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Network Linkages between NGOs and Corporations

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Abstract

In 2005, the number of organizations that described themselves as environmental NGOs reached 6,493. But, are all of these organizations part of same the environmental movement? This paper uses the tools of social network analysis to illustrate that the movement is actually an intertwined constellation of networks, each with multiple and differentiated constituencies, some of which intersect with business organizations. By creating network clusters of NGOs based on (a) issue keywords, and (b) board interlocks with corporations and foundations, this paper challenges the simple classifications of “non-governmental organization” or “corporation” as accurate descriptors of who is in and who is out of the movement. In the end, such classifications may serve as misnomers, lumping many organizations or clusters of organizations with varied interests into one category. This result has implications for both the roles that individual NGOs can play when engaging with business and how they interact with the network as a whole.

Who is in the environmental movement? This is not such an easy question to answer in today's political and market climate. While we can simply identify the movement in terms of the non-governmental organization (NGOs) that set agendas on protecting the environment, that category of actors includes many organizations that may not share similar interests and excludes other organizations that fall outside such a singular definition. Consider the following:

- In 2000, law enforcement officials documented more than 30 acts of sabotage against genetic research. Activists trampled experimental grass fields in Oregon, pruned pinot noir vines and uprooted strawberry fields in California, and hacked down cornfields in Maine. On New Year's Eve, arson destroyed a suite of offices in Michigan State University's Agriculture Hall. The environmental group, the Earth Liberation Front, claimed responsibility, saying it had focused on the building because of the program's ties to biotechnology. ***Are groups identified by the FBI as terrorist organizations part of the environmental movement?***
- In 2006, Environmental Defense was invited to help broker a \$45 billion leveraged buyout of Dallas-based TXU by two private equity firms -- Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and the Texas Pacific Group. Lawsuits to block construction of the plants were filed by a consortium of environmental NGOs as well as several ad hoc business organizations and a coalition of mayors and officials in 24 cities and counties organized by Dallas mayor Laura Miller. To get Environmental Defense and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) to sign off on the deal, the equity firms promised to eliminate plans for eight of the

coal plants, reduce carbon output to 1990 levels by 2020, devote \$400 million to energy efficiency and alternative energy sources, and support a federal cap-and-trade system for greenhouse reductions. ***Is a group that brokers business deals in the same environmental movement as a group that commits arson?***

- In 2000, environmental activists, such as World Wildlife Fund and Amnesty International, joined fifty multinational corporations, such as DaimlerChrysler, Nike, Royal Dutch Shell, Bayer and Unilever, labor unions and the United Nations in signing the "global compact" on environmental protection and human rights. ***Are the corporations in this example part of the environmental movement?***
- In 2007, the U.S. Climate Action Partnership, a consortium of ten blue-chip corporations and four non-governmental organizations, announced a call for federal standards on greenhouse emissions. Other corporations have derided these companies as "Kyoto capitalists" and the "carbon cartel," while an editorial in the *Wall Street Journal* (2007) castigated these "10 jolly green giants" for pursuing a regulatory program "designed to financially reward companies that reduce CO₂ emissions and punish those that don't." ***Are the goals of the corporations of the USCAP consistent with the goals of the environmental movement?***

In short, are all these examples part of the same "environmental" movement? And in them, who is part of the environmental movement and who is not? This chapter will set the stage for the chapters that follow by deconstructing the environmental movement. How is it different from other social movements? Where are its boundaries? Who is in

and who is out? While at first glance these may seem to be simple questions, this paper will use the tools of social network analysis (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Borgatti Everett and Freeman 2002) to depict the environmental movement as an intertwined constellation of networks, each with multiple and differentiated constituencies. It will challenge the simple classifications of “non-governmental organization” or “corporation” as accurate descriptors of who is in and who is out of the movement. In the end, such classifications may serve as misnomers, lumping many organizations or clusters of organizations with varied interests into one category.

BREAKING DOWN THE CONSTITUENCY OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT

When discussing the constituency of the environmental movement, one would natural begin with a discussion of the **non-governmental organizations** that identify themselves as such and constitute a social movement industry (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Strang and Soule 1998; Campbell 2005). This group of organizations is comprised of constituent groups that connect the values of their cause with their personal identity, creating a value congruence that is a potent force for social change. These activist organizations have little material stake in organizational output yet influence that output through ideological activism. They become, what may be described as cultural or institutional entrepreneurs (Troast, Hoffman, Riley and Bazerman 2002), driving change in the norms, values and beliefs of organizational systems.

In 2005, the number of organizations that described themselves as environmental NGOs reached 6,493 (Gale Research 2005). But, are all of these organizations part of

same the environmental movement? The fact is that the term “environmentalist” was not chosen by the organizations that find themselves branded by it. It was a term coined by the press in 1970 to make sense of the 20 million activists that participated in the first Earth Day. As this was an unprecedented event with obvious popular appeal and representative of a new movement, the media used the term in press accounts and it has remained as a definitive label. But Evernden (1985: 125) warns that the very term itself may be a misnomer for such a large group of actors with negative implications.

"The term 'environmentalist' was not chosen by the individuals so described. It was seized upon by members of the popular press as a means of labeling a newly prominent segment of society. . .In fact, the act of labeling a group may constitute an effective means of suppression, even if the label seems neutral or objective. For in giving this particular name, not only have the labelers forced an artificial association on a very diverse group of individuals, but they have also given a terse public statement of what 'those people' are presumed to want. Environmentalists want environment — obviously. But this may be entirely wrong, a possibility that few environmentalists have contemplated even though many have lamented the term itself. For in the very real sense there can only be environment in a society that holds certain assumptions, and there can only be an environmental crisis in a society that believes in environment."

Environmental NGOs are, in fact, a diverse and heterogeneous group. While they share common attention towards issues regarding the natural environment, they differ in how that issue is operationalized or framed (e.g. ecosystem protection, diversity loss, climate change, energy efficiency, ozone depletion, and many others), with implications for the goals they strive for and the location of their supporters within the social structure (Zald and McCarthy 1987). Each of these frames draws in differing and interconnected constituencies.

For example, some NGOs seek completely non-confrontational means to achieve their goals of protecting ecosystems for conservation purposes (e.g. The Nature Conservancy). Some NGOs seek to protect these habitats for the purposes of sport (e.g. Trout Unlimited, Ducks Unlimited). Some are staffed with lawyers and scientists and work within existing institutions to bring about corporate and social change (e.g. the Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental Defense, World Wildlife Fund). Others prefer to remain outside those institutions, relying on less professionally oriented staff and working in a more confrontational style (e.g. Greenpeace USA, Rainforest Action Network). Still others prefer to engage in acts of sabotage and deliberate violation of the law, leading government agencies to label them terrorist groups (e.g. Earth First!, the Earth Liberation Front).

Membership in the environmental movement is indeterminate (Beck 1992). Within the environmental movement there is not a demographic or well-structured political constituency, neither among proponents or opponents of particular environmental policy initiatives. Opposition to environmentalism on the grounds of threatened material interests or aversion to state intervention would be easier to explain than environmental advocacy (Buttel 1992). A high quality environment tends to be a public good, which when achieved cannot be denied to others, even to those who resist environmental reforms. For many environmental issues, those who act to protect the environment can expect to receive no personal material benefits (Buttel 1992). So the targets of their actions are left to decide who is a legitimate representative for environmental concerns.

The indeterminate nature of many environmental policy issues and solutions means that they attract a wide range of supporters cutting across social, economic and demographic lines. Environmental supporters may include **employee groups, labor unions, community groups, consumers, environmental activists, investors, insurers, the government, industry competitors, internal managers and religious groups** (Morrison 1991; Rockefeller and Elder 1992; Hoffman 2000; Brulle 2000; Warner and Sullivan 2004; Selsky and Parker 2005; Gottlieb 2006; Detomasi 2007). All of these constituents have to some degree become active environmental advocates (Hoffman 2000).

Of particular note has been the growing collaboration between NGOs and various **corporations** (Westley and Vredenburg 1991; de Bruijn and Tucker 2002; Rondinelli and London 2003; Pearce and Doh 2005; Galaskiewicz and Sinclair-Colman 2006) and **foundations** (Brulle and Jenkins 2005; Westhues and Einwiller 2006; Prewitt 2006). While such interaction is not new – philanthropic giving between businesses and NGOs began in the nineteenth century with the U.S. Congress allowing a federal income tax deduction for such activity in 1953 (Galaskiewicz and Sinclair-Colman 2006) – the form of this collaboration became more strategic, commercial and political in the 1990s (Galaskiewicz and Sinclair Colman 2006). At that time, more structured alliances between environmental NGOs and corporations (Westley and Vredenburg 1991; Rondinelli and London 2003; Orti 1995) and between foundations and environmental NGOs (Parker and Selsky 2004; Brulle and Jenkins 2005) began to take shape. These collaborations can take many forms, including philanthropic (giving money to NGOs), strategic (event sponsorships and donations of products/equipment), commercial (cause-

related marketing, licensing of names and logos, and scientific collaborations) or political (policy-marketing and lobbying) (Galaskiewicz and Sinclair-Colman 2006).

Beyond this breadth of engaged constituencies, the movement engaged by environmental issues is distinct for its inclusion of two unique actors. The first is a decidedly non-social constituent. More than just a constituency of social advocates, there is also **the environment itself** to contend with. The prominence and power of environmental changes act as a form of social pressure, placing demands on social, political, economic and technical institutions which are unique from other demands that societies face. Events like climate change, species extinction, acid rain, the ozone hole, fisheries collapse, and others focus attention without clarity and sometimes without warning, imposing demands for action and change. While open to social interpretation and enactment (Hoffman and Ocasio 2001), environmental events nonetheless force organizational and institutional interests to devote resources and attention to the issue. In essence, the environment itself becomes a social movement constituent.

The second unique movement participant is a social constituent who is not yet social. Environmental issues (such as ozone depletion, species extinction, and climate change) typically raise basic issues of inter-generational goods, boundaries, and resource claims (Wade-Benzoni 1996). The vast geographic scales and long time horizons involved to preserve the long-term viability of the ecosystem on the behalf of **future generations** are difficult to represent adequately in policy discussions. Since future generations cannot express their interests in contemporary social debates, their needs are open to social interpretation and enactment by cultural and institutional entrepreneurs much like the interpretation of environmental events. The inclusion of these two

unconventional actors expands the range of social movement participation and creates greater challenges for both organizational actors and researchers. In the end, the ambiguity of what is called an environmental activist necessitates a more critical analysis of the boundaries and makeup of this group of organizations (Zald 2007).

THE NETWORK OF NGOS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT

Recent analysis (Hoffman 2009) uses empirical measurement of social network ties (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Borgatti, Everett and Freeman 2002) among NGOs to examine the form of networks within the movement. Drawing boundaries between and linkages among various actors in the movement in terms of network dynamics is important for explaining how the behavior of one set of actors influences the beliefs and actions of another set (Powell, White, Koput and Owen-Smith 2005). A sample pool of the largest 72 environmental groups by budget was gathered from the *Encyclopedia of Associations* (Gale Research 2005). These groups range in size from 100 members to 1.2 million (average 136,000), in budget from \$1 million to \$245 billion (average \$18.5 million) and in date of formation from 1875 to 1995 (average 1958). Overall, while the sample is biased towards large national and international groups, it is a useful sample for developing a picture of one piece of the NGO movement related to the environment and how that sample is clustered into smaller populations.

Mapping of this sample was conducted using subject keywords. Within the *Encyclopedia*, the Gale editorial staff works in conjunction with a content development vendor to create new or updated content on a continuous basis throughout the year. The categories and keywords are assigned by the vendor based on a list created by Gale

Research and reviewed by the editorial staff when the organization's entry is keyed as a new entry. Information is obtained and updated through direct contact with the organization, typically via email or their website. Once the categories and keywords are assigned, they generally don't change. In the rare instance that an organization requests that a particular keyword be assigned to their entry, the editorial staff will oblige as long as the keyword makes sense.

Within the sample set of this study, 28 total keywords were identified by members (with a range of 1 to 5 keywords per NGO). Keywords included: “agriculture,” “bird,” “conservation,” “deer,” “education,” “energy,” “environmental protection,” “fish,” “forestry,” “health,” “international development,” “law,” “marine biology,” “natural resources,” “nuclear weapons,” “paper,” “parks and recreation,” “politics,” “pollution control,” “primates,” “rain forests,” “rangeland,” “tropical studies,” “water,” “wetlands,” “wildlife,” “wood,” and “world affairs.”

Using these keywords as network ties among NGOs, the first network map was created to identify clusters of organizations shown in figure 3-1a. The nodes in the figure represent the 72 NGOs in the sample set. The ties represent common keywords among them.

Insert Figure 3-1a here

Within this network map, three dominant populations capture 96 percent of the sample. Each term reflects a different field frame (Hunt, Benford and Snow 1994) of the population's goal and purpose. The term “pollution control” refers to the direct control of

emissions and effluents into air, water or soil from consumption, heating, agriculture, mining, manufacturing, transportation and other human activities that, left unchecked, will degrade the environment. “Environmental protection” is a broader term, addressing actions at international, national and local levels to prevent and, where possible, reverse environmental degradation of ecosystems. This term often has a legislative component to it. “Conservation” refers to groups that seek the preservation and protection of the environment and the natural things within it, some for its own sake, others for the benefit of human beings. These clusters represent three overlapping but distinct movements within what we call the environmental movement. There are many more.

Looking further at the dataset reveals that smaller sectors emerge around specific issues, as shown in figure 3-1b, and specific species, as shown in figure 3-1c.

Insert Figures 3-1b and 3-1c here

What becomes evident from these network maps is that the constellation of the largest NGOs in the environmental movement is, in fact, an interconnected series of smaller networks based on issues of relevance to the individual members. So, while they may be identified as part of the same movement, they are diverse and heterogeneous in their makeup.

LINKAGES AMONG NGOS, CORPORATIONS AND FOUNDATIONS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT

Further analysis of board interlocks (Hoffman and Bertels 2007) looks more deeply at the patterns of interconnections between these NGOs and corporations and foundations. Boards are charged with the “ultimate responsibility for the non-profit organizations that they oversee” and serve as an important channel for “connecting individual institutions to their larger context” (Ostrower and Stone 2006: 612). Board interlocks are mechanisms for gaining access to critical resources such as information and, of particular importance to NGOs, funding “both because individual board members will influence their corporations’ giving and because the closer connections they have to others will also raise overall giving levels” (Marquis, Glynn, and Davis 2007). But board interlocks also become mechanisms for influence by incorporating “representatives of external groups into the decision-making or advisory structure of an organization” (Scott and Davis 2007: 235). As such they represent a significant measure of interconnection between NGOs and other constituencies.

Using the list of the largest 54 environmental organizations from the *Encyclopedia of Associations* (Gale Research 2005), the lists of the boards of directors was collecting using IRS 990 forms for the years 2000 and 2005. Then this list was cross-referenced with the membership of public U.S. companies found in *Compact Disclosure*[®], a database that provides access to SEC-filed financial and other information contained within Annual Reports, Proxy Statements, and 10-K/20-F filings for over 12,000 companies. Lastly, a list was generated of foundations that had donated more than \$100,000 in any given year between 1999 and 2004 to any of the 54 NGOs on the list through *GuideStar*[®], a database that compiles financial information from the IRS Business Master File of exempt organizations and IRS Forms 990, 990-EZ, and 990-PF

(Philanthropic Research, Inc. 2007). The list of board members for each of these foundations was generated from their websites, annual reports and IRS 990 forms and cross referenced with the database of NGO board members.

Using the aggregate network data from the sample set creates a depiction of an interconnected constellation of actors: 54 NGOs, 425 corporations, and 156 foundations sharing communication ties through 422 common board members for the combined years 2000 and 2005 (361 common board members in 2000 and 383 common board members in 2005). A comparison of the 2000 and 2005 data shows that the overall number of board level ties increased by 3% while the average distance between reachable pairs decreased, suggesting that the individual actors in the field are becoming more closely tied. But this increase in connections is not uniform or homogenous. Centralization within the field increased by 54% suggesting that there are certain areas within the field where clustering among organizations is growing more acute.

Looking more specifically at the types of the changing tie patterns in the sample set, we see that NGOs are becoming more interconnected with other members of the field -- an 18% increase. This increase manifests itself primarily in a 44% increase in ties between NGOs and a 25% increase in ties between NGOs and foundations. Similarly, the density of ties between NGOs increased by 44% and the corresponding measure between NGOs and foundations increased by 23%. A modest 4% increase in ties between NGOs and corporations was also detected (N to C tie density increased by 5%).

With this conceptualization, we can think of the movement forming at the intersection of common channels of dialogue and discussion among three populations: NGOs, corporations and foundations, as shown in figure 3-2. In domain "A" we find a

population of NGOs that were isolates and having ties only with other NGOs. In domains B, C, and D, we find varying types of engagement among NGOs, foundations and corporations.

Insert Figure 3-2 about here

This is a critically important finding as it demonstrates a distinction beyond keywords among NGOs in the environmental movement. It suggests a differentiation in terms of who NGOs consider to be valid partners for engagement and the tactics used to engage them. Some groups define their identity in opposition to corporations and corporate activities. For them, alliances with corporations are anathema. This makes it easy to mobilize action against a clear target. Other groups define their identity in conjunction with business and the capitalist system. For them, alliances with corporations are a useful means to further their agenda.

Looking more closely at the specific actor types within the domains in figure 3-2, we can see that organizations in domains B, C and D (e.g. Environmental Defense and World Wildlife Fund, shown in figure 3-3) have strong networks of ties while those in domain A (e.g. Greenpeace and Rainforest Action Network, shown in figure 3-3) have no such ties.

Insert Figure 3-3 about here

THE RADICAL FLANK EFFECT:

CONSENSUS OR CONFLICT; “DARK GREENS” OR “BRIGHT GREENS”

This distinction between those with business ties and those without is representative of a schism that seems to be emerging between two camps in the environmental movement. Some groups define their identity in a *conflict* orientation to corporations and corporate activities. Other groups define their identity in terms of a *consensus* orientation with business and the capitalist system (Schwartz and Shuva 1992). And still others lie somewhere between these poles.

But all postures lie within the same interconnected environmental movement and this creates an awkward tension as the actions of one group are tied to and influenced by the actions of the other. Both how they are positioned and how they are viewed is central to their ability effect change. Movement positioning falls along a continuum (as depicted in figure 3-4a) where NGOs and corporations can position themselves on the spectrum with the left representing more of a conflict orientation and the right representing more of a consensus orientation. More recent popular terminology within the environmental movement has also emerged to highlight these differences within the environmental movement – “dark greens” move further to the left of the continuum and seek radical political change in the dominant market system, while “bright greens” focus on engaging within the market system to develop better designs and technologies that will ameliorate contemporary environmental problems. Conner and Epstein (2007) describe the core of this schism as the tension between purity and pragmatism and suggest that the gulf between them is widening.

Insert Figure 3-4a here

[Editor layout note: Figures 3-4a and 3-4b should be even with each other on opposite facing pages, 3-4a on the left, 3-4b on the right]

One reason for the widening gulf is funding. NGOs with ties to corporations and foundations have more money. Using least squares regression, there is a strong correlation between the number of corporate and foundation ties and the size of an NGO's budget in both 2000 ($p < 0.001$) and 2005 ($p < 0.01$). This effect was much stronger for corporate ties than for foundation ties. And some within the environmental movement feel that this funding co-opts those who receive it. A recent book by Christine MacDonald (2008), the former media manager at Conservation International, expresses outrage at environmental NGOs for accepting donations from oil, lumber and mining industries without holding them accountable for ongoing pollution practices. She charges that the association between environmental NGOs and corporations has led to a system of co-optation, where the outcome is assisted greenwashing.

But these different strategies are critical for the overall impact of the movement. Both camps are needed for the environmental movement to achieve its objectives (Conner and Epstein 2007). The ability of more moderate, consensus-oriented NGOs to operate as change agents is influenced by the presence of more radical, conflict-oriented ENGOs through what is called the "radical flank effect" (Haines 1984), a mechanism triggered by the bifurcation of a social movement into radical and moderate factions (Gupta 2002). The effect of this polarization within the same movement can have both negative and positive outcomes (Gupta 2002).

Negative radical flank effect. In this view, the effects of more radical organizations in the movement can have a negative effect on moderate groups by creating a comparison effect and a backlash among opposing groups. In this negative radical flank effect (Haines 1984), all members of the environmental movement are viewed in the same way as the more visible radical members. “Even if moderates and radicals embrace considerably different goals and tactics, their coexistence and common identification as members of the same movement field reflects badly on the moderates and harms their ability to achieve their objectives” (Gupta 2002: 6). So, for example, when an environmental extremist group creates headlines for a terrorist act, all environmental groups may be viewed in the same light, thus limiting their ability to operate as legitimate members of social debates. Evidence of this effect can be seen in some public opinion polls. For example, the percentage of people who agree with the statement “most people actively involved in environmental groups are extremists, not reasonable people” increased from 32 percent in 1996 to 41 percent in 2000 (Shellenberger and Nordhaus 2004).

Positive radical flank effect. In this view, the effects of more radical organizations in the movement can have a positive effect on moderate groups by creating a contrast effect (Haines 1984). All members of the environmental movement are viewed in contrast to other members and extreme positions from some members can make other organizations seem more reasonable to movement opponents (McAdam 1992). For example, many have argued that that Martin Luther King was seen as more moderate by the American public in the 1960s because he was viewed in contrast to the more radical Malcolm X militancy. Similarly, radicals in the civil rights movement in the 1960s

increased the level of funding for moderate groups (Haines 1984). Bringing this effect to the environmental movement, we can see radical groups pushing organizations towards engaging with moderate groups. For example, when the Rainforest Action Network threatens to protest at Staple's for the company's limited offerings of recycled paper, the company solicited the assistance of what were perceived as more moderate groups, like Environmental Defense. While still part of the same movement, Environmental Defense was seen as more moderate and therefore more palatable and legitimate for a partnership. In the 1970s, Russell Train, second administrator of the EPA once quipped, "Thank God for the David Brower's of the world. They make the rest of us seem reasonable" (US Environmental Protection Agency 1993).

The strategy of flank effects. Positioning on the continuum in figure 3-4a becomes critical for understanding the dynamics of social change and the players that promote it. This consideration is important for funding, membership, partnerships (with companies and other NGOs), media attention, and ability to mobilize people – in short power to play the role of institutional entrepreneur. Further, it is important to understand where your constituency lies and the positioning they are willing to support. Earth First! or the Earth Liberation Front, for example, find that culturally (and legally) illegitimate activities on the far left of the continuum can further their goals and bolster their support within the narrow segment of society that endorse such controversial action (Elsbach and Sutton 1992). Other groups, such as The Nature Conservancy or Environmental Defense Fund, prefer to work more towards the right, within the institutions of society and utilize legitimate market based activities to achieve their ends. When the position matches their constituency's expectations, resources flow. But if an NGO drifts too far from their core

position on the continuum, they may find membership and donations impacted. For example, in the mid-1990s, Greenpeace found that their reputation suffered for their efforts to work with corporations in a less confrontational style. They were moving more to the right on the continuum. To correct this repositioning, the group staged an “eco-commando” action on the Brent Spar oil rig in 1995, being sure to have the media alerted and on hand. This action reestablished their more confrontational image and moved them back to the left of the continuum.

Application of this continuum is not restricted to NGOs. It also applies to corporations. Shown in figure 3-4b, corporations can range from conflict to consensus orientation with respect to NGOs. This has been illustrated most vividly in the debate within corporate circles around the issue of climate change. In 1997, BP was the first to shift its position on the issue and acknowledge that climate change was a problem that needed to be addressed. It is doubtful that this moderate consensus-oriented position could have been as effective if Exxon-Mobil had not staked out the more radical, conflict-oriented position of disputing the science. Even more recently, as some companies have begun taking proactive actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and calling for federal regulation, other companies have openly resented these actions and derided them with such terms as “Kyoto capitalists” or the “carbon cartel.” For example, when General Electric announced plans to publish its first “Citizenship Report,” the *Wall Street Journal* was again critical that environmentalists had made their “biggest catch yet” and pondered whether “capitalists are abandoning capitalism” (Murray 2005: A2). To mirror the popular terminology among environmental NGOs, might we refer to the more radical corporate organizations as “dark blue” and the more moderate organizations

as “bright blue”? Such terminology can be helpful in understanding the positioning of players on these issues and the interaction effects among them.

Insert Figure 3-4b here

[Editor layout note: Figures 3-4a and 3-4b should be even with each other on opposite facing pages, 3-4a on the left, 3-4b on the right]

The radical flank effect is in place in both the corporate and NGO continuums. And we can hypothesize that, while both the negative and positive effects can be seen in various populations, we would expect the negative flank effect to most prevalent at the extreme conflict-oriented positions, as negative projections on the entire community they oppose supports their orientation. The positive flank effect should be most prevalent towards the consensus-oriented positions on the continuum as these organizations – whether corporate or NGO -- will likely have a more nuanced understanding of the breadth of the continuum given their experiences through engagement.

CONCLUSION

When asking the question – who is in the environmental movement? – it is best to think of the movement as a series of intertwined networks comprised of a diverse array of actors. As such, they “can be characterized exclusively as a web-like structure of informal, unorganized relations of cooperation and communication among local cells” (Zald and McCarthy 1987: 162). These cells include not only NGOs, but also

corporations, foundations and other organizational actors. Their presence within the movement is a signal of both convergence of ideas between change agents and change targets, but also as a signal of cooptation and conformity. Through steady interaction NGOs can find themselves aligning more with the corporations they are trying to influence than the cause to which they were originally attached (Michels 1962). By understanding the network configuration of the web-like structure that is the environmental movement, we can better assess the form their agenda takes, the resources that are brought to bear and the channels of influence that are utilized.

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Figure 3-1a
Network Map based on Keyword Ties – Three Dominant Populations






Figure 3-2
The Environmental Movement as an Intersecting
Domain of Organizational Populations



	2000	2005
A	40.74%	48.15%
B	7.41%	11.11%
C	25.93%	27.78%
D	25.93%	12.96%
Total	100%	100%

Figure 3-3
NGO Networks of Ties with Corporations and Foundations



● NGO ▲ Corporation ■ Foundation

Figure 3-4a
NGO Populations on a Continuum




Figure 3-4b
Corporate Populations on a Continuum

