

**Does Casework Build Support for a Strong Parliament?  
Legislative Representation and Public Opinion in Morocco and Algeria**

by

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## **DEDICATION**

This work is dedicated to the nearly two thousand study participants who generously shared their time and perspectives.

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## **PART I**

### **Introduction**

## **CHAPTER I**

### **Why Do Nominally Democratic Legislatures Enhance Authoritarianism?**

#### **Legislative Politics in Multiple Arenas**

### **Introduction**

Recent scholarship on the role of parliaments in political development reveals two findings which seem contradictory, at least on the surface. On the one hand, Steven M. Fish shows that Eastern European countries whose parliaments enjoyed stronger constitutional prerogatives at independence were more likely, controlling for starting level of democracy and other factors, to be electoral democracies or liberal democracies by 2000.<sup>1</sup> This finding emphasizes the importance of legislatures for establishing horizontal and vertical control at political transition and preventing regime backsliding into a system with a strong and unaccountable executive branch of government.<sup>2</sup>

But nominally democratic parliaments, when they are constrained by the executive branch of government, may not always increase the likelihood of democratic transition and survival. Instead, they may have the opposite effect. Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski show that authoritarian regimes which maintained legislatures enjoyed longer tenures than those

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<sup>1</sup> Steven M. Fish, "Creative Constitutions: How Do Parliamentary Powers Shape the Electoral Arena?" in *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, ed. Andreas Schedler (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).

<sup>2</sup> See Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, & Reequilibration* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978): 70.

without such institutions.<sup>3</sup> The authors offer an elite-level explanation for this pattern, arguing that autocratic institutions lengthen regime tenure because they reduce internal threats to rule by coopting opposition elites and bringing them into the regime.

Why do partisan legislatures lengthen the tenure of authoritarian regimes? I agree with Ellen Lust-Okar who writes that a fully convincing answer is not yet well established.<sup>4</sup> While authoritarian regimes are skilled at the creation of a political class and the cooptation of parties, and in this sense Gandhi and Przeworski's logic is plausible and even convincing, their explanation neglects mass-level dynamics. Further, it fails to address why members of parliament accept this outcome (i.e. why cooptation is an outcome within the winset of both incumbent and opposition elites) and why ordinary citizens accept weak legislative institutions (i.e. why ordinary citizens do not contest for stronger legislatures).

In order to begin to shed light on this larger puzzle, I investigate how institutions influence member behavior and how the deputy-citizen link shapes constituent attitudes toward the parliament. I argue that mass political attitudes are an important but neglected part of a causal story which accounts for the empirical regularity identified by Gandhi and Przeworski.

My analysis unfolds in three parts. First, I argue that representation is a mechanism of cooptation occurring as members bargain for reelection in multiple--incumbent and mass--arenas. I investigate how incumbent preferences, which vary by regime type, shape legislative institutions and, in turn, how these institutions influence the level of and relationship between participation in debate and provision of casework. The findings demonstrate that parliamentary institutions vary within a class of authoritarian regimes and shape members' provision of programmatic and particularistic benefits.

Second, I contend that incumbent preferences for debate in Morocco create an institutional opening for opposition elites, in this case Islamist deputies, to more fully develop party-focused strategies and programmatic benefits than their counterparts in Algeria. I evaluate competing explanations for understanding why Moroccan Islamist deputies are more likely to perceive incentives to cultivate a party reputation than are members of other parties and why they are more likely to participate in committee debate, but no more or less likely to have higher caseloads. Algerian Islamist deputies do not differ from other parties on these outcomes. These findings demonstrate that variation exists in the activities of members in authoritarian settings and

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<sup>3</sup> Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats," *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 11 (2007).

<sup>4</sup> Ellen Lust-Okar, "Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan," *Unpublished manuscript*: 2.

run counter to conventional wisdom which suggests that Islamist parties gain popular support through service provision.<sup>5</sup>

Third, I argue that incumbent strategies to engineer loyal parliaments have implications for public opinion. I suggest that limited popular support for a strong legislature may serve as a contextual factor affecting the size of the winset in future rounds of bargaining over constitutional prerogatives of the legislative vis-à-vis the executive branch. I investigate the effects of casework on public opinion and find that it does not enhance constituent support for a parliament with the power to make laws. Rather, perceptions that elections are free and that the work of deputies is transparent and effective are related to greater support for a strong parliament. This conclusion has implications for understanding why nominally-democratic legislatures enhance authoritarian rule.

### **Institutionalism and the Study of Authoritarian Politics**

The slowing of the third wave of democratization has led to increased scholarly attention on the dynamics of non-democratic political settings. This project seeks to address and extend two relatively neglected areas of this literature by focusing on the dynamics of formal institutions and on the relationship between elite-level bargaining and public opinion.

#### **The Dynamics of Formal Institutions**

Although it is non-controversial that the institutions of authoritarian politics should be studied with rigorous empirical methods, there is limited work examining the processes by which formal institutions, including parliaments, operate.<sup>6</sup> References to legislatures figure centrally in nearly all of the country cases in *Political Liberalization in the Arab World* and have been the subject of a seminal work, *Arab Legislatures*. However, few systematic studies investigate cross-national or sub-national variation in the dynamics of legislative institutions, the activities of members, and the attitudes of ordinary citizens toward the legislature.<sup>7</sup> The reoccurrence of the

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<sup>5</sup> See, for example, Augustus Richard Norton, "Hizballah: From Radicalism to Pragmatism?" *Middle East Policy* 5, no. 4 (1998).

<sup>6</sup> Ellen Lust-Okar, *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

<sup>7</sup> Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denoeux, and Robert Springborg, *Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), Bahgat Korany and Saad Amrani, "Explosive Civil Society and Democratization from Below: Algeria," in *Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World*, ed. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998). For examples of work on MENA region parliaments or councils, see: Kim et al. (1984) on Turkey, Korea, and Kenya; Baaklini et al. (1999) on Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, Yemen, and

“weak-legislature conclusion” in some comparative politics literature suggests that conventional wisdom, perhaps until very recently, reflected the view that formal institutions and institutional dynamics in non-democratic political settings are a black box of idiosyncratic and personalized processes ill-suited to study with the tools of modern political science.<sup>8</sup>

In this project, I consider differences in the level of participation in debate and provision of casework among Moroccan and Algerian members and investigate how the preferences of incumbents, which vary by regime type, account for these differences.

### **Public Opinion toward Parliaments**

Second, studies of authoritarian institutions focus on how institutions, particularly electoral institutions, are shaped by elite-level bargaining. This literature misses other ways institutions matter. In particular, it neglects the reasons authoritarian governments implement the “trappings” of democracy in the first place, among them the effects of parliaments on the public’s image of the regime.<sup>9</sup>

In this project, I examine why citizens hold different opinions about the importance of having a legislature with strong prerogatives and test whether the representative link shapes these orientations. I ask whether the provision of casework—which the data suggest is one of the parliament’s most robust functions--influences popular support for democratic political institutions and report on the practical significance of these findings for legislative strengthening programs.

### **Why Have Dynamics of Legislatures under Authoritarianism Been Missed?**

Why have elite and mass dynamics of legislatures in authoritarian settings been missed? In the past, misconceptions about authoritarian legislatures have probably been the most important contributors to the lack of research. These include the belief that authoritarian legislatures are remnants of colonialism, that the dynamics of legislatures are irrational or

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Egypt; Weinbaum (1975) on Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan; Al-Haj (2001) on Oman; Saif (2001) on Yemen; and, Baaklini (1978) on Kuwait.

<sup>8</sup> Michael L. Mezey, "The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World," in *Handbook of Legislative Research*, ed. Samuel C. Patterson, Gerhard Loewenberg, and Malcolm E. Jewell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985): 734.

<sup>9</sup> See Marshall and Jagers, as cited in Andreas Schedler, "The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism," in *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006):12.

idiosyncratic, or that parliaments are merely “window-dressing” and do not have important political outcomes.<sup>10</sup>

The view that authoritarian legislatures are “window-dressing” is being replaced by new work showing that parliaments have important political consequences.<sup>11</sup> Yet, as I also mentioned, our understanding of why this is the case is hindered by a lack of cross-national and sub-national data informing how authoritarian institutions operate. In contrast to scholarship in consolidated democracies, where the processes of formal and informal institutions are a major domain of inquiry and are analyzed as both dependent and independent variables, scholarship on “weak” authoritarian legislatures is rare, and that which exists is largely descriptive.<sup>12</sup>

Finally, practical concerns may have contributed to the dearth of studies on formal institutions, particularly those examining variation in legislative behavior and its relationship to the attitudes of constituents. Studies of the dynamics of political institutions require extensive time and resources, particularly when large-scale data collection among members and citizens is required. Perceived, and in some cases actual, barriers to political institutions in authoritarian regimes have undoubtedly prevented scholars from undertaking the type of research that has been conducted on national legislatures, such as the Congress, for a half-century or more.<sup>13</sup> The data collection efforts associated with this present study demonstrates that such work is possible even while important challenges exist.

### **Empirical Questions**

In order to address these gaps, I investigate three sets of questions in the primary empirical chapters 4, 5, and 6.

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<sup>10</sup> Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg, *Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions.*: Chapter 1.

<sup>11</sup> Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats."

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, Ahmed A. Saif, *A Legislature in Transition: The Yemeni Parliament* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001).

<sup>13</sup> Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denoeux, and Robert Springborg, *Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg, *Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions.*: 18-22.

## Chapter 4

First, why do parliaments—“*democracy’s* premier institution”—exist in authoritarian regimes?<sup>14</sup> If they do not legislate independently or control the executive, what role do they play? Why does cooptation of members of parliament work? McGuire and Olson suggest that the outcome of cooptation makes both incumbent and opposition elites better off.<sup>15</sup> But why should this be the case? If opposition elites wish to govern, why would they cooperate or acquiesce in exchange for limited policy concessions?

In Chapter 4 I argue that members’ choice of representative activities is a form of bargaining in multiple arenas. I suggest that understanding how members simultaneously consider the preferences of regime power-holders and constituents allows us to better understand why cooptation of parliamentary elites occurs. I argue that cooptation occurs as members make strategic choices among two goods—legislative responsiveness and constituency responsiveness—in order to maximize the probability of re-election. Members must consider payoffs in two arenas: (1) regime power-holders, who exert influence over electoral structuring and access to patronage, and (2) constituents, whose support the member must mobilize in order to enhance the probability of being elected. I argue that, given preferences of regime power-holders for a weak legislature, members must acquiesce on legislative responsiveness to acquire resources to provide constituency responsiveness—the primary support-generating preference of constituencies. This acquiescence constitutes the mechanism of cooptation, but I suggest that it is amplified by mass-level political preferences for constituency service. I show that incumbent preferences for level of debate and casework capacity vary in the two countries and explain why Moroccan deputies are more likely than Algerian deputies to have higher caseloads and to engage more frequently in parliamentary debate. These results deepen our understanding of how and why cooptation of parliamentary elites occurs and how it may vary by regime type.

## Chapter 5

Second, if authoritarian legislatures exist to provide privileges for cooperation to potential political competitors (i.e. if members are coopted), why do many legislators go to their districts and provide constituency service? Why do they vary from one another in the types and

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<sup>14</sup> Quote taken from Yun-Han Chu, Larry Diamond, and Doh Chull Shin, "How People View Democracy: Halting Progress in Korea and Taiwan," *Journal of Democracy* 12, no. 1 (2001): 131, emphasis mine.

<sup>15</sup> Martin C. McGuire and Mancur Olson, Jr., "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," *Journal of Economic Literature* 34 (1996).

level of services they provide to their constituents? How are incentives to cultivate a personal vote and actual caseloads explained by institutional variation and other systematic factors?

In an analysis of data relevant to these questions, I find three puzzling empirical regularities. First, comparative institutions literature suggests that closed-list proportional representation (PR) systems limit incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and to provide casework. Although we do not have a clear baseline from other authoritarian country cases, we observe levels of personal reputation-seeking behavior among members of parliament in Morocco and Algeria which appear high. Further, conventional wisdom suggests that more inclusive party list selectorates should encourage personal reputation-seeking activities. Yet deputies from Islamist parties, whose party list selection procedure is more inclusive than that of other parties, perceive greater incentives to cultivate a party reputation than their non-Islamist counterparts.

In Chapter 5 I address these surprising patterns by suggesting that parliamentary institutions have “mechanical” and “psychological” effects on members’ perceptions of incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and to provide casework. I argue that the higher level of centrality of the Moroccan parliament provides an institutional opening which affects the strategies of opposition elites, in this case Islamist deputies, in Morocco differently from in Algeria, where such an opening does not exist. These results inform work on the strategies of Islamist parties.

## **Chapter 6**

Finally, why do constituents vary in their support for democracy and strong democratic institutions? Does constituency service improve support for a strong parliament with the power to make laws? Is casework a form of representation which enhances popular demand for democracy? Does casework, even if it is particularistic at best and clientalistic at worst, enhance support for having a legislature with stronger prerogatives vis-à-vis the executive?

Most literature examining public opinion toward democracy in authoritarian regimes focuses on demographic, religious, and political economic determinants of support in the Arab world. However, research from other world regions suggests that citizens’ evaluations of how well institutions deliver on human rights, freedom, and transparency is a strong predictor of support for democracy and democratic institutions. The data suggest that while members shape the attitudes of ordinary citizens, casework is not a form of representation which enhances support for having a strong legislature. I argue that this result adds to our understanding of how


mass-level dynamics are linked to elite-level bargaining and why nominally democratic legislatures are associated with longer regime tenure.

### **A Conceptual Map of Legislative Politics in Multiple Arenas**

To organize my analysis of data relevant to these three sets of questions, I develop a conceptual map of legislative politics comprised of three arenas of political activity and three links or relationships between these arenas (See Figure I. 1.). The framework I propose serves two functions. First, it highlights two arenas of political activity—the members’ representative behaviors and mass political opinion—which are missing from Gandhi and Przeworski’s explanation but which are integral to understanding the empirical regularity they identify. The conceptual map further illustrates how the three arenas of political activity (Levels I, II, and III) are related to one another (Links I, II, and III).

Second, the map provides an organizational structure within which analyses of political dynamics at each of the three levels fit. Taken together, the six components of the conceptual map sketch a broader argument about how mass and elite-level dynamics are connected, or, more specifically, how the nested game of institutional design and bargaining over the substantive outcome of elections occurs in multiple arenas and may affect regime tenure. Within the scope of this project and with the available data, I do not test this broader argument. Rather, I make a series of micro-level casual arguments about political dynamics within each of the three arenas and intend for the framework to encourage future work on the significance of institutional dynamics for regime survival and breakdown.

**FIGURE I. 1. A Conceptual Map of Legislative Politics in Multiple Arenas**



### **Arenas**

The conceptual map is comprised of three arenas of political activity: political institutions, representatives' activities, and public opinion. In each of Chapter 4, 5, and 6, I explain variation in political outcomes in each of these three arenas.

### *Arena 1: Parliamentary Institutions (Chapter 4)*

The first level or arena of political activity is parliamentary institutions. In Chapter 4 I examine how institutions are shaped by incumbent preferences and affect the dynamics of parliamentary politics.

Parliamentary institutions include both formal rules and informal norms.<sup>16</sup> In this project I focus on three types of formal laws and rules. These formal institutions structure: (1) Legislative elections (Who will be elected and how?), (2) The internal functioning of the parliament (How will members conduct themselves?), and, (3) The external linkages of the parliament to other government entities (What powers will the legislature have vis-à-vis the executive branch of government and the bureaucracy?). Formal institutions and rules are contained in legal texts, principally the constitution; organic laws governing parliamentary functioning (e.g. “Règlement Intérieur de l’Assemblée Populaire Nationale”, Algeria); and organic laws governing elections and party organization (e.g. “Loi n° 36-04 relative aux parties politiques”, Morocco, and “Order Enacting an Organic Law Governing the Electoral System”, Algeria). In Chapter 4, for example, I identify constitutional rules which determine whether members are allowed to hold a second public or private function; these rules vary by country and help explain differences in caseload.

### *Arena 2: Representative Behavior (Chapter 5)*

The second arena of political activity is members’ representative activities. In Chapter 5, and to an extent in Chapter 4, I explain how representative behavior is shaped by opportunities and constraints created by institutions and other characteristics of members and their districts. I use a four-part understanding of representation discussed in Chapter 3. Generally, by representatives’ activities I mean casework (i.e. helping citizens solve problems, including problems related to government bureaucracy); participation in debate in parliament; district projects; and communication with constituents. Chapter 3 discusses the tension associated with studying the behavior of members in authoritarian institutions as representation.

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<sup>16</sup> March and Olsen define formal institutions as “relatively stable collection[s] of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations”. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” *American Political Science Review* 78, no. 3 (1984): 948.

### *Arena 3: Public Opinion (Chapter 6)*

The third arena or level in the map is public opinion. In Chapter 6 I investigate how popular support for a parliament with the power to make laws is formed. Principally, I examine items in the survey which measure whether constituents want their country to have a parliament and, if they do, whether the parliament should have the power to make laws or should simply advise the government.

### **Links**

The links in the conceptual map reflect my best guess about the broader relationships among the levels. Although I test micro-level hypotheses within each arena of political activity, I do not test the relationships represented by the links.

### *Link I (Chapter 4)*

In analyses corresponding to Level I, I investigate how incumbent preferences for capacity and level of debate correspond to particular institutional rules and, in turn, how these rules affect the level and combination of representative goods members choose. I assume that parliamentary institutions are the outcomes of elite-level bargaining and that they create opportunities and constraints which shape the extent to which members participate in debate and provide casework. The data show that both Moroccan and Algerian members provide programmatic benefits within parameters defined by incumbents. However, because incumbent preferences for level of debate differ by regime type, provision of programmatic benefits reduces members' ability to provide particularistic benefits in Algeria, but enhances it in Morocco. This relationship adds detail to our understanding of how and why cooptation of parliamentary elites occurs and demonstrates that the dynamics of cooptation vary systematically in two cases with distinct regime types.

### *Link II (Chapter 5)*

In analyses corresponding to Level II, I test how incentives to cultivate a personal or party reputation, as well as participation in debate and provision of casework, are influenced by both institutional and non-institutional factors. The evidence suggests that all members may

participate in debate and provide casework, but that opposition members in Morocco perceive stronger incentives to foster a party reputation and to provide programmatic benefits than their non-Islamist counterparts in response to the greater institutional opening in Morocco. To illustrate the broader significance of this finding, I argue that the provision of programmatic and particularistic benefits shapes the quality of the representative link members establish (or fail to establish) with constituents. I suggest that this relationship enhances our understanding of how Islamist and other opposition groups adopt different strategies to maximize electoral outcomes given variation in the institutional structures and rules of the game.

### *Link III (Chapter 6)*

In analyses corresponding to Level III, I test whether casework provision and different forms of contact between members and citizens enhance support for having a parliament with the power to make laws. The data suggest that a link exists, but that perceptions of transparency and effectiveness among members and institutions, not provision of particularistic benefits, improves support for a strong parliament. Link III reflects an argument about the broader significance of these findings for future rounds of elite-level bargaining. Depressed public support for a strong parliament is, in a sense, the final link in a cycle of authoritarian governance in which depressed popular support for a strong parliament affects the size of the winset between incumbent and opposition elites in future rounds of bargaining over constitutional prerogatives of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive. I suggest that these results add detail to our understanding of why constituents in political systems with coopted parliaments do not overwhelmingly support robust parliamentary powers and how these conditions may contribute to longer regime tenures.

### **Legislators as Links**

Previous work on legislatures in developed democracies seeks to explain why legislative institutions evolve, why legislators engage in particular representative activities (e.g. casework), and why these practices affect, or fail to affect, public opinion and voting behavior. In some cases, research makes explicit how two of these arenas of political activity—institutions, representative behaviors, and public opinion—are inter-related and affect larger, more significant matters such as political development, representation, and accountability. Few, if any, studies link dynamics in all three arenas, however.

Here I highlight insights from two bodies of literature. The first links legislatures with political development, suggesting that the legislative strengthening is a core process of democratic consolidation;<sup>17</sup> that the strength of legislative prerogatives at transition is an important factor in democratic survivability;<sup>18</sup> and that mass perceptions of the transparency of legislative elections is a factor affecting whether transition to democratic governance occurs.<sup>19</sup> A second group of studies suggests that members of parliament shape attitudes of ordinary citizens about institutions. This project seeks to integrate and extend these insights.

## **Legislatures and Political Development**

Although modernization theory held a central place in studies of democratization for some time, Samuel P. Huntington first conceptualized political development as institutionalization in a 1965 article, “Political Development and Political Decay”.<sup>20</sup> In his later work, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Huntington developed further the notion that political development is characterized by “subprocesses”—differentiation, equality, participation, capacity, and institutionalization—and not by preconditions, spawned numerous fruitful research programs.<sup>21</sup> Although Huntington did not explicitly examine legislatures, his ideas contributed to a literature from the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s which theorized about the process of legislative institutionalization.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).

<sup>18</sup> Steven M. Fish, "Creative Constitutions: How Do Parliamentary Powers Shape the Electoral Arena?" in *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, ed. Andreas Schedler (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).

<sup>19</sup> Michael Herb, "Princes, Parliaments, and the Prospects for Democracy in the Gulf," in *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, ed. Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005).

<sup>20</sup> Karen L. Remmer, "Theoretical Decay and Theoretical Development: The Resurgence of Institutional Analysis," *World Politics* 50, no. 1 (1997).

<sup>21</sup> Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. See, for example, Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*: 93. In a book devoted to understanding problems of democratic consolidation, Diamond also identifies three processes of democratization—democratic deepening, legitimation and institutionalization. Institutionalization refers to the strengthening the state administrative apparatus, the institutions of representation, and the structure that ensure horizontal accountability, justice, and the rule of law. While Diamond identifies legislatures and their development as core to the process of democratic consolidation, he does not extensively reference empirical studies which test how this occurs.

<sup>22</sup> Richard Sisson defines institutionalization as “the creation and persistence of valued rules, procedures, and patterns of behavior that enable the successful accommodation of new configurations of political claimants and/or demands within a given organization whether it be a party, a legislature, or a state”. Richard Sisson, "Comparative Legislative Institutionalization: A Theoretical Explanation," in *Legislatures in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Allan Kornberg (New York: David McKay Company, 1973).

## Legislators and Legislative Strengthening

Four theories have been posited for how legislative institutionalization occurs.<sup>23</sup> First, Fred Riggs, Richard Sisson, and Marvin G. Weinbaum argue that changes in the salience or viability of the legislature result from external forces out of the control of the legislature.<sup>24</sup> Examples include an abrupt expansion or contraction in executive powers, a radical modification in the configuration of parliamentary parties, a revision in formal constitutional procedures, a change in societal norms regarding the legislature, or a change in the level of support accorded to the legislature by attentive publics.

Second, changes in the internal capacity of a legislature—increases in “resources and expertise that will allow it to perform the functions to which it theoretically is entitled”—could improve its independent role in policymaking.<sup>25</sup> Abdo I. Baaklini and James J. Heaphey examined legislative reforms in Brazil, which they say focused on efficiency, not political oriented reforms, and therefore lead to increased salience of the parliament.<sup>26</sup> R. B. Jain showed that reforms in the Indian Lok Sabha ensured the effective utilization of time, improved the committee system, increased the institution’s legislative oversight capacity, and improved the effectiveness of individual members of parliament.<sup>27</sup>

Two final causes are of particular interest to the present study. In several essays in *Comparative Legislative Reforms and Innovations*, Baaklini and Heaphey argued that members of parliament are important agents in the promoting of legislative viability, durability, institutionalization, and salience of the legislature.<sup>28</sup> According to Kim, Barkan, Turan, and Jewell, “[f]or legislative institutionalization to occur, the activities of the legislature must be valued both by the legislature’s own members and by those external to the organization, in this instance, members of the public, members of locally based elites, and those members of the nation’s ruling elite who determine what the substance of legislative activity shall be”.<sup>29</sup> For

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid.: 19.

<sup>24</sup> Fred Riggs, "Legislative Structures: Some Thoughts on Elected National Assemblies," in *Legislatures in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Allan Kornberg (New York: David McKay Company, 1973), Sisson, "Comparative Legislative Institutionalization: A Theoretical Explanation," Robert Weinbaum, in *Comparative Legislatures*, ed. Michael L. Mezey (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979).

<sup>25</sup> Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg, *Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions*: 63.

<sup>26</sup> Abdo I. Baaklini and James J. Heaphey, *Legislative Institution Building in Brazil, Costa Rica, and Lebanon* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976).

<sup>27</sup> See R. B. Jain in Abdo I. Baaklini and James J. Heaphey, eds., *Comparative Legislative Reforms and Innovations* (Albany, NY: SUNY, 1977).

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Chong Lim Kim, Joel D. Barkan, Ilter Turan, and Malcolm E. Jewell, *The Legislative Connection: The Politics of Representation in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1983): 12.

these authors, members, by their role in shaping the beliefs of constituents about the importance of having a strong, autonomous parliament, are crucial to understanding why legislatures remain weak.

### **The Representative Link and Mass Political Attitudes**

A number of studies suggest that legislators serve as unique and consequential links between the formal institution of the parliament and the constituents they are constitutionally mandated to represent. Through the 1960s and 1970s, the legislative institutionalization literature was concerned with understanding this unique function of legislators in linking the national government and local population in a geographical constituency. In *Legislative Connections*, for example, Chong Lim Kim, Joel D. Barkan, Ilter Turan, and Malcolm E. Jewell argue that members of legislatures in Kenya, Turkey, and South Korea link citizens in the periphery with a single, centralized state.<sup>30</sup> Other studies viewed members of national legislatures as the ideal and only intermediary between citizens and national policy elites which served to integrate diverse regions and ethnic group and mobilize support for national public policy.<sup>31</sup> Robert Weinbaum observed that legislators build confidence in the government and strengthen a sense of political identity based increasingly on geographic representation and less on sect, clan, or other allegiances. He writes:

Individual legislators, regardless of their performances as lawmakers . . . are customarily unsurpassed for their effectiveness as middlemen. Typically, no other set of national actors has a better defined clientele and few are perceived as more accessible or legitimate ombudsmen . . . Their interventions are no less consequential, however, because they do not regularly raise issues of broad public policy. For the activities of elected representatives that help satisfy even unmomentous demands cannot be negligible where, as in much of the Middle East, central governments remain remote and suspect for large segments of the population. Any routinization of communications with national administrators that brings familiarity and increases trust becomes a suitable, if necessary gradual, means of loosening deep-rooted parochial and sectarian allegiances.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Michael L. Mezey, "The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World," in *Handbook of Legislative Research*, ed. Samuel C. Patterson Gerhard Loewenberg, Malcolm E. Jewell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).

<sup>32</sup> Marvin G. Weinbaum, in *Legislatures in Plural Societies: The Search for Cohesion in National Development*, ed. Albert F. Eldridge (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1977): 96.

These early studies suggested that legislators act as a link between government institutions and ordinary citizens. Several decades later, work on democratization again turned to the ways that formal institutions shape the attitudes and orientations of constituents.

*Institutions and Support for Democracy in Consolidating Democracies*

Evidence from Latin America, Eastern Europe, and East Asia suggests the importance of perceptions of institutional performance in understanding support for democracy. In Korea, Doh Chull Shin and Peter McDonough find that a scale measure of perceived level of democracy and the level of satisfaction with the way democracy is working are the most salient predictors of support for the legitimacy of democracy.<sup>33</sup> Ji-Young Kim finds in Korea that perceptions of poor institutional performance, especially corruption, lower the likelihood of voting and levels of trust in democratic institutions.<sup>34</sup> In this connection, Shin and McDonough find among Koreans that the belief that the government affects respondents as individuals is particularly salient in their evaluations of democratic institutions.<sup>35</sup>

Similarly, evidence from Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America demonstrates that legitimacy of democracy is threatened by the inability of many states to build institutions which safeguard liberty, transparency, and rule of law. Richard Rose, William Mishler, Christian Haerpfer find in Central and Eastern Europe that evaluations of the former regime vis-à-vis perceptions of freedom in the current regime are central to predicting why citizens view democracy as the most legitimate form of governance.<sup>36</sup> In particular, views about corruption—perceptions that privileged ties to the state unfairly benefit a narrow capitalist elite—are associated with lower support for democracy.<sup>37</sup>

In *Developing Democracy*, Larry Diamond summarizes the findings of studies examining the impact of institutional performance on constituents' beliefs about the most appropriate political regime for their country. He writes, "[s]upport of democracy is not strongly correlated with perceptions of systemic efficiency or satisfaction with near-term performance, but rather with the political performance of the system, or how well it delivers on promises of freedom and

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<sup>33</sup> Doh Chull Shin and Peter McDonough, "The Dynamics of Popular Reactions to Democratization in Korea," *Journal of Public Policy* 19, no. 1 (1999).

<sup>34</sup> Ji-Young Kim, "'Bowling Together' Isn't a Cure-All: The Relationship between Social Capital and Political Trust in South Korea," *International Political Science Review* 26, no. 2 (2005).

<sup>35</sup> Shin and McDonough, "The Dynamics of Popular Reactions to Democratization in Korea."

<sup>36</sup> Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies* (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers, 1998).

<sup>37</sup> Judith S. Kullberg and William Zimmerman, "Liberal Elites, Socialist Masses, and Problems of Russian Democracy," *World Politics* 51, no. 3 (1999).

democracy.” In his words, “. . . beliefs about the legitimacy of democracy are shaped more by political than economic performance and, in fact, have many causal sources, some of which do not relate to performance of the system at all”.<sup>38</sup> These insights suggest the need to test not only the role of perceptions of how institutions are providing reform in shaping support for democracy but also how direct interaction between institutions and citizens in the formation of these crucial beliefs and attitudes.

#### *Studies of Popular Attitudes toward Democracy in Authoritarian Contexts*

Scholars analyzing survey data from authoritarian political settings, mainly Arab countries, have recently been concerned with dispelling stereotypes that cultural and religious factors best explained why support of democracy was not unequivocal and widespread in Arab countries.<sup>39</sup> Analyses of these data, thus, set out to address notions that deterministic cultural background induces Middle Eastern peoples to accept patrimonial leaders or to maintain tribalism which is at odds with citizenship in a democratic state, or that Islam is incompatible with democracy and therefore Muslim-majority nations are unlikely or unable to transition to democracy.<sup>40</sup> The results of a number of analyses of public opinion data suggest that rather than religious factors, political economic and country-specific events are among the most important explanatory variables for unconstrained support of democracy among ordinary citizens in Arab countries.<sup>41</sup>

While this literature demonstrated the extent of support for democracy in the Arab world and the role of demographic, cultural and religious, political economy, and country-specific factors in shaping support for democracy, it neglected the ways in which institutions shape these evaluations. This literature has not yet fully incorporated insights from other world regions about the importance of evaluations of parliaments and parties, as well as political outputs of democracy, in explaining variation in individual beliefs in the legitimacy of democratic institutions. Interactions with members of parliaments are absent from all present studies of popular support for democracy in authoritarian political settings.

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<sup>38</sup> Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*: 200.

<sup>39</sup> See, for example, Jill Crystal, "Authoritarianism in the Arab World," *World Politics* 46, no. 1 (1994).

<sup>40</sup> Hisham Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Moataz A. Fattah, *Democratic Values in the Muslim World* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).

<sup>41</sup> See, for example, Mark Tessler, "Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries," *Comparative Politics* 34 (2002), Mark and Lindsay Benstead Tessler, "Why Are Some Ordinary Citizens in Partly-Free Countries 'Security Democrats?' Insights from a Comparison of Morocco and Algeria," (Manuscript).

## Literature Overview

This project seeks to integrate these insights about the role of legislators as links between elite and mass-level dynamics and to build upon debates and questions within three additional literatures. These include literatures on authoritarian politics, institutions, and democratization. The project should also provide insights about how to understand competing notions of representation and clientelism in non-democratic political settings and questions about the role and strategies of Islamist parties in parliamentary politics.

### Authoritarian Politics Literature

The dynamics of institutions in authoritarian political contexts were, until recently, the focus of only a relatively small number of studies.<sup>42</sup> The end of the third wave of democratization in the 1990s proved to be a watershed, however, as scholars sought to understand the diversity of regimes emerging from failed democratic transitions.<sup>43</sup> The literature forms several interconnected strands and focuses extensively on how electoral institutions are shaped by elite-level bargaining.<sup>44</sup> The first area of this literature seeks to define authoritarianism and create typologies of non-democratic regimes.<sup>45</sup>

A second theme concerns how institutions shape and are shaped by political bargaining between incumbent and opposition elites and how, under conditions of power imbalance, these institutions strengthen regimes' hold on power.<sup>46</sup> Bargaining leads to outcomes such as particular electoral systems and differences in state-society relationships which have consequences for elite political participation, according to Ellen Lust-Okar.<sup>47</sup> Lust-Okar's work shows how regimes use institutional rules to create and maintain different relationships between the regime and

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<sup>42</sup> See, for example, Guy Hermet, Richard Rose and Alain Rouquié, ed., *Elections without Choice* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978).

<sup>43</sup> Peter Burnell creates a typology of democratic failures and a list of the general approaches scholars have taken to explain these approaches. Bruce Burnell, "Arrivals and Departures: A Preliminary Classification of Democratic Failures and Their Explanation," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 36, no. 3 (1998).

<sup>44</sup> See, for example, Marsha Pripstein Posusney, "Multiparty Elections in the Arab World: Elections Rules and Opposition Responses," in *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, ed. Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005).

<sup>45</sup> See, for example, Larry Diamond, "Elections without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2001).

<sup>46</sup> See, for example, Posusney, "Multiparty Elections in the Arab World: Elections Rules and Opposition Responses." Ellen Lust-Okar and Amaney Ahmed Jamal, "Rulers and Rules: Reassessing the Influence of Regime Type on Electoral Law Formation," *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 3 (2002).

<sup>47</sup> Lust-Okar, *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World*.

opposition groups and between opponents themselves, which she calls divided or unified structures of contestation.

A third, smaller area focuses on how institutions structure mass political participation. Mona El-Ghobashy demonstrates how administrative litigation in Egypt allows new forms of expressive participation under authoritarianism.<sup>48</sup>

The authoritarian politics literature aims to elucidate how authoritarian politics operates, but has thus far been primarily concerned with the foundational work of defining and creating typologies of non-democratic regimes and by examining how elite-level bargaining is shaped by and shapes electoral institutions. This project extends the authoritarian politics literature by focusing on parliaments as an arena of contestation with important consequences for mass political attitudes.

### *Legislative Politics under Electoral Authoritarianism*

I take as a reference a typology developed by Larry Diamond which classifies contemporary political systems in six types: (1) liberal democracy, (2) electoral democracy, (3) ambiguous regimes, (4) competitive authoritarian, (5) hegemonic electoral authoritarian, and (6) politically closed authoritarian.<sup>49</sup> Diamond classifies the Moroccan and Algerian regimes as hegemonic electoral authoritarianism (as of 2001), following the work of Andreas Schedler (and Giovanni Sartori).<sup>50</sup> Together competitive authoritarian and hegemonic electoral authoritarian make up a broader concept of electoral authoritarianism developed in a book-length project by Schedler. Competitive and hegemonic electoral authoritarianism are distinguished by their degree of competitiveness between opposition and ruling elites.<sup>51</sup> When I refer to authoritarian regimes in this project, I refer to electoral authoritarian regimes (i.e. to both (4) competitive authoritarian and (5) hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes).

**Electoral authoritarianism.** Electoral authoritarianism (EA) refers to a set of regimes in which elections “violate the liberal-democratic principles of freedom and fairness so profoundly and

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<sup>48</sup> Mona El-Ghobashy, "Taming the Leviathan: Constitutionalist Contention in Contemporary Egypt" (Columbia University, 2006).

<sup>49</sup> Diamond, "Elections without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes."

<sup>50</sup> Along with Hegemonic Electoral Authoritarianism, Competitive Authoritarianism are forms of electoral authoritarianism distinguished only by the degree of competition in the party and electoral system and the possibility of the opposition taking power, which exists only in the latter regime type.

<sup>51</sup> Andreas Schedler, "Elections without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002).

systematically as to render elections instruments of authoritarian rule rather than ‘instrument of democracy’”.<sup>52</sup> Electoral authoritarianism exists where elections are portrayed as the principal institution by which public sovereignty is exercised; however, true sovereignty over policymaking lies elsewhere in the regime. Because of severe electoral manipulation, elections are not to a meaningful extent free, failing to meet the following conditions: “. . . when the legal barriers to entry into the political arena are low, when there is substantial freedom for candidates and supporters of different political parties to campaign and solicit votes, and when voters experience little or no coercion in exercising their electoral choices”.<sup>53</sup> Electoral authoritarianism is characterized by skilled manipulation of electoral procedures in order to achieve regime persistence,<sup>54</sup> typically relying on the military, either directly or indirectly.<sup>55</sup> Under authoritarianism, elections are participative and competitive in form,<sup>56</sup> but, serve as a “democratic façade covering authoritarian rule”.<sup>57</sup> Most work on regime type as electoral competitiveness focuses on electoral manipulation, but has less to say about clientelism outside of the electoral context.

#### *Legislatures as Arenas of Contestation and a Second Constitutive Feature of Electoral Authoritarianism*

For Schedler, elections are the central battlefield between incumbents and opposition. The conventional wisdom concerning legislatures in authoritarian political settings, as expressed by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, is that they are not a major “arena of contestation”.<sup>58</sup> Schedler suggests that while parliaments and other institutions are not “meant to constitute countervailing powers” they are nevertheless sources and sites of contestation.<sup>59</sup> Parliaments and

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<sup>52</sup> Schedler, "The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism.": 3. Also citing Bingham G. Powell, *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000).

<sup>53</sup> Diamond, "Elections without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes.": 28

<sup>54</sup> William Case, "Manipulative Skills: How Do Rulers Control the Electoral Arena?" in *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).

<sup>55</sup> Elizabeth Spiro Clark, "Why Elections Matter?" *The Washington Quarterly* 23, no. 3 (2000).

<sup>56</sup> Schedler, "The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism."

<sup>57</sup> Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000): 34.

<sup>58</sup> Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "Linkage and Leverage: How Do International Factors Change Domestic Balances of Power?" in *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, ed. Andreas Schedler (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).

<sup>59</sup> Schedler, "The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism.": 12. I define contestation as a struggle for victory between rivals. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "Competitive Authoritarianism: Origins and Evolution of Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era," (October 11, 2006): 2. Bellin's term "robust authoritarianism" is also closely related to new authoritarianism. See Eva Bellin, "Coercive Institutions

elections are “interdependen[t] . . . since parliament derive their legitimacy from the credibility and integrity of the electoral processes that shape and define them”.<sup>60</sup>

Extending Schedler’s theory of electoral authoritarianism, I suggest that instead of being secondary in importance, legislatures are also significant arenas of contestation with effects in other parts of the political system. Candidates and parties contest legislative elections not only for access to resources and *wasta*, but also to influence policy.<sup>61</sup> Further, the extent to which members provide particularistic or programmatic benefits has implications for how ordinary citizens view the parliament. Regime power-holders employ electoral manipulation and patronage to control the outcome of legislative elections because it matters who is elected to parliament.

Thus, I argue that electoral authoritarianism is characterized not only by electoral manipulation, but also by weak and coopted national parliaments which fail to fulfill the following three criteria:

1. It is constitutionally and politically permitted to operate as an autonomous and influential institution;
2. It is capable of resisting actions emanating from the executive; and,
3. It is able to formulate its own policy proposals and can affect the decision-making process in significant ways.<sup>62</sup>

#### *Definitions: Democracy, Autocracy, and Transition*

Following Robert A. Dahl and later extensions by Gerardo L. Munck and others, I view democracy and authoritarianism as endpoints on continuums of participation and contestation.<sup>63</sup> Dahl has noted that as political liberalization becomes widespread, regimes are less meaningfully differentiated by levels of participation than by popular and elite contestation. Democracy, or polyarchy, is a political system characterized by seven institutions: (1) elected officials; (2) free and fair elections; (3) inclusive suffrage; (4) right to run for office; (5) freedom of expression; (6)

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and Coercive Leaders,” in *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, ed. Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005).

<sup>60</sup> United Nations Development Programme, *Parliamentary Development: Practice Note* (2003 [cited January 26, 2008]; available from [http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/ParIPN\\_ENGLISH.pdf](http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/ParIPN_ENGLISH.pdf)).

<sup>61</sup> Lust-Okar, “Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan.”

<sup>62</sup> Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg, *Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions.*: 63.

<sup>63</sup> Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), Gerardo L. Munck, “Drawing Boundaries: How to Craft Intermediate Regime Categories,” in *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, ed. Andreas Schedler (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006). See, especially, page 33.

alternative information; and, (7) associational autonomy.<sup>64</sup> The institutions of polyarchy are the highest attainable level of democracy in the modern state where, for example, direct democracy is not practical.<sup>65</sup> Elsewhere, Dahl defines democracy as “the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals”.<sup>66</sup>

Authoritarianism is a political system in which individual political and civil rights and other institutions of polyarchy are threatened by social control and the requirement of adherence to the authority of the state. Authoritarianism is characterized by oppression and generally hierarchical in nature. Because democracy and autocracy constitute endpoints on continuum of the degree to which the institutions of polyarchy have been attained, the intermediary regime types then represent aspects of both systems.

The ways in which authoritarianism contrasts with autocracy may be difficult to delineate. However, autocracy presupposes that power is held by an individual rather than a state, and that this power is absolute. All autocrats need a power structure in order to rule; however, allegiance in an autocracy rests with an individual rather than with a state ideology or apparatus. Liberalization of political rights, for example in recent decades in Morocco, suggests that even if allegiance must be to an individual (i.e. the monarch), his power is not absolute (e.g. contestation has led to a relaxation of certain freedoms of expression). The endpoint in Diamond’s continuum, politically closed authoritarian, may be analogous with autocracy, although global pressure on regimes to liberalize suggests that autocracy vis-à-vis authoritarianism is a category without decreasing resonance in the modern world.

Just as democracy and autocracy form a continuum with intermediate regime types, our understanding of transition and failed transition depends on where the markers between these regime-types fall. To better understand these terms it is useful to define democratization and liberalization. “Political liberalization involves the expansion of public space through the recognition and protection of civil society and political liberties, particularly those bearing upon the ability of citizens to engage in free political discourse and to freely organize in pursuit of common interests”.<sup>67</sup> In this way, liberalization results in a narrow expansion of access to political positions and resources, even while a meaningful institutional opening for contestation over policies is limited, because the underlying structure of decision-making power does not change. Democratization requires a change in the way public policies are made; that is, a

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<sup>64</sup> Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*.: 233.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*: 218-222.

<sup>66</sup> Dahl, *Polyarchy Participation and Opposition*.: 1.

<sup>67</sup> Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble, ed., *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World*, vol. Volume 1: Theoretical Perspectives (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).: 3.

meaningful expansion not only of participation but also contestation. It is “an expansion of political participation in such a way as to provide citizens with a degree of real meaningful collective control over public policy.”<sup>68</sup>

Democratization is synonymous with democratic transition; transition has occurred when a regime moves from one type on the continuum to another.<sup>69</sup> If political changes more closely approximate liberalization, this constitutes a failed or stalled democratic transition.

## The Democratization Literatures

Second, in addition to the authoritarian politics literature, this project draws upon and hopes to contribute to theory on the persistence and breakdown of authoritarian regimes. One aspect of this literature addresses the impact of constitutional and institutional arrangements—including parliamentary versus presidential systems and types of institutional configurations—on the longevity of democracy or the likelihood that it will emerge.<sup>70</sup> Other work views transition as a reconfiguration of institutions, identifying them as a missing variable in studies of democratic transition.<sup>71</sup> The puzzle at the heart of this project—why authoritarian institutions contribute to regime persistence—relates to a growing literature which is beginning to tease out the role of institutions in the democratization process.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid.: 3. Entelis (1995), citing Przeworski, suggests that the goal of authoritarian regimes undergoing liberalization is to “relax social tension and to strengthen their position in the power block by broadening the social base of the regime: to allow some autonomous organization of the civil society and to incorporate the new groups into the authoritarian institution” (Przeworski 1991, as cited Entelis 1995, p. 50).

<sup>69</sup> O’Donnell and Schmitter define a transition as “the interval between one political regime and another”. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986): 6.

<sup>70</sup> For examples of the former, see Mark P. Jones, *Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), Matthew Soberg and John M. Carey Shugart, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). For examples of the latter, see Axel Hadenius and Han Teorell, “Pathways from Authoritarianism,” *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 1 (2007). Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa,” *World Politics* 46 (1994).

<sup>71</sup> Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

<sup>72</sup> Richard Snyder and James Mahoney, “The Missing Variable: Institutions and the Study of Regime Change,” *Comparative Politics* 32, no. 1 (1999).

## **Institutions Literatures**

Finally, this project seeks to contribute to literature on political institutions, which focuses on how institutions shape both other institutional structures as well as the political behavior of actors.<sup>73</sup> A significant component of the institutions literature addresses constituency service of members of national legislatures, especially the American Congress.<sup>74</sup> This literature provides much of the methodological foundation for the present study and will be reviewed at a later stage. Related to this literature is political theory focusing on representation in the American political context.<sup>75</sup> Readings of this literature influenced the development of this study and create at least an initial tension between democratic representation and anthropological understandings of Middle Eastern societies which privilege clientelism as a mode of political representation.<sup>76</sup> This tension will be addressed in Chapter 3 where I develop two contrasting paradigms, which I call the “representation” paradigm and the “patron-client” paradigm.

### **Overview of the Chapters**

The remaining chapters unfold as follows.

#### *Part I: Introduction*

Chapter 2 outlines the methodology and comparative framework, highlighting how the similarities and differences in the cases inform interpretation of the between-country results in the main empirical chapters. Chapter 3 operationalizes representative behavior and describes casework operations in Morocco and Algeria. It presents two competing paradigms—the representation and patron-client paradigms—which highlight the tension created by studying casework and other activities of members of parliament in nondemocratic settings.

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<sup>73</sup> For examples of the latter, see Arend Lijphart, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems a Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945-1990*, *Comparative European Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). Pippa Norris, *Electoral Engineering Voting Rules and Political Behavior* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

<sup>74</sup> See, for example, Michael A. Smith, *Bringing Representation Home: State Legislators among Their Constituencies* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2003).

<sup>75</sup> See for, example, William T. Bianco, *Trust: Representatives and Constituents* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994).

<sup>76</sup> See, for example, Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury, eds., *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies* (London: Duckworth, 1977).

## *Part II: Empirical Chapters*

Chapter 4 examines the first level or arena of political activity: parliamentary institutions. It investigates how formal rules vary by institutional setting and influence members' participation in debate and provision of casework. Further, it shows how representation is a mechanism of cooptation occurring as members choose "baskets" of programmatic and particularistic goods.

Chapter 5 examines the second level in the conceptual map: representative behavior. It explains why members differ between and within countries in the incentives they perceive to cultivate a personal or party reputation and to provide casework.

Chapter 6 examines the third arena or level in the diagram: public opinion. It considers why the attitudes of ordinary citizens vary in their support for a parliament with strong constitutional prerogatives. It investigates whether casework is a form of representation which enhances support for a stronger legislature.

## *Part III: Conclusion*

Finally, Chapter 7 considers the implications of the findings for understanding why legislatures enhance authoritarian rule and how policymakers working in the area of legislative strengthening projects can respond.

## CHAPTER II

### Research Plan and Comparative Framework

#### Research Methods and Research Plan

While qualitative and quantitative methods are usually combined in research on constituency service in American and Comparative politics, there is limited precedence of quantitative research on the behavior of parliamentarians in politically-closed countries. Conventional wisdom, perhaps appropriately, suggests that: “. . . the behaviour of institutions and individuals in North Africa is not subject to easy quantification.”<sup>77</sup> However, in order to fully address misconceptions of authoritarian politics as “unintelligible to modern political science” and to investigate the central questions in this project, both qualitative and quantitative methods must be considered as potential tools to investigate political dynamics in these settings.<sup>78</sup>

Accordingly, one tension which emerged in the selection of research methods is the need to balance the rigors of and potential for statistical control afforded by quantitative survey methods while considering the corresponding need to develop and support a convincing causal story through in-depth qualitative work. I sought to combine survey research with semi-structured interviews in order to determine which of the methods would be most appropriate for analysis of parliaments in authoritarian settings.

Another set of research design decisions concerned the development of the comparative framework and the selection of cases. Although the design offers four levels of within-country comparative analysis--the party and parliamentary group, the electoral district, the member of parliament, and the constituent--the addition of a fifth level, the country, adds analytical depth to the investigation of the project's central questions.

At the most basic level, Morocco and Algeria lend themselves to comparison because they offer contrasting institutional settings--monarchy and former one-party regime—but similar

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<sup>77</sup>David Mednicoff, "Civic Apathy in the Service of Stability? The Cultural Politics of Monarchist Morocco," *Journal of North African Studies* (1999): 2.

<sup>78</sup>Quote taken from presentation given by Ellis Goldberg, Yale University, May 6, 2008.

levels of electoral competitiveness and legislative prerogatives (i.e. both are cases of hegemonic electoral authoritarianism). Thus, although the first, and primary, objective of the project is the prediction of within-country variation in each of three arenas of political activity--institutional rules, representative behavior, and public opinion--comparison of dynamics between the two cases within these arenas offers an additional opportunity to evaluate the logic of the conceptual framework and, thus, to shed light on how elite and mass-level dynamics are linked and inform our understanding of the relationship between legislative institutions and longer regime tenure.

In this chapter I begin by providing an overview of the data collection methods, outlining how the surveys were developed and implemented in the field. I conclude by discussing the comparative framework, identifying how the similarities and differences may inform an understanding of possible within-country dynamics in the two countries.

### **The Data and Surveys**

The main source of data is the member and constituent surveys (See Table II. 1.). The design and implementation of the surveys have two advantages. First, since the design links a portion of the member data with constituent data at the level of the electoral district, the effect of constituent responsiveness of members on the political attitudes of individual citizens in those districts may be estimated. Second, the questionnaire includes a number of items which measure self-report political behaviors, such as citizens' experiences requesting casework and contact with members of the national, regional, and local legislative assembly, offering the possibility to investigate the effect of these experiences on attitudes.<sup>79</sup> Approximately one-third of the members and 800 constituents participated in each country.

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<sup>79</sup> Most survey research in the Arab world focuses on political attitudes. See, for example, the World Values Survey (Ronald Inglehart and Mark Tessler) and the Arab Democracy Barometer (Mark Tessler and Amaney Jamal).

**TABLE II. 1. Member and Constituent Surveys in Morocco and Algeria**

	<b>Members of Parliament</b>	<b>Constituents</b>
Morocco	112 (of 325) members of the Chamber of Representatives (Upper House)	800 constituents in 12 districts
Algeria	97 (of 389) members of the National Popular Assembly (Lower House)	800 constituents in 8 districts

### **Sampling and Implementation: The Member and Constituent Surveys**

The member surveys were conducted from August 2005 to May 2007; the constituent surveys were conducted from August 2006 to February 2007. Probabilistic sampling was used for both surveys with the exception of the Algerian constituent survey for which quota sampling was required by issues of political sensitivity (See Appendix 1).

#### *Member Survey*

Fifty percent of the sample of members was drawn using random stratified sampling where the strata were party (parliamentary group) and gender. Female members and male and female deputies from parties and parliamentary groups with fewer than eight percent of the seats in Parliament were over-sampled. The remaining fifty percent of the sample was comprised of all members from a random stratified sample of electoral districts where region and population were the strata. Selected districts ranged from two members to thirty-two members.

Access to the parliamentary building was achieved in Algeria by contacting the presidents of the parliamentary groups and in Morocco by requesting access from the Secretary-General of the Parliament.

A paper and pencil questionnaire in French and Arabic was used to facilitate data collection. In some cases, the president of the group or another deputy in the group assisted with the distribution of the written questionnaire. Every effort was made to conduct the interviews face-to-face with the aid of the questionnaire because of the advantage this provided for response

rate and quality of the accompanying open-ended responses. The interview took approximately one hour to complete and the response rate was 57 percent in Morocco and 48 percent in Algeria.

### *Constituent Survey*

Although sixteen electoral districts in Algeria and twenty-four districts in Morocco were selected for the member survey, only half of these were selected as sites for the constituent survey. While region and population were respected as strata, factors such as location of interviewing staff and local permissions were important in the selection of the eight Algerian and twelve Moroccan districts where the household survey would be conducted.

The number of respondents in each district was equal to the proportion of the nation's total population living in that district. Respondents in two sparsely-populated and one densely-populated district in Algeria were under and over-sampled and, as with the member survey data, component weights were computed. While respondents within districts were selected in Morocco using standard household survey sampling practices, quota sampling was used in Algeria. The latter technique created further need for weighting due to an over-reliance in the sample of men and more well-educated individuals. Challenges in the Algerian sampling suggest the need for caution particularly in comparing univariate distributions between the countries without appropriate multivariate statistical controls.

The survey was conducted by Moroccan and Algerian teams face-to-face. The survey had 130 questions and took approximately 80 minutes to complete. The response rate was 59 and 75 percent in Algeria and Morocco respectively (See Appendix 1).

### **Subsystem Units of Analysis: Members and Constituents by District**

Morocco and Algeria serve as the system-level units in the comparative framework. Below the level of the country, there are four units of analysis (See Table II. 2.).

**TABLE II. 2. Linked Subsystem Units of Analysis: Members and Constituents by District**

Algeria				Morocco			
District	Total Members	Number Members Responding	Constituents Responding	District	Total Members	Percent Members Responding	Constituents Responding
West				North			
1	4	3 (75%)	56	1	4	3 (75%)	85
2	6	4 (67%)	59				
				Center			
Center				2	4	3 (75%)	86
3	32	10 (31%)	227	3	5	4 (80%)	102
				4	2	2 (100%)	25
East				5	3	3 (100%)	61
4	12	6 (50%)	113				
5	16	7 (44%)	150	East			
6	7	4 (57%)	66	6	2	1 (50%)	42
				7	3	3 (100%)	47
South							
7	4	3 (75%)	50	South			
8	6	3 (50%)	59	8	4	4 (100%)	80
				9	4	2 (50%)	69
Other Districts	302	57 (19%)	0	10	4	2 (50%)	89
				11	4	2 (50%)	72
				Sahara			
				12	2	1 (50%)	42
				Other Districts	284	82 (29%)	0
<b>Total</b>	389	97 (25%)	780	<b>Total</b>	325	112 (34%)	800

*The Electoral Districts*

Algeria is divided into 48 multi-member electoral districts equivalent to its states (*willayat*). In addition to the 381 members elected in geographical districts, eight members are elected in overseas districts in which a large number of Algerians reside. Eight electoral districts within Algeria were selected into the study: two from the west, one from the center, three from the east, and two from the south. Probabilistic sampling was used to selected districts.

Morocco is divided into ninety-five multi-member districts drawn within the country's 16 administrative districts; an additional thirty seats are reserved for national party lists of women.

295 members represent the geographical districts, each with a magnitude of two to five in addition to the thirty-member national district. Twelve electoral districts within Morocco were selected for the study: one from the north, four from the center, two from the east, four from the south, and one from the Sahara.

*The Moroccan Chambre des Représentants (Upper House)*

The Seventh *Chambre des Représentants (al-Majlis al-Nouwab)*, elected on September 27, 2002, was made up of twenty-two parties, and for the first time since the recent introduction of a quota, included a significant number of women and a strong showing for the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD) in the districts in which it fielded candidates (See Tables II. 3. and II. 4.). Of the 26 parties which contested the elections, eleven were created in 2001 and 2002.<sup>80</sup> The Socialist Union of Socialist and Popular Forces (USFP) won 50 seats; the oldest, *Istiqlal* (Independence) Party received 48 seats; the Islamist PJD gained 42 seats; the conservative party of the *makhzen* the National Rally of Independents (RNI) took 41 seats; and the People's Movement and the National People's Movement, which subsequently formed a single Popular Movement (MP), received 27 and 18 seats respectively; and, the Constitutional Union (UC) had 16 seats. The remaining fifteen parties received 83 seats.

Although contrary to organic law, party-switching during the session is not enforced and it is a relatively common practice. Nine (9.9 percent) of respondents reported having changed their parliamentary group since begin elected in 2002. Party-switching during the parliamentary mandate does not occur in Algeria. At the time of the study, the make-up of the parliamentary groups was as follows: the MP group was now in the majority with 72 deputies; the *Istiqlal* group had increased to 60 deputies; the USFP lost two members, leaving 48 deputies; the PJD, which does not allow switching, remained with 42 deputies; the RNI group decreased by two to 39 deputies; the CD group comprised 28 deputies; the Socialist Alliance grouped 21; the FFD had 8 members; and other smaller parties and members without a party affiliation numbered 11.

In Morocco, the democratic bloc (*Koutla*) was comprised, at the time of the study, of USFP, *Istiqlal*, PPS, and the GSU, although the make-up of *Koutla* and other party alliances shifts from time to time.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> J. C. Santucci, *Les Partis Politiques Marocains a L'epreuve Du Pouvoir* (REMALD, 2001).

<sup>81</sup> As of May 21, 2003. A.c., "Maroc: La Koutla Condamne Et Appelle a Une Manifestation," *Liberation*, May 21, 2003 2003. The lowest response rate in Morocco was from the RNI, (17.9 percent responding) and the highest among the *Istiqlal* (40 percent) and the PJD (38.1 percent).

**TABLE II. 3. Legislative Election Results, 2002**

	<b>Morocco</b>	<b>Algeria</b>
<b>Date of Election</b>	September 27, 2002	May 30, 2002
<b>Parties Represented</b>	22 parties and three independents	9 parties and 30 independents
<b>Largest Party</b>	USFP (50 of 325 seats)	FLN (199 of 389 seats)
<b>Islamist Party First Participates/2002 Representation</b>	1997/42 of 325 seats, PJD	1997/81 of 325 seats, <i>Islah</i> and MSP
<b>Turnout</b>	52 percent	47 percent

Source: Journal Officiel de la République Algérienne; Bulletin Officiel du Royaume du Maroc; “Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms – Algeria”, 2008 ([http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Algeria\\_APS.doc](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Algeria_APS.doc)); “Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms – Morocco”, 2008 ([http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Morocco\\_APS.doc](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Morocco_APS.doc))

*The Algerian National Popular Assembly (Lower House)*

In Algeria, the May 30, 2002 elections to the *Assemblée Nationale Populaire* (APN, *al-Majlis ash-Sha’bi al-Watani*) resulted in the election of nine parties and thirty independents. Because the Berber Front of Socialist Forces (FFS) and Gathering for Culture and Democracy (RCD) boycotted elections, the fifth mandate was less diverse than the fourth. Further, the government-created National Rally for Democracy (RND), which won a majority in the fourth parliament in results generally attributed to rigging, lost its majority to the FLN, the former single party with significant allegiance within the population which gained 51 percent of the seats in parliament. There are 25 women elected to parliament in Algeria on party lists, but no quota system is in place at the national level.<sup>82</sup>

The National Liberation Front (FLN) received 199 seats; the RND won 47 seats; the moderate Islamist parties *el-Islah* and the Movement for Society and Peace (MSP) gained 43 and 38 seats respectively; the socialist Workers’ Party (PT) received 21 seats; four minor parties

<sup>82</sup> The 4<sup>th</sup> National Assembly, elected in 1997, had 389 members and was made up of 10 parties and 11 independents. These included the new government-created Democratic National Rally (RND), 156 seats; the National Liberation Front (FLN), 62 seats; the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP, formally HAMAS), 69 seats; Ennahda (MN, formerly MNI), 34 seats; and two Berber parties, FFS and RCD, 20 and 19 seats respectively.

(FNA, ME, PRA, and MEN) gained 11 seats; and, there were 30 independent candidates which formed a parliamentary group. In Algeria at the time of the study, the majority FLN was in a ruling coalition with the government-created RND and one of the Islamist parties willing to enter into a formal alliance with the government, MSP.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> In the survey, the lowest response rates were among the FLN (14.1 percent participating) and the PT (14.3 percent) and the highest among the *el-Islah* (46.5 percent).

**TABLE II. 4. Representation of Parliamentary Groups in the Population and Sample**

<i>Algeria: Fifth Assembly, 2002-2007</i>			<i>Morocco: Seventh Chambre, 2002-2007</i>		
<b>Parliamentary Groups</b>	<b>Seats</b>	<b>Percent Responding</b>	<b>Parliamentary Groups</b>	<b>Seats<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Percent Responding</b>
National Liberation Front (FLN)	199	28 (14.1%)	Movement Group (MP)	72	15 (20.8%)
<u>National Rally for Democracy (RND)</u>	47	12 (25.5%)	Independence Group of Unity and Equality ( <i>Istiqlal</i> )	60	24 (40.0%)
<u>Movement for National Reform (el-Islah)</u>	43	20 (46.5%)	<u>Socialist Group (USFP)</u>	48	11 (22.9%)
<u>Movement for the Society of Peace (MSP)</u>	38	12 (31.6%)	Justice and Development Group (PJD)	42	16 (38.1%)
<u>Workers' Party (PT)</u>	21	3 (14.3%)	Group of the <u>National Rally of Independents (RNI)</u>	39	7 (17.9%)
Independents	30	8 (26.7%)	Group of the <u>Constitutional Democrat Union (CD)</u>	28	9 (32.1%)
			Group of the Socialist Alliance	21	7 (33.3%)
			Deputies of the Democratic Forces Front (FFD)	8	3 (37.5%)
<b>Small Parties without Groups</b>			<b>Small Parties without Groups</b>		
<u>Algerian National Front (FNA)</u>	8	3 (27.3%) <sup>b</sup>	<u>Deputies of the Unified Socialist Left (GSU)</u>	3	2 (18.2%) <sup>b</sup>
<u>Islamic Renaissance Movement (En-Nahda)</u>	1		<u>Deputies of the Alliance of Freedoms</u>	1	13 (11.6%)
<u>Party of Algerian Renewal (PRA)</u>	1		<u>Deputies without Party Affiliation</u>	7	
<u>Movement of National Understanding (MEN)</u>	1		<u>Party (Missing Data)</u>		
Party (Missing Data)		11 (11.3%)			
<b>Total</b>	<b>389</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>325</b>	<b>112</b>

<sup>a</sup> At the time of the study, April to August 2006

<sup>b</sup> Total of three respondents from FNA, En-Nahda, PRA, and MEN; party not reported in table to protect respondent identity. In Morocco, responses are combined for GSU, Alliance of Freedoms, and deputies without party affiliation.

### **The Comparative Framework: Similar Features**

Morocco and Algeria share important similarities, among them their historical and political backgrounds, parliamentary history, the electoral system in effect at the time of the study, and the general level of electoral competitiveness and prerogatives of the parliament vis-à-vis the executive (See Table II. 5.). These similarities reduce the number of possible factors which could explain differences in between-country results. More specifically, Chapter 4 will suggest that institutional rules pertaining to whether members can hold a second public function help account for differences in aggregate levels of participation in debate and casework provision. While conclusions based on two country cases are necessarily tentative, the case selection holds many other electoral and legislative institutional rules constant, thereby reducing the number of possible explanations for differences in effects between the two countries.

**TABLE II. 5. Comparative Framework: Similar Features**

	<b>Morocco</b>	<b>Algeria</b>
<i>Historical and Cultural Characteristics</i>	Populous countries, Sizeable Berber populations, Influence of Islamic and Arab culture, French colonization (Independence 1956)	Populous countries, Sizeable Berber populations, Influence of Islam and Arabic culture, French colonization (Independence 1962 after Revolutionary War)
<i>Political Characteristics</i> <b>Parliamentary History</b>	First Assembly: Late 1950s (National Consultative Assembly)  Years of Parliamentary Absence/Dissolution: 9 years, 1966-1969 and 1972-1976.	First Chamber: 1962 (Constituent Assembly)  Years of Parliamentary Dissolution: 11 years, 1965-1976
<b>Legislative Electoral System (at Time of Study)</b>	System: Closed-List Proportional Representation, Chamber of Representatives (325 seats) is upper house of bi-cameral Parliament  District Magnitude: Two to five in 95 geographical constituencies, 30 in national constituency for women  Mandate: Five years (2002-2007)	System: Closed-List Proportional Representation, National Popular Assembly (389 seats) is lower house of bi-cameral Parliament  District Magnitude: Two to five in 48 geographical constituencies, 8 seats overseas districts  Mandate: Five years (2002-2007)
<b>Electoral Competitiveness and Legislative Powers</b>	Hegemonic Electoral Authoritarianism  Preponderance of Executive Power over Legislative Branch	Hegemonic Electoral Authoritarianism  Preponderance of Executive Power over Legislative Branch

## Historical and Cultural Characteristics

In *States and Women's Rights*, Mounira M. Charrad applies a comparative framework to understanding the role of tribe and state formation in the promulgation of personal status codes in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. In it, she refers to the countries of the *Maghreb* as a “geocultural entity”, emphasizing the ways in which their peoples, cultures, and histories share common roots.<sup>84</sup> Contiguous states in the Arab West (*Maghreb*), Morocco and Algeria share sizable indigenous Berber populations comprising several distinct language groups. Although estimates of the size of the Berber population vary, nearly all people in both Morocco and Algeria share both Arab and Berber roots.

Morocco and Algeria today are the most populous countries in the Arab world and face on-going challenges of a young population and high unemployment rate. Algeria's population numbers approximately 34, 000, 000 (July 2008); 26.3 percent of its population aged 14 years and under (2008) (See Table II. 6.).<sup>85</sup> Morocco's population also numbers approximately 34, 000, 000 (July 2008) in a country one-fifth the size of Algeria (not accounting for the disputed territory of the Moroccan/Western Sahara); 30.5 percent of Moroccans are 14 years or under.<sup>86</sup> Serious economic difficulties—chief among them unemployment—pose on-going challenges to social development and political stability.<sup>87</sup> Economic crisis, especially unemployment, in the 1980s unleashed popular protest leading to political liberalization. The October 1988 riots in Algeria which hastened political liberalization alone cost an estimated 1,000 lives.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Mounira M. Charrad, *States and Women's Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

<sup>85</sup> Demographic figures appear in CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>.

<sup>86</sup> Almost two-thirds of women in Morocco are illiterate. Among rural girls aged 7-15 years, about 55 percent have never attended school. Guilain Denoeux and Rhys Payne, "Democracy and Governance: Assessment of Morocco," (Washington, DC: ARD, 2003): 22.

<sup>87</sup> Abdelbaki Benziane, "Islam, Democracy and the State in Algeria: Lessons for the Western Mediterranean and Beyond," *Journal of North African Studies* 9, no. 2 (2004). Benziane shows the massive demand for university positions but no jobs to absorb graduates.

<sup>88</sup> Mouloud Hamrouche, "Hamrouche Va Loin: Les Clans, Le Pouvoir, L'armee Et La Crise," *La Nation*, 8 - 14 August, 1995 1995. Lahouari Addi, "Algeria's Tragic Contradictions," *Journal of Democracy* 3 (1996).

**TABLE II. 6. Key Social, Economic and Political Indicators**

Indicator	Morocco	Algeria
Population, July 2006 est.	33,241,259	32,930,091
GDP Per Capita (PPP), 2006 est.	\$4,400	\$7,700
Barrels of Oil Produced per Day, 2005	300 barrels	1.4 million barrels
Literacy Rate, 15 Years and Older	52.3 percent (2004)	69.9 percent (2002)
Human Development Index Rank, UNDP, 2006 <sup>a</sup>	123 (out of 177 countries)	102 (out of 177 countries)
Freedom House Rating, 2006 <sup>b</sup> Political Rights Civil Liberties	Partly Free 5 4	Not Free 6 5
Corruption Index Rank, Transparency International, 2007 <sup>c</sup>	72 (out of 180 countries)	99 (out of 180 countries)

Source: "Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms – Algeria", 2008 ([http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Algeria\\_APS.doc](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Algeria_APS.doc)); "Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms – Morocco", 2008 ([http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Morocco\\_APS.doc](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Morocco_APS.doc)); World Factbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>

<sup>a</sup> Lower rank indicates higher level of development

<sup>b</sup> See <http://www.freedomhouse.org>. Political and civil rights scores range from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free).

<sup>c</sup> Lower score corresponds to lower levels of corruption.

Morocco and Algeria are predominately Arabo-Islamic societies with less than two percent of their populations identifying as non-Muslim. Both countries are influenced by Arab language and culture, having come under Arab conquest beginning in the 700s A.D., approximately ten years after the death of the Muslim Prophet. Both have a long history of politically powerful religious *confréries* (Sufi brotherhoods) and *‘ulama* (religious scholars), though the degree to which they have been brought under the control of the regime differs.<sup>89</sup>

<sup>89</sup> Michael J. Willis, "Between Alternance and the Makhzen: At-Tawhid Wa Al-Islah's Entry into Moroccan Politics," *Journal of North African Studies* 4, no. 3 (1999). Baber Johansen, "Des Institutions Religieuses Du Maghreb," *Arabica* 35, no. 3 (1988). See also Korany and Amrani, "Explosive Civil Society and Democratization from Below: Algeria." In Morocco, Saints held a privileged status and played an important role in legitimizing the political order, including the role of the bureaucracy (*makhzen*) (Johansen: 240). In Algeria, religious congregations and probably more powerful and can achieve a certain form of representation by promising the political support to candidates seeking power at the national level.

Both were colonized by the French, among other invaders and colonizers, and gained independence in the same era: July 3, 1962 in Algeria, after more than 130 years of colonial rule beginning in 1830, and March 2, 1956 in Morocco, after less than fifty years as a protectorate beginning in 1912.

### *Some Related Differences*

Despite these similarities, Morocco and Algeria's historical, cultural, and economic characteristics also engender differences which do not compete with explanation in later chapters, but should be noted. These include aspects of social development and economic resources.

**Socioeconomic development.** Although both Morocco and Algeria face enormous social challenges, the effect of which is a large demand for casework, Algeria ranks higher on conventional indicators of social and economic development than Morocco. GDP is higher in Algeria: \$7,600 (per capita PPP, 2006), compared with \$4,600 in Morocco (2005). The UNDP Human Development Index (2006) ranks Algeria 102<sup>st</sup> and Morocco 123<sup>rd</sup> among 177 countries. Population growth rate is lower in Algeria than in Morocco: 1.51 children per woman (2008) compared with 2.57 children per woman (2008).

Years of socialist policy in Algeria produced better developed infrastructure and higher rates of schooling. Fewer Moroccans than Algerians, 15 years and older, are literate: 52.3 percent (2004) in Morocco compared with 69.9 percent (2002) in Algeria. These differences in social development, while important to keep in mind, should not come to bear on inferences in future chapters.

**Natural resources.** Morocco and Algeria differ significantly in their access to natural resources, particularly oil. Algeria has sizable oil revenues. Over 60 percent of budget revenue in Algeria comes from oil—1.4 million barrels are produced per day (2005)—compared with only 300 barrels per day (2005) in Morocco, where iron and phosphates are less lucrative natural resources. Oil exploration is taking place at present in the Western Sahara, a disputed territory annexed by Morocco in the 1970s. Differences in the availability of rents may come to bear on analyses of the determinants and effects of casework provision.

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Given the peaceful orientation of sufi brotherhoods, President Boutiflika and other national leaders arranged conferences with them following the Algerian civil war.

**Colonial history.** Although it is less relevant to understanding the present study, it is useful and important to note differences in colonial history. Although both Morocco and Algeria were colonized by the French, the nature of occupation and of the political orders which prevailed in the pre-independence period differed in significant ways. Beginning in 788 A.D., Morocco was ruled by successive Moorish dynasties which achieved a delicate territorial integration through alliances between tribes and kin groupings. The current Alaouite dynasty traces its history to 7<sup>th</sup> century Morocco and to the Prophet Mohammed through his daughter, Fatima Zahra, and her husband, the cousin of the Prophet and fourth *Calipha* (successor), Ali.<sup>90</sup> The son Moulay Ali Cherif, the Sultan of Tafilalt in 1631, Moulay Rashid was able to unite and bring a measure of peace to the country in 1660, establishing its capital in Meknès and driving out British and Spanish competitors. 1890-1900 was characterized by considerable tribal resistance against the Sultan.<sup>91</sup> By the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Moroccan elites demanded greater rights from the French protectorate, but Morocco's destiny was to be affected by geo-political events to the East in Algeria. A short period of resistance to French colonialism characterized also by inter-party and faction fighting among Moroccans was followed by independence in 1956. France gave up control of Morocco more easily due to its stronger desire to hold Algeria, which was then engaged in the early part of a bloody revolutionary war what would last from 1954-1962.

Algeria's pre-independence history was characterized not by dynasties, but by successive invasions and intense European colonization. Berber territory experienced the arrival of foreign powers beginning with Phoenician traders (900-146 B.C.), Romans (98 to 117 A.D.), who annexed the territory to the Roman Empire; Germanic Vandals (429 A.D.), Byzantines (429 to 536 A.D.), Spanish, who set up outposts (1504 through 1792), and the Ottomans, who held Algiers from 1554 to 1830 until the arrival of the French. The arrival of Islamic armies, which began in 642 and lasted until the arrival of the French at *Sidi Ferruch* in 1830, had, along with the French, the greatest impact on contemporary Algeria. Family and kin groupings and indigenous political institutions were among the structures decimated by a long colonial rule of the French, which has been described as the Arab world's most intense, owing to the large number of European settlers (approximately 1.5 million on the eve of the revolutionary war) and the often brutal divide-and-conquer strategies of the French colonial powers.<sup>92</sup> The 130-year occupation

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<sup>90</sup> Lust-Okar, *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World*.

<sup>91</sup> Rahma Bourqia and Susan Gilson Miller, eds., *In the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power, and Politics in Morocco* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

<sup>92</sup> William Quant, "Islam, Democracy and the State in Algeria: Lessons for the Western Mediterranean and Beyond," *Journal of North African Studies* 9, no. 2 (2004).

ended in 1962 after eight bloody years of revolutionary conflict which resulted in 1.5 million displaced people and 150, 000 deaths.<sup>93</sup>

Morocco gained independence in 1956 and, by 1962, King Hassan II and the pro-palace National Consultative Council established a multiparty political system under the supreme power of the monarchy. Algeria's 1962 independence was followed shortly thereafter with the establishment of a single party, the National Liberation Party, and a strong president. Both established consultative councils within a few months of gaining independence.

## **Parliamentary History**

Despite important differences in colonial history, the nature of the political struggles during regime consolidation, and the development of state-society relations in the years following independence, there are also important similarities in the parliamentary histories of the two countries (See Tables II. 7. and II. 8.).

### *Establishment of the Parliaments*

**Algeria.** Following Algeria's July 5, 1962 declaration of independence, elections to the first Constitutional Assembly were held on September 20, 1962. Although the Assembly had the formal role of elaborating the country's first constitution, the document was created largely outside of the institution. On August 14, 1962, Abbas Ferhat:

*“. . . resigned as President of the Algerian Assembly . . . in order to mark his disagreement with the constitutional project of the FLN. The Constituent Assembly saw [the powers of the Parliament] reduced. The Constitution itself had been elaborated outside of it, whereas Ferhat Abbas and Krim Belkacem wanted to make it an instrument of control of the government.”<sup>94</sup>*

The primary power struggle at the time was between groups from different regions of the newly-formed country; the group of Tlemcen (Ahmed Ben Bella and Colonel Houari Boumediène) eventually gained the upper hand. The constitution granted the parliament very limited powers and on October 3, 1963 it was dissolved.

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<sup>93</sup> Michael Bonner, Megan Reif, and Mark Tessler, "Introduction," *Journal of North African Studies* 9, no. 2 (2004).

<sup>94</sup> Benjamin Stora, *Algerie: Histoire Contemporaine 1830-1988* (Alger: Casbah Editions, 2004): 240. Translated from French by the author.

**Morocco.** The French saw the monarch as the leader most capable of uniting the tribes. The first Consultative Assembly was created by decree with members chosen by King Mohammed V, but it was not until March 10, 1962 when his successor, Hassan II, promulgated the first constitution.<sup>95</sup> Although the *Istiqlal* party proposed itself as a single party, the constitution established a multiparty system. As in Algeria, the assembly participated in drafting the constitution, but formal authority outside the assembly ensured that the legislative branch had few prerogatives independent of the executive.

### *Elite Recruitment*

Interview evidence suggests that efforts by incumbents to recruit “loyal” and acquiescent members are similar in the two countries. Both regimes sought, at parallel stages of parliamentary history, to create a loyal parliamentary membership in Morocco during the “years of lead”, which began in the 1960s and ended in the early 1990s, and in Algeria in the years following the annulled elections of 1992, which would be easy to work with and not pose a danger to the executive’s hegemony over the legislative (and judicial) branches.<sup>96</sup> While the parliaments were an arena for political liberalization strategies in both countries, the Algerian Parliament was at the center of political change, whereas in Morocco it was affected by gradual reform, including opposition appointments, electoral reform, and constitutional amendments over several decades. In neither country, however, was the underlying structure of power changed; rather, elections and parliaments provide regime legitimation and distribution, but not to a meaningful extent for representation and popular sovereignty.

### *Periods of Parliamentary Politics*

Both Morocco and Algeria have experienced periods of parliamentary absence of approximately similar lengths. Morocco’s Parliament was dissolved from 1966-1969 and 1972-1976; the Algerian Parliament was dissolved from 1965-1976 and in 1991 when the results of the elections were annulled and two Legislative Institutions of Transition established from 1992-1996. Morocco experienced two coup attempts (July 1971 and August 1972) and Algeria two coups (1976 and 1992).

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<sup>95</sup> Susan E. Waltz, *Human Rights and Reform: Changing the Face of North African Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997): 108-9.

<sup>96</sup> Zakya Daoud, *Maroc: Les Années De Plomb, 1958-1988: Chroniques D'une Résistance* (Houilles: Manucius, 2007).

**TABLE II. 7. Legislative Bodies in Algeria since Independence (1962-2007)**

Body	Year	Constitutions and Major Events	Seat in APN	Parties
<b><i>Single-Party Legislatures</i></b>				
Constituent Assembly	1962-1963	Independence (1962); Rules of Procedure	196	FLN
Constituent Assembly, (National Assembly renewed one year)	1963-1964	Constitution of 1963 Oct 3, 1963 suspension of legislature	138	FLN
Regime of Ordinance, no legislature	1965-1976	1975 Coup; Constitution of 1976		FLN
National People's Assembly, 1 <sup>st</sup> Legislature (Unicameral)	1977-1982		261	FLN
National People's Assembly, 2 <sup>nd</sup> Legislature (Unicameral)	1982-1987		276	FLN
National People's Assembly, 3 <sup>rd</sup> Legislature (Unicameral)	1987-1992	Constitution of 1988 open up possibility of multi-party elections (Revised Feb 23, 1989)	205	FLN
<b><i>Legislative Institutions of Transition</i></b>				
National Consultative Council	1992-1994	Civil War begins after second round of legislative elections are annulled (1991 Coup)	430	FLN
National Transitional Council	1994-1997	Constitution of 1996		FLN
<b><i>Multi-Party Legislatures</i></b>				
National People's Assembly (Bicameral), (4 <sup>th</sup> )	1997-2002		389	Ten parties and 11 independents
National People's Assembly (Bicameral), (5 <sup>th</sup> )	2002-2007		389	Nine parties and 30 independents

**TABLE II. 8. Legislative Bodies in Morocco since Independence (1956-2007)**

Body	Year	Constitutions and Major Events	Members
<b><i>Late 1950s</i></b>			
National Consultative Assembly	Late 1950s		Members Appointed by Royal Decree
<b><i>1963-1977</i></b>			
Legislature 1 (Bicameral)	1963-1965	Independence 1956; March 10, 1962 Constitution	144 Members, Directly Elected
Legislature 2 (Unicameral)	1970-1971	1970 Constitution; July 1971 and August 1972 coup attempts	240 Members, 1/3 Directly Elected
<b><i>1977-1992</i></b>			
Legislature 3 (Unicameral)	1977-1983	1972 Constitution; May 30, 1980 Constitution	267 Members, 2/3 Directly Elected
Legislature 4 (Unicameral, Prolonged 2 years)	1984-1992	1992 Constitution	306 Members, 2/3 Directly Elected
<b><i>1992-1996</i></b>			
Legislature 5 (Unicameral)	1993-1997	September 23, 1996 Constitution	333 Members, 2/3 Directly Elected
<b><i>Post-1996</i></b>			
Legislature 6 (Bicameral)	1997-2002	July 1999 Mohammed VI takes throne	325 Members, Directly Elected
Legislature 7 (Bicameral)	2002-2007		325 Members, Directly Elected
Legislature 8 (Bicameral)	2007-2012		325 Members, Directly Elected

## Legislative Electoral System

At the time of the study, Morocco and Algeria had similar electoral systems: a closed party-list proportional representation system to legislatures with overlapping mandates (2002-2007) (See Table II. 9.).<sup>97</sup> While the closed party-list proportional representation system in Morocco replaced a system of plurality in single-member districts only in the year prior to the September 2002 elections, the electoral rules at the time of the study were substantially similar. Variation exists in district magnitude, however, providing one competing explanation for between-country differences in caseload addressed in Chapter 4. Analyses of caseload in Chapter 5, which control for district magnitude, find that it does not account for individual-level variation in caseload.

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<sup>97</sup> A law passed on June 26, 2006 in Morocco established a seven percent threshold in the 2007 elections for a party to enter parliament. It further barred parties from participation if they did not receive at least three percent of the vote in the 2002 elections. See "Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms -- Morocco," in *Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Fride, 2008): 8-9.

**TABLE II. 9. Electoral System for Moroccan House of Representatives and Algerian National Popular Assembly, As of 2002 Legislative Elections <sup>a</sup>**

	<b>Morocco</b>	<b>Algeria</b>
<b>Electoral System</b>	Closed-list proportional representation (PR)	Closed-list proportional representation (PR)
<b>Procedure</b>	Independent candidates: Yes, with 100 signatures  List: Equal to the number of seats  Ballots: Single ballot	Independent candidates: Yes  List: Equal to the number of seats plus three  Ballots: Multiple, one per party list
<b>Seats/Districts</b>	295 seats in 95 multi-member geographical districts; 30 seats for women in national constituency	381 seats in 48 geographical districts; 8 seats in overseas districts
<b>Threshold</b>	3 percent, 2002 elections	5 percent, 2002 elections
<b>Suffrage</b>	Individuals 20 years and older, excludes expatriates	Individuals 18 years and older, includes expatriates
<b>Term</b>	5 Years (2002-2007)	5 Years (2002-2007)

Source: Barwig, 2007; NDI 2007; "Order Enacting an Organic Law Governing the Electoral System", Algeria.

<sup>a</sup> Several minor amendments in Morocco during the 2002 mandate will apply to the 2007 elections.

### **Degree of Electoral Competition**

Finally, although Morocco and Algeria have different institutional settings, both are characterized by flawed electoral competition which allows incumbents to influence the membership of parliament and, thus, its role in policymaking. In both countries, elections are "little more than a theatrical setting for the self-representation of self-reproduction of power,"<sup>98</sup> "designed to give opposition enough seats to stay in the system, but not enough to change or challenge it."<sup>99</sup> Elections are better thought of as a tacit bargain between contesting factions

<sup>98</sup> Schedler, "Elections without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation.": 47.

<sup>99</sup> Bourqia and Miller, eds., *In the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power, and Politics in Morocco*, Henry Munson, Jr., "The Elections of 1993 and Democratization in Morocco," in *In the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power and Politics in Morocco*, ed. Rahma Bourqia and Susan Gilson Miller (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999): 273-4.

aimed at maintaining the political status quo; a "mechanism of elite control and renewal from above through an administrative process of restructuring, reward, exclusion, and co-optation."<sup>100</sup>

Although both countries are undergoing a process of political change, these changes are best understood as political liberalization: "risk-free, cosmetic reforms that give their citizens an outlet to vent but little more."<sup>101</sup> While there have been recent improvements in human rights among other reforms in Morocco, change is limited and not intended to bring about sustained democratization.<sup>102</sup> Mohamed Tozy writes that the 2007 elections, which took place a few months after the data collection for this project ceased, brought contradictory signs of both "progress and regression."<sup>103</sup> In his words, "The 2007 elections were not about putting competing political projects or societal options before the voters in order to let them choose among them . . . the elections were mainly about changing the methods by which the system can adapt in the face of a crisis among its elections."<sup>104</sup> In Algeria, as in Morocco, recent changes have not altered the basic structure of political decision-making. President Boutiflika may have removed some of the most prominent generals in July 2004, for example, Mohammed Lamari, but little has changed the "power of the shadowy elite that has held sway in one form or another since independent in 1962".<sup>105</sup>

These statements about the competitiveness of elections are reflected in freedom measures. According to Freedom House, Morocco is partly free, with political rights of 5 and civil rights of 6 on a scale of 1 to 7, where 7 is unfree. Algeria is not free, with political rights of 6 and civil rights of 5. Algeria's press is commonly cited as one of the freest in the Arab world; however, in both countries, taboos exist which limit the ability of the media to discuss the most sensitive issues. In Morocco, Article 41 of the press code imposes a three-to-five year jail sentence for statements challenging the monarchy, Islam, "national integrity", public order, or the

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<sup>100</sup> Abdeslam M. Maghraoui, "Monarchy and Political Reform in Morocco," *Journal of Democracy* 12, no. 1 (2001).

<sup>101</sup> Shadi Hamid and Jeb Koogler, "The Myth of Moroccan Democracy" (paper presented at the A Better Deal, September 20, 2007 2007).

<sup>102</sup> Marina Ottaway and Meredith Riley, "Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition?" in *Middle East Series*, ed. Carnegie Papers (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006): 3. See also Michael McFaul and Tamara Cofman Wittes, "Morocco's Elections: The Limits of Limited Reform," *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 1 (2008).

<sup>103</sup> Mohamed Tozy, "Morocco's Elections: Islamists, Technocrats, and the Palace," *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 1 (2008): 34.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*: 37.

<sup>105</sup> John P. Entelis, "The Democratic Imperative Vs. The Authoritarian Impulse: The Maghreb State between Transition and Terrorism," *Strategic Insights* 4, no. 6 (2005).

“morale of the army”.<sup>106</sup> Threats to civil liberties and freedom of speech include the closure of Al-Jazeera’s Algiers bureau.<sup>107</sup>

## **Powers of the Moroccan and Algerian Parliaments**

The Moroccan and Algerian parliaments are subordinated to the executive branch of government and cannot legislate independently of it. In both Morocco and Algeria, non-elected individuals exercise considerable lawmaking power, giving the executive hegemony over the legislative branch and, thus, *de facto* legislative power (See Tables II. 10. and II. 11.). In Morocco, Articles 45, 46, 55, and 58 of the Constitution allow non-elected entities within the executive to amend laws. Most bills considered in the parliament are *projets de loi*, meaning that they emanate from the executive, not the membership of the parliament. In Algeria, the ruling clique of military generals shapes the weightiest matters of policy through the president who is, in practice, their choice although officially elected by the people (Article 71). The role of the monarch in lawmaking is clearly defined by the constitutions; the role of the military in Algeria is not statutory, although it is widely believed to play this role via its direct influence on the executive.

### *Morocco*

**Powers of the King and the executive.** In Morocco, the monarchy exercises considerable influence over the legislative (as well as executive) branch of government through his constitutional prerogatives and role in structuring parliament debate. The King is the Commander of the Faithful, Supreme Representative of the Nation, and Symbol of its unity (Article 19). The King can dissolve parliament. He can request a second reading of a bill and submit any bill to national referendum.<sup>108</sup> With the permission of the Constitutional Council, he can amend any legislation passed by the parliament (Article 48). Once laws are passed by the parliament they must be promulgated by royal decree.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> Payne, "Democracy and Governance: Assessment of Morocco.": 18-9. Since 2000, instances of newspaper seizure have been reported (*Demain* and *Le Journal*). Newspaper editor Moustafa al-Alawi (*al-Ousboui*) charged for printing claims of responsibility with May 16, 2003 bombings in Casablanca.

<sup>107</sup> Entelis, "The Democratic Imperative Vs. The Authoritarian Impulse: The Maghreb State between Transition and Terrorism."

<sup>108</sup> Payne, "Democracy and Governance: Assessment of Morocco."

<sup>109</sup> "Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms -- Morocco."

**Role of King in defining parliamentary debate.** The King structures parliamentary debate in two ways; one, in his speech at the opening of Parliament, as well as other speeches and royal decrees and, two, through the program of the executive branch which is responsible for most bills brought before the parliament. Through these addresses, as well as through the parliamentary administration which establishes the parliamentary agenda, the issues upon which the parliament focuses are clearly defined.

**Role of the Chamber of Deputies in policymaking and oversight.** The prerogatives of the parliament include approving the budget, voting on bills, questioning ministers, and forming ad hoc commission to questions members of the government. Legislation can be proposed by the prime minister or by any member of either house. In practice, nearly all bills debated in the house originate with the government.

The constitution allows for a vote of non-confidence. A member of the government may be indicted if one-quarter of the relevant chamber sign. Members have immunity except for egregious acts and those injurious to the King.

### *Algeria*

**Powers of the president and the executive.** The Algerian president “exercises supreme magistracy within the limits defined by the constitution” (Article 72). The president and prime minister sign decrees (Article 85) and may pass the annual budget, even if rejected by the parliament.<sup>110</sup> The president is solely responsible for matters of armed forces, national defense, and foreign policy (Article 77). The president appoints (and dismisses) the prime minister and, in concert with him or her, chooses a government which can meet in the president’s presence or absence and approve legislation (Article 77, 78, and 79). Further, the Constitutional Council, appointed by the president, can turn back and amend laws passed by the parliament. The passage of laws in the second chamber requires a three-quarters majority; one-third of its members are appointed by the president, making any law with which the executive does not agree impossible to pass. The president, in consultation with the speakers of the APN and the Council of the Nation and the prime minister, can dissolve parliament.

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<sup>110</sup> "Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms -- Algeria," in *Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Friede, 2008).

**Role of the president in defining parliamentary debate.** The prime minister “executes and coordinates the programme adopted by the National Popular Assembly” (Article 83). The government presents a “general policy declaration” to the APN each year (Article 84). In this way, the executive shapes the issues the parliament will address.

**Role of the National Popular Assembly in policymaking and oversight.** The government’s program is prepared by the prime minister and presented to the Cabinet, over which the president presides (Article 79). The program is then submitted to the APN for “general debate” (Article 80); if the program is not approved, the government and the APN are dissolved (Article 82).

Morocco and Algeria are both cases of hegemonic electoral authoritarianism. That is, they are the same regime type in the sense that their elections are semi-competitive and their legislatures may shape policies through debate, but cannot challenge the program of the executive. However, the Moroccan and Algerian political systems constitute different institutional settings (i.e. Morocco is a monarchy and Algeria is a republic) and, thus, we expect corresponding differences in parliamentary rules to shape the behavior of members of parliament in predictable ways.

**TABLE II. 10. Formal Distribution of Domestic Power: Legislative Branch**

	<b>Morocco</b>	<b>Algeria</b>
<b>Legislative Branch</b> Houses of Parliament	Bicameral since 1996  <i>Majlis al-Nuwab</i> (House of Representatives, Upper House), 325 Members, Directly elected, Laws Passed by 2/3 Majority  <i>Majlis al-Mustasharin</i> (House of Counselors, Lower House), 270 Members, 2/3 elected by local and regional assemblies, 1/3 elected by trade and agricultural unions, 9-year terms (one-third renewed each three years), Laws passed by 3/4 majority	Bicameral since 1996  <i>Al-Majlis al-Shabi al-Watani</i> (National Popular Assembly, Lower House), 389 Members, Directly elected, Laws Passed by 2/3 Majority  <i>Majlis al-Oumma</i> (Council of the Nation, Upper House), 144 Members, 2/3 elected by local assemblies and 1/3 appointed by President, 6-year terms (half renewed each three years), Laws passed by 3/4 majority
Initiation of Legislation	Prime Minister or either House of Parliament	Prime Minister or either House of Parliament
Promulgation of Legislation	By royal decree, May be returned to Parliament, submitted to referendum, or amended with consent of Constitutional Council	President may approve budget if rejected by Parliament
Parliament May Dissolve the Cabinet by Vote of No Confidence	Yes	Yes
Parliament May Indict Members of Government	Yes	No
Functions Mentioned in Constitution	Legislation (budgets, social and economic matters, excludes foreign policy), questioning ministers, fact-finding commissions to investigate government	Legislation (budgets, social and economic matters, excludes foreign policy), oversight, and transmission of needs of citizens to central government
Deputy May Hold Second Public or Private Function, Serve Simultaneously as Minister or Mayor	Yes, amended in 2002 to limit to one additional presidency of a local council, urban community or professional association	No

**TABLE II. 11. Formal Distribution of Domestic Power: Executive Branch**

	<b>Morocco</b>	<b>Algeria</b>
<b>Executive Branch</b>		
<b>Head of State</b>	King, whose person is “sacred and inviolable” (Article 21), Addresses Parliament directly	President of the Republic, who “exercises the supreme magistracy” (Article 72), elected by popular vote
May Rule by Decree	Yes	Yes, between sessions of Parliament and on specified matters of foreign policy
May Dissolve Parliament, Call for Early Elections	Yes	Yes
<b>Prime Minister</b>	Appointed by King, Presents government’s program to Parliament	Appointed and dismissed by President, Presents government’s program to Parliament
<b>Cabinet</b>	Appointed by King on proposal of the Prime Minister, Formally responsible to President and Parliament	Appointed by King on proposal of Prime Minister, Formally responsible to President and Parliament

Source: Moroccan and Algerian Constitutions; Payne 2003; “Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms – Algeria”, 2008 ([http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Algeria\\_APS.doc](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Algeria_APS.doc)); “Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms – Morocco”, 2008 ([http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Morocco\\_APS.doc](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Morocco_APS.doc))

### **Different Features**

The cases also differ in other important respects, providing an opportunity to evaluate and assess the reasons for differences and similarities in between-country results. Morocco is a monarchy and Algeria is a military-backed republic; the nature of the political elite and its relationship to other parts of the bureaucracy differ; and the pace and role of the parliament in liberalization also differ (See Table II. 12.).

**TABLE II. 12. Comparative Framework: Different Features**

	<b>Morocco</b>	<b>Algeria</b>
<i>Institutional Setting (Regime Type)</i>	Monarchy  Arbitration of family and kin interests within the <i>makhzen</i> by the King	Republic, Military-Backed  Division of yield between the clans by the ruling clique of generals; Political power consolidated behind strong President
<i>Parliamentary Institutions</i> <b>Parliamentary Membership</b>	Narrow, privileged elite, not expanding	Many new elites, narrowly expanding
<b>Second Function</b>	Member can Hold a Second Public Function	Member cannot Hold a Second Public Function
<i>Parliamentary Liberalization History</i>	Gradual, connected principally with freedom of expression and human rights, less clear political regime change	Abrupt, closely linked to introduction of multiparty legislative elections, more clear political regime change

**Institutional Setting**

Although cases of hegemonic electoral authoritarianism, Morocco and Algeria are characterized by different institutional settings: in Morocco, a hereditary monarchy allied with a powerful political and economic elite, the *makhzen*, and, in Algeria, a former one-party system in which a clique of military generals wields control and arbitrates the division of yield between the clans.<sup>111</sup> While the Moroccan king stands atop of the political system as an impartial arbitrator among competing interests of family and kin grouping, high-ranking generals in Algeria use state resources and institutions to maintain a delicate balance between regions and clans. In Algeria, the identity of the most powerful individuals is obscured for most ordinary citizens, even while the role of the military in the policymaking process is hidden or, in the words of Hugh Roberts, an

<sup>111</sup> John P. Entelis, *Comparative Politics of North Africa: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980). Aylin Guney and Aslihan Celenk, "The European Union's Democracy Promotion Policies in Algeria: Success or Failure?" *Journal of North African Studies* 12, no. 1 (2007).

“occult” power.<sup>112</sup> The president and the state are not the real power: “The state, then, exists in two dimensions: in one it is visible, official, obedient to rules; in the other it is obscure, hidden from public view, guided by a changing balance of forces that only initiates can discern”.<sup>113</sup> “Official political life is no more than the tip of the iceberg.”<sup>114</sup>

While both countries have an arbitrator whose power is exercised through a strong executive, there are important differences between the preferences of incumbents for politics and, thus, institutional rules in monarchical and former one-party institutional settings. Chapters 4 and 5 will identify one contrasting institutional rule—whether members can exercise a second public function—and assess the likelihood that it produces observed differences in members’ participation in debate and caseload.

### *Morocco*

The Moroccan King is the Commander of the Faithful (*Amir al’Mu’minin*) whose subjects perform an annual ceremony of allegiance (*bay’a*).<sup>115</sup> The King enjoys a high level of legitimacy. This legitimacy has two sources: the divine right as a descendent of the Prophet Mohammed, and the Sunni elected Caliph and a representative of the collective will.<sup>116</sup> Traditionally, the King was thought to possess *baraka*, or “charismatic power—combustible and extravagant—the power of God in the exploits of powerful men.”<sup>117</sup> The King presides not only over *chorfa*, but also religious leaders (*ulama*). Morocco’s political system also includes *sharif*, or individuals with particular family names who also trace their bloodline to the Prophet Mohammed and enjoy moral and political standing as a result.

It is useful to describe the nature of family and kin groupings in Morocco as a preface to understanding other topics of significance, including the role of the *makhzen* in contemporary political affairs. Mounira M. Charrad argues that strong family and kin groupings played a role in state formation in Morocco rather than in Algeria.<sup>118</sup> These groupings remain salient, in particular since Moroccan politics can be read as a single history of consolidation of political allegiances of the tribes, kin groupings, and later political parties around the person of the King.

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<sup>112</sup> Hugh Roberts, *The Battlefield Algeria, 1988-2002: Studies in a Broken Polity* (London: Verso, 2003).

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>114</sup> Zaidi Sekia, "The Power of Dignitaries and Religious Congregations: The Postponed State," *El Hourria Weekly*, October 1995 1995.

<sup>115</sup> Bourqia and Miller, eds., *In the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power, and Politics in Morocco*.

<sup>116</sup> Maghraoui, "Monarchy and Political Reform in Morocco."

<sup>117</sup> Clifford Geertz, See Rahma Bourqia and Susan Gilson Miller, ed., *In the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power, and Politics in Morocco* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

<sup>118</sup> Charrad, *States and Women's Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco*.

Although there is considerable discord among family groups within the political sphere—and the king is thus an indispensable part of solving these disagreements in the absence of a strong political system—their strength probably played an important role in the production of a small, political class. In later chapters, discussions of constituency responsiveness and the potential tensions posed by the clientalistic logic of the political system will be enhanced by a greater understanding of the differences between family and king in Morocco and the clan and large family tree in Algeria.

Abdeslam M. Maghraoui argues that Morocco is characterized by a weak formal political process in which the executive exercises hegemony over weak political parties and a discredited political process exists to ensure continuation of the political and economic status quo.<sup>119</sup> This assessment is accurate insofar as it highlights the weak role of the legislative branch in policymaking and the salience of patron-client relationships in the everyday working of government. The *makhzen*, a word literally meaning storehouse, but connoting in contemporary usage the state or administration, “refers to the individuals and institutions that carry out the king’s rule”.<sup>120</sup> It is comprised of a group of well-connected families, landowners, high-ranking military officers, security forces, army hierarchy, corrupted elements of the business elite, high levels of the bureaucracy, the parastatal managers, and the parties of the administration, who are the palace’s clients who served the sultan since colonial times.<sup>121</sup>

The *makhzen* have become synonymous with the state and are well positioned to advance their political and economic interests through the state structure.<sup>122</sup> Their control extends to the Royal Cabinet, an extra-constitutional body which governs alongside the government cabinet comprised of advisors and senior army officers close to the palace, as well as the Ministries of Sovereignty—Interior, Justice, Foreign Affairs, and Religious Affairs—which are appointed by the King and answer to the king and the Royal Cabinet, rather than to the prime minister.<sup>123</sup> Local governance of sixteen administrative regions created in 1997 constitutes a form of decentralization, but one must note that the powers of these units is limited by oversight of the decisions of locally-elected officials in a system of *tutelle*, and the considerable power remains in

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<sup>119</sup> Maghraoui, "Monarchy and Political Reform in Morocco."

<sup>120</sup> Payne, "Democracy and Governance: Assessment of Morocco.": IV.

<sup>121</sup> Marais (1973) defines the *makhzen* as the “ruling class” of Morocco (p. 182). Gellner (1973) and others have written on the division of pre-Independence Morocco into the *siba* (or dissident groups) and the *makhzen* (the government or administration).

<sup>122</sup> Payne, "Democracy and Governance: Assessment of Morocco.": 14. Miller, ed., *In the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power, and Politics in Morocco.*: Bourqia and Miller 308

<sup>123</sup> Payne, "Democracy and Governance: Assessment of Morocco.": 14.

important local extensions of executive power: the *caid* and *wali* (governor) is the local official of the Ministry of the Interior and answers directly to the palace.<sup>124</sup>

## *Algeria*

Observers remark that there are only two parties in Algeria: the army and the administration.<sup>125</sup> In this view, political parties, ministers, and the bureaucracy are extremely weak groups of “civil servants who work for the army” and are subordinate to those in the most powerful government position, including the President, the Minister of the Interior, and the governors (*walis*). Roberts has characterized the Algerian multiparty experience as “an extremely limited form of pluralism managed and manipulated by an executive dominated by the military.”<sup>126</sup> The role of the ruling clique within the army is so important, Eva Bellin writes that “every state has an army but in Algeria the army has a state”.<sup>127</sup> Algeria is a republic, however, as noted, real power on the weightiest matters is not vested in the president but in a “ruling clique” referred to as *le pouvoir* (the power or authority) or *les décideurs* (the decision-makers).<sup>128</sup> Policies are made in: “(1) closed circles in the capital city and (2) in the interior regions where family names and religious congregations hold sway over their representatives in the capital”.<sup>129</sup>

The basis of the Algerian regime’s legitimacy is historical, built on the revolutionary credentials of the National Liberation Front and strengthened by democratic legitimacy as a result of the political liberalization process. At independence, the Army of National Liberation became the National Popular Army. The single vanguard national party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), was created and former resistance leaders Boumedienne, Benjedid, Zeroul, Ben Bella, Boudiaf, and Bouteflika served as presidents. Regime legitimacy is built upon Revolution,

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<sup>124</sup> Willis, "Between Alternance and the Makhzen: At-Tawhid Wa Al-Islah's Entry into Moroccan Politics.". Can mobilize clientalist networks. CSIS: 8.

<sup>125</sup> Sekia, "The Power of Dignitaries and Religious Congregations: The Postponed State."

<sup>126</sup> Roberts, *The Battlefield Algeria, 1988-2002: Studies in a Broken Polity.*: 263.

<sup>127</sup> John Entelis (2005), p. 143, citing Eva Bellin,

<sup>128</sup> Quant, "Islam, Democracy and the State in Algeria: Lessons for the Western Mediterranean and Beyond.". The political clan denotes a ruling clique from two or three regions, generally with a military background, whose interests are most well served by the political and economic rentier system. Sections of the administration can be controlled by a clan. Batna, Tebessa, and Souk Ahras dominate policy/army. Administrative skills (management, finance, and transport) come from the Kabylie. Tlemcen is the origin of culture, education and the judiciary with references from Morocco. Algeria, Observer #2, May 2007.

<sup>129</sup> Algeria, Observer #2, May 2007.

Nation, Socialism, Arab-Islamic, and People's democracy, rather than on democratic pluralist theory.<sup>130</sup>

The gap in legitimacy founded on participation in the liberation fight began at Boumedienne's death in 1978 and continued to widen until the riots of the late 1980s made political reform necessary.<sup>131</sup> The Algerian regime sought to foster "democratic legitimacy" in order to replace "revolutionary legitimacy" in a context in which nearly seventy percent of the country's population was born after the revolution.<sup>132</sup> It does so, however, while hanging on to power, maintaining a weak, puppet legislature subordinated by a strong presidency dependent on the military. Ait Ahmed, the leader of the FFS and one of Algeria's "chefs historiques," has likened Boutiflika's presidency to a "constitutional dictatorship" in which "incumbent rulers agree to open up the political system as long as their interests are preserved".<sup>133</sup>

Evans and Phillips describe the Algerian political regime as an entrenched oligarchy which enriches itself through kickbacks from oil and gas deals; the political system serves to arbitrate the division of the yield. In Algeria, clans compete with one another and "structures, apparatus, and institutions . . . are run in total accordance with the principle of equilibrium between the groups and the clans".<sup>134</sup> Personal and clan interests pervade the administration and crucial decisions are made based on factional struggles rather, than on legitimate differences in policy or ideology rather than on requirements of good policy.

Charrad writes that family and kin groupings were less important in state formation in Algeria, in part because of the decimation of indigenous groupings and institutions as a result of French divide and rule policy. Tribe or clan may be thought of as a politically relevant unit which cannot be ignored in a study of legislative representation and constituent service.<sup>135</sup> Politically relevant groupings in Algeria are not based primarily on kinship or tribe, as in Morocco, but rather on large family trees in the North African sense of tribe.<sup>136</sup> Observers often refer to the clan in the sense of region or original and political clan, denoting a group that is

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<sup>130</sup> Korany and Amrani, "Explosive Civil Society and Democratization from Below: Algeria."

<sup>131</sup> Addi, "Algeria's Tragic Contradictions."

<sup>132</sup> Rachid Tlemcani, "Algerie," in *Dictionnaire Du Vote*, ed. Pascal Perrineau and Dominique Reynie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2001).

<sup>133</sup> Y. Bouandel, "The Presidential Election in Algeria, April 1999," *Note on Recent Elections / Elections Studies* 20 (2001), Youcef Bouandel and Yahia H. Zoubir, "Algeria's Elections: The Prelude to Democratization," *Third World Quarterly* 19, no. 2 (1998): 189.

<sup>134</sup> Entelis, "The Democratic Imperative Vs. The Authoritarian Impulse: The Maghreb State between Transition and Terrorism." *Algeria, Observer* #2, May 2007.

<sup>135</sup> Youcef Bouandel, "Political Parties and the Transition from Authoritarianism: The Case of Algeria," *Journal of Modern North African Studies* 41, no. 1 (2003).

<sup>136</sup> Elbaki Hermassi, *Leadership and National Development in North Africa: A Comparative Study* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

linked in the hierarchy of political power by personal relationships.<sup>137</sup> These differences in the nature of clan and family come to bear on aspects of political institutions, including on the nature on the parliamentary elite.

## **Parliamentary Institutions**

Two features of parliamentary institutions should be relevant to between-country hypotheses at all three levels in the conceptual framework. These include the nature of parliamentary membership and the institutional relationship between the parliament and the bureaucracy.

### *Parliamentary Membership*

There are certain differences in the nature of the parliamentary membership in the two countries which are important to note, particularly as we assess the relationship between the action of members of parliament and the perceptions of these attitudes by ordinary citizens. The first is that in Morocco the parliamentary membership is drawn mainly from the *makhzen*: members of well-connected families, wealthy landowners, and tribal leaders. Parliamentary rosters in Morocco share a number of common family names and this membership is not seen by many ordinary citizens as expanding or departing from the status quo of the past despite regime claims of democratization. The *makhzen* are the real government administration whose interests are ensured by the political process.

In Algeria, access to the parliament is narrowly expanding to individuals who were at the margins but who successfully used their relationship to powerful individuals in the regime or standing with the local community to obtain seats.<sup>138</sup> Even if the structure of political power—or the hegemony of powerful generals in policymaking and the role of the administration in executing it—has not changed, there is a sense in which access to political power is changing. A member of parliament in Algeria might have been previously unknown, but was selected via a

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<sup>137</sup> Algeria, Observer #2, April 2006. The wally (i.e. governor) is the representative of the president; the minister can do nothing if the wally refuses. The structure of power is as follows: Generals, wallies, University chancellors, Managers, and members of the APW/APC. People try to connect to generals through one of these lower people

<sup>138</sup> Incumbency is greater in Morocco than in Algeria. 48 (52.2 percent) of Moroccan members during the 2002-2007 mandate were serving for the first time, while 27 (29.4 percent) were serving their second, 11 (12.0 percent) their third, and 6 (6.5 percent) their fourth mandate. 71 (83.5 percent) of Algerian members sampled were serving their first mandate, while 12 (14.1 percent) were serving their second and 2 (2.4 percent) their third mandate.

connection to the president or his family prior to liberalization. In Algeria, many members have had little political experience; some were teachers, doctors, or were unemployed prior to election.<sup>139</sup>

As a consequence of differences in the memberships, members of parliament in Morocco are more likely to have access to ministers; for example, to seek help with casework requests. Further, constituents may be more likely to view parliamentarians negatively as being part of the same privileged class that has dominated politics for some time.

### *Second Public Function*

A second difference in parliamentary institutions concerns the nature of the bureaucracy and its relationship to the parliament. As noted, this difference will be presented and assessed as a factor explaining both between and within-country variation in casework provision in Chapters 4 and 5. Although both countries have a strong bureaucracy,<sup>140</sup> the parliament is not functionally distinct from the executive and bureaucracy in Morocco in that members can be named as ministers while retaining their seats. Many members of parliament are also elected to municipal or provincial assemblies or are elected as mayors or heads of provincial councils. Survey data suggests that as many as 40 (40.9 percent) of the sample also hold a second public function. Individuals in the bureaucracy and the parliament represent the interests of a single elite class of which they are a part.

In Algeria, the constitution prohibits deputies not only from exercising a second function, but also from engaging in a number of types of paid work. Algerian members can continue to engage in business, which generally becomes easier with the status and connections afforded by their public position.

The single political class and, more specifically, the relationship between the parliament and the bureaucracy in Morocco has consequences for the potential capacity of the parliament to provide (and resolve) casework requests and to provide district projects.

### **Parliamentary Liberalization History**

The political liberalization experiences of the two countries, which began at approximately the same time, differ in a number of important respects.

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<sup>139</sup> Algeria, Observer #2, April 2006.

<sup>140</sup> Algeria, Observer #2, April 2006.

Moroccan liberalization experience has been gradual--“cycles of political opening followed by varying degrees of return to repression”<sup>141</sup>—and has been associated with freedom of expression, human rights, and continued liberal economic reform, and has been less clearly linked to the parliament.<sup>142</sup> According to Amy Young, although Mohammed VI released political prisoners, “...scholars today have cast doubt on whether there is actually substantial change in the area of promoting democracy and human rights”.<sup>143</sup> In terms of economics, the size of the most-traditional rural notables is shrinking and the king is increasingly appointing reform-minded, or at least liberal economic reform minded elites, to technocratic positions which characterize the same “reserved domains” outside of electoral politics.<sup>144</sup>

Because of the pace of political change since King Mohammed VI took the throne in 1999, many observers indicate that liberalization is further along in Morocco, owing to the gradual but sustained opening which began with the appointment of the first opposition Prime Minister, Abderrahmane Youssoufi, in 1998. The Moroccan multiparty parliamentary experience has been longer, and inclusion of opposition parties less abrupt, while the Algerian experience is associated with a violent and tumultuous period of transition. Its longer history of multiparty politics has led to a more institutionalized party system in Morocco than in Algeria. Although it serves at the pleasure of the king, who can dissolve it at any time, the parliament was first directly elected in the late 1970s and since that time has gradually gained some measure of influence in some areas of national debate and policymaking. In Morocco’s 1997 legislative elections, candidates from the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD) ran, and in 2002 a national list for women was created. Nevertheless, observers both within and outside the parliament view it as dominated by the executive and unable to play an independent role in control and policymaking.

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<sup>141</sup> Laurie A. Brand, *Women, the State, and Political Liberalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998): 31.

<sup>142</sup> These include: the establishment of a Consultative Council in 1990 and Ministry of Human Rights in 1993; a Constitutive Council for Social Dialogue in 1994; an anti-drug campaign in 1994; the creation of a Moroccan chapter of Transparency International in 1995; successive improvements to the transparency of elections, at least on election day, improvements in human rights and expression, and the reform of the Personal Status Code in 2004. See Saloua Zerhouni, "Elite Et Transition Democratique Au Maroc: Les Parliamentaires De La Legislature 1997-2002" (Universite Hassan II - Ain Chok, 2001-2002).

<sup>143</sup> Amy Elizabeth Young, "Meeting the Quota: Cooperation among Leftist and Islamist Women to Promote Political Participation in Morocco" (paper presented at the Fifth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence & Montecatini Terme, 24-28 March 2004 2004): 3.

<sup>144</sup> See also Tozy, "Morocco's Elections: Islamists, Technocrats, and the Palace.": 38> Unpublished BJMES paper. A countervailing trend has been the rise of the intelligence services (*Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire*, DST) since September 11, 2001 and the rise of the head General Laanigri who is becoming more prominent than Interior Minister Ahmad Midaoui. An ARD report notes that the King’s cousin, Moulay Hishem, has been persecuted for advocating a constitutional monarchy. See Payne, "Democracy and Governance: Assessment of Morocco.": 9.

In Algeria, where liberalization has been more limited and characterized by abrupt starts and stops, the parliament has been at the center of the recent democratic experiment, which resulted in civil war during the 1990s. Though it existed as a forum for discussion among members of the country's single vanguard party since independence in 1962, the Algerian political system was opened to multiparty elections in 1990. Following the 1992 victory of the Islamic Salvation Front, the military annulled the elections, plunging the country into a ten-year civil war that took the lives of more than 150,000. In Algeria, multi-party elections resumed in 1997 at the height of the civil war which engulfed the nation following the constitutional coup in 1991 of the military of the Islamic Salvation Front who was posed to win a majority in Parliament. Human rights and freedoms have eased as a wave of controversial amnesty referendum moved Algeria closer to political stability, even while it remains in a state of emergency. These changes, nevertheless, have effect on the intention of ruling elites to hold only power indefinitely. In Algeria, it is clear that the military-backed regime increasingly consolidated in a strong executive. However, these changes are really a narrow expansion of access to the yield without changes to the political status quo or structure of power, for example, by including 1000 more people. The parliament remains controlled by the executive and by a institutional culture of support for the program of the president.

Three legislatures were elected in Algeria after the resumption of multiparty elections in 1997, 2002, and 2007. Although the parliament plays an extremely limited role in policymaking, parties representing a range of perspectives, including moderate Islamist, socialist, nationalist, and Berber, have held seats in the last two sessions. Nevertheless, the military has played a strong role in manufacturing a political class by dismantling political parties and creating new ones which mirror the original political landscape of the 1991 elections. The FLN, and a number of created parties which are its allies, remains the dominant political force giving assent to the program of the executive and largely acquiescing to its use of decree powers between sessions.

Because of these differences, Algerians may be more likely than Moroccans to believe that their country has undergone a change in regime, owing to the recent introduction of a multiparty legislature. William Mishler and Richard Rose show that popular support for democracy in post-communist Europe depends on both fears of the old regime and prospective evaluations or hopes for the future under the new democratic regime. It follows that constituents' views about the desirability of democratic political institutions may depend on whether they associate present, weak parliament with democracy, or with a non-democratic status quo which has remained the same under political liberalization.

## Conclusion

These differences in institutional setting, nature of the parliamentary membership, relationship between the bureaucracy and the parliament, and parliamentary liberalization history, will come to bear in future chapters as I present and assess competing explanations for similarities and differences in within-country effects. While incumbents in these two institutional settings have contrasting preferences for legislative politics—here I focus on level of debate and casework capacity—they have similar preferences for parliaments with limited independent influence on policymaking. Thus, in the first, elite-level arena we expect to find variation in parliamentary institutions—external, internal, or electoral rules—which reflect incumbent preferences for legislative politics and which generate higher levels of debate and casework capacity in the case of monarchy, compared with the case of a former one-party regime. In the third, mass-level arena, however, we expect similarities in electoral competitiveness and legislative prerogatives to generate very similar conditions of mass opinion: depressed popular support for having a strong parliament with the power to make laws, as a result of weak and co-opted parliaments and the poor quality of the representative link. These popular attitudes should be driven by conditions of electoral manipulation and weak parliaments characterizing hegemonic electoral authoritarianism, but unaffected by the particular institutional setting. Taken together, these expectations will be relevant to assessing the logic of the conceptual map (Figure I. 1.).

## CHAPTER III

### Legislative Responsiveness or Legislative Patronage?

#### The Representation and Patron-Client Paradigm and the Representative Link

##### Introduction

The area studies controversy in Middle East studies brought into focus the tension between two competing goals: first, to generate in-depth knowledge of the political systems of a region and, second, to develop and test theories explaining political dynamics across multiple areas of the world. Work which seeks to address, or at least respect, both of these goals simultaneously may meet both practical as well as conceptual challenges. The notion of representation, studied in clientelistic political systems, is one conceptual tension. On the one hand, because formal political institutions exist in a wide variety of regime types and world regions, they may serve as “analytical bridges” in cross-national and cross-regional analysis.<sup>145</sup> On the other hand, characteristics of these institutions differ across regions and cases, casting doubt on whether comparison of political dynamics between them is really meaningful.

Here I consider how the application of theoretical and empirical work from western democracies creates a tension with notions of patronage and clientelism central to mainstream understandings of authoritarian politics and to the political logic of Moroccan and Algerian politics. Representation implies responsiveness to the preferences of constituents; yet electoral manipulation and patronage challenge the notion that casework, or any other actions of members of parliament in authoritarian settings, constitutes representation. I argue that rather than obfuscate our understanding of the dynamics of legislative politics, application of theories and definitions of representation from democratic political contexts to other political settings sharpens not only our understanding of how institutional arrangements affect political behavior, but also how and why the failure of representation contributes to the robustness of authoritarian regimes.

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<sup>145</sup> Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*.

In this chapter, I define representation and patron-client relationships, suggesting how the differences between the two may be recognized. Second, I describe the representative link from the perspective, first, of the deputy and, then, from the perspective of the citizen. From these descriptions emerge two ways of viewing the casework request: one, as a form of clientelism which perpetuates political activities with precedence in the pre-liberalization period or, two, as a form of representation which may bolster satisfaction with the political system, and possibly also confidence in the parliament, as an important political institution. In Chapters 4 and 5 I consider a whole universe of particularistic demands (i.e. casework) and distinguish them only from public policymaking (e.g. member participation in parliamentary debate). I return in Chapter 6 to the question of whether, and to what extent, casework is clientelistic, and assess how this informs an understanding of the effects of casework on popular attitudes.

### **Defining and Operationalizing Representation: The Representation Paradigm**

In contrast to direct democracy, polyarchy necessitates modern political institutions which imply representation of aggregated interests by elected officials. In keeping with this understanding, modern literature in American politics defines representation as policy “congruence”, or the degree to which representatives advocate for the opinions of the constituency on specific legislation. Hanna Pitkin was among the first to argue that conceptualization of representation solely as policy congruence is problematic; because of interest aggregation, congruence between representatives and constituents is not always possible on every issue.<sup>146</sup>

Thus, Pitkin argued that representation ought to be conceptualized not as policy congruence, but as responsiveness to citizens needs’ and, if necessary, explanation of alternative actions on policy matters. Eulau and Karpis further developed a four-part conceptualization of representation behavior as “responsiveness” of members to constituents.<sup>147</sup>

Eulau and Karpis’ conceptualization influenced several decades of research on representation in American politics, including a body of literature on constituency service. Three major strands of empirical research examine variation in representative behavior and constituent service behavior in the U.S. First, Fenno’s early qualitative work examines qualitatively how

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<sup>146</sup> Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

<sup>147</sup> Heinz Eulau, "Changing Views of Representation," in *The Politics of Representation: Continuities in Theory and Research*, ed. Heinz and John C. Wahlke Eulau (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978), Heinz Eulau and Paul D. Karpis, "The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 2, no. 3 (1977).E and K 1977; See also Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation*.

Members of Congress conceptualize their constituency and allocate time and resources accordingly.<sup>148</sup> A second body of literature uses National Election Study (NES) data and qualitative interviews to examine how and why constituency service behavior varies in the national legislatures of U.S. and Britain.<sup>149</sup> Finally, numerous quantitative studies measure and explain variation in the amount of and importance placed on casework among state legislators.<sup>150</sup> These studies provide an intellectual foundation for survey question-wording and hypothesizing in this project. More importantly, they provide the basis of what I call the representation paradigm, or the notion that the actions of members, including casework, are a form of representation with the potential to bolster satisfaction with the political system and possibly also confidence in the parliament as an important political institution. Viewed from this perspective, casework and other forms of constituency responsiveness in Morocco and Algeria could play a role in promoting democratic transition and consolidation if they raise public confidence in and demand for a strong parliament.

#### *Operationalizing the Four Components of Representation*

In Eulau and Karp's work, representation had four components: policy responsiveness, symbolic responsiveness, allocation responsiveness, and service responsiveness. Policy responsiveness comprises actions of representatives to vote according to the preferences of constituents. This is referred to as the *lawmaking* function. Symbolic responsiveness is psychological, implying a relationship "built on trust and confidence expressed in the support that the represented give to the representative and to which he responds by symbolic, significant gestures, in order to, in turn, generate and maintain continuing support".<sup>151</sup> It involves *communicating* with constituents about work of the member in the House. Allocation responsiveness comprises project assistance, "assisting state and local governments in their attempts to secure federal grants from agencies that possess discretion in allocation of such

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<sup>148</sup> Richard F. Fenno, *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), Smith, *Bringing Representation Home: State Legislators among Their Constituencies*.

<sup>149</sup> John R. Johannes, *To Serve the People: Congress and Constituency Service* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984). Johannes 1979; 1980. Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina, *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).

<sup>150</sup> Mark C. and Donald E. Whistler Ellickson, "Explaining State Legislators' Casework and Public Resource Allocations," *Political Research Quarterly* 54, no. 3 (2001), Lilliard E. Jr. and Patricia K. Freeman Richardson, "Gender Differences in Constituency Service among State Legislators," *Political Research Quarterly* 48 (1995).

<sup>151</sup> Karp, "The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness." : 246.

funds”.<sup>152</sup> Allocation responsiveness generally refers to *projects* for development in a member’s district. Finally, service responsiveness, the primary subject of this present study, refers to taking care of individual requests. Often called *casework*, it describes in the Algerian and Moroccan surveys, “. . . requests received from citizens relative to housing, employment, or education . . .”<sup>153</sup>

Finally, constituency service, and particularly casework, is significant for several reasons. First, the legitimacy of legislatures is based on the claim of members to represent citizens.<sup>154</sup> Therefore, the extent to which members provide casework and other potential forms of representation will have consequences for how citizens evaluate the parliament and its importance in the policymaking process. Second, constituency service is extremely consequential because new authoritarian regimes restrict the parliament by circumscribing its role in lawmaking. Casework is one of the only forms of representation open to many members of parliament in order to generate popular support; virtually all research on parliaments in developing countries identifies constituency service, especially casework, as the major tasks in which members engage.<sup>155</sup> Third, the resolution of casework requests requires resources and networks. Given the firm grasp that incumbents hold on sources of patronage, members’ ability to provide casework may depend on whether they acquiesce in the legislature. Finally, in contrast to aggregate measures, the representative link and the provision of casework provides a means by which to directly access the impact of representative institutions on citizens’ political attitudes.

I use these four terms (Column 1) and their common appellations (Column 2) from the American politics literature (See Table III. 1.). Further, in my analysis, I divide representation into two forms: policy responsiveness and constituency responsiveness, which includes the three constituency-oriented activities of communication, projects, and casework (Column 3). Column 4 lists ways of conceptualizing these activities from the perspective of the patron-client paradigm, which I discuss next.

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<sup>152</sup> Johannes, *To Serve the People: Congress and Constituency Service.*: 2-3.

<sup>153</sup> In the U.S. context, casework is more broadly construed to include any “intervention [by a legislator] for individuals, groups, or organizations (including businesses) that have requests of, grievances against, or a need for access to federal (and occasionally state or local) government departments or agencies.” *Ibid.*: 18. Together, casework and district projects make up constituency service, or actions to obtain particularized or collective benefits for constituents. Karps, "The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness.": 246.

<sup>154</sup> Gerhard Loewenberg, "Legislatures and Parliaments," in *The Encyclopedia of Democracy*, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995).

<sup>155</sup> Mezey, "The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World."

**TABLE III. 1. The Representation and Patron-Client Paradigms**

Type of Representation	Other Terms in Representation Literature	Terms Used in This Project (Representation Paradigm)	Terms Used in This Project (Patron-Client Paradigm)
<i>Policy Responsiveness</i>	Lawmaking/ Policymaking	Policy Responsiveness	Contestation/ Moderation/ Acquiescence (See Chapter 4)
<i>Symbolic Responsiveness</i>	Communication	Constituency Responsiveness	N/a
<i>Allocation Responsiveness</i>	District projects/ Pork		Patronage
<i>Service Responsiveness</i>	Casework/ Individual requests		Clientelism/ Patronage

*The Representation Paradigm in the Moroccan and Algerian Member Survey*

I used Eulau and Karps' stylized forms of responsiveness in the member survey, asking members to rank their activities in terms of the time they devote to each. I ask further questions about each type of representation; however I focus on casework. Members generally agreed that the categories are appropriate, but differed in their responses to them. After reading the four categories of legislative activities, one Moroccan member said: "You know what we do. This is what we do."<sup>156</sup> An Algerian member noted, however, that: "Some members are reluctant to respond because they know that they are not doing what they are supposed to be doing."<sup>157</sup> These statements should not be viewed as contradictory, but rather as indicative of the fact that the functions of Moroccan and Algerian parliamentarians are parallel, in certain respects, to those of democratic legislatures.

The member data yield the following distributions. Overall, casework is ranked the most time-consuming activity (2.4 in Morocco and 2.1 in Algeria), followed by lawmaking (2.5 in Morocco and 2.3 in Algeria), and projects (2.9 in Morocco and 2.8 in Algeria) in both countries (See Table III. 2.). Communicating with citizens about legislative work is a low priority in both countries. Overall, these data suggest some commonalities in the way members spend their time

<sup>156</sup> Morocco, Member Interview #1, January 2006.

<sup>157</sup> Algeria, Member Interview #1, April 2006.

in the two countries, but also differences; for example, the greater importance of projects among Moroccan members. The reason for the latter might be investigated in future research. If taken alone, these data suggest that members are engaged in important representative activities and, accordingly, that the representation paradigm is appropriate for the Moroccan and Algerian cases.

**TABLE III. 2. Representative Activities among Moroccan and Algerian Members**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Most Time-Consuming Task:		
Projects for the District	26 (28.6%)	14 (17.3%)
Debating and Writing Laws/Policies	32 (35.2%)	35 (43.2%)
Providing Help with Individual Requests	23 (25.3%)	30 (37.0%)
Communicating with Constituents	4 (4.4%)	1 (1.2%)
Meeting with Members of Party	6 (6.6%)	1 (1.2%)
<i>Total</i>	91	81
Mean Rank (1=Most time to 5=Least time):		
Projects for the District	2.9 (1.6) <sup>a</sup>	2.8 (1.3)
Debating and Writing Laws/Policies	2.5 (1.4)	2.3 (1.5)
Providing Help with Individual Requests	2.4 (1.1)	2.1 (1.1) <sup>b</sup>
Communicating with Constituents	3.4 (1.1)	3.6 (1.0)
Meeting with Members of Party	3.7 (1.3)	4.0 (1.1)
<i>Total</i>	92	84

*The Representation Paradigm in the Moroccan and Algerian Constituent Survey*

Moroccans and Algerians constituents want deputies, first, to obtain funds for development projects; second, to take care of citizens' request; third, to work on writing and debating laws; and fourth and fifth, to communicate with citizens and organize meetings with party members (See Table III. 3.). However, they believe that deputies prioritize these tasks in nearly the reverse order.

Even among those who believe elections are now democratic, there is an expectation that deputies will contribute to real social and economic change: "There won't be any fraud this time. But people still won't have confidence until they see something concrete."<sup>158</sup> Qualitative evidence suggests that citizens expect members to be close to them in the district and to solve social and economic problems in their community. Taken together, interview and survey evidence from constituents suggests a representative gap: citizens believe that members are not present and that they do little to solve problems in the district. This evidence casts doubt on the

<sup>158</sup> Algeria, Constituent #2, April 2007.

appropriateness of the representation paradigm for understanding parliamentary politics in Morocco and Algeria.

**TABLE III. 3. Expectations and Perceptions Moroccan and Algerian Constituents**

	<i>Morocco</i>		<i>Algeria</i>	
	Most Important Task to Citizen	Task Perceived Most Important to Deputy	Most Important Task to Citizen	Task Perceived Most Important to Deputy
Obtaining Funds	1	5	1	3
Writing and Debating Laws	3	2	3	2
Taking Care of Citizens' Requests	2	4	2	1
Informing Citizens	4	3	4	4
Organizing Meetings with Party	5	1	5	5

Questions: Please tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with the following statements: (1) Only people with a connection to a deputy can ask for help with a personal problem (2) People around here do not trust the outcome of elections.

### **Defining and Operationalizing Patronage and Clientelism: The Patron-Client Paradigm**

While operationalizing representation as a set of tasks may be a useful way of analyzing political institutions and outcomes, it is not reflective of legislative politics if it presupposes wrongly that the legislature as a whole is representative, or that casework requests themselves are not merely forms of patronage or clientelism. In other words, casework could have positive affects in the political system, as scholars writing on developing polities in the 1960s and 1970s believed, by building popular support for the parliament and contributing to its development. But, the fact that partisan legislatures appear to contribute to the robustness of authoritarian regimes casts doubt on the hypothesis that casework promotes mass-level confidence in the parliament, or contributes to oversight of the bureaucracy. In both of these ways, the representation paradigm can be placed in doubt by the politics of patronage and clientelism.

### **A Representative Legislature**

Whereas democratic legislatures “. . . fundamentally serve to provide stable patterns of popular representation . . . [t]he *raison d’etre* of authoritarian institutions is not to constrain ‘despotic power,’ but to supply a regime with the ‘infrastructural power’ necessary to implement its command over potential opposition in civil society and within the multiple layers of the state

apparatus itself.”<sup>159</sup> A representative legislature presupposes that elections provide genuine democratic choice and achieve a distribution of parties (and independents) which, according to a set of agreed-upon electoral institutions free from institutional bias, matches the preferences of the electorate.<sup>160</sup>

Since electoral authoritarianism circumscribes democratic choice through electoral manipulation and maintains a loyal parliament through patron-client relationships, it will be non-representative by definition. In Chapter 1 I argued that weak legislatures, along with non-competitive elections, are a second constitutive feature of electoral authoritarianism. Here I argue that patronage, along with the violations of democratic norms in electoral structuring (i.e. electoral manipulation), is a second tool that incumbents use to maintain “loyal”, acquiescent parliamentary membership.

Clientelism and patronage in the parliamentary system—whether the member is serving as a client of incumbent elites or as a patron of political supporters—challenge the representative nature of the legislature, limiting “its effectiveness in pursuing policy goals . . . [by feeding] into a pattern of factions” and by violating personal equality and individual rights within the political system.<sup>161</sup> Put another way, representation refers to the alignment of the interests of policymakers to those of the general public; when members privilege narrow interests rather than those of the general public, they challenge the representative nature of the parliament.<sup>162</sup>

### **Defining Patronage and Clientelism**

In the literature and in this project, clientelism and patronage are used interchangeably.<sup>163</sup> Patron-client relationships are hierarchical relationships between two people of unequal status and resources for which both parties find mutual benefit in an exchange of interests.<sup>164</sup> Waterbury suggests that they are asymmetrical and durable in the sense that the patron keeps

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<sup>159</sup> Dan Slater, "Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the Personalization of Power in Malaysia," *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 1 (2003): 81-2.

<sup>160</sup> Schedler, "Elections without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation.": 39.

<sup>161</sup> Sa'eda Kilani and Basem Sakijha, *Wasta: The Declared Secret* (Amman: Jordan Press Foundation Printing Press, 2002).

<sup>162</sup> M. Castanheira and H. S. Esfahani, "Political Economy of Growth: Lessons Learned and Challenges Ahead," in *Explaining Growth: A Global Research Project*, ed. M. Gary and S. Lyn (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

<sup>163</sup> See, for example, Nicolas van de Walle, "Presidentialism and Clientalism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 41, no. 2 (2003): 297-8.

<sup>164</sup> Landé, 1977, xx, as cited in Jean and Yves Schemel Leca, "Clientélisme Et Patrimonialisme Dans Le Monde Arabe," *International Political Science Review* 4, no. 4 (1983): 455.

track in order to continue to extract benefits by providing discriminatory access to resources.<sup>165</sup> Different forms of clientelism may exist; for example, political or electoral clientelism, defined as the exchange of goods for political support.<sup>166</sup> Authoritarian clientelism draws particular attention to coercion, in that it involves “enduring political subordination of clients . . . reinforced by the threats of coercion.”<sup>167</sup>

In the literature on the Arab world, *wasta* is also used interchangeably with both patronage and clientelism. In contemporary spoken Arabic, *wasta* can refer to both the one who acts as an intermediary and the act of providing the favor itself. *Wasta* is a social tool with deep historical precedence in which loyalty to family, tribe, religion, and sect is used to achieve a mutually beneficial exchange of interests.<sup>168</sup> In this sense, *wasta* simply means using an intermediary to solve a problem and it could apply to a purely private matter; for example, helping someone get a job in the private sector. The one who seeks the favor, the one who acts as a mediator, and the one who provides the benefit or service all gain something, but the latter benefits most, arguably, from the prestige of having provided the service and from the open-ended “tacit power and . . . social debt” which results from the “exchange.”<sup>169</sup> In its contemporary usage, however, *wasta* generally refers to the use of an individual’s position within a state bureaucracy and the resources of the state to gain power and influence (for the giver) to solve a problem or gain preferential treatment (for the receiver). In this sense it is similar to notions of the patron-client relationship in literature from a number of world regions.<sup>170</sup>

### **Particularized Demands versus Patronage and Clientelism**

Research on constituency service in American Politics generated debate on the benefits and drawbacks for democracy of members providing particularistic benefits to individuals and associations, especially through casework. In a certain sense, these requests are preferential in

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<sup>165</sup> Gellner and Waterbury, eds., *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*.

<sup>166</sup> Javier Auyero, "The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account," *Latin American Research Review* 35, no. 3 (2000), Leonard Wantchekon, "Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin," *World Politics* 55, no. 3 (2003), John Waterbury, "An Attempt to Put Patrons and Clients in Their Place," in *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, ed. Ernest and John Waterbury Gellner (London: Duckworth, 1977). Wantchekon: 400. Auyero: 58.

<sup>167</sup> Jonathan Fox, "The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico," *World Politics* 46, no. 2 (1994): 153.

<sup>168</sup> Kilani and Sakijha, *Wasta: The Declared Secret*: 21.

<sup>169</sup> Sa'eda Kilani and Basem Sakijha, *Wasta: The Declared Secret* (Amman: Jordan Press Foundation Printing Press, 2002): 21. See also Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society*.

<sup>170</sup> See, for example, Auyero, "The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account."

nature. On the one hand, benefits for districts, organized interests, and individuals and associations (“pork-barrel politics”) may diverge from the interests of the broader population in favor of the interests of a particular constituency. On the other hand, casework was justified as a means of oversight—a means by which to determine when individuals are not getting those rights and privileges to which they are entitled by law. How can we recognize the difference between particularistic demands, which exist in most democratic political settings, and patronage?

The state apparatus in both Morocco and Algeria—along with the parliamentary system—operates via the logic of patron-client relations, reproducing itself in the various structures of governance.<sup>171</sup> Members of parliament can and do use both personal and state resources, including both material resources and personal connections, to solve casework requests. The difference between particularistic benefits and clientelism may not always be clear-cut.

Sa’eda Kilani and Basem Sakijha suggest that the need for *wasta* arises from bureaucratic bottlenecks which are out of the control of the seeker, and that the act of providing *wasta* contradicts “norms and laws”.<sup>172</sup> This occurs when the request is legal (though preferential) or illegal to “go around the law . . . regain a lost right . . . or avoid routine and administrative complications.”<sup>173</sup> I argue that a casework request is clientalistic if it breaks a law, or, if it involves inequality, reciprocity, and proximity.<sup>174</sup> In the words of a Jordanian elite: “*Wasta* violates the individual’s rights who feels betrayed, and insecure. It creates chaos in the country and overall dissatisfaction”.<sup>175</sup> A request would break a law if it violates, in some way, individual rights and equality as guaranteed by the constitutions of Morocco and Algeria, *inter alia*. If it does not involve one of these two conditions, I suggest that it is particularistic, not clientalistic.

### **Member Perspectives on the Legislative Link**

Three general patterns emerge in the interview and survey data concerning the representative link from the perspective of the member. First, members express their view of their role and the nature of their constituency in very diverse ways. Second, to the extent to

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<sup>171</sup> See, for example, Brand, *Women, the State, and Political Liberalization*, Azzedine Layachi, *State, Society & Democracy in Morocco: The Limits of Associative Life* (Washington, DC: The Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1998), Hugh Roberts, “The Algerian Bureaucracy,” *Review of African Political Economy* (1982).

<sup>172</sup> Kilani and Sakijha, *Wasta: The Declared Secret*, Sakijha, *Wasta: The Declared Secret.*: 21.

<sup>173</sup> Sakijha, *Wasta: The Declared Secret.*: 20. Algeria, Member #27, March 2007.

<sup>174</sup> Leca, “Clientélisme Et Patrimonialisme Dans Le Monde Arabe.”, Waterbury, “An Attempt to Put Patrons and Clients in Their Place.”: 337.

<sup>175</sup> Dr. Maysoun Bdour., cited in Kilani and Sakijha, *Wasta: The Declared Secret.*. 79.

which patterns emerge in open-ended responses to questions about the role of a deputy, these patterns reflect language in the constitution pertaining to the role of the parliament and parliamentarian. Finally, basic notions of role types emerge in the open-ended interviews, but these types appear clearer among Moroccan than Algerian members, suggesting that the longer length of multiparty experience leads to the emergence and differentiation of representative types.

### **The Role of the Deputy**

Parliamentarians describe their role in diverse ways, although their answers cluster around constitutional prerogatives. Algerian members often describe their mandate as “national” (Article 105), but highlight the importance of having a presence in the constituency in order to “remain faithful to the trust of the people and be permanently aware of their aspirations” (Article 100). Moroccan members cite the functions of oversight and legislation prescribed by the constitution (Articles 45 and 60, *inter alia*).<sup>176</sup>

When asked how he sees his role, one Islamist deputy in Algeria stated that: “Deputies have the following responsibilities: Legislation, following the program of the executive, and bringing the preoccupations of citizens to the authorities.”<sup>177</sup> For another, the “Role is to defend the interests of citizens and the state”.<sup>178</sup> For a member of the FLN, the role of the deputy is:

First to legislate—to elaborate the laws that are proposed by the government. The second role is to transmit the complaints of citizens to government. The deputy must live among the citizens. He must have a parliamentary office in the district. The deputy does not have the power to solve problems. They try to intervene at the willaya to solve the problem. We ask a lot from a deputy, but they have no resources to solve problems.<sup>179</sup>

For another Algerian deputy, the role of the deputy is to:

. . . legislate according to the needs of population, to promulgate texts. Second it is to be a link between people and the *pouvoir* that takes into consideration their demands. Finally, it is to question and control the government. Just like the constitution.<sup>180</sup>

The Moroccan Constitution defines the legislative and control function (e.g. Fact-finding committees, Article 42) of the legislature, but does not prescribe other roles or functions. A

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<sup>176</sup> Morocco, Observer #3, July 2006.

<sup>177</sup> Algeria, Member #17, December 2005.

<sup>178</sup> Algeria, Member #20, December 2005.

<sup>179</sup> Algeria, Member #22, December 2005.

<sup>180</sup> Algeria, Member #19, March 2005.

socialist member in Morocco described the role of the parliamentarian as oversight and legislation, but did not name representation and accountability within those roles.

While there is some consensus concerning the role of the deputy, that is, those tasks upon which he or she should focus, there is much less consensus within the parliament and the political system concerning the prerogatives appropriate for the parliamentarian and parliament. More importantly, however, there has been insufficient public debate concerning the prerogatives of the parliamentarian and the parliament; disagreement exists between reformist and traditionally-minded factions within both parliaments which stymies such a debate.<sup>181</sup>

Table III. 4. demonstrates the diversity of opinion concerning whether there is agreement among members about the proper role of the deputy, whether there is agreement in other branches of government about the role of the deputy, and whether the parliament has adequate power vis-à-vis these branches. For each of these statements, deputies are almost evenly split between agreement and disagreement. Further, there is variation in satisfaction levels with the legislative experience; satisfaction level does not tend to vary by party.

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<sup>181</sup> Zerhouni, "Elite Et Transition Democratique Au Maroc: Les Parlementaires De La Legislature 1997-2002".

**TABLE III. 4. Attitudes toward Legislative Development among Moroccan and Algerian Members**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
In House, Agreement about Role of Deputy:		
Strongly Disagree (1)	6 (6.9%)	6 (7.2%)
Disagree	23 (26.4%)	33 (39.8%)
Agree	50 (57.5%)	31 (37.4%)
Strongly Agree (4)	8 (9.2%)	13 (15.7%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	87 (2.7) <sup>a</sup>	83 (2.6) <sup>d</sup>
In the Political System, Agreement about Role of Deputy:		
Strongly Disagree	6 (7.1%)	6 (7.4%)
Disagree	20 (23.8%)	34 (42.0%)
Agree	49 (58.3%)	32 (39.5%)
Strongly Agree	9 (10.7%)	9 (11.1%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	84 (2.7) <sup>b</sup>	81 (2.5) <sup>e</sup>
Lawmaking Power of the Legislature Sufficient:		
Strongly Disagree	12 (14.5%)	8 (9.6%)
Disagree	34 (41.0%)	25 (30.1%)
Agree	24 (28.9%)	38 (45.8%)
Strongly Agree	13 (15.7%)	12 (14.5%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	83 (2.5)	83 (2.7) <sup>f</sup>
Level of Satisfaction with Legislative Work:		
Very Dissatisfied	2 (2.3%)	6 (7.1%)
Dissatisfied	38 (43.7%)	41 (48.8%)
Satisfied	39 (44.8%)	32 (38.1%)
Very Satisfied	8 (9.2%)	5 (6.0%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	87 (2.6) <sup>aa</sup>	84 (2.4) <sup>c</sup>

Questions: (1) In general, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with parliamentary work? (2) At the House of Representatives, there is an agreement on the role of the deputy. (3) At all levels of the political system, there is an agreement on the role of the deputy. (4) The House of Representatives has a constitution power that is great enough to permit it to propose bills.

<sup>aa</sup> In Morocco, *Makhzen* party (UC and RNI) deputies are more likely to be satisfied (P Chi<sup>2</sup> < .051).

<sup>a</sup> In Morocco, *Makhzen* party (UC and RNI) deputies are more likely to believe there is an agreement in the House about the role of deputies (P Chi<sup>2</sup> < .022).

<sup>b</sup> In Morocco, *Makhzen* party (UC and RNI) deputies are more likely to believe there is an agreement in the political system about the role of deputies (P Chi<sup>2</sup> < .040).

<sup>c</sup> In Algeria, Islamist deputies are less satisfied with parliamentary work (P Chi<sup>2</sup> < .050).

<sup>d</sup> In Algeria, Islamist deputies are less likely to believe there is an agreement in the House about the role of deputies (P Chi<sup>2</sup> < .035).

<sup>e</sup> In Algeria, government parties (FLN and RND) are more likely to believe there is an agreement in the political system about the role of deputies (P Chi<sup>2</sup> < .054).

<sup>f</sup> In Algeria, Islamist deputies are less likely to agree that the power of the parliament has enough power to make laws (P Chi<sup>2</sup> < .050). (This relationship exists in Morocco, however, the level of significant is .114)

## Deputy Role Types

The beginning of a theory of role types emerges similarly in both countries. Among members who are most active in the parliament, there are those who believe that serving constituents through casework provision is appropriate while others believe that it should be secondary to work on larger community projects (district projects) affecting many people or on legislation for the public good.

### *Deputy Role Type 1: Citizen-Orientation*

The first role type, which I call the citizen-orientation, reflects a deputy who is focused on the constituency and on having a high level of contact with the constituent and knowledge of his or her needs and problems. For a socialist Moroccan deputy: “the deputy has a mission to offer services to solve citizen problems.”<sup>182</sup> And for an Islamist deputy in Morocco: “I am in my district everyday except for the days that parliament is in session. I have a daily relationship with the district where I live. I meet ordinary citizens everyday in my house and outside my house and in the party headquarters.”<sup>183</sup>

Similarly, in Algeria, for an Islamist deputy: “It is rare that someone will go far to seek out a deputy. The deputy must be close and attached to the people. We try to solve their problems and to be faithful to the electoral campaign. We represent the party. We risk losing the next election.”<sup>184</sup> For a deputy from the FLN: “I am in charge of their problems—I consider them my own problem. Our party head advised me to open an office. If you are not from the district, you cannot be elected. You could never be reelected if you were not there and you are not known by the people of the district.”<sup>185</sup>

The citizen-orientation has roots in traditional understandings of the deputy as the intermediary between the citizen in the periphery and the government in the capital.

### *Deputy Role Type 2: Legislative-Orientation*

By contrast, other members believe that solving citizen requests, while necessary at times to maintain electoral support or to assist the party, is fundamentally contrary to democratic

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<sup>182</sup> Morocco, Member #2, April 2006.

<sup>183</sup> Morocco, Member #3, July 2006.

<sup>184</sup> Algeria, Member #3, December 2005.

<sup>185</sup> Algeria, Member #3, December 2005.

practices, or is secondary in importance to the legislative function. For deputies fitting the Legislative-Orientation, one should spend time solving district problems affecting numerous people (e.g. lack of electricity in a neighborhood) or writing and debating legislation which they view as serving the public interest. Role types are more clearly differentiated in Morocco, perhaps owing to its longer history of multiparty politics. Moroccan members often appear to be clearly in one of these two categories, whereas Algerian members often make statements which share aspects of both orientations. Further, the Legislative-Orientation appears, at least tentatively-speaking, to be more common among Moroccan than Algerian members.

For example, in the words of a socialist deputy in Morocco: “. . . people pushed us to move the government to change illegal laws in order to solve their problems. I am a lawyer so I can solve these problems. By these laws they are suffering under corruption and lack of infrastructure. I choose to be in the committee on legislation in order to change these laws.”<sup>186</sup> And for an *Istiqlal* deputy: “People don’t understand our role in revising laws. They want to ask for individual problems, personal interests, not collective interests.”<sup>187</sup> A USFP deputy said: “There are too many problems—the system is ineffective. I prefer to work on regional, not individual problems. But we are obliged. We must do this for elections and for the party. Citizens don’t even care about big projects. What they want are their individual problems solved.”<sup>188</sup> One woman from a small party in Morocco paused and said that she does not take care of many individual requests: “I serve globally. All my action is aimed at serving at the national level.”<sup>189</sup> A PJD deputy from Morocco added that the: “role of a deputy is not to serve citizens. This can lead to clientelism and pervert the system. The citizens are many and they want help with personal problems, but our real role is to legislate.”<sup>190</sup> In the words of an *Istiqlal* member: “I am a deputy of the nation. I serve, in a collective fashion, 1000 people. I must be effective. I prefer to ask the government for large projects. I cannot help with employment. I can’t intervene unfairly for one person.”<sup>191</sup> And for a USFP deputy: “I generally try to solve problems affecting at least 800 people. The legislative work is first priority.”<sup>192</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> Morocco, Member #4, May 2006.

<sup>187</sup> Morocco, Member #5, September 2005.

<sup>188</sup> Morocco, Member #6, April 2006.

<sup>189</sup> Morocco, Member #7, January 2006.

<sup>190</sup> Morocco, Member #8, September 2005.

<sup>191</sup> Morocco, Member #9, June 2006.

<sup>192</sup> Morocco, Member #10, May 2007.

## **The Nature of the Constituency**

Members also vary, to a great extent, in terms of the way in which they define their constituency. Although we might expect deputies to identify their electoral district or country as the primary identity represented, they do not always do so. Among the groups and identities members could choose as their primary focus of representation—their commune, region, country, state or province, electoral district, religious community, ethnic or language group, family or clan, party or ideology, social class, or an organized interest—a considerable number of combinations of first and second choices were selected. Even when space is given to select a primary and secondary identity, responses range for “country only” to a selection of five or more answers. Some also add additional answers such as “women”, “young people in youth associations”, “humanism and egalitarianism”, among other responses. Although this diversity is not inherently problematic, it may reflect the lack of discussion and debate about the nature of representation, or rather the development of consensus over a long period of parliamentary experience.

In Algeria, deputies are most likely to say that they represent the country first (48.8 percent) and the electoral district second (26.8 percent), although many other choices were also selected and in various combinations. In Morocco, deputies are most likely to say that they represent their country first (51.1 percent) and their region second (17.1 percent). The electoral district was the first identity represented by 26.8 percent of Algerian members and 11.4 percent of Moroccan members. The electoral district ranked as the second community among 36.2 percent of Algerian members and 25.8 percent of Moroccan members.<sup>193</sup>

### **“Home Style”: Deputies and Attention to the District**

“Home style” reveals much about a member’s awareness of constituents’ wishes and the importance attributed to district matters.<sup>194</sup> Here again there is considerable diversity in terms of the days spent in the district, frequency of speeches and meetings, office hours, types of offices, if any, and number of assistants (See Table III. 5.). Although members in both countries spend about the same number of days per month in the district, 16.5 in Morocco compared to 17.4 in Algeria, Moroccan members give more speeches per month; 2.1 on average, compared to 1.3

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<sup>193</sup> In terms of five-point scale measure of representation of the district (1) through the country (5), there is diversity along the scale in both countries but the mean is the same, about 3.3 in Morocco and 3.2 in Algeria (See Table 5).

<sup>194</sup> R. E. Infall and Brian Crisp, “Determinants of Home Style: The Many Incentives for Going Home in Columbia,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26, no. 3 (2001): 487.

among Algerian members. Further, they offer more office hours per week; about 22.3 hours per week in Morocco, compared with 19.4 in Algeria. They have more assistants, on average, and they are more likely, on average, to have each of the different types of offices. In Chapter 4 I discuss why differences exist in the capacity of the Moroccan parliament and why it is an outcome of elite-level bargaining and reflective of the preferences of monarchs and presidents.

There is considerable diversity in the locations deputies receive casework requests, including public places such as cafes or mosques, homes, the parliament, party offices, local parliamentary offices, businesses, and associations. In the case of Morocco, members often have a dual function in the government administration and, therefore, handle requests at the offices of regional or local government.

Although most members are presented with individual requests at a number of locations as well as by telephone, when asked to identify which of seven types of offices they have, only 6.4 percent of Algerian and 14.6 percent of Moroccan deputies responded that they do not have any of the types of offices listed in the survey. The plurality, 71.8 percent of Algerian deputies and 43.4 percent of Moroccan deputies, use one type of office, while 21.8 percent and 41.8 percent, respectively, use two or more of these types of offices.

In Algeria, 19.2 percent claimed to have no or “very little” office hours. In Morocco, this figure is 23.6 percent. There is a considerable range in the other responses, from 1 to 75 hours per week, with several deputies noting that the office is always open. In Morocco, this figure is 1 to 24 with some saying “unlimited”. In both countries, the most common modes are by telephone, by self-presentation at the home or office of the deputy or his or her party, by mail, and via an intermediary.

Further, only about half of deputies, 59.0 percent in Algeria and 49.1 percent in Morocco, do not employ assistants. In Morocco, where the multiparty experience is longer, party headquarters and assistants, as well as party militants, appear to provide a stronger and better developed framework for helping with casework requests. By contrast, Algerian deputies appear to organize themselves on a more individual basis to work for re-election.

**TABLE III. 5. “Home Style”**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Mean Geographical Focus of Representation	3.3 (1.2)	3.2 (1.0)
Mean Days in District	16.5 (8.3)	17.4 (6.7)
Mean Speeches/Meetings per Month	2.1 (2.0)	1.3 (1.7)
Mean Office Hours per Week	22.3 (33.5)	19.4 (28.8)
Proportion with Type of Office:		
Office in Home	38 (41.3%)	34 (40.0%)
Office in Party Headquarters in Capital	22 (23.9%)	5 (5.6%)
Office in Party Headquarters in District	27 (29.4%)	22 (25.9%)
Separate Parliamentary Office in Capital	17 (18.5%)	2 (2.4%)
Separate Parliamentary Office in District	38 (41.3%)	24 (28.2%)
Office Shared with Another Function in Capital	9 (9.8%)	-
Office Shared with Another Function in District	5 (5.4%)	-
Parliamentary Office in Capital (Shared with Other Deputy)	-	5 (5.9%)
Parliamentary Office in District (Shared with Other Deputy)	-	11 (12.9%)
Mean Full-time Assistants	.6 (1.1)	.3 (.7)
Mean Part-time Assistants	.7 (1.2)	.5 (.9)

### Casework

The data reveal that taking care of individual requests is an important function for many deputies in both Algeria and Morocco, and that members vary considerably in their provision of casework. The perception among members in both countries is often that they are bombarded by requests. According to one *Islah* deputy in Algeria, deputies receive “all problems imaginable—even a headache.”<sup>195</sup> A USFP deputy in Morocco described himself as the “eternal assistant,” saying that citizens often return with one request after another, and that many come with emotional appeals for help based on having voted for the deputy in the previous election.<sup>196</sup>

Table III. 6. shows that Moroccan members have higher caseloads on average than do Algerian members: 98 requests per month on average in Morocco and 44 requests per month in Algeria.

<sup>195</sup> Algeria, Member #3, December 2005.

<sup>196</sup> Morocco, Member #11, November 2006.

**TABLE III. 6. Average Caseloads per Month among Moroccan and Algerian Members**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Number of Requests per Month (Range)	0 to 1600	0 to 210
Mean Number of Requests per Month	97.8 (215.1)	44.3 (41.1)
<i>Total</i>	85	70

### Types of Requests

The types of requests received by Algerian and Moroccan deputies are similar, although there are some minor differences reflecting variation in social issues between the two countries. For example, the magnitude of the housing crisis makes lodging one of the most common casework requests in Algeria, whereas in Morocco it is important, but not mentioned as frequently by deputies. In Algeria, there are also a number of requests connected with the black decade, such as social services for bombing victims and their families.

In Algeria, the majority of requests are social in nature (e.g. employment, housing, and health), but often also stem from problems with the corrupt and unresponsive bureaucracy and lack of justice in the court system. Citizens do not generally approach deputies about matters of policymaking or their voting record. Given that housing is in part administered by the government, hospitals are public, and jobs, both public and private, are generally doled out on the basis of personal relationships, the provision of many services being susceptible to corruption and favoritism. As an example, a young person shared that he could not use the government program providing loans for young people to start businesses because he did not have a personal connection and that, if approved, the bank manager will expect a cut of the loan.<sup>197</sup> A young medical student stated that it is now common for doctors in the public hospitals to take bribes for beds, which are in short supply, and for members of influential families to receive preferential treatment.<sup>198</sup> In these matters, the influence of a deputy may be effective in helping citizens obtain a service to which they are by law entitled. There is also a perception among deputies that citizens view them as well-paid and this explains why they are so frequently asked for monetary handouts. According to an Independent deputy in Algeria, over 30 percent of the requests he receives are for money.<sup>199</sup>

<sup>197</sup> Algeria, Constituent #3, July 2004.

<sup>198</sup> Algeria, Constituent #4, July 2006.

<sup>199</sup> Algeria, Member #5, May 2006.

The most common problems in Morocco also mirror its socioeconomic situation, with jobs and basic infrastructure, medicine, education, electricity, and requests for money common requests. An *Istiqlal* deputy in Morocco, who stated that he receives requests daily for housing and medicine, described his casework requests: “This is a rural area and people lack basic infrastructure.”<sup>200</sup>

At his local parliamentary office in a large Algerian city in the East, an Independent deputy showed me an elaborate application and filing system for taking requests and keeping records.<sup>201</sup> Among the requests received that day was one from a man who was a victim of a bombing during the 1990s and needed housing. The deputy said he would contact the government, which administrates several housing programs, about this need. Another request was from a youth sports team in need of funds to participate in a competition. By contacting an association, the deputy was able to procure the needed resources. Here, both knowledge and influence, in addition to an open door driven by electoral incentives, provided a highly efficient casework operation which actively seeks requests from citizens.

An hour in the office hours of a USFP deputy in Morocco provides a further snapshot of the requests with which many members are presented. The deputy stated that he held offices hours once a week, and, that he employs a secretary to manage citizens arriving and waiting their turn to see the deputy.<sup>202</sup>

Request 1: Four middle-aged men who created an association seeking to help people find housing asked the deputy to act as an intermediary with the government to register the association. The deputy promised to talk to the *quaid*, the local representative of the King, in order to facilitate the process and obtain the permission.

Request 2: Three middle-aged men asked for help promoting a business they have just started. When I asked why they came to the deputy, they said that they had gone to several parties and other elected official in regional and local government. One said he has known the deputy for four years and considers him educated and capable of helping with their request. He hoped the deputy would have some contacts that could be of use in expanding business.

Request 3: A young woman with a diploma in economic sciences came in for help finding a job. The deputy agreed to contact the Ministry of Work to see if they can help find her a job.

Request 4: A middle-aged woman asked for the deputy’s help in getting a room at the university so that her son could defend his thesis. The deputy said he would speak to the administration of the university.

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<sup>200</sup> Morocco, Member #12, March 2006.

<sup>201</sup> Algeria, Member #6, June 2004.

<sup>202</sup> Morocco, Member #2, April 2006.

Request 5: A middle-aged woman who says she is an old friend of the deputy came in with her daughter. It appeared that they did not have a specific request on that day, and may just have been visiting, but stated that the deputy previously helped the young woman find a dorm room while she was in university in Rabat.

Request 6: A middle-aged couple asked for help solving a tax problem related to their car. They stated that the deputy already helped them solve one legal problem when a former business partner embezzled money from the company.

Request 7: Four elderly members of a Berber cultural association asked for help obtaining financial resources. The deputy said he would write a letter to the Ministry of Culture to request money for clothing and other needs to develop the association.

Request 8: A young, unemployed man asked for money. A heated exchange ensued as the deputy explained his role as a Member of Parliament and suggested that the man ask for help from associations.

Request 9: Another young man requested the use of the fax and the phone in the office in order to search for a job. The deputy said that he does not have a phone or a fax machine in the office because he used those of his group at the Parliament.

Several clear themes emerged from these office hours. In addition to the diversity of age and gender represented by the citizens, the majority of the requests involved asking the deputy to play the role of an intermediary, or perhaps even defender, before the government administration. The deputy was seen not only to have an open door, but also to have an influence with the government that the citizen does not enjoy. “I am the porte-ecouté”, said the deputy, “None of the other deputies in this district work for citizens. I want people to learn that they can vote for someone and that person will work for them. People don’t have much confidence in deputies because many of them get elected and never come to the district.”<sup>203</sup>

Like many others I visited in their districts, this deputy makes citizens feel supported and represented, even though their requests reveal two pervasive needs; the first socioeconomic, and the second for an intermediary to help with seemingly banal administrative requests. Several deputies explained that they must attend weddings and other social events to maintain popularity in their party, as well as to foster a sense among citizens that their leaders are defending their interests before the government. One deputy in a rural district in Morocco began the interview and then within a few moments a citizen approached him, told him that they were burying the citizen’s mother, and the deputy left immediately to be at the funeral with members of his constituency.<sup>204</sup>

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<sup>203</sup> Ibid.

<sup>204</sup> Morocco, Member #13, June 2006.

## Characteristics of Citizens Who Make Requests

As these brief observations demonstrate, impressions of casework as a privilege of wealthy and influential citizens are not by-and-large characteristic of casework operations in either country (See Table III. 7.). Over 80 percent of members in both Algeria and Morocco disagree that sometimes only rich citizens can make demands. The same result holds for the statement that only citizens of the same family can ask for help, which is asked only in Morocco. As an MP deputy in Morocco commented: “No, friends and family aren’t enough to win an election,” and for a USPF colleague, “The rich do not need [to ask] a deputy. They have other means.”<sup>205</sup>

Most deputies agree that they are sometimes confronted with illegal requests from citizens wishing to find a shortcut or special treatment (e.g. getting a license without taking a driving test, etc.) and others admit the existence of abuses of power by deputies in order to help family and personal contacts solve personal problems. There is a relatively high level of consensus among deputies that citizens sometimes make baseless claims. 61.0 percent of Algerian members and 71.5 percent of Moroccan members agree on this point. An MSP deputy in Algeria said that some requests, while founded, are based on poor knowledge of the law and that sometimes citizens ask for help to make an exception above the law.<sup>206</sup> In Morocco in particular, the integration of legislators into local government position fosters confusion in the general public about the role of a deputy, whose role is to legislate on national issues, and a local official, whose job is to attend to local problems such as lack of infrastructure.

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<sup>205</sup> Morocco, Member #14, May 2006; Morocco, Member #15, September 2005

<sup>206</sup> Algeria, Member #7, December 2005.

**TABLE III. 7. Attitudes of Members Concerning Constituency Responsiveness**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Sometimes Only Rich Citizens Can Make Demands:		
Strongly Disagree (1)	48 (52.8%)	48 (56.5%)
Disagree	34 (37.4%)	25 (29.4%)
Agree	5 (5.5%)	8 (9.4%)
Strongly Agree (4)	4 (4.4%)	4 (4.7%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	91 (1.6)	85 (1.6)
I Sometimes Receive Baseless Requests:		
Strongly Disagree	8 (8.8%)	6 (7.3%)
Disagree	18 (19.8%)	26 (31.7%)
Agree	41 (45.1%)	35 (42.7%)
Strongly Agree	24 (26.4%)	15 (18.3%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	91 (2.9)	82 (2.7)
Serving Citizens Improves Government Functioning (Oversight):		
Strongly Disagree	3 (3.3%)	5 (6.0%)
Disagree	4 (4.4%)	10 (11.9%)
Agree	47 (52.2%)	28 (33.3%)
Strongly Agree	36 (40.0%)	41 (48.8%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	90 (3.3)	84 (3.3)

Finally, deputies generally receive a large number of requests from women suggesting casework operations are relatively open to the general public. The mean proportion of requests coming from women is approximately 30-39 percent and the mode is less than 10 percent in both countries. Deputies fall in all the response categories ranging from less than 10 percent to over 70 percent. Percentage of requests from women is not related significantly to the party or to the gender of the deputy in either country. One female deputy in Algeria, in particular, stated that “It’s clear. Women are more comfortable coming to female deputies”.<sup>207</sup> In Morocco, many male deputies claimed that more women than men make requests of them and those women generally come seeking help for their sons and daughters. In rural areas, some deputies suggest that few women come to them directly; instead, a male family member acts as an intermediary, but this appears to be an exception rather than a rule. There appears, therefore, to be diversity in the degree to which deputies receive requests from women, but it is clear that both male deputies in these societies do not receive requests from men only.

<sup>207</sup> Algeria, Member #8, June 2004.

## Rationale for Solving Requests

There is broad agreement among members that serving citizens is important for maintaining electoral support (See Table III. 8.). In Algeria, 17.6 percent of deputies disagree and 84.4 percent agree with this statement. In the words of an el-Islah deputy from Algeria: “Citizens think we don’t bring problems to the government. They demand results, not an effort.”<sup>208</sup> A USFP deputy in Morocco who disagreed stated that: “Even if you help citizens [with problems], they will forget. They won’t vote [for you].”<sup>209</sup> Other deputies, according to an observer, avoid going more often than once a year, or even only at the end of the mandate, because of the high expectations that they will solve personal problems and that they will demand resources and help arguing that they voted for the deputy.<sup>210</sup>

There is also agreement, though with variation, that serving citizens is the most important thing that the deputy does. This indicator is a proxy for the role-types, Citizen-Oriented and Legislative-Oriented. In Algeria, 85.5 percent of members agree with this statement. In Morocco, this percentage is about 82.5 percent. Some deputies disagreed with this statement and explained their response by stating that their job is to legislate for a national interest--not to serve citizens. Many others, especially in Morocco, agreed, but said that they served citizens *by* legislating for the public good.

**TABLE III. 8. Attitudes of Members Concerning Constituency Responsiveness**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Serving Citizens Important for Electoral Support (Electoral Basis):		
Strongly Disagree (1)	0 (0.0%)	4 (4.7%)
Disagree	6 (6.5%)	11 (12.9%)
Agree	23 (25.0%)	31 (36.5%)
Strongly Agree (4)	63 (68.85%)	39 (45.9%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	92 (3.6) <sup>b</sup>	85 (3.2) <sup>d</sup>
Serving Citizens Most Important Think I Do (Role Type):		
Strongly Disagree (1)	1 (1.1%)	4 (4.8%)
Disagree	15 (16.5%)	8 (9.6%)
Agree	30 (33.0%)	23 (27.7%)
Strongly Agree (4)	45 (49.5%)	48 (57.8%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	91 (3.3)	83 (3.4)

<sup>208</sup> Algeria, Member #27, July 2006.

<sup>209</sup> Morocco, Member #4, May 2006

<sup>210</sup> Morocco, Observer #2, September 2005.

## Solving Casework Requests

At times, resolution of casework requests is informal. However, members often handle casework through a relatively formal process requiring citizens to present a written file, or in some cases the deputy or his staff prepares a file, containing information on the person's qualifications for a job, housing program, or other government service. Based on this information, the deputy assesses the qualifications and makes a written or verbal recommendation to a member of the government, contacts private party, or uses his or her own money to help with the need.

Good personal relationships, both in the public and private sector, say deputies, are key to solving citizen problems and many regret that they are unable to solve many problems. According to an MP deputy in Morocco, members use relationships to find the citizen a job in the government, and for a CD deputy in Morocco, professional contacts or relationship with associations are a means to provide help for citizens: "We can't usually do anything—we write oral questions. If the administration worked, these requests wouldn't exist."<sup>211</sup> According to a USFP deputy: "the administration does not always respond to our requests for help with citizen problems, but associations, foundations, and business, many which are run by deputies, provide some resources by which to solve requests."<sup>212</sup> "We have a business—that's why they come to me. We hire", says one PJD deputy. Another socialist member in Morocco has a foundation funded by his business and uses this as a means to help citizens. For an MP deputy: "It helps if I have a friend in the administration."<sup>213</sup> In Morocco, when the minister leaves the oral question session each Wednesday, deputies approach him to hand stacks of dossiers as he descends from the parliamentary chambers. An observer suggested that some deputies attend oral questions on Wednesday alone for this opportunity to present requests to the Minister.<sup>214</sup>

Deputies vary in their success; direct connections with ministers and bureaucrats (e.g. members of the same party), and connections in associations or business are important for solving casework requests. In Algeria, where deputies generally enjoy, on average, a more distant relationship from the power, many find the doors of the commune and willaya closed, and ministers do not return their phone calls. Overall, Algerian members appear to be less effective than Moroccan deputies at solving casework requests. This may be the reason they receive fewer requests on average. Although deputies from a variety of parties mentioned the same issue, one

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<sup>211</sup> Morocco, Member #16, August 2006.

<sup>212</sup> Morocco, Member #17, April 2006.

<sup>213</sup> Morocco, Member #14, May 2006.

<sup>214</sup> Morocco, Observer #3, June 2007.

PT deputy said that his calls to ministries and oral questions rarely, if ever, receive a response. An Islah deputy in Algeria said: “People think deputies have influence, but we don’t. We write many letters and receive no response. You must have personal relationships with someone in the government, or private relationships, in order to help citizens with problems.”<sup>215</sup> One way that the regime exercises control over deputies is by their ability to reach their goals, including solving citizen requests and influencing development projects in their district. One Moroccan deputy stated that as a result of raising questions concerning human rights abuses in a parliamentary committee meeting, the doors are shut for him and he can only use personal, private relationships, including his business, to achieve his goals as a member.<sup>216</sup>

### **Effects of Casework on Government Functioning**

Although few could provide examples, many deputies agree that taking care of citizen requests improves governance or provides oversight of the bureaucracy; 92.2 percent in Morocco and 82.1 percent in Algeria. According to an Islah deputy in Algeria: “If a citizen does not know about a right or is blocked, we have the right to plead on their behalf. This is our role to control.”<sup>217</sup> But for a PT deputy from Algeria, casework is a stop-gap function--we “need to legislate [to improve the system of] governance.”<sup>218</sup>

The foregoing summary of casework practices from the perspective of the deputies suggests that members are engaged in activities which, although not without obstacles and although an outgrowth of an unrepresentative legislature, constitute some form of responsiveness to citizens. Taken alone, this data provides evidence that members engage in activities which might have a positive effect in the system, including enhancing the public’s confidence in parliamentary institutions.

But the members’ perspectives also provide details which cast doubt on the representative paradigm. Citizens face barriers to obtaining what they are entitled to because of a culture of personal relationships in the provision of public and private goods. Citizens faced with an inefficient and ineffective bureaucracy go to deputies for help, further reinforcing the lack of fairness in the provision of government services. Viewed in this way, the ombudsman role might actually reinforce traditional patron-client relations and fail to enhance confidence in democracy and democratic institutions. The perspectives of citizens on the representative link, to which I

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<sup>215</sup> Algeria, Member #3, December 2005.

<sup>216</sup> Morocco, Member #18, July 2006.

<sup>217</sup> Algeria, Member #9, December 2005.

<sup>218</sup> Algeria, Member #10, July 2006.

turn, cast even greater doubt on the usefulness of the representation paradigm for understanding the effects of casework in the political system, including its effect on the attitudes and orientations of ordinary citizens concerning the appropriateness of parliamentary institutions for their society.

### **Constituent Perspectives on the Legislative Gap**

Although some members admit shortcomings in their ability to serve citizens through both national lawmaking and local constituency service, most have a more favorable image of the legislative link than do citizens. “There isn’t much of a deputy-citizen relationship”, according to a deputy from a majority party in Algeria. “Many deputies do not have a good reputation because they are not close to the population”.<sup>219</sup> A Moroccan member from a socialist party suggested that: “most deputies don’t bother to do anything during the mandate.”<sup>220</sup> Another claimed that there is “no link at all between deputies and citizens”.<sup>221</sup>

One reason for the gap is that deputies lack staff, resources, and, in most cases, responsive bureaucracies to solve citizens’ problems. “Local offices didn’t work because deputies were spending a lot of money and not being able to solve problems,” according to a deputy from a majority party in Algeria. “We are elected but have no resources to stay next to them, to listen to them, to help them. We listen even if we cannot solve everything,” according to an Islamist deputy in Algeria. Another problem is that the historical nature of clientelism in the political system, including in the parliament, induces citizens to bring both valid as well as illegal requests to members. According to an Islamist deputy in Algeria, “[m]any requests are valid when someone does not know the law they are entitled to, but others are the result of someone wanting something outside the law, an exception. This happens often.”<sup>222</sup>

Some deputies are aware of their poor image, although they tend to argue that citizens misunderstand them and their efforts to work within the constraints of their resources. According to an Islamist deputy in Algeria: “[c]itizens think we don’t bring problems to the government. People think deputies do nothing.”<sup>223</sup> Another said: “[p]eople think deputies earn a lot. This creates conflict. They think we are the bank and can ask for money for medicine and other

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<sup>219</sup> Algeria, Member #11, May 2006.

<sup>220</sup> Morocco, Member #10, May 2007.

<sup>221</sup> Morocco, Member #1, January 2006.

<sup>222</sup> Algeria, Member #12, December 2005

<sup>223</sup> Algeria, Member #13, May 2006.

things.”<sup>224</sup> A third Islamist deputy in Algeria said: “[m]any people have a prejudice that it’s hard to see a deputy. He advertises his office. There is hesitation. Will he really listen? Welcome me?”<sup>225</sup>

Despite these overwhelmingly negative views, some constituents, particularly those living in the vicinity of a local parliamentary office, which some members maintain, express a positive opinion about the job that particular member is doing. One Moroccan man outside a PJD office said: “these deputies are the only ones who work for us.”<sup>226</sup> A number of Algerians interviewed also saw deputies as effective in getting resources for their districts. One Algerian man said that he liked one of the deputies from his district because he has “a strong personality and can get resources for the *willaya*”.<sup>227</sup>

### **Satisfaction with the Parliament and its Members**

Reflective of these statements are survey data concerning evaluations of the parliament and its members, which Moroccans and Algerians view in very critical terms. Only 9.4 percent of Moroccans and 10.1 percent of Algerians think the parliament is doing a good or excellent job. Slightly more—16.9 percent in Morocco and 15.0 percent in Algeria—think that members from their district are doing well (See Table III. 9.).

Among the functions of the parliament, Moroccans believe their parliament is most effective at debating national issues (1.6) and worst at communicating with citizens and solving their personal problems (1.3). Algerians view the parliament as best at debate and solving economic problems (1.8) and worst at solving their personal problems (1.6). Overall, however, these satisfaction scores are low.

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<sup>224</sup> Algeria, Member #4, March 2005.

<sup>225</sup> Algeria, Member #13, May 2006.

<sup>226</sup> Morocco, Constituent #1, July 2006.

<sup>227</sup> Algeria, Constituent #5 April 2007.

**TABLE III. 9. Specific Support for the Parliament and its Members among Moroccan and Algerian Constituents**

	<i>Morocco</i>					<i>Algeria</i>				
	Poor 1	Fair 2	Good 3	Excellent 4	Total/ Mean	Poor	Fair	Good	Excellent	Total/ Mean
Overall Evaluation of the Members in this District	528 68.4%	114 14.8%	128 16.6%	2 0.3%	772 1.5	232 34.7%	337 50.4%	99 14.8%	1 0.2%	669 1.8
Overall Evaluation of the House of Representatives	404 57.5%	233 33.1%	58 8.3%	8 1.1%	703 1.5	244 38.0%	334 51.9%	65 10.1%	0 0.0%	643 1.7
Evaluation of Debate in House of Representatives	379 55.0%	209 30.3%	81 11.8%	20 2.9%	689 1.6	237 37.8%	290 46.3%	99 15.8%	1 0.2%	627 1.8
Evaluation of Deputies Solving Economic Problems	496 64.4%	210 27.3%	48 6.2%	16 2.1%	770 1.5	267 38.1%	334 47.6%	100 14.3%	0 0.0%	701 1.8
Evaluation of Deputies Solving Personal Programs	578 77.1%	140 18.7%	28 3.7%	4 0.5%	750 1.3	358 54.3%	237 36.0%	64 9.7%	0 0.0%	659 1.6
Evaluation of Deputies Communicating with Citizens	522 73.0%	152 21.3%	37 5.2%	4 0.6%	715 1.3	381 57.3%	205 30.8%	74 11.1%	5 0.8%	665 1.6
Evaluation of Previous House of Representatives	410 62.5%	179 27.3%	57 8.7%	10 1.5%	656 1.5	220 38.9%	247 43.7%	84 14.9%	14 2.5%	565 1.8

Questions: (1) Overall, how would you evaluate the job the House of Representatives is doing? Etc.

## **Salience of and Contact with the Parliament and its Members**

Awareness and knowledge of the parliament seems relatively high in Morocco and Algeria. Salience is higher in Morocco than in Algeria which may be due to the higher level of media coverage of the parliament, especially of parties and programs, than in Algeria. In Morocco and Algerian respectively, 46.2 and 33.2 percent believe they have a good or excellent knowledge of the House of Representatives and how it functions. In 2006 and early 2007, 78.4 percent of Moroccans and 74.2 percent knew the year of the next election (2007). Although similar proportions of Moroccans and Algerians—60.1 percent and 62.6 percent respectively—never read about the parliament in the last month, the mean number of times was 1.5 in Morocco and 0.9 in Algeria. 46.1 percent of Moroccans and 39.4 percent have watched a live debate of the parliament, reflective of the higher coverage of live debates in Morocco than in Algeria. Moroccans are similarly more likely to pay less attention to the current parliament than to the present parliament: 58.3 percent in Morocco and 50.1 percent in Algeria (See Table III. 10).<sup>228</sup>

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<sup>228</sup> In 1976, about one-half of Koreans were generally familiar with the legislature. Chong Lim Kim and Gerhard Loewenberg, "The Cultural Roots of a New Legislature: Public Perceptions of the Korean National Assembly," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* I, no. 3 (1976): 371.

**TABLE III. 10. Salience of the Legislature among Moroccan and Algerian Constituents**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Knowledge of House of Representatives:		
Poor (1)	158 (20.1%)	149 (20.0%)
Fair	266 (33.8%)	349 (46.9%)
Good	283 (36.0%)	215 (28.9%)
Excellent (4)	80 (10.2%)	32 (4.3%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	787 (2.4)	745 (2.2)
Knows Year of Next Legislative Election:		
Yes	323 (78.4%)	245 (74.2%)
No	89 (21.6%)	85 (25.7%)
<i>Total</i>	412	330
Number of Times in Last Month Read about House:		
None	418 (60.1%)	396 (62.6%)
Once	701 (10.1%)	101 (16.0%)
Twice	75 (10.8%)	87 (13.7%)
Three Times	33 (4.8%)	24 (3.8%)
Four or More	99 (14.2%)	25 (3.9%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	695 (1.5)	633 (0.9)
Ever Watched a Live Debate:		
Yes	339 (46.1%)	300 (39.4%)
No	396 (53.9%)	462 (60.6%)
<i>Total</i>	735	762
Follow Debate of Current House:		
Less Than Previous House (1)	284 (58.3%)	247 (50.1%)
About the Same	113 (23.2%)	125 (25.4%)
More than Previous House (3)	90 (18.5%)	121 (24.5%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	487 (1.6)	493 (1.7)

Questions: (1) What is your level of knowledge of the role and functioning of the House of Representatives? (2) What is the year of the next election? (3) How many times in the last month have you read about the House of Representatives? (4) Have you ever watched a live debate of the parliament? (5) Do you follow the debate of the current House of Representatives less than the previous House, about the same, or more than the previous House?

According to interviews, people often recognize deputies in the streets, particularly in Algeria and in rural areas. Moroccans and Algerians are more likely than one might imagine to know the name of a member or to have contacted him or her in each of the six ways measured by the survey. About one-third of Moroccans, compared with one-half of Algerians, know the name of at least one deputy from their district.

Several factors may explain these differences. Relationships with members in Algeria appear more informal, likely due to the fact that Algerian members are more accessible because many are new elites. Hugh Roberts suggests that bureaucracy in Algeria, unlike the notables and

landowners in Morocco, is mass and popular.<sup>229</sup> Members in Morocco say that citizens do not understand the difference between a member of parliament and a local official. The ability of Moroccan members to perform two public functions may help explain why fewer Moroccans say they know the name of a deputy. Further, the district magnitude is higher in Algeria than in Morocco, which may help explain differences in level of contact. District magnitude and percent of the population that is urban is positively related to whether an Algerian knows the name of a member; however, the two are negatively related in Morocco.

The proportion of Moroccans who have contacted a current member from their district in one of the six ways ranges from 3.9 percent (seen a member in his or her home or office) to 19.0 percent (have seen a member in a public place). In Algeria, this proportion ranges from 10.0 percent (seen a member in a party office or home or office) to 33.2 percent (heard of a member second hand). 65.2 percent of Moroccans and 43.6 percent of Algerians have never contacted a member in any of these ways, while the mean number of ways is 0.7 in Morocco and 1.3 in Algeria. 6.4 percent of Moroccans and 16.6 percent of Algerians say a member is a friend or family member (See Table III. 11.).

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<sup>229</sup> Roberts, "The Algerian Bureaucracy."

**TABLE III. 11. Level of Contact between Citizens and Deputies in Morocco and Algeria, Current Mandate from This District**

	<i>Morocco</i>			<i>Algeria</i>		
	Yes	No	Total	Yes	No	Total
Know Name	235 (32.6%)	487 (67.5%)	722 (100.0%)	343 (50.3%)	339 (49.7%)	682 (100.0%)
From of Contact:						
Heard of Second Hand	128 (16.2%)	664 (83.8%)	792 (100.0%)	248 (33.2%)	499 (66.8%)	747 (100.0%)
Seen in Public Place	151 (19.0%)	642 (81.0%)	793 (100.0%)	200 (27.1%)	539 (72.9%)	739 (100.0%)
Seen at a Meeting	90 (11.4%)	703 (88.7%)	793 (100.0%)	162 (21.5%)	592 (78.5%)	754 (100.0%)
Seen in Party Office	31 (3.9%)	764 (96.1%)	795 (100.0%)	74 (10.0%)	666 (90.0%)	740 (100.0%)
Visited Home or Office	33 (4.2%)	762 (95.9%)	795 (100.0%)	74 (10.0%)	669 (90.0%)	743 (100.0%)
Is a Friend or Family Member	50 (6.4%)	737 (93.7%)	787 (100.0%)	122 (16.6%)	611 (83.4%)	733 (100.0%)
Summary of Contact:						
None	538 (65.2%)			344 (43.6%)		
One	114 (13.8%)			188 (23.8%)		
Two	85 (10.3%)			107 (13.6%)		
Three	51 (6.2%)			62 (7.9%)		
Four	23 (2.8%)			34 (4.3%)		
Five	7 (0.9%)			28 (3.6%)		
Six	7 (0.9%)			26 (3.3%)		
<i>Total/Mean</i>	825 (0.7)			789 (1.3)		

Questions: (1) Please do not tell me his or her name, but do you know the name of a current deputy from this district? (2) Have you heard of a current deputy from this district second hand? Etc.

Although more Algerians than Moroccans know the name of or have come into contact with a deputy in the six ways listed in the table, more Moroccans—14.3 percent compared to 9.4 percent of Algerians—have actually contacted a current member from their district to ask for help with a personal or community problem or to express an opinion. Moroccans and Algerians are both most likely to have contacted an elected official from the commune, with about twenty percent in each country having done so. On average, Moroccans and Algerians who have contacted an official have contacted a local official twice as many times as a deputy. Moroccans and Algerians were about as likely to be satisfied with the outcome of the request, and slightly more likely to be satisfied than dissatisfied with any particular request. Overall, 2.9 percent of Moroccans have had a satisfying experience contacting a member about a problem while 2.0 percent have had a dissatisfying experience. 5.0 percent of Algerians have had a satisfying experience while 4.5 percent have had a dissatisfying experience (See Table III. 12.).

The reasons that citizens chose to contact officials differs across country and level of government. In Morocco, while constituents are most likely to contact a deputy because he or she is a member of his or her tribe or family (48.7 percent), they are most likely to contact a provincial or communal official just because he or she is an elected official (55.3 and 55.7 percent respectively). In Algeria, constituents are most likely to contact a deputy because he or she is a member of the same party (29.3 percent), but just because he or she is elected is also an important reason (24.0 percent). Like in Morocco, Algerians are most likely to contact provincial and local officials just because they are elected (47.9 and 57.3 percent respectively).

**TABLE III. 12. Asking Elected Official for Help among Moroccan and Algerian Constituents**

Legislator	<i>Morocco</i>			<i>Algeria</i>		
	National	Provincial	Municipal	National	State	Municipal
Has Contacted to:						
Ask for Help with a Personal Problem	96 (12.0%)	29 (3.6%)	87 (10.9%)	46 (5.8%)	44 (5.6%)	138 (17.5%)
Ask for Help with a Community Problem	16 (2.0%)	9 (1.1%)	74 (9.3%)	16 (2.0%)	12 (1.5%)	52 (6.6%)
Express an Opinion	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.1%)	3 (0.4%)	12 (1.5%)	13 (1.6%)	12 (1.5%)
<i>Total</i> <sup>a</sup>	114 (14.3%)	39 (4.9%)	164 (20.5%)	74 (9.4%)	69 (8.8%)	163 (20.7%) <sup>b</sup>
Number of Times:						
1	73 (64.0%)	16 (43.2%)	51 (32.7%)	9 (17.7%)	12 (20.0%)	18 (12.0%)
2	14 (12.3%)	6 (16.2%)	31 (19.9%)	17 (33.3%)	20 (33.3%)	48 (32.0%)
3	9 (7.9%)	0 (0.0%)	16 (10.3%)	11 (21.8%)	12 (20.0%)	68 (45.3%)
4 or More	18 (15.8%)	15 (40.5%)	58 (37.2%)	14 (27.5%)	8 (13.3%)	16 (10.7%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	114 (2.0)	37 (3.0)	156 (3.7)	51 (3.2)	16 (3.5)	150 (6.6)
Level of Satisfaction:						
Very Dissatisfied (4)	26 (22.6%)	8 (21.6%)	28 (17.7%)	7 (10.6%)	8 (11.8%)	18 (12.0%)
Dissatisfied	16 (13.9%)	7 (18.9%)	35 (22.2%)	16 (24.2%)	24 (35.3%)	48 (32.0%)
Satisfied	61 (53.0%)	12 (32.4%)	72 (45.6%)	30 (45.5%)	28 (41.2%)	68 (45.3%)
Very Satisfied (1)	12 (10.4%)	10 (27.0%)	23 (14.6%)	13 (19.7%)	8 (11.8%)	16 (10.7%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	115 (2.5)	37 (2.7)	158 (2.6)	66 (2.5)	68 (2.5)	150 (2.7)
Reason for Selecting This Official:						
Tribe or Family	57 (48.7%)	1 (2.6%)	5 (3.1%)	5 (6.7%)	7 (9.6%)	13 (7.3%)
Friend	10 (8.5%)	4 (10.5%)	15 (9.2%)	13 (17.3%)	10 (13.7%)	16 (9.0%)
Party	5 (4.3%)	2 (5.3%)	2 (1.2%)	22 (29.3%)	16 (21.9%)	9 (5.1%)
Another Connection (e.g. Business)	9 (7.7%)	10 (26.3%)	43 (26.4%)	9 (12.0%)	5 (6.8%)	28 (15.7%)
Just Because Elected	31 (26.5%)	21 (55.3%)	94 (57.7%)	18 (24.0%)	35 (47.9%)	102 (57.3%)
<i>Total</i>	117	38	163	75	73	178

<sup>a</sup> Total of 800 in Morocco and 788 in Algeria

<sup>b</sup> Some respondents in Algeria have contacted a local official about more than one type of issue. The total reports only the number of unique respondents who have contacted a local official about one or more of the three types of problems.

## Member and Citizen Perspectives on Election Manipulation and Patronage

Finally, I turn to consider citizen perceptions of electoral manipulation and patronage. Interview evidence suggests that, as a consequence of these tools, Moroccan and Algerian constituents have an overwhelmingly negative view of the parliament and its members, although this image is especially negative in Morocco. Many Moroccans and Algerians refer to their parliaments as “theaters of democracy” and “international publicity” for democracy. Algerians are commonly ambivalent, expressing the notion that deputies are “suits and blah blah” whereas Moroccans commonly express fear of, or anger, toward members whom they perceive as serving their own interests and being wholly unresponsive to the needs of ordinary people.<sup>230</sup>

### *Electoral Manipulation*

Maintaining a weak legislature involves numerous strategies on the part of regime incumbents. Schedler suggests that these strategies may be categorized as seven basic violations of democratic choice in elections and electoral structuring.<sup>231</sup> In both countries, lack of transparent procedures for choosing electoral lists, and interference by the Ministry of Interior, in some cases, to influence or change lists profoundly shapes parliament’s membership and thus the shape of legislative politics.<sup>232</sup> These procedures create “safe seats” in districts of up to thirty-two members such that, even a perfectly free and fair election, some individuals will be elected by the regime, not by the people.<sup>233</sup> Regime type, structure of the political elite, and liberalization history lead to some differences in strategy; however, the aim is the same. Regime power-holders must ensure that the distribution of parties—and individuals—will not yield enough members with the will and ability to challenge the hegemony of the executive over all aspects of policymaking. Legislative elections are primarily designed to: “balance the political playing field” between incumbent and opposition factions contesting for political power.<sup>234</sup> Generally, this involves tacit negotiation and quotas.<sup>235</sup>

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<sup>230</sup> Algeria, Constituent #12, April 2007.

<sup>231</sup> Schedler, "Elections without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation."

<sup>232</sup> Algeria, Member #14, May 2006.

<sup>233</sup> Gideon Rahat, "Candidate Selection: The Choice before the Choice," *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 1 (2007).

<sup>234</sup> Ibid.

<sup>235</sup> See, for example, Henry Jr. Munson, "The Elections of 1993 and Democratization in Morocco," in *In the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power and Politics in Morocco*, ed. Rahma and Susan Gilson Miller Bourqia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

The importance of tribe and class in Morocco and kin and clan in Algeria are reflected in statements made by ordinary citizens about the parliamentary membership.<sup>236</sup> According to a Moroccan man, “[t]he candidates are all from the same families. Our vote will bring nothing. The political map is already drawn.”<sup>237</sup> In Algeria, many members are new elites, but ordinary citizens are aware of important connections between many elected officials and powerful members of the “ruling clan”. Previously “unknown” individuals are elected, prompting politically savvy citizens to suggest that they have been selected by a powerful force: “. . . a person with no reputation and he wins third position in the party? This means that a powerful force put him there. Maybe the Secretary-General or the President.”<sup>238</sup> According to an Algerian opposition party member, “[i]t’s not that people don’t want change. The pouvoir blocks change . . . All Algeria belongs to a [political] clan, not to citizens.”<sup>239</sup> According to one Algerian man, “there is a total lack of confidence in elections and the parliament.”<sup>240</sup> Another recounted the arrival of a man at the polling station he oversaw in the 1997 legislative election who handed him fifty sealed votes for the RND, presumably one of many such moves, which led to that party’s landslide victory just a few months after it was created.<sup>241</sup> A Moroccan woman described the 2002 elections in which she talked with many neighbors over the course of the campaign and had a general sense of which party appeared to be popular in her neighborhood. The results, she said, were opposite, suggesting that, “Something must have happened. I think parties purchased votes so that people would not vote for their choice. I don’t know, but that seems to be what happened.”<sup>242</sup> Electoral manipulation—despite claims in western media and academic work that Moroccan and Algerian elections are now relatively free and fair—has simply evolved and, to the detriment of the parliament’s credibility, is very much perceived by ordinary citizens (See Table III. 13.).

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<sup>236</sup> Charrad argued that in Algeria, these networks are “kin-based forms of association”, rather than tribes and in that sense differ from the stronger kin-based allegiance than in Morocco (p. 169). Kin-based networks appear to have been stronger in pre-independence Morocco than Algeria, whereas clannishness pits parts of the administration against others and patronage in Algeria (Roberts 1982). Colonialism re-enforced both blood descent and clientelism and an “autochthonous clientelism parallel to another evoked by the colonial presence” emerged in which the new clientele are the pre-independence ALN and post-independence FLN (Etienne 1977). Mournia M. Charrad, *States and Women's Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), Bruno Etienne, "Clientalism in Algeria," in *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, ed. Ernest and John Waterbury Gellner (London: Duckworth, 1977): 291. Roberts, "The Algerian Bureaucracy."

<sup>237</sup> Morocco, Constituent #3, November 2006.

<sup>238</sup> Algeria, Constituent #6, April 2007.

<sup>239</sup> Algeria, member #13, May 2006.

<sup>240</sup> Algeria, Constituent #7, May 2006.

<sup>241</sup> Algeria, Constituent #6, April 2007.

<sup>242</sup> Morocco, Constituent #3, July 2007.

**TABLE III. 13. Perceptions of Legislative Elections and the Legislative Connection among Moroccan and Algerian Constituents**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
People Around Here Do Not Trust the Outcome of Elections:		
Strongly Agree	337 (43.9%)	243 (36.6%)
Agree	346 (45.1%)	329 (49.6%)
Disagree	55 (7.2%)	69 (10.4%)
Strongly Disagree	30 (3.9%)	23 (3.5%)
<i>Total/ Mean</i>	768 (1.7)	664 (1.8)
Only People with a Connection to a Deputy can Ask for Help:		
Strongly Agree (1)	199 (51.6%)	155 (46.8%)
Agree	120 (31.1%)	107 (32.3%)
Disagree	46 (11.9%)	49 (14.8%)
Strongly Disagree (4)	21 (5.4%)	20 (6.0%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	386 (1.7)	331 (1.8)

Questions: Please tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with the following statements: (1) Only people with a connection to a deputy can ask for help with a personal problem (2) People around here do not trust the outcome of elections. These measure of efficacy are highly correlated, 0.47 in Morocco and 0.61 in Algeria.

### *Patronage Strategies*

Patronage is a second tool of regime power-holders to maintain a weak parliament. Most work on patronage networks focuses on how members of parliament or other officials serve as a patron and citizens as clients. In both Morocco and Algeria, citizens frequently perceive a need for an intermediary to help with government agencies. According to an Algerian man, “You need help with ordinary things. You need someone to help you with everything like an ordinary piece of paper to a bank loan”.<sup>243</sup> In Morocco, citizens came to a members’ local office to seek an intermediary with everything from a room for a thesis defense to using the fax machine. As noted, citizens and members alike see the role of the deputy as an intermediary: “[m]y job is to contact the ministry of commerce to get money for a business or for a job . . . . We have the right to play this intermediary role.”<sup>244</sup>

Survey data indicate that citizens perceive that securing help from a member of parliament as an intermediary requires a personal connection with him or her: 82.7 percent of Moroccans and 79.1 percent of Algerians agree that such a connection is needed in order to ask for help with a personal problem (See Table III. 14).

<sup>243</sup> Algeria, Observer #2, April 2006.

<sup>244</sup> Algeria, Member#2, May 2007.

However, members of parliament are not generally a first or most effective choice when faced with a problem with the government. When asked what they would be most likely to try first, both Moroccans and Algerians were most likely to take the issue straight to the agency involved: 48.6 and 59.5 percent respectively said they would be most likely to do this. About a third would go to a family or friend while less than ten percent would try another strategy first. About one third of Moroccans believe that taking the issue directly to the agency would be most effective and about one third asking a family member or friend would be most effective. Similarly, about a quarter of Algerians think taking the issue directly to the agency involved would be most effective while forty percent think asking a family or friend would be best. Only 2.5 percent of Moroccans and 1.5 percent of Algerians would go to a Member of Parliament first; 8.0 percent of Moroccans and 7.7 percent of Algerians believe that taking the problem to a member of parliament would be most effective (See Table III. 14.).

**TABLE III. 14. Strategies for Dealing with a Problem with the Government among Moroccan and Algerian Constituents**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
<i>Would Ever Try:</i>		
Take Directly to Agency	648 (82.7%)	291 (80.2%)
Ask Family or Friends	70 (9.0%)	66 (19.0%)
Ask Local Government	480 (60.8%)	270 (74.0%)
Ask Religious Person	201 (25.7%)	148 (41.9%)
Ask Courts	387 (50.1%)	96 (27.4%)
Ask Member of Parliament	111 (14.3%)	100 (28.6%)
Ask Minister Government	48 (6.2%)	86 (24.8%)
Ask Political Party	61 (7.9%)	72 (21.7%)
<i>Total</i>	Varies	Varies
<i>Would Try First:</i>		
Take Directly to Agency	373 (48.6%)	141 (59.5%)
Ask Family or Friends	236 (30.7%)	65 (27.4%)
Ask Local Government	52 (6.8%)	8 (3.4%)
Ask Religious Person	12 (1.6%)	6 (2.5%)
Ask Courts	25 (3.3%)	5 (2.1%)
Ask Member of Parliament	19 (2.5%)	3 (1.3%)
Ask Minister Government	16 (2.1%)	9 (3.8%)
Ask Political Party	4 (0.5%)	0 (0.0%)
Other	31 (4.0%) <sup>a</sup>	0 (0.0%)
<i>Total</i>	768	237
<i>Thinks Would Be Most Effective:</i>		
Take Directly to Agency	241 (31.6%)	78 (24.2%)
Ask Family or Friends	233 (30.6%)	126 (39.0%)
Ask Local Government	77 (10.0%)	26 (8.1%)
Ask Religious Person	4 (0.5%)	5 (1.6%)
Ask Courts	26 (3.4%)	9 (2.8%)
Ask Member of Parliament	61 (8.0%)	25 (7.7%)
Ask Minister Government	65 (8.5%)	53 (16.4%)
Ask Political Party	10 (1.3%)	1 (0.3%)
Other	45 (5.9%)	0 (0.0%)
<i>Total</i>	762	323

<sup>a</sup> 31 respondents offer “corruption” as a response.

Questions: (1) If you had a problem with the government, would you: take the issue directly to the government agency involved, etc. (2) Which would you try first? (3) Which would probably be most effective?

Further, according to several measures, Moroccans are less likely than Algerians to expect deputies, state and provincial legislators, and local legislators to be helpful with a personal problem. Moroccans are less likely than Algerians to believe that deputies would be interested in hearing their opinion about a law. In both countries, citizens believe deputies would be more interested in hearing about an opinion about a law than helpful with a personal problem.

Moroccans and Algerians expect elected officials at the levels of government to be about as helpful (See Table III. 15.).

**TABLE III. 15. Expected Helpfulness of Elected Officials among Moroccan and Algerian Constituents**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Expected Helpfulness with Personal Problem:		
National Legislators		
Not Very Helpful (1)	443 (67.2%)	193 (38.8%)
Somewhat Helpful (2)	165 (25.0%)	254 (51.1%)
Very Helpful (3)	51 (7.7%)	50 (10.1%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	659 (1.4)	497 (1.7)
State/Provincial Legislators		
Not Very Helpful	394 (69.2%)	191 (37.5%)
Somewhat Helpful	155 (27.2%)	270 (53.1%)
Very Helpful	20 (3.5%)	9.4 (9.4%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	569 (1.3)	509 (1.7)
Municipal Legislators		
Not Very Helpful	326 (54.9%)	190 (35.7%)
Somewhat Helpful	223 (37.5%)	272 (51.0%)
Very Helpful	45 (7.6%)	71 (13.3%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	594 (1.5)	533 (1.8)
Expected Interest in Opinion about Law:		
Not Very Helpful	533 (80.0%)	582 (48.3%)
Very Helpful	11 (1.7%)	22 (3.8%)

Questions: (1) If you had a personal problem that a deputy from this district/an elected official from this *willaya* or province/a local official from this commune could help with, how helpful do you think he or she would be? (2) If you had an opinion about a law being debated in parliament, how interested do you think deputies from this district would be?

Table III. 16. suggests that a relatively high number of Moroccans and Algerians—80.34 percent and 63.7 percent respectively—have an opinion about the way that deputies vote in parliament. Nearly 20 percent of Moroccans and 40 percent of Algerians have never thought about it. Only 2 respondents in Morocco and 12 in Algeria had contacted a member from their district during the 2002-2007 mandate to express an opinion.

Moroccans are less approving of how members vote and less likely to express an opinion to deputies than are Algerians (See Table III. 16.). A Moroccan political party member argued, “We try to show our program, but people only care about personality, popularity, financial

resources, and affiliation”.<sup>245</sup> In general, individuals want help that will directly affect them and are not interested in contacting members about policy issues.

**TABLE III. 16. Knowledge of Policy Outputs among Moroccan and Algerian Constituents**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Approval of Voting (Members from this district):		
Have Never Thought of It	139 (19.66%)	239 (36.3%)
Disapproved	374 (52.9%)	237 (36.0%)
Approve	194 (27.4%)	183 (27.8%)
<i>Total</i>	707	659
Has Contacted Deputy to Express an Opinion	2 (0.3%)	12 (1.5%)
<i>Total</i>	800	788

Questions: (1) Do you approve or disapprove of the way deputies from this district vote in parliament or have you never thought about it? (2) Have you ever contacted a deputy to express an opinion about a law?

The clientelism literature does not always emphasize the role of the member as a client of regime power-holders. However, the Moroccan system is built on patron-client relationships, reproduced in the parties. In it, parties are clients of the state.<sup>246</sup> A parliament, like a bureaucracy, is only free from this form of patronage to the extent that its members are “selected for their posts by fair and public criteria, are constrained to observe impartial rules, are accountable for what they do and can be removed from their positions without undue difficulty and in accordance with recognized procedures”.<sup>247</sup> When a member owes her position or success in that position to a powerful client—in this case regime power-holders—she is not fully free to exercise oversight over the executive and to play an independent role in policymaking. Because of the power of the patronage system, regime power-holders can give or remove privileges; thus, deputies differ both between and within countries to the extent which they can solve problems. The ability of deputies to solve citizens’ problems, for example, depends on compliance in parliament and on exchanges of interests.

Citizens do not typically perceive manipulation of the parliamentary membership by regime power-holders. They believe that most deputies present themselves for their own family interests: “[t]hey receive a business card so that they can make money in business and get

<sup>245</sup> Morocco, Member #9, June 2006.

<sup>246</sup> Layachi, *State, Society & Democracy in Morocco: The Limits of Associative Life*: 76. See also note 3 pg. 81.

<sup>247</sup> Ernest Gellner, "Patrons and Clients," in *Patrons and Clients*, ed. Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., 1977): 1.

privileges.”<sup>248</sup> According to a Moroccan man employed by a deputy, “[t]hey are thieves. Don’t believe what he tells you. Some people say there has been change, but I don’t see it. They are there for their own interests. Maybe they do some good. I don’t know.”<sup>249</sup> A woman stated that, “[d]eputies are there for pay only, for a free lunch, and then they will leave. They don’t represent citizens.”<sup>250</sup>

These perceptions of elections and patronage in the deputy-citizen suggest strongly that parliamentary politics are best understood through the patron-client paradigm and that it may be naïve to think that casework and other deputy-citizen interaction constitutes representation. But can casework, even if it is particularistic at best or clientalistic at worst, improve popular support for democratic institutions? Or, does it make citizens less sure that democracy is the best system of governance for their country? I return to this question in Chapter 6.

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<sup>248</sup> Morocco, Constituent #4, July 2007.

<sup>249</sup> Morocco, Constituent #5, July 2007.

<sup>250</sup> Morocco, Constituent #6, May 2006.

## PART II

### Empirical Chapters

#### CHAPTER IV

##### **Representation as Bargaining in Multiple Arenas: How Regime Preferences Shape Member Behavior**

###### **Introduction**

Why do multiparty legislatures lengthen the tenure of authoritarian regimes? Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski suggest that autocratic institutions lengthen tenures because they reduce internal threats to rule by coopting opposition and bringing it into the regime. Rulers in nondemocratic regimes, they argue, “cannot win competitive elections, because their preferences diverge from those of the majority of the population”.<sup>251</sup> To maintain autocratic rule, autocratic rulers must respond to the threat of rebellion with one of several strategies.

The first tool incumbents use is force and repression.<sup>252</sup> Risk perception determines how regimes choose whether to use force, in what measure, and with which opposition groups. Holger Albrecht and Eva Wegner show that the particular containment strategies incumbents use to negotiate participation of Islamist opposition, whether repression or inclusion, depend on the institutional setting (i.e. monarchical versus presidential regime) and strength of the opposition

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<sup>251</sup> Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.": p. 1281. See also Martin C. McGuire and Mancur Olsen Jr., "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," *Journal of Economic Literature* 34 (1996).

<sup>252</sup> Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats." Dmitry Gershenson and Herschel I. Grossman, "Cooptation and Repression in the Soviet Union," *Economic and Politics* 13, no. 1 (2001).

groups.<sup>253</sup> Other work suggests that the effectiveness of force varies by type of opposition and may not be effective for some groups (e.g. universities, bureaucracy, etc.).<sup>254</sup>

The Moroccan and Algerian regimes use force and repression against Islamist groups which demand an Islamic State. The Moroccan Justice and Charity movement, which challenges the right of the monarch to serve as a religious leader and openly criticizes the monarchy's wealth is repressed because it cannot be coopted into the regime.<sup>255</sup> In Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Front became an illegal political party, many of its leaders and members jailed, following its 1991 victory in the first round of elections and subsequent annulment of the results by the Algerian government. Although most of its leaders were amnestied following the subsequent civil war, former FIS leaders are banned from participation in politics.

While some level of coercion is always required to maintain autocratic governance, the use of outright force or repression may be less effective than cooptation strategies which encourage and entice opposition groups to cooperate in negotiated political institutions slanted in favor of the interests of incumbents. Distributing spoils and making policy concessions are two mechanisms of cooptation.

Thus, incumbents may use a second strategy: distributing spoils. In exchange for policy acquiescence, opposition members receive privileges and material rewards. In this sense, liberalization may be thought of primarily as an expansion in access to resources from which incumbent and opposition elites—even new elites—may benefit, so long as they abide within the negotiated limits of policy contestation and oversight.

Third, to coopt opposition groups, autocratic rulers make policy concessions in issue areas which do not threaten the basic political system. Jillian Schwedler argues, for example, that the Jordanian King offered the Muslim Brotherhood influence over social policy in exchange for its participation and cooperation in other policy areas.<sup>256</sup> Nominally democratic legislatures are ideal institutional settings, Gandhi and Przeworski argue, for policy concessions to be negotiated and, thus, for cooptation to facilitate regime stability. The Workers' Party in Algeria is a vocal

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<sup>253</sup> Holger Albrecht & Eva Wegner, "Autocrats and Islamists: Contenders and Containment in Egypt and Morocco," *Journal of North African Studies* 11, no. 2 (2006).

<sup>254</sup> F. H. Cardoso, "On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America," in *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, ed. D. Collier (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979): 48. As cited in Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats."

<sup>255</sup> Marlise Simons, "Morocco Finds Fundamentalism Benign but Scary," *New York Times*, April 9, 1998. According to Mohammed Tozy, membership in Justice and Charity was between 50,000 and 500,000 in 1998. See also Saloua Zerhouni, "Determinants and Mechanisms of Parliamentary Cooperation between Islamists and Leftists in Morocco," in *Fifth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting* (Florence -- Montecatini Terme: 2004).

<sup>256</sup> Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

opposition group. However, it does not threaten the regime because its major area of contestation concerns workers' rights' and it does not have the national popularity to govern, according to interview evidence. In Morocco, the Islamist PJD is widely viewed as having been coopted, or *makhzenized*, because of its agreement with palace laws in parliament.<sup>257</sup>

The mechanisms of cooptation suggest a puzzle. Why does cooptation of political elites elected to parliament work? McGuire and Olson suggest that the outcome of cooptation makes both incumbent and opposition elites better off.<sup>258</sup> But why should this be the case? If one tool of cooptation is policy concessions—and opposition elites wish to govern—why do they cooperate or acquiesce in exchange for limited policy concessions?

One neglected part of the answer, I argue, lies in the preferences of ordinary citizens whose support constitutes a second arena in bargaining over reelection. Members of parliament are not merely engaged in negotiation with incumbent elites who prefer policy acquiescence and who control the outcome of elections through election structuring. Citizens influence (though they do not determine) the outcome of semi-competitive elections by giving or withholding political support. Viewed this way, the preferences of constituents serve as a contextual factor in elite-level bargaining over the outcome of elections. According to survey data, citizens have preferences for constituency responsiveness (i.e. casework and district projects) and, to a lesser extent, policy responsiveness (i.e. contestation). Incumbents who control the levers of patronage influence access to resources needed by members to provide constituency responsiveness and may use it to entice members to acquiesce on policy issues in order to mobilize support among constituents.

I add detail to Gandhi and Przeworski's assertion that: "[c]o-opting by distributing spoils and co-opting by making policy concessions entail different institutional mechanisms."<sup>259</sup> I argue that for elected members, the two mechanisms, although analytically distinct, are interconnected via the mechanism of representation. One mechanism by which cooptation occurs is through the strategic choices members make between representative activities. I develop a visual representation of cooptation in which policy responsiveness and constituency responsiveness are substitute goods between which members make a conscious choice under conditions of electoral uncertainty as they seek to maximize their chances of reelection.

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<sup>257</sup> See, for example, Amr Hamzawy, "Party for Justice and Development in Morocco: Participation and Its Discontents," *Carnegie Papers*, no. 93 (2008).


<sup>258</sup> McGuire and Olson, "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force."

<sup>259</sup> Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.": 1282.

## Chapter Overview

In this chapter I focus on the arena of parliamentary institutions (Level I) and develop evidence for the hypothesis that institutions shape the representative behavior of members (Link I) (See Figure IV. 1.). The chapter proceeds as follows.

**FIGURE IV. 1 A Conceptual Map of Legislative Politics in Multiple Arenas**



*The First Game of Institutional Design: How Regime Type Shapes Parliamentary Institutions*

In the first section I focus on the first nested game of institutional design, suggesting how incumbent preferences, which vary by regime type, correspond to differences in formal rules governing parliamentary debate and deputy roles (Level I). I show how incumbent preferences for level of debate and capacity correspond to differences in the levels of participation in debate in committee and caseload (Link I).

*The Second Game in Multiple Arenas: How Legislative Institutions Shape Representative Behavior*

Existing literature applying new institutionalism to authoritarian politics focuses almost exclusively on the nested games of institutional design: how elite-level bargaining simultaneously shapes both electoral institutions as well as the substantive outcome of elections. Institutional design is only one type of nested game conceptualized by George Tsebelis, however.<sup>260</sup> The second type, missed in much of the authoritarian politics literature, is the nested game of multiple arenas. Actors must choose strategies by simultaneously considering payoffs in more than one arena.

In the second part of the analysis, I investigate the relationship between policy and constituency responsiveness by developing a theory of representation as bargaining in multiple arenas. I argue that mass political support constitutes a politically-relevant contextual factor in the process of cooptation of members. In choosing representative behavior to mobilize popular support, members of parliament must seek an optimal balance between acquiescence in the parliament in order to gain the resources for constituency responsiveness (i.e. casework and district projects) and policy responsiveness (i.e. contestation/debate) in the legislature. I argue that if members go too far beyond the tacit boundaries of “constructive opposition”, these members encounter difficulties in acquiring resources to provide constituency responsiveness in the current round (i.e. mandate), or even losing their ability to be placed in the party list in future rounds of elections. However, if they acquiesce too significantly in policy responsiveness, their party risks losing popular support, not because they do not or cannot provide constituency responsiveness, but because they are viewed as coopted or *makhzenized*. Thus, members of

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<sup>260</sup> George Tsebelis, *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

parliament must strategically “represent” by considering how the context (i.e. mass political attitudes) affects payoffs in the principle game: reelection.

### **The Argument**

I develop an argument about cooptation in which I suggest that the selection of an optimal “basket” of representative activities is a mechanism by which cooptation occurs. I argue that cooptation occurs as members make strategic choices among two goods—policy responsiveness and constituency responsiveness—in order to maximize the probability of reelection. Members must consider payoffs in two simultaneous games or multiple arenas: regime power-holders who exert influence over the structuring and thus substantive outcome of elections and access to patronage, and constituents whose support the member must mobilize in order to enhance the probability of being elected. I argue that given preferences of regime power-holders for a weak legislature, members must acquiesce on policy responsiveness to acquire resources to provide constituency responsiveness--the primary support-generating preference of constituencies. This acquiescence constitutes the mechanism of cooptation, but I suggest that it cannot occur, or at least persist, without the component of mass-level political preferences. I argue that policy responsiveness and constituency responsiveness are substitute goods; I test this using a multivariate model of time devoted casework.

### **Why do Parliaments Exist in Authoritarian Political Settings?**

The existence of the legislative assembly in a plethora of institutional arrangements and in all or nearly all types of political systems has been noted by scholars for decades. In 1973, J. Blondel found that only five states in the world, all of which were part of the Middle East, had never had a legislature or assembly. He describes the parliament as a resilient institution. In his words:

Legislatures are . . . spread very broadly across the world . . . The absence of a legislature seems in almost all cases to be a temporary occurrence, either deliberately so (as when a legislature is abolished because of instability or the need to reform the institution . . .) or because the leaders seem unable to maintain themselves in office for long without the legitimizing influence of a legislature . . . Some sort of natural law seems to force leaders of modern politics sooner or later to create legislatures or to be overthrown and replaced by men who will, in turn, create an assembly.<sup>261</sup>

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<sup>261</sup> J. Blondel, *Comparative Legislatures* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973): 9.

Why do parliaments exist in authoritarian regimes? If these institutions do not primarily legislate, what role do they play? Numerous explanations have been offered in political science literatures. These explanations may be grouped into three general classes: (1) Older conventional wisdom which has generally been abandoned in mainstream work; (2) Functionalist explanations; and, (3) Newer theories focusing on institutions as the outcome of elite-level bargaining.

### **Older Conventional Wisdom: Authoritarian Legislatures as Window-Dressing**

The first group of theories relates to the conventional wisdom, which is generally no longer accepted in mainstream political science thought, that authoritarian legislatures do not have any particular political functions or consequences. The first of these views is that parliaments in nondemocratic countries are “window dressing” for authoritarian regimes and thus play a “cosmetic” rather than a substantive role. This type of argument also appeared in the world politics literature when a debate concerning whether international institutions are window-dressing held prominence in the literature. Students of international institutions recognized that rational actors who bear the costs of institutions do so because the benefits of institutions to those actors outweigh their costs.<sup>262</sup> As noted, recent work makes it clear that authoritarian legislatures have important political consequences.<sup>263</sup>

A second conventional view is that legislatures are remnants of colonialism. Abdo Baaklini has argued persuasively against this perspective, citing instances from the Middle East in which colonial powers worked to dismantle indigenous legislative institutions because they threatened the power of the colonial rule.<sup>264</sup> Indeed, the Ottoman Empire’s first council emerged during the period of Selim III (1789-1807); and Egypt, Iraq, and Syria all had well-functioning legislatures in the interwar years.<sup>265</sup> Although modern parliaments originated in western European countries and spread via institutional diffusion to other parts of the world, councils and assemblies existed in the indigenous culture of other societies as well, and modern legislatures have precedence in precolonial and colonial African, Asian, and Middle Eastern societies.<sup>266</sup>

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<sup>262</sup> Mezey, "The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World.": 734.

<sup>263</sup> Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats."

<sup>264</sup> Baaklini and Heaphey, *Legislative Institution Building in Brazil, Costa Rica, and Lebanon.*: Chapter 8.

<sup>265</sup> Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg, *Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions.*: Chapter 1.

<sup>266</sup> Loewenberg, "The Cultural Roots of a New Legislature: Public Perceptions of the Korean National Assembly.": 371. Gerhard Loewenberg argues that the form of the parliament is generally present in polities from local civil society associations to nations to international bodies. See Gerhard Loewenberg, *Modern Parliaments: Change or Decline?* (Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1971).

Further, Morocco did not even have a parliament during colonial times; Algeria had a parliament in the colonial period with limited participation of the indigenous Muslim population.<sup>267</sup>

### Functionalist Arguments

A number of other roles fit within the broader paradigm of functionalism. Functionalism is an approach originating in sociology which explains the existence of social institutions by the function they serve; for functionalists, institutions are created to fulfill a role or function.<sup>268</sup> A large body of literature in the 1960s and 1970s focused on the functions of legislatures in developing countries; virtually all scholars writing on the subject at the time approached their work with a functionalism paradigm. A functionalist approach to Arab legislatures appeared even in the late 1990s. Functionalist arguments are limited in that they offer an explanation for what parliaments do, but not necessarily for how they connect to broader outcomes such as regime survival or breakdown.

First, Baaklini et al. suggest that Arab parliaments have grown in importance in recent years because incumbents desire to increase visibility of parliaments to increase domestic and international legitimacy and to project a liberal visage to the world and to the World Bank. In truth, this is probably one function of both the Moroccan and Algerian parliaments. The administration of both the Moroccan and Algerian Parliaments devotes resources to improving the public image of these institutions even while fundamental changes to the structure of political power are not made.<sup>269</sup> Evidence of the success of such a strategy is manifested in statements that Morocco is “the model of Middle East reform” or that Algeria is “one of the most democratic countries” in the Arab Middle East.<sup>270</sup> Uninformed individuals, and perhaps even relatively informed observers, may be fooled by a democratic façade.

A second function of parliaments in comparative work on legislatures through the 1980s, but also which have been noted recently by Denoex and Desfosses, is political integration. Weinbaum argued that members of parliament in Afghanistan were unparalleled in their ability to

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<sup>267</sup> Baaklini, Denoex, and Springborg, *Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions*. See also Marvin G. Weinbaum, "Classification and Change in Legislative Systems: With Particular Application to Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan," in *Legislative Systems in Developing Countries*, ed. and Chong Lim Kim G. R. Boynton (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1975): 33.

<sup>268</sup> J. Holmwood, "Functionalism and Its Critics," in *Modern Social Theory: An Introduction*, ed. A. Harrington (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2005).

<sup>269</sup> Guilain P. Denoex and Helen R. Desfosses, "Rethinking the Moroccan Parliament: The Kingdom's Legislative Development Imperative," *Journal of North African Studies* 12, no. 1 (2007).

<sup>270</sup> Cite Hamid and Koogler who disagree with this CW. For Algeria, find citation.

integrate the periphery with the core.<sup>271</sup> Interview evidence from Morocco suggests that rural populations may encourage a local notable to run for parliament, believing that he will be an effective advocate for them at the level of the national government. The role of political integration may also refer to bringing together parties representing different policy preferences.<sup>272</sup> The weakness of the representative link and the political process (including the exclusion of some parties which would gain support in the population) limits the effectiveness of these roles in Morocco and Algeria. Nevertheless, this may be one role that parliaments play in these countries, but the mechanism and its effects are understudied.

A third function of parliaments in authoritarian political settings is that they allow the regime to more effectively achieve its political goals, including managing political and economic reform and mobilizing public support for policies prescribing austerity and repression of Islamic militants. On the one hand, the low level of confidence that the Moroccan and Algerian publics place in the parliament and their limited knowledge of the legislative work of the parliament, as indicated by data from the constituent survey, casts doubt on the extent to which the parliament creates support for unpopular reforms or lessens discontent about the difficult economic situation. When in the opposition prior to 1997, the Moroccan USFP virulently criticized economic policies it considered to blame for high inflation. Once the period of *alternance* began, inflation worsened, yet the USFP stopped mentioning this problem. This process did not create support in the population, but rather deepening lack of confidence in the political elite, and possibly greater support for other groups such as the Islamist Party of Justice and Development or the outlawed movement Justice and Charity.

A fourth function of legislatures and assemblies in authoritarian regimes is to respond to demands for expansion of political participation. Ellen Lust-Okar and Amaney Jamal have suggested that “[p]olitical liberalization serves as a pressure valve against mounting opposition during economic crises.”<sup>273</sup> Liberalization of the parliament, even if it actually represents a small expansion of access to resources, certainly plays this role in both the Moroccan and Algerian cases.

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<sup>271</sup> Similarly, Gandhi and Vreeland show that parliamentary authoritarian regimes are less likely to experience civil war. See Ellen Lust-Okar, "Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan."

<sup>272</sup> For example cooperation between socialist and Islamist parties in Morocco. See Zerhouni, "Elite Et Transition Democratique Au Maroc: Les Parlementaires De La Legislature 1997-2002".

<sup>273</sup> Lust-Okar and Jamal, "Rulers and Rules: Reassessing the Influence of Regime Type on Electoral Law Formation.": 342-3.

Fifth, parliaments provide a mechanism by which to scrutinize the bureaucracy. There is some interview evidence to suggest that indeed both parliaments play the former role.<sup>274</sup> Interviews turned up very limited evidence of a potential oversight role of the legislature over the bureaucracy.<sup>275</sup> Thus, while this role may exist to a limited extent, it cannot, like other functionalist arguments, explain why regimes choose or accept a multiparty parliamentary institution rather than having a single-party caucus or an independent oversight branch of the government oversee the bureaucracy. Thus, functionalist theories fail to explain the mechanisms by which parliaments fulfill these roles and exert effects in the political system.

### **Newer Theories**

Following mainstream thinking, a new set of theories begin with the assumption that the creation and persistence of legislatures with particular institutional structures are the outcome of elite-level bargaining in the nested game of institutional design. The creation of a parliament is not an accident of colonialism, but rather is an explicit political bargain within the winset of incumbent and opposition groups at independence. The shape of the parliament, including the party system, its capacity, and prerogatives vis-à-vis the executive, are shaped at independence, and in subsequent time periods, by on-going rounds of elite-level bargaining.<sup>276</sup>

It is important to clarify that the second and third types of explanations respond to two slightly different questions and are based in two literatures which make explicit different assumptions. The second group seeks to identify roles or functions of parliaments and assumes that through these roles legislatures contribute (or may contribute) to a process of political development (e.g. institutionalization or democratization). It addresses a “what” question; namely, what role do parliaments play?

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<sup>274</sup> See, for example, discussions of bargaining between left and Islamist deputies in Morocco. Zerhouni, "Determinants and Mechanisms of Parliamentary Cooperation between Islamists and Leftists in Morocco."

<sup>275</sup> Denoeux and Desfosses, "Rethinking the Moroccan Parliament: The Kingdom's Legislative Development Imperative."

<sup>276</sup> The outcome of this bargaining is also shaped by contextual factors, which include uncertainty, the historical antecedents in the institutional context, synergistic issue lineage, international threats, offers, and side payments, and potential reverberation in the domestic sphere, among other factors. In the Moroccan and Algerian cases, the length of time after independence before the parliament was established reflects greater uncertainty on the part of the Moroccan monarch as compared to the Algerian president and military regime. The multiparty character of the Moroccan parliament contrasts with the one-party regime in Algeria and reflects differences in the preferences of incumbents. Luong Jones, Pauline, *Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988). See also Remington and Smith.

The third class of explanations to which this project seeks to contribute asks not only what parliaments do, but also why they exist. It asks a “why” question; namely, why do authoritarian legislatures contribute to regime survival? It also sees authoritarian institutions as consequential, but acknowledges that they may not promote democratic transition. Thus, the third body of literature offers early, though more promising clues for explaining why authoritarian parliaments contribute to the longevity of regimes.

### **Cooptation through Patronage and Cooptation through Policy Concessions**

Although there is increasing acceptance that authoritarian institutions have important political consequences, the mainstream view is that regime power-holders coopt members of the political elite to gain “loyal parliaments”.<sup>277</sup> Most work on liberalization in the Arab world characterizes parliaments as filled with regime “place-men” whose independent influence on policymaking and oversight of the government is limited.<sup>278</sup> If these individuals play a role in making laws, it is by the legitimacy they confer to policies by limiting debate and providing the “rubber stamp” upon which their personal privileges depend. In this view, members are either disinterested in challenging the policy preferences of incumbents or are willing to acquiescence vis-à-vis their own policy preferences when faced with the opportunities and constraints of the legislature. Although cooptation through spoils and cooptation through policy concessions as incumbent strategies are distinct, as Gandhi and Przeworski argue, they are intricately linked for the opposition member as though they form a single mechanism.

### **Defining Cooptation**

For O’Donnell, cooptation is to “encapsulate” opposition or “domesticate” the opposition.<sup>279</sup> I define cooptation as a bargaining process which entices opposition members to participate in the formal political process. It entails the exchange of patronage (e.g. material goods, prestige, access to networks, etc.) and/or policy concessions on the part of incumbents for political behavior on the part of the opposition, which is closer to the ideal point of regime power brokers. Used for elites willing to accept the institutional framework and participate in the formal political process, cooptation is achieved by coercion, though softer in form than force or

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<sup>277</sup> Posusney, "Multiparty Elections in the Arab World: Elections Rules and Opposition Responses."

<sup>278</sup> Roberts, *The Battlefield Algeria, 1988-2002: Studies in a Broken Polity.*: 264.

<sup>279</sup> See Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.": 1281 and 1283. See also Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1973).

repression. Opposition mitigates or moderates its position, entering into “constructive” opposition in exchange for the ability to participate in legislative politics and the formal political process. The pressures exerted by incumbent are expressed this way by an Algerian Islamist deputy: “[t]he government exerts a bad influence on the deputy. He cannot play a free role.”<sup>280</sup> According to an opposition party member in Morocco: “[t]he rules of the game require a government and opposition. We play the part of the opposition in this comedy. We are really collaborators. How can we react against the regime when we are a part of it? All parties are vulnerable. They cannot resist.”<sup>281</sup>

### **Linking Mechanism of Cooptation to the Representation and Patron-Client Paradigms**

In this chapter I refer to policy responsiveness and constituency responsiveness (See Table IV. 1.). I operationalize policy responsiveness as participation in debate in committee. Participation in debate may entail contestation, moderation, or acquiescence on the part of the opposition and may result in policy concessions on the part of incumbents. By constituency responsiveness I mean casework and district projects, which correspond to distribution of spoils in the patron-client paradigm.

Although I use the terms representation and representative activities in this and following chapters, I do so cautiously and without implying that participation in debate or casework necessarily constitutes representation of constituents. Chapter 7 addresses the appropriateness of the representation and patron-client paradigms for the cases.

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<sup>280</sup> Algeria, Member #13, May 2006.

<sup>281</sup> Morocco, Member #19, July 2006.

**TABLE IV. 1. The Representation and Patron-Client Paradigms**

Terms Used in This Project (Representation Paradigm)	Other Terms in Representation Literature	Type of Representation	Terms Used in This Project (Patron-Client Paradigm)	Corresponding Mechanism of Cooptation
Policy Responsiveness/ Programmatic Benefits	Lawmaking/ Policymaking/ Debate	Policy Responsiveness	Contestation/ Moderation/ Acquiescence	Policy Concessions
Constituency Responsiveness/ Particularistic Benefits	District projects/ Pork	Allocation Responsiveness	Clientelism/ Patronage	Distribution of Spoils
	Casework/ Individual requests	Service Responsiveness		

### **Distribution of Patronage**

A vast literature exists on political patronage in several world regions. Ellen Lust-Okar demonstrates the importance of *wasta* in legislative politics in Jordan. Her fieldwork suggests that parliament in Jordan is a basis for those who contest and win elections to demand jobs and patronage for friends and relatives, and presumably for constituents, from government ministries and bureaucracies. In this way, *wasta* broadens the base of support for the regime because members serve as patrons, distributing particularized benefits to friends and supporters. The popular support generated by the distribution of *wasta* translates into regime stability and legitimacy. If parliaments play this role, then they contribute to regime persistence because beneficiaries do not want to risk loss of privileges, or constituents are enticed to participate in the hope of electing a family or tribal representative who can improve their lives, if elected.

An Algerian observer described liberalization as a “narrow expansion of the yield” to perhaps a 1000 or more people.<sup>282</sup> This implies that the regime allows a relatively small number of individuals, who were at the margins, to contest and win seats in local, regional, and national councils. “All of the deputy’s personal problems are solved,” said an Algerian observer.<sup>283</sup> And, a Moroccan journalist described the privileges of deputies by saying, “Well, it’s worth their while.”<sup>284</sup>

<sup>282</sup> Algeria, Observer #2, October 2005.

<sup>283</sup> Ibid.

<sup>284</sup> Morocco, Observer #1, June 2007.

## **Incumbent Policy Concessions and Opposition Moderation**

Work on policy concessions of incumbents finds its analog in literature on opposition issue moderation.

### *Incumbents and Policy Concessions*

Gandhi and Przeworski argue that: “if these institutions do matter for [regime] survival in power, they must entail policy compromises and thus have consequences for other outcomes.” Policy concessions are an outcome of elite-level bargaining and are used by Gandhi and Przeworski to refer to concessions made by incumbent elites. Incumbents make compromises when the cost of doing so is less than the potential threat to their power or when the cost of doing so is less than using another strategy; namely distribution of resources. Within the framework of negotiation, opposition elites also make policy concessions; these are referred to in a separate literature as “moderation” because this literature generally deals with Islamist parties which are seen to take on less “extreme” policy positions as a consequence of participating in the political process.<sup>285</sup> Opposition members, whether Islamist, socialist, or members of other parties, are those which express some level of criticism with the program of the government and engage in varying levels of policy contestation (See Figure IV. 2.). Members of parliament who do not contest acquiesce to the will of the government may be considered incumbent elites because theirs is complete “acquiescence”—simple “rubber-stamping” or “hand-raising” in parliament without debate or expression of alternative policy choices. These individuals may have genuine support for the government and its programs; they may disagree personally with policies, but still display fully acquiescent political behavior; or, they may be acting opportunistically and have little interest in policies.

Figure IV. 2. shows political negotiation between incumbent and opposition elites, cooptation also requires movement on the part of regime power-holders from their ideal policy positions or “concessions”.

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<sup>285</sup> These terms have the unfortunate and unintended effect of suggesting that Islamist parties hold extreme positions whereas pro-government parties, for example, do not.

**FIGURE IV. 2. Continuum of Policy Acquiescence-Contestation: Incumbent and Opposition Preferences and the Effect of Concessions and Moderation**



*Opposition and Issue Moderation*

When opposition members “moderate”, they accept policy proposals which are closer to the preferences of incumbents than to their ideal point. Moderation is a change in strategy which results from and creates new political space. In summarizing the deradicalization of the left in Western Europe and Latin America, Carrie Rosefsky Wickham suggests that leaders moderated their agendas in order to take advantage of new opportunities for participation provided by democratization. Most recently, scholars are interested in understanding whether and why Islamists will pursue alternative (i.e. more moderate) positions as a consequence of participation in the formal political process; namely, parliamentary elections. The dominant wisdom is that moderation occurs as a result of iterated political interaction resulting in political learning of two types: a change in strategy or ideology. Wickham shows, with reference to Egypt, that moderation can occur under conditions of liberalization since institutional openings provide avenues for participation. This provides “strategic incentives for moderation and . . . opportunities for political learning” which she defines as “experience-driven change in individual leaders’ core values and beliefs”.<sup>286</sup>

Similarly, with respect to Jordan and Yemen, Janine Astrid Clark and Jillian Schwedler suggest that Islamist parties may increase women’s participation in politics as a shift in strategy (i.e. to appear more moderate) or as a shift in ideology (i.e. as a result of the success of moderates within their ranks).<sup>287</sup> Unsurprisingly they find that it is both the structure of disagreement between moderates and hardliners that creates political opportunities for women to take a greater role in the politics of Islamist parties. According to R. Quinn Meham, Islamists moderate (“reframe their message”) as a strategic response to the incentives and constraints they

<sup>286</sup> Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party," *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 (2004): 205.

<sup>287</sup> Janine Astrid Clark and Jillian Schwedler, "Who Opened the Window? Women's Activism in Islamist Parties," *Comparative Politics* 35, no. 3 (2003).

perceive.<sup>288</sup> This strategy is clear from interview evidence. In Algeria, the Islamist MSP joined governing coalition with regime parties FLN and RND. A deputy from the MSP stated that: “[w]e see what they are doing. We turn and look the other way for now. It is alright for now, but soon it won’t be.” And for another member of the MSP: “[w]e will have a PRESIDENT in 2012.” These statements indicate that policy moderation in the short-run is part of a medium or long-run strategy to govern which, of course, implies influence over both policies and resources.

### **Cooptation in Morocco and Algeria**

Much has been written on cooptation of political elites in Morocco, where the process has been referred to by multiple writers as *makhzenization*. Once elites are coopted into the system, according to Albrecht and Wegner, they engage in a “tamed type of protest articulation”.<sup>289</sup> The Algerian process of cooptation of elites has not been discussed sufficiently in the literature; the cooptation of elites within the multiparty context is a relatively recent development.

Let me begin by discussing the relationship of cooptation to party creation and the production of a political class. The creation of the first “multiparty” legislature in Morocco took place in 1963 prior to liberalization, while the first multiparty legislature was not created in Algeria until 1997, via the process of liberalization. In both cases, regime incumbents sought loyal members from which they created a pro-government bloc in parliament. In Morocco, the first elections gave a majority to independent candidates, which functioned as a pro-palace bloc.<sup>290</sup> In Algeria, the pro-government RND created shortly before the 1997 elections won 156 of the 389 seats in the lower house of parliament (about 40 percent) and ensured an easy majority by which to pass the president’s program.

In Algeria, the creation of the RND was part of a distinguishable pattern in which regime power-holders manufactured a political class along the lines of the political map drawn by the

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<sup>288</sup> See also Zerhouni, "Determinants and Mechanisms of Parliamentary Cooperation between Islamists and Leftists in Morocco." Wegner, "Autocrats and Islamists: Contenders and Containment in Egypt and Morocco." A number of very good articles document the ways in which the Party of Justice and Development “moderated” its positions on prominent policies since it began to participate in parliamentary politics in 1997. According to Zerhouni, the PJD shifted from being against a bill to not proposing amendment because according to, Abdallah Baha, because the PJD is unified against terrorist and unified with the king. She writes: “PJD appeared to have been moderating over the past few years—particularly during 2006—quieting or sidelining the dissidents within the party that had been promoting a line critical of the monarchy and its policies” (p. 40), including Mustapha Ramid who had been calling for constitutional amendment. Lise Strom, "Testing Morocco: The Parliamentary Elections of September 2007," *Journal of North African Studies* 13, no. 1 (2008).

<sup>289</sup> Wegner, "Autocrats and Islamists: Contenders and Containment in Egypt and Morocco."

<sup>290</sup> Strom, "Testing Morocco: The Parliamentary Elections of September 2007."

annulled 1991 elections. The first round of elections in 1991, although generally neutral administration, generated a certain level of support for three “Fronts”: The FLN, the FFS, and the FIS. From the Berber FFS, the regime encouraged the creation of a second Berber party, the RCD, thus dividing this possible source of opposition to the government. Both participated in the 1997 elections, then boycotted in 2002, in response to the squashing of debate in the legislature. Finally, the FIS was banned, but several Islamist parties were created in their place; among them Hamas (later named MSP), En-Nahda, and El-Islah. The less popular MSP joined a governing coalition with the FLN and RND during the 2002-2007 mandate. En-Nahda and El-Islah, the more popular movements, have been manipulated and crushed whenever a charismatic leader comes to their helms. Through these strategies, the regime controls opposition parties, removing dedicated and charismatic members from positions if they can lead their party to a majority in the parliament or pose a serious challenge to the regime.

Since Morocco gained independence, “the monarchy has manipulated the party configurations by including some parties in the management of the affairs of state, excluding others, repressing some, and even promoting the birth of a pro-monarchy bloc which would dominate parliamentary life, when there was one.”<sup>291</sup> The creation of political parties continued in Morocco until the 2000s as the regime fomented division between the country’s approximately 26 political parties. Individuals are enticed to begin new parties by the promise of getting rewards sooner, leading to a discrediting of the party system.<sup>292</sup> In the words of Maghraoui,

Through this mechanism [elections], the monarchy selects not only its political allies but its opponents. The absence of a single and simple electoral code gives the administration leeway to include or exclude candidates and to manipulate the electoral process and results at will. Other devices to control the electoral process include the proliferation of political parties created and endorsed by the administration and headed by men close to the king, which have tended to dominate electoral districts to dilute the relatively independent urban vote; setting the elections to the upper house after those to the lower house, which allows the administration to “correct” unforeseen political balances and redress “undeserved” rewards or punishments in the lower house; an informal quota system to keep parties on a leash; and, of course, the widespread buying and selling of votes.<sup>293</sup>

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<sup>291</sup> Layachi, *State, Society & Democracy in Morocco: The Limits of Associative Life.*: 76.

<sup>292</sup> Zerhouni, "Determinants and Mechanisms of Parliamentary Cooperation between Islamists and Leftists in Morocco."

<sup>293</sup> “The king has relied on divide and rule tactics to selectively reward or punish different factions, leading to a competition among established interest for the favors of the palace. Using a mixture of co-optation and intimidation, the modern Moroccan monarchs have relied on both carrots and sticks to orchestrate the political fortunes of their subjects. The result of the careful management of competing interest done by the Moroccan rulers has led to one of the most stable and legitimate states in the region.” Payne, "Democracy and Governance: Assessment of Morocco.": III.

Maghroui has called this process in Morocco depoliticization of the political elite, a reduction to clientelistic politics, and “sparse and ambivalent” among elites.<sup>294</sup> This creates a “constructive opposition” and “soft opposition”; a parliament dominated by pro-regime forces generally unwilling to challenge the status quo.<sup>295</sup> All parties are supportive of the monarchical regime; “they perform a function of opposition that is less confrontational than that observed in truly open and competitive polities.”<sup>296</sup> “The ultimate goal is to eliminate any potential opposition to regime, state, and king. The consequence of such policies has been a ‘*makhzenization*’ of society, i.e. an almost total control of society by the state through various administrative, cultural, political, and police means.”<sup>297</sup> This has led to dependence on the state through clientelism.

Laayachi’s statements suggest that the mechanisms of policy concession and patronage are linked, if not meaningfully understood, as a single mechanism. I argue that they are linked through the mechanism of representation as members seek to bargain in multiple arenas. In order to test observable implications of this argument, I investigate the relationship between these two mechanisms of cooptation: distribution of patronage and policy concessions/moderation. Why is this linkage missed? I argue this is because work thus far focuses on institutional design and misses how bargaining over parliamentary representation occurs in multiple arenas.

### **The First Nested Game of Institutional Design: Incumbent Preferences and the Shape of Electoral Laws and Party Systems**

Most work applying new institutionalism to authoritarian political contexts investigates the role of strategic bargaining between incumbent and opposition elites in shaping political institutions. This work suggests that elites negotiate in two nested games; one over the substantive outcome of elections and the other over the rules of the game. Andreas Schedler, borrowing from George Tsebelis, has called this the nested game of institutional design. One part of this literature focuses on explaining the distribution of domestic political power in institutional choices of parliamentarian or presidential systems. Findings from this literature have been applied to assessing the role of institutions in influencing the direction and pace of political transition.

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<sup>294</sup> Abdeslam M. Maghraoui, "Democratization in the Arab World? Depoliticization in Morocco," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 4 (2002).

<sup>295</sup> Brand, *Women, the State, and Political Liberalization*: 31.

<sup>296</sup> Layachi, *State, Society & Democracy in Morocco: The Limits of Associative Life*: 75.

<sup>297</sup> *Ibid.*: 42.

A second area focuses on individual institutions—in this case how preferences for party structure vary across institutional settings and affect choice of electoral rules. This work links with legislative politics because it shows in concrete terms why particular party systems emerge. Ellen Lust-Okar and Amaney Jamal theorize definitively concerning the role of regime type in shaping electoral and party systems in the Arab world. Here I summarize their argument in order to extend it to two characteristics of legislative institutions: centrality and capacity. At the outset, let me note that my conclusions are based on only two cases. While I compare dynamics in Morocco and Algeria, the hypotheses I generate about monarchies and presidential regimes cannot be tested without addition of other cases.

### **Assumptions about Preferences of Actors**

Lust-Okar and Jamal assume that incumbent preferences vary by regime type.

*Assumption A<sub>1</sub>: “Incumbent preferences over the distribution of domestic political power vary across different types of authoritarian regimes.”*<sup>298</sup>

In my analysis, I refer to regime power-holders and incumbent elites interchangeably. I use this analysis as a means by which to generate and begin to evaluate between-country hypotheses. The hypotheses I generate need to be tested in other cases; therefore, I am cautious about using monarchical and presidential regimes.

I define incumbents in Morocco as the monarchy and as the part of the *makhzen* closely connected to the palace. In Algeria, I define regime power-holders as the ruling clique of military generals whose accent is critical to major policy decisions.

The opposition differs across time and space, particularly in Morocco. For the mandate of interest (2002-2007), the opposition comprises parties and actors who are outside the system and seek to change it, rather than simply to gain resources through it. In the words of Jean-Jacques Levenue, the opposition is not “those linked to existing power structure [but] . . . those opposed to it.”<sup>299</sup>

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<sup>298</sup> Ellen and Amaney Ahmed Jamal Lust-Okar, "Rulers and Rules: Reassessing the Influence of Regime Type on Electoral Law Formation," *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 3 (2002). 338.

<sup>299</sup> Jean-Jacques Levenue suggests two stylized types of actors: those linked to existing power structure and those opposed to it. See also Willis.

In both Algeria and Morocco, there are movements and parties which are illegal<sup>300</sup>, which the regime has been unable to coopt into the system, or which have boycotted elections,<sup>301</sup> apparently because the tacit bargain over the outcome of those elections does not fall within the winset of both incumbent and opposition. In this sense, these movements and parties are the true opposition. Since I focus on deputies elected to parliament, I also include elites who have been coopted into the regime but, nevertheless, engage in meaningful contestation (i.e. cause incumbents to make policy concessions).

Among those parties which participated in the 2002 elections and which gained representation, Islamist parties constitute the “true” opposition for this study.<sup>302</sup> The opposition in Morocco during the mandate of interest (2002-2007) is the PJD, although the *Koutla* (democratic block) comprised of the USFP, Istiqlal, PPS, and the GSU formed a “soft” or “moderate” opposition after periods of parliamentary history during which they constituted the opposition. The PJD has pursued a stance of “critical endorsement”, supporting the government on most bills, provided that the policy does not impinge upon an interpretation of Islam embraced by its members. The PJD, thus, tends to vote for the majority of the laws, but cited some criticisms.<sup>303</sup> In Algeria, the opposition is likewise the Islamist parties, *el-Islah* and MSP, notwithstanding the fact that the MSP entered for strategic reasons into a governing coalition with government parties, FLN and RND in the 2002-2007 mandate.

Following Lust-Okar and Jamal and statements made elsewhere in this chapter, I assume that institutions are the outcome of elite-level bargaining. I expand their work on electoral institutions to look at other legislative institutions, including rules related to the internal functioning and relationship vis-à-vis areas of the government external to the parliament.

*Assumption A<sub>2</sub>: Incumbent and opposition elites bargain over the shape of parliamentary institutions in the periods of consolidation of power and liberalization.*

### *Regime Preferences and Institutional Design*

Lust-Okar and Jamal assume that while opposition preferences for small-party representation do not vary, regime power brokers in the two types of states differ in terms of the

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<sup>300</sup> See Zerhouni, "Determinants and Mechanisms of Parliamentary Cooperation between Islamists and Leftists in Morocco."

<sup>301</sup> Parties of the extreme left. PADS, which still claims repression, called for a boycott of the 1997 legislative elections in Morocco.

<sup>302</sup> Wegner, "Autocrats and Islamists: Contenders and Containment in Egypt and Morocco."

<sup>303</sup> Zerhouni, "Determinants and Mechanisms of Parliamentary Cooperation between Islamists and Leftists in Morocco."

party system and, thus, electoral rules which best suit their interests. “Monarchs prefer electoral rules that divide political power across competing political parties and promote society’s dependence on the monarchs for arbitration and stability.”<sup>304</sup> “Presidents in one-party states prefer electoral laws that promote the majority party and serve to weaken and fragment opposition parties.”<sup>305</sup> I adopt these assumptions also.

*Assumption A<sub>3</sub>: “In both monarchies and one-party states, opposition elites prefer rules that favor small-party representation.”<sup>306</sup>*

*Assumption A<sub>4</sub>: “Monarchs prefer electoral rules that divide political power across competing political parties and promote society’s dependence on the monarch for arbitration and stability.”<sup>307</sup>*

Given differences in preferences, “Electoral rules in monarchies promote the division of political power among contending forces. Electoral rules in former one-party states promote a single large party and act against representation of small political parties.”<sup>308</sup>

*Assumption A<sub>5</sub>: “Presidents in one-party states prefer electoral laws that promote the majority party and serve to weaken and fragment opposition parties.”<sup>309</sup>*

Based upon evidence from 1977-1996, they demonstrate that monarchies Morocco, Jordan, and Kuwait do not have electoral rules which promote majority parties, whereas former one-party regimes Egypt, Algeria, Palestine, and Tunisia have such rules which include party lists, rules moving remaining votes to large parties, and thresholds. Further, the electoral code in Algeria uses the Hare formula which tends to produce over-representation of larger parties. Under this formula, a party could receive as few as thirty percent of the votes but get two-thirds of the seats. In Morocco, no such provisions enhancing a single dominant party were used at the time that their study was conducted.<sup>310</sup>

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<sup>304</sup> Lust-Okar, "Rulers and Rules: Reassessing the Influence of Regime Type on Electoral Law Formation.": 354.

<sup>305</sup> Ibid.: 355.

<sup>306</sup> Ibid.: 353.

<sup>307</sup> Ibid.: 354.

<sup>308</sup> Ibid.: 356.

<sup>309</sup> Ibid.: 355.

<sup>310</sup> Ibid.: 358. Morocco adopted a closed-list PR system in multi-member districts before the 2002 elections and now uses counting rules similar to the Hare formula.

## *The Party System in Morocco and Algeria*

Following from these assumptions, Lust-Okar and Jamal hypothesize that: “In legislatures in monarchies, opposition parties should be well-represented. In legislatures of former one-party states, they should not.”<sup>311</sup>

*Hypothesis A<sub>1</sub>: “Electoral rules in monarchies promote the division of political power among contending forces. Electoral rules in former one-party states promote a single large party and act against representation of small political parties.”*<sup>312</sup>

The outcome of elections for the mandate of interest in Morocco and Algeria reflects the preferences of monarchs and presidents for the distribution of political power across parties, as mediated by electoral rules. In Morocco in 2002, 22 parties were elected to parliament with representation ranging from six seats (2.8 percent) to fifty seats (9.6 percent). Clearly, no one party is capable of effectuating a policy change independent of a coalition. Until 2002 when a new electoral code was promulgated, Morocco had a plurality system with 325 seats in 1996 and no threshold to reduce representation of small parties. In Algeria in 2002, nine parties were elected with representation ranging from one seat (.3 percent) to 199 seats (51.2 percent). In the parliamentary election which led to the 1991 victory of the Islamic Salvation Front in 1991, a plurality system in multimember districts was also in use. The new electoral code promulgated following the FIS victory in the first round of elections in 1991, created the present system which uses, as in Morocco at the present time, a closed-list proportional representation system in multimember districts and a 5 percent threshold.

### **The First Nested Game of Institutional Design:**

#### **The Effect of Regime Type on Centrality and Capacity of the Legislature**

Nearly all work on variation in parliamentary institutions in the Arab Middle East focuses on development level; for example, the level of centrality and capacity of legislatures, as in the work of Baaklini et al.<sup>313</sup>

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<sup>311</sup> Ibid.: 360.

<sup>312</sup> Ibid.: 356.

<sup>313</sup> Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg, *Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions*.

## Centrality: The Power of the Parliament to Influence Policies

Centrality is the degree to which legislatures function as powerful, representative, and independent policymaking institutions. In short, it is their power to affect political outcomes and to resist pressure emanating from the executive. Baaklini et al. suggest three levels of centrality. States in category one have: “. . . succeeded in negotiating and establishing most of the institutional arrangement required for enshrining the legislature as the principal area of political competition”.<sup>314</sup> Those in category two have: “. . . demonstrated substantial successes in negotiating new political rules and that have begun to revitalize the legislature on that basis”.<sup>315</sup> In category three legislatures, “. . . political incumbents and the main opposition forces agree on the basic rules of the political game, including the constitutional framework, the electoral law, and the law regulating the formation and operation of political parties and voluntary associations”.<sup>316</sup> For Baaklini et al., category three legislatures embody a high level of centrality:

1. It is constitutionally and politically permitted to operate as an autonomous and influential institution;
2. It is capable of resisting actions emanating from the executive; and,
3. It is able to formulate its own policy proposals and can affect the decision-making process in significant ways.<sup>317</sup>

I have adopted parliaments with “limited centrality”, or weak parliaments, in Chapter 1 to describe a feature of hegemonic electoral authoritarianism political systems additional to noncompetitive and manipulated elections. I argue that the Moroccan and Algerian parliaments, while they do not differ significantly in terms of actual centrality as defined by those prerogatives given them in the constitution (See Chapter 1), nevertheless differ in terms of level of debate between political parties in the legislature over particular policies.

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<sup>314</sup> Ibid.: 66.

<sup>315</sup> Ibid.: 67-8.

<sup>316</sup> I suggest that centrality concerns primarily influence on policy; however, it also consists of the ability to provide oversight of other branches of government. Abdo; Denoeux Baaklini, Guilain; Springborg, Robert, *Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999): 66.

<sup>317</sup> Ibid.: 63.

*Level of Debate in the Legislatures: Assumptions and Expectations*

How do regime preferences for parliamentary politics affect level of debate? I have already established that regime power-holders in hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes prefer parliaments with low centrality. We find the parliament has few prerogatives independent of the executive, and that opposition groups in both countries contest for constitutional changes (See Chapter 1). Opposition elites, I assume, prefer parliaments with high centrality.

*Assumption B<sub>1</sub>: Incumbent elites in authoritarian political systems prefer parliaments with low centrality.*

*Assumption B<sub>2</sub>: Opposition elites prefer parliaments with high overall centrality.*

*Hypothesis B<sub>1</sub>: The parliaments in Morocco and Algeria will have limited constitutional powers independent of the executive.*

*Hypothesis B<sub>2</sub>: Opposition elites will contest for greater constitutional powers for the Parliament.*

Level of debate is affected by internal norms and procedures, electoral laws, and the number of parties elected and the distribution of power between them. The Algerian constitution prescribes for the parliament a role in “general debate” of the programme of the executive (Article 80). By contrast, the Moroccan constitution mentions that draft bills are examined by committees, continuing between sessions (Article 54). Article 58 provides extensive details of the procedure for debate, including the number of readings, procedures for a joint committee in cases of disagreements within committees or between the houses, and resubmission of the amended bills to houses. Further, the Moroccan constitution offers two modes of oversight to the parliament, including weekly question periods attended by ministers before parliament and the ability to set up fact-finding committees. While the opposition finds fault with these mechanisms, in practice, they may map onto informal institutions which shape the level of the debate in the legislatures of different political regimes.

Further, the electoral code in Algeria uses the “Hare” formula which tends to produce over-representation of larger parties. Under this formula, a party could receive as few as thirty percent of the votes, but get two-thirds of the seats. In Morocco, no such provisions enhancing a

single dominant party were used.<sup>318</sup> These rules shape the party system and also level of debate in the legislature.

The effect of the distribution of parties on the level of debate is evident when comparing the 1997-2002 and 2002-2007 mandates in parliament. One deputy described the debate in the 2002-2007 mandate as “flat”, arguing that the boycott of the 2002 elections by the RCD and the FFS, as well as the reduction in the number of former ministers elected in 2002, diminished the level of debate compared to the 1997-2002 session during which no party held more than 32 percent of the seats (RND).<sup>319</sup>

In Morocco, by contrast, where the king continues to manage consensus and coalitions in the parliamentary system, debate and the questioning of ministers is lively. Because of Morocco’s long history of multiparty politics as a forum for interaction between and among government and opposition elites, its parliament is well-positioned to contribute to reform and has a relatively greater influence on public policies than that of Algeria.

Level of debate is affected by internal norms and procedures and by the number of parties and coalitions in parliament. The Algerian constitution describes the role of the government to engage in “general debate” as well as committee work on the programme of the government (Article 80). The Moroccan constitution establishes a more elaborate system, providing details for how draft bills are examined by committees which continue between sessions (Article 54). Article 58 provides extensive details of the procedure for debate, including the number of readings, procedures for a joint committee in cases of disagreements within committees or between the houses, and resubmission of the amended bills to houses. Further, in addition to the legislative function prescribed by both constitutions, the Moroccan constitution offers two modes of oversight to the parliament; the weekly questioning of ministers before parliament and the ability to set up fact-finding committees. While the opposition finds fault with these mechanisms, they influence the level of the debate within the sessions. These constitutional provisions suggest that debate should be of particular importance in the Moroccan system vis-à-vis the Algerian system, where the role of the parliament to vote on laws is not elaborated by many of the same details provided by the Moroccan constitution.

Level of debate may also be affected from mandate to mandate by the number of parties represented, the power relationship between them (e.g. coalitions), and the range of policy preferences expressed by them, *inter alia*. The effect of the distribution of parties on the level of debate is evident when comparing the 1997-2002 and 2002-2007 mandates in parliament. One

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<sup>318</sup> Lust-Okar, "Rulers and Rules: Reassessing the Influence of Regime Type on Electoral Law Formation."

<sup>319</sup> Algeria, Member #1, April 2006.

deputy described the debate in the 2002-2007 mandate as “flat”, arguing that the boycott of the 2002 elections by the RCD and the FFS, as well as the reduction of former ministered elected in 2002 led to a vast reduction in the level of debate compared to the 1997-2002, session during which no party held more than 32 percent of the seats (RND).

*Assumption B<sub>3</sub>: Monarchs prefer moderate or high levels of debate in parliament over a set of issues defined by them. Presidents prefer limited parliamentary debate.*

*Hypothesis B<sub>3</sub>: The overall level of parliamentary debate will be higher in Morocco than in Algeria.*

Given these hypotheses, we should observe higher levels of involvement in lawmaking activities in Morocco than in Algeria.

*Hypothesis B<sub>4</sub>: Members in Morocco will be more likely to participate in lawmaking activities than will members in Algeria.*

#### *Participation in Lawmaking Activities: Empirical Evidence*

Are some deputies more or less likely to have engaged in policymaking activities? Moroccan members are more likely than Algerian members to participate in policymaking even though the role of the parliament in independently shaping laws is very limited (See Table IV. 2.). Thirteen percent of Algerian members compared with none of the Moroccan members during the present mandate (2002-2007) performed lawmaking tasks. Of particular interest is speaking in the plenary session. Only 4 (4.6 percent) of Moroccan respondents have never done so compared with 44 (51.8 percent) of Algerian respondents. These survey statistics are consistent with the effect of fostering a large number of political parties which compete among themselves, as in Morocco, rather than a single dominant party, as in Algeria.

Moroccan members of parliament are more active than Algerian members of parliament in lawmaking activities. It is not possible to determine whether this difference is a consequence of the longer number of years of multiparty parliamentary experience in Morocco through which the parliament has developed a more central role in policymaking, or whether it reflects regime strategy for greater debate in Morocco. I argue that both are implications of regime strategy and suggest that the level of debate over policies and the participation of members in lawmaking activities should be higher in monarchies than in former one-party states within the class of hegemonic electoral regimes.

**TABLE IV. 2. Lawmaking Actions among Moroccan and Algerian Members**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Number of Actions:		
Zero	0 (0.0%)	13 (13.4%)
One	4 (4.6%)	7 (7.2%)
Two	7 (8.0%)	10 (10.3%)
Three	19 (21.6%)	20 (20.6%)
Four	16 (18.2%)	21 (21.7%)
Five	16 (18.2%)	20 (20.6%)
Six	26 (29.6%)	6 (6.2%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	88 (4.3)	97 (3.2) <sup>b</sup>
Propose a Project/Proposition of Law:		
No	23 (26.1%)	37 (43.5%)
Yes	65 (73.9%)	48 (56.5%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	88 (.7)	85 (.6) <sup>c</sup>
Speak in Plenary Session:		
No	4 (4.6%)	44 (51.8%)
Yes	84 (95.5%)	41 (48.2%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	88 (1.0)	85 (.5) <sup>d</sup>
Look for Support for a Law Outside Parliament:		
No	47 (53.4%)	42 (49.4%)
Yes	41 (46.6%)	43 (50.6%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	88 (.5)	85 (.5) <sup>e</sup>
Debate a Law in Committee:		
No	9 (10.2%)	18 (21.2%)
Yes	79 (89.8%)	67 (78.8%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	88 (.9) <sup>a</sup>	85 (.8)
Propose an Amendment:		
No	18 (20.5%)	23 (27.1%)
Yes	70 (79.6%)	62 (72.9%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	88 (.8)	85 (.7)
Convince a Colleague in Private to Vote for a Law:		
No	52 (59.1%)	39 (45.9%)
Yes	36 (40.9%)	46 (54.1%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	88 (.4)	85 (.5)

<sup>a</sup> Kutla deputies are less likely to have debated a law in committee (P Chi<sup>2</sup> < .043).

<sup>b</sup> Islamist deputies in Algeria have performed more of these activities, but the difference is not substantively significant (P Chi<sup>2</sup> < .035).

<sup>c</sup> Islamist deputies in Algeria are less likely to have proposed a law (P Chi<sup>2</sup> < .026). Government (HMS, RND, FLN) deputies in Algeria are less likely to have proposed a law (P Chi<sup>2</sup> < .049). Government (RND, FLN) deputies in Algeria are less likely to have proposed a law (P Chi<sup>2</sup> < .040).

<sup>d</sup> Islamist deputies in Algeria are less likely to have spoken in a plenary session (P Chi<sup>2</sup> < .015).

<sup>e</sup> Government (HMS, RND, RND) deputies in Algeria are less likely to have looked for support for a law outside parliament (P Chi<sup>2</sup> < .048). Majority party (FLN) deputies in Algeria are less likely to have looked for support for a law outside parliament (P Chi<sup>2</sup> < .005). Government (RND, FLN) deputies in Algeria are less likely to have looked for support for a law outside parliament (P Chi<sup>2</sup> < .007).

## Capacity: The Resources to Represent

Capacity is “a parliament’s possession of the resources and expertise that will allow it to perform the functions to which it theoretically is entitled”.<sup>320</sup> Members need material and human resources in order to provide “policy” responsiveness, as well as “constituency” responsiveness. Here I focus on the latter.

I can find no interview evidence that monarchs endow parliaments with greater material or human resources than do presidents, meaning that the amount of staff and resources in parliament and the level of indemnities members receive does not appear to be substantially different. However, the elite status of members in Morocco and their dual role in the bureaucracy allows them to have greater access to resources and networks, as discussed in Chapter 2, through which they can provide district projects and solve casework requests. Most deputies believe that the material and logistical resources available to them with which to fulfill their mandates are vastly insufficient to fulfill their role as defined by the constitution.<sup>321</sup> Although the difference is not statistically significant, Moroccan members are somewhat more likely than Algerian members to agree that the resources provided to them by the parliament, government, and parties is sufficient (or too much); 22 (25.6 percent) or Moroccan deputies and 14 (17.6 percent) of Algerian deputies agreed with that statement (See Table IV. 3.).

**TABLE IV. 3. Perceptions of Resources among Moroccan and Algerian Members**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Resource Level:		
Not Enough (1)	64 (74.4%)	66 (82.5%)
Enough	22 (25.6%)	13 (16.3%)
Too Much (3)	0 (0.0%)	1 (1.3%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	86 (1.3)	80 (1.2)

Questions: Do you think the resources deputies receive from the Parliament, the government, and their parties are: too much, enough, or not enough?

### *Level of Capacity for Constituency Responsiveness: Assumptions and Expectations*

I begin by assuming that members prefer to have a high level of access to resources through which they may provide “constituency” responsiveness. I assume that incumbents have preferences for capacity which differ by regime type. Monarchs prefer a level of capacity for the parliament that, although it may be less than other parts of the bureaucracy, is greater than that of

<sup>320</sup> Baaklini, Denooux, and Springborg, *Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions.*: 63.

<sup>321</sup> There are no statistically significant differences in perceived resource levels between parties and blocks in either country.

a parliament in a presidential system. In Morocco, the parliament is one part of a larger *makhzenian* political system based upon patron-client relationships. The role of the King as arbitrator over the whole system is not contested. In Algeria, incumbents prefer lower capacity of the legislature because it should not compete with the hegemony of the president and the executive by making alternative, viable policy proposals. There is no arbitrator over the system that can assure regime continuity other than the army working through a strong, hegemonic president.

*Assumption B<sub>4</sub>: Members prefer to have access to resources for service and allocation responsiveness.*

*Assumption B<sub>5</sub>: Regime power-holders in monarchies prefer parliaments which provide high overall levels of constituency responsiveness. Regime power-holders in presidential systems prefer lower levels of constituency responsiveness.*

*Hypothesis B<sub>5</sub>: Morocco will have institutional rules which foster a higher level of capacity for “constituency” responsiveness among members of parliament than will Algeria.*

*Hypothesis B<sub>6</sub>: Members in Morocco will be more likely to believe that they can access ministers and members high in the government than will members in Algeria.*

How do regime preferences affect access to resources to provide constituency responsiveness, including casework, district projects, and communication? Because of the higher capacity afforded to members in monarchical systems by this institutional structure, I hypothesize that members will have higher caseloads and be more likely to have access to district projects than will members in presidential systems.

*Hypothesis B<sub>7</sub>: Moroccan members will have higher caseloads and be more likely to influence funds for district projects than will Algerian members.*

#### *Empirical Evidence: Capacity for Constituency Responsiveness*

Two institutional mechanisms mediate the effect of regime preferences on capacity level. In Morocco, members of parliament may serve simultaneously as ministers in the government or as officials elected to positions in local government, either as majors or as members of councils. All of these positions bring with them resources to provide casework and district projects. Many members of parliament are also elected to municipal or provincial assemblies, or are elected as

mayors or heads of provincial councils. Survey data suggests that as many as 40 (40.9 percent) of the sample also hold a second public function.

Second, monarchs choose constitutional arrangements which allow members to hold second functions in the private sector, whereas presidents do not allow such functions. In Morocco, most members maintain their former job, their function being listed prominently on public lists of parliamentarians. In Algeria, with some exceptions (e.g. certain business endeavors, notaries, etc.), members cannot hold such functions. We make the following empirical observations which affect the capacity of members of parliament to provide “constituency” responsiveness.

*Hypothesis B<sub>8</sub>: Morocco will have constitutional arrangements which amalgamate the legislative branch with the bureaucracy and encourage members to have a second public function. In Algeria, a second public function will not be allowed.*

*Hypothesis B<sub>9</sub>: Morocco will have constitutional arrangements which allow members to have second functions in business or the public sector. In Algeria, second functions will be limited.*

Finally, as noted in Chapter 2, members of parliament are drawn from an elite political class, the *makhzen*, whereas many Algerian members are new elites with little or no prior experience in politics. Here, too, we find evidence to support the hypothesis that members perceive greater access to ministers and other individuals within networks which can provide help with solving casework requests. Many Algerian deputies, including some from majority parties, suggest that their role and access is very limited. According to an Islamist deputy in Algeria: “[t]he government has the power and the deputy can only accomplish something by asking the ministry who may or may not respond . . . People think the deputy has influence to realize a lot. In reality this is not true. The system always limits the deputy’s power. We write letters and recommendations [to ministries]. There is almost always no response. You must have a personal relationship with someone in the government. I cannot accomplish anything. There are too many obstacles.”<sup>322</sup> Another member from a majority party concurred: “[w]e do much more personally over coffee . . . We work indirectly. We fix problems as a team. . . . If we have problems with the *wally*, we can’t work it out. We will request an exchange of interest. I am simple and correct.”<sup>323</sup>

Despite these generalities, some Algerian deputies and most Moroccan deputies clearly have access to important members of the regime. During an interview, an Islamist deputy in

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<sup>322</sup> Algeria, Member #17, July 2006.

<sup>323</sup> Algeria, Member #15, July 2006.

Algeria, in this case the MSP, which was in a ruling coalition with the government parties FLN and RND, received a call from the *wally* of his state.<sup>324</sup> In Morocco, deputies are much more likely to say that they have access to government ministers, though some say that they have been blocked from challenging officials publicly on politically sensitive issues. One Islamist deputy in Morocco explained that he does not receive requests any longer because he cannot do anything to help: “The doors are closed to me.”<sup>325</sup> “If you play the game,” according to one Algerian observer, “you will win.” Deputies who do not play according to the rules cannot be reelected, successful in solving citizens’ problems, and risk losing personal privileges. A Moroccan political consultant said: “I won’t run. I’m the president of an association—I prefer to be private. I won’t sell myself to be elected. This is still a rentier state.”<sup>326</sup>

Table 4 shows that Moroccan members are more likely than Algerian members to have higher caseloads; 98 requests per month on average in Morocco and 44 requests per month in Algeria. The data confirm that Moroccan members are more likely than Algerian members to rank district projects as their most time-consuming function; 28.6 percent compared with 17.3 percent. The mean percentage of members’ work week devoted to casework is, however, similar. The mean is 2.3 in Morocco and 2.1 in Algeria on a scale of 1 to 4 where the mean is close to 2, or 25 to 50 percent of the work week.<sup>327</sup>

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<sup>324</sup> Algeria, Member #7, December 2005.

<sup>325</sup> Morocco, Member #20, May 2007.

<sup>326</sup> Morocco, Observer #4, July 2006.

<sup>327</sup> Rankings of casework relative to other functions suggest, contrary to expectations, that Algerian members are actually more likely than Moroccan members to prioritize casework. 23 (25.3 percent) of Moroccan members and 30 (37.0 percent) of Algerian members rank casework as their most time consuming function, with a mean of 2.1 in Algeria compared with 2.4 in Morocco suggesting that Algerian members spend more time with casework than to Moroccans relative to other tasks. These data cast doubt on the quality of the ranking measures relative to more concrete measures such as lawmaking activities actually performed and cases actually taken in an average month. Given that Moroccan members are allowed to hold a second function, whether in business or in the public sector, rankings could be misleading.

**TABLE IV. 4. Activities among Moroccan and Algerian Members**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Most Time-Consuming Task:		
Projects for the District	26 (28.6%)	14 (17.3%)
Debating and Writing Laws/Policies	32 (35.2%)	35 (43.2%)
Providing Help with Individual Requests	23 (25.3%)	30 (37.0%)
Communicating with Constituents	4 (4.4%)	1 (1.2%)
Meeting with Members of Party	6 (6.6%)	1 (1.2%)
<i>Total</i>	91	81
Mean Rank (1=Most time to 5=Least time):		
Projects for the District	2.9 (1.6) <sup>a</sup>	2.8 (1.3)
Debating and Writing Laws/Policies	2.5 (1.4)	2.3 (1.5)
Providing Help with Individual Requests	2.4 (1.1)	2.1 (1.1) <sup>b</sup>
Communicating with Constituents	3.4 (1.1)	3.6 (1.0)
Meeting with Members of Party	3.7 (1.3)	4.0 (1.1)
<i>Total</i>	92	84
Percentage of Week Devoted to Casework:		
25 Percent or Less	24 (26.7%)	28 (32.9%)
26-50 Percent	31 (34.4%)	32 (37.7%)
51-75 Percent	22 (24.4%)	13 (15.3%)
76 Percent or More	13 (14.4%)	12 (14.1%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	90 (2.3)	85 (2.1)
Number of Requests per Month (Range)	0 to 1600	0 to 210
Mean Number of Requests per Month	97.8 (215.1)	44.3 (41.1)
<i>Total</i>	85	70

<sup>a</sup> Ranked higher PJD ( $p < .001$ ). (ie do much less)

<sup>b</sup> FLN ranks casework lower ( $p < .037$ ).

### **Representation as Cooptation:**

#### **The Relationship between Policy Contestation and Service Provision**

Members of parliament in monarchical regimes are more likely than those in presidential regimes to engaging in lawmaking activities and to have higher caseloads. But what is the relationship between engage in lawmaking activities (i.e. policy contestation) and casework (i.e. service responsiveness or patronage)? In other words, does cooptation, which requires policy cooperation for privileges, lead to a trade-off between participation in debate (“policy” responsiveness) and resources for provision of casework (“service” responsiveness)? Do the preferences of monarchs and presidents for level of debate lead to a different relationship between

provisions of these two types of representative goods? I construct an argument about cooptation through representation, beginning with assumptions and hypotheses used to test it.

## **Assumptions and Hypotheses**

### *Party, Candidate, and Member Preferences*

Following from the assumptions of rational choice, I assume that all actors have preferences and act to maximize utility. Members seek to maximize the chance of reelection and attainment of higher political office.<sup>328</sup> Survey data show that 89.7 percent of Moroccan deputies and 88.5 percent of Algerian members were seeking reelection and desired a more important political career, or both. Parties seek to maximize representation over the long-run; thus, I assume that they also wish to see their members maximize the change of reelection or attainment of higher political office. I argue that the optimal strategy of both actors is equivalent. Interview evidence suggests that parties seek candidates that provide constituency service. An Islamist deputy in Algeria suggested that: “[t]he first thing the party looks for is someone who serves the citizen, is close, and is almost in a parental role over the citizens. They want someone who will take on the demands of citizens.”

*Assumption C<sub>1</sub>: Members seek to maximize the chance of reelection or attainment of higher political office in the short-run.*

*Assumption C<sub>2</sub>: Parties seek to maximize representation in the government over the long-run.*

*Assumption C<sub>3</sub>: The choice of representative goods which maximizes members’ popular support is also optimal for the party.*

### *Regime Power-Holder Preferences*

I assume that both monarchs and presidents set conservative limits within which parliamentary debate can take place: “The monarchy as the ultimate Moroccan power center cannot be contested by parliamentary government; in turn, for those actors who accept the rules of the game, there is a sphere for articulation and political contest, namely parliament and

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<sup>328</sup> Scholars assume that members seek reelection. See Carey and Shuggart 418, Rae 1971; Mayhew 1974; Epstein 1967; Taagepera and Shugart 1989.

elections”.<sup>329</sup> Within these limits monarchs prefer a higher level of debate in parliament than do presidents. For one party leader in Algeria, “The state wants parties and deputies which will vote without asking too many questions.”<sup>330</sup>

*Assumption C<sub>4</sub>: Regime power-holders prefer members who acquiesce on policy and oversight outside of prescribed limits. Incumbents punish members who do not acquiesce within the institutional limits by removing access to networks of patronage.*

*Assumption C<sub>5</sub>: Monarchs prefer moderate levels of parliamentary debate within clearly-prescribed issue boundaries. Presidents prefer low levels of parliamentary debate but do not state clear issue boundaries.*

The mechanism of cooptation suggests that members who contest beyond these limits encounter difficulty attaining patronage and access to patronage networks which facilitate the resolution of casework requests and the provision of district projects. Two Moroccan members interviewed made this point. One Moroccan deputy from a socialist party claimed that he had opposed the regime and that, “all doors are closed to me.”<sup>331</sup> In this case, the deputy was a wealthy businessman with extensive contacts in civil society. Through these networks, the deputy was still able to solve problems. The second deputy was in the opposition. He claimed that he once took casework requests but that, because he was in the opposition and really wanted reform, he had no contacts with which he could solve any problems. So, he turned people away.<sup>332</sup>

### *Citizen Preferences*

I assume that citizens prefer high levels of service and allocation responsiveness. Further, they are adverse to behavior by members which suggests that they are in parliament to serve their own interests (i.e. they are coopted). Interview evidence suggests that Moroccan and Algerian constituents expect members to be present in their districts, to help them solve personal problems with jobs and the administration, and to attract development funds and resources to the district. Citizens expect to know deputies before voting for them. In Algeria, one reason people vote for large parties is that they do not know or trust new parties. “You could never be reelected

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<sup>329</sup> Layachi, *State, Society & Democracy in Morocco: The Limits of Associative Life*: 129.

<sup>330</sup> Algeria, Observer #3, April 2007.

<sup>331</sup> Morocco, Deputy #18, July 2006.

<sup>332</sup> Morocco, Deputy #21, May 2007.

if you weren't there and you are not known by the people of the district", said a majority party member in Algeria.<sup>333</sup>

Moroccans and Algerians rank from most to least important: obtaining funds for development projects, taking care of citizens' requests, writing and debating laws, informing citizens, and organizing meetings with party members (See Table IV. 5.). They also believe that deputies prioritize these tasks in nearly the reverse order. Even among those who believe elections are no longer flawed, there is an expectation that deputies will contribute to real social and economic change: "There won't be any fraud this time. But people still won't have confidence until they see something concrete."<sup>334</sup>

**TABLE IV. 5. Expectations and Perceptions Moroccan and Algerian Constituents**

	<i>Morocco</i>		<i>Algeria</i>	
	Most Important Task to Citizen	Task Perceived Most Important to Deputy	Most Important Task to Citizen	Task Perceived Most Important to Deputy
Obtaining Funds	1	5	1	3
Writing and Debating Laws	3	2	3	2
Taking Care of Citizens' Requests	2	4	2	1
Informing Citizens	4	3	4	4
Organizing Meetings with Party	5	1	5	5

Questions: Please tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with the following statements: (1) Only people with a connection to a deputy can ask for help with a personal problem (2) People around here do not trust the outcome of elections.

*Assumption C<sub>6</sub>: Citizens prefer high levels of casework and district projects.*

*Assumption C<sub>7</sub>: Citizens prefer members who do not seek personal gain or are puppets of the regime (acquiescent on policy).*

### **Representation as Bargaining in Multiple Arenas**

I construct a visual representation of bargaining in multiple arenas which adds detail to our understanding of why cooptation or *makhzenization* works once members are elected to parliament. Members of parliament seek to maximize their chances of reelection by making strategic choices about representative activities while simultaneously considering payoffs in multiple arenas. Members of parliament are not merely engaged in negotiation with incumbent

<sup>333</sup> Algeria, Member #2, March 2007.

<sup>334</sup> Algeria, Observer #8, April 2007.

elites who prefer a measure of policy acquiescence and who control the outcome of elections through election structuring. Semi-competitive elections give both regime incumbents and also, to some extent, citizens agency in the outcome. Citizens influence the outcome of elections via political support. I argue that incumbents control the levers of patronage, requiring support-maximizing members to limit policy responsiveness (i.e. contestation) in order to provide “service” responsiveness (i.e. solving requests of citizens).

Thus, I extend Gandhi and Przeworski’s assertion that: “[c]o-opting by distributing spoils and coopting by making policy concessions entail different institutional mechanisms.”<sup>335</sup> I argue that, within legislative politics, the two mechanisms, although analytically distinct, are interconnected via the primary mechanism of representation. In other words, one mechanism by which cooptation occurs is the strategic choices members make between representative activities. I test whether policy responsiveness and service responsiveness are substitute goods requiring members to make a conscious choice between them, under conditions of electoral uncertainty, as they seek to maximize the chance of reelection.

Members of parliament must choose baskets of two types of representative activities--policy responsiveness and constituency responsiveness--which I define as casework, district projects, and communication. I use a model of revealed preferences in two arenas to illustrate this mechanism (See Figure IV. 3.).

*Assumption C<sub>8</sub>: Members seek to maximize popular support by choosing an optimal combination of legislative and constituency responsiveness given the preferences of regime power-holders and citizens.*

The budget lines  $l_a$  and  $l_m$  signify all combinations of representative activities which may be selected by members of parliament, given the constraints and opportunities of parliamentary institutions, where the subscripts identify the country. The budget line reflects the power, preferences, and coalitions of actors at all levels; institutions, formal and informal; and elite-level strategies.


The preference-maximizing market basket is  $Q_m$  and  $Q_a$  on indifference curve  $U_m$  and  $U_a$ . Members trade off between forms of representation—(“policy” responsiveness and “constituency” responsiveness)—balancing acquiescence in policy matters for resources and networks with which to solve constituent problems. In maximizing the change of reelection, actors must consider payoffs in multiple arenas.

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<sup>335</sup> Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.": 1282.

**FIGURE IV. 3. Dynamics of Cooptation and Optimization of Popular Support in the Morocco and Algerian Legislatures**

“Policy”  
 Responsiveness  
 (Units of Policy  
 Contestation)



“Constituency” Responsiveness  
 (Units of Casework and District Projects)

The slope and placement of the line is determined by parliamentary institutions, negotiated by incumbent and opposition elites in the first nested game of bargaining over institutional design. This line reflects the preferences of incumbents for levels of debate and constituency responsiveness, *inter alia*. In both countries,  $P$  reflects the level of contestation which may result in the withdrawal of resources and networks by which to provide services. Because regime power-holders in Algeria prefer minimal debate in parliament,  $P_a$  is lower than  $P_m$ .  $Q$  reflects the maximum level of casework and district projects, *ceteris paribus*, which a

fully acquiesce member can provide. Because regime power-holders in Morocco prefer higher constituency responsiveness, and since parliamentary institutions facilitate greater capacity in this area,  $P_a$  is lower than  $P_m$ .

In strategically determining representative behavior to maximize the chances of reelection or attainment of higher office, members of parliament must seek an optimal balance between acquiescence in the parliament in order to gain the resources for constituency responsiveness (e.g. casework and district projects) and “policy” responsiveness (i.e. contestation) in the legislature. I argue that if members go too far beyond the tacit boundaries of “constructive opposition”, these members encounter difficulties in acquiring resources to provide “constituency” responsiveness in the current round (mandate) or even losing their ability to be placed in the party list in future rounds of elections. However, if they acquiesce too significantly in “policy” responsiveness, their party risks losing popular support, not because they do not or cannot provide constituency responsiveness (e.g. casework), but because they are viewed as coopted (“*makhzenized*”). For example, the old opposition in Morocco, led ostensibly by the USFP and Istiqlal has been seen as drawn into the government; they take the blame for certain failed social policies for which they contested while in the opposition and cannot take credit for improvements, which might be seen as the result of the government, and of the opposition.<sup>336</sup> Thus, members of parliament must strategically “represent” by considering how the context (i.e. mass political attitudes) affects payoffs in the principle game: reelection.

### **Testing the Implications of the Preference Model**

The preference model suggests observable implications which can be tested with member data. Here I focus on predicting variation in time devoted to casework, paying special attention to the nature of the relationship between access to casework on the one hand, and participation in parliamentary debate on the other.

### **Measurement and Hypotheses**

#### *Dependent Variable*

The dependent variable is time devoted to casework as a percentage of one’s work week as a deputy (See Table IV. 6). In Algeria, this should generally be an individual’s entire work

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<sup>336</sup> Tozy, “Morocco's Elections: Islamists, Technocrats, and the Palace.”: 38.

week since members are not allowed, with a few exceptions (e.g. notary public), to exercise a second function. In Morocco, a deputy may have a second position in the private sector, or even be elected or appointed to a second public function. In either case, and particularly in the latter, the member's second function may be linked with casework. A deputy who is a businessman, for example, will generally use business contacts to get jobs for constituents if he or she provides casework; members who are simultaneously majors will handle casework operations with state budgets and resources and thus casework operations under the two functions will not be separate in general.

The dependent variable has four ordered categories. Table IV. 6. presents the distribution of time devoted to casework in the two countries. Moroccan members tend to devote slightly more time on average than do Algerian deputies, but the difference is not statistically significant. The modal category in both Morocco and Algeria is 25 to 50 percent.

**TABLE IV. 6. Percentage of Work Week Devoted to Casework Moroccan and Algerian Members**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Percentage of Week Devoted to Casework:		
25 Percent or Less	24 (26.7%)	28 (32.9%)
26-50 Percent	31 (34.4%)	32 (37.7%)
51-75 Percent	22 (24.4%)	13 (15.3%)
76 Percent or More	13 (14.4%)	12 (14.1%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	90 (2.3)	85 (2.1)

Question: What percentage of your workweek as a deputy do you devote to solving citizens' personal requests?

#### *Independent Variables*

**Trading off baskets of representative goods.** The primary independent variable of interest is participation in parliamentary debate (See Table IV. 7.). As a proxy for this variable, I use an indicator of whether the deputy has ever, during the mandate (2002-2007), debated a law in committee. In both Algeria and Morocco, all deputies are members of a committee and, thus, have multiple opportunities to do so. Nearly all members have debated a law in committee at least once: 89.8 percent of Moroccan members and 78.8 percent of Algerian members. Already, the higher proportion of Moroccan members who have debated a law suggests that debate, albeit within the guidelines of "constructive opposition", is more acceptable in the Moroccan case than in the Algerian setting, particularly when coupled with differences in the frequency of other lawmaking activities.

**TABLE IV. 7. Lawmaking Actions among Moroccan and Algerian Members**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Debate a Law in Committee:		
No	9 (10.2%)	18 (21.2%)
Yes	79 (89.8%)	67 (78.8%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	88 (.9) <sup>a</sup>	85 (.8)

Hypothesis 1 states that in order to mobilize popular support and maximize changes of reelection, members in both Algeria and Morocco face a trade-off between legislative responsiveness and constituency responsiveness. The same trade-off exists in both countries, but because the preferences of regime power-holders for level of debate in the parliament varies across regime type, the budget line is less steep, meaning that Moroccan members may simultaneously choose a higher level of both legislative and constituency responsiveness than can Algerian members (i.e. Indifference curve  $U_M$  is higher than  $U_2$ ). Interview evidence suggests strongly that Moroccan members are more likely to have the stature to question and approach ministers than are Algerian members. Evidence also suggests that Algerian members feel a higher level of pressure to conform to norm of executive control over the policymaking realm.

*Hypothesis C<sub>1</sub>: Members face a trade-off between policy responsiveness and gaining resources for constituency responsiveness. Because monarchs prefer a level of debate, Moroccan members are less likely to face this trade-off than are Algerian members where presidents prefer a very limited level of debate.*

**Party membership: Opposition and the structure of non-opposition.** First, what is the relationship between being in the opposition and access to resources to provide casework? I hypothesize that, contrary to expectations about Islamist parties in much of the literature, members of the Islamist opposition will devote less time to casework for three reasons. First, because of their position in the opposition, Islamist deputies have less access to resources and networks to solve casework requests. Second, because they are in the opposition, Islamist deputies will devote greater resources and time to developing a party program than will members of other parties. Third, because Islamist parties more closely resemble a party in the western sense (i.e. Islamist parties are to a lesser extent “façade” parties), they will behave in ways which conform most closely to expectations of the effect of electoral system on political behavior. Closed-list proportional representation systems should lead to low caseloads—probably lower than what we observe in the Moroccan and Algerian cases—thus we would expect the political behavior of parties which are most democratic in their internal functioning to conform more closely to this pattern than those which are least democratic in their internal functioning.

*Hypothesis C<sub>2</sub>: Members of the opposition will devote less time, on average, to casework.*

What about non-opposition parties: majority parties, “moderate” opposition parties, smaller parties and independents, and regime-created parties? How will these parties differ from the opposition and from one another in the time devoted to casework?

If monarchs prefer a multiplicity of smaller parties which compete with one another and have similar abilities to mobilize popular support, institutions in the political system should provide similar levels of opportunity for resources for casework and district projects for all non-opposition parties. Thus, non-opposition parties should devote more time to casework than opposition parties, but non-opposition parties should not differ from one another in this provision.

*Hypothesis C<sub>3</sub>: Members of majority and other non-opposition parties in Morocco will devote more time, on average, to casework than will the opposition party. Members of non-opposition parties in Morocco will not differ from one another in the time they devote to casework.*

*Hypothesis C<sub>4</sub>: Members of the majority party in Algeria will devote more time, on average, to casework than will the opposition party and other non-opposition parties (small parties and independents notwithstanding). Members of non-opposition parties in Algeria will differ from one another in the time they devote to casework.*

If presidents prefer a single dominant party, they should provide greater opportunity to the majority party to mobilize support through constituency service than to other opposition and non-opposition parties.

A special case in Morocco and Algeria may be small parties with less than eight percent of the seats and independents. These deputies should have a greater incentive to cultivate a personal vote and, thus, be more likely to devote more time to casework.

*Hypothesis C<sub>5</sub>: Members of small parties and independent deputies will devote more time, on average, to casework.*

*Hypothesis C<sub>6</sub>: Non-opposition elites will have equal access to service responsiveness in Morocco but unequal access to service responsiveness in Algeria.*

In the next sections, I test these hypotheses in multivariate models and develop and test a final hypothesis concerning the relationship between legislative responsiveness and constituency responsiveness in the two countries. I argue that members in both countries need to trade off between policy responsiveness and gaining the resources to provide constituency responsiveness.

However, because monarchs prefer a higher level of debate than do presidents, members in Morocco are much less likely to face this trade-off than are their Algerian counterparts.

*Hypothesis C<sub>7</sub>: Members face a trade-off between policy responsiveness and gaining resources for constituency responsiveness. Because monarchs prefer a level of debate, Moroccan members are less likely to face this trade-off than are Algerian members.*

**Representative role.** Following from the basic political logic of Friedrich’s “rule of anticipated reactions”, legislators who believe constituency service is more important for maintaining electoral support will receive more casework.<sup>337</sup> Interview data revealed differences among deputies in the ways they conceive of their role as representatives. These differences are discussed at greater length in Chapter 4. Here, I control for extent the to which members believe serving citizens is central to their role as a deputy. Members’ responses to the following statement are measured as a likert scale: “Serving citizens is the most important thing I do as a deputy.” I hypothesize that those who agree more strongly with this statement will devote more time to casework.

*Hypothesis C<sub>8</sub>: Members who have a service orientation will devote more time, on average, to casework than those who focus on other aspects of representation.*

**Political ambition.** Members who have greater political ambition should devote more time to casework because of the role casework plays in developing standing in the party, as well as the district. Political ambition is measured by a question asking whether the member will not, may, or certainly will pursue a more important political position in the future.

*Hypothesis C<sub>9</sub>: Members who have greater political ambition will devote more time, on average, to casework.*

**Previous mandates.** Members who have served a previous mandate should also have more established networks for casework provision and, therefore, may be more likely to devote more time to it.

*Hypothesis C<sub>10</sub>: Members who have served a previous mandate will devote more time, on average, to casework.*

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<sup>337</sup> 1946, 589-91.

**Developmental level of district.** Developmental level of the district is an important control and may also explain variation in time devoted to casework. In Algeria, developmental level is measured as a proportion of households with toilets linked to a sewage system, and is measured in Morocco as the number of hospital beds per capita in the region in which the electoral district is located. Rural and less developed districts will lack infrastructure and, thus, members in these districts should devote more time to casework.

*Hypothesis C<sub>11</sub>: Members whose districts are better developed will devote less time, on average, to casework.*

**Institutional variation: District magnitude.** District magnitude is also an important control because of its relationship to incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Members in small districts will have a greater need to develop standing with citizens in order to be placed first on the party list in the next elections where such a list position is most critical to being reelected.

*Hypothesis C<sub>12</sub>: Members in larger districts (higher district magnitude) will devote less time, on average, to casework.*

**Openness of casework operations.** I control for the openness of casework operations, which is proxied by the proportion of casework requests that come from women. Members with more open casework practices will be more likely to devote more time to casework.

*Hypothesis C<sub>13</sub>: Members with more open casework operations will devote more time, on average, to casework.*

**Political competition within districts.** Finally, I control for the average time devoted to casework among members in the same district. Members may work together on casework and may also work together with other branches of government on casework in that district. More responsive members may also create a more competitive environment which encourages other members in that district to improve constituency responsiveness in order to build or maintain popular support. Thus, I hypothesize that mean time devoted to casework among members of one's district will predict the amount of time an individual respondent devotes to casework.

*Hypothesis C<sub>14</sub>: Members in districts with higher average time devoted to casework among other members will devote more time, on average, to casework.*

Further, I control for the proportion of the seats in the district held by members of one's party. Members who are the only member of their party from their district may devote more time to casework in order to mobilize popular support and retain a position as head of the list. This effect may be mitigated by the gains in efficiency attained by members who are elected with other members of their party and, thus, can work together on the resolution of casework.

*Hypothesis C<sub>15</sub>: Members in districts with a larger proportion of members from their party will devote less time, on average, to casework.*

### **Bi-Variate Relationships**

Bi-variate distributions suggest that Moroccan members who have spoken in committee are also more likely to devote a higher proportion of their week to casework than those who have not spoken in debate (See Table IV. 8.). In Algeria, the relationship is opposite: those who have spoken in committee are more likely to devote a lower proportion of their week to casework. These differences are not statistically significant in two-tailed Chi-squared test for independence. However, they suggest that the hypothesized trade-off between legislative and constituency responsive is present in Algeria, but may be different or less strong in Morocco.

**TABLE IV. 8. Percentage of Work Week Devoted to Casework Moroccan and Algerian Members**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Percentage of Week Devoted to Casework:		
25 Percent or Less	24 (26.7%)	28 (32.9%)
26-50 Percent	31 (34.4%)	32 (37.7%)
51-75 Percent	22 (24.4%)	13 (15.3%)
76 Percent or More	13 (14.4%)	12 (14.1%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	90 (2.3)	85 (2.1)
Mean Percentage of Week Devoted to Casework by Legislative Responsiveness:		
Has Spoken in Committee	2.3 (1.0)	2.1 (1.0)
Has Not Spoken in Committee	1.9 (.9)	2.3 (1.2)
<i>Total</i>	87	84
Mean Percentage of Week Devoted to Casework by Party:		
“Moderate” Opposition Parties ( <i>Koutla Bloc</i> )	2.2 (.9)	-
Regime-Created Parties ( <i>Makhzen</i> Parties and RND)	2.4 (1.0) <sup>†</sup>	2.3 (1.2)
Majority Parties (MP and FLN)	2.6 (1.2)	2.2 (1.1)
Islamist Party/Parties (“True Opposition”)	1.9 (1.0)	1.8 (.9)
Small Groups/Parties (21 or fewer seats)	2.6 (1.0) <sup>†</sup>	2.4 (1.0)
<i>Total</i>	89	81

Question: What percentage of your work week as a deputy do you devote to solving citizens’ personal requests?

<sup>†</sup>  $p < .10$  \*  $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$  two-tailed test Chi<sup>2</sup> test.

Bivariate distributions also suggest that Islamist deputies devote least time to casework than all other parties in both countries. In itself, this is important evidence given conventional wisdom that Islamist parties gain popularity through service provision. Although the Chi-squared tests of independence do not compare levels of time devoted to casework between non-opposition parties, the levels of time devoted to casework is closer among non-opposition parties in Algeria, even though I hypothesized that values on the dependent variable would be closer among non-opposition parties in Morocco. Multivariate modeling will provide more convincing evidence of the nature of the relationship between these variables.

### Multivariate Results

Ordered logit is used to test the effect of the independent variables on time devoted to casework. All variables are standardized with values from 0 to 1 (See Tables IV. 9. and IV. 10.).

The results suggest that, as hypothesized, Moroccan members who have debated a law in committee are more likely to devote a higher proportion of their week to casework.<sup>338</sup> Algerian members who have debated a law, however, are less likely to devote time to casework. In Algeria, when all other variables are held at their means, members who have debated a law in committee are 19 percent more likely than those who have not to be in the second casework category (25-50 percent of their week devoted to casework); members who have debated a law in committee are 25 percent less likely than those who have not to be in the third category (51-75 percent); and members who have debated a law in committee are 15 percent less likely than those who have not to be in the third casework category (76-100 percent). In Morocco, the relationship is reversed. Members who have debated a law in committee are 9 percent less likely than are those who have never debated a law to be in the second casework category (25-50 percent); members who have debated a law in committee are 25 percent less likely than are those who have never debated a law to be in the third casework category (51-75 percent); members who have debated a law in committee are 9 percent more likely than those who have not to be in the third casework category (76-100 percent). These results suggest that members who are more active in parliamentary debate will be less likely to provide casework in Algeria, but more likely to provide casework in Morocco.

What other factors are important for explaining why some members devote little time to casework while others devote considerable time? Within-country effects tend to be similar in the two countries although not all of the same variables are statistically significant. Having a service role orientation is associated with more time devoted to casework in both countries, although the effect in Algeria is significant only at the  $p < .10$  level. The same is true of more open casework operations which also predict greater time devoted to casework, but fails to meet the  $p < .05$  level in Algeria. Finally, higher average time devoted to casework among members in one's district also predicts greater time devoted to casework at the individual level in both countries.

A few other differences in within-country effects also emerge. In Algeria, greater political ambition and the higher mean level of time devoted to casework in one's district significantly predicts greater time devoted to casework. This effect is not significant in Morocco. One might argue that provision of casework—or the establishment of patron-client relationships—is particularly important as a political strategy in Algeria.

All of the hypothesized relationships concerning the effect of party membership on time devoted to casework fail to be supported by the data. In Algeria, neither membership in the

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<sup>338</sup> In neither case does time devoted to casework predict whether a deputy has spoken in committee; this suggests that endogeneity is not biasing the results.

opposition or non-opposition, nor the structure of non-opposition have any explanatory power. In Morocco, parliamentary group membership does make some difference, though not as hypothesized. In the full model, members of the largest parliamentary group (MP) are more likely to devote more time to casework, but not at less than the  $p < .05$  level. This seems contrary to the expectation that monarchs prefer parties at parity with one another and, therefore, may not give advantages to any one party. However, it may be incorrect to assume that the preferences of power-holders can lead to such an exact relationship with political outcome. Further, the majority party may have greater ministerial portfolios and, therefore, be most efficient at solving casework requests. Wald tests reveal that the effect of parliamentary group membership on time devoted to casework differs between the majority party (MP) and the opposition (PJD). This difference is also close to statistical significance for the PJD and small parties, as well as for the koutla (moderate opposition) and the PJD. These results suggest that parliamentary group is important in Morocco, but that it is the opposition that is different from other parties in terms of time devoted to casework; in this case, the PJD spends less time on this representative function than members of other groups.

**TABLE IV. 9. Determinants of Time Devoted to Casework (Service Responsiveness) in Algeria**

Model Estimated	Ordered Logit Coefficients (1 <25%; 4 >75%)	Marginal Effects <sup>1</sup> (Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome)		
		2	3	4
Islamist party (MSP and Islah)	-.19 (.95)	-.00 (.02)	-.02 (.10)	-.01 (.03)
Majority party (FLN)	.58 (1.16)	-.01 (.04)	.07 (.14)	.02 (.05)
Small party	.11 (1.09)	-.00 (.01)	.01 (.13)	.00 (.04)
Higher developmental level of district	-1.12 (3.10)	-.00 (.06)	-.13 (.35)	-.04 (.12)
Previous term in Parliament	-.41 (.91)	-.01 (.06)	-.04 (.09)	-.01 (.03)
Serving citizen most important	2.21 (1.48) <sup>†</sup>	.01 (.12)	.25 (.17) <sup>†</sup>	.08 (.06)
Political ambition	3.32 (.93)***	.01 (.17)	.38 (.13)**	.13 (.06)*
Higher district magnitude	-.13 (1.61)	-.00 (.01)	-.02 (.18)	-.01 (.06)
Higher proportion of same party in district	-.21 (2.33)	-.00 (.01)	-.02 (.26)	-.01 (.09)
More open casework operation	1.60 (1.01) <sup>†</sup>	-.01 (.08)	.18 (.12) <sup>†</sup>	.06 (.04)
Higher casework deputies in district	12.39 (2.60)***	.05 (.65)	1.40 (.48)**	.47 (.20)*
Has debated law in committee	-2.02 (.73)**	.19 (.14)	-.26 (.10)*	-.15 (.10) <sup>†</sup>
Weight	-.64 (.93)	-.00 (.03)	-.07 (.11)	-.02 (.04)
N	68			
LR Chi <sup>2</sup> / Prob. > Chi <sup>2</sup>	57.55/.0000***			
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> / Log Likelihood	.3209/-60.899			
<b>Wald Test of Linear Hypotheses</b>				
H <sub>0</sub> : β <sub>Islam</sub> - β <sub>FLN</sub> =0	.48 (.4870)			
H <sub>0</sub> : β <sub>Islam</sub> - β <sub>Small</sub> =0	.12 (.7301)			
H <sub>0</sub> : β <sub>FLN</sub> - β <sub>Small</sub> =0	.12 (.7312)			

<sup>†</sup>  $p < .10$  \*  $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$  two-tailed test; Standard errors are in parentheses; <sup>1</sup>  $\partial y / \partial x$  for variable means, change of dummy variables from 0 to 1.

**TABLE IV. 10. Determinants of Time Devoted to Casework (Service Responsiveness) in Morocco**

Model Estimated	Ordered Logit Coefficients (1 <25%; 4 >75%)	Marginal Effects <sup>1</sup> (Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome)		
		2	3	4
Koutla party	.62 (.82)	-.07 (.11)	.09 (.12)	.05 (.07)
Majority party (MP)	1.68 (.96) <sup>†</sup>	-.26 (.16) <sup>†</sup>	.20 (.07)**	.20 (.16)
Islamist party (PJD)	-.83 (1.04)	.05 (.04)	-.12 (.14)	-.05 (.05)
Small party	1.07 (.91)	-.15 (.14)	.15 (.12)	.10 (.11)
Higher developmental level of district	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)
Previous term in Parliament	-.20 (.49)	.02 (.05)	-.03 (.08)	-.01 (.04)
Serving citizen most important	2.84 (1.41)*	-.30 (.19) <sup>†</sup>	.44 (.24) <sup>†</sup>	.21 (.11) <sup>†</sup>
Political ambition	-.35 (.67)	.04 (.07)	-.05 (.10)	-.03 (.05)
Higher district magnitude	-2.14 (2.06)	.23 (.24)	-.33 (.32)	-.16 (.16)
Higher proportion of same party in district	1.07 (3.00)	-.11 (.32)	.17 (.46)	.08 (.22)
More open casework operation	3.39 (1.07)**	-.36 (.18)*	.52 (.20)**	.25 (.10)*
Higher casework deputies in district	8.79 (2.14)***	-.94 (.43)*	1.35 (.42)***	.64 (.23)**
Has debated law in committee	2.19 (.87)*	.09 (.15)	.25 (.07)***	.09 (.03)**
Weight	-.58 (2.75)	.06 (.30)	-.09 (.42)	-.04 (.20)
N	79			
LR Chi <sup>2</sup> / Prob. > Chi <sup>2</sup>	48.78/.0000***			
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> / Log Likelihood	.2296/-81.831			
<b>Wald Test of Linear Hypotheses</b>				
H <sub>0</sub> : β <sub>MP</sub> - β <sub>Islam</sub> =0	5.56 (.0175)*			
H <sub>0</sub> : β <sub>MP</sub> - β <sub>Small</sub> =0	.44 (.5064)			
H <sub>0</sub> : β <sub>Islam</sub> - β <sub>Small</sub> =0	3.24 (.0717) <sup>†</sup>			
H <sub>0</sub> : β <sub>Koutla</sub> - β <sub>MP</sub> =0	2.34 (.1264)			
H <sub>0</sub> : β <sub>Koutla</sub> - β <sub>Sislam</sub> =0	2.66 (.1026) <sup>†</sup>			
H <sub>0</sub> : β <sub>Koutla</sub> - β <sub>Small</sub> =0	.32 (.5736)			

<sup>†</sup>  $p < .10$  \*  $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$  two-tailed test; Standard errors are in parentheses; <sup>1</sup>  $\partial y / \partial x$  for variable means, change of dummy variables from 0 to 1.


## Discussion and Conclusions

These results suggest that the structure of incentives to provide different combinations of representative goods differs by regime type according to the preferences of incumbents. Members in Algeria, a former one-party state, where a single dominant party is preferred by incumbents, face a trade-off between policy responsiveness and obtaining resources to the provision of casework. In Morocco, a case of monarchy, where a large number of factionalized parties and a high level of debate is preferred by incumbents, members do not face this trade-off. This does not mean, as interview evidence from Morocco shows, that Moroccan members cannot face this trade-off (i.e. that the budget line is still sloped downward) at particular points on the budget line. Rather, it means that at least for the range contestation we observe, which is generally within the limits set for the parliament, Moroccan members do not face this trade-off. Rather, the direction of the relationship between these two activities appears to be opposite, suggesting that at least some form of participation in debate is encouraged, or at least not discouraged, with the removal of casework opportunities. Interview evidence from Morocco is clear: contestation outside of the established boundaries of politics is punished. I encountered several claims of this in different political parties. For this reason, we know that there is some point  $P_m$  at which increasing contestation leads to removal of patronage networks for the provision of casework. Some of the cited members could still provide services through associations, while others said they had ceased provision altogether.

However, as noted, the relationship between participation in debate and provision of casework in Morocco is negative, demonstrating that at certain points on the curve, legislative and constituency responsiveness are complements, not substitutes. In other words, unlike in Algeria, participation in parliamentary debate (e.g. commissions, plenary sessions, etc.) may be rewarded by access to patronage networks for resolving requests. This result makes sense, given what we know about the preferences of monarchs for lively parliamentary debate and the concomitant effects of these preferences on electoral rules, the party system, and, as I have shown, parliamentary institutions. Given the results, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the budget line in Algeria,  $l_a$  is sloped downward. However, the evidence from Morocco suggests that the budget link,  $l_m$ , is kinked; sloped upward for some range of values of  $P_m$  and  $Q_m$ . Thus, I propose the following revision to the budget model (See Figure IV. 4.).

**FIGURE IV. 4. Dynamics of Cooptation and Optimization of Popular Support in the Morocco and Algerian Legislatures**

“Policy”  
Responsiveness  
(Units of Policy  
Contestation)



“Constituency” Responsiveness  
(Units of Casework and District Projects)

Further research might test this model in other cases of monarchies and former one-party systems to determine whether the results in Morocco and Algeria generalize to broader classes of authoritarian regimes. Further attention might be turned to adding complexity to the model by considering different budget lines for opposition and non-opposition groups.

## CHAPTER V

### Members as Links

#### Introduction

Following Duverger, Cox, and Riker, Pippa Norris notes that electoral systems have “mechanical” effects on institutional arrangements and political outcomes, for example, by affecting the structure of party competition or the proportionality of seats to votes, among other outcomes.<sup>339</sup> Norris also argues that institutions have “psychological effects” on the attitudes and behavior of members, and, on the quality of representation and accountability in the political system. In other words, institutions, via the representative link, affect ordinary citizens and likely shape their politically-relevant views.

#### The Puzzles

John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart argue that the closed-list proportional representation system in one round, such as the electoral system in Morocco and Algeria, engenders the weakest incentives among possible seat allocation formulas, *ceteris paribus*, to promote personal reputation.<sup>340</sup> The strength of these incentives is expected to decline as district magnitude increases.

Further, Norris suggests that the interaction between centralized party candidate selection and party allots, like those existing in Morocco and Algeria, should yield cohesive and disciplined parliamentary parties, party voting, and, of particular importance for this chapter, programmatic, rather than particularistic benefits.<sup>341</sup> Most empirical work examines the United

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<sup>339</sup> The distinction between mechanical and psychological effects was first identified by Duverger and later used by Riker and Cox. I am grateful to Ken Kollman for identifying this. Norris, *Electoral Engineering Voting Rules and Political Behavior*.

<sup>340</sup> John M. and Matthew Shugart Carey, "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas," *Electoral Studies* 14, no. 4 (1995).

<sup>341</sup> Norris, *Electoral Engineering Voting Rules and Political Behavior*.

States, Britain, and Australia, where first-past-the-post plurality rules in single member districts are associated with the observed increase in constituency attention over the past fifty years.<sup>342</sup> Caseloads grew dramatically in Britain from nearly nothing in 1950 to approximately 33 hours per week (constituency work) in 2001.<sup>343</sup> Given the evidence in the comparative literature on constituency service (stopped here), we should expect the electoral system in Morocco and Algeria “to encourage politicians to offer programmatic benefits, focused on the collective record and program of their party, and to strengthen cohesive and disciplined parliamentary parties” rather than casework.<sup>344</sup>

### *Member Perceptions of Incentives to Cultivate a Personal or Party Reputation*

The survey asked members to rank their perception of the importance of building a party or personal reputation as a strategy for gaining reelection. Five response categories were given:

- (1) Party only;
- (2) Party and personal image, with emphasis on party;
- (3) Party and personal image equally;
- (4) Personal and party image, with emphasis on personal image
- (5) Personal image only (See Table V. 1.).

Although, admittedly, we lack a baseline for authoritarian settings like Morocco and Algeria, these data appear puzzling. The mean response is about the same in the two countries, or about “both party and personal image equally” (“3”). There is variation among respondents in both countries, with at least a few deputies selecting each category. Given the closed-list PR-system, we expect very low incentives to cultivate a personal reputation, or for the distribution to be heavily skewed toward “party only” (“1”). Yet the results do not conform to these expectations expressed by Carey and Shugart and advanced in the literature.<sup>345</sup>

Why do Moroccan and Algerian members tend, on average, to feel that both party and personal reputation are important for reelection? What do we learn about legislative politics from the individual-level determinants of these perceptions? More specially, does variation in district magnitude play a role in explaining variation in perceptions?

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<sup>342</sup> Brian J. Gaines, "The Impersonal Vote? Constituency Service and Incumbency Advantage in British Elections, 1950-92," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (1998), Norris, *Electoral Engineering Voting Rules and Political Behavior*, Donley T. Studlar and Ian McAllister, "Constituency Activity and Representational Role among Australian Legislators," *Journal of Politics* 58, no. 1 (1996).

<sup>343</sup> Norris, *Electoral Engineering Voting Rules and Political Behavior*: 235.

<sup>344</sup> *Ibid.*: 232.

<sup>345</sup> Carey, "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas."

*Member Caseloads*

Second, the member survey asked respondents to estimate the number of casework requests they receive in an average month (See Table V. 1.). Yet caseloads (“service” responsiveness) seem high in relation to conventional wisdom. Moroccan deputies handle 98 requests per month, on average, while Algerian members handle 44 requests, on average. Caseload varies from 0 to 1600 in Morocco and from 0 to 210 in Algeria.<sup>346</sup>

Since electoral competition is limited in these settings, one might ask why members go to their districts to help constituents with requests at all? Given the electoral institutions, why do members of parliament provide constituency service? What explains variation in caseload? Can district magnitude or any other institutional features account for this variation?

**TABLE V. 1. Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote and Strategies among Moroccan and Algerian Members**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Perceived Incentives to Build Personal Reputation:		
Build a Strong Party Image (1)	9 (10.0%)	10 (11.9%)
Build Both, Strong Party Image Emphasis	19 (21.1%)	22 (26.2%)
Build both Equally	36 (40.0%)	26 (31.0%)
Build Both, Personal Image Emphasis	20 (22.2%)	11 (13.1%)
Build a Strong Personal Image (5)	6 (6.7%)	15 (17.9%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	90 (2.9)	84 (3.0)
Caseload (“Service Responsiveness”):		
Number of Requests per Month (Range in Sample)	0 to 1600	0 to 210
Mean Number of Requests per Month	97.8 (215.1)	44.3 (41.1)
<i>Total</i>	85	70

Questions: What is the most effective strategy for reelection? (1) Build a Strong Party Image, etc.

<sup>346</sup> Members do not have professional staff other than the small number of individuals who work in the parliamentary group offices, any staff who may assist them in party offices, or a small number of individuals they may employ on a party or full-time basis. Moroccan members in the sample employ between zero and nine part or full-time staff members, or about 1.1, on average. Algerian members employ between zero and seven part of full-time staff members, or about .7, on average. Yet, deputies may have high caseloads.

## *Islamist Deputies*

There is a further puzzle. Conventional wisdom in Middle East politics literature, based mainly on Eastern cases with weak state structures (e.g. Palestine, Jordan, etc.), suggests that Islamist parties gain popularity through the provision of social services. By extension, one might expect that Islamist deputies provide higher caseloads on average, and, thus, may also perceive a higher incentive to cultivate a personal reputation.

Looking comparatively at candidate-selection procedures in developed democracies, Gideon Rahat makes a similar prediction about incentives to cultivate a personal reputation in cases of more inclusive party list selectorates.<sup>347</sup> The selectorate is a group of individuals whose preferences come to bear on the selection and order of the candidates because the political system, either formally or informally, gives them power in this decision. Rahat suggests that candidate selection procedures, which often vary both across countries as well as across parties within countries, fall on a continuum of inclusivity and exclusivity. In his formulation, inclusive procedures encourage politics of personality and lead to low levels of party cohesion. The selectorate in most parties in Morocco and Algeria is highly exclusive and, thus, should not be associated with high levels of incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Further, according to interview evidence, the selectorate in Islamist parties is more inclusive than that of other parties because it takes into account votes of party militants at the local and regional levels. Thus, by Rahat's logic, Islamist deputies should perceive greater incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and have higher average caseloads than should members of other parties. This prediction falls along the same lines as conventional wisdom in the literature on Islamist parties, as noted.

Yet we observe the opposite pattern (See Table V. 2.). Moroccan Islamists are markedly more oriented toward party reputation than are members of all other parliamentary group categories ( $p < .001$ ). The effect is also statistically significant for Algerian Islamist deputies ( $p < .05$ ). Further, although the difference is not statistically significant, Islamists do not have higher caseloads, on average, than members of other parties and groups. If conventional notions of social service provision in the Middle East politics literature, or conventional wisdom about the effect a less centralized selectorate do not hold in the Moroccan and Algerian cases, what then explains these counter-intuitive results?

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<sup>347</sup> Rahat, "Candidate Selection: The Choice before the Choice."

**TABLE V. 2. Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Reputation and Caseloads among Moroccan and Algerian Parties and Groups**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Mean Incentive: <sup>a</sup>		
“Moderate” Opposition Parties ( <i>Koutla</i> Bloc)	3.2 (.9)	N/a
Regime-Created Parties ( <i>Makhzen</i> Parties and RND)	3.1 (.8)	3.1 (1.2)
Majority Parties (MP and FLN)	3.1 (1.3)	2.8 (1.1)
Islamist Party/Parties (“True Opposition”)	1.6 (.8)***	2.5 (1.0)*
Small Groups/Parties (21 or fewer seats)	3.1 (.7)	4.3 (1.3)***
Mean Caseload:		
“Moderate” Opposition Parties ( <i>Koutla</i> Bloc)	64.0 (122.3)	N/a
Regime-Created Parties ( <i>Makhzen</i> Parties and RND)	293.0 (640.4)	39.8 (36.9)
Majority Parties (MP and FLN)	89.3 (83.7)	33.9 (22.8)
Islamist Party/Parties (“True Opposition”)	126.0 (256.4)	39.1 (33.6)
Small Groups/Parties (21 or fewer seats)	156.1 (371.0)	80.5 (66.4)

<sup>a</sup> 1=Party Only; 5=Personal Only.

<sup>†</sup>  $p < .10$  \*  $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$  two-tailed Chi<sup>2</sup> test

### The Argument

Following the literature on issue moderation discussed in Chapter 4, I argue that an institutional opening in the Moroccan case explains why Islamist deputies there perceive greater incentives to cultivate a party reputation compared with those of other Moroccan members. This effect remains statistically significant in multivariate analysis in Morocco, but not in Algeria. To account for this difference, I argue that liberalization alone may not be sufficient to create differences in reelection strategy (e.g. party or personally-oriented strategies). Rather, the combination of liberalization, which I argue is a necessary condition, and the higher level of debate encouraged in the Moroccan parliament, which I argue is a sufficient condition, creates a distinctive institutional opening which explains why PJD deputies tend to be more party-oriented and focused on programmatic benefits than other deputies. In other words, the opportunity and incentives to engage in a higher level of debate in parliament under a monarchical system encourage and allow disciplined parties which develop programmatic rather than solely particularistic strategies. For this reason, although PJD deputies do not provide less casework, on average, they do not provide more than other parties, as conventional wisdom suggests of Islamist parties.

## Chapter Overview

In this chapter, I examine whether institutions have “mechanical” and “psychological” effects on the type, level, and determinants of “service” responsiveness among Moroccan and Algerian members (Level II), and whether they establish a representative link at the level of the district (Link II).


### *Level II: How Institutions Create Incentives and Shape Member Casework Practices*

First, in an analysis corresponding to Level II in the conceptual map, I investigate on how opportunities and constraints created by institutions affect two related outcome variables: members’ perceptions of incentives to cultivate a personal reputation, and their provision of casework (See Figure V. 1.). I focus on “service” responsiveness because of its accessibility to all or most deputies, regardless of their political party or professional background, wishing to build political support. I test the effects of both institutional and noninstitutional variables on perceptions of incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and caseload.

### *Link II: How Member Behavior Shapes the Representative Link*

Second, in an analysis corresponding to Link II in the framework, I test whether a district-level link between member caseload and level of citizen contact with deputies exists at the level of the district. I examine whether a correlation emerges at the district-level in average caseloads (i.e. member data) and the proportion of constituents who recognize the name of a deputy and have contacted him or her (i.e. constituent data). In doing so, I begin to investigate whether and how member behavior has implications for the quality of the representative link, which is further analyzed in Chapter 6.

**FIGURE V. 1. A Conceptual Map of Legislative Politics in Multiple Arenas**



**Electoral System: The Party List Selection Procedure and Selectorate**

In closed-list multimember districts, citizens cast a single ballot for a party. The party selectorate ranks the candidates and the elector cannot influence this choice.

## **General Nature of the Party Selectorate**

Interview evidence suggests a highly centralized and generally nontransparent list selection procedure for all significant parties holding seats in the 2002-2007 mandates. Parties have a similar organizational structure in both countries; the party selectorate consists of the members of the national bureau of the party. Parties vary to the extent that local party members influence the choice of the selectorate. Under electoral authoritarianism, incumbent elites (e.g. Ministry of the Interior) can influence party lists and, thus, are part of the party list selectorate.

## **Islamist Party Selectorates**

A marked trend in improved consideration of party militant preferences in party list selection procedures emerged among Islamist parties in both Morocco and Algeria. In preparing for the 2007 elections, both the Moroccan PJD and the Algerian MSP were incorporating a procedure of voting among ordinary party adherents in the selection of candidates for electoral lists. Although party militants were set to vote for their candidate choices, it was clear that the final selection and classing of candidates remained the choice of the party bureau. Thus, Islamist parties in both countries are making modest gains in “democratizing” party list selection procedures, according the right to vote for candidates to party militants. Further, the PJD is the only party in which deputies consistently said that they did not have a choice about whether to present their candidacy a second (or third) time; rather, this is up to the party. We can test whether this difference in selection procedure (i.e. a less centralized selectorate), which I want to emphasize is modest, impacts perceptions of incentives to cultivate a personal vote and caseload in the expected direction.

## **Incumbent Elites and Party List Selection**

Under electoral authoritarianism, regime incumbents also wield control over electoral structuring, and influence party lists in ways which make them effectively part of the selectorate. Claims of this type of interference were made during interviews only in Algeria, but there are almost certainly subtle ways in which officials can influence party lists in Morocco as well. Opposition members in Algeria claim that Ministry of Interior officials sometimes preclude independent lists from elections by returning rejected lists with stipulations (e.g. more signatures

needed), and by giving the list members only a few days before the deadline to make changes.<sup>348</sup> Further, an Islamist deputy in Algeria noted that he was moved ten places up the list because the candidates who were selected by the party for the first nine seats did not pass the security interview undertaken by the Ministry of Interior.<sup>349</sup> A small Berber party also claimed that its party list had been approved by the Ministry of Interior, but the order of the names switched.<sup>350</sup>

These actions are, by definition, difficult to observe and to verify beyond claims of interviewees. Regardless, it is reasonable to expect that incumbent elites outside the party selectorate play a role in choosing who candidates will be, even if this role is subtle. Since most list selection takes place behind closed doors, it is impossible to verify that this is not the case. The extent to which regime incumbents are included in the selectorate, and the extent to which the selectorate is centralized and nontransparent is, of course, very significant “because there are ‘safe seats’ in virtually every legislature. In many cases it is the candidate-selection procedure—and not the general election—which determines who will become a member of parliament.”<sup>351</sup> Even if balloting is correctly done on election day, it is possible for voters to be disenfranchised by the “choice before the choice.”<sup>352</sup>

### **A Word on Personal and Party Reputation: Competing or Complimentary Pulls?**

Authoritarian politics and authoritarian institutions are, according to conventional wisdom, “personalized.”<sup>353</sup> Citizens in Morocco and Algeria express an interest in particularistic, not programmatic goods (See Chapter 4, Citizen Preferences); according to interview evidence, constituents seek candidates they “know” and “trust” before voting for a party list. Thus, we expect members in authoritarian settings to be selected for their personal standing in the community and to be engaged in representative activities which provide for their personal image in the district (e.g. casework).

But we know noncompetitive elections to be the outcome of bargaining among incumbent and opposition elites. As such, the preferences and strategies of both party

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<sup>348</sup> Algeria, Member #16, March 2005.

<sup>349</sup> Algeria, Member #17, July 2006.

<sup>350</sup> Algeria, Observer #3, April 2007.

<sup>351</sup> Gideon Rahat, "Candidate Selection: The Choice before the Choice," *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 1 (2007): 139.

<sup>352</sup> Quotation taken from title. Ibid.

<sup>353</sup> Slater, "Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the Personalization of Power in Malaysia."

selectorates and incumbents profoundly influence electoral structuring and, thus, also affect deputies' strategies for reelection.

What does it mean for a Moroccan or Algerian member to cultivate a party reputation as a reelection strategy? What does it mean to cultivate a personal reputation as a reelection strategy? National setting appears to be very important when considering opportunities and constraints faced by members.

### **Why Personal Reputation Matters to Deputies**

The preferences of constituents in Morocco and Algeria suggest that deputies seeking reelection must promote their personal reputation, perhaps through the provision of district projects and casework. Constituents in both Morocco and Algeria rank district projects and casework as the most important and second most-important task of deputies. Members, for their part, complain that citizens do not understand their national lawmaking mandate, and confuse their function with that of a local official. In the words of an Algerian deputy: "It is true that many deputies do not bother to do anything during the mandate, but then the citizens won't shake their hands when they come back to campaign a second time."<sup>354</sup> Citizens look for credible work in the district when considering whether to reelect a candidate.

Further, knowing the identity of candidates on party lists is important to constituents. In discussing the May 2007 election, an Algerian constituent stated that he would not vote because he did not know any of the candidates on the list. Algerian women viewing posters of party lists in their district pointed out which of the candidates they knew. During legislative electoral campaigns in Morocco, friends and party militants talk to all their family, friends, and neighbors to convince them to vote for a particular candidate and party list.

These statements suggest that the personal vote is important to deputies as they campaign for reelection and as they choose representative activities during the mandate. Cain et al. define the personal vote as: "the portion of a candidate's electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record." The part of the vote that is not personal includes support for the candidate based on his or her partisan affiliation; fixed voter characteristics such as class, religion, and ethnicity; reactions to national conditions such as the state of the economy; and performance evaluations centered on the head of the governing party.<sup>355</sup>

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<sup>354</sup> Algeria, Member #2, March 2007.

<sup>355</sup> Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, Morris Fiorina, *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987): 9. I suggest that in the Moroccan and

Conventional wisdom concerning nondemocratic political settings suggests that voters select candidates they know about (e.g. the candidate's family is known) or are connected to by family or other relationships. Survey data and evidence from qualitative interviews confirm the importance of candidates' personal qualities and performance in voting decisions.

In Table V. 3., I have starred four factors which fit within the definition of the personal vote. These include that: (1) the voter knows or is connected to the candidate; (2) the candidate chooses to live in the district; (3) the candidate works hard; and, (4) the candidate has a strong or influential political personality (e.g. in order to get resources for the district). 62.5 percent of respondents in Morocco and 58.8 percent of respondents in Algeria chose one of these four characteristics as the most important factor in their choice of which party list to vote for. Whether the candidate works hard is the most important factor for the largest proportion, or 47.5 percent of Moroccans and 34.2 percent of Algerians. No other factor is most important to more than 10 percent of the Moroccan sample, although the strength of the political personality is also most important for 21.9 percent of the Algerian sample.

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Algerian contexts, ethnicity could be part of the personal vote, but more specifically that family and tribe linkages are important to the personal vote.

**TABLE V. 3. Proportion Selecting Factor as Relevant for Vote Choice among Moroccan and Algerian Constituents**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Percent Selecting as One Important Factor:		
From family or tribe	358 (49.3%)	406 (57.7%)
Endorsed by tribal leader	181 (25.6%)	235 (33.9%)
*Know or connected with	347 (47.5%)	354 (50.1%)
*Lives in state/ <i>willaya</i>	326 (44.8%)	315 (46.4%)
Is religious	360 (53.0%)	315 (46.7%)
*Works hard	664 (91.2%)	615 (84.3%)
Party program	410 (58.2%)	431 (58.3%)
Party questions the government	453 (66.7%)	398 (57.3%)
Party close to the government	213 (31.3%)	220 (32.8%)
*Strong influence or personality	343 (50.0%)	565 (80.0%)
<i>Total</i>	705	700
Percent Selecting as Most Important Factor:		
From family or tribe	63 (9.3%)	101 (15.6%)
Endorsed by tribal leader	11 (1.6%)	10 (1.5%)
*Know or connected with	37 (5.4%)	14 (2.2%)
*Lives in state/ <i>willaya</i>	14 (2.1%)	3 (.5%)
Is religious	40 (5.9%)	40 (6.2%)
*Works hard	323 (47.5%)	222 (34.2%)
Party program	55 (8.1%)	70 (10.8%)
Party questions the government	62 (9.1%)	37 (5.7%)
Party close to the government	7 (1.0%)	6 (.9%)
*Strong influence or personality	51 (7.5%)	142 (21.9%)
<i>Total</i>	680	649

Questions: (1) Please tell me if each of the following are a factor in your decision of which party list to vote for. (a) The candidate is from your family or tribe, etc. (2) Please tell me which of the factors is the most important in your decision of which party list to vote for.

### Why Party Reputation Matters to Deputies

The preferences of party selectorates in Morocco and Algeria suggest that deputies seeking reelection must also promote their party's reputation. However, there is evidence that provision of district projects and casework, because they matter to citizens, are also important from the perspective of the party.

Parties seek a range of qualities among potential candidates. Parties seek candidates who work hard and are well-known, according to interview evidence. For an Islamist deputy in Algeria, the criteria for selection include: "intellectual level, political or management experience, and popularity in the district."<sup>356</sup>

<sup>356</sup> Algeria, Member #19, March 2005.

The family or ethnic background of candidates is also important. In the Mزاب region of Ghardia, which has four seats, the FLN must find Mزاب candidates to fill at least the first two names on the list (in 2002 all four FLN list members were Mزاب) in order to gain the support of tribal leaders. One FLN member recalled that he had been asked to run because of his ethnicity; he reluctantly accepted. In this community, leaders choose a party and the group votes as a block. In a larger district like Bejaia, with twelve seats, the FLN must find a mix of candidates and strategically class them according to their ethnicity (e.g. Berber), family, and area of residence in order to maximize votes from people in the district who would know or have a family or ethnic connection with individuals on the list. In the words of an FLN Deputy from Batna “My tribe is shaoui. The lists have to have shaoui in order to gain election.”<sup>357</sup>

While parties generally select candidates, candidates sometimes select parties. Some members in both Morocco and Algeria said that they had been asked by parties to run on their lists, generally because of the personal and family standing of the candidate in a region. Further, candidates might be attracted to a particular party for various reasons; among them, to gain access to ministers from that party. According to a Moroccan member, “I joined this party because they have several ministers. Ministers from our party will help with requests.”<sup>358</sup> In the words of an Algerian member of the FLN, “it would be better to be a senator; you can do more for your party.”<sup>359</sup> Others simply agree to be classed in a low position on the list in exchange for the help of the candidate who is elected in the unsuccessful candidate’s bid for local election. Further, those who have worked for the party will have a share in the benefits and networks once the party does well and will receive benefits such as seats in parliament, senate seats, ministerial posts, etc.

Party members in different parts of the government can help solve citizen requests; they can manage funds for district projects, they can provide help with personal problems, they can provide government resources for campaign, etc.

Some members claimed that the party looks for individuals who work hard or who belong to particular ethnic groups, but it is also clear that the selection is based on personal connections. In the words of an FLN deputy: “The problem is that party makes the list. There is often conflict between party members. If you have friends high in the party, you can be first, second, or third on the list. If you have a problem with them, you can’t be on the list. I was chosen because of my studies, personality, and tribe.”<sup>360</sup>

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<sup>357</sup> Algeria, Member #18, April 2007.

<sup>358</sup> Morocco, Member #22, May 2007.

<sup>359</sup> Algeria, Member #28, April 2007.

<sup>360</sup> Algeria, Member #18, April 2007.

As these comments demonstrate, neither the personal nor the party image can be neglected by most deputies seeking reelection. They further suggest the importance of the national setting, not merely of institutions, in understanding why members vary in their perceptions of incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and to provide casework.

### **Institutional Hypotheses**

Three institutions, which vary at the subsystem level, may affect perceptions of incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and caseload. These include rules allowing a second public function in local or regional governance, district magnitude, and the exclusivity of the party list electorate.

#### **Formal External Rule: A Second Public Function**

The first institutional difference relates to rules allowing Moroccan deputies to hold a second public function. Article 105 of the Algerian constitution stipulates that the post of deputy may not be held concurrently with any other mandate or function. No such prohibition is found in the Moroccan constitution.

In Morocco, an estimated 40 members (44.9 percent) held a second public function, where I define a second function as being a minister or being a member or president of a local (municipal) or provincial council. Ministers and the heads of municipalities (mayor) and provinces (governors) have contacts and resources, as well as a mandate, to provide resolution of casework request. Individuals in these positions say that there is no formal distinction in their casework as a deputy and as a member of another local, regional, or national office.

I hypothesize that deputies who have a second public function will provide greater levels of casework.

*Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, caseload should be higher among Moroccan deputies who have a second public function than among those who do not.*

#### **Formal Electoral Institution: District Magnitude**

A second source of within-country institutional variation is district magnitude. Districts range from two to five in Morocco, with a national district of thirty women. Districts range from

four to thirty-two in Algeria with eight other members representing overseas districts with one or two seats each.

Carey and Shugart hypothesize that as district magnitude increases, the incentives to foster a personal reputation decline in a closed-list PR-system in one round.<sup>361</sup> Bernhard Wessles finds that among national MPs in Europe and members of the European Parliament in the 15 states, those from districts of smaller magnitude pay greater attention to constituency service.<sup>362</sup> John Curtice and Phil Shively find that citizens in PR systems with multimember districts are less likely to be contacted by members or to have knowledge of the members than those living with single-member district systems.<sup>363</sup>

Thus, I hypothesize that incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and caseload will decrease as district magnitude increases.

*Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, incentives to cultivate a personal vote and caseload will decrease as district magnitude increases.*

## **Islamist Deputies**

Two additional institutional features suggest competing expectations concerning personal reputation-seeking behavior of Islamist deputies.

### *Informal Electoral Institution: Inclusivity of the Selectorate*

On the one hand, their more inclusive party selectorate leads to the expectation that Islamist deputies should have higher incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Further, conventional wisdom about Islamist parties suggests that Islamist deputies should have higher average caseloads than do members of other parties and groups. It follows that Islamist deputies should have greater incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and to provide casework than should deputies from non-Islamist parties.

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<sup>361</sup> Carey, "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas."

<sup>362</sup> Bernhard Wessels, "Whom to Represent? The Role Orientations of Legislators in Europe," in *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

<sup>363</sup> John Curtice and Phil Shively, "Who Represents Us Best? One Member or Many?" (paper presented at the International Political Science Association World Congress, Quebec, 2000).as cited in Norris, *Electoral Engineering Voting Rules and Political Behavior.*: note 8, page 342.

*Hypothesis 3<sub>a</sub>: Ceterus paribus, Islamist deputies should have greater incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and to provide casework than should deputies from non-Islamist parties.*

### *Institutional Opening*

On the other hand, bivariate distributions suggest that Islamist deputies, because of their role in the opposition, have significantly higher incentives to cultivate a party reputation than do members of other parties. The issue moderation literature provides an explanation for why Islamist deputies should have higher incentives to engage in party reputation-seeking behavior.

If these expectations are correct, we should observe not only higher incentives to engage in party reputation-seeking behavior and higher caseloads among Islamist deputies, but also a higher magnitude of the effect in Morocco than in Algeria. The higher level of debate in the Moroccan parliament, resulting from the preferences of monarchs, provides a particularly salient institutional opening by which Islamist deputies will be able to critique the program of non-opposition parties in committee and the House. Thus, they will have a strong incentive to develop its own distinct party platform on a house of issues. In other words, the Moroccan PJD, much more than the Algerian Islamist parties, will have an incentive to provide party *programmatic* benefits to constituents, rather than to rely solely on *particularistic* benefits like casework. I argue that this is because of their role as opposition parties, rather than because they are Islamist parties, *per se*.

*Hypothesis 3<sub>b</sub>: Ceterus paribus, Islamist deputies should have greater incentives to cultivate a party reputation and to provide programmatic benefits rather than casework than should deputies from non-Islamist parties.*

According to anecdotal evidence, this is in fact what we observe. The Moroccan PJD appears to have more detailed literature on their policy positions than do Islamist parties in Algeria. Further, they appear to express positions on television and in the parliament to a greater extent than do their Algerian counterparts who face state-run media focused on the president and *his* program.

Further, Chapter 4 demonstrated that participation in parliamentary debate in Morocco, so long as the boundaries drawn by the monarch are respected, is not a substitute, but rather a complement, for casework. In Algeria, it appears that participation in debate comes at the expense casework provision.

## Non-Institutional Hypotheses

Several other factors may predict variation in perceptions of incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and caseload.

### Political Experience and Ambition

Further, most comparative literature suggests that new members are more likely than their more senior colleagues to provide casework. David M. Wood and Garry Young show, for example, that junior members of parliament in Britain and Ireland are more active in constituencies than those who have previously served terms, and are more likely to cite reelection as a motivation for this.<sup>364</sup>

*Hypothesis 4: Members who have not served a previous term will perceive greater incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and will have higher caseloads.*

It is difficult to hypothesize about the effect of political ambition on personal vote strategy. On the one hand, one would expect those with higher political ambition to work for the party image, since the party selectorate largely influences whether they will be a candidate in the next election. On the other hand, if parties look for candidates with higher standing in their districts, greater political ambition should be expected to have a higher incentive to cultivate a personal vote.

I hypothesized that casework is the only representative activity which is accessible to all members wishing to enhance their popular support in the district. Therefore, I expect that higher political ambition should be related to higher caseloads in both countries.

*Hypothesis 5: Members with higher ambition to pursue a more important political career will perceive greater incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and will have higher caseloads.*

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<sup>364</sup> Garry Young and David M. Wood, "Comparing Constituency Activity by Junior Legislators in Great Britain and Ireland," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22, no. 2 (1997): 217.

## **Independent and Small Party Deputies**

Independent deputies may run in both countries. Independents and those from small parties with fewer than eight percent of the seats in parliament should perceive higher incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and have higher caseloads.

*Hypothesis 6: Ceterus paribus, independent deputies and those from parties with few seats should have greater incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and to provide casework than should deputies from other political parties.*

## **Role Type**

Two role types, the citizen-orientation and the legislative-orientation, emerge in the interview evidence. As a proxy for these orientations I use a question common in comparative studies of representation, "Serving citizens is the most important thing that I do as a deputy."

Donley Studlar and Ian McAllister find that the three role types among Australian legislators predict the degree of focus on constituency affairs.<sup>365</sup> Thus, I hypothesize that those who agree more strongly with this statement will perceive higher incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and to provide casework.

*Hypothesis 7: Ceterus paribus, deputies with a citizen-orientation role type will perceive greater incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and to provide casework than deputies with a legislative-orientation.*

## **Inclusivity of Casework Operations**

Members may vary from one another in terms of the inclusivity or exclusivity of their casework operations. Members with parliamentary offices, and others, may seek to provide casework assistance to members of their constituency broadly. Other members may provide help on an exclusive basis only within personal networks or in cases of particular need.

As a proxy for inclusivity of casework operations, I use the proportion of requests that come from women. The percentage of requests that comes from women is not significantly

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<sup>365</sup> Donley T. Studlar and Ian McAllister, "Constituency Activity and Representational Role among Australian Legislators," *Journal of Politics* 58, no. 1 (1996).

related in either country to party, gender of deputy, or rural district, but is significantly related to the total number of requests received.

*Hypothesis 8: Ceterus paribus, deputies with more open casework operations will have higher caseloads.*

### **Political Competition**

We also expect that political competition among members within particular multimember districts shapes incentives for personal reputation-seeking and caseload. First, I include a measure of the percentage of seats in the district that are held by members of one's own party. Members from districts, in which they are the only member of their party elected, may perceive greater incentives to cultivate a personal vote and to provide casework than those who are one of several members of their party list elected in the district.

*Hypothesis 9: Ceterus paribus, deputies from districts with lower proportions of deputies from their party will perceive higher incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and will have higher caseloads.*

Further, I include a measure of the average caseload among all members from the district. This factor should be statistically significant since it includes the member's own case level in the calculation of the mean. It may also control for district-level conditions of both political competition among members of a district and the efficiency of service provision of government levels and agencies in the district.

*Hypothesis 10: Ceterus paribus, deputies from districts with higher average caseloads among all deputies from that district will perceive higher incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and will have higher caseloads.*

### **Level of District Development**

Finally, I control for the level of development of the district. Interview evidence suggests that demand for casework is higher in rural areas which lack infrastructure relative to urban areas. However, administrative bottlenecks should drive demand for casework in both rural and urban areas. Further, members in rural areas may be more likely to be supported for personal characteristics, such as their being from prominent local families. One Moroccan member stated that the people of his town urged him to run because other members of his family had previously

been members of parliament and he was trusted to “represent the interests of the town’s people to the central government.”<sup>366</sup>

*Hypothesis 11: Ceterus paribus, deputies from districts rural areas will perceive higher incentives to cultivate a personal reputation and will have higher caseloads.*

### **Bivariate Distributions**

Here I list bivariate distributions of the outcome and institutional variables.

#### **Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Reputation**

Bivariate distributions and ANOVA test of independence suggest that the institutional opening hypothesis, rather than expectation based on the exclusivity of the selectorate, explains perceived incentives among Islamist deputies relative to those of other parties. District magnitude is not related to this outcome (See Table V. 4.).

#### *The Islamist Opposition*

Bivariate distributions suggest that Islamist deputies are less likely than deputies from other parties, on average, to perceive incentives to cultivate a personal reputation. In Morocco, Party of Justice and Development deputies in Morocco are most focused on party reputation (1.6), followed by all other parties whose incentives average (3.1-3.2), the center of the distribution. The same bivariate effect applies in Algeria. Deputies of the Movement for Society and Peace and Islah are significantly less likely than those from other parties to perceive an incentive to cultivate a personal vote (2.5). Independents and members of parties with twenty-one or fewer seats (in Algeria only), are significantly more likely to perceive an incentive to cultivate a personal vote than those from other parties.

#### *District Magnitude*

No statistically significant bivariate relationship exists in either country between district magnitude and perceived incentives to cultivate a personal vote.

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<sup>366</sup> Morocco, Member #22, May 2007.

**TABLE V. 4. Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Reputation among Moroccan and Algerian Members**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Mean Strategy by Party:		
“Moderate” Opposition Parties ( <i>Koutla Bloc</i> )	3.2 (.9)	N/a
Regime-Created Parties ( <i>Makhzen</i> Parties and RND)	3.1 (.8)	3.1 (1.2)
Majority Parties (MP and FLN)	3.1 (1.3)	2.8 (1.1)
Islamist Party/Parties (“True Opposition”)	1.6 (.8)***	2.5 (1.0)*
Small Groups/Parties (21 or fewer seats)	3.1 (.7)	4.3 (1.3)***
District Magnitude:		
2	3.2 (1.1)	4 (N/a)
3	3.0 (1.2)	N/a
4	3 (1.0)	3.3 (1.4)
5	2.8 (1.0)	2.0 (0.0)
6	N/a	3.5 (1.2)
7	N/a	3.6 (1.5)
8	N/a	2.6 (1.4)
9	N/a	2.3 (1.5)
10	N/a	3.3 (1.0)
11	N/a	3.0 (1.2)
12	N/a	2.8 (1.7)
16	N/a	2.5 (1.0)
30	2.8 (1.2)	N/a
32	N/a	2.9 (1.4)

†  $p < .10$  \*  $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$  two-tailed Chi<sup>2</sup> test

### Caseload

Other than district magnitude in Algeria, institutional variables are not related to caseload in bivariate tests of independence (See Table V. 5.).

#### *The Islamist Opposition*

Bivariate distributions suggest that there are no statistically significant bivariate relationships between the political parties and parliamentary groups in terms of casework provision.

#### *District Magnitude*

A statistically significant bivariate relationship exists between district magnitude and casework provision in Algeria.

*Public Function*

On average, deputies with a second public function in Morocco have high caseloads, although the bivariate relationship does not yield a statistically significant result. These relationships, however, must be tested in multivariate models to see whether they might be an artifact of some other district or individuals' characteristic. Do these differences hold up to multivariate analysis?

**TABLE V. 5. Caseloads among Moroccan and Algerian Members**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Mean Strategy by Party:		
“Moderate” Opposition Parties ( <i>Koutla Bloc</i> )	64.0 (122.3)	N/a
Regime-Created Parties ( <i>Makhzen</i> Parties and RND)	293.0 (640.4)	39.8 (36.9)
Majority Parties (MP and FLN)	89.3 (83.7)	33.9 (22.8)
Islamist Party/Parties (“True Opposition”)	126.0 (256.4)	39.1 (33.6)
Small Groups/Parties (21 or fewer seats)	156.1 (371.0)	80.5 (66.4)
District Magnitude:		
2	64.0 (83.2)	50 (N/a)**
3	136.4 (334.7)	N/a
4	111.5 (212.1)	42.2 (33.1)**
5	50.9 (58.0)	61.7 (37.5)**
6	N/a	42.3 (49.6)**
7	N/a	30.2 (17.3)**
8	N/a	25.0 (13.2)**
9	N/a	86.7 (65.1)**
10	N/a	50.0 (30.6)**
11	N/a	31.6 (17.5)**
12	N/a	24.8 (3.7)**
14	N/a	30.0 (N/a)**
15	N/a	18.3 (2.9)**
16	N/a	33.8 (27.0)**
30	42.6 (38.9)	N/a
32	N/a	85.0 (81.4)**
Public Function:		
No	63.1 (147.0)	N/a
Yes	145.6 (281.3)	N/a

†  $p < .10$  \*  $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$  two-tailed ANOVA test

## Multivariate Results

Ordered logit and OLS regression are used to estimate the relationship between the independent and outcome variables. All variables are standardized with values from 0 to 1.

### Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Reputation

#### *The Islamist Opposition*

The results of a regression support the institutional opening hypothesis (See Table V. 6.). In Morocco, Islamist deputies are significantly more likely than deputies of other parties and groups to perceive incentives to cultivate a party reputation. This effect suggests that differences in party list selection procedures (e.g. a marginally more inclusive selectorate among Islamist parties) are much less important than the institutional opening of higher debate level in structuring the opportunities and constraints faced by opposition members. This evidence suggests that the higher level of debate encouraged by incumbent elites in Morocco allows the opposition there to be highly disciplined and to develop party-centered programmatic, rather than personal reputation-seeking, particularistic benefits. When all other variables are held at their means, members of the PJD are 29 percent more likely than non-Islamists to be in the second--mostly party image--response category; 45 percent less likely to be in the third category; 24 percent less likely to be in fourth category 4; and six percent less likely than members of other groups to be in the fifth--personal image only--category.

The institutional opening explanation is also supported by the lack of effect of being in the Islamist opposition in Algeria on perceptions of incentives to cultivate a personal or party image. Parliamentary debate over the program of the government is discouraged in Algeria; thus, the same institutional opening for alternative programmatic benefits does not, I argue, exist. In Algeria, incumbent preferences for a single, dominant program of the president and minimal parliamentary debate over its projets de loi do not create the same institutional opening (i.e. opportunities) for the opposition to strategically develop a distinct party platform and to debate other parties on their proposals (See Table V. 7.).

### *District Magnitude*

There is no evidence that district magnitude operates on perceived incentives to cultivate a personal vote in either country.

### *Non-Institutional Factors*

In neither country are parties of the moderate opposition, regime-created parties, or majority parties more or less likely to perceive different levels of incentives to cultivate a personal vote. The effect in the regression is insignificant and the parties are not different from one another in Wald tests.

In Algeria, but not in Morocco, deputies from parties with fewer than eight percent of the seats in the house and independents perceive greater, on average, incentives to cultivate a personal reputation. Why this difference in the two countries? One reason may be that 57 percent of the Algerian deputies classed as “small” in the regression are independents. In Morocco, none of the two or three independents participated in the study; thus, this category in Morocco is populated by deputies from the CD, Alliance, FFD, and GSU groups, rather than by many independents, as in Algeria. Some of these parties are indeed regime-created.

In both countries, the control for the average strategy in the electoral district is statistically significant, as expected. No other factors are important in Algeria. That political ambition is insignificant in both countries suggests that members may feel the pull of multiple arenas—the need to serve citizens and to placate elite (party) interests—simultaneously.

**TABLE V. 6. Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote among Algerian Members of Parliament**

Model Estimated	Ordered Logit Coefficients (1=Party; 5=Individual)	Marginal Effects <sup>1</sup> (Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome)			
		2	3	4	5
Islamist party (MSP and Islah)	.93 (.85)	-.12 (.10)	-.06 (.09)	.10 (.09)	.10 (.11)
Majority party (FLN)	-.07 (1.11)	.01 (.15)	.00 (.03)	-.01 (.11)	-.01 (.10)
Small party	2.21 (1.12)*	-.20 (.07)**	-.26 (.19)	.16 (.07)*	.34 (.25)
Higher developmental level of district	.21 (2.51)	-.03 (.35)	-.01 (.08)	.02 (.26)	.02 (.23)
Previous term in Parliament	.65 (.67)	-.08 (.07)	-.05 (.08)	.07 (.07)	.07 (.09)
Serving citizen most important	1.52 (1.24)	-.21 (.18)	-.05 (.09)	.16 (.14)	.14 (.12)
Political ambition	-.76 (.78)	.11 (.11)	.02 (.05)	-.08 (.08)	-.07 (.07)
Higher district magnitude	.35 (1.69)	-.05 (.23)	-.01 (.06)	.04 (.18)	.03 (.15)
Higher proportion of same party in district	-.99 (2.36)	.14 (.33)	.03 (.09)	-.10 (.25)	-.09 (.21)
Strategy of deputies in district	12.24 (2.60)***	-1.69 (.50)***	-.40 (.63)	1.27 (.46)**	1.10 (.38)**
Weight	.90 (.89)	-.12 (.12)	-.03 (.06)	.09 (.10)	.08 (.08)
N	71				
LR Chi <sup>2</sup> / Prob. > Chi <sup>2</sup>	54.66/.0000***				
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> / Log Likelihood	.2565/-79.2122				
<b>Wald Test of Linear Hypotheses</b>					
H <sub>0</sub> : $\beta_{\text{Islam}} - \beta_{\text{FLN}} = 0$	.96 (.33)				
H <sub>0</sub> : $\beta_{\text{Islam}} - \beta_{\text{Small}} = 0$	1.31 (.25)				
H <sub>0</sub> : $\beta_{\text{FLN}} - \beta_{\text{Small}} = 0$	2.34 (.13)				

<sup>†</sup>  $p < .10$  \*  $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$  two-tailed test; Standard errors are in parentheses; <sup>1</sup>  $\partial y / \partial x$  for variable means, change of dummy variables from 0 to 1.

**TABLE V. 7. Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote among Moroccan Members of Parliament**

Model Estimated	Ordered Logit Coefficients (1=Party; 5=Individual)	Marginal Effects <sup>1</sup> (Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome)			
		2	3	4	5
Koutla (“Moderate Opposition”)	-.35 (.71)	.05 (.11)	-.01 (.04)	-.04 (.08)	-.01 (.02)
Majority party (MP)	-1.07 (.91)	.18 (.16)	-.10 (.14)	-.11 (.07)	-.03 (.02)
Islamist party (PJD)	-3.90 (1.08)***	.29 (.14)*	-.45 (.10)***	-.24 (.06)***	-.06 (.03)*
Small party	.11 (.82)	-.02 (.12)	.00 (.02)	.01 (.10)	.00 (.03)
Higher developmental level of district	.00 (.00)*	-.00 (.00)*	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)*	.00 (.00) <sup>†</sup>
Previous term in Parliament	-.26 (.46)	.04 (.07)	-.01 (.02)	-.03 (.06)	-.01 (.01)
Serving citizen most important	-.26 (1.25)	.04 (.19)	-.01 (.04)	-.03 (.15)	-.01 (.04)
Political ambition	-.22 (.59)	.03 (.09)	-.01 (.02)	-.03 (.07)	-.01 (.02)
Higher district magnitude	1.68 (1.83)	-.26 (.28)	.05 (.09)	.21 (.23)	.05 (.06)
Higher proportion of same party in district	-1.43 (2.83)	.22 (.43)	-.04 (.11)	-.17 (.35)	-.04 (.09)
Strategy of deputies in district	5.27 (2.28)*	-.80 (.37)*	.16 (.24)	.65 (.30)*	.17 (.10) <sup>†</sup>
Weight	4.02 (2.65)	-.61 (.42)	.12 (.20)	.49 (.33)	.13 (.10)
N	83				
LR Chi <sup>2</sup> / Prob. > Chi <sup>2</sup>	51.18 / .0000***				
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> / Log Likelihood	.2148 / -93.5642				
<b>Wald Test of Linear Hypotheses</b>					
H <sub>0</sub> : β <sub>MP</sub> - β <sub>Islam</sub> =0	7.31 (.01)**				
H <sub>0</sub> : β <sub>MP</sub> - β <sub>Small</sub> =0	1.63 (.20)				
H <sub>0</sub> : β <sub>Islam</sub> - β <sub>Small</sub> =0	13.44 (.00)***				
H <sub>0</sub> : β <sub>Koutla</sub> - β <sub>MP</sub> =0	1.05 (.30)				
H <sub>0</sub> : β <sub>Koutla</sub> - β <sub>Sislam</sub> =0	14.42 (.00)***				
H <sub>0</sub> : β <sub>Koutla</sub> - β <sub>Small</sub> =0	.39 (.53)				

<sup>†</sup>  $p < .10$  \*  $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$  two-tailed test; Standard errors are in parentheses; <sup>1</sup>  $\partial y / \partial x$  for variable means, change of dummy variables from 0 to 1.

## **Caseload**

Do similar effects operate on caseload? Theory suggests that the two should be closely related.

### *The Islamist Opposition*

Although deputies of the PJD are more likely to perceive incentives to cultivate a party reputation, they are not more likely to provide lower caseloads. Party or parliamentary group fails to explain any variation in Morocco (See Table V. 8.).

This is not highly unsurprising. While members of the PJD are not less likely, on average, to provide casework, they are also not more likely. 52.0 percent of PJD members compared with 32.3 percent of deputies from other parties rank lawmaking as their most time-consuming task ( $p < .10$ ). This relationship is not statistically significant in Algeria. In fact, the relationship is opposite: 38.7 percent of Islamist deputies in Algeria rank lawmaking as their most time-consuming task compared with 46.0 percent of deputies from other parties.

In Algeria, independents and members of small party have significantly higher caseloads than those deputies from other parties. Not only do these individuals have a greater incentive to cultivate a personal vote, but they are less likely to work on policy matters.

### *District Magnitude*

There is no evidence that district magnitude operates on caseloads in either country.

### *Public Function*

The lack of distinction between the parliament and other levels and branches of government in Morocco is tremendously important with respect to the provision of casework. Deputies who serve simultaneously as a minister or as a member or the head of a local or regional council (e.g. mayor or wally) receive 33 more case requests in an average month.

### *Non-Institutional Variables*

Political ambition appears to have a significant positive effect on caseloads in Algeria. Those deputies who hope to have a more important political career in the future receive about 32 more requests per month.

In Morocco, variation in caseload is explained by more open case operations. Deputies who receive more than 70 percent of requests from women receive, on average, 61 more requests per month than those who receive less than 10 percent of their requests from women.

**TABLE V. 8. Caseload among Moroccan and Algerian Members of Parliament**

Model Estimated	Morocco OLS Coefficients	Algeria OLS Coefficients
Koutla (“Moderate Opposition”)	-2.36 (22.97)	-
Islamist party (PJD)/(MSP and Islah)	37.23 (29.86)	9.00 (16.19)
Majority party (MP)/(FLN)	29.54 (25.03)	12.84 (21.38)
Small party	36.91 (24.61)	46.15 (19.48)*
Higher developmental level of district	.01 (.01)	-.81 (48.40)
Previous term in Parliament	2.64 (13.76)	5.76 (14.55)
Serving citizen most important	9.90 (37.15)	-34.67 (22.37)
Political ambition	1.82 (20.67)	31.96 (15.19)*
Higher district magnitude	-20.95 (59.16)	10.52 (29.38)
Higher proportion of same party in district	49.41 (89.61)	-51.10 (42.94)
More open casework operations	61.47 (29.78)*	29.78 (19.03)
Second public function	33.37 (16.62)*	-
Average caseload in district	91.85 (31.10)**	.75 (.23)**
Weight	35.32 (76.98)	7.00 (20.19)
N	75	59
F / Prob. > F	2.18 / .0192*	4.35 / .0001***
R <sup>2</sup>	.3371	.5314
<b>Wald Test of Linear Hypotheses</b>		
H <sub>0</sub> : $\beta_{Islam} - \beta_{FLN} = 0$	-	.03 (.86)
H <sub>0</sub> : $\beta_{Islam} - \beta_{Small} = 0$	-	5.62 (.02)*
H <sub>0</sub> : $\beta_{FLN} - \beta_{Small} = 0$	-	1.42 (.24)
H <sub>0</sub> : $\beta_{MP} - \beta_{Islam} = 0$	.07 (.7862)	-
H <sub>0</sub> : $\beta_{MP} - \beta_{Small} = 0$	.08 (.7819)	-
H <sub>0</sub> : $\beta_{Islam} - \beta_{Small} = 0$	.00 (.9919)	-
H <sub>0</sub> : $\beta_{Koutla} - \beta_{MP} = 0$	2.60 (.1121) <sup>†</sup>	-
H <sub>0</sub> : $\beta_{Koutla} - \beta_{Sislam} = 0$	2.59 (.1127) <sup>†</sup>	-
H <sub>0</sub> : $\beta_{Koutla} - \beta_{Small} = 0$	2.69 (.1061) <sup>†</sup>	-

<sup>†</sup>  $p < .10$  \*  $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$  two-tailed test; Standard errors are in parentheses.

## Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter opened with several puzzles. First, given expectations concerning closed-list PR systems, why do Moroccan and Algerian members tend, on average, to feel that both party and personal reputation are important for reelection? Second, given the electoral system and the fact that elections are not perfectly competitive, why do members go to their districts and provide constituency service? Finally, why do opposition deputies, in this case Islamists, whose party selectorates are more inclusive than those of other parties, appear to be more party-oriented than deputies from other parties?

I have argued that both national settings as well as institutions are important determinants of the incentives deputies perceive and the personal and party reputation-seeking behavior they pursue. Although party selectorates—along with incumbents who are effectively also members of selectorates under electoral authoritarianism—powerfully shape the outcome of elections, they have preferences for members who are active in their districts, helping to understand why deputies tend to place an emphasis on the provision of particularistic goods. The second arena—that of constituents—also requires the reelection-seeking deputy to be present in the district and to provide help with individual and community problems. Thus, we should be unsurprised that casework is important in Morocco and Algeria, even though the ballot structure is not generally associated with high levels of personal-reputation seeking behavior.

The most significant findings, however, are those which relate to the comparison of expectations concerning inclusivity of the selectorate with those competing predictions related to the effects of institutional openings for the Islamist opposition. These results suggest that parliaments in monarchical regimes, to the extent that monarchs prefer higher levels of debate between a fractionalized and fragile party system which they can arbitrate, may structure incentives of the Islamist opposition in ways that are different from parliaments in former one-party regimes. In the latter, Islamist deputies are no more likely than members of any other party to engage in debate, to perceive incentives to promote a party image, or to have higher caseloads. In Morocco, where institutions structure opportunities and constraints in a different way, Islamist deputies adopt different strategies. They are more likely than members of other parties, according to bivariate results, to rank policymaking as their most time-consuming activity.<sup>367</sup> Further, they are significantly more likely than members of all other parties to promote party over personal image. Future research might test whether these results from Morocco and Algeria generalize to broader classes of monarchical and former one-party regimes. A further avenue for research is to

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<sup>367</sup> This difference was not significant in multivariate tests.

explore the extent to which casework behavior is driven by electoral incentives or by availability of resources to solve problems.

### **“Psychological” Effects of Institutions: The Representative Link**

What these results mean for the progress of democratic transition and strengthening of the parliamentary institutions is unclear. However, the results provide evidence that parliamentary institutions within regimes with a similar, low level of electoral competition (e.g. hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes) vary from one another in meaningful ways that are probably significant for political development.

One way of getting at this question, given that we have only two country cases in one time period, is to examine the effects of institutions on the attitudes and orientations of citizens via the representative link. I find some evidence that some type of link exists, based on simple correlations in the member and constituent data at the district level (See Table V. 9.).

Among citizens who know the name of at least one deputy from his or her district, average monthly caseloads of members from their districts are only slightly higher, and only in Algeria. However, caseloads and constituent evaluations that the job members are doing are positively correlated in both countries. For Moroccans, among constituents who believe deputies in their district are doing a poor job, the average caseload in their district is 97.2 requests per month. This figure increases steadily, reaching 160.0 casework requests for constituents who believe their members are doing an excellent job. The same effect holds in Algeria, increasing from 46.7 casework requests in districts in which constituents evaluate the job of deputies as poor, to 61.4 requests in districts in which citizens evaluate the job as good.

But other bivariate results raise questions about the effects of the link on constituent attitudes. Citizens who have had a satisfying case request resolved tend to live in districts with lower than average caseloads.

These data appear to reflect a representative link, but they raise questions about whether that link promotes representation and accountability along the lines of the representation paradigm or challenges fairness along the lines of the patron-client paradigm. It is to this question that the next chapter will turn.

**TABLE V. 9. Mean Monthly Caseload of All Members in Constituent's Electoral District**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Constituent Knows Name of at Least One Member from District:		
No	95.4 (78.1)***	44.5 (26.2)***
Yes	95.2 (81.5)***	54.3 (25.4)***
Constituent Evaluation the Job of Deputies from District:		
Poor	97.2 (78.7)***	46.7 (25.7)***
Fair	97.3 (67.4)***	50.4 (25.3) ***
Good	106.9 (85.5)***	61.4 (25.8) ***
Excellent	160.0 (152.0)***	24.8 (.) <sup>a</sup> ***
Constituent Has Had a Satisfying Casework Experience:		
	96.5 (77.2)***	50.8 (26.5)*
	83.3 (92.9)***	46.3 (25.7)*

<sup>a</sup> Only one observation.

<sup>†</sup>  $p < .10$  \*  $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$  two-tailed test; Standard deviations are in parentheses.

## CHAPTER VI

### Casework and Diffuse Support for the Parliament

*“How can representative government function if those who are elected to represent the people in the [Thai] National Assembly forget the interest of the country as a whole and pursue only their selfish gain?”*


-Thanad Khoman, Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs, as cited Darling 1960, p. 356

Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski argue that partisan institutions lengthen the tenure of authoritarian rulers because they reduce internal threats to rule by coopting opposition and bringing it into the regime. Their explanation, while convincing, presents a puzzle; namely, why do citizens in political systems with weak and coopted institutions fail to contest for stronger parliaments?

In Chapter 4 I argued representation is a mechanism of cooptation occurring as members bargain in multiple arenas for reelection. The particular baskets of representative goods that members of “loyal” parliaments choose shapes the representative link that members establish (or do not establish) in their constituencies. Through this link, whether high or low quality, characterized by absence or presence, the behaviors of members shape the attitudes of ordinary citizens.

In this chapter I turn to an examination of the role of legislators as link between institutions and constituents. I extend Gandhi and Przeworski’s elite-level explanation by exploring the relationship between elite and mass dynamics. I argue that citizens have an overwhelmingly negative view of the parliament and its members and that service responsiveness (i.e. casework) by members does not improve support for having a strong parliament. I suggest that public opinion serves as a contextual factor affecting the outcome of future rounds of bargaining over the prerogatives of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive (See Figure VI. 1.).

**FIGURE VI. 1. A Conceptual Map of Legislative Politics in Multiple Arenas**



### **The Puzzle**

Although the constitutional prerogatives of the parliaments are weak, most ordinary citizens in Morocco and Algeria believe that their parliaments have weight in the policymaking process. A relatively high proportion, 56.0 percent of Moroccans and 34.0 percent of Algerians, believe that the parliament has the power to hold the government accountable; on average, both

Moroccans and Algerians believe that the parliament has a “somewhat effective” role in making laws on social and political issues, or about “3” on a scale of 1-4. Yet *satisfaction* with the job the parliament is doing is very low. On this indicator, the modal Moroccan believes that the parliament is doing a poor job, while the modal Algerian believes the parliament is doing a fair job. When taken as a proxy for contestation for a stronger parliament, only 60 percent of Moroccans and 80 percent of Algerians wish to have a parliament with the power to make laws. Why is popular support for a strong parliament relatively low compared to the prerogatives citizens believe it actually has? Do casework and other forms of interaction between the citizen and member constitute a form of representation which enhances satisfaction with the legislature and support for a strong parliament?

### **Linking Paradigms**

In Chapter 3 I discussed two paradigms—the representation and patron-client paradigms—which serve as competing ways of viewing casework in authoritarian political settings. In this chapter, I begin to evaluate the effects of casework on public opinion in order to shed light on which of the two paradigms is most appropriate as a means by which to conceptualize “representation” in Morocco and Algeria.

First, I focus in this chapter on the assumptions and expectations of the institutionalization literature (See Table VI. 1.). This work emerged from studies of legislative institutions in developing societies of newly independent countries in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, and made important strides in hypothesizing about the ways in which legislators establish a representative link with constituents. This work corresponds with the “representation” paradigm; it suggests that the representative link necessarily enhances prospects of democracy by positively presupposing citizens to the value of strong democratic institutions.

A competing paradigm, the authoritarian politics literature leaves open the possibility that the link entrenches or fails to reverse the political logic of clientelism and, thus, does not improve popular support for a strong legislature. It is consistent with that I call the “patron-client” paradigm. In this paradigm, the representative link might not enhance support for having a strong parliament because deputy-citizen contact is limited and leads predominantly to clientalistic casework requests.

**TABLE VI. 1. Linking Literatures with the Representation and Patron-Client Paradigms**

Literature	Role of Member	Corresponding Paradigm (This project)	Mechanism of Political Development	Role of Mass Support
Authoritarian politics literature	Legislators establish a representative link	“Patron-client” paradigm: Link entrenches or fails to reverse political logic of clientelism; creates more robust authoritarianism	Bargaining in Nested Games (Contingency approach)	Contextual factor influencing size of winset in future rounds of elite-level bargaining
Institutionalization literature	Legislators establish a representative link	“Representation” paradigm: Link enhances prospects for democracy	Preconditions approach (May be process-oriented)	Mass popular support necessary condition

**Overview**

In this final empirical chapter, I sketch Level III and Link III of the conceptual framework, connecting mass-level dynamics with elite-level bargaining in Level I.

*Level III: How the Representative Link Shapes Public Opinion*

First, I examine the determinants of individual orientations toward the parliament, assessing how experiences with members of parliament shape these attitudes. I explore how the relationship between member behavior and individual attitudes, which I call the representative link, can inform our understanding of why authoritarian institutions contribute to authoritarian survival. I test whether casework and several other types of deputy-citizen interaction enhance popular support for a strong parliament.

*Link III: How Mass Opinion Affects Future Rounds of Elite-Level Bargaining over Institutional Design*

Second, although I cannot test it in the present project, I theorize about how mass-level opinion serves as a contextual factor for elite-level bargaining over institutional design. Institutions—and their prerogatives—are shaped by successive rounds of bargaining between opposition and incumbent elites. The preferences of ordinary citizens about institutions serve as a contextual factor influencing the size of the winset between incumbent and opposition elites as they bargain over institutional design and, thus, shape the future role of the legislature in the policymaking process. The determinants of support for a strong parliament—in particular, whether casework improves support—will help shed light on how the dynamics of public opinion relate to elite-level dynamics.

**The Legislative Institutionalization Literature and the Representation Paradigm**

The legislative institutionalization literature has its roots in a series of individual country studies which sought to understand the political systems of newly-independent states of Africa and Asia by analyzing the structure and function of their legislatures.<sup>368</sup> In Table 1 I suggested that this literature is consistent with the expectations of the representation paradigm. Unsurprisingly, these studies revealed that parliaments in developing countries tended to play a weak role in lawmaking—what Robert A. Packenham labeled the “decisional function” of legislatures.<sup>369</sup> Guided by functionalism, the literature suggested that legislatures in Africa and Asia played other important roles in the political system; among them, fostering integration of the core and the periphery and legitimating the regime.<sup>370</sup>

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<sup>368</sup> See, for example, Mezey, "The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World." Charles Hornsby, "The Social Structure of the National Assembly in Kenya, 1963-83," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 27, no. 2 (1989). Abdo I. Baaklini, "Legislatures in the Gulf Area: The Experience of Kuwait, 1961-1976," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 14 (1982), Saif, *A Legislature in Transition: The Yemeni Parliament*, Weinbaum, "Classification and Change in Legislative Systems: With Particular Application to Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan."

<sup>369</sup> Robert A. Packenham, "Legislatures and Political Development," in *Legislatures in Developmental Perspective*, ed. Allan Kornberg and Lloyd D. Musolf (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1970): 522.

<sup>370</sup> For examples of work on the role of members in integrating people in the periphery with the central government, see Albert F. Eldridge, *Legislatures in Plural Societies: The Search for Cohesion in National Development* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1977). Abdo I. Baaklini and James J. Heaphey, *Legislative Institution Building in Brazil, Costa Rica, and Lebanon* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976).

This literature also demonstrated that members in developing country settings who were attentive to their districts provided a high level of constituency service, especially the provision of help with individual requests or casework.<sup>371</sup> Scholars argued that establishing a “legislative link” was a unique and consequential role of the Member of Parliament because it built support for a new, “modern” institution: the legislature. This literature broke away from other studies of developing country contexts by viewing constituency service as representation, not clientelism.<sup>372</sup> Instead, it drew upon new developments in American politics research which suggested that: “Nearly everything [a legislator] does to win and hold support—allocating, reaching, presenting, responding, communicating, explaining, assuring—involves representation.”<sup>373</sup>

The study of support for having a strong legislature drew on work from the US and western countries and became central to theorizing about legislative representation and development in comparative contexts.<sup>374</sup> In several essays in *Comparative Legislative Reforms and Innovations*, Baaklini and Heaphey, as well as other authors, argued that members of parliament play a role in promoting legislative viability by improving public satisfaction with and support for the legislature.<sup>375</sup> Although “a transformed legislature follows one of several events—an abrupt expansion or contraction in executive powers, a radical modification in the

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<sup>371</sup> See for example, Malcom E. Jewell, "Legislators and Constituents in the Representative Process," in *Handbook of Legislative Research*, ed. Samuel C. Patterson Gerhard Loewenberg, Malcolm E. Jewell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), Michael Ong, "The Member of Parliament and His Constituency: The Malaysian Case," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 3 (1976). Shriram Maheshwari, "Constituency Linkage of National Legislators in India," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 3 (1976), Manindra Kumar Mohapatra, "The Ombudsmanic Role of Legislators in an Indian State," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 2 (1976).

<sup>372</sup> Michael L. Mezey, "Constituency Demands and Legislative Support: An Experiment," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (1976): 107. Hopkins equates constituency service with clientelism. See Raymond Hopkins, "The Kenyan Legislature: Political Functions and Citizen Perceptions," in *Legislative Systems in Developing Countries*, ed. G. R. Boynton and Chong Lim Kim (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1975): 217.

<sup>373</sup> Richard F. Fenno, *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* (Boston: Little Brown, 1978): 240. Pitkin argues that representation includes four areas: lawmaking, allocation, service, and symbolic responsiveness. Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation*. See also Karpis, "The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness." Allocation responsiveness refers to the provision of projects for the district. Symbolic responsiveness entails communication with citizens which contributes to the building of trust. Service responsiveness, or casework, is the focus of this chapter and includes any “intervention for individuals, groups, or organizations (including businesses) that have requests of, grievances against, or a need for access to federal (and occasionally state or local) government departments or agencies.” Johannes, *To Serve the People: Congress and Constituency Service*: 18.

<sup>374</sup> See, for example, Roger H. Davidson and Glenn R. Parker, "Positive Support for Political Institutions: The Case of Congress," *The Western Political Quarterly* 25, no. 4 (1972). W. Samuel Patterson G. R. Boynton, and Ronald D. Hedlund, "The Structure of Public Support for Legislative Institutions," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* XII, no. 2 (1968), John C. Wahlke Samuel C. Patterson, and G. Robert Boynton, "Dimensions of Support in Legislative Systems," in *Legislatures in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Allan Kornberg (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1973).

<sup>375</sup> Abdo I. and James J. Heaphey Baaklini, *Legislative Institution Building in Brazil, Costa Rica, and Lebanon* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976).

configuration of parliamentary parties, a revision in formal constitutional procedures, or a change in society norms regarding the legislature"--according to Michael L. Mezey--"a change in the level of support accorded to the legislature by attentive publics", can also have an important effect on the persistence or development of a legislature.<sup>376</sup> In this view, legislatures can, by virtue of the behavior of their members, contribute to their institutionalization as representative political institutions.<sup>377</sup>

### **Legislative Institutionalization**

Recognition of the limitations of parliaments in developing and nondemocratic nations also led scholars to theorize about why legislatures remain weak.<sup>378</sup> A first body of literature argued that legislatures are weak because their structure is incompatible with many political settings in which they have been "transplanted" by colonial powers. Richard Sisson and Leo M. Snowiss argue that legislatures are incongruent with indigenous political structure in some countries and are hindered by their association with leaders with a colonial past.<sup>379</sup> In this view, "[w]here legislatures exist as institutional borrowings from alien political cultures, their fragile condition is hardly surprising."<sup>380</sup> In Pierre Rondot's words, "eastern public opinion holds western intrigues primarily responsible for the failure of parliamentarian in the East. However, the real causes . . . evolve from the very character of oriental societies," namely divisions in clienteles, clans, etc.<sup>381</sup> Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denooux, and Robert Springborg suggest that legislatures are erroneously viewed by many contemporary scholars as western institutions transplanted into incompatible or hostile political environments.<sup>382</sup> Abdo Baaklini has argued persuasively against this view, citing instances from the Middle East in which colonial powers

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<sup>376</sup> Mezey, "The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World.": 260. See also Sisson, "Comparative Legislative Institutionalization: A Theoretical Explanation.", Weinbaum, "Classification and Change in Legislative Systems: With Particular Application to Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan." Chong Lim Kim, Joel D. Barkan, Ilter Turan, and Malcolm E. Jewell, *The Legislative Connection: The Politics of Representation in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1984): 159.

<sup>377</sup> Baaklini, *Legislative Institution Building in Brazil, Costa Rica, and Lebanon*. Also Jain.

<sup>378</sup> These three reasons are outlined in Ersin Kalaycioglu, "Why Legislatures Persist in Developing Countries: The Case of Turkey," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* V, no. 1 (1980).

<sup>379</sup> Richard Sisson and Leo M. Snowiss, "Legislative Viability and Political Development," in *Legislatures in Development: Dynamics of Change in New and Old States*, ed. Joel Smith and Lloyd D. Musolf (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979): 64.

<sup>380</sup> Loewenberg, "The Cultural Roots of a New Legislature: Public Perceptions of the Korean National Assembly.": 384.

<sup>381</sup> Pierre Rondot, "Parliamentary Regime in the Middle East," *Middle East Affairs* IV, no. 8-9 (1953): 257.

<sup>382</sup> Baaklini, Denooux, and Springborg, *Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions*. See also Weinbaum, "Classification and Change in Legislative Systems: With Particular Application to Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan.": 33.

worked to dismantle indigenous legislative institutions because they threatened the power of the colonial rule.<sup>383</sup> Indeed, the Ottoman Empire's first council emerged during the period of Selim III (1789-1807); and, Egypt, Iraq, and Syria all had well functioning legislatures in the interwar years.<sup>384</sup> Although modern parliaments originated in western European countries and spread via institutional diffusion to other parts of the world, councils and assemblies existed in the indigenous culture of other societies as well, and modern legislatures have precedence in precolonial and colonial African, Asian, and Middle Eastern societies.<sup>385</sup>

A second theory suggests that parliaments remain weak because of the attitudes and values of citizens, including the absence of the necessary widespread approval and support for democratic institutions or of a "civic culture".<sup>386</sup> Snowiss and Sisson argue that a host of requisite "societal conditions" are lacking in new nations with weak legislatures; further, the belief that these institutions are "invalid and ineffective" is widespread.<sup>387</sup> In Richard Sisson's view, the structure of the parliament must be compatible with the culture of the nation. Where it is not, these bodies will be weak.<sup>388</sup> Chan Woo Park argues that in previous decades in Korea, public expectations of the legislature mixed traditional and modern views such as old notions of authority which contradicted with new ideas of accountability.<sup>389</sup> Thus, without "supportive ideologies" within the population, Sisson and Snowiss argue, legislatures in new nations will only survive if they satisfy the needs of dominant classes.<sup>390</sup>

Ersin Kalaycioglu argued instead that legislatures remain weak because they "undermine their own existence" by failing to meet the expectations of citizens and, thus, to promote diffuse support for the legislature.<sup>391</sup> This view is important because it begins to distance itself from cultural modernization theory by emphasizing member and citizen agency. Drawing on work by

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<sup>383</sup> Baaklini, *Legislative Institution Building in Brazil, Costa Rica, and Lebanon.*: Chapter 8.

<sup>384</sup> Baaklini, Denooux, and Springborg, *Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions.*: Chapter 1.

<sup>385</sup> Loewenberg, "The Cultural Roots of a New Legislature: Public Perceptions of the Korean National Assembly.": 371. Gerhard Loewenberg argues that the form of the parliament is generally present in polities from local civil society associations to nations to international bodies. See Loewenberg, *Modern Parliaments: Change or Decline?*

<sup>386</sup> Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba Almond, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, an Analytic Study* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), Seymour Martin Lipset, *The Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1960).

<sup>387</sup> Richard Sisson and Leo M. Snowiss, "Legislative Viability and Political Development," in *Legislatures in Development: Dynamics of Change in New and Old States*, ed. Joel Smith and Lloyd D. Musolf (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979): 44. The authors describe the functions of these legislatures which cause them to be viewed this way.

<sup>388</sup> Sisson, "Comparative Legislative Institutionalization: A Theoretical Explanation."

<sup>389</sup> Loewenberg, "The Cultural Roots of a New Legislature: Public Perceptions of the Korean National Assembly."

<sup>390</sup> Snowiss, "Legislative Viability and Political Development.": 59.

<sup>391</sup> Kalaycioglu, "Why Legislatures Persist in Developing Countries: The Case of Turkey.": 124.

V. O. Key, it highlights the link between the government system and the political attitudes of ordinary citizens and suggests that constituents' choices and attitudes are rational, not simply the result of psychological stimuli or enduring political culture.<sup>392</sup> In this view, political attitudes do not arise from time invariant and deterministic political culture, but rather are shaped by beliefs about whether institutions deliver economic, political, or social benefits. It is also important because it problematizes the assumption that members of parliament necessarily improve support for a strong parliament. It suggests the need to test this proposition vis-à-vis the possibility that parliaments with little interest in the problems of ordinary citizens do little to convince the population that a strong parliament is in its best interests.

### **Extending the Legislative Institutionalization Literature**

Chong Lim Kim, Joel D. Barkan, Ilter Turan, and Malcom E. Jewell made one of the final contributions to the legislative institutionalization literature with a book-length project demonstrating the role of modernity in shaping public support for the legislature.<sup>393</sup> Although these studies have rarely been cited since the 1980s, they make up an important body of scholarship which cannot be ignored in future research on legislative politics in nondemocratic political settings. This chapter critiques and extends the legislative institutionalization literature in several ways; first, by seeking to recall and integrate its insights into contemporary scholarly debates. The insights it offered are useful and relevant to important questions in authoritarian politics, political development, political attitudes, and legislative strengthening.<sup>394</sup>

Second, much of this literature argued that elites outside the parliament, including in the executive, disapproved of the nonrepresentative nature of the legislature's membership. Samuel P. Huntington argues that legislative institutions in developing countries are dominated by traditional elites who are opposed to needed reforms and, thus, are not well supported by pro-modernization governments.<sup>395</sup> Similarly, Sisson and Snowiss argue that members elected to legislatures are traditional and anti-modern; thus, the more pro-reform executive is unlikely to grant the parliament a greater say in policymaking.<sup>396</sup> This chapter extends the literature by

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<sup>392</sup> V. O. Key, Jr. and with the assistance of Milton C. Cummings, *The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966). See also V. O. Key, "Public Opinion and American Democracy," (1961).

<sup>393</sup> Kim, *The Legislative Connection: The Politics of Representation in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey*. For more recent work on legislatures, see, for example, Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, eds., *Legislative Politics in Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

<sup>394</sup> Mezey, "The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World.": 765.

<sup>395</sup> Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*.: 387.

<sup>396</sup> Snowiss, "Legislative Viability and Political Development."

recognizing that the executive may have an interest in failing to promote parliamentary development, or even in manipulating it, to establish “loyal” parliaments not only because they do not challenge its grip on power, but also because they have particular effects on public opinion.<sup>397</sup> Weak legislatures may not induce widespread support for a strong parliament vis-à-vis a strong personalized president or monarch and, thus, may be itself a strategy of authoritarian regimes.

Third, the literature on citizens’ support for the parliament tends to rely on self-report evaluations of members in order to test whether deputies shaped the attitudes of citizens. But because, as the literature suggested, support of the parliament is related to support for other institutions and the regime as a whole, these measures may constitute a single syndrome of political attitudes. Additional and more compelling evidence of a link would be provided by direct measures of interaction between members and citizens and experiences asking for help with personal problems. This chapter includes new measures of contact between members and citizens, including whether individuals have ever asked for help with a personal or community problem.

Fourth, the legislative institutionalization literature relied heavily on cultural modernization theory and did not test whether it, or another approach such as rational choice institutionalism, best explains variation in individuals’ support for the legislature. Although Kalaycioglu argued that V. O. Key’s approach to public opinion was appropriate for understanding the formation of support, the model he proposed partially contradicted this claim by suggesting that socialization and the development of particular political culture orientations—especially modernity—was also a key mechanism. This chapter tests both paradigms for understanding variation in satisfaction with, and support for, the legislature under authoritarianism. It includes a third hypothesis which falls under the rubric of a rational choice paradigm: support for the parliament is related to one’s position within the political structure. Those who enjoy personal connections with members are more likely to extract particularized benefits and, thus, more likely to be supportive of a strong parliament. If those who receive particularized benefits from deputies with whom they have a direct or indirect connection are more likely to support a strong legislature, this evidence would suggest that constituency service—even it is at best particularistic and at worst clientalistic—contributes to popular support for a strong legislature. However, constituency service may lead to lower levels of support for a strong parliament. In this case, it might be more meaningfully understood as a continuation of the

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<sup>397</sup> Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist, eds., *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005).

patronage system which existed before liberalization, and might serve as a barrier to, rather than a catalyst of, widespread support for a strong and influential legislature.

Finally, while the legislative institutionalization literature could show that members influence political attitudes, it had insufficient data and cases to demonstrate that greater support for the legislature promotes its development. While these conjectures seem sensible and offer motivation for studying variation in individuals' attitudes toward the legislature, failure to test the literature's core hypothesis ultimately contributed to its disappearance from the political science canon. This chapter seeks to address how legislatures influence public opinion with the goal of contributing to future research which might later test the effect of support on the development of the parliament and on democratic political development. It explicitly recognizes growing evidence from a number of regions that widespread support for democracy—and by extension for democratic institutions—is a condition for the survival of a nascent democratic transition.<sup>398</sup> In other words, individuals' attitudes about the importance of having a strong parliament may be consequential for understanding how authoritarian politics operates and why it persists.<sup>399</sup>

### **Satisfaction with and Support for the Parliament**

What are the implications of an extremely weak legislature and manipulated legislative elections for the formation of public opinion toward democracy's most critical institution? If "[p]opular support is critically important to the persistence and the efficient functioning of a legislative body", how is this support formed?<sup>400</sup> How does the parliament take "hold in the public mind" as "a valued and popular institution"?<sup>401</sup> What is the role of individual legislators in shaping support for a strong parliament?

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<sup>398</sup> See, for example, Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*.

<sup>399</sup> For evidence of the importance of strong legislative institutions in democratization see Fish, "Creative Constitutions: How Do Parliamentary Powers Shape the Electoral Arena?"

<sup>400</sup> Kim, *The Legislative Connection: The Politics of Representation in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey*: 159.

<sup>401</sup> Gerhard Loewenberg and Chong Lim Kim, "Comparing the Representativeness of Parliaments," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* III, no. 1 (1978): 372. Michael L. Mezey, *Comparative Legislatures* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979): 27.

## Defining Specific and Diffuse Support

By support, this chapter refers to the generally-accepted definition of *diffuse support* developed by David Easton in the context of a political system in which diffuse support and specific support for political institutions is one of two types of responses (input) of members. Diffuse support is a set of attitudes which place value on an institution as an indispensable, taken-for-granted part of the political system. "A system may seek to instill in its members a high level of *diffuse support* in order that, regardless of what happens, the members will continue to be bound to it by strong ties of loyalty and affection. This is a type of support that continues independently of the specific rewards which the member may feel he obtains from belonging to the system."<sup>402</sup>

Diffuse support contrasts with *specific support*, or "generalized attachment to political objects . . . not conditioned upon specific returns at any moment."<sup>403</sup> "This is an input to a system that occurs as a return for the specific membership. It represents or reflects the satisfaction a member feels when he perceives his demands as having been met."<sup>404</sup> Policy support, for example, is specific support which comes about through satisfaction with laws and voting in the legislature.<sup>405</sup> Specific support is generally viewed by theorists as contributing over time to diffuse support. *Satisfaction* refers to specific support in this chapter.

John C. Wahlke has suggested that, in the developing country context, support of the legislature is constituted by resistance to attempts to abolish or severely limit the power of the legislature.<sup>406</sup> During the time of the study, newspapers in Algeria reported government plans to propose a constitutional amendment formally increasing the power of the president vis-à-vis the legislature. Although no draft text appeared, reports suggested that the aim of the amendments were to establish the office of the vice-president, eliminate the term limit of the president, and reduce the power of the parliament. Elites who support this amendment suggested that it would create a presidential system, rather than a hybrid system more like the United States.

An Algerian woman expressed a high level of diffuse support for a strong parliament. When asked what she thought of these proposed constitutional changes: "I like President Boutiflika. If it [removal of the term limit] was only for him, I would agree. But what about in the future? I don't think it is a good idea to limit the power of the parliament, because we don't

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<sup>402</sup> David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965): 124-5.

<sup>403</sup> David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965): 272-3.

<sup>404</sup> Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis*: 125.

<sup>405</sup> See John C. Wahlke, "Policy Demands and System Support: The Role of the Represented," *British Journal of Political Science* 1, no. 3 (1971).

<sup>406</sup> *Ibid.*

know who will lead Algeria in the future and if they will be a good president.” Another woman expressed a low level of support for a strong parliament: “I’m not sure we need a parliament. I think a monarchy like in Morocco would be the best way to govern Algeria. But, unfortunately we don’t have such a possibility in Algeria.”<sup>407</sup>

In Morocco, there are no proposals to abolish the parliament; instead, there are demands from the opposition to amend the constitution to give it an independent role in policymaking. There is a sense that the King views such a constitutional amendment as being possible, but that parties should democratize internally before such a change is made. Expressing diffuse support for the parliament, an ordinary citizen stated: “I am ready to change my low view of the parliament. I am ready to see the parliament play a more democratic and strong role.”<sup>408</sup>

### **Expectations for Levels of Satisfaction and Support under Authoritarianism**

Owing to the inability of their parliaments under conditions of electoral manipulation and patronage (as well as lack of resources) to deliver its promises to citizens, Moroccans and Algerians should have low overall levels of *satisfaction* (i.e. specific support) with the parliament. However, due to the relatively long history of legislative politics, these settings will be characterized by conditions of moderate levels of support for a parliament with the power to make laws, or diffuse support. Further, these settings should be characterized by declining levels of specific and diffuse support since liberalization.

#### *Satisfaction with the Parliament and its Members*

As hypothesized, Moroccans and Algerians view the parliament and its members in very critical terms. Only 9.4 percent of Moroccans and 10.1 percent of Algerians think the parliament is doing a good or excellent job. Slightly more—16.9 percent in Morocco and 15.0 percent in Algeria—think that members from their district are doing well (See Table VI. 2.).

Satisfaction is lower in Morocco which has had a liberalized parliament for a longer period of time than in Algeria. And, they are lower in the country in which the parliament plays a slightly greater role in policymaking and oversight, but in which this role is viewed by many as being for the service of an elite class and in which the membership is viewed as particularly corrupt and unresponsiveness. In Algeria, individuals have a low opinion of members, but these

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<sup>407</sup> Algeria. Interview. 2007.

<sup>408</sup> Morocco. Interview. 2007.

members are at worst generally viewed as self-enriching and unwilling to stand up for the public interest in the parliament.

Among the functions of the parliament, Moroccans believe their parliament is most effective at debating national issues (1.6) and worst at communicating with citizens and solving their personal problems (1.3). Algerians view the parliament as best at debate and solving economic problems (1.8) and worst at solving their personal problems (1.6).

**TABLE VI. 2. Specific Support for the Parliament and its Members among Moroccan and Algerian Constituents**

	<i>Morocco</i>					<i>Algeria</i>				
	Poor 1	Fair 2	Good 3	Excellent 4	Total/ Mean	Poor	Fair	Good	Excellent	Total/ Mean
Overall Evaluation of the Members in this District	528 68.4%	114 14.8%	128 16.6%	2 0.3%	772 1.5	232 34.7%	337 50.4%	99 14.8%	1 0.2%	669 1.8
Overall Evaluation of the House of Representatives	404 57.5%	233 33.1%	58 8.3%	8 1.1%	703 1.5	244 38.0%	334 51.9%	65 10.1%	0 0.0%	643 1.7
Evaluation of Debate in House of Representatives	379 55.0%	209 30.3%	81 11.8%	20 2.9%	689 1.6	237 37.8%	290 46.3%	99 15.8%	1 0.2%	627 1.8
Evaluation of Deputies Solving Economic Problems	496 64.4%	210 27.3%	48 6.2%	16 2.1%	770 1.5	267 38.1%	334 47.6%	100 14.3%	0 0.0%	701 1.8
Evaluation of Deputies Solving Personal Programs	578 77.1%	140 18.7%	28 3.7%	4 0.5%	750 1.3	358 54.3%	237 36.0%	64 9.7%	0 0.0%	659 1.6
Evaluation of Deputies Communicating with Citizens	522 73.0%	152 21.3%	37 5.2%	4 0.6%	715 1.3	381 57.3%	205 30.8%	74 11.1%	5 0.8%	665 1.6
Evaluation of Previous House of Representatives	410 62.5%	179 27.3%	57 8.7%	10 1.5%	656 1.5	220 38.9%	247 43.7%	84 14.9%	14 2.5%	565 1.8

Questions: (1) Overall, how would you evaluate the job the House of Representatives is doing? Etc.

As hypothesized, Algerians are slightly less critical than Moroccans of the job of the current parliament. However, approval has declined very slightly in Algeria (1.72 to 1.81) and improved very slightly in Morocco since the last mandate (1.49 to 1.53). 73.0 percent of Moroccans and 66.0 percent of Algerians have the same evaluation of the former and current parliament while 27.0 and 34 percent, respectively, have an improved or deteriorated image (See Table VI. 3.).

**TABLE VI. 3. Change in Satisfaction with the Present Compared with the Former Mandate of Parliament among Moroccan and Algerian Constituents**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Evaluate Present House of Representatives:		
Three Points Lower than Former	0 0.0%	5 0.9%
Two Points Lower than Former	5 0.8%	14 2.5%
One Point Lower than Former	78 12.1%	104 18.5%
Same as the Former	470 73.0%	354 63.0%
One Point Higher than the Former	83 12.9%	78 13.9%
Two Points Higher than the Former	7 1.1%	7 1.3%
Three Points Higher than the Former	1 0.2%	0 0.0%
<i>Total</i>	644	562
<i>Mean</i>	.02	-.10
<i>Standard Deviation</i>	0.6	0.7

Confidence in the parliament, as a form of specific support, is low in both Morocco and Algeria. 55.4 percent of Moroccans do not have much confidence, while 36.6 percent have some, and 8.0 percent have a lot. In Algeria, 25.0 percent do not have much confidence, 51.6 percent have some, and 15.2 percent have a lot. Moroccans have the most confidence in civil society and religious leaders and least confidence in political parties. Algerians have most confidence in religious leaders and least confidence in parties. As hypothesized, the gap between confidence in the president and the parliament in Algeria is much larger in Algeria than in Morocco. Because Algeria lacks a legitimate arbitrator, it must engage strategies which promote the image of the president and deemphasize the programs of the parliament and parties (See Table VI. 4.).

Moroccans and Algerians trust the parliament less than do respondents in many African countries. According to African Democracy Barometer data using the same questions, the

proportion of the sample who have some confidence or a lot of confidence in the Parliament is 70 in Ghana (1999), 58 in Nigeria (2000), 55 in Mali (2001), 92 in Tanzania (2001), and 57.9 on the continent as a whole. In every country studied, except South Africa, approval of the parliament was not as high as approval of the president. The data from Morocco and Algeria suggest a similar relationship.<sup>409</sup>

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<sup>409</sup> Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi, *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 108. Job performance (all Africa): 49% approve of leaders in the parliament; 53% approve of elected local leaders; 64% approve of job performance of the president. South Africa is the only country examined in which more people approve of the job MPs are doing (64%) than the job the President is doing.

**TABLE VI. 4. Confidence in Public Institutions among Moroccan and Algerian Constituents**

	<i>Morocco</i>				<i>Algeria</i>			
	Not Much 1	Some 2	A Lot 3	Total/ Mean	Not Much 1	Some 2	A Lot 3	Total/ Mean
Political Parties	487 64.7%	239 31.7%	27 3.6%	753 1.4	284 41.2%	351 50.9%	55 8.0%	690 1.7
President and the Government	343 45.3%	302 39.8%	113 14.9%	758 1.7	145 21.0%	356 51.6%	189 27.4%	690 2.1
Parliament	414 55.4%	273 36.6%	60 8.0%	747 1.5	228 33.2%	354 51.6%	104 15.2%	686 1.8
Civil Society	164 21.6%	312 41.2%	282 37.2%	758 2.2	169 25.0%	384 56.9%	122 18.1%	675 1.9
Religious Leaders	131 17.1%	337 43.9	300 39.1%	768 2.2	69 9.9%	327 47.1%	299 43.0%	695 2.3
Unions and Associations	231 33.3%	304 43.8%	159 22.9%	694 1.9	200 29.9%	360 53.8%	109 16.3%	669 1.9
Judicial System	232 30.5%	374 49.2%	155 20.4%	761 1.9	277 39.8%	264 37.9%	155 22.3%	696 1.8

Question: Please tell me whether you have not much confidence, some confidence, or a lot of confidence in the following institutions.

### *Diffuse Support of the Parliament and its Members*

Support for the existence of a parliament with the power to make laws is relatively high in both Morocco and Algeria, perhaps owing to the fact that these bodies have existed almost continuously since the 1960s. Algerians demonstrate a higher level of diffuse support than do Moroccans. 82.5 percent of Algerians and 63.7 percent of Moroccans support having a parliament with the power to make laws, while 7.1 percent of Algerians and 23.1 percent of Moroccans believe it would be desirable to have no parliament at all. Comparable percentages—10.4 in Algeria and 13.2 in Morocco—support having a parliament that only advises the government (See Table VI. 5).<sup>410</sup>

A stronger test of diffuse support for the parliament is derived by combining the two measures. In Algeria, 80.1 percent of respondents support, or strongly support, having a parliament and believe that the parliament should have the power to make laws. In Morocco, this proportion is 60.5 percent. What an individual means by these statements is bounded within current regime such that both the Moroccan and Algerian legislatures already have the power, in a sense, to make laws.<sup>411</sup>

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<sup>410</sup> Studies from the US have focused on compliance and institutional commitment as two components of support. See G. R. Boynton, "The Structure of Public Support for Legislative Institutions.", Samuel C. Patterson, "Dimensions of Support in Legislative Systems." Mezey found that compliance not a measure of diffuse support in a small sample of six Asian countries. Mezey, "Constituency Demands and Legislative Support: An Experiment." A host of studies provide additional measures of diffuse support which could be incorporated into future waves of surveys in the Arab Middle East and elsewhere. Questions in these sources measure commitment to a parliament with strong power to influence policymaking.

<sup>411</sup> Because of differences in methodology, it is difficult to compare levels of support in Morocco and Algeria with other countries across time. Countries in which the legislature appeared to enjoy a high level of diffuse support are Trinidad and Tobago (Ghany 1996); Turkey (Kalaycioglu 1980); and, Kenya (Hopkins 1975). Moderate levels of support generally characterized Korea (Park 2002; Kim 1976). Low levels of support characterized the Lebanon, Philippines, Latin America, Thailand, and Uruguay (Crow 1970; Mezey 1979; Astiz 1973; Darling 1960; Stauffer 1970). A study of opinion toward the parliament of Trinidad and Tobago revealed a high level of diffuse support: Do you believe that Parliament is an important institution in our system of governance? In 2002, 94.6% responded yes; 1.9% no; and, 3.4% don't know. In 2006, 92.8% yes; 7.0% no; and, 0.2% don't know (Ghany 2006). Most work on Turkey suggests that the National Assembly was historically viewed with relatively high levels of specific and diffuse support. Kalaycioglu finds on his five-point scale, 66.2% of the sample in Turkey score 5 while 21.3% score 4. In Kenya, finds in urban areas that people think the parliament provides valuable services. By contrast, Mezey writes that in the Philippines, one of the post powerful parliament in the world at the time, there was not public outcry at Marcos' suspension of the parliament which was viewed as highly corrupt by citizens (Mezey 1979, 27; Stauffer 1975). In Uruguay, the parliament was described as obstructionist (Astiz 1973: 3) and Thai parliament frequently suffered coups (Darling 1960: 356). Latin American parliaments represented wealthy class not lower and rural people (Astiz 1973). Hamid Ghany, "Public Perceptions of Parliament in Trinidad and Tobago: Evidence from the Field," in *Seventh Workshop of Parliamentary Scholars and Parliamentarians* (Wroxton, Oxfordshire, United Kingdom: 2006), Kalaycioglu, "Why Legislatures Persist in Developing Countries: The Case of Turkey." Hopkins 1975. Chong Lim Kim, "The Cultural Roots of a New Legislatures: Public Perceptions of the Korean National

While many early studies of support misunderstood aspects of legislative politics in developing countries, many were correct in suggesting that where legislative tradition is not firmly established—and, thus, the “reservoir of good will” shallow—diffuse support will be low. However, a long history of legislative politics can produce support for a legislature even where constituent satisfaction with the parliament is low. The data from Algeria suggest that diffuse support can be relatively high, even when specific support, or satisfaction, as we will see, is very low. Chan Woo Park also found in Korea, for example, that with the frequent changes in legislative regime, diffuse support was high while approval was low.<sup>412</sup>

**TABLE VI. 5. Diffuse Support for the Parliament among Moroccan and Algerian Constituents**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
<b>Desired Form of Parliament:</b>		
None	86 (23.1%)	23 (7.1%)
Only Advises	49 (13.2%)	34 (10.4%)
Power to Make Laws	237 (63.7%)	269 (82.5%)
<i>Total</i>	372	326
<b>Opinion on Existence of Parliament:</b>		
Strongly Oppose (1)	27 (3.7%)	24 (3.4%)
Oppose	76 (10.5%)	50 (7.0%)
Support	368 (50.6%)	488 (68.4%)
Strongly Support (2)	256 (35.2%)	152 (21.3%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	727 (3.2)	714 (3.1)
<b>Level of Diffuse Support:</b>		
Support on Both Measures	219 (60.5%)	257 (80.1%)
Support on Neither or Only One Measure	143 (39.5%)	64 (13.9%)
<i>Total</i>	362	321

Questions: (1) Do you believe there should be: No parliament in Algeria/Morocco, a parliament that only advises the government, or a parliament with the power to make laws? (2) Do you strongly support, support, oppose, or strongly oppose the existence of a parliament in Algeria/Morocco?

Assembly," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 3 (1976). Carlos Alberto Astiz, "The Decay of Latin American Legislatures," in *Legislatures in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Allan Kornberg (New York: David McKay Company, 1973), Frank C. Darling, "Marshal Sarit and Absolutist Rule in Thailand," *Pacific Affairs* 3, no. 4 (1960), Mezey, *Comparative Legislatures*. Robert B. Stauffer, "Congress in the Philippine Political System," in *Legislatures in Developmental Perspective*, ed. Allan Kornberg and Lloyd D. Musolf (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1970). Hopkins, "The Kenyan Legislature: Political Functions and Citizen Perceptions." Ralph E. Crow, "Parliament in the Lebanese Political System," in *Legislatures in Developmental Perspective*, ed. Allan Kornberg and Lloyd D. Musolf (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1970).

<sup>412</sup> Chan Wook Park, "Change Is Short but Continuity Is Long: Policy Influence of the National Assembly in Newly Democratized Korea," in *Legislatures: Comparative Perspectives on Representative Assemblies*, ed. Peverill Squire Gerhard Loewenberg, and D. Roderick Kiewiet (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002): 332.

### *How Much Power do Citizens Believe the Parliament Has?*

How much power do citizens believe the parliament has? Do they believe that it currently has the power to make laws? Overall, Moroccans believe their parliament has more power than do Algerians. 56.0 percent of Moroccans, compared with 34.0 percent of Algerians, believe the parliament has enough power to hold the government accountable. This is consistent with the actual role played by the parliaments in the two countries which, although extremely limited, is greater in several meaningful ways in Morocco. For example, debate tends to be livelier in the Moroccan case and, although there are significant limitations in their accountability, ministers are questioned each Wednesday by the upper house (See Table VI. 6.).

Moroccans do not differ to a significant extent from one another to the degree to which they believe their parliaments influence policy. However, both view foreign policy as the least likely to be influenced by the parliament. All of these figures suggest that Moroccans and Algerians are generous with their evaluations of the role their parliaments play in oversight of the executive and influence on policymaking. Thus, although they expect individual deputies will not be helpful with their problems and will be unresponsive to those without a personal connection, Moroccans and Algerians think that the parliament has a relatively robust role in oversight and policymaking.

**TABLE VI. 6. Perceived Power of the Parliament among Moroccan and Algerian Constituents**

	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algeria</i>
Parliament Has Power to Hold the Government Accountable:		
No	278 (44.0%)	419 (66.0%)
Yes	354 (56.0%)	216 (34.0%)
<i>Total</i>	632	635
Role of the Parliament in Social Issues:		
Not Effective (1)	72 (9.8%)	88 (11.9%)
A Little	151 (20.35%)	84 (11.4%)
Somewhat	352 (47.7%)	345 (46.8%)
Great Extent (4)	163 (22.1%)	221 (30.0%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	738 (2.8)	738 (2.9)
Role of the Parliament in Political Issues:		
Not Effective	68 (9.8%)	92 (12.6%)
A Little	130 (18.8%)	138 (18.9%)
Somewhat	314 (45.3%)	329 (45.1%)
Great Extent	181 (26.1%)	170 (23.3%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	693 (2.9)	729 (2.8)
Role of the Parliament in Economic Issues:		
Not Effective	91 (12.5%)	112 (15.5%)
A Little	161 (22.2%)	172 (23.8%)
Somewhat	287 (39.5%)	314 (43.4%)
Great Extent	188 (25.9%)	125 (17.3%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	727 (2.8)	723 (2.6)
Role of the Parliament in Foreign Policy Issues:		
Not Effective	99 (14.8%)	241 (34.0%)
A Little	153 (22.9%)	200 (28.3%)
Somewhat	239 (35.8%)	183 (25.9%)
Great Extent	176 (26.4%)	84 (11.9%)
<i>Total/Mean</i>	667 (2.7)	708 (2.2)

Questions: (1) Does the parliament have the power to hold the government accountable? (2) In your opinion, what is the role of the parliament in social/political/economic/foreign policy issues?

### How is Diffuse Support Formed?

Cultural modernization theory and rational choice institutionalism offer competing explanations for why individuals are more or less supportive of the parliament in Morocco and Algeria.

## Cultural Modernization Theory

Cultural modernization theory suggests that individual modernity, which develops through formal education, urbanization, and socialization, fosters support for modern political institutions. Kalaycioglu argues that expectations and perceptions of the legislature develop both in early as well as later life. In early life, interpersonal trust and basic role expectations of members of parliament form. Support for the national legislature develops as a child's sense of interpersonal trust extends to political institutions, and as that individual engages in formal education and political activities. One's level of modernity and perceptions of the congruency between members' behaviors and expectations are central forces in shaping support for the legislature.<sup>413</sup>

A number of studies in newly-independent states in the 1960s and 1970s found evidence that modernity was related to a syndrome of personal and political background characteristics which build diffuse support for the legislature. These factors included formal education, urban residence, higher income, liberal values, interpersonal trust, knowledge of the parliament, and political participation. For example, Samuel C. Patterson finds correlational evidence in a limited sample for a relationship between education and support.<sup>414</sup> G. R. Boynton finds a relationship between higher income and support, though urban residence was not a factor in his study.<sup>415</sup> Modernity predicts support for the legislature in two of three countries—Korea and Kenya, though not in Turkey—examined in an in-depth study conducted by Kim, Barkan, Turan, and Jewell.<sup>416</sup>

Other studies found that knowledge of the legislature and political participation are predictors of diffuse support. Salience—knowing about the legislature and what it does—is seen as a prerequisite of support, according to Kim and Lowenberg, and is strongly related to support in several countries.<sup>417</sup> Kalaycioglu finds salience is the most important predictor of diffuse support for the legislature because it is related to higher activity levels of deputies in their districts.<sup>418</sup> In two different studies, Samuel C. Patterson and G. R. Boynton find that political

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<sup>413</sup> Kalaycioglu, "Why Legislatures Persist in Developing Countries: The Case of Turkey.": 125-9.

<sup>414</sup> Samuel C. Patterson, "Dimensions of Support in Legislative Systems.": 299.

<sup>415</sup> See G. R. Boynton, "The Structure of Public Support for Legislative Institutions." Samuel C. Patterson also finds correlational evidence in a limited sample for a relationship between income.

<sup>416</sup> Kim, *The Legislative Connection: The Politics of Representation in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey*.

<sup>417</sup> Patterson finds correlation between political knowledge and support. Samuel C. Patterson, "Dimensions of Support in Legislative Systems.": 299. Loewenberg, "Legislatures and Parliaments."

<sup>418</sup> Kalaycioglu, "Why Legislatures Persist in Developing Countries: The Case of Turkey."

participation is correlated with support for the parliament.<sup>419</sup> Studies of support tend not to include interpersonal trust in models, although cultural modernization theory suggests that it should be positively related to diffuse support. Finally, contrary to expectations, one study, which considered the relationship between liberal values to support, found that support for the legislature can exist independently of democratic values.<sup>420</sup>

Finally, satisfaction with how well the government is functioning and with the policies of the government and its institutions predict support for the legislature.<sup>421</sup> Kalaycioglu suggested that these forms of satisfaction may cause individuals to filter out or to disagree with negative statements about the legislature.<sup>422</sup>

Cultural modernization theory has been criticized because it suggests that political orientations are deterministic, primarily outside the control of the individual, and shaped by deeply engrained “habits of the heart,” rather than by rational calculus of the most efficacious political behavior. Elements of the theory see some political cultures as less modern, while others are more modern and some more conducive to democracy. Still others are less conducive to its development and have been particularly discredited.

Cultural modernization theory suggests the following hypotheses:

*H<sub>CM1</sub>: Higher education is related to greater support for the legislature*

*H<sub>CM2</sub>: Urban residence will be related to greater support for the legislature*

*H<sub>CM3</sub>: Higher economic satisfaction is related to greater support for the legislature*

*H<sub>CM4</sub>: Liberal values are related to greater support for the legislature*

*H<sub>CM5</sub>: Higher interpersonal trust is related to greater support for the legislature*

*H<sub>CM6</sub>: Great knowledge of the parliament (salience) is related to greater support for the legislature*

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<sup>419</sup> Samuel C. Patterson, "Dimensions of Support in Legislative Systems.": 299. G. R. Boynton, "The Structure of Public Support for Legislative Institutions."

<sup>420</sup> Kalaycioglu, "Why Legislatures Persist in Developing Countries: The Case of Turkey."

<sup>421</sup> Mezey, *Comparative Legislatures*.

<sup>422</sup> In a similar vein, support may be related to evaluations of past regime (Mishler and Rose 1996); the capacity in general of the government to deliver goods, especially economic goods (Norton 1997); and the performance of the system/leg as a whole (Kalaycioglu 1980). Kalaycioglu, "Why Legislatures Persist in Developing Countries: The Case of Turkey.", William and Richard Rose Mishler, "Trajectories of Fear and Hope: Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 28, no. 4 (1996). Philip Norton, "Introduction," *Parliamentary Affairs* 50, no. 3 (1997), Richard Rose and William Mishler, "Trajectories of Fear and Hope: Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 28, no. 4 (1996).

*H<sub>CM7</sub>: Higher political participation is related to greater support for the legislature*

*H<sub>CM8</sub>: Higher satisfaction with government functioning is related to greater support for the legislature*

Years of formal schooling is used as a measure of education.<sup>423</sup> Urban residence is measured by the percent of the population of the electoral district (Algeria, 1987) or the closest approximation of the electoral district, the province, (Morocco, 1998) which lives in an urban area.<sup>424</sup> Economic satisfaction is a self-report measure of how satisfied one's household is with their current financial situation.<sup>425</sup> Support for traditional gender roles is used as a proxy for liberal democratic values.<sup>426</sup> Level of interpersonal trust is measured by support for the statement that others around one can be trusted.<sup>427</sup> Knowledge of the legislature is measured by a self-reported evaluation of how well the individual understands the functions of the parliament (See Table VI. 7.). Political participation is measured by interest in the outcome of elections.<sup>428</sup> Finally, satisfaction is measured as agreement or disagreement with the statement that the government in the capital is doing a good job running the country's affairs.<sup>429</sup>

### **Political Attitudes and Behaviors of Rational Actors**

Kalaycioglu's work took a first step toward distancing itself from cultural modernization theory by arguing that legislatures themselves undermine their own success. This contention suggested that the behaviors of members have a direct impact on the attitudes (and perhaps also behaviors) of citizens. If attitudes of individual legislators are shaped by members, they are context-sensitive, time-invariant, and responsive to changes in reward calculations. Although Kalaycioglu's work heavily emphasized cultural modernization theory, it also described a process in which the formation of attitudes toward the legislature and behaviors involving interactions

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<sup>423</sup> Ranges from no schooling (0 years) zero grades to doctorate (18 years).

<sup>424</sup> Ranges from 25% to 99% in selected Algerian districts and from 9% to 100% in Moroccan districts.

<sup>425</sup> Algeria: Very dissatisfied (13%), dissatisfied (34%), satisfied (44%), and very satisfied (9%). Morocco: Very dissatisfied (14%), dissatisfied (26%), satisfied (53%), and very satisfied (7%).

<sup>426</sup> Question: Which statement is closest to your opinion: It would be better if men and women adhered to traditional gender roles, or, it would be better if women were able to work outside the home and men helped with children. Algeria: 89% traditional and 11% progressive. Morocco: 66% traditional and 34% progressive.

<sup>427</sup> Question: One should worry about being cheated when interacting with people outside one's family. Algeria: Strongly agree (7%), agree (39%), disagree (41%), and strongly disagree (13%). Morocco: Strongly agree (10%), agree (32%), disagree (42%), and strongly disagree (16%).

<sup>428</sup> Interest the outcome of elections is measured on a scale from 1 to 7. Mean is 3.9 in Algeria and 3.6 in Morocco.

<sup>429</sup> Algeria: Very dissatisfied (8%), dissatisfied (22%), satisfied (53%), and very satisfied (17%). Morocco: Very dissatisfied (25%), dissatisfied (35%), satisfied (37%), and very satisfied (4%).

with legislators are based on rational calculation. In this view, participation leads to interest in politics, knowledge of the system, and political efficacy. A more politically-involved individual will have a greater number of contacts, and the number and efficiency of these contacts will also depend on one's position within the political structure. Those with the contacts and knowledge of how to advance demands will get more from legislators and are, therefore, likely to be more satisfied and supportive of political institutions, including and especially the legislature.<sup>430</sup>

The latter process appears to fit anecdotal evidence not only from field research in Morocco and Algeria, but also from research on and conversations with members of parliament from Africa that a "learning" process occurs in which legislators are central as links through which individuals develop new rational calculations which reflect new political norms and institutions. In a personal communication, a legislator from Kenya suggested that constituents need to learn about the new role of the member under democracy. This role, in her words, was not to provide help with personal problems, but rather to oversee the government and make laws in the interest of the whole nation. If particularized demands were to be handled, these should be in response to problems in the bureaucracy or problems of development involving a large number of constituents.

Citizens may also learn about changes in the efficacious of their vote and their ability to ask officials for assistance. Through alternance, voters in Senegal became aware that they are efficacious and that they can vote for someone who is responsive to district needs.<sup>431</sup> A socialist deputy in Morocco who had an office in a small urban area suggested that he provided office hours and services to constituents in order to teach them that their vote could be used to elect someone who is responsive to their needs, in contrast to the five other members in the city's two electoral districts, whom he described as absent and living in Rabat.<sup>432</sup>

These anecdotes concur with field evidence which suggests that individuals who are well-connected and who extract personal benefits from relationships from members will be more supportive of the parliament. In Algeria, a young, educated male expressed interest in having a member of parliament with a "strong personality" who could get resources for the *willaya*. He seemed disinterested in other political parties who, from the perspective of an outsider, seem

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<sup>430</sup> Kalaycioglu, "Why Legislatures Persist in Developing Countries: The Case of Turkey.": 127. Kalaycioglu seemed to advance the contention that actors are rational though he simultaneously suggested that support could change as a result of modernization or experiences. He seemed to advance a theory of public opinion consistent with both cultural modernization and rational choice institutionalism, but in so doing introduced some inconsistencies into his approach.

<sup>431</sup> Brian Levy and Kpundeh Sahr, eds., *Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004): 115.

<sup>432</sup> Morocco, Member #2, April 2006.

closer to liberal democratic ideals. Instead, he was reasonably well-connected, knowing two members of parliament from his district and having a good relationship with two political parties.<sup>433</sup> His approach to politics had more to do with how to rationally extract the most benefits for himself, his family, and his region than with voting for the most “democratic” party in the most abstract sense. Thus, one could understand this individual’s political attitudes not as lacking in democratic values, but rather as a rational response given the logic of the political system in Algeria.

### **Position in Structure of Political Power**

There are two ways in which one’s position within the structure of political power may influence diffuse support for the parliament. The first is through direct and indirect relationships with members of parliament: either having a friend or family member who is a deputy or simply knowing the name of a member of parliament from one’s district. The latter probably measures an indirect connection while the former is clearly a direct connection. Those who enjoy one of these two types of relationships with deputies are more likely to extract benefits and also to be more supportive of the legislature.

The second area of position within the power structure is inclusion in groups whose interests are not well represented by a parliament dominated by the policies of an authoritarian regime and powerful class or clan interests, rather than the policy preferences of ordinary citizens. This includes more religious individuals and perhaps also women.

The parliament may be less representative of religious individuals because the Islamic opposition is allowed only to participate in a limited and controlled manner in both countries. Cultural theories and conventional wisdom suggests that individuals with stronger religious convictions hold a more undemocratic political culture and, thus, are more likely to be opposed to the legislature. More religious individuals may be more likely to desire a stronger parliament because they have no other way than through an authoritarian government to advocate for their policy preferences.

Although the Moroccan monarchy is the Commander of the Faithful, and the president of Algeria must be a Muslim—and thus neither government is secular—both advance policies were viewed inconsistent with Islam by key segments of the population. One segment of the political elite, and those of the political preferences of the population, is not represented by state institutions because of repression, manipulation, and cooption of Islamist opposition, including

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<sup>433</sup> Algeria, Constituent #5, April 2007.

the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria and the Justice and Charity Party in Morocco. In 2006, the Algerian president reversed a decision of parliament to allow the importation of alcohol, a move viewed by some observers as driven by key interests in the military involved in the sale of alcohol.<sup>434</sup> In Morocco, a man expressed anger to me because western countries: “. . . force us to change laws about polygamy. They force us to sell alcohol.” In reality it may be the Moroccan government, elite, and civil society which are responsible for these laws, but there is not a system of representative government by which ordinary people can change these laws in line with their values if these policy preferences are contrary to those of the elite and the government. Thus, those whose interests are less well-represented, and in this case more religious people, will be less supportive of the legislature.

If we accept number for parliamentary seats as a measure of representation, women’s interests are less well-represented in both parliaments. Further, women are less likely than men and women to contact deputies in all of the ways measured by the survey. Thus, on average, women should be less supportive of the legislature than are men. Although women’s interests are defined differently by different individuals, many female members of parliament see their primary contribution as bringing in new issues and perspectives that would not automatically be introduced by their male counterparts. The Moroccan parliament has also played a role, though not the key role, in the passage of the new PSC. Thus, there is some possibility in Morocco that women would be more supportive of the legislature than would men.

*H<sub>PS1</sub>: Having a deputy who is a friend or family member is related to higher support for the legislature*

*H<sub>PS2</sub>: Knowing the name of a deputy is related to higher support for the legislature*

*H<sub>PS3</sub>: Female gender is related to lower support for the legislature*

*H<sub>PS4</sub>: Higher personal religiosity is related to higher support for the legislature*

*H<sub>PSS</sub>: Higher social religiosity is related to higher support for the legislature*

Having a deputy as a friend or family member and knowing a current deputy from one’s district are indicator variables (See Table III. 11.). Two measures of religiosity and one measure of support for Islamist parties are included in the regression. First, personal religiosity is measured by the degree to which religious considerations are important for dress choice.<sup>435</sup>

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<sup>434</sup> Morocco, Constituent #2, November 2006.

<sup>435</sup> Algeria: Very important (8%), somewhat important (28%), and not at all important (64%). Morocco: Very important (17%), somewhat important (39%), and not at all important (44%).

Second, political religiosity is measured on a seven-point scale by the degree to which one believes that religion and politics ought not to be separate.<sup>436</sup> Third, confidence in Islamist parties measures not only approval of conservative values, *but also* confidence that the conservative political parties have the will and ability to deliver on the values and preferences of their supporters.<sup>437</sup>

### **Legislators as Links**

In a certain sense, having a deputy as a family member or friend, or knowing the name of a deputy is a way of testing whether deputies act as links between the outcome of elite-level bargaining and the political attitudes of ordinary citizens. There are other ways as well. First, how well individuals evaluate the performance of members should be related to support for having a strong parliament.<sup>438</sup> Second, studies from East Asia, in particular, suggest the importance of perceptions of institutional functioning for shaping political attitudes.<sup>439</sup> Michael Herb offers historical evidence from Europe which suggests that where the public viewed elections as fairly administered, transition to parliamentarianism occurred. By contrast, when elections were marred by corruption and rigging, weak regime legitimacy hindered transition.<sup>440</sup> A measure of how transparent and open an individual believes elections and access to deputies to be is likely to predict support for a strong legislature. Third, deputies who deal with a large number of demands and who are more visible through party meetings and constituency visits are likely not only to influence the support of individuals directly, but also to have particular “spillover” effects in their districts; for example, by inducing other deputies to also provide services to citizens.<sup>441</sup> Fourth, responsiveness to individual citizens needs should also increase support for the legislature.<sup>442</sup> Those who have had a satisfying casework resolution with a

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<sup>436</sup> Measured on a same from 1 (No influence) to 7 (Complete fusion). Mean in Algeria is 3.0. Mean in Morocco is 3.5.

<sup>437</sup> Algeria: No confidence (20%), some confidence (54%), and a lot of confidence (26%). Morocco: No confidence (36%), some confidence (67%), and a lot of confidence (27%).

<sup>438</sup> See Mezey, *Comparative Legislatures*.

<sup>439</sup> See, for example, Doh Chull and Chong-Min Park Shin, "The Democratization of Mass Political Orientations in South Korea," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 15 (2003).

<sup>440</sup> Herb, "Princes, Parliaments, and the Prospects for Democracy in the Gulf." See also Margaret Susan Thompson and Joel H. Silbly, "Historical Research on 19th-Century Legislatures," in *Handbook of Legislative Research*, ed. Samuel C. Patterson, Gerhard Lowenberg, and Malcolm E. Jewell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).

<sup>441</sup> Kalaycioglu, "Why Legislatures Persist in Developing Countries: The Case of Turkey.", Kim, *The Legislative Connection: The Politics of Representation in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey*, Mezey, "Constituency Demands and Legislative Support: An Experiment."

<sup>442</sup> Kim, *The Legislative Connection: The Politics of Representation in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey*.

member of parliament are most likely to support a strong legislature. Fifth, those who have contacted a member in one or more ways in the district, but who do not know the name of a deputy and who do not have a deputy as a friend or family member, are a measure of whether contact alone builds support. Finally, a measure is included for the percentage of the deputies in the district who are from the large ruling parties. In these districts, individuals may be more pro-status quo and they may also have more effective casework operations because deputies are more likely to be connected to the local representatives of the executive, such as the *wally* in Algeria and the governor in Morocco.

*H<sub>LL1</sub>: Evaluating members from one's district more highly is related to higher support for the legislature*

*H<sub>LL2</sub>: Higher perceived institutional openness and transparency is related to higher support for the legislature*

*H<sub>LL3</sub>: Individuals who live in districts with a higher proportion with higher average casework loads will have higher support for the legislature*

*H<sub>LL4</sub>: Individuals who have had a satisfying casework experience will be more likely to support having a strong legislature*

*H<sub>LL5</sub>: Having had contact with a member one does not know or have a connection with is related to lower support for the legislature*

*H<sub>LL6</sub>: Individuals who live in districts with a higher proportion of deputies from large pro-government parties will have higher levels of support for the legislature*

Evaluation of members from one's district is measured as a scale of agreement to the statement; overall, the deputies from this district are doing an excellent, good, fair, or poor job (See Table III. 9.). Perceived institutional openness and transparency is a scale created by the two measures in Table III. 13. Mean casework load is taken from responses to the deputy survey linked to district.<sup>443</sup> A satisfying casework is someone who has ever contacted a deputy from his or her district and said that this contact was satisfying or very satisfying (see Table III. 12.). Having had contact with a member whom one does not know or have a connection with is generated as a variable where at least one of the six measure of contact are present, but "know" and "friend" are not (See Table III. 9. and III. 11.). Finally, election results are used to generate

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<sup>443</sup> Ranges from 13.5 to 85 requests per month in selected districts in Algeria and from 26.8 to 206.4 in selected districts in Morocco, where the mean is taken at the level of the province, not the district, due to smaller district magnitudes and differences between administrative and electoral boundaries which make lower-level measures imprecise in some cases.

the proportion of deputies from large pro-government parties in the district, defined as the FLN in Algeria and non-Islamist parties in Morocco with 40 or more seats in Parliament.<sup>444</sup>

## Results

Morocco and Algeria differ in terms of their regime type (i.e. institutional setting), history of parliament liberalization, parliamentary membership, and level of debate in the parliament. These differences may help account for greater levels of knowledge of the parliament in Morocco, higher levels of contact between members and citizens in Algeria, and higher satisfaction with, and support for, the parliament in Algeria. However, both are authoritarian regimes which engage electoral manipulation and patronage to maintain ineffective parliaments. The quality of the representative link is similar in the two countries. Within the universe of cases of authoritarianism, at least in the Arab Middle East, Morocco and Algeria provide a comparison of arguments based on the effect of casework and other deputy-citizen interactions, on the formation of support. If similar individual-level dynamics are found in the two countries, this result will suggest that the quality of the representative link under electoral authoritarianism, rather than the specific institutional setting, is an important determinant of the attitudes of ordinary citizens, as suggested by the conceptual framework.

Although the preceding hypotheses relate to diffuse support, they will first be applied to predicting short-term satisfaction with the parliament. Next, the same regressors will be used to model diffuse support for the parliament. All independent variables are standardized from 0 to 1.

### Satisfaction with the Parliament

The survey provides multiple ways of measuring satisfaction with the parliament. Ordered logit is used to model one of them: overall evaluation of the parliament (See Table III. 9.).

#### *Model I: Cultural Modernization Theory*

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<sup>444</sup> Percentage of deputies from the majority party, the FLN, in Algeria ranges from 41% to 75%. In Morocco, large parties are majority parliamentary groups with more than 40 seats: Group of the Movement (MP), Group Socialist (USFP), Group Istiqlal (Istiqlal) and Independents Group (RNI). This excludes the Islamist Group, the PJD. Proportion of seats in district from large groups ranges from 25% to 75% in Morocco. Note that all non-opposition parties were also tested in Morocco and were also statistically insignificant.

Model I suggests that, when tested alone, some observable implications of cultural modernization theory explains variation in satisfaction with the performance of the parliament (See Tables VI. 7. and VI. 8.). While Algerians with higher economic satisfaction, more liberal gender values, greater knowledge of the functioning of the parliament, higher interest in politics, and greater overall satisfaction with government performance are more likely to believe the parliament is doing a good job, those with higher education, who live in urban areas, and who have less interpersonal trust are more likely to believe the parliament is performing well. Similarly, in Morocco, while greater interest in politics and satisfaction with government performance leads to greater satisfaction with the parliament, greater knowledge of the parliament predicts lower satisfaction with its functioning. These results are inconsistent with many of the most important predictions of cultural modernization theory.

These results, which suggest that more-educated urban dwellers in Algeria are less approving of the job the parliament is doing, are consistent with conventional wisdom in MENA politics, but are contrary to what earlier studies suggested about modernity and satisfaction. Elections in Algeria and Iran suggest that turnout is lower in urban areas because citizens in these areas are more aware of “les enjeux” and, thus, likely to participate in elections. Lower turnout and greater numbers of null votes in urban areas, for example, have characterized Moroccan elections since 1963.<sup>445</sup>

Most of the variables, however, fail to reach statistical significance of the model of satisfaction in Morocco, suggesting a different or perhaps more nuanced picture of satisfaction there. Moroccans who are more interested in politics and more approving of the government are generally more likely to be satisfied with the parliament. Further, the difference in the sign on knowledge of the parliament (salience) in the two countries suggests that knowledge builds satisfaction in Algeria, but weakens it in Morocco. Adding more variables to be the model may help clarify why this difference exists.

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<sup>445</sup> Munson, "The Elections of 1993 and Democratization in Morocco."

**TABLE VI. 7. Determinants of Satisfaction in Morocco (Model I)**

Model Estimated	Ordered Logit Coefficients	Marginal Effects <sup>1</sup> (Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome)		
		Fair=2	Good=3	Excellent=4
Higher education	.02(.29)	.00(.05)	.00(.02)	.00(.00)
Urban residence	-.16(.28)	-.03(.05)	-.01(.02)	-.00(.00)
Higher economic satisfaction	.20(.46)	.03(.08)	.01(.03)	.00(.00)
More liberal values	.11(.18)	.02(.03)	.01(.01)	.00(.00)
Higher interpersonal trust	.41(.39)	.07(.07)	.03(.02)	.00(.00)
Higher knowledge of parliament	-1.02(.40)**	-.17(.07)**	-.06(.03)**	-.01(.00)*
Higher interest in politics	1.01(.27)***	.17(.05)***	.06(.02)***	.01(.00)*
Higher political satisfaction	2.91(.46)***	.50(.09)***	.18(.03)***	.03(.01)**
N	636			
LR Chi <sup>2</sup>	88.63			
Prob. > Chi <sup>2</sup>	.0000***			
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.0738			
Log Likelihood	-556.081			

*p* < .05 \*\* *p* < .01 \*\*\* *p* < .001 two-tailed test. Cut points omitted. Standard Errors are in parentheses. Poor=1 is the reference group. <sup>1</sup>  $\partial y/\partial x$  for variable means, change of dummy variables from 0 to 1

**TABLE VI. 8. Determinants of Satisfaction in Algeria (Model I)**

Model Estimated	Ordered Logit Coefficients	Marginal Effects <sup>1</sup> (Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome)		
		Fair=2	Good=3	Excellent=4
Higher education	-1.07(.44)*	-.19(.07)**	-.06(.03)*	No obs.
Urban residence	-.98(.49)*	-.17(.09)*	-.05(.03)*	
Higher economic satisfaction	2.35(.59)***	.41(.11)***	.13(.04)***	
More liberal values	.93(.35)**	.12(.03)***	.07(.03)*	
Higher interpersonal trust	-1.11(.57)*	-.20(.10)	-.06(.03)	
Higher knowledge of parliament	2.40(.72)***	.42(.12)***	.13(.05)**	
Higher interest in politics	1.34(.52)**	.24(.10)*	.07(.03)**	
Higher political satisfaction	2.72(.74)***	.48(.14)***	.15(.04)***	
N	504			
LR Chi <sup>2</sup>	63.70			
Prob. > Chi <sup>2</sup>	.0000***			
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.1744			
Log Likelihood	-389..89			

\*  $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$  two-tailed test. Cut points omitted. Standard Errors are in parentheses. Poor=1 is the reference group. <sup>1</sup>  $\partial y / \partial x$  for variable means, change of dummy variables from 0 to 1

*Model II: Position in Structure of Political Power*

The first model tested the effect of general satisfaction with government functioning on satisfaction with the performance of the parliament (See Tables VI. 9. and VI. 10.). Model II adds measures of one's position within the structure of political power, demonstrating that in Algeria, higher education, urban residence, and lower economic satisfaction are still related to lower satisfaction with the parliament, but that the effects of the other variables from Model I are no longer statistically significant. Both having a deputy as a family member or friend and knowing the name of a deputy predicts higher satisfaction with the parliament. The size of the effect is greater for having a friend who is a deputy than for simply knowing the name of a deputy from one's district.

In Morocco, the addition of measures of one's position in the structure of political power suggests that knowing the name of a deputy from one's district is positively related to satisfaction with the parliament, although having a friend who is a deputy is not statistically significant. Individuals who hold a less secular view of the relationship between religion and politics and who have more confidence in Islamist parties are more likely to be satisfied with the performance of the parliament in Morocco, suggesting at least in the short-term, more religious individuals are relatively more satisfied with the representation of their interests in parliament. With the addition of more variables, the effect of knowledge of the parliament on satisfaction remains positive in Algeria and negative in Morocco.

**TABLE VI. 9. Determinants of Satisfaction in Morocco (Model II)**

Model Estimated	Ordered Logit Coefficients	Marginal Effects <sup>1</sup> (Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome)		
		Fair=2	Good=3	Excellent=4
Higher education	-.16(.36)	-.03(.06)	-.01(.02)	-.00(.00)
Urban residence	.05(.35)	.01(.06)	.00(.02)	.00(.00)
Higher economic satisfaction	.74(.54)	.13(.10)	.04(.03)	.00(.00)
More liberal values	.26(.22)	.05(.04)	.01(.01)	.00(.00)
Higher interpersonal trust	.33(.46)	.06(.08)	.02(.03)	.00(.00)
Higher knowledge of parliament	-.91(.49)	-.16(.09)	-.05(.03)	-.00(.00)
Higher interest in politics	.15(.35)	.03(.06)	.01(.02)	.00(.00)
Higher political satisfaction	3.00(.55)***	.53(.11)***	.17(.04)***	.02(.01)*
Female	.17(.22)	.03(.04)	.01(.01)	.00(.00)
Higher social religiosity	-.55(.45)	-.10(.08)	-.03(.03)	-.00(.00)
Higher political religiosity	.89(.43)*	.16(.08)*	.05(.02)*	.00(.00)
Higher confidence in Islamic parties	2.42(.40)***	.43(.08)***	.14(.03)***	.01(.01)*
Know name of deputy	.66(.21)**	.11(.04)**	.04(.02)**	.00(.00)
Have deputy friend	.25(.38)	.04(.07)	.02(.03)	.00(.00)
N	495			
LR Chi <sup>2</sup>	132.61			
Prob. > Chi <sup>2</sup>	.0000***			
Pseudo R2	.1427			
Log Likelihood	-398.335			

$p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$  two-tailed test. Cut points omitted. Standard Errors are in parentheses. Poor=1 is the reference group. <sup>1</sup>  $\partial y / \partial x$  for variable means, change of dummy variables from 0 to 1

**TABLE VI. 10. Determinants of Satisfaction in Algeria (Model II)**

Model Estimated	Ordered Logit Coefficients	Marginal Effects <sup>1</sup> (Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome)		
		Fair=2	Good=3	Excellent=4
Higher education	-1.18(.51)*	-.25(.10)*	-.04(.02)	No obs.
Urban residence	-1.40(.56)**	-.29(.12)*	-.05(.02)*	
Higher economic satisfaction	2.16(.63)***	.45(.13)***	.08(.03)**	
More liberal values	.49(.42)	.10(.07)	.02(.02)	
Higher interpersonal trust	-.38(.60)	-.08(.13)	-.01(.02)	
Higher knowledge of parliament	1.15(.80)	.24(.16)	.04(.03)	
Higher interest in politics	.99(.62)	.21(.13)	.04(.02)	
Higher political satisfaction	2.03(.93)*	.43(.20)*	.07(.03)*	
Female	-.06(.28)	-.01(.06)	-.00(.01)	
Higher social religiosity	.47(.62)	.10(.13)	.02(.02)	
Higher political religiosity	-.24(.85)	-.05(.18)	-.01(.03)	
Higher confidence in Islamic parties	.27(.59)	.06(.12)	.01(.02)	
Know name of deputy	.51(.26)*	.11(.05)*	.01(.01)	
Have deputy friend	.92(.44)*	.16(.06)**	.05(.03)	
N	410			
LR Chi <sup>2</sup>	62.34			
Prob. > Chi <sup>2</sup>	.0000***			
Pseudo R2	.1458			
Log Likelihood	-308.251			

*p* < .05 \*\* *p* < .01 \*\*\* *p* < .001 two-tailed test. Cut points omitted. Standard Errors are in parentheses. Poor=1 is the reference group. <sup>1</sup>  $\partial y / \partial x$  for variable means, change of dummy variables from 0 to 1

*Model III: Legislators as Links*

Finally, how do perceptions of, and experiences with, deputies add to an understanding of why some individuals view the parliament in a favorable light than do others? Model III suggests that once the full model is considered for Algeria, the only variable from cultural modernization theory which predicts variation either way in satisfaction with the parliament is economic satisfaction, which is positively related to satisfaction with the parliament (See Tables VI. 11. and VI. 12.). Knowing a member of parliament, having more favorable evaluations of the job deputies from one's district are doing, and having more favorable perceptions of elections and casework operations predict higher satisfaction with the parliament. The latter effect suggests the importance of political outputs of institutions—how well democratic reform is reflected in elections and the constituency service efforts of deputies—in determining one's short-term satisfaction with the parliament. However, these results suggest that satisfaction is part of a syndrome of more general satisfaction with how one is doing economically and politically under the current regime.

In Morocco, the results for the first seven variables in the full model are similar to those for Algeria: satisfaction with overall government functioning predicts satisfaction with the parliament. Position in the structure of power is also important, however. Knowing the name of a member of parliament from one's district predicts higher satisfaction. However, higher confidence in Islamist parties also predicts satisfaction, suggesting those who prefer religious parties are more confident in, and satisfied with, the parliament. In Morocco, the PJD is regarded by many citizens and western observers as being the most internally democratic and hard-working political party. As in Algeria, both more favorable evaluations of the job deputies from one's district are doing, and having more favorable as well as perceptions of that elections and casework operations, are more transparent and democratic predict higher satisfaction with the parliament. Further, individuals who do not enjoy a direct or indirect personal connection with a member but, nevertheless, have had contact with a member in at least one of the six ways are also more likely to be satisfied in the short-run with the parliament.

**TABLE VI. 11. Determinants of Satisfaction in Morocco (Model III)**

Model Estimated	Ordered Logit Coefficients	Marginal Effects <sup>1</sup> (Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome)		
		Fair=2	Good=3	Excellent=3
Higher education	-.22(.41)	-.04(.08)	-.01(.02)	-.00(.00)
Urban residence	.30(.43)	.06(.08)	.01(.02)	.00(.00)
Higher economic satisfaction	.46(.59)	.09(.11)	.02(.02)	.00(.00)
More liberal values	.31(.25)	.06(.05)	.01(.01)	.00(.00)
Higher interpersonal trust	.23(.51)	.04(.10)	.01(.02)	.00(.00)
Higher knowledge of parliament	-.61(.54)	-.12(.11)	-.02(.02)	-.00(.00)
Higher interest in politics	-.36(.40)	-.07(.08)	-.01(.02)	-.00(.00)
Higher political satisfaction	2.96(.62)***	.57(.13)***	.12(.03)***	.01(.01)*
Female	.13(.24)	.02(.05)	.01(.01)	.00(.00)
Higher social religiosity	-.78(.49)	-.15(.10)	-.03(.02)	-.00(.00)
Higher political religiosity	.69(.46)	.13(.09)	.03(.02)	.00(.00)
Higher confidence in Islamic parties	2.19(.45)***	.42(.09)***	.09(.02)***	.01(.00)*
Know name of deputy	.68(.25)**	.13(.05)**	.03(.01)*	.00(.00)
Have deputy friend	.22(.42)	.04(.08)	.01(.02)	.00(.00)
Better evaluation members	2.49(.57)***	.48(.12)***	.10(.03)***	.01(.01)*
Better perception elections	2.78(.57)***	.54(.12)***	.11(.03)***	.01(.01)*
Higher average caseloads	.32(.38)	.06(.07)	.01(.01)	.00(.00)
Satisfying casework resolution	-.03(.50)	-.01(.10)	-.00(.02)	-.00(.00)
Contact, no connection with deputy	1.05(.36)**	.19(.06)***	.06(.03)*	.01(.00)
Percentage large parties in district	-1.36(.78)	-.26(.15)	-.05(.03)	-.01(.00)
N	444			
LR Chi <sup>2</sup>	170.28			
Prob. > Chi <sup>2</sup>	.0000***			
Pseudo R2	.2041			
Log Likelihood	-332.017			

$p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$  two-tailed test. Cut points omitted. Standard Errors are in parentheses. Poor=1 is the reference group. <sup>1</sup>  $\partial y / \partial x$  for variable means, change of dummy variables from 0 to 1

**TABLE VI. 12. Determinants of Satisfaction in Algeria (Model III)**

Model Estimated	Ordered Logit Coefficients	Marginal Effects <sup>1</sup> (Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome)		
		Fair=2	Good=3	Excellent=4
Higher education	-.01(.67)	-.00(.15)	-.00(.02)	No obs.
Urban residence	-.84(.82)	-.19(.18)	-.02(.02)	
Higher economic satisfaction	1.55(.72)*	.35(.16)*	.04(.02)	
More liberal values	-.22(.45)	-.05(.10)	-.01(.01)	
Higher interpersonal trust	.32(.70)	.07(.16)	.01(.02)	
Higher knowledge of parliament	1.00(.82)	.22(.18)	.03(.02)	
Higher interest in politics	.25(.64)	.06(.14)	.01(.02)	
Higher political satisfaction	1.41(1.16)	.31(.26)	.04(.03)	
Female	-.44(.32)	-.10(.07)	-.01(.01)	
Higher social religiosity	.51(.72)	.11(.16)	.01(.02)	
Higher political religiosity	-.08(.97)	-.02(.22)	-.00(.02)	
Higher confidence in Islamic parties	.45(.63)	.10(.14)	.01(.02)	
Know name of deputy	.57(.32)	.13(.07)	.02(.01)	
Have deputy friend	.38(.46)	.08(.09)	.01(.02)	
Better evaluation members	3.86(1.24)**	.86(.30)**	.10(.03)**	
Better perception elections	2.65(.86)**	.59(.19)***	.07(.04)	
Higher average caseloads	-1.20(.92)	-.27(.21)	-.03(.02)	
Satisfying casework resolution	-.00(.81)	-.00(.18)	-.00(.02)	
Contact, no connection with deputy	.03(.31)	.01(.07)	.00(.01)	
Percentage large parties in district	-.21(1.44)	-.05(.32)	-.01(.04)	
N	353			
LR Chi <sup>2</sup>	89.47			
Prob. > Chi <sup>2</sup>	.0000***			
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.2153			
Log Likelihood	-243.885			

$p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$  two-tailed test. Cut points omitted. Standard Errors are in parentheses. Poor=1 is the reference group. <sup>1</sup>  $\partial y / \partial x$  for variable means, change of dummy variables from 0 to 1

## **Summary of Models of Satisfaction (Specific Support)**

The results of the three sets of models suggest strongly that cultural modernization theory is incapable of explaining variation in satisfaction with the parliament. When considered alone (Model I), the results contradict the theory in Algeria and fail to reach statistical significance in Morocco.

A second finding is that one's personal position within the structure of political power is a predictor of satisfaction with the legislature, but only in Morocco.

Third, more religious individuals and those who are more supportive of Islamist parties are most satisfied with the parliament in Morocco, perhaps owing to the more robust performance of Islamist parties when compared with regime "façade" parties.

A fourth finding is that satisfaction in both countries is shaped by positive evaluations of the job deputies from one's district are doing, even if measures of average caseloads in the direct and having had a satisfying casework request resolution do not predict higher satisfaction in either country. Further, satisfaction also appears to be shaped by perceptions that elections are more transparent elections and deputy-citizen relationship less susceptible to clientelism. This effect suggests that members act as links to shape political attitudes of citizens; in this case, satisfaction.

## **Diffuse Support for the Parliament**

More importantly, however, how does position within the political structure and experiences with legislators shape diffuse support for having a strong parliament?

### *Model IV: Cultural Modernization Theory*

Unsurprisingly, greater interest in politics increases diffuse support for the parliament in Algeria. Those individuals who hold more liberal gender values are more likely to be satisfied with the parliament, but less supportive of having a parliament with the power to make laws. This finding suggests that, with only seven regressors considered, democratic values do not necessarily lead to confidence that a strong parliament will best serve the nation. Instead, these individuals may have more confidence in the post-conflict Algeria in a strong leader.

In Morocco, those in urban areas are more likely to support having a strong parliament as are those who have a higher interest in politics. In general, these findings are not inconsistent

with findings from previous studies in the 1970s and 1980s, which suggested that modernity predicted support for a strong parliament.

*Model V: Position in the Structure of Political Power*

The addition of five more regressors suggests that less liberal gender values and greater knowledge of the parliament are related in Algeria. However, here, confidence in Islamist political parties also plays a significant role in support for having a strong parliament.

Similarly, in Morocco, higher support for having a parliament with the power to make laws is more common among individuals living in urban areas, those who are more religious, and those who have higher confidence in Islamist parties. Unlike for satisfaction in the parliament, the impact of religiously on diffuse support for the parliament is constant in both countries.

*Model VI: Legislators as Links*

In Algeria, the full model reveals that greater interest in politics and higher satisfaction with general government functioning are positively related to support. Higher education and more liberal values are negatively related to support, however (See Tables VI. 13. and VI. 14.). This result suggests that those who we might think would be most likely to support having a strong parliament—a key democratic reform—show less confidence in having a strong parliament.

Those who adhere to a less secular view of the relationship between religion and politics, and have greater confidence in Islamist parties, are more likely to support a strong parliament. It is notable that this effect holds not only for Islamist parties, but also for confidence in other parties. Views that elections and the deputy-citizen relationship are more transparent and open are related to higher support for the parliament. This result is consistent with historical evidence which creates a link between the belief that elections are free and fair and the development of the parliamentary system in Europe.<sup>446</sup>

Although this is one way to conceive of legislators as links between the outcome of elite-level bargaining and popular political ideas, other measures suggest that this link may not promote support for a strong, democratic parliament. Both the average number of requests taken in one's district and the percent of deputies belonging to the majority party in one's district (FLN) are negatively related to individual-level support for the parliament. Because of the patronage

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<sup>446</sup> See, for example, Herb, "Princes, Parliaments, and the Prospects for Democracy in the Gulf."

system favors pro-regime deputies, these deputies may be more effective at solving problems. Individuals in districts where more casework is performed appear to be less likely to support a strong parliament. This result suggests that constituency service, rather than being a new, open form of representation, may instead be a continuation of patronage patterns which existed prior to liberalization.

As in Algeria, those who adhere to a less secular view of the relationship between religion and politics, and have greater confidence in Islamist parties, are most likely to support a strong parliament. Views that elections and the deputy-citizen relationship are more transparent and open are also related to higher support for the parliament.

Further, the puzzling, though somewhat intuitive relationship between districts with more average casework requests and lower support for the parliament also exists in Morocco. It may be that where members are more effective in solving requests, they may be part of a larger government apparatus which is efficient at solving problems of citizens. Individuals in those districts may be more pro-regime and, thus, less supportive of the parliament. Or, it may be that efficient resolution of particularized demands—clientalist or otherwise—depresses support for democratic reform in ways which may be key to understanding the operation of authoritarian politics. Individuals from districts with different configurations of political parties, including high proportions of deputies from majority parties, are not more or less likely to support a strong parliament. This may be because there are a larger number of political parties elected in smaller districts, or because deputies are mainly part of an elite class and less likely to differ from one another in their ability to solve casework requests. There were fewer examples in Morocco than in Algeria of deputies who expressed an inability to contact members of the government at the local or national level about citizens' problems.

**TABLE VI. 13. Determinants of Diffuse Support in Morocco**

Model Estimated	Logit Coefficients			Marginal Effects <sup>1</sup>		
	Model IV	Model V	Model VI	(Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome)		
	Model IV	Model V	Model VI	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Higher education	-.23(.43)	-.06(.51)	.01(.58)	-.06(.10)	-.01(.12)	.00(.14)
Urban residence	.89(.40)*	1.09(.48)*	.67(.62)	.22(.10)*	.26(.12)*	.16(.15)
Higher economic satisfaction	-.18(.69)	.33(.80)	.89(.92)	-.04(.17)	.08(.19)	.22(.22)
More liberal values	-.27(.25)	-.16(.32)	-.19(.35)	-.07(.06)	-.04(.08)	-.05(.09)
Higher interpersonal trust	.23(.52)	.06(.62)	.43(.71)	.06(.13)	.02(.15)	.11(.17)
Higher knowledge of parliament	-.81(.59)	-1.00(.72)	-1.19(.80)	-.20(.14)	-.24(.17)	-.29(.19)
Higher interest in politics	1.34(.39)***	.88(.47)	.76(.52)	.32(.09)***	.21(.11)	.19(.13)
Higher political satisfaction	-.77(.65)	-1.27(.78)	-.83(.92)	-.19(.16)	-.31(.19)	-.20(.22)
Female	-	-.35(.30)	-.64(.33)*	-	-.09(.07)	-.16(.08)*
Higher social religiosity	-	.14(.62)	.70(.69)	-	.03(.15)	.17(.17)
Higher political religiosity	-	1.94 (.59)***	1.64(.65)*	-	.47(.14)***	.40(.16)**
Higher confidence in Islamic parties	-	1.78(.55)***	1.38(.63)*	-	.43(.13)***	.34(.15)*
Know name of deputy	-	.28(.32)	.15(.36)	-	.07(.08)	.04(.09)
Have deputy friend	-	-.63(.63)	.97(.71)	-	.14(.13)	.21(.13)
Better evaluation members	-	-	3.15(1.42)*	-	-	.77(.35)*
Better perception elections	-	-	.46(.74)	-	-	.11(.18)
Higher average caseloads	-	-	-2.13(.60)***	-	-	-.52(.15)***
Satisfying casework resolution	-	-	-.53(.95)	-	-	-.13(.24)
Contact, no connection with deputy	-	-	-.88(.55)	-	-	-.22(.13)
Percentage large parties in district	-	-	.01(1.00)	-	-	.00(.24)
Constant	08(.80)	-1.83 (1.17)	-2.35(1.52)	-	-	-
N	325	268	242			
LR Chi <sup>2</sup>	18.96	49.29	62.99			
Prob. > Chi <sup>2</sup>	.0151*	.0000***	.0000***			
Pseudo R2	.0430	.1346	.1896			
Log Likelihood	-211.115	-158.415				

\*  $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$  two-tailed test; Standard errors are in parentheses; <sup>1</sup>  $\partial y / \partial x$  for variable means, change of dummy variables from 0 to 1.

**TABLE VI. 14. Determinants of Diffuse Support in Algeria**

Model Estimated	Logit Coefficients (0=No; 1=Yes)			Marginal Effects <sup>1</sup> (Change in Probability of Predicted Outcome)		
	Model IV	Model V	Model VI	Model IV	Model V	Model VI
Higher education	-.30(.66)	-.80(.73)	-3.92(1.16)***	-.04(.09)	-.11(.10)	-.31(.09)***
Urban residence	-.36(.76)	.02(.83)	-.02(1.03)	-.05(.10)	.00(.12)	-.00(.09)
Higher economic satisfaction	-1.07(.97)	-.47(.95)	.54(.94)	-.15(.14)	-.07(.13)	.04(.07)
More liberal values	-1.92(.52)***	-2.07(.79)**	-2.43(.85)**	-.38(.12)***	-.42(.18)*	-.39(.21)
Higher interpersonal trust	.27(1.12)	-1.00(1.08)	-1.67(1.36)	.04(.16)	-.14(.15)	-.13(.11)
Higher knowledge of parliament	1.77(1.15)	2.99(1.31)*	1.76(1.23)	.24(.16)	.42(.18)*	.14(.10)
Higher interest in politics	2.34(.82)**	1.91(1.15)	6.24(1.70)**	.32(.12)**	.27(.17)	.49(.14)***
Higher political satisfaction	1.47(.95)	-.41(1.11)	-4.01(1.93)*	.20(.13)	-.06(.16)	-.31(.15)*
Female	-	-.02(.49)	.77(.60)	-	-.00(.07)	.06(.05)
Higher social religiosity	-	1.18(1.19)	3.98(1.35)**	-	.16(.17)	.31(.11)**
Higher political religiosity	-	-1.88(1.03)	-1.34(1.10)	-	-.26(.15)	-.10(.09)
Higher confidence in Islamic parties	-	4.59(1.06)***	3.39(1.16)**	-	.64(.15)***	.26(.10)*
Know name of deputy	-	-.89(.52)	.09(.63)	-	-.13(.08)	.01(.04)
Have deputy friend	-	.99(.97)	.04(.87)	-	.10(.07)	.00(.07)
Better evaluation members	-	-	-3.91(2.55)	-	-	-.30(.21)
Better perception elections	-	-	3.57(1.40)**	-	-	.28(.12)*
Higher average caseloads	-	-	-4.18(1.42)**	-	-	-.33(.12)**
Satisfying casework resolution	-	-	1.36(1.12)	-	-	.07(.04)
Contact, no connection with deputy	-	-	-1.35(.80)	-	-	-.12(.06)
Percentage large parties in district	-	-	-8.49(3.46)*	-	-	-.66(.29)*
Constant	-.54(1.37)	-1.95(1.70)	5.57(3.03)	-	-	-
N	237	193	151			
LR Chi <sup>2</sup>	33.65	38.77	45.50			
Prob. > Chi <sup>2</sup>	.0000***	.0004***	.0009***			
Pseudo R2	.1404	.2449	.3707			
Log Likelihood	-103.542	-80.670	-49.690			

\*  $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$  two-tailed test; Standard errors are in parentheses; <sup>1</sup>  $\partial y / \partial x$  for variable means, change of dummy variables from 0 to 1.

## Discussion and Implications

Contrary to my expectations at the start of the project, the results cast doubt on the contention that members' efforts to serve citizens build support for a parliament with the power to make laws. Under conditions of patronage, what appears to build support is not casework, but Islamist opposition, or, more specifically, confidence in a political party which provides alternative policy programs. Confidence in other political parties, which is not included in the models but was tested as an alternative, was also associated with greater support for having a strong parliament.

Further, the results suggest that efforts to improve the transparency and fairness of elections and to address clientalism in the deputy-citizen relationship may be the single most important way to build support for a stronger parliament in Morocco and Algeria. Responsiveness to particularized demands may build support for democracy and democratic institutions but only to the extent that citizens view casework as open to all. Otherwise, it may simply perpetuate the system of rents that existed prior to liberalization of the parliament. In a similar way, Melissa Thomas and Oumar Sissokho suggest that *alternance* has not changed the patron-client system, and may even have made it worse in Senegal.<sup>447</sup>

This result suggests a significant break from theories of support in other developing country systems (e.g. the institutionalization literature) in favor of a patron-client paradigm which allows for the possibility that the actions of members neither bolster confidence in a stronger parliament, nor contribute to the breakdown of authoritarian regimes. What is remarkable is that the determinants of support are similar in the two countries, despite the fact that the political systems are quite different.

Finally, the results suggest that political attitudes are shaped by changes in the political environment. They suggest that legislators act as links, shaping popular attitudes in consequential, though perhaps counterintuitive, ways. Given institutional opportunities and constraints, it is not self-evident that members automatically enhance the prospect of democratic transition by improving popular support for the legislature. Rather, it seems more likely that they depress popular support for giving the parliament more power and, thus, contribute to the inability of the opposition to press incumbents for stronger parliamentary prerogatives in future rounds of bargaining.

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<sup>447</sup> Melissa A. Thomas and Oumar Sissokho, "Liaison Legislature: The Role of the National Assembly in Senegal," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 43, no. 1 (2005): 111.

## **The Representation and Patron-Client Paradigms**

Finally, the results suggest that studies of and programs related to casework ought to consider the possibility that casework is generally clientelistic and best viewed through the prism of a patron-client model. The findings also suggest that the representation paradigm is appropriate for cases of parliamentary politics in settings of electoral authoritarianism, but only in limited and specific ways. When it is not clientelistic, casework can be regarded as a form of representation, but it does not make a parliamentary system representative. In other words, even when casework is particularistic and not clientelistic, it is not sufficient to make the parliamentary system as a whole representative. In a democracy, casework may be one function of a member, but it is certainly not a substitute for policy responsiveness in a legislative system which is accountable to the electorate. Further, in most developed democracies, high casework volume developed only in the last fifty years. Citizens require more of their elected officials than the occasional intervention with a personal problem, no matter how great.

The limited extent to which casework fits a representation model is illustrated by evidence that particularistic benefits alone do not make citizens more certain that they want a parliament with the power to make laws. Until the parliament breaks out the status quo of electoral manipulation, patronage, and corruption in which it has been mired for decades, robust popular support for a strong parliament may be difficult to achieve.

## PART III

### Conclusion

## CHAPTER VII

### Policy Implications for Legislative Strengthening Programs under New Authoritarianism

#### Legislative Strengthening Programs

More than fifty years after President Woodrow Wilson first campaigned for a strong role of U.S. foreign policy in the spread of democratic governance, a host of public and private organizations have coalesced to form an international democracy promotion regime which boasts a combined annual budget of two billion dollars.<sup>448</sup> The emergence of democracy as the

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<sup>448</sup> Following from collective understanding in the field of International Relations, Stephen D. Krasner defines an international regime as an “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”. Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983): 2. Regimes embody both formal organizations as well as informal norms, rules, principles, and decision-making procedures. Eric C. Bjornlund provides a history of the expansion and internalization of democracy promotion from its birth as an American foreign policy objective to its explicit linkage with human rights and international law by the UN General Assembly, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Commonwealth, and a number of other multilateral and nongovernmental organizations. Eric C. Bjornlund, *Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004): Chapter 2. See also Thomas Carothers, ed., *Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004). Thomas Carothers, "A Quarter-Century of Promoting Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 4 (2007). For work on democracy promotion in the Middle East, see Ronald D. Asmus, Larry Diamond, Mark Leonard, and Michael McFaul, "A Transatlantic Strategy to Promote Democratic Development in the Broader Middle East," *The Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (2005)., Katerina Dalacoura, "Us Democracy Promotion in the Arab Middle East since 11 September 2001: A Critique," *International Affairs* 81, no. 5 (2005)., and Guney and Celenk, "The European Union's Democracy Promotion Policies in Algeria: Success or Failure?"

“preeminently acceptable form of governance” underlies a host of initiatives which aim to strengthen the capacity of civil society, electoral mechanisms, and free media in newly democratizing countries, as well as in many authoritarian regimes.<sup>449</sup>

A new and rapidly-expanding area of democracy promotion activities focuses on legislative strengthening. The USAID agency, the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), the European Union (EU), Elections Canada, and a host of other multilateral organizations and developed democracies have programs which assist national, regional, and local legislatures to more effectively fulfill the complex roles of independent and effective lawmaking institutions. From Algeria to Pakistan and from Albania to Paraguay, parliamentary assistance projects provide technical and training programs to improve areas of legislative practice as diverse as constituent relations, document minutes of parliamentary sessions, promote e-governance, and improve the relationship between the parliament and the press.<sup>450</sup>

The importance of strengthening legislatures as part of democracy promotion activities is increasingly recognized by governance experts. Hugh Roberts asserts that the failure of US organizations to address the subordination of the legislature to the executive remains a key gap in democracy promotion efforts. In his view, an empowered legislature—one which plays an independent role in legislation and provides oversight of the executive and bureaucracy—will create internal pressure for free and fair elections because it increases the incentives for social groups to seek representation in and through it.<sup>451</sup>

### **Obstacles to Parliamentary Support Programs**

Parliamentary support programs face at least two types of obstacles. The first is the lack of systematic research relevant to parliamentary projects in authoritarian settings. Thomas Carothers notes that while practitioners develop rich practical knowledge, little scholarly research, beyond a body of reflective pieces on key debates in democracy promotion, is available

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<sup>449</sup> Quote from Amartya Sen, "Democracy as a Universal Value," *Journal of Democracy* 10, no. 3 (1999): 3. See also Programme, *Parliamentary Development: Practice Note* ([cited]).

<sup>450</sup> See for example, National Conference of State Legislatures, *International Technical Assistance Projects* (2007 [cited January 15, 2008]; available from <http://www.ncsl.org/public/internat/Technical.htm>). Programme, *Parliamentary Development: Practice Note* ([cited]).

<sup>451</sup> Hugh Roberts, "Rethinking Democracy Promotion in the Middle East," in *Rethinking Democracy Promotion in the Middle East* (Washington, DC: Project on Middle East Democracy, United Institute of Peace, January 16, 2008).

to guide the efforts of practitioners.<sup>452</sup> Further, although books on the history and politics of election monitoring, media support, and civil society assistance programs are available, no parallel volume exists on legislative strengthening.<sup>453</sup> In addition to the dearth of program evaluations on parliamentary support projects, there is a corresponding lack of studies which shed light on the dynamics by which institutions operate in authoritarian nations. Without such research it is difficult to make an informed judgment about whether legislative strengthening projects should be continued when they appear to have largely cosmetic effects.<sup>454</sup> Further, this gap leaves practitioners with little distilled information about how to improve these programs in the short-term.<sup>455</sup>

The second, and more consequential, obstacle to parliamentary support projects stems from the rise of “new authoritarianism”. These regimes tout democratic rhetoric, but are neither democracies nor democratizing. Instead, they enact shallow and deceptive political reforms to boost waning legitimacy without changing the underlying structure of political power.<sup>456</sup>

New authoritarianism presents unique obstacles to parliamentary support projects because regime power brokers seek to enhance the visibility of elections and parliaments while preventing them from functioning in a transparent and democratic manner. Governments may face incentives to engage in parliamentary support projects in order to gain resources and opportunities for members and staff, or to lessen international pressure for democratic reform. However, new authoritarian regimes “box clever”, in the words of Hugh Roberts, limiting and manipulating programs in order to maintain an incipient parliament.<sup>457</sup> Mona El-Ghobashy has

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<sup>452</sup> Carothers, ed., *Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion*. Examples of important pieces include those concerning the gradualism versus sequencing debate and democracy promotion community’s response to the seminal work of Carothers on the “End of the Transitions Paradigm”. See also Thomas Carothers, “Misunderstanding Gradualism,” *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 3 (2007)., Thomas Carothers, “The “Sequencing” Fallacy,” *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 1 (2007)., Kenneth Wollack, “Debating the Transition Paradigm: Retaining the Human Dimension,” *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 3 (2002)., Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (2002).

<sup>453</sup> Krishna Kumar, *Promoting Independent Media: Strategies for Democracy Assistance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006). Bjornlund, *Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy*.

<sup>454</sup> This lack of information is also reflected in debates over “electoralist” and “anti-electoralist”, sequencing versus gradualism in the literature, and other issues within the democracy promotion community which, thus far, rely on rich practical knowledge from the field, but few cross-national studies of political institutions under authoritarianism. See also Clark, “Why Elections Matter?”

<sup>455</sup> Pakenham argued that technical assistance programs should not be undertaken until a better understanding of the political consequences of legislatures is better understood. Although this body of literature has grown since 1970, it is still insufficient. See Pakenham, “Legislatures and Political Development.”

<sup>456</sup> Diamond, “Elections without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes.”, Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy* 76, no. 6 (1997).

<sup>457</sup> Mona El-Ghobashy, February 15, 2008, Roberts, “Rethinking Democracy Promotion in the Middle East.”

highlighted the ways in which the Egyptian Parliament accepts programs which enhance the parliamentary library and digitize the minutes of parliamentary sessions.<sup>458</sup> These strategies limit legislative strengthening programs to narrow, politically achievable programs which emphasize technical support and training projects. However, the projects fail to address the core governance issues; namely, flawed elections and a weak and controlled parliament which lacks an independent role in oversight and policymaking.<sup>459</sup>

Fish has shown that weak prerogatives of the legislature have consequences for the success or failure of democratic transition and consolidation. I have argued that failure to address weak and corrupt parliaments also has implications for public demand for a stronger legislature, which, I suggest is a contextual factor in future rounds of elite-level bargaining over the distribution of domestic power between the branches of government.

### **What Builds Support for a Strong Legislature?**

I argued in Chapter 6 that programmatic benefits and institutional outcomes (e.g. transparent elections), not particularistic benefits, enhance popular support for a parliament with stronger prerogatives. Having had a casework request resolved in a satisfactory manner or having had contact with a deputy in the district, whether through a personal connection or through some other non-direct interaction (e.g. at a meeting or party office), is not associated greater support for a strong parliament in either country. These findings cast doubt on the argument in the legislative institutionalization literature that the representative link automatically builds feelings of support and appreciation for the legislature and contributes to its strengthening vis-à-vis the executive.

Instead, the findings strongly support accumulating evidence about the importance of positive outputs of institutions for building popular support for democracy and, by extension, democratic institutions. Predictors of support for a parliament with the power to make laws include greater confidence in political parties, including Islamist parties; in Morocco, better evaluations of the job members are doing and, in Algeria, perceptions of more transparent elections and open casework operations. These findings are consistent with work from several regions which links evaluations that institutions are delivering on transparency and democracy with more supportive attitudes toward democracy.

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<sup>458</sup> Mona El-Ghobashy, February 15, 2008

<sup>459</sup> Roberts, "Rethinking Democracy Promotion in the Middle East." Roberts accessed 2008.

## **Implications for the Design of Legislative Strengthening Programs**

These results suggest three lessons which could inform the design legislative strengthening programs either by suggesting a change of course or by reinforcing the importance of particular efforts. The first implication is that caution might be taken when considering programs aimed at improving constituent-deputy relationships in the district if these programs focus exclusively on casework. Programs which focus on improving the provision of particularistic benefits, however effective, may not address the real problem of representation, which is that the parliamentary system lacks both vertical and horizontal accountability and leaves many constituents unconvinced of the importance of achieving a strong parliament. For example, the project which supported local parliamentary offices in Algeria until 2004 may have improved the ability of members to provide casework, but it probably did not enhance the ability of members to develop alternative policy strategies to deal with the issues at the heart of the problems presented to them.

The second suggestion is that programs must focus on challenging areas of reform which include improving the transparency of elections and parties and enhancing the lawmaking and oversight powers of the parliament. As noted, predictors of support for a parliament with the power to make laws include greater confidence in Islamist parties (and parties more generally); in Morocco, better evaluations of the job members are doing and, in Algeria, a better perception of the transparency of elections and the openness of casework operations. Legislative strengthening programs which enhance the capacity of parties to develop alternative policy solutions—even if the parliamentary system limits their ability to shape laws—and projects which improve the transparency of elections are likely to have the greatest impact on bolstering public support for parliament in ways that enable opposition elites to achieve stronger constitutional prerogatives.

The third implication relates to the importance of encouraging fuller inclusion of opposition parties, the development of stronger party systems, and the creation of opportunities for debates about public policy. Opposition parties, in this case, Islamist parties, but also other secular parties, play an important role in providing programmatic benefits, representing policy positions of marginalized segments of the population, and enhancing demand for a strong parliament. In Morocco, the Islamist opposition enjoys a narrow institutional opening for debate which improves competition among the parties to provide alternative policy proposals. Confidence in all parties, including in Islamist parties, is positively related to support for a strong parliament. Like other opposition parties, the PJD represents the policy positions of a particular segment of marginalized Moroccans. It is the most religious citizens—those who support a less

secular view of the relationship between religion and politics--who are most likely to believe that having a parliament with the power to make laws is most appropriate for their countries. Exclusion and repression of part of the political spectrum and failure to reform and strengthen parties may be detrimental to the development of demand for a more effective and competitive parliament institution.

### **The Rise of New Authoritarianism: Further Considerations for Governance Program Priorities and Planning**

While there are important reasons for strengthening parliaments, there is, in my assessment, a need for caution about whether and how to do so.

#### *Cost-Benefit Analysis: Evaluating Carefully Whether to Work with Legislatures*

First, it is important to evaluate carefully the wisdom of investing funds in legislative strengthening in countries in which incumbents lack the political will to develop the parliament into an autonomous, influential, and representative institution.<sup>460</sup> Mona el-Ghobashy's comments during a recent working session are a case in point. My own field research also suggests that many projects in Morocco and Algeria have contributed to cosmetic changes, such as digitizing parliamentary debates and providing equipment for local offices. While parliaments in Morocco and Algeria need technical support over many years to develop the capacity to play an independent role in policymaking, improvements may be made in areas which do not challenge the basic rules of the game, but afford a certain level of legitimacy to the parliaments' shallow democratization efforts. Practitioners recognize these limitations and work to overcome them. Organizations like NDI and USAID frequently work with parties and civil society as a means by which to avoid the limitations of program implementation, for example, in the parliament.

#### *Conditionality: Maximizing the Results of Programs*

As a result of the potential for democracy promotion programs to enhance the legitimacy and, thus, robustness of authoritarian regimes, the concept of reverse conditionality, or conditionality-in-kind, should be, in my view, a part of legislative strengthening programs.

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<sup>460</sup> Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg, *Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions*.

Future funding should only be provided to the extent that tangible progress has been made in achieving process toward agreed-upon goals of previous programs.

### Conclusion

Policymakers recognize that the public views the parliament as a body without “authority and influence” which is undeserving of more power.<sup>461</sup> Denoeux and Desfosses argue that: “[t]he Moroccan legislature still finds it difficult to shed the damage done to its public credibility by three decades (1970s through 1990s) during which elections were manipulated by the Ministry of Interior, and during which it failed to assert in many meaningful way[s] any of its core constitutional prerogatives.”<sup>462</sup>

Unfortunately, the representative link leaves the average citizen unconvinced that the parliamentary practices of the past have changed, according to *overwhelming* interview evidence. The results of this project show that public relations efforts, like those engaged recently in both countries, are unlikely to produce a level of public support for a strong parliament which can positively affect future rounds of bargaining over institutional design. Instead, certain parliamentary support projects may be ineffective at addressing the ways in which partisan legislatures contribute to the robustness of authoritarianism. Even projects which focus on the provision of constituency service may not improve support for democratic institutions because they do not represent a departure from the political logic which characterized the pre-liberalization period. An anonymous interviewee in a study of the Moroccan parliament prepared by independent contractors suggested that: “[t]he devaluing of the real work of the deputy, be it by ignorance or be it by political calculus, brings limitation to his function and by the same to the democratic process.”<sup>463</sup> These obstacles make larger questions about how legislatures develop and why legislatures may prolong authoritarian rule more exigent. Politically challenging reforms which improve the ability of the parliament to provide programmatic benefits and outputs, such as transparency, are necessary to change public perceptions and allow the parliament to contribute to democratic progress not stagnation.

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<sup>461</sup> Guilain P. Denoeux and Helen R. Desfosses, "Rethinking the Moroccan Parliament: The Kingdom's Legislative Development Imperative," *Journal of North African Studies* 12, no. 1 (2007): 80.

<sup>462</sup> *Ibid.*: 81.

<sup>463</sup> "Strategie De Communication Globale De La Chambre Des Representants," (Rabat: Obvision Agence Conseil en Communication, 2006): 31. Quote translated by the author.

## **APPENDICES**

## APPENDIX 1

### Sampling Design

#### The Constituent Survey

The Algerian and Moroccan constituent surveys are nationally-representative surveys of the adult population residing in Algeria and Morocco. The surveys were conducted from August 2006 to February 2007. The sample size is 800 in each country.

#### First-Stage Sampling: Electoral Districts

The first-stage sampling unit is the electoral district, as defined by the electoral map for legislative elections to the countries' Houses of Representatives.<sup>464</sup> The forty-eight electoral districts in Algeria are equivalent to the state (*willaya*); an additional eight seats are elected overseas. The ninety-one electoral districts in Morocco are drawn within the country's sixteen administrative districts; an additional thirty seats are reserved for women on national lists. The electoral district is used as the first-stage sampling unit in order to permit the data from the constituent survey to be matched with data collected from a survey of elected members of the lower house of Parliament in Algeria and upper house of Parliament in Morocco (See Table A1.1.).

#### *Algeria*

**Stage 1a.** In Algeria, sixteen of the country's 48 (domestic) electoral districts were selected using random stratified sampling, where the strata were district magnitude and region. First, the districts were listed by order of their magnitude and grouped into three categories: small (four seats), medium (five to nine seats), and large (ten to thirty-two seats) districts. Within each of

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<sup>464</sup> The Moroccan and Algerian Parliaments are bicameral. The Algerian National Popular Assembly (lower house) comprises of 389 directly-elected members. The Moroccan Chamber of Representatives (upper house) comprises of 325 directly-elected members. In both countries, legislative elections are conducted using a form of closed-list proportional representation in multimember districts. Districts range from 2 to 5 in Morocco, with an additional 30 seats on national lists reserved for women. Districts range from 4-32 in Algeria, with an additional eight seats in overseas districts (e.g. Paris, Cairo, Berlin, etc).

these categories, districts were randomly selected such that the proportion of districts selected in each category is approximately equal their proportion in the total population of districts. Thus, the probability of selection for any individual member of the adult population is approximately equal at stages 1a and 1b.

**Stage 1b.** The 16 selected districts were divided into regions. In Algeria, the regions consist of the Center, West, East, and South/Southeast. Districts were selected from each region at a rate approximately proportional to population: Center (one), West (two), East (three), and South/Southeast (two). The reduction of districts from sixteen to eight in Stage 1b respected region as a stratum, but, convenience was a consideration in the reduction. The team sought to select districts within regions where one or more members of the survey team resided.

### *Morocco*

**Stage 1a.** In Morocco, twenty-four of the country's ninety-one (geographical) electoral districts were selected using random stratified sampling, where the stratum was administrative region.

**Stage 1b.** The twenty-four selected districts were divided into regions. In Morocco, the regions consist of the Center, North, East, South, and the Moroccan/Western Sahara. Districts were selected from each region at a rate approximately proportionate to population: Center (four), North (two), East (two), South (three), and the Moroccan/Western Sahara (one).

**TABLE A1. 1. Constituent Survey Sampling Design**

	Algeria	Morocco
<b>Stage One</b>		
Unit	Electoral District	Electoral District
Design	Random-Stratified Sampling	Random-Stratified Sampling
Strata	District Magnitude and Region	District Magnitude and Region
Total Districts	48	91
Districts Selected in 1a	16	24
Districts Selected in 1b	8	12
<b>Stage Two</b>		
Unit	Individual	Individual (Within Household)
Design	Quota Sampling	Random-Stratified Sampling
Sample Size	800	800
Response Rate	59.2%	75.3%

<sup>a</sup> Stage 1b is non-random. Reduction of 16 randomly-selected districts to 8 accomplished respects regional distribution but considers also location of interviewing staff for within region selection.

### Second-Stage Sampling

#### *Algeria*

**Stage-Two 2a.** The number of respondents sampled in each eight Algerian districts was proportional to that district's share of the total population in the country. However, two smaller *willaya* were over-sampled in order to ensure that at least fifty respondents came from each selected district. The number of respondents was thus decreased in Algiers, the largest district.

**Stage-Two 2b.** Within the district, individuals were selected using quota sampling, where the strata were age, gender, and education.

#### *Morocco*

**Stage-Two 2a.** The number of respondents sampled in each twelve Moroccan districts was proportional to that district's share of the total population in the country.

**Stage-Two 2b.** Within the district, individuals were selected using random stratified sampling. Several dispersed locations were selected followed by streets within these areas. Once the first house was selected, an individual was chosen within the home respecting a series of strata: housing type, gender, age, level of education, marital/family status, and socio-professional category (including employment status). The interviewer had a list of required profiles; for example, a woman 35-44 years of age, married, with high school education. If that woman could not be found at the first house, the interviewer went to the next home until she could be found, and so on.

### **Response Rate**

The estimated response rate is 59.2 percent in Algeria and 75.3 percent in Morocco. These figures are calculated based upon data provided by interviewers on the number of refusals since the previous completed survey. The modal responses are 1 in Algeria and 0 in Morocco.

### **Weights Compensating for Unequal Probability of Selection of Individuals**

#### *Algeria*


**General.** There are two potential sources of error resulting from the Algerian sampling design. The first is difficult to address with a weighting strategy. Because of the use of quota sampling, the study is characterized by non-random selection of individuals with relationships to interviewers. Cross tabulation of the data suggests that the interviewer is more likely to know the name of a deputy for interviews for which the interviewer and the respondent know one another well, than for interviews for which the interviewer and the respondent have met only a few times or do not know one another at all ( $p < .016$ ). Although not statistically significant, the same relationship holds for all other forms of contact between the interviewer and Member of Parliament. This suggests that a large numbers of individuals in the sample who know the name of a deputy (50 percent) may be over-estimated because the sampling design over-estimates family and personal relations of interviewers who themselves may be connected more closely to individuals of privileged political standing. The use of quota sampling is an on-going limitation of many nationally-representative social science surveys conducted in Algeria. Weights have not yet been calculated to try to control for this bias.

**Unequal Probability Weights.** In order to ensure that at least fifty surveys were conducted in any one *willaya*, individuals in two smaller *willayat* (Tissemsilt and Tamanaraset) were oversampled. These were taken from Algiers, the largest district. A weight (*wreg*) was calculated to adjust for unequal probability of selection based on electoral district.

**Poststratification Weights.** Official statistics suggest that women and less-educated individuals were under-represented in the final dataset. Thus, a weight was calculated for gender (*wgender*) and education level (*weduc*) based upon official statistics at the national level. *Willaya*-level statistics are, thus far, unavailable.

**Component Weights.** A final weight was computed as the product of the weights for electoral district (*wreg*), gender (*wwomen*), and education level (*weduc*). The resulting weight was centered (*wcenter2*) and the 95-100<sup>th</sup> percentile trimmed because the range was more than four times the average weight; a common rule of thumb (Raghu). The component weight used in the analyses is *wcenter3* (See Figure A1. 1.).

**FIGURE A1. 1. Distribution of Component Weights**



*Morocco*

All Moroccan adults residing in Morocco have theoretically an equal probability of selection. Thus, no weights were calculated.

## The Member Survey

The Algerian and Moroccan member surveys are representative of the membership of the Algerian National Popular Assembly (2002-2007) and the Moroccan Chamber of Deputies (2002-2007). The surveys were conducted from August 2005 to May 2007. The size of the population is 389 in Algeria and 325 in Morocco (See Table A1. 2.). The sample size was 204 in Algeria from which 97 responded (response rate of 48 percent); the sample size was 195 in Morocco from which 112 responded (response rate of 57 percent).<sup>465</sup>

**TABLE A. 2. Member Survey Sampling Design**

	Algeria	Morocco
<b>First Fifty Percent of Sample</b>		
Unit	Member	Member
Design	Random-Stratified Sampling	Random-Stratified Sampling
Strata	Party	Parliamentary Group
Number Members Selected	102	97
Over-Sampled Units	Parties with Less than Eight Percent of Seats and Women	Parliamentary Groups with Less than Eight Percent of Seats and Women
<b>Second Fifty Percent of Sample</b>		
Unit	(All Members In) Electoral District	(All Members In) Electoral District
Design	Cluster Sampling	Cluster Sampling
Strata	Region and Population of District	Region and Population of District
Number Members Selected	102	98
Number Districts Selected	16	24
<b>Total Members Selected</b>	220	195

<sup>a</sup> Stage 1b is non-random. Reduction of 16 randomly-selected districts to 8 accomplished respects regional distribution but considers also location of interviewing staff for within region selection.

<sup>465</sup> Response rates are approximate.

### Selection of First Fifty Percent of Sample: Members by Party/Parliamentary Group

The first half of the sample was drawn by randomly selecting a known proportion of each party (Algeria) and parliamentary group (Morocco). All women were selected, as were members of all parties in Algeria with 21 or fewer seats (5 percent) and parliamentary groups with 21 or fewer seats in Morocco (6 percent) (See Table A1. 3.).

**TABLE A. 3. Member Survey Sampling by Party/Parliamentary Group**

<b>Party/Parliamentary Group</b>	<b>Number in House</b>	<b>Proportion in House</b>	<b>Number Selected</b>	<b>Proportion in Sample</b>
<b>Algeria</b>				
FLN	199	.51	64	.32
RND	47	.12	26	.55
Islah	43	.11	26	.60
HMS	38	.10	26	.68
Independent	30	.08	60	1.00
Workers Party	21	.05	21	1.00
FNA	8	.02	8	1.00
En-Nahda	1	.002	1	1.00
PRA	1	.002	1	1.00
MEN	1	.002	1	1.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>389</b>	<b>100 Percent</b>	<b>204</b>	<b>100 Percent</b>
<b>Morocco</b>				
MP	72	.22	34	.22
Istiqlal	60	.18	28	.18
USFP	48	.15	23	.15
PJD	42	.13	20	.13
RNI	39	.12	19	.12
CD	28	.09	14	.09
Socialist Alliance	21	.06	21	1.00
FFD	8	.02	8	1.00
Unified Socialist Left	3	.009	3	1.00
Alliance of Freedoms	1	.003	1	1.00
No Affiliation	7	.02	7	1.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>325</b>	<b>100 Percent</b>	<b>195</b>	<b>100 Percent</b>

### Selection of Second Fifty Percent of Sample: All Members in Selected Electoral Districts


Next, sixteen Algerian and twelve Moroccan electoral districts were selected using random stratified sampling, where region and population/district magnitude were the strata.

These districts are the same as those used in sampling in the constituent survey. All members from these districts were added to the sample.

### **Weights Compensating for Unequal Probability of Selection of Individuals**


Weighting was necessary to adjust for the unequal probability of selection of members by party size and gender. There were no outliers in the weights in either country; therefore, no trimming was done (See Figures A1. 2. and A1. 3.).

**FIGURE A1. 2. Unequal Probability Weights: Algerian Member Survey**



**FIGURE A1.3. Unequal Probability Weights: Moroccan Member Survey**

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## APPENDIX 2

### Respondents in Qualitative Interviews

Interview protocols available upon request.

#### Morocco

**TABLE A2. 1. Members Interviews in Morocco**

Number	Gender	Age	Party	Place/Region	Date
1	M	40-49	USFP	Rabat	January 2006
2	M	40-49	USFP	Rabat	April 2006
3	M	50-59	PJD	Rabat	July 2006
4	M	70-79	USFP	Marrakech	May 2006
5	M	60-69	Istiqlal	Rabat	September 2005
6	M	50-59	USFP	Rabat	April 2006
7	F	50-59	FFD	Rabat	January 2006
8	M	60-69	PJD	Rabat	January 2006
9	M	50-59	Istiqlal	Rabat	June 2006
10	M	50-59	USFP	Rabat	May 2007
11	M	60-69	USFP	North	November 2006
12	M	50-59	Istiqlal	East	March 2007
13	M	70-79	Alliance	South	June 2006
14	M	50-59	MP	Rabat	May 2006
15	M	60-69	USFP	Rabat	September 2005
16	M	50-59	CD	Rabat	August 2006
17	M	50-59	USFP	Rabat	April 2006
18	M	60-69	Alliance	Rabat	July 2006
19	M	50-59	USFP	Rabat	July 2006
20	M	60-69	PJD	Rabat	May 2007
21	M	60-69	PJD	Rabat	May 2007
22	M	70-79	MP	Rabat	May 2007
23	M	60-69	PJD	Rabat	July 2006

**TABLE A2. 2. Constituent Interviews in Morocco**

<b>Number</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Function</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Date</b>
1	M	40-49	Unemployed	Tangiers	July 2006
2	M	40-49	Unknown	South	November 2006
3	F	30-39	Unemployed	Casablanca	July 2007
4	F	40-49	Unemployed	Rabat	July 2007
5	M	50-59	Driver	Casablanca	July 2007
6	F	40-49	Teacher	Khemmiset	May 2006
7	M	20-29	Employee	Rabat	May 2007
8	M	40-49	Government Employee	Rabat	May 2007
9	F	20-29	Student	Rabat	May 2007

**TABLE A2. 3. Observer Interviews in Morocco**

<b>Number</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Function</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Date</b>
1	M	50-59	Consultant	Rabat	June 2007
2	F	30-39	NGO Staff	Rabat	September 2005
3	F	50-59	NGO Staff	Rabat	July 2006
4	M	40-49	Journalist	Rabat	July 2006
5	M	20-29	Student	Rabat	May 2007
6	M	20-29	NGO Staff	Rabat	May 2007
7	M	50-59	Professor	Rabat	June 2006
8	M	50-59	Professor	Rabat	June 2006

## Algeria

**TABLE A2. 4. Members Interviews in Algeria**

Number	Gender	Age	Party	Place	Date
1	M	40-49	RND	Algiers	December 2005
2	M	50-59	FLN	Algiers	March 2007
3	M	60-69	El-Islah	Algiers	December 2005
4	M	60-69	El-Islah	Algiers	March 2005
5	M	50-59	Independent	Algiers	May 2006
6	M	60-69	Independent	Setif	June 2004
7	M	50-59	MSP	Algiers	June 2004
8	F	50-59	RND	Algiers	June 2004
9	M	60-69	Islah	Algiers	August 2006
10	M	50-59	PT	Algiers	July 2006
11	M	50-59	FLN	Algiers	May 2006
12	M	50-59	MSP	Algiers	December 2005
13	M	40-49	Islah	Algiers	May 2006
14	M	40-49	Islah	Algiers	May 2006
15	M	50-59	MSP	Algiers	July 2006
16	M	40-49	Independent	Algiers	May 2006
17	M	50-59	Islah	Algiers	December 2005 and July 2006
18	M	40-49	FLN	Algiers	April 2007
19	M	50-59	Islah	Algiers	March 2005
20	M	40-49	Islah	Algiers	December 2005
21	M	40-49	Islah	Algiers	May 2006
22	M	50-59	FLN	Algiers	December 2005
23	F	50-59	FLN	Algiers	November 2005
24	M	50-59	Independent	Algiers	January 2006
25			Independent		January 2006
26	M	40-49	FLN	Algiers	March 2007
27	M	40-49	FLN	Algiers	March 2007
28	M	60-69	FLN	Algiers	April 2007

**TABLE A2. 5. Constituent Interviews in Algeria**

Number	Gender	Age	Function	Place	Date
1	M	30-39	Student	Outside Algeria	April 2007
2	M	50-59	Employee	Algiers	April 2007
3	M	20-29	Student	Oran	July 2004
4	M	30-39	Student	Algiers	July 2006
5	M	20-29	Student	Algiers	April 2007
6	M	30-39	Student	South	April 2007
7	M	50-59	Unknown	Algiers	May 2006
8	F	40-49	Employee	Algiers	April 2007
9	M	50-59	Professor	Algiers	March 2007
10	M	50-59	Taxi Driver	Algiers	March 2007
11	F	30-39	Teacher	Algiers	April 2007
12	M	50-59	Taxi Driver	Algiers	April 2007
13	M	50-59	Employee	Algiers	April 2007
14	F	20-29	Employee	Algiers	April 2007
15	M	50-59	Employee	Algiers	March 2007

**TABLE A2. 6. Observer Interviews in Algeria**

Number	Gender	Age	Function	Place	Date
1	Male	40-49	Former deputy (1987-1992)	Algiers	October 2005
2	Male	50-59	Journalist, political scientist	Algiers	October 2005, April 2006, March 2007, and May 2007
3	Male	40-49	Party member	Algeria	April 2007
4	Male	40-49	Political Scientist	Algiers	October 2005
5	M	50-59	Candidate from PRA	Algiers	March 2007
6	M	50-59	Candidate from PRA	Algiers	March 2007

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