistic concerns directly. Ironically, it is *Lunyu* 6:30, which Chenyang Li presented above as evidence of “love with gradations” or a partialistic concern in Kongzi’s thought. Look at the translation of the passage above more closely. Even in Li’s translation, it is clear that both Zigòng and Kongzi are not concerned with an ideal person’s psychological attitude toward other people but the consequence of his altruistic action. In other words, the message of the passage is that willing to benefit other people is not as difficult as actually benefiting them, because successfully benefiting others partly depends on external conditions that are not under the full control of a perfectly altruistic person; and this is exactly the reason why the ancient sage kings Yáo and Shùn would have found it a difficult goal to achieve. Moreover, in the same passage Kongzi also says the following:

Rén 仁 is this: If you want a position [in the government], then help others have such positions; if you want to have a successful political career, then help others build such careers. [If you] could take analogy from what is near, it can be called a method of rén 仁.  

75 “夫仁者, 己欲立而立人, 己欲達而達人. 能近取譬, 可謂仁之方也已.” *Lunyu* 6:30. I discuss this passage in detail in Chapter 3.
This is a Kongzian version of the golden rule, which recommends helping others achieve what you would want for yourself. Kongzi does not make any stipulation here that you should help others only after having secured enough for yourself. Rather, the message of this dictum seems to be that if you and other people pursue the same thing, you should help others have it first. And it is clear that the spirit of this dictum is not that of “love with gradations.”

6.2.1.3 Familial Affection and Sympathy: Two Main Components of Kongzi’s Ài 愛

I think that those scholars who emphasize the importance of particularistic concerns in Confucian ethics make a common mistake. Their observation of the strong particularistic—and therefore to some extent partialistic—tendency in Confucian ethics is correct, but they make a wrong assumption that 1) Kongzi’s moral ideal of rén 仁 is solely based on the idea of graded love, and 2) it is from this idea that the strong particularistic tendency of Confucian ethics derives. For example, although having actually said that Kongzi’s rén refers to “the tender aspect of human feelings and an altruistic concern for others” (or just “sympathy” for short), 76 Li does not forget to add that “Confucius and Mencius believed that a person practicing Jen (rén) should start from one’s parents and siblings and then extend to other people….In other words, although one should love both his father and a stranger, he should love his father first and more than the stranger.” 77 In addition, David Wong thinks that although containing both particularistic and universalistic elements, Confucian ethics is still dominantly particularistic, and that “the Confucian emphasis on the importance of [one’s] ties to particular others seems to work against the claim that love can be extended to all in any reliable way.” 78 In other words, he argues that “[w]e may accept the Confucian argument that we cannot do without these particular loyalties, but not the Confucian assurance that these loyalties will reliably grow into love for all under a set of practically possible institutions and given human nature as it is.” 79 In short, Li thinks that Kongzi’s

76 Li, “The Confucian Concept of Jen and the Feminist Ethics of Care,” p. 72.
77 Ibid., p. 79.
79 Ibid.
conception of 仁 is characterized by loving people in a graded manner, and Wong thinks that Kongzi’s love is partialistic by nature.

However, from the perspective of the historian of Chinese philosophy, it is anachronistic to think that Kongzi’s moral ideal of 仁 is solely based on the idea of graded love, and it is not careful enough to think that Kongzi’s love is by nature partialistic and is unlikely to evolve into universal love. First, Mengzi’s idea of graded love or love with gradations is a sophisticated philosophical response to the Mohist Yí Zhī’s 夷之 idea of “universal love.” Basically, Yí Zhī’s idea of universal love is that there are no gradations in one’s love for human beings, although its application starts from one’s parents.80 In other words, according to Yí Zhī’s view, one can love one’s neighbor’s child as much as he loves his brother’s child.81 However, Mengzi thinks that this is wrong; he thinks that one cannot—and therefore to some extent should not—love one’s neighbor’s child as much as his brother’s child, and this is the reason why Mengzi criticizes Yí Zhī’s idea of non-graded love. In short, insofar as Mengzi’s idea of graded love is a response to Yí Zhī’s proposal of non-graded love, it is anachronistic to ascribe this idea to Kongzi’s conception of 愛, which constitutes the basis of his conception of 仁.

Second, one might think it plausible that although Kongzi did not actually propose the doctrine of graded love, 1) Kongzi’s conception of 愛 and 仁 were already particularistic by nature; 2) it stimulated Mòzī to propose an alternative doctrine of “impartial care” (兼愛); 3) Mòzī’s doctrine of “impartial care” developed into the later Mohist Yí Zhī’s doctrine of “universal love” or “non-graded love”; and 4) Mengzi criticized this doctrine of Yí Zhī’s by proposing the doctrine of graded love. Interpreted this way, Mengzi’s idea of graded love was not a new idea at all. Although having gotten redressed and theoretically more sophisticated, it was Kongzi’s old idea of partialistic love that Mengzi tried to advocate. However, there is not much textual evidence for this position. Advocates of this position often cite such passages as Lunyu 13:18, but I have already argued that such passages do not actually show that Kongzi

81 “人之親其兄之子為若親其鄰之赤子.” Ibid.
advocated a purely particularistic ethic. On the contrary, I argued, even such seemingly particularistic passages show the importance of universalistic concerns in Kongzi’s ethical thought.

Moreover, in Chapter 3 (especially Sections 3.1 and 3.2) I have distinguished three different senses of ài 愛 and two senses of āi 哀 in the Analects. I have argued that ài 愛 is used in the Analects as (1) one’s natural affection for close people, (2) one’s caring attitude for virtually everyone that goes beyond one’s natural boundary of affection, and (3) some sort of valuing, which may be sometimes expressed as stinginess. On the other hand, I have shown that āi 哀 is mainly used in the Analects and the Zūozhuàn as (1) one’s feeling of sorrow at the loss of close people and (2) the feeling of sympathy or pity for the misfortune or suffering of others. As I see it, the first and the second entries of each list match not only with each other but also with the particularistic and the universalistic concerns that I have identified in the previous section (6.2.1.2). In other words: on the one hand, one’s natural affection for close people tends to be expressed as the feeling of sorrow when misfortune befalls them, and such emotions or attitudes are expressions of one’s particularistic concerns; on the other hand, one’s caring attitude for virtually everyone is related with one’s feeling of sympathy for the suffering of others, and this shows that one has some universalistic concerns too. And I think that the importance of the latter group—viz. one’s universal caring attitude, sympathy, and universalistic concerns—in Kongzi’s ethical thought shows that Kongzi’s conception of love (ài 愛) is not purely partialistic by nature.

At this point, concerning the relationship between the emotions of ài 愛 and āi 哀, we are reminded of Rawls’s conception of attitude that I introduced in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1.3). As I briefly summarized there, Rawls proposes that an attitude is a set of ordered families of dispositions, and that love is a good example of such an attitude. According to him, love consists of a set of dispositions such as the disposition to feel joy at the presence of the person one loves, and the disposition to feel sorrow when one’s loved one suffers. According to this view, we have the following parallel pictures of the relationship between the two components of Kongzi’s ài 愛 and āi 哀: (1) On one hand, one’s natural affection for close people, a constituent of Kongzi’s ài 愛, contains a
disposition to be expressed as sorrow (āi 哀) in a sorrowful situation, and this disposition is actualized as the emotional response of sorrow at the loss of close people or in a similar situation. (2) On the other hand, one’s universal caring attitude, another constituent of Kongzi’s ài 愛, involves one’s sympathetic concern for others that tends to respond to the suffering of others, and this tendency is actualized as the feeling of pity or sympathy (āi 哀) in a relevant situation.

However, whereas one’s natural affection for close people seems to involve necessarily the disposition to feel sorrow when misfortune befalls those one holds dear, one’s universal caring attitude does not have to be the kind of concern that necessarily involves sympathy at the suffering of others. For unlike the natural affection for close people which is quite spontaneous and well-grounded in human nature, the attitude of universal caring is more or less what one consciously adopts, and one’s sympathetic concern for others is not the only reason that one adopts such an attitude. For example, one might want to treat others as one would treat oneself, thinking somewhat abstractly that doing so will make the world a much better place to live, or one might adopt such an attitude believing that treating everyone equally, including oneself, would be most beneficial to oneself eventually. In short, in so far as one adopts the attitude of universal caring only because of these abstract or somewhat selfish reasons, sympathy or sympathetic concern does not ground one’s universal caring attitude. Apparently, though, this is not the case for Kongzi. For as we have seen previously in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2), the feeling of pity or sympathy at the suffering of others is an important ethical emotion for the Confucian nobleman to have, and probably the nobleman’s universal caring attitude is in large part grounded in his sympathy.

6.2.2 Self-Love and Impartial Care in the Mòzǐ

6.2.2.1 From Kongzi’s Ài rén 愛人 to Mòzǐ’s Jiān’ài 兼愛

Although pity or sympathy (āi 哀) is an important ethical emotion in the Analects that

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82 Darwall, Philosophical Ethics, p. 225.
provides the affective foundation for the nobleman’s universal caring attitude, it is also true that Kongzi and his immediate disciples never clearly pointed out the close relationship between their doctrine of “ài rén” or universal caring and the feeling of sympathy at the misfortune of others. Moreover, as we have seen in Chapter 3, Kongzi frequently emphasized one’s natural affection for family members and other relations as a crucial constituent of the nobleman’s virtuous character. In this circumstance, it might have remained quite vague to Kongzi’s followers and other contemporary intellectuals how one could go beyond the boundary of one’s natural affection for close people and extend one’s caring attitude to those outside one’s circle of closely related people. More specifically, Kongzi sometimes recommends the principle of “shù” —“Do not do to others what you do not want them to inflict upon yourself,” or “Treat others as you want them to treat yourself”—as a crucial component of the highest Confucian moral ideal rén (“humaneness”). However, in the *Analects* we do not find any clear explanation of how one could enact this principle, specifically whether enacting this dictum involves going against or placing constraints on one’s natural affection for close people, or whether something in one’s psychological make-up—e.g. one’s disposition to feel sympathy at the suffering of others—facilitates one’s treating others as one treats oneself.  

In the history of Chinese philosophy, we find the first reflective and highly systematic effort to answer this question in the *Mòzǐ*. According to Mòzǐ, the source of social disorder is individuals’ ideological differences and mutual hostility (bù xiāng ài  不相愛) between individuals, families, and countries. As Mòzǐ sees it, the reason why all levels of social entities try to harm each other is their factionalist tendency to promote their interests at the expense of others, and this tendency is supported by their belief that factionalism (bié 別) is the best way to advance their interests. The most explicit and self-conscious defense of such a factionalist tendency can be found in Wūmǎzǐ’s remark to Mòzǐ:

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83 For further discussion of this matter, see Section 2.2.2.3 of Chapter 2 above.
I am different from you; I am not capable of impartial care. I love people from Zōu 鄒 more than people from Yuè 越, love people from Lǔ 魯 more than people from Zōu, love those in my hometown more than people from Lǔ, love my family members more than those in my hometown, love my parents more than my [other] family members, and love myself more than my parents; this is because [the former] is closer to me [than the latter in each case]. If I were hit, I would feel pain, but if others were hit, I would not feel any pain. Why shall I not remove my source of pain but remove what I do not suffer at all? Therefore, I adopt [the policy of] “benefit myself by killing others;” but not [the policy of] “benefit others by killing myself.”

Mòzǐ’s alternative to this factionalist position is “impartial care” (jiǎn’ài 兼愛). According to him, one can enact impartial care by “regarding (shì 視) another country as if it were one’s own country, regarding another family as if it were one’s own family, and regarding another person as if he or she were oneself,” and in the “Jiǎn’ài xià” 兼愛下 chapter Mòzǐ recommends to care about (wèi 為) another country, another city, and another family as much as one cares about one’s own country, one’s own city, and one’s own family. As Graham has well pointed out, although including the character “ài 爱” which is often translated as “love” and which I have partly rendered above as one’s natural affection for close people, Mòzǐ’s jiǎn’ài 兼愛 has little to do with the warmth of the sentiment of love. As Graham said, “[Mòzǐ] uses ài as we use ‘love’ when talking of ‘self-love,’ which is concern for oneself; jiǎn’ài is being as much concerned for one person as for another…. [O]ne has the impression that Mohists were not people with warm sympathies towards everyone, but people whose personal affections [were] disciplined by a stern sense of justice.”

According to Sīmǎ Qiān’s 司馬遷 “Zhòngní dìzǐ lièzhuàn” 仲尼弟子列傳 (Biographies of Kongzi’s Disciples), Kongzi had a disciple named Wūmǎ Shī 巫馬施.

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90 Sīmǎ Qiān 司馬遷, Shìjì 史記, p. 2218.
and Zhèng Xuán 鄭玄 (127–200 C.E.) said that Wūmǎ Shī was from Lǔ 魯 dukedom.\(^{91}\)

In addition, in the previous quotation Wūmǎzǐ 巫馬子 expresses greatest loyalty to the people of Lǔ among the peoples from various regions of China. Based on these facts, Wūmǎzǐ 巫馬子 in this Mòzǐ passage has been traditionally regarded as the Wūmǎ Shī 巫馬施 mentioned in Sīmā Qiān’s “Biographies” or at least his son,\(^{92}\) and the partialistic doctrine presented by Wūmǎzǐ has usually been ascribed to the “Confucians.” However, Mòzǐ’s doctrine of impartial care explicated as “regarding another country as if it were one’s own country, regarding another family as if it were one’s own family, and regarding another person as if he or she were oneself” has stronger affinity with the universal caring attitude contained in Kongzi’s recommendation of ài rén 愛人 or his principle of shù 恕 than with Wūmǎzǐ’s extremely egoistic position that puts oneself even before one’s parents. Moreover, at one place Mòzǐ explicates his doctrine of jiān’ài 兼愛 in terms of serving other people before taking care of oneself,\(^{93}\) and Kongzi sometimes explains his conception of virtue (dé 德) or humaneness (rén 仁) in terms of engaging in a difficult service for others first and thinking about the reward from it afterwards.\(^{94}\)

In this light, despite all of the differences in important theoretical details between Confucianism and Mohism that we will examine in the following, Mòzǐ’s proposal of jiān’ài 兼愛 and his philosophical argumentation against the partialistic thinkers of his time can be considered to inherit an important part of Kongzi’s conception of ài 愛, and to be an important theoretical effort to answer the question Kongzi left unsolved: How can one go beyond the boundary of one’s natural affection for close people and extend one’s caring attitude to a larger group of people? When put this way, the question sounds as if asking what kind of moral cultivation is required for one to overcome one’s partialistic tendencies and serve the common good of human beings in general. However, Mòzǐ would have taken this question differently, because he seems to believe that rational, persuasive arguments clearly showing where one’s greatest and securest benefit lies can

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91 Ibid.
change people’s pattern of behavior successfully without changing their basic desiderative structure or their evaluative judgment of what things are worth pursuing. For example, Mòzǐ provides the following argument against Wūmázi’s partialistic position that we have seen above:

Master Mòzǐ said, “Are you going to conceal your thesis, or preach it to other people?” Master Wūmá said, “Why would I conceal my thesis? I will preach it to others.” Master Mòzǐ said, “Then, if one person were pleased [i.e. persuaded] by you, one person would want to benefit himself by killing you; if ten persons were pleased by you, ten persons would want to benefit themselves by killing you; if the whole world were pleased by you, all in the world would want to benefit themselves by killing you. [On the other hand, if] one person were not pleased by you, one person would want to kill you thinking that you are distributing inauspicious words; if ten persons were not pleased by you, ten persons would want to kill you thinking that you are distributing inauspicious words; if the whole world were not pleased by you, all in the world would want to kill you thinking that you are distributing inauspicious words. If they were pleased by you, they would want to kill you; if they were not pleased by you, they would also want to kill you...What does your doctrine benefit? If you insist on preaching without benefiting anything, it is wasting [your] words.”

This argument aims to show that adopting a partialistic policy does not help promote one’s benefit; on the contrary, it works against advancing one’s interests, and any rational agent would not adopt a policy that tends to bring about harm rather than benefit. Besides this negative argument, Mòzǐ also provides a positive argument for the benefit of enacting impartial care:

Let us suppose that there are two officers, one holding to partiality and the other to impartiality. [Now,] the partialistic officer would say, “How can I care about my friend as if caring about myself, and care about my friend’s parents as if caring about my parents?” Consequently, when off-duty, he treats his friend [by] not feeding him when starving, not clothing him when cold, not taking care of him when ill, and not burying him when dead. Such are the partialistic officer’s words, and such his actions. [On the other hand,] the words and actions of the impartial officer are different. He would say, “I heard that the noble officer of the world definitely cares about his friend as if caring

about himself, and cares about his friend’s parents as if caring about his parents; it is only after [acting so] that one becomes a noble officer of the world.” So, when off-duty, he treats his friend by feeding him when starving, clothing him when cold, taking care of him when ill, and burying him when dead. Such are the impartial officer’s words, and such his actions. So, these two officers disagree with each other in words, and oppose each other in actions. Let us also suppose that these officers are determined to keep their words and carry through their actions, so that their words and actions match like two parts of a tally, and there are no words but realized in actions.

Then, let me ask: Now, there is a great plain here, and an officer in armor and helmet is about to go for a battle, but the odds of life and death are unknown yet. Or, he is setting out on a distant mission as an emissary of his ruler to such countries as Bā, Yuè, Qi, or Jīng, but whether he could return is not clear. Then, let me ask, whom of our two officers shall he follow? If he is to ask somebody to support his parents and take care of his children and wife, shall it be his impartial friend or partialistic friend? I think that in the case like this, there is no foolish man or foolish woman in the world. Even one criticizing impartiality will definitely think it right to entrust his family to an impartial person. This is the case where one condemns impartiality in words but adopts it when making a choice [for oneself]—words and deeds miss each other here.96

In this argument, Mòzǐ points out that the benefit of impartial care is recognized and approved even by the adamant advocate of a partialistic policy; it is nothing else than his partialistic concern for himself and his family members that makes him break from his partialist position and entrust his family members to a person of impartiality.

6.2.2.2 Was Mòzǐ a Voluntarist?

At this point, I would like to examine what might be going on in the partialist’s mind when he changes his policy after being exposed to Mòzǐ’s arguments. Specifically, concerning some of David S. Nivison’s ideas on this topic, I would like to discuss 1) what psychological resources are called on for the partialist to change his policy, and 2)

whether the partialist’s adopting the doctrine of jiān’ài 兼愛 also involves any change in his affections or emotions. As will become clear in the following, clarifying these issues is crucial for assessing whether Mòzǐ’s solution to Kongzi’s unsolved problem—viz. how one could go beyond the boundary of one’s natural affection for close people and extend one’s caring attitude to a larger group of people—was successful or not.

In his “Philosophical Voluntarism in Fourth-Century China,” Nivison characterizes Mòzǐ as a radical voluntarist. Although Nivison does not provide any clear definition of “voluntarism,” we can have a good sense of it from his following remarks:

Mòzǐ appeared to think...that if you can get people to follow a properly constructed argument implying that it would be in their rational interest for them to have certain affections (and beliefs, for that matter), then they will conclude that they should have those affections, and can at that point if they will (and they are simply perverse if they don’t) proceed to adopt them, just as they might decide, on persuasion, to move their limbs. It is usually said of Mòzǐ’s “universal love” (jiān’ài 兼愛) that it is not “love” at all, but merely cold self-interest....Mòzǐ is surely not to be recommended as a philosopher with a deep understanding of love. But it is possible to read him as intending that his universal love really be an affection, and not just a stance.97

Nivison is making two points here. First, he ascribes to Mòzǐ the view that one can adopt certain beliefs or affections at will, if he decides to do so. Second, he argues that when one approves the doctrine of jiān’ài 兼愛 (“universal love” in Nivison’s terms) and decides to act upon it, one’s affective attitude towards other people drastically changes, say, from indifference to affective caring. As the reader might think now, these are strange views, and I will shortly argue that Nivison does not need to ascribe these views to Mòzǐ. But first, why does Nivison want to ascribe these views to Mòzǐ? He says:

[A]t this level of Mohist thinking there is not yet a sensitivity to distinctions that analysis makes for some of the rest of us: between (a) doing something as “right,” i.e., identified by reason as useful and prudent; (b) doing something recognized as “really” right, i.e., dictated by morality (whether useful and prudent or not); and (c) doing it with the inner feeling that it just is the thing to do, a feeling that makes it the natural thing to do. Then a decision to do something under its first representation here would seem to carry along

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with it the appropriate disposition.\(^\text{98}\)

That is, according to Nivison, Mòzǐ did not clearly distinguish between three reasons or motivations for doing something—i.e. (a) doing it because it is useful, (b) doing it because it is moral, and (c) doing it with the relevant moral dispositions or feelings, and consequently ended up arguing that once one is persuaded that doing something is useful, one is also persuaded that doing it is also morally right, and one can generate the relevant affective motivation for that action in one’s mind if one decides to do so. Interpreting Mòzǐ this way, Nivison anticipates Mencius’ purportedly more perceptive observation of the human mind (xīn 心) a century later: in *Mencius* 1A:7, “Mencius carefully shows the king that he really has in himself all the time the disposition needed to be really kind. [In contrast,] Mòzǐ merely tells people like King Xuan, ‘you can practice universal love. The six Sage Kings did it.’ For him, all you have to do is make up your mind to do it, and there’s no further problem.”\(^\text{99}\)

However, I think that this is not the right picture to ascribe to Mòzǐ. I would like to refute Nivison’s second thesis first by providing three arguments. First, in agreement with several previous scholars,\(^\text{100}\) I think that the concept of ài 愛 in Mòzǐ’s term “jiān’ài 兼愛 does not have any affective or emotional aspect. As Graham has originally pointed out,\(^\text{101}\) it is not just that Mòzǐ did not recommend love as an emotion; he distrusted emotions and recommended to eradicate all of them:

*Make sure to eradicate six [types of] outrageousness. Think when silent, teach when speaking, and work when moving. [If you can] get these three to alternate [continuously, you will] definitely become a sage. Make sure to eradicate joy, anger, pleasure, sorrow, love, [and hatred], and practice humaneness and righteousness. [If you can make your] hands, feet, mouth, nose, and ears act on righteousness, [you will] definitely become a sage.*\(^\text{102}\)

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\(^{98}\) Nivison, “Philosophical Voluntarism in Fourth-Century China,” p. 131.

\(^{99}\) Ibid.


The term that Mòzǐ uses in this passage to label six emotions is “bì” (辟 (“to avoid”)), and Sūn Yíràng glosses that “bì” here stands for “pì” (僻. “Pì” usually means ‘outrageous,’ ‘biased,’ or ‘extreme,’ and thus is used for things that are bad or to be avoided. Since Mòzǐ uses this term to designate emotions, he seems to think that emotions are simply what hinder human beings from functioning properly by clouding their minds or prompting them in wrong directions. And since Mòzǐ’s list of such emotions includes ài (factional or partialistic love, presumably), it is likely that Mòzǐ’s “jiān’ài” 兼愛 does not have any affective or emotional aspect.

Second, though, one might think that although Mòzǐ condemned ài as factional love, he might have still recommended jiān’ài 兼愛 as a calm, evenly distributed affection or goodwill for everyone. However, I think that this is an unlikely option in Mòzǐ for the following reason: As we have seen in Section 6.1.1.3 above, ài as a natural or cultivated attitude or as a broad conception of emotion is closely intertwined with a set of other particular emotions. Specifically, we have seen that in Kongzi 1) ài as one’s natural affection for close people is expressed as deep sadness (āi 哀) at the loss of close people, and 2) ài as one’s universal caring attitude is based on one’s pity or sympathy (āi 哀) at the suffering of others. Moreover, we have also seen that in the Analects the filial son’s love for his parents makes him feel both fear and joy at their old parents’ surviving another year. However, we do not find a similar connection between Mòzǐ’s jiān’ài 兼愛 and other emotions in the Mòzǐ.

For example, the chapter of “Eradicating Partiality” (“Qùsī” 去私) in Lûshì chūnqì 呂氏春秋 contains an anecdote of a chief (jùzǐ 鉅子) of a group of Mohists in Qin 秦. One day the chief’s son killed a man, but the king of Qin proposed to pardon him because he was the only son to the chief who was already very old. However, the Mohist chief insisted on executing his son, saying:

According to the Mohist law, a murderer should be killed, and an injurer should be punished. This is in order to prohibit murder and injury, and prohibiting murder and injury is a great duty of the world. Even if your majesty pardon him and have your...
officials release him, I cannot but enforce the Mohist law [on my own terms].

As the author of the chapter comments, the Mohist chief restrained himself from being partial to his son and managed to remain public-minded by practicing the “great duty.”

In this passage, one might think that although the chief’s attitude of jiān’ài 兼愛 recommends him not to be affected by his partialistic, familial affection for his son, his jiān’ài 兼愛 can still be a fair-minded warm concern for everyone. However, in addition to the seeming indifference to his son’s poor lot, the chief in the current passage shows no sign of sympathy for the murdered person either. In this light, the Mohist law banning murder and injury does not seem to be based on a sympathetic concern for everyone, and we could infer that jiān’ài 兼愛 is not a properly tempered emotion.

Third, I think that Mózǐ’s “impartial care” (jiān’ài 兼愛) is more of a behavior than an emotion. In other words, I think that impartial care in the Mózǐ is a type of behavior aimed at promoting the benefit (lì, 利) of the world, and the motivation of the agent for her act of impartial caring does not need to be based in a loving affection for the cared-for. At the beginning of the “Jiān’ài xià” 兼愛下 chapter, Mózǐ declares that the primary business of the benevolent person (rénrén 仁人) is to promote the benefit and remove the harm of the world, and then he defines the greatest harm to be big countries attacking small ones, the powerful oppressing the weak, the many harassing the few, the cunning deceiving the foolish, and so forth. On the other hand, the benefit of the world is exactly its opposite—people of different capacities cooperating harmoniously, the old without wife or children are cared for until death, the young without parents get proper

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104 “墨者之法曰：‘殺人者死，傷人者刑。’此所以禁殺傷人者也。夫禁殺傷人者，天下之大義也。王雖為之賜，而令吏弗誅，腹[黃+享]不可不行墨者之法。” (“黃” and “享” constitutes one character, which is the chief’s personal name, but is not included in the MS-Word character set.) Lǔshì chūnqiū 呂氏春秋, “Qūtǐ” 去私. Chén Qiyōu, Lǔshì chūnqiū jiǎoshì, p. 56.
105 “子，人之所私也。忍所私以行大義，鉅子可謂公矣。” Ibid.
106 This point is corroborated by Ivanhoe’s comment on Mózǐ’s argument against aggressive war: “What is striking in Mózǐ’s searing and well-argued condemnation of aggressive war is the complete absence of descriptions of the horror of war. All Mózǐ seems to see is the unprofitability of war. His overriding concern with lì (‘benefit’ or ‘profit’) led him to ignore a broad range of psychological goods and harms.” (Ivanhoe 1998). In other words, the rationale behind Mózǐ’s recommendation of jiān’ài 兼愛 and his condemnation of mutual hostility is not the emotion of fear at the horrible experiences people will have to go through in the war, but the cool calculation that mutual hostility between different levels of social entities do not promote the benefit of the world.
support until maturity. Here Mòzǐ defines the benefit and harm of the world respectively as the peaceful cooperation and hostile conflict between social entities, and he does not distinguish “ài rén”愛人 (“loving people”) from “lì rén”利人 (“benefiting people”) very clearly.

For example, in the “Jiān’ài xià”兼愛下 chapter Mòzǐ once says that the benefits of the world are generated by “loving and benefiting people” (ài rén lì rén愛人利人), but it is not clear whether Mòzǐ regards ài愛 here as a pre-existing emotion motivating one to benefit others or as a certain type of activity identical with the activity of benefiting others (“lì rén”利人). However, I think that it is more plausible to interpret Mòzǐ’s “ài rén”愛人 to be identical with “lì rén”利人, because later in the same chapter Mòzǐ uses the compound “ài lì”愛利 (“loving and benefiting” or “caring and benefiting”) a number of times, and clearly indicates that àilì愛利 is an activity to perform (cóngshì從事) rather than an emotion to feel and an activity to perform. Moreover, as we have seen above, Mòzǐ says that one can practice impartial care by regarding (shì視) another country, another family, and another person as if it were one’s own country, one’s own family, and oneself, or by caring about (wèi為) another country, another city, and another family as much as one cares about one’s own country, one’s own city, and one’s own family. Whether interpreted as looking at something in a particular light or as trying to provide more care for somebody than normally expected, Mòzǐ’s jiān’ài兼愛 clearly involves the agent’s non-spontaneous, conscious efforts to go against her natural partialistic tendency, and in that sense I think jiān’ài兼愛 is an action or at least a behavior rather than an emotion.

So far we have seen that Mòzǐ’s jiān’ài兼愛 does not contain any affective or emotional aspect, and now it must be also clear that the partialist whom Mòzǐ persuades to adopt his policy of jiān’ài兼愛 does not have to go through any change in emotions. At this point, I would like to turn to Nivison’s first thesis about Mòzǐ and voluntarism.

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109 “姑嘗本原若眾利之所自生, 此胡自生?...必曰從愛人利人生.” Ibid., p. 115.
110 A typical phrase is “cóngshì hū àilì rén zhī qīn” 從事乎愛利人之親 (“to engage in caring for and benefiting another person’s parents”). See ibid., p. 125.
and think about what kinds of psychological resources are really called on for the partialist to change his policy in Mòzī’s theory. Nivison’s first thesis was that according to Mòzī’s moral psychology, one can adopt certain beliefs or affections at will if he decides to do so. However, since it is already clear that adopting Mòzī’s policy of impartial care does not necessarily involve any change in the agent’s emotions but requires a change of behavior, Nivison’s thesis concerning affections needs to be modified accordingly. We find a modified version of Nivison’s view in Philip J. Ivanhoe’s remark:

Mòzī’s...basic approach to influencing people’s behaviour entailed an extreme form of voluntarism. He believed that most, or at least many, people could simply take up a form of behaviour and would do so if they were given good reasons for adopting it. Mòzī argued that anyone who truly understood that a given form of behaviour does indeed maximize the common good (as he understood it) would immediately act accordingly. This belief in the inexorable power of argument is of a piece with his sparse moral psychology and belief in the plasticity of human nature, and helps to explain his active and persistent interest in the forms and method of philosophical debate.\(^{111}\)

In the following, I argue that as long as Mòzī’s impartial care is interpreted as a kind of action or even behavior, the role volition plays in one’s adopting and practicing impartial care is very small and insignificant. On the other hand, I think that what plays a crucial role in one’s changing policy and practicing impartial care is one’s particular kinds of desires or aspirations as opposed to volition or will-power as a separate faculty. However, in order to make this point I need to go through several steps, and I would like to start from analyzing Ivanhoe’s remark.

To begin with, one might wonder what Ivanhoe means exactly by “good reasons” for adopting a certain type of behavior. In his remark, a “good reason” for adopting the behavior of impartial care seems to be the understanding that impartial caring maximizes the common good. However, granting that impartial caring indeed maximizes the common good, how can maximizing the common good be a good reason for an individual to adopt impartial caring? If the primary goal of an individual were maximizing her own good, would her understanding that impartial caring maximizes the common good appeal to her as a good reason to practice impartial caring? Not necessarily so. Then, how can

\(^{111}\) Ivanhoe, “Mohist Philosophy.”
the gap between the common good and the individual good be bridged? Later on in his article, Ivanhoe correctly says that Mòzǐ often asserts or assumes that maximizing the common or collective goods will result in maximizing individual good. For example, he mentions Mòzǐ’s argument in the “Jiān’ài xià” 兼愛下 chapter that a truly filial man would embrace impartial care as the best means to serve his parents well, because it would be only when he serves other people’s parents as if they were his own parents that other people would serve his parents as well.¹¹² Then, the best interpretation of Ivanhoe’s remark quoted above would be the following:

*Given the strong likelihood that the maximization of the common good will entail the maximization of the individual good, the understanding that impartial caring will maximize the common good gives one a good reason to adopt and practice the policy of impartial care. In other words, one who understands the facts about the relationship among the common good, the individual good, and impartial care will see that practicing impartial care is in one’s best interest.*

Now, if Mòzǐ had held “an extreme form of voluntarism,” what is the role of volition in this picture for a rational agent to adopt impartial care? As I see it, there is no significant role for a radical voluntarism to play in Mòzǐ’s moral psychology. Let us think about this matter using an analogy. Suppose that I am thirsty now, and I go to my refrigerator to have a scoop of ice-cream. However, my wife in the kitchen offers me a cup of cool water instead, telling me that cool, pure water will be better for quenching my thirst than stuffy ice-cream. ‘She’s got a point,’ I think, and I drink the water. Then my seven-year-old son returns from the soccer-field, and reaches the ice-cream box that I took out of the refrigerator a minute ago. “No, have this. This will be better.” I offer my son a cup of cool water. However, having already seen the ice-cream, my son still craves the ice-cream even though he seems to understand my explanation of why cool water is better than ice-cream for quenching his thirst. I think it strange and say, “Do you just want the ice-cream or want the ice-cream because you are thirsty? If you are thirsty, you’d better have water.” And my son says, “Yes I’m thirsty and I know that water will be better than ice-cream, but I still want ice-cream for my thirst!”

¹¹² Ibid. See also Mòzǐ 墨子, “Jiān’ài xià” 兼愛下. Sūn Yírāng, Mòzǐ xiāngū, p. 125.
In this picture, I had a desire to slake my thirst, and took up a glass of water and drank it without hesitation, once I thought that water would be better than ice-cream for my thirst. Perhaps I wanted the water and decided to drink it when I was persuaded that water was better for my thirst, but my wanting the water was almost automatic, and my deciding to drink it was almost unconscious. I did not need any remarkable support from my will-power to complete my act of drinking water. Likewise, Mòzī seems to assume that most of the agents to be persuaded by his argument are like me in this picture; they have basic intelligence to understand the relevant facts about pursuing their best interest, and once they understand where their best interest lies, their desire to enhance their own well-being provides them with enough motivation for going through the relevant procedure to accomplish their goals. In this light, the “inexorable power” of Mòzī’s argument comes from the conjunction of the listener’s desire to promote her good (i.e. her material well-being) and her understanding that the best way to promote her good is to take care of other people’s good too. An extra faculty of volition is not required for Mòzī’s argument to be compelling to such an agent.

6.2.2.3 Self-love: The Sole Motivation for Impartial Care

Mòzī indicates this picture of his moral psychology at several places of his “Jiān’ài” 兼愛 chapters. For example, having presented several types of arguments proving the benefit of practicing impartial care in the third “Jiān’ài” 兼愛 chapter, Mòzī complains that many people still consider impartial care (jīān’ài 兼愛) to be an impracticable ideal. According to Mòzī, such people compare enacting jīān’ài to such an impossible task as jumping over the great rivers like Huánghé 黃河 and Chángjiāng 長江 carrying Mount Tai in one hand.113 Perhaps these people are like my son in the picture that I have presented in the previous section—they see that impartial caring is in their best interest, but like Wūmǎzǐ 巫馬子 quoted above, they also think that they are not capable of (bùnéng 不能) practicing impartial care. Mòzī initially responds to this objection by

113 “吾譬兼之不可為也，猶挈泰山以超江河也。故兼者直願之也，夫豈可為之物哉?” Mòzī 墨子, “Jiān’ài xià 兼愛下. Sūn Yírāng, Mòzī xiāngǔ, p. 120.
quoting passages from the *Documents* (*shū* 书) and the *Poetry* (*shī* 詩) which are meant to show that 1) there are precedents of the ancient sage kings who managed to practice impartial care, and that 2) this makes impartial care a certainly practicable ideal.\textsuperscript{114} However, Mòzī’s interpretation of those passages is dubious, and it is not clear exactly how the sage kings could practice impartial care. That is, if they were capable of impartial care simply because they were a special kind of human beings, this cannot appeal to many ordinary people who might lack the sage kings’ moral character.

So, Mòzī now faces a question of how to change people’s belief that impartial care is too difficult a task for them to undertake (*nán ér bù kě wéi* 難而不可為\textsuperscript{115}), and the argument Mòzī provides for this purpose aims to show that impartial care is not a difficult task at all. According to him, people often do much more difficult things to curry their ruler’s favor, and they want to act as their ruler likes (*hào* 好) because they think that it is a good way to promote their interests. If such is most people’s behavioristic tendency, Mòzī argues, people should feel no difficulty in practicing impartial care, because impartial care is clearly in their rational interest and it is much easier than many other things people happily suffer to advance their interests. Mòzī makes this point by telling three parallel stories. Since these stories reveal some important theoretical aspects of Mòzī’s moral psychology that previous scholars have not fully addressed, I would like to quote and discuss these stories and Mòzī’s related argument in full detail below:

\begin{quote}
In the past, King Líng 灵 of the state of Jīng 荆 liked slender waists. During his reign, low officials of Jīng did not eat more than one meal [per day], and they could not stand up without using a cane, and could not walk without leaning against the wall. So, reducing one’s diet is a very difficult thing to do, but many people did it [because] King Líng liked it. Within a generation the commoners [of Jīng] could also change [accordingly], and this was [due to their] seeking means to comply with their superiors.

In the past, King Gōujiàn of the state Yuè 越 liked courage. He trained his soldiers and [other] subjects for three years, but he was not certain of his knowledge [of the degree that they were trained]. So, one day [he set fire to his boats and encouraged his soldiers to advance by drumming. [Each row] of his soldiers stumbled over [those] in the row before, and those who were drowned or burned to death were incalculable. At that time [they] kept marching even when drumming was stopped; the soldiers of Yuè were really dreadful. So, burning oneself is a very difficult thing to do, but many people did it
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., p. 125.
because] King Gǒujiàn liked it. Within a generation the commoners [of Yuè] could also change [accordingly], and this was [due to their] seeking means to comply with their superiors.

In the past, Duke Wén of Jin liked coarse clothes. During his reign, the officials of the state Jin [wore] suits of coarse cloth, jackets of sheepskin, hats of softened silk, and shoes of coarse material. In such attire, they would have an audience with Duke Wén and walk about in his court. So, [wearing] coarse clothes is a very difficult thing to do, but many people did it [because] Duke Wén liked it. Within a generation the commoners [of Jin] could also change [accordingly], and this was [due to their] seeking means to comply with their superiors.

So, reducing one’s diet, burning oneself, and [wearing] coarse clothes are extremely difficult things to do in the world; but many people did it because their rulers liked it, and within a generation the commoners could also change [accordingly]. Why was that so? [They] sought means to comply with their superiors. Now, as for [the policy of] mutual impartial caring and mutual benefiting, it is profitable and easy to practice beyond measure. As I suppose, [the only reason that this policy is not widely practiced is] only that there is no ruler who likes it. If there were rulers who like it, and if such rulers promote it with rewards and praise and dignify it with punishments, I suppose people’s inclination toward mutual impartial caring and mutual benefiting will be comparable to fire’s burning up and water’s flowing down; nothing in the world could stop that.116

It is interesting that the three stories in this passage, though exactly parallel in structure, concern different aspects of human beings. That is, whereas the ruler in the first story likes a particular type of physical appearance as beautiful, the second and third rulers like particular virtues either directly (i.e. King Gǒujiàn’s liking of courage) or as manifested in a certain type of attire (i.e. Duke Wén’s liking of coarse clothes as manifesting frugality). However, what is more interesting and significant is that Mòzǐ represents the second and third rulers to be not interested in distinguishing genuine virtues and their resemblances. As we have seen earlier in Section 2.1.2 of Chapter 2, the ancient Chinese had a sophisticated distinction between one’s character (qíng情) and its

116 “昔荆灵王好小要。当灵王之身，荆国之士饭不逾乎一，固据而後兴，扶垣而後行。故约食为其难也，然后为而灵王说之。未逾于世而民可移也，即求以就其上也。昔者越王句践好勇。教其士臣三年，以其知为未足以知之也，焚舟失火，鼓而进之。其士偃前列，伏水火而死，有不可胜数也。当此之为也，不鼓而退也，越国之士可谓豝矣。故约身为其难也，然後为之越王说之。未逾於世而民可移也，即求以就其上也。昔者晋文公好苴服。当文公之时，晋国之士，大布之衣，牂羊之裘，练帛之冠，且苴之屨，入见文公，出以践之朝。故苴服为其中也，然後为而文公说之。未逾於世而民可移也，即求以就其上也。是故约食焚舟苴服，此天下之至难为也，然後为而上说之，未逾于世而民可移也。何故也？即求以就其上也。今若夫兼相爱，交相利，此其有利且易为也，不顾胜数也。我以谓则无有上说之者而已矣。苟有上说之者，勝之以赏誉，威之以刑罰，我以谓人之於就兼相爱交相利也，譬之犹火之就上，水之就下也，不可防止於天下。” My translation reflects scholars’ emendations of the text seen ibid., pp. 125–127.
manifestations in words and manners well before Mòzǐ, and Mòzǐ’s almost intentional neglect of this distinction is strikingly important for understanding his implicit theory of moral psychology. King Gōujiàn and Duke Wén in Mòzǐ’s stories do not seem to care whether people’s courageous and frugal behaviors are genuine or merely driven by their self-interest, and Mòzǐ’s presenting these rulers in this way reveals his firm belief that what is important about a virtue or a policy is their behavioral implications, and their psychological or motivational foundation is not a question of the highest priority insofar as they produce the expected result—promoting the benefit of the world.

However, the primacy of the behavioral implications of a virtue or a policy does not make it a useless task to inquire into their motivational foundations. On the contrary, in order to make a certain type of behavior—impartial caring, for Mòzǐ—a constant practice among people, it is crucial 1) to know what motivates people to adopt that kind of behavior and 2) to maintain the relevant conditions that give them reasons to adopt and practice the recommended type of behavior. This gives Mòzǐ a good reason to be interested in clarifying this issue to some extent, and he seems to think that self-love, which is expressed as their desire to benefit themselves and is often accompanied by partialistic behaviors, can be also the strongest motivation for people’s continuous practicing of impartial care. As Kwong-loi Shun has pointed out, there is no genuine conflict between Mòzǐ’s recommendation of impartial care and people’s natural concern for themselves, because what is problematic is not the concern of the people for themselves but their concern for themselves combined with their disregard for others. Moreover, in a previously quoted argument against Wūmǎzǐ 巫馬子, we have seen that Mòzǐ does not criticize Wūmǎzǐ’s self-love; what he criticizes is Wūmǎzǐ’s wrong belief that his partialistic policy (bié 别) is the right means to promote his self-interest. However, the current passage seems to present an even stronger position, namely that people’s desire to pursue their personal interest and avoid harm provides the sole and

117 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, pp. 30–31. People’s partialistic concern in Mòzǐ is not only for themselves but often also for their family, state, and so forth, but in my current discussion I am considering the most extreme case. Mòzǐ talks about the hostile conflict and competition even between family members at each beginning of his three “Jiān’ài” 兼愛 chapters. See Sūn Yī ràng, Mòzǐ xiā ngǔ, pp. 99–100, 101–102, and p. 114.
sufficient motivation for them to practice impartial care. I will further explain this position below by contrasting it with that of Kongzi’s on a similar topic.

As we have seen in Section 2.2.2.3 of Chapter 2, by comparing the influence of the ruler’s virtue on the commoners to the wind blowing over the grass, Kongzi suggests that the commoners have the ability to appreciate their ruler’s virtue and emulate it. In other words, Kongzi thinks that if the ruler desires to be good, his subjects will emulate this desire of their ruler’s and eventually become good themselves to some extent. In this light, despite Kongzi’s belief in the commoners’ lack of intelligence to understand deep meanings of morality and their lack of leisure to study poetry, rituals, and music for their moral training, Kongzi seems to be very optimistic about the possibility to transform people’s character in a positive way, and we have seen that Kongzi’s firm rejection of Ji Kāngzǐ’s 季康子 proposal to use forceful means to regulate people’s behavior was also in this context. Now, the Mòzǐ passage quoted above also says that the commoners tend to emulate their ruler’s preference (hào 好 or yuè 說), and previous scholars have not paid enough attention to the rich philosophical implications of this passage. Consequently, they ended up mistakenly emphasizing the similarity rather than contrast between Mòzǐ’s and Kongzi’s views of the masses’ motivational foundation for embracing morality.

According to Nivison, the current Mòzǐ passage under consideration strongly implies that Mòzǐ denies any fixed moral nature for human beings. Nivison says, like Gàozǐ 告子 who compares the formulation of moral character to making cups out of willow wood, Mòzǐ in the “Guiyì” 貴義 chapter likens the cultivation of a person’s character to making a wall. The point of these analogies is that like a piece of uncarved woodblock or a large amount of dumped soil waiting for the form of a cup or a wall to be imposed upon them, human nature lacks any pre-existing inclinations toward good or evil and can be shaped to take the moral form by proper cultivation.118 While Nivison elaborates the possible theoretical influence from Mòzǐ to Gàozǐ on this “plasticity of human nature” thesis, Schwartz and Hansen find the precursor of this view in Kongzi. Quoting part of the passage in question, Schwartz comments on the similarity between Kongzi and Mòzǐ in emphasizing the importance of the ruler’s charismatic power for

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118 Nivison, “Philosophical Voluntarism in Fourth-Century China,” p. 130.
initiating desired moral changes among people. In addition, although not citing any specific textual evidence, Hansen is more explicit that in Mòzǐ, people’s internalizing the pattern of guidance their ruler adopts involves changing their prior dispositions. And according to Hansen, this is also true for Confucians who aim at reshaping and polishing human nature through training in the Rituals (li 禮).121

However, a more careful reading of the text reveals that Mòzǐ departs from Kongzi significantly, and by doing so he proposes an interesting solution to Kongzi’s unanswered question, viz. how to make one overcome one’s selfish desires and extend one’s caring attitude to those outside one’s circle of closely related people. As we have seen earlier in Chapter 2, this was a hard question for Kongzi; Rǎn Qiú 冉求, one of Kongzi’s most talented disciples, complained of his insufficient moral strength to carry through Kongzi’s teaching, and Kongzi could do nothing but merely urge him to try more. However, Mòzǐ does not suffer this problem, because he acknowledges only one source of motivation for practicing impartial care: self-love. According to Mòzǐ in the passage under consideration, people emulate their rulers’ preference (hào 好 or yuè 說) as a means to show their compliance to their rulers, or literally “to turn toward their superiors” (xiàng qí shàng 向其上). Why would they do so? Ivanhoe says that they do so “simply to curry favor [with their rulers]”,122 and Hansen says that the commoners in Mòzǐ have a natural desire to conform to their superiors.123 However, Ivanhoe’s suggestion sounds theoretically insufficient, and Hansen’s view seems textually ill-grounded. For in the “Shàngtóng” 尚同 (“Upward Conformance”) chapters Mòzǐ presents everyone’s disagreement with one another as a natural state people originally find themselves in, and he recommends people’s compliance with their superiors as a remedy for this natural disorder. And if people’s complying with their superiors does not derive from their natural inclinations, there must be a special reason for people to want to conform to their superiors.

119 Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, p. 150.
120 Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, p. 128.
121 Ibid., p. 129.
122 Ivanhoe, “Mohist Philosophy.”
123 Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, p. 121.
I submit that people’s emulation of their ruler’s preference is not a simple result of their natural urge to comply with their superiors, but a well-calculated action to promote their best interests. In other words, they pretend to like what their rulers like because they think that doing so will advance their personal interests, and their emulation of their rulers’ liking at the level of behavior is hardly transformed into the genuine liking of what their rulers like. For example, in two of the three stories in the passage, it is clear that no one would ever become genuinely fond of limiting diet extremely to have a slender waist or marching into a burning boat to look brave, even though doing so might greatly help advance one’s personal interests otherwise. In addition, although not as clear as the other two cases, we could imagine that many will hate wearing coarse clothes all the time even if that makes them look frugal and have a better chance to be recruited by their frugal ruler. Mòzǐ seems to think that, at least in this passage, people would practice impartial care for exactly the same reason as in the other three cases of the stories. They would practice impartial care if their rulers like it, not because they really like it but because they think that doing so would bring them a better chance to promote their personal interests. Since they are ready to do even more difficult things for the same purpose, the apparent advantage of impartial caring over the other activities in terms of its relative easiness and the prospect of its being reciprocated, they have an inexorable reason to practice impartial care.

Moreover, if they need an additional booster, the rulers can promote the practice of impartial caring by rewarding those who practice it and punishing those who do not. Since the system of reward and punishment would not work if people did not desire reward and fear punishment, and people’s desiring reward and fearing punishment are in turn based on their love of themselves, it is also clear that self-love is indispensable in Mòzǐ’s theory for giving people a constant reason to practice impartial care. In addition, Mòzǐ’s recommendation of reward and punishment to support people’s practice of impartial care indicates that Mòzǐ was pessimistic about the possibility to change people’s character in the way that they could appreciate the intrinsic value of impartial caring and develop genuine fondness of that practice. In this light, Mòzǐ’s view of self-love as the masses’ sole motivation for practicing impartial care is markedly different from Kongzì’s view of their character as changeable in a positive way to some extent, and Mòzǐ’s view
seems to be a precursor of Hán Fēi’s 韓非 legalist view of human nature as evil rather than being a successor of Kongzi’s implicit view of human nature as susceptible of moral influence.

For these two reasons—namely that 1) Mòzǐ postulates no additional motivation for people’s practicing impartial care than self-love and that 2) Mòzǐ’s reward and punishment system for supporting people’s practice of impartial care requires self-love as a precondition for its operation, it is clear that self-love is the sole and sufficient motivation for people’s practice of impartial caring in Mòzǐ’s implicit theory of moral psychology as presented in this passage.

6.3 Enculturation and A New View of Mengzi’s Emotional Extension

However, Mòzǐ’s appeal to self-love or the desire to promote one’s own interests as a means to persuade people to adopt the universalistic attitude of impartial care did not satisfy Mengzi: When asked by King Hui 惠 of Liáng 梁 what means Mengzi has to profit the kingdom, Mengzi recommends the king not to think about profit but only about humaneness and righteousness. For if the king pursues profit then his subordinates will also pursue profit, and it will in turn bring about disastrous results not only to his kingdom but also to his throne. On the other hand, if the king could make his subordinates set their minds on humaneness and righteousness by making himself an ethical role-model for them, a harmonious and flourishing country would not be just a utopian ideal for them. However, the crucial question is how to make people like King Hui, who keeps fat horses in his stable while his people are starving to death (Mengzi 1A:4) and drives his sons and brothers to the battlefield for the sake of land (Mengzi 7B:1), genuinely benevolent and righteous people. We know that Mengzi proposes emotional cultivation or more specifically emotional extension, but we have also seen in Section 6.1 of this chapter that the three dominant interpretations of Mengzi’s theory of emotional extension in the field are equally problematic. However, although Wong’s

\[124\] Mengzi 1A:1.
interpretation has unfortunately gone in a wrong direction, in the earlier version of his view published in 1991.\textsuperscript{125} I find an important insight into the interpretation of Mengzi’s emotional extension that I intend to develop below.

Instead of emphasizing the role of analogical reasoning in determining the intentional objects of emotions in non-paradigmatic cases, in his 1991 article Wong suggests that socialization and enculturation play a crucial role in Mengzi’s emotional extension. His suggestion is based on Ronald de Sousa’s concept of “paradigm scenarios,” which de Sousa originally proposes as a hypothesis for explaining how human beings build up a wide repertoire of emotions starting from mainly physiological and instinctual responses. According to de Sousa, “[p]aradigm scenarios involve two aspects: first, a situation type providing the characteristic objects of the specific emotion type…, and second, a set of characteristic or ‘normal’ responses to the situation, where normality is first a biological matter and then very quickly becomes a cultural one.”\textsuperscript{126}

For example, de Sousa explains, a baby between six and nine months returns its caretaker’s smile by smiling and frown by crying or frowning as a result of mere “vicarious resonance,” but in the next stage of development the baby can take its caretaker’s facial expressions as signs of what it can expect her to do and feel. And after nine months the baby will look to its caretaker for guidance as to what to look at and how to react or feel about it, and the caretaker’s guidance in this matter makes a primitive form of paradigm scenarios. As the baby grows up as a child it learns to talk about emotions in terms of the stories that give rise to them, and the child builds up a more and more sophisticated list of emotions as it learns more and more elaborate paradigm scenarios through its continuous encounter with art, literature, and culture.\textsuperscript{127}

Now, Wong in his 1991 article adapts this concept of paradigm scenarios to his interpretation of Mengzian extension of compassion. According to him, the specific situation type characteristic of compassion is somebody’s suffering, and the paradigm scenarios for compassion prescribe that the normal responses to such a situation be helping the person in question escape his difficulties. In addition, following de Sousa, Wong argues that such responses in Mengzi are originally biological and instinctual ones,

\textsuperscript{125} Wong, “Is There a Distinction Between Reason and Emotion in Mencius?”
\textsuperscript{126} De Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion, p. 182. Emphasis is original.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., pp. 182–184.
and such matters as what should be perceived as suffering or whose suffering is to become salient as a reason to act in a certain situation can only be determined when one’s natural helping responses have developed through socialization and enculturation.\textsuperscript{128} However, Wong does not develop this picture any further, and in this earlier version of his interpretation of Mengzian extension Wong already describes Mengzian emotions in paradigmatic cases as some sort of natural impulses or “inchoate stirrings” that can be channeled to certain type of actions in non-paradigmatic situations.\textsuperscript{129} However, we have already seen that this kind of hydraulic view of Mengzian emotions is hard to ascribe to Mengzi, and I think that my view of Mengzian emotions as concern-based construals works better with Wong’s original view that Mengzian emotional extension occurs primarily through the inculcation of social values in the process of enculturation or socialization. In the following, I discuss some textual evidence from the \textit{Mengzi} that could support this new interpretation of Mengzian extension.

Look at the following passage first, which was quoted earlier in Chapter 4 when I was explaining Mengzi’s conception of shame and dislike:

\begin{quote}
Now [if] a person’s fourth finger is bent and does not stretch straight, [even if] it does not hurt or cause harm to one’s work, if there is anyone who could make it straight, [the person would go to him] without finding it far to travel from Qin to Chu; this is because of the finger that is not like others’. [However, many people] know to hate it when one’s finger is not like others’, but do not know to hate it when one’s heart and mind are not like others’—this is called not knowing the categories.\textsuperscript{130}
\end{quote}

In this passage, Mengzi says that those who find it shameful to have a malfunctioning finger should also feel shame when they have malfunctioning heart and mind; and Mengzi here seems to be concerned with the proper extension of emotions, specifically the extension of shame and dislike or the feeling of \textit{xiūwù zhī xīn} 羞惡之心. According to Mengzi, the reason why some people feel shame for their malfunctioning finger but fail to feel the same way for their malfunctioning heart and mind is because they do not know that one’s physical and ethical inferiorities to others belong to the same category

\textsuperscript{128} Wong, “Is There a Distinction Between Reason and Emotion in Mencius?” p. 35.
\textsuperscript{129} For example, see ibid., p. 40.
\textsuperscript{130} “今有無名之指屈而不信，非疾痛害事也，如有能信之者，則不遠秦楚之路，為指之不若人也。指不若人，則知惡之；心不若人，則不知惡，此之謂不知類也.” \textit{Mengzi} 6A:12.
and deserve similar affective responses. However, Mengzi cannot be interpreted here to be saying that one’s recognition that there is no difference between one’s physical inferiority and ethical inferiority to others naturally enables one to feel the same way for both kinds of inferiorities, because this is exactly the position of the logical extension interpretation that we have earlier found problematic. Then, how shall we interpret Mengzi’s remark that one’s failure to extend one’s 休辱之善 in properly is due to not knowing the categories (不識類)?

The solution to this question that I would like to suggest is to interpret the phrase “knowing the categories” (識類) strongly, so that it does not mean a merely weak intellectual recognition of the similarity between two things but a more active kind of knowledge that involves proper affective responses to its objects. But before elaborating this idea further, I would like to ponder another passage from the Mengzi:

Everyone has some things that they will not bear, and to extend this [response] to those things that they will bear is humaneness. Everyone has some things that they will not do, and to extend this [attitude] to those things that they will do is righteousness. If one can fill out one’s heart that does not desire to harm others, one could never use up one’s humaneness; if one can fill out one’s intention not to bore [holes] or climb [over the walls], one could never use up one’s righteousness; if one can fill out one’s [intention] not [to provide] grounds for receiving humiliating treatments, there will be nowhere that one goes and does not do what is right. Speaking to a scholar with whom one is not supposed to speak, this is seeking an end with words; not speaking [to someone with whom] one may speak, this is seeking an end by silence; all of these belong to the category of boring [holes] or climbing [over the walls].

What Mengzi means by “some things that everyone will not bear” in this passage are probably indisputable objects of one’s compassion such as an endangered baby or an animal anticipating undeserved death, and what he means by “some things that everyone will not do” will be paradigmatic cases of wrongdoing such as robbery or theft that Mengzi generally describes as “boring holes in the wall and climbing over the walls to take what is not one’s own.” According to Mengzi, though, there are also things that people do not naturally feel sorry for or indignant about while still belonging to the same

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131 “人皆有所不忍, 達之於其所忍, 仁也; 人皆有所不為, 達之於其所為, 義也。人能充無欲害人之心,而仁不可勝用也; 人能充無穿踰之心, 而義不可勝用也; 人能充無受爾汝之實, 無所往而不為義也。士未可以言而言, 是以言賤之也; 可以言而不言, 是以不言賤之也; 皆穿踰之類也。” Mengzi 7B:31.
categories as the paradigmatic cases of humaneness and righteousness, and Mengzi says that one can achieve humaneness and righteousness by making oneself feel the same way for both the paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic cases of moral emotions. But how?

In my view, a clue to this question could be found in the last part of the passage, where Mengzi mentions two examples of improper behavior—viz. speaking with someone one may not speak with and not speaking with someone one may speak with. That is, according to Mengzi, when one speaks with someone one is not supposed to speak with (or vice versa) in the light of one’s status or political stance, it is often because one has some hidden goals to pursue; and Mengzi also says that violating the social norms for private purposes is the same kind of misdeed as climbing over a wall and stealing somebody else’s property. Then, why does Mengzi say that (i.e. speaking with someone one is not supposed to speak with or vice versa belongs to the same category as stealing someone else’s property), and how does his saying this help one feel averse to the former activity as much as one would feel to the latter? As I see it, what Mengzi is intending to do here is some sort of indoctrination or mental habituation, hoping that those who are exposed to his sermons long enough will come to adopt the same perspective of things as he has and think and feel about things in the same way as he does, by coming to care about those things that they have not been concerned about before. If this is correct, it must be the case that a crucial part of Mengzian wisdom—which enables one to focus on the right features of the situation in question, engage in proper analogical reasoning across similar cases, and derive the correct moral judgment from such analogical reasoning, as we have seen in Chapter 5—is partly formed through this indoctrination process. But do we have evidence?

Let us examine Mengzi’s following remark:

No wonder that the king is not wise. Even a plant that most easily grows cannot survive if you expose it to the sun for one day and leave it in the cold for ten days. I [have the opportunity to] meet with him only rarely, and once I leave, those who make him cold arrive; what could I do if he had some sprout [of wisdom]?132

As has been discussed in Section 5.1.3 of the previous chapter, this passage is part of a

132 “無或乎王之不智也。雖有天下易生之物也，一日暴之，十日寒之，未有能生者也。吾見亦罕矣，吾退而寒之者至矣，吾如有萌焉何哉?” Mengzi 6A:9.
larger narrative whose point is to emphasize that wisdom cannot be acquired unless one exercises one’s intellect wholeheartedly. However, when taken on its own terms, this passage also reveals another important aspect of Mengzi’s thought on wisdom. That is, in this passage Mengzi seems to think that the growth of wisdom involves not only understanding the points of ethical doctrines and intellectually affirming them but also making them take root in one’s heart and effectively warding off bad influences from the outside that could potentially undermine one’s growing tree of wisdom. What I mean by “bad influences from outside” might include incorrect ethical positions from Mengzi’s perspective such as Yáng Zhū’s 楊朱 egoism or Mòzǐ’s cold impartiality, but more importantly what shrivel up one’s sprouts of virtues are people’s everyday activities driven by harmful, self-centered motives. So Mengzi says as follows:

*Thanks to the rest they get during the day or night and the qì of the calm morning, people have a modicum of liking and disliking that are close to [those of] others. But what they do during the day fetters and destroys those [feelings]. If the fettering is repeated, then their nocturnal qì is insufficient to preserve [those feelings]. If their nocturnal qì is insufficient to preserve, then they become not far from birds and beasts. People see their being [like] birds and beasts, and think that the natural endowment has never been in their mind, but how could this be the characteristic feature of human beings? So, with the right nourishment, there is nothing that would not grow; without the right nourishment, there is nothing that would not diminish.*

In this passage Mengzi is clear that what destroy people’s sprouts of virtues—including the sprout of wisdom—are their everyday activities aimed at ethically undesirable goals. As they repeat such activities day by day, they get used to the wrong motives of those activities and start to feel numb with their bad effects, eventually becoming indistinguishable from beasts who do not know to be concerned about right things. This result is exactly what Mengzi anticipated about the king who was “warmed up” by Mengzi for one day but then “frozen” for ten days by those around him in *Mengzi 6A:9.*

The importance of long-term, constant exposure to the good effects of ethical role-models in moral self-cultivation is also emphasized in *Mengzi 3B:6,* where Mengzi

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133 “其日夜之所息，平旦之氣，其好惡與人相近也者幾希；則其旦晝之所為，有梏亡之矣。梏之反覆，則其夜氣不足以存。夜氣不足以存，則其遠禽獸不遠矣。人見其禽獸也，而以為未嘗有才焉者，是豈人之情也哉？故苟得其養，無物不長；苟失其養，無物不消。” *Mengzi 6A:8.* The underlining is mine.
compares moral education to the teaching of a language, or more precisely, a particular dialect:

Mengzi said to Dài Bùshèng 戴不勝, “Do you wish your king to be good? I’ll tell you clearly. Suppose that here is an official of Chǔ 楚, who wants his son [to speak] the language of Qi 齊. Shall he have a man from Qi 齊 tutor his son, or have a man from Chǔ 楚 tutor him?” [Dài Bùshèng] said, “[He shall] have a man from Qi 齊 tutor his son.” [Mengzi] said, “If a crowd of Chǔ people chatters around the boy when one person from Qi teaches him, even if you try [to make] him [speak] the language of Qi by whipping him every day, you cannot succeed. But [in the same manner,] if you take him to the Qi streets or villages like Zhuāng 莊 or Yuè 嶽 and let him live there for several years, even if you try [to make] him [speak] the language of Chǔ by whipping him every day, you cannot succeed either. [Now,] you consider Xuē Jūzhōu 薛居州 to be a good man, and [that’s why you] had him stay at the king’s place. If those at the king’s place were all [like] Xuē Jūzhōu regardless of their age or rank, whom could the king do bad things with? [But] if those at the king’s place are all [unlike] Xuē Jūzhōu regardless of their age or rank, whom could the king do good things with? [And in the latter situation,] what difference could just one Xuē Jūzhōu make about the king of Sòng 宋?”

What Mengzi emphasizes in this passage seems to be the importance of emulation in moral education or moral self-cultivation: just as the young members of a particular linguistic community learn how properly to use their language mainly by observing the other, more mature members of their community as opposed to those belonging to a different linguistic group, the members of a moral community learn the norms of their community and get ethical guidance and psychological support in performing good acts by exposing themselves to the influence of the good, rather than bad, members of their community. However, emulation in Mengzi does not seem to remain merely at the level of behavior. To me, Mengzi also seems to think that the leading members of the moral community should aspire not only to emulate their role-models’ behaviors but also to emulate their general ethical outlook and the way they feel about things in particular ethical situations, especially in non-paradigmatic situations where uncultivated innate moral emotions are of little use.

134 “孟子謂戴不勝曰：‘子欲子之王之善與？我明告子。有楚大夫於此，欲其子之齊語也，則使齊人傅諸？使楚人傅諸？’ 曰：‘使齊人傅之。’ 曰：‘一齊人傅之，衆楚人咻之，雖日撻而求其齊也，不可得矣；引而置之莊嶽之閒數年，雖日撻而求其楚，亦不可得矣。子謂薛居州，善士也，使之居於王所。在於王所者，長幼卑尊皆薛居州也，王誰與為不善？在王所者，長幼卑尊皆非薛居州也，王誰與為善？一薛居州，獨如宋王何？’” Mengzi 3B:6.
At this point, one might wonder why I use such terms as “emulation of outlook” or “emulation of feeling,” instead of discussing how people can come to realize what the right things to care about really are in ethically non-paradigmatic situations, and how they subsequently come to feel appropriate emotions in various situations based on their diverse but proper concerns about things. Admittedly, the “emulation of outlook” or the “emulation of feeling” in Mengzi are not supposed to occur in a blind fashion or even against the natural grain of one’s moral sensibility; to a large extent, the Mengzian agent should be considered not merely to aim at mimicking the virtuous person’s perspective and emotions but try to have his perspective and emotions genuinely. Disappointingly, though, there seems to be some significant room for cultural or other kinds of arbitrariness in Mengzi’s conception of emotional extension, and I think that what fills this gap is a set of social values or group preferences that are not always well-grounded but still inculcated in the minds of the followers of Kongzi through some sort of enculturation or indoctrination process, which may well include the appeal to the authority of the Confucian sages. Mengzi 5B:4 provides a good example of such a case:

Wànzhāng 萬章 asked, “May I ask what the correct attitude is when engaging in social intercourse?” [Mengzi] said, “It is respect.” [Wànzhāng] said, “‘Outright rejection of someone’s gift is considered to be disrespectful,’ what [does this saying mean]?” [Mengzi] said, “When a superior presents a gift, if one accepts it only after asking oneself whether he would have acquired it by right means or not, this is deemed disrespectful; this is why [one is] not [supposed] to reject it.” [Wànzhāng] said, “What if one does not reject it with express words, but only rejects it in one’s heart thinking that ‘it is wrong for him to take it from the people,’ and declines it with other excuse? Wouldn’t it be acceptable?” [Mengzi] said, “As long as the donor associates with others in the proper way and treats others according to the rituals, even Kongzi would have accepted such a gift.” [Wànzhāng] said, “Suppose that there is someone who waylays people outside a city gate; [if] he associates with others in the proper way and sends things [to others] according to the rituals, can one accept the loot?” [Mengzi] said, “No, it is not acceptable....” [Wànzhāng] said, “Nowadays, the rulers’ taking things from their people is no different from looting. If [they] polish their rituals in social intercourse and the nobleman takes their gifts on that ground, what kind of justification is it?” [Mengzi] said, “Do you think that if a true king should arise, he would line up the contemporary rulers and kill [all of] them? [Or do you think that] he would [try to] teach them first, and kill them only when they don’t change [their bad ways]? To say that taking what is not one’s own is robbery is to fill the categories and push the moral principles to the extreme. When Kongzi was holding office in Lù, [it was the custom of] the people of Lù to compete with each other [for game] in a hunt, and Kongzi did the same thing. If competing [for
In a hunt is acceptable, how much more would the accepting of a gift be?"135

The topic of this conversation between Mengzi and one of his advanced disciples Wànzhāng is whether it is appropriate to accept gifts from one’s superiors when they are likely to have acquired those goods in the first place through improper means. Since they are one’s superiors, though, one is supposed to treat them deferentially, and this makes it hard for one to reject their gifts only on the ground that those goods might not belong to them properly. This problematic situation gives rise to a discussion between Mengzi and Wànzhāng, where Mengzi tries to persuade his disciple that it is all right to accept gifts from such people as long as they are polite and follow the elaborate norms in social intercourse faithfully. Wànzhāng, though, seems to think that righteousness is a more important virtue than respect in such a situation; for he compares the rulers of his time to robbers who ambush beside the roads outside the city gates and rob passengers of their belongings. To use Mengzi’s words, Wànzhāng seems to think that taking what is not one’s own through improper means is to be considered as robbery or theft in a broad sense, and one should not accept an improper gift even if that counts as lack of respect toward one’s superior.

As I see it, Mengzi is losing the debate with his disciple Wànzhāng, because he does not explain here why considering the wicked rulers of his time as robbers is a mistake—specifically a fallacy of excessive inference in which one “fills the categories and push the moral principles” (chōng lèi zhì yì 充類至義) to the extreme (jìn 盡). As we have seen above, in Mengzi 7B:31 Mengzi clearly says that the behaviors of speaking with someone one may not speak with and not speaking with someone one may speak with both belong to the category of stealing somebody else’s property when they are equally motivated by the hidden desire to promote self-interests at the expense of the social norms, and for this reason Mengzi recommends that one should fill out one’s

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135 "萬章問曰：‘敢問交融何心也？’ 孟子曰：‘恭也．’ 曰：‘卻之卻之為不恭’，何哉？’ 曰：‘尊者賜之，曰， “其所取之者義乎，不義乎？” 而後受之，以是為不恭，故弗卻也．’ 曰：‘請無以辭卻之，以心卻之；曰， “其取諸民之不義也”，而以他辭無受，不可乎？’ 曰：‘其交也以道，其接也以禮，斯孔子受之矣．’ 萬章曰：‘今有禦人於國門之外者，其交也以道，其餽也以禮，斯可受禦與？’ 曰：‘不可．’ 曰：‘今之諸侯取之於民也，猶禦也．苟善其禮際矣，斯君子受之．敢問何說也？’ 曰：‘子以為有王者作，將比今之諸侯而誅之乎？其敎之不改而後誅之乎？夫謂非其有而取之者盜也，充類至義之盡也．孔子之仕於魯也，魯人獵較，孔子亦獵較．獵較猶可，而況受其賜乎？’” Mengzi 5B:4.
intention not to “bore holes or climb over the walls” to the extent that one would not do the things that one used to do in the past without feeling guilt, shame, or other kinds of negative emotions. In other words, in *Mengzi* 7B:31 Mengzi seems to be saying that the cultivation of one’s ethical emotions resides in making one’s moral emotional sensibility extremely refined and sensitive. However, now in *Mengzi* 5B:4, he seems to contradict himself by saying that certain things are too extreme to be the proper objects of one’s ethical feelings, and therefore one should stop cultivating one’s moral emotional sensibility at a certain point.

But how do we know where is the right point to stop cultivating our ethical emotions? Conceptually it is possible that, although one is supposed to cultivate one’s moral sensibility as much as possible in principle, in actuality one should stop cultivating it before it gets too sensitive or even paranoid. But how do we know when to stop, especially when there is a disagreement about such a question among the good members of the moral community, such as between Mengzi and his advanced disciple Wànzhāng?

Mengzi’s solution to this question seems to be introducing the authority of the sage to the debate: Competing with other people for animals in a hunt is not a very decent behavior for the well-cultivated nobleman, but Kongzi participated in such an activity probably because he considered it to be alright to do so. Now, Kongzi is a sage whose decision no one can doubt, and accepting a gift presented according to correct protocols is a much decent act in comparison to fighting over the animals in a hunt. Therefore, it is too extreme to feel averse to accepting a gift politely presented by one’s superiors. However, if this were the point Mengzi is getting at by appealing to the authority of Kongzi as sage, it does not make a very persuasive argument, because Mengzi here is only appealing to Kongzi’s purported sagacity and people’s admiration of him rather than clearly revealing what was the rationale behind Kongzi’s participation in the lowly activity as an ideal agent. With such a rationale kept under the veil of mysterious authority, people may find it hard to relate to Kongzi competing with others in pursuit of better animals in a hunt, and consequently they may also find it hardly convincing that one should not feel averse to accepting goods that were not acquired by proper means in the first place. In this light, it is understandable that Wànzhāng responds to Mengzi’s
argument only with the following perplexed question: “Then, was it not to carry out the Way that Kongzi held office?”

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\[136\] “然則孔子之仕也，非事道與?” Ibid. Mengzi answers to this question in the omitted part of the passage, but his answer to this question is also very cryptic and hardly intelligible.
Chapter Seven

Conclusion

Although often conceived as comparable to the Western conception of emotion and sometimes used for the so-called “cross-cultural comparison” of emotion, in the context of moral philosophy the ancient Chinese term “qing 情” best refers to the concept of character. As referring to certain psychological items in an individual’s mind including her goals and aspirations, emotional reactions at certain objects, and deep-seated evaluative judgments of things, a person’s qing 情 reveals to its observer what kind of person she is and how she is distinct from others in character.

In ancient China, perhaps as much as today, knowing about other people’s character correctly had significant practical implications: associating with right players in politics and finding right spouses meant secure life and prosperity, and people of flawed character were considered definitely to bring about disaster not only to themselves but also to others. For this reason, ancient Chinese thinkers emphasized the importance of good character in the flourishing of a community, and Kongzi and Mengzi devoted special attention to the philosophical discussion of emotions due to their being a crucial constituent of a person’s character.

What is fascinating about Kongzi’s conception of emotion is that he seems to view emotions to be intertwined with some sort of evaluative thinking: When one feels both joy and fear simultaneously about the age of one’s old parents (Lunyu 4:21), one’s joy and fear respectively take her parents’ staying healthy and their being close to death as their intentional objects. These two emotions in turn are each expressions of the filial child’s hào 好 (“desire” or “liking”) and wù 惡 (“aversion” or “disliking”), which respectively find the parents’ remaining healthy desirable (hào 好) and their getting old undesirable (è 惡).
Mengzi inherits Kongzi’s insight into the “rationality of emotions” and further develops it in his theory of moral emotions. The best interpretation of Mengzi’s view of emotions is to regard Mengzian emotions as some sort of “concern-based construals.” For example, if a person felt some sort of painful feeling at the sight of a baby about to fall into a well and ran to the rescue of it (Mengzi 2A:6), that person’s feeling of distress is primarily her construal of the situation as one where an innocent being is endangered, and such a construal is possible only when she is concerned about the welfare of the baby in particular or the welfare of other beings in general.

This “construal view” of Mengzian emotions enables us to avoid previous scholars’ mistaken interpretations that consider Mengzian emotions as either desires or behavioral dispositions. More importantly, though, my view of Mengzian emotions enables us to perceive the important theoretical distinction between Mengzi’s shifēi zhī xīn and the other three sprouts of his: Whereas compassion, respect, and the feeling of shame and dislike are merely construals of their respective situations, shifēi zhī xīn is largely equivalent to the psychological state of judgment; and when combined with one of these ethical emotions, it elevates that emotion, previously a mere presentation of things to the person feeling that emotion, to the status of a kind of moral judgment.

Shifēi zhī xīn as a kind of moral judgment plays two important roles in Mengzi’s theory of emotions and moral agency. First, when two moral emotions pull the agent in different directions with conflicting ethical considerations, one can arrive at a correct moral judgment by taking both emotions in view and weighing (quán 權) the relative importance of the respective emotions’ ethical demands. Wong’s thesis of no distinction between reason and emotion in Mengzi overlooks this reflective function of the mind that goes far beyond the “rationality” of emotions, and we can see that moral emotions in Mengzi often provide only a partial basis for all-things-considered ethical judgment.

Second, the characteristic of shifēi zhī xīn as moral judgment enables us to solve Nivison’s “immediate action problem.” According to Nivison, the only source of moral motivation in Mengzi is one’s ethical emotions, and one cannot perform moral actions until one has fully cultivated these ethical “sprouts.” This seems to introduce a serious moral dilemma for Mengzi, though, because Mengzi acknowledges that there are some moral obligations that should be fulfilled immediately. However, what really motivates
oneself in Mengzi is not an emotion but an ethical reason that may or may not be embodied in an emotion, and this in turn reveals Mengzi’s idea that full moral action is possible even before one fully cultivates one’s ethical emotions.

However, the ideal Mengzian agent is the one who does the right thing not only with correct knowledge but also with proper affective motives, and this raises the question of how one could “extend” one’s ethical emotions in paradigmatic situations to non-paradigmatic cases. In my view, Mengzian emotional extension occurs primarily through some sort of enculturation or social habituation process. That is, I think that the social norms in ancient China such as the Confucian rituals embody certain cultural assumptions concerning which emotions are more important than others and what the appropriate boundaries for their applications are, and it is largely by habituating oneself to the ethical role-models’ general ethical outlook and their particular judgments that the Mengzian agent eventually comes to feel the same way as her role-models do in ethically non-paradigmatic situations.
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