Consensus, Capacity, and the Choice to Cooperate

by

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Acknowledgements

I combine domestic politics with foreign policy and security interactions. There is a role for international institutions in helping nations achieve wider interests, but there is also a role for domestic political preferences and purely national conceptions of the national interest.

– Personal Statement, Rackham Application
January 2001

Some of the earliest advice that I got at Michigan was from a senior student, who cautioned me that “practically nobody writes a dissertation on what they came in thinking they wanted to do. Your interests will change a lot during graduate school.” In light of that advice, I still find it a bit amazing that I have come full circle and ended right where I started: the international and domestic politics of overlapping European security institutions. During the term that I was at American University’s Brussels Center (AUBC), I wrote two major pieces about the European Union’s emergent security policy structures and how they would interact with existing bodies. Elements of those analyses and that experience color the work in this dissertation. At that point, few policymakers had begun to grapple with the question of how the institutions would relate to one another, now that their jurisdictions were beginning to blur and overlap more than they had in the early post-Cold War period. So the first debt of this dissertation, chronologically at least, goes to Jerry Sherdian of AUBC for his encouragement of both my extensive research and my graduate school plans.
The route from the application statement of interests to this dissertation, though, was hardly direct; “circuitous” or “torturous” are perhaps more accurate. The second debt of this dissertation goes to the now-nameless undergrad in a PS 160 section who asked the fateful question, “What are all the stages of cooperation and how do they fit together?” That question, asked in my second term of teaching, is responsible for getting me to think about cooperation as process and as a giant selection problem. I set that idea aside when it alone failed to turn into a dissertation, but I am glad to have pulled it out and incorporated it into the final project.

Completing a dissertation in an emerging research agenda and with a new approach to case selection, as I have done, required the collection of two extensive new datasets. The forum shopping chapter in particular benefited greatly from research assistants from UM’s Undergraduate Research Opportunity Program (UROP). Michael Fialkoff, Silvia Stoljevska, and Laura Taylor (all of UROP) were enormous assets in this process, and Bob Mushroe and Pam Kiel also provided additional help. Jane Lawrence joined the project in its last term, but she went above and beyond the call of duty in her help. Besides doing a large amount of data collection (about a quarter of the observations in the dataset are her work), she helped immensely in the later states of the project by converting results to tables, managing references and citations, locating obscure facts in foreign language sources, and much more.

Many colleagues provided much-appreciated input on various parts of this project. Conference discussants Roy Ginsberg and Claes de Vreese, and job talk audiences at California Polytechnic University and Oakland University (Rochester, MI), made valuable comments on Chapter 3. Michael E. Smith challenged me on important
parts of the CFSP argument, and Michael Koch gave much helpful advice on using standardized measures of government preferences. John Jackson first suggested using the seemingly unrelated framework; that insight was crucial in enabling me to test my claims.

More of my colleagues than I can count have read parts of this dissertation, but only one has read it all. Sarah Croco read virtually every word I have ever written about this project – sometimes repeatedly – and she was infinitely patient with this Stata-challenged researcher. The graduate students at Maryland will be very lucky to have her as an advisor. Early drafts of the project benefited from comments from Michelle Allendoerfer, Hyeran Jo, Joel Simmons, Tana Johnson, Ryan Kennedy, Sarah Fischer, Jennifer Sese, and Laura Akers. Grace Cho, Kenyatha Loftis, Cliff Lightfoot, Natalia Buniewicz, Manny Teodoro, Sam Snideman, and a number of non-academic friends and colleagues helped me refine the later editions.

My committee’s knowledge and insights were especially valuable as I moved into the later stages of the project and tried to implement (or impose) my plan on my rather reluctant data. I completed the write-up under severe time constraints, and they all deserve many thanks for their willingness to work with that timeline and provide feedback so rapidly. My committee chair Jim Morrow has an uncanny knack for identifying the core research problem in a given question, and his encyclopedic mastery of such a huge range of the international relations literature has been of immense value to all of his graduate students. Jim took me on as an advisee at a point where I was on the brink of dropping out of the program. He very gently gave me the feedback and encouragement I needed to move forward at that difficult time. Without his support for both my research and my teaching interests, I would never have completed this program.
Rob Franzese is every bit the statistics guru he is claimed to be. He can not only spot the methodological problems in work well outside his area of expertise and propose solutions for them, but he can also manage to explain those solutions in plain text email. I am not entirely sure which of those two skills is the more impressive. Jana von Stein’s familiarity with the cooperation literature and her generosity with her time and comments vastly improved key parts of this dissertation. Finally, Dario Gaggio of the History Department provided both an outsider’s perspective on the overall argument and also valuable feedback on the Albanian case study.

Four other current and former faculty members at Michigan deserve special mention. I was fortunate enough to spend three years working for Jennifer Widner on two large data collection projects. The projects themselves were well outside my area of expertise, but they gave me invaluable skills in data collection, dataset creation, and project management. Nancy Burns’ rapid-fire teaching style in PS 599 helped me overcome my statistophobia early in the program. Chris Achen and Don Kinder gave me confidence in my ability to talk and think about research design and research methods in a critical manner. Taking PS 699 with Chris taught me to trust my instincts, and PS 680 with Don gave names to those instincts. This dissertation literally would not have been possible without their important contributions, both to my knowledge and my confidence.

The Department of Political Science, and especially Michelle Spornhauer, were critical in making this dissertation (and even graduate school) possible. Michelle managed to keep me fully funded the entire way through my seven-year journey, and I am grateful for her helpfulness and friendship throughout the process. A grant from the Department’s Harold K. Jacobson Research Fund enabled additional data collection for
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I never would have survived the write-up process (and graduate school in general) without the help of a wonderful group of friends. Sarah Croco, Grace Cho, Michelle Allendoerfer, Jessi Grieser, Caitlin O’Roarke and the rest of the Honors gang were always ready to work in a coffee shop, gather for movie night, commiserate over lunch, or just have a good laugh. Manny Teodoro, Tom Flores, Joel Simmons, Hyeran Jo, and Irfan Nooruddin could always be counted on to provide a laugh or a helpful hint or a word of encouragement at the worst of times. They all believed I could do this, even when I did not. Finally, the fun baristas at Beaner's (oh, sorry, Biggby's) and Espresso Royale, and their fantastic coffee and tea drinks, made writing this dissertation in less than four months bearable.

Finally, I want to extend my biggest thanks to my parents, Tom and Janis Powner (and Angie and Grandma Rose and Velvet), for their support during the seven years I have spent on this journey. They supported me through everything, even the times when my health situation deteriorated and when I was considering leaving graduate school. Without their unwavering commitment to seeing me do what was best for me, I never would have stayed in graduate school long enough to write this today.

Ann Arbor, Michigan
July 15, 2008
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>American Political Science Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUBC</td>
<td>American University Brussels Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union (of Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party (of Albania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRS</td>
<td>Fully random sample</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOT</td>
<td>Institutions Other Than</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISA</td>
<td>International Studies Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>Multinational Protection Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Ordinary Least Squares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UM</td>
<td>University of Michigan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UROP</td>
<td>Undergraduate Research Opportunity Program, UM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Chapter 1

Introduction: A Mess, a Muddle, and a Maze

In early 1997, the situation in Albania looked dire. Some two-thirds of the country’s citizens had invested in fraudulent “pyramid” investment schemes, and the schemes’ collapse left citizens destitute and the already-weak economy in shambles. The government – already under pressure from inside and out for its blatant rigging of elections the previous May – was implicated in the pyramid schemes. In response, citizens in the south looted weapons from military armories, and armed rioting ensued around the country. Amid the opposition's calls for the president to resign, armed groups overthrew the ruling party's officials in town after town and advanced steadily on the capital, Tirana. The government declared a state of emergency and severely restricted civil and political liberties. In response, some 13,000 refugees crossed the Adriatic by boat to Italy, overwhelming local social service providers, and many more arrived elsewhere by other means.¹

The states of Western Europe faced a dilemma about how to react to this crisis. NATO could help coordinate a military-based crisis intervention or provide airlift and support facilities for a civilian mission, but the distribution of capabilities within NATO meant that this option would require US agreement and participation. NATO or the Western European Union (WEU)² could patrol the Adriatic to intercept refugees, but not

¹ The Albanian crisis is substantially under-studied in the literature, but good summaries of various aspects are Pettifer and Vickers (2007), Perlmutter (1998), Jarvis (2000), and Vaughan-Whitehead (1999).
² The Western European Union is a smaller military defense alliance whose membership is restricted to European states. In particular, its full members are the six founding states of the EU (Germany, France,
all concerned states were members of either of these organizations. Members of the European Union (EU) had the ships to man an Adriatic patrol themselves, but only if they could access NATO command-and-control facilities. The UN could authorize and equip a humanitarian mission, though such actions were notoriously slow. Moreover, UN action would require extensive leadership and participation by the European states, and still risked foot-dragging by the reluctant US and other permanent members of the Security Council. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)\(^3\) could also authorize an intervention, but getting the agreement of all 54 members still presented a major hurdle, and the organization itself lacked any military capabilities or experience. Finally, alongside all these institutional alternatives, the states had the options to assemble an ad hoc “coalition of the willing,” or even to act unilaterally.

The question for the states of Western Europe, and for political scientists, is this: How do states choose a particular solution or response to a problem when many potential solutions exist? Choices in foreign policy are rarely “do \(x\) or do nothing”; choices more frequently resemble “do \(x\), do \(y\), do \(z\), or do nothing,” and cooperation is only one of those options. Other options – indeed the most commonly selected options – include doing nothing and acting unilaterally. Scholars have suggested a few reasons why cooperation might emerge under some circumstances, but they have generally failed to specify when states might prefer cooperation to the myriad other options available.\(^4\) Even within the single option of “cooperation” a wide range of options exist: outside of an

\(^{3}\) Until 1995, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

\(^{4}\) See, e.g. (K. E. Smith 1999), (Ginsberg 1989), (Ginsberg 2001), and the case studies in (Evans, Jacobson and Putnam 1993) and (Milner 1997).
institution or in one, and if in an institution, which one? Expanding from a dichotomous choice set (cooperate or not) to a larger pool of options (cooperate, unilateral action, do nothing) becomes theoretically knotty, especially when the choices are not mutually exclusive and can both substitute and complement one another.

Scholars have also failed to appreciate the complexities introduced by the existence of multiple organizations. Political scientists have theorized that the choice to cooperate in foreign policy is often driven by the “politics of scale,” 5 where states collaborate to achieve benefits or goals that they could not unilaterally obtain. In theory, such gains from cooperation do not require a formal organization, but institutions can help states to achieve these scale benefits through the centralization and/or delegation of tasks. 6 By pooling resources and delegating some functions to specialized staff, states can capture more of the possible gains from cooperation. This scholarship, however, either explicitly assumes that a single focal institution exists, 7 or implicitly assumes that any existing institutions are functionally equivalent and interchangeable – that they would all have the same magnitude of effects on state gain. 8

In the presence of multiple organizations whose jurisdictions overlap, however, this straightforward set of explanations begins to falter. Which organization should states use? 9 The case of Albania demonstrates that both assumptions of a single focal institution

5 (Ginsberg 1989).
6 (Abbott and Snidal 1998).
7 (Jupille and Snidal 2006).
8 (Abbott and Snidal 1998).
9 The existence of multiple institutions with highly similar memberships and substantive issue area jurisdictions is in itself a puzzle to scholars of international cooperation, and the puzzle is only compounded by the institutions’ differing decision processes and internal structures. The work of Koremenos ( (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001); (Koremenos 2005)) and her collaborators in particular suggests that institutions in the same issue area should look the same, but the same logic of efficiency and utility maximization that produces this result should also argue against the existence of competing, substantively similar organizations. This remains an open question for future research.
and functional interchangeability do not hold in European foreign policy cooperation in particular.\textsuperscript{10} The Council of Europe, OSCE, EU, WEU, and NATO took up the issue in turns, and none acted for a variety of reasons. The EU and WEU lacked the capacity to act independently in Albania, and certain EU members were reluctant to become involved. NATO and the UN had the capability to intervene but also lacked sufficient consensus to act. Any of these would have been appropriate focal institutions, but the lack of consensus in some and capacity in others prevented cooperation from emerging.\textsuperscript{11}

Adding to this, cooperation in an \textit{institution} was not the only possible response. States could have, and indeed did, choose to act in coordinated groups outside of formal institutions. These “coalitions of the willing,” or ad hoc groupings, represent a self-selected pool of members. This fundamental feature makes explaining cooperation outside institutions different – and more complex – than explaining cooperation inside institutions. Membership in the ad hoc group becomes a variable subject to strategic manipulation, not a given. Strategic manipulation of membership may be subject to constraints imposed by the requirements of capacity; expending the political capital to form a coalition of the willing is useless if the coalition lacks the ability to achieve its stated goals.

This dissertation presents a framework for analyzing foreign policy behavior choices across the full set of potential outcomes: no action, unilateral action, cooperation

\textsuperscript{10}The same can be said for many other regions and for many other more specific issue areas. For example, the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union), and the UN and its agencies, were frequent fora for African cooperation and dispute settlement. Other parts of this region had access to the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the (British) Commonwealth, or the Organisation de la Francophonie, or sub-regional bodies like the Mano River Union, to coordinate their activity.

\textsuperscript{11}In the end, Italy and other neighboring states acted unilaterally to intercept refugees, while most Western powers evacuated their nationals by boat and helicopter. Substantially after the onset of the crisis and the unilateral interception efforts, Italy and some EU and non-EU states led an OSCE-organized, UN-authorized, mission into Albania to provide humanitarian aid and to prepare for parliamentary elections. Chapter 5 explores the evolution and dynamics of this complex effort.
outside institutions, and cooperation inside (and the choice between) institutions. Exploring and explaining the complete range of state behavior choices allows scholars to begin integrating existing literatures on segments of the process to create a fuller understanding of foreign policy behavior. I argue that by focusing on two necessary conditions for cooperation – the existence of consensus and the existence of capacity – we can predict behavior in the absence of either or both, something existing work has not been able to do well. The remainder of this chapter presents arguments for the choices of foreign policy as a topic of study, and Europe as the focal region. It concludes by noting the contributions of this dissertation and presents a plan for the remaining chapters.

**Why Study Foreign Policy?**

For the purposes of this project, foreign policy cooperation is collaboration by states to enact joint or common policy on non-economic issues of interest that generally occur outside or across their borders. This can take a number of forms, from enacting a common or joint statement or conclusion, to adopting some form of collective action like withdrawing ambassadors, enacting economic sanctions, or using military force. Foreign policy cooperation may occur within an existing international institution, or it may occur outside any standing body. Substantively, foreign policy cooperation may include issues of human rights promotion, humanitarian and other foreign aid, issues of interstate and domestic conflict or conflict resolution, support for democratization, and many other issue areas. It also includes issues of relevance to economics but not directly part of it, like environmental protection and labor standards as a human rights issue.
Why is such a broad definition of “foreign policy” a good place to test arguments about state foreign policy behavior? Studies of cooperation behavior have normally tested their arguments in well-defined, single-issue subfields of foreign policy: trade and tariffs policy, sanctions policy, standards-setting, FTA formation, human rights behavior, or environmental policy. Many of these studies, including most of the highly rigorous ones, focus on issues that fall within the broader class of foreign economic policy. This is unfortunate because non-economic foreign policy has three key characteristics that differentiate it from foreign economic policy: Domestic audiences rarely receive direct gains, the benefits of cooperation are unclear or minimal, and cooperation itself carries sovereignty costs. As a result, incentives to cooperate in general foreign policy are very different from those that prevail in foreign economic policy. This section addresses each of these substantive reasons to study foreign policy, and then presents an additional methodological justification for this choice.

**Substantive Reasons for Studying Foreign Policy, Broadly Defined**

As the section above suggested, foreign policy cooperation incentives differ from foreign economic policy cooperation incentives in three key ways: by lacking direct incentives for citizens to advocate cooperation, by lacking clear gains for states themselves, and by causing states to incur (or risk) substantial sovereignty costs.

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12 (Busch 2005); (Busby 2007); (Damro 2006); (Davis 2006); (Hafner-Burton 2005); (Mattli 2005).

13 Studies on non-economic issues are slowly increasing in rigor but have not yet reached the same level as most economic work.
Few or No Direct Gains for Citizens

Studies have consistently demonstrated that state behavior in foreign economic policy is strongly driven by the interests of key domestic groups. Domestic advocacy or pressure groups, acting in their own self-interest, have incentives to encourage states to cooperate on many economic matters. The situation in foreign policy is often different, however. Foreign policy activity itself may result in gains in the international arena, but no theoretical reason exists to expect cooperation on, say, a joint statement about human rights in a particular country or a trans-boundary environmental project to produce substantially greater gains for domestic constituents than acting alone may bring. As a result of this (likely) absence of direct domestic gains from cooperation itself, no self-interested group of citizens would likely have an incentive to advocate cooperation on foreign policy issues. Without direct citizen pressure to cooperate (and the resulting lack of constituent interest in the matter), governments retain a high degree of flexibility in their choice of foreign policy behavior. As a result, domestic pressure – if any exists – influences or constrains the goals of foreign policy in a broad sense but does not typically constrain the specific strategies used to pursue those goals.

Unclear Gains from Cooperation for States

States’ own gains from cooperation are also unclear in many non-economic issues, which further complicates the decision. To use the example from the previous paragraph, do states have a clear reason to believe that a joint statement about human

14 See, e.g., (Davis 2006); (Milner 1997); (Pekkanen, Solis and Katada 2006); (Limbago 2004).
15 Indeed, citizens rarely experience direct benefit from foreign policy at all; scholars widely cite it as an example of a pure public good. The benefits accrue diffusely to all, rather than to a specific group who might then advocate for it. On foreign policy as a public good, see (Meernik and Oldmixon 2008); (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2004).
16 (Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida 1989).
17 (Davidson 1998); (Edwards 2006); (Friedrichs, Mihov and Popova 2005).
rights is more likely to evoke a change in behavior than a unilateral one? One claim, which appears frequently in literature on the EU’s Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), is that more voices speaking together amplify the message and have more influence than unilateral statements by the same number of states.¹⁸ On the other hand, one can imagine a situation where the acting state has strong ties – historical, economic, ethnic, etc. – to the target state. In this situation, a forceful unilateral statement from the actor may actually carry more influence with the target than a watered-down statement from the actor in collaboration with other states. In foreign economic policy, however, economic theory gives good reason to believe that the gains from cooperation will be significant, divisible, and targeted. States can estimate their own benefit fairly precisely, even in situations where the agreement may deviate from their own ideal point.

Two additional factors compound this situation of unclear state gains from cooperation. First, most forms of foreign policy cooperation are about sharing costs rather than increasing and dividing benefits. While the goal is still to achieve a better outcome than would be possible under non-cooperation, the benefits of cooperation typically amount to keeping a situation from getting worse (i.e., averting future higher costs) rather than capturing explicit gains in the current period. Incentives for cooperation are dampened by the lack of any new or additional benefits to distribute. That the benefits of foreign policy cooperation are largely in expectation compounds this dampening effect.¹⁹

The primary benefits come from averting higher costs in the future, but discounted

¹⁸ For this argument, see, e.g., (Hill 2001); (Hey, 2003). Even if some benefit accrues from this amplification, though, states must still incur (sometimes substantial) transaction costs to negotiate a unanimously-accepted text. These costs could potentially offset the amplification gains.
¹⁹ Cooperating can increase success in two ways: by increasing the total capacity brought to bear on the problem and by decreasing the per-state cost of action, making a more extensive range of actions possible. As an example, four states running separate $500 million humanitarian relief and mediation missions in a conflict zone could provide a much more direct effort to end fighting by instead conducting a joint $2 billion peacekeeping mission.
avoided costs are not particularly motivating. In the short term, cooperation can make success more likely by increasing the total amount of resources available and making a wider range of options possible, but it is by no means guaranteed. This might make states less willing to take risks on a high-visibility, high-cost, high-stakes cooperative mission and instead increase the attractiveness of low-visibility, low-cost, low-stakes unilateral actions such as declarations.

Second, even in those cases where states choose to cooperate on foreign policy, theory suggests several reasons why states might prefer not to conduct this cooperation through a formal international organization. If cooperation is mostly a “problem of coordination” (Stein 1990), as Ginsberg (1989) and others suggest, then the main obstacle to cooperation is informational. While institutions can help to facilitate information flow to solve these problems, they are not necessary conditions for cooperation. States can overcome communication problems without institutions more easily than they could overcome, e.g., enforcement problems.

If, however, foreign policy cooperation involves distribution problems (differences between states over which outcome is most preferred) as well as coordination problems, then the option of cooperation through an institution can become much less desirable. As Fearon (1998) demonstrates, institutions lengthen the shadow of the future, and in the presence of distribution problems this can severely impede bargaining. Cooperation in an institution with a long shadow of the future may also restrict states’ policy flexibility as conditions on the ground change. As a result, cooperation on foreign policy through a formal organization may actually be less
attractive than extra-institutional activity, even with the additional transaction costs the latter option imposes.

**Sovereignty Costs**

Finally, Realist theory draws our attention to concerns about the national interest and sovereignty that states are thought to have. If states are concerned about maintaining their own sovereignty, then foreign policy is a least-likely case for cooperation.\(^{20}\) External sovereignty, or the exclusive right to make policy towards other units in the international system, is a defining characteristic of a Westphalian state.\(^{21}\) Foreign policy cooperation necessarily restricts freedom of action in external affairs, and this is particularly true when enacted through an institution where agreements are politically or legally binding. Perhaps as evidence of state concern about this, none of the institutions in this study can issue legally binding foreign policy agreements, thought they all can (and often do) establish politically binding ones.\(^{22}\) If states are quite protective of their sovereignty – and patterns of defections from collective agreements and of failed attempts at cooperation suggest that they are – then predicting and explaining cooperation in a broad set of foreign policy issues should be very difficult since states should have little incentive to cooperate at all.

**A Methodological Reason to Study Foreign Policy, Broadly Defined**

Finally, an important methodological justification for studying a broadly defined field such as “foreign policy” exists. Most studies of cooperation behavior focus on a

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\(^{20}\) See Gordon (1997/98) on the conditions required for successful foreign policy integration.

\(^{21}\) (Krasner 1999); see also (Koenig-Archibugi 2004) on sovereignty concerns as a variable, not a constant.

\(^{22}\) Politically binding agreements do not take the form of international treaties. They do not often require ratification and are not transposed into domestic law, so they are not enforceable in national courts.
single issue, a sub-issue within the broader pool of foreign policy issues (e.g., human rights, free trade areas or the environment). While this choice is defensible given the scarcity of systematic data about international cooperation, it has the unfortunate methodological downside of producing theory and findings that do not necessarily generalize well to other subfields. Single-issue studies provide no way for analysts to determine if the findings result from underlying characteristics of the issues themselves (e.g., the relative non-salience of most UN Food and Agricultural Organization decisions or the highly technical nature and relative invisibility of national current account restrictions),\(^\text{23}\) rather than as general characteristics about states’ incentives to cooperate. The use of a data pool whose contents span multiple issue areas provides variation on these underlying characteristics, and helps us to ensure that the findings are about cooperation in a general sense and are not simply functions of these underlying characteristics.\(^\text{24}\)

*Implications for Research*

The result of these unusual substantive characteristics of foreign policy is a situation where non-institutional cooperation and unilateral action remain substantially more attractive than in many economic issues. As a result, efforts to predict and explain foreign policy behavior, broadly defined, face a more difficult test than in narrower issue areas. The methodological reason for studying foreign policy also suggests the need for (and increased challenge of) testing on a broader, representative sample of issues. Arguments that withstand testing here are particularly robust and should be well-

\(^\text{23}\) (de Haen, et al. 2003); (Simmons 2000); (Von Stein 2005).
\(^\text{24}\) (Gabel, Hix and Schneider 2002).
supported in further studies of specific subfields of cooperation such as human rights, trade, and the environment. To paraphrase Bennett and Elman (2006), studying foreign policy cooperation in such a broad definition allows us to make the ‘Sinatra inference’: If the theory can make it here, it can make it anywhere.  

Why Europe?

Three reasons that address both theoretical and methodological concerns support the choice of Europe as a testing ground for theories of foreign policy behavior. First, the European foreign policy space has a very high density of institutions. At least five, and as many as eight, different institutions or bodies claim jurisdiction over some portion of foreign policy issues in that region. This range of bodies allows states the opportunity to choose between them, as well as to choose between institutional cooperation and other outside options. Second, these organizations exhibit variation on theoretically relevant variables such as the extent of their institutionalization, their memberships, and their substantive jurisdictions. At the same time, however, they are similar enough to remain comparable in a large-n framework. They fulfill similar functions in international relations and perform the same kinds of duties in the international system that we can plausibly treat them as similar units for comparison.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, European states exhibit considerable variation in their capacity to act independently. This is a theoretically critical point for evaluating a general theory of foreign policy behavior and foreign policy cooperation: Independent activity must be a viable option for at least some members of the group. Without viable outside options, the choice set shrinks dramatically to “do nothing” and

(Levy 2002, 144).
“cooperate.” For states without independent action capacity, the incentives to cooperate and compromise one’s ideal point may be stronger than the choice of doing nothing. When the ability to act without extensive support from institutions or other states exists, however, the imperative of cooperation to achieve goals decreases. Indeed, European states have a long tradition of ad hoc groupings and coalitions of the willing, from Bosnia’s “Contact Group” to the Multinational Protection Force in Albania.\textsuperscript{26} Europe is one of the few regions to have multiple states that have the capacity to act independently in international affairs. This makes it a strong candidate for evaluating a theory that emphasizes the non-dichotomous nature of foreign policy choices.

\textbf{An Introduction to the Consensus and Capacity Framework}

The consensus-capacity framework explains states’ foreign policy choices at both the unilateral and multilateral levels as a sequence of decisions. By treating foreign policy as a sequence of discrete decisions, rather than a single dichotomous ‘cooperate-or-not’ decision, it identifies a range of other behaviors that can emerge from the foreign policy decision-making process. The framework’s predictions thus allow us to predict when states would choose to act unilaterally, and also when they would choose to act multilaterally both inside and outside institutions.

In brief, I argue that both consensus and capacity are jointly necessary but neither singly nor jointly sufficient conditions for international cooperation. When one or both are absent, behaviors other than may cooperation emerge. The absence of capacity in a particular institution or group often results in low-resource-intensity declarations by the institution or unilateral actions by capable states. The absence of consensus in an

\textsuperscript{26} On the tradition of ad hoc multilateralism, see (Gegout 2002, esp. 339).
organization prohibits cooperation and can result in unilateral actions, extra-institutional cooperation, or decisions to do nothing. The absence of both consensus and capacity in an international group or organization can only result in unilateral activity or choices to do nothing.\footnote{Small ad hoc coalitions may be possible, but they are unlikely for reasons that I establish in Chapter 2.}

**Contribution and Plan of the Dissertation**

Chapter Two begins by expanding the notions of consensus and capacity in foreign policy behavior, and establishes how these ideas will help to predict and explain state foreign policy behavior. It then turns to the methodological aspects of testing a general explanation of foreign policy behavior, and in particular the problem of how to obtain an unbiased data set even in the presence of selection effects. We cannot study choices of foreign policy behaviors without also studying instances where no behavior happened, but it \textit{could} plausibly have. Negative cases or “non-events” are integral to testing the consensus-capacity framework, and to testing many other theories of state behavior. This chapter contributes a strategy for how one might obtain them in the study of cooperation and similar topics.

Chapters Three, Four and Five are the empirical heart of the dissertation. Chapter Three begins by exploring the earliest observable decision in the foreign policy cooperation process, the initial decision to cooperate through an institution. In particular, I study the decision to cooperate in the European Union, since its unlimited jurisdiction makes it a reasonable choice for action on any given event or issue. In answering the question “When do states cooperate?,” this chapter integrates arguments from the literatures on European integration and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
itself with a range of other theories in the broader political science literature. The goal is
to understand what kinds of issues, and what kinds of other factors, prompt cooperation
through institutions – or at least through this particular institution. To do this, I apply
quantitative methods to a newly developed dataset of 300 randomly chosen world events
to examine which types of events receive cooperation. This chapter reveals the critical
role of pre-crisis preference convergence mechanisms in promoting cooperation. It also
finds, contrary to expectations in the CFSP literature, that presidency ideologies have a
notable influence under some conditions.

Armed with this knowledge, we can then examine if these same factors also
prompt unilateral or extra-institutional cooperation, or if the set of influential factors
differ across venues. Chapter Four considers these questions, examining the full range of
potential foreign policy outcomes, from unilateral behavior to the use of multiple
institutions. If Realist arguments are correct, unilateral action should be most likely to
occur when strong and differentiated national interests are at stake; as national interests
get stronger and more divergent, other forms of foreign policy activity should become
less likely. If institutionalist arguments are correct, the same factors should generally
predict cooperation in all institutions, and cooperation patterns across institutions should
differ systematically in relation to the institutions’ values on those variables. Finally, this
chapter examines patterns of complementarity and substitution across events and
institutions. In particular, I explore patterns of outcomes for signs of ‘forum shopping,’ or
the strategic choice among institutions to maximize gains.

Chapter Five examines forum shopping behavior in a qualitative manner,
exploring the dynamics of cooperation in the Albanian case which opened this chapter.
The European response to this crisis was incredibly complex. A UN-authorized, OSCE-organized, Italian-led ad hoc coalition went into Albania on a peacekeeping mission to organize and oversee elections, while the Council of Europe cheered loudly from the sidelines and provided logistical support for the elections and the constitution-drafting process that was to follow. States can clearly distinguish between these institutions at a very fine level of detail, even if – to analysts at least – the institutions appear very similar in their membership, jurisdiction, capacity and other characteristics of theoretical interest. But how do states do this, and why? This chapter returns to the previously-bracketed question of how individual state preferences and behavior influenced the final outcome in this crisis by examining several states’ behavior at different stages of the crisis, a topic for which the methods of earlier chapters were ill-suited. It reveals particularly strong evidence of capacity concerns on the part of some (but not all) states, and some intriguing instances of sequential forum shopping behavior as states revealed their preferences over the course of the crisis.

Chapter Six concludes the dissertation by evaluating the usefulness of the consensus-capacity framework for understanding state foreign policy behavior at the levels of both state behavior and international outcomes. It notes gaps in the theory’s predictions and findings that counter expectations, such as the role of inter-temporal linkage. Finally, it identifies particular contributions to our understanding of foreign policy behavior and opportunities for future research.
Chapter 2
Theorizing and Explaining Foreign Policy Choice

The previous chapter made a case for studying cooperation in the context of Europe and in the issue areas of foreign policy. This chapter continues by presenting a framework for understanding when states choose to cooperate – and by extension, when they choose to act unilaterally – on foreign policy issues. This framework emphasizes two important insights: that cooperation is a process or sequence of moves with multiple potential outcomes besides “cooperate” and “not cooperate,” and that we can understand which of these outcomes emerge by considering the role of consensus and capacity.

This chapter first establishes the case for treating cooperation as a sequence of decisions with multiple outcomes. The second section considers the current state of theory about international cooperation, and about foreign policy cooperation specifically. It also addresses the theoretical complications that overlapping or duplicative international institutions present. The third section presents the consensus and capacity framework and establishes expectations for the empirical chapters, including when states might choose actions other than cooperation in institutions. The fourth section addresses methodological obstacles to studying cooperation empirically, namely the problems of case selection and identifying negative cases. The penultimate section presents a mixed-methods research design for solving the cooperation puzzle; the final section concludes.
Theorizing Foreign Policy Choices

Foreign policy cooperation emerges at the end of an extensive chain of decisions. The decision to cooperate itself is a strategic choice in which states anticipate the likely reactions of their potential partners before proposing collective activity. If states believe that their partners are unlikely to agree, then the event may exit the decision process at an outcome other than ‘cooperation.’ Figures 2-1 to 2-3 graphically depict the decision sequence and the alternative outcomes. To illustrate the complexity of this decision process, this section will briefly review the literature on the decision to cooperate, the decision to do so through an institution, and the decision of which institution to use.

Figure 2-1. The Decision to Cooperate.

The Decision to Cooperate

Early scholarship on cooperation focused on identifying the conditions under which cooperation could arise, that is, under what conditions states would choose to raise an issue at choice point 1 (Figure 2-1) and advance to the bargaining stage at choice point 2. This work primarily explained when cooperation may be possible (the dark print in
Figure 2-1), but it generally neglected what happens when cooperation does not occur. These other decisions and outcomes are gray in the figure.

These works focused on the role of payoff structures (i.e., interest configurations) and power configurations in the emergence of cooperation, and they emphasized cooperation to provide public goods, particularly free trade in the international system.\(^{28}\) The study of public goods issues, which have the classic ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ payoff structure where all actors have incentives to defect, eventually gave way to the study of a broader range of payoff configurations.\(^{29}\) This scholarship clarified the role of distribution problems, or differences in preferences over the set of possible agreements, as obstacles to cooperation. Stein (1990) also established that some configurations of interests do not support cooperation, even with repeated cooperation over time. Together, these works created an initial understanding of when issues might reach outcomes \(A\) or \(B\).

Subsequent scholarship considered the implications of later stages of cooperation on the initial decision to cooperate. Fearon (1998) considered how concerns about the enforceability of an agreement might influence bargaining over the agreement itself.\(^{30}\) Others introduced the ratification stage to consider how configurations of domestic interests or institutions influence states’ ability to conclude agreements successfully.\(^{31}\) These authors acknowledge the process or multi-stage nature of international

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\(^{28}\) Keohane (1984); Olson (1982); Axelrod (1984).
\(^{29}\) Stein (1990); Morrow (1994).
\(^{30}\) Enforcement decisions extend two choices to the right of the “cooperation” outcomes in Figure 2-1: one where states decide to implement the agreement and a second where the other states then decide to enforce if the first state chose not to implement.
\(^{31}\) Putnam (1988) is the best-known statement of this modern second-image approach, but see also Milner (1997) for a formal treatment of asymmetric ratification constraints. Tarar (2001) considers a model where both sides require domestic ratification. In a recent piece, Earnest (2008) uses an agent-based model with a relatively large number of players, all of whom require domestic ratification, and also multiple outcome possibilities. His analysis addresses when cooperation emerges rather than how states choose between the competing (and equally valued) equilibria, but it raises interesting possibilities for future research.
cooperation, but they continue to limit the set of possible choices to ‘cooperate vs. not cooperate’ rather than allowing the form and venue of the cooperation to be a variable.

Gruber (2000) and Gilligan (2004) take some steps in this direction by treating the set of potential cooperation partners as a variable. Gruber’s argument centers around his conception of ‘go-it-alone power,’ or the ability to alter the status quo either alone or in a small group. Joiners, he claims, can often be motivated not by their own gains from participation. Instead, they join because their true preference – the pre-agreement status quo – is no longer available, and the status quo under the new agreement is better than exclusion. Gilligan, on the other hand, considers how the set of states included in a multilateral cooperation event affects the shape of the resulting agreement. In particular, he investigates how even large organizations can achieve fairly deep levels of cooperation over time by manipulating the set of new players. This n-player model is one of few that studies how group preferences translate into the form of an agreement.\footnote{For Gruber, the form of the agreement is a function of the preferences of the go-it-alone coalition and the potential domestic losers in each. Recent work by Stone, Slantchev, and London (2008) also explores the issue of who will participate in cooperation in a repeated collective action problem. Outcomes here, though, are not determined by the preferences of the players. Instead, the distribution of power in the international system explains both provision of the public good and creation of institutions. Chapter 3 of this dissertation contributes by considering how the group’s characteristics influence the likelihood of cooperation.}

The literature thus provides a fairly clear sense of what kinds of conditions would facilitate cooperation and so implicitly provides expectations for conditions where it would be unlikely. Where it is less useful, however, is in understanding the complexity of the ‘not cooperate’ option (i.e., the gray text in Figure 2-1). The ‘not cooperate’ category masks a wide range of behaviors; these might include no action (the status quo, outcome $B$ in Figure 2-1), or some form of unilateral action (choice 3 outcome $C$). The unilateral action might be a ‘defect’ or ‘not-cooperate’ behavior (i.e., doing something other than
the agreed or cooperative action). Unilateral action might also occur, however, without
the state in question having considered ‘cooperate’ (i.e., without opening negotiations or
approaching potential partners); both failed and unopened negotiations effectively choose
‘no’ at choice point 2. This could occur if, for example, the acting state believed no other
partners would be interested. This type of strategic behavior truncates the set of issues on
which any attempted cooperation emerges and suggests a need for particular attention to
selection bias at very early stages in the cooperation process.

**The Decision to Cooperate in an Institution**

The previous section discussed literature on the emergence of cooperation in
general. This section extends to the next stage in cooperation decision-making, the choice
to conduct the cooperation through or in a formal international organization (choice 4 in
Figure 2-2, to reach outcome E). As above, this collective decision is made by all the
institution’s members, but it presumes that states have already reached a decision to
cooperate (choice point 2).

**Figure 2-2. The Decision to Cooperate in an Institution.**

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33 I use the terms international institution and international organization interchangeably to refer to
intergovernmental bodies with a formal legal basis and a secretariat or other minimal permanent resources.
The properties of institutions are fairly well understood. Axelrod (1984) and Keohane (1984) show how institutions can lengthen the shadow of the future and facilitate cooperation even under less auspicious payoff structures like the prisoners’ dilemma. Institutions increase the probability of repeated interaction with a partner and thus make possible reciprocal punishment of defection. Even when preventing defection is less of a concern, states can still benefit from cooperating through institutions. Abbott and Snidal (1998) explain that centralization and delegation within formal international organizations allow states to capture more of the gains from cooperation; institutions intervene between cooperating states and the substantive issues on which the states cooperate. By providing centralized information collection and distribution, and a forum for multilateral bargaining, institutions can reduce the transaction costs of cooperation. By delegating monitoring to the institution, states can increase the credibility of reports of compliance and defection, even when noise disrupts direct state-to-state observation. 34

The decision to cooperate outside of an institution, however, is substantially under-theorized. Extra-institutional cooperation occurs (i.e., events reach outcome D) when a coalition of willing states coordinate policy outside the framework of an established formal organization. If institutions are so beneficial to cooperation, though, why do we still observe cooperation outside of them? Cooperation outside a formal institution may be attractive because no additional gains exist, i.e., because states have already achieved fully efficient cooperation on that issue. 35 In the case of some forms of bilateral cooperation – on standards, perhaps, where defection from the cooperative equilibrium is not in an actor’s self-interest – such a situation may be plausible. Extra-

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34 Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001) reverse the causal arrows and explain the effect of issue characteristics on institutional design.
35 States have already captured all the available gains from cooperation without the use of an institution.
institutional cooperation may also be attractive, though, because states cannot access the additional gains even with the use of an institution, or because the costs of the institution would exceed the benefits it would bring. The increased shadow of the future that institutions provide may also create a barrier to cooperation by locking states into lesser-preferred outcomes or outcomes whose value is uncertain at the time of agreement.  

For states, an additional benefit of cooperating outside a formal structure is the ability to be selective about one’s partners. Cooperation through an institution usually involves all members of the institution, meaning that the set of preferences which any agreement must satisfy is fixed. Moreover, decision rules in most formal international organizations typically allow any member to exercise a veto, which gives every actor an opportunity to frustrate attempts at consensus. Cooperating outside an institution allows states to choose as partners only those states whose preferred policy outcomes are similar to their own. The benefits of a policy outcome closer to their own ideal points may well outweigh the gains available through an existing formal organization.

The Decision on Which Institution to Use

As the last two sections have suggested, states have alternative foreign policy options besides cooperation through an institution. The least-theorized choice, though, is how states choose between the various institutions that are available for use on any given issue. The proliferation of international organizations, particularly through the 1990s, means that identifying an issue on which only a single institution has jurisdiction is

36 (Fearon 1998).
37 If the benefits of cooperation through an institution are great enough, the ad hoc coalition of states has the choice to create a new institution for its cooperation. The question of institutional creation, however, is outside the scope of this dissertation.
increasingly difficult.\textsuperscript{39} The choice is no longer ‘not cooperate’ versus ‘cooperate’; it is now ‘not cooperate,’ ‘cooperate here,’ or ‘cooperate elsewhere.’\textsuperscript{40} Figure 2-3 shows an expansion of what was formerly outcome $E$, now shown as a choice point where states choose yes or no for each international institution under consideration. This extension of the figure means that strategic states must now consider a further stage of decision-making when they plan their own strategies.

In an early piece on how states choose between institutions, Jupille and Snidal (2006) posit that states’ choices are four-fold. They can choose to use an existing institution, modify an existing institution, select between existing institutions, or create a new institution. A key assumption of this work, however, is that a single focal institution exists, against which states weigh their other options. But when multiple plausible fora exist, how do states choose between them? Jupille and Snidal treat this issue only in passing and instead focus on their choices of modifying or creating new institutions.

\textbf{Figure 2-3. The Decision on Which Institution to Use.}

\begin{figure}[h]
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{39} See, e.g., Raustiala and Victor (2004, 306) on institutional density in the international system.  
\textsuperscript{40} Recognition of this alternate outcome is akin to Stam’s (1996) re-coding of war outcomes from ‘win’ and ‘lose’ to ‘win, lose, or draw.’ Unlike Stam’s outcomes, however, these choices are not mutually exclusive; this poses additional complications to analysis.
Pekkanen, Solis, and Katada (2006) and Ortiz Mena (2005) address this question from a different angle, presenting arguments about forum choice rooted in domestic politics. For Pekkanen et al., Japanese forum preferences for a trade agreement emerged from a need to control the agreement’s content to placate domestic interests while still capturing as much of the gain from free trade as possible. The resulting bilateral free trade agreement with Mexico continued heavy protection for Japanese rice producers but obtained free access for Japanese manufactured goods; such a partial agreement would not have been possible in either the World Trade Organization or regional fora available at the time. Ortiz Mena responded to this from the Mexican perspective, arguing that desires for neither gains nor control drove the Mexican decision. Instead, accepting a bilateral agreement with Japan was part of the Mexican government’s efforts to consolidate domestic reforms by entrenching them in international law.

In a curious development, though, neither side in this debate appears to acknowledge that forum choice is a collective decision between all of the participants, not just the unilateral choice of one participant.\footnote{Both papers explicitly attempt to explain only the evolution of their own side’s forum preferences. Neither even suggests that its own framework explains the decisions of the other party.} Pursuing a bilateral preferential trade agreement with Mexico was a viable option for Japan only because Mexico was willing to accept that type of forum. This tacit consensus on the appropriate forum was critical: Had Mexico desired otherwise, Japan would not have been able to achieve its most preferred outcome. Achieving cooperation requires convergence on strategies – on which forum or type of agreement to choose – as well as on outcomes.

Other work considers forum choice from an international angle, with some attention to the collective nature of forum decisions. Daniel Drezner (2003), for instance,
provides an explanation of collective choice when the outcome is not in the immediate interests of all parties. In Drezner’s study of international financial regulation, the larger and more powerful states in the international system had similar preferred policy outcomes. As a result, they all had similar forum preferences – one where they could achieve an outcome close to their ideal points. Weaker states, in contrast, preferred to use the International Monetary Fund (IMF), where they could demand concessions favoring their own interests in return for accepting the powerful states’ preferences.

The market power of the larger states, however, allowed them to disregard the preferences of the developing world and establish an agreement at their own ideal point through an alternate institution where the developing states had no voice, the Bank of International Settlements. Power asymmetry then led to the weaker states’ acquiescence to the new rules, although they themselves desired otherwise. The benefits of participating in the new regime outweighed potential costs and/or benefits of fighting for their own preferred forum, especially once the great powers arranged for the IMF to enforce the agreement and make access to some assistance contingent on compliance.\textsuperscript{42}

In an additional contribution, Raustiala and Victor (2004) study a ‘regime complex’ of overlapping and non-hierarchical regimes in the broad field of plant genetic resources. They find evidence about forum shopping similar to Drezner’s: Groups of states pushed for the use of institutions whose framing of common problems was beneficial to their own interests. Raustiala and Victor also find evidence of distinct differences in the benefits and costs of pursuing issues in substantively broader versus

\textsuperscript{42} Gruber (2000) would posit a different explanation, that the less-powerful states joined not because they saw any explicit benefits from the new regime. Because the no-regime status quo was no longer available, though, the costs of being excluded outweighed the value of the post-regime status quo.
narrower fora – for example, that credibility of promises matters more than issue linkage in broader fora⁴³ – and these differences may also drive state venue choices.⁴⁴

**The Consensus-Capacity Framework**

In this dissertation, I argue that the need for both consensus and capacity shape all forms of foreign policy behavior – including both the choices to act alone and/or to cooperate, and if they choose to cooperate, then through which (if any) institution(s). Without consensus, agreement is impossible; without capacity, action is impossible. In this section I further elaborate on the concepts of *consensus* and *capacity* and explain why both are jointly necessary but neither singly nor jointly sufficient for cooperation.

**Consensus**

Consensus is necessary for cooperation both inside and outside of formal international organizations. International organizations, especially those in foreign policy, usually have unanimity or consensus decision rules. Unanimity requires all parties to agree actively; consensus requires that no one actively object.⁴⁵ These strong decision rules mean that the player who is least disadvantaged by the status quo controls the outcome; this actor can veto any potential agreement that would make her worse off than she was under the status quo. This power severely restricts the range of possible agreements in a given institution. The existence of this veto power, combined with the costliness of failed cooperation attempts, give states an incentive to consider carefully

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⁴³ (Raustiala and Victor 2004, 298).
⁴⁴ Chapters 4 and 5 extend Raustiala and Victor’s work about whether characteristics of institutions other than the identity and/or preferences of members influence their attractiveness for cooperation and look for patterns of substitutability and complementarity across the available outcomes.
⁴⁵ Consensus is a slightly weaker decision rule, but both are still very strong compared to, e.g., the majority or even supermajority decision rules in domestic legislatures.
before making a proposal in an international organization. In a world where multiple international organizations exist, the strong decision rules also create incentives for states to shop for an institution whose members’ preferences are distributed in such a manner that they will accept the proposal.

In the absence of consensus, however, states may prefer not to approach an institution for cooperation. If the state wishing to act does not believe that consensus exists in any of the available fora, it has two outside choices available to it. First, it could assemble an ad hoc (extra-institutional) coalition of the willing from states whose preferences are similar to its own. As the section above suggested, the proposing state can assure consensus around its own ideal point by deliberately selecting states on the basis of their preferences. This choice of ad hoc activity, however, is contingent upon the potential group members having sufficient capacity to enact their preferences successfully. A group with inadequate capacity will fail, and since states prefer to avoid incurring the costs of failure, rational states should not move ahead with coalition formation if they do not expect that the ad hoc group will be able to achieve success.  

Second, states may choose unilateral action, but this too faces a similar capacity constraint. All states have the capacity to issue statements and declarations; this weak form of action requires only a foreign ministry spokesperson or even a lone ministry official to read an approved text or respond to a question. Beyond this, though, national capacity varies greatly. If neither an institution’s membership nor a cluster of like-minded states is available to bolster capacity, then most states will be unable to take action. States

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46 (Gegout 2002). This reliance on beliefs about capacity also explains why a state whose preferences would otherwise include it in the ad hoc group may choose not to participate. A state that believes that the potential group’s capacity would be inadequate for the task would want to remain out of the group. I return to the points about capacity in that subsection below.
that lack the capacity to achieve their ideal points unilaterally are limited to issuing statements at best or accepting the third option – doing nothing – at worst. 47

**Sources of Consensus**

Four prominent factors – the structure of incentives on the issue, historical or situational characteristics, ideology, and issue salience – can influence the emergence of consensus on an issue. Each can act both as a spur and as an impediment to consensus and thus to cooperation. I address each in turn below.

The first factor that can be a source of consensus is the structure of actors’ incentives (i.e., the payoff structure). Some decisions are coordination problems, where the difficulty of consensus lies in reaching a common outcome rather than in carrying it out. When states solve this problem, coordination games produce self-enforcing equilibria: Once players achieve an agreement, such as on the language of a common declaration, none have incentives to deviate from it. 48

Other types of issues, however, such as deploying a peacekeeping mission or giving humanitarian aid, are public goods that carry with them an incentive to defect. Individual states believe that actions or contributions by their partners can substitute for their own efforts, so an incentive to free ride exists. As a result, all under-contribute and

47 Doing nothing can also be a deliberate choice, as the figures in this chapter show. The present discussion raises the possibility that doing nothing could be a default choice – one created by the absence of consensus and the lack of capacity – rather than one that the actor deliberately selects. I revisit this below.

48 Compare, for example, the difference in statements saying “We condemn the recent electoral intimidation in Egypt and Zambia,” and “We condemn the recent electoral intimidation in Zambia and Egypt.” The statements are substantively the same, but for maximum effect, scholars and practitioners should argue, the declarations should be identically worded. Presuming that agreement exists on the desired degree and targets of condemnation, reaching agreement on the specific order of the states should not be difficult. In these (admittedly rare) cases, the payoff structure facilitates cooperation. This scenario, of course, presumes that states agree on the content of the declaration (i.e., that no distribution problems exist), and that they are only uncertain about the precise wording that the others plan to adopt. While this may not be an entirely accurate portrayal of the declaration drafting process, it is nonetheless a common belief among scholars of European foreign policy cooperation; see (Wagner 2003) or (Ginsberg 1989).
the public good is poorly provided – if indeed it can be provided at all with the limited resources that the states committed. States facing a situation where they believe their partners will free-ride or otherwise shirk may be unwilling to agree to such a bargain.\(^49\)

Second, some historical factors can affect consensus. Countries often maintain foreign policy ties with former colonies, or have longstanding bilateral ties to other states that may be the targets of cooperative action.\(^50\) Other characteristics of similarity, such as sharing non-aligned status, economic interests, or geographic contiguity with the target state, may also affect states’ preferences by making them sympathetic to the target. These relationships and similarities may be obstacles to consensus (i.e., contribute to dissensus) if the organization’s members have ties to parties on both sides of the dispute.

Ideology may also influence states’ ability to reach a consensus. Governments of similar ideological background may share commitments to certain international causes. Governments of the left may be more sympathetic to calls for global redistribution, since their domestic political systems value this,\(^51\) or be more attentive to labor rights, the environment, and human rights concerns since these issues interest their core constituents. Cooperation allows them to commit more of their resources to domestic priorities while still achieving desired international outcomes. If these governments are more inward-focused, however, as post-materialist argument suggest,\(^52\) then they may be less inclined to cooperate overall. Governments of the right are thought to be more internationalist, and so they might be more inclined to cooperate. Again, though, post-

\(^{49}\) (Olson 1982).

\(^{50}\) For example, the UK has a longstanding “special relationship” with the United States and maintains very cordial ties with its former colony of Australia. The Nordic Bloc, on the other hand, comprises three EU members and Norway – or alternatively, two committed NATO members and two neutrals. These ties may pull members in different directions depending on the substantive issue under consideration.

\(^{51}\) (Noël and Thérien 1995).

\(^{52}\) (Inglehart, 1997).
materialist arguments suggest that these parties are concerned with national pride and national identity; they may be less enthusiastic about pooling sovereignty in foreign policy cooperation.\textsuperscript{53}

Finally, the salience of an issue may influence the chance of consensus. Media coverage of foreign events can increase the extent of visibility and public concern about those events at home, and thus increase their salience to opinion-sensitive leaders.\textsuperscript{54} Public attention to an issue may then provoke decision-makers to address an issue that they otherwise might have preferred to ignore or defer.\textsuperscript{55} Even in the absence of explicit public pressure on a highly publicized issue, policymakers may feel compelled to react to avoid public perceptions of incompetence.

**Capacity**

Capacity is the resource set available to a state or set of states for use in foreign policy that increase its chances of obtaining its (or their) desired outcome. To be willing to act, states must have sufficient resources to execute their desired action with a level of probable success that they deem acceptable. Actors cannot guarantee success in foreign policy, even if they choose to try using force to compel the target’s behavior, so they must instead have a threshold probability of success that makes the expected benefit of using a given foreign policy instrument exceed its cost.\textsuperscript{56} Capacity involves both physical

\textsuperscript{53} I thank Michael Koch for a helpful discussion of these ideas.
\textsuperscript{54} All of the focal states in this study are democratic, which implies that their leaders must be at least minimally sensitive to domestic opinion, but see Croco (2008) for a discussion of limitations on the influence of popular opinion on wartime leaders.
\textsuperscript{55} The current crisis in Sudan is an obvious example of this.
\textsuperscript{56} Force will remove the target’s ability to choose its own policy – if it succeeds. The current US involvement in Iraq demonstrates that even overwhelming levels of capabilities cannot guarantee a successful use of force.
components (bureaucracies, spokesmen, economic aid, military forces) and also intangible elements such as legitimacy and credibility.

In the case of an individual state, capacity is relatively easy to determine; the state, in theory, has access to all of its own resources. It may use its entire diplomatic network, all of its foreign aid budget, or the full range of its military capabilities, if it so chooses. Not all forms of capacity will be relevant for a particular problem or issue, nor will states often choose to commit all of their resources to a single issue, but the existence of the resources creates opportunities for the owning state to use them.

For an institution, on the other hand, capacity is a sum of its own capacity and some fraction of its members’ capacity.\textsuperscript{57} Institutions vary in their own resources.\textsuperscript{58} Some institutions have aid and project budgets that are independent of member-state contributions. Some have developed reputations as forceful activists on particular issues, such as the Council of Europe on human rights issues. Other times, institutions have specific and unique capabilities that no other institutions have. The European Union’s Commission has a network of delegations that rivals any great power’s embassy network in both number and dispersion.\textsuperscript{59} NATO owns an extensive range of military capabilities, including transport and early-warning aircraft, which belong to the organization itself rather than to any specific member state.

\textsuperscript{57} I address the latter in the next section.
\textsuperscript{58} This usage of ‘own resources’ or ‘own capacity’ parallels the usage in the European Union, where it refers to a designated portion of tax revenue that accrues directly to the Union, without need for approval as a grant in the member states’ budgets.
\textsuperscript{59} Delegations are effectively embassies, with ambassadors and other usual privileges, but which are sent by a body other than a state. None of the other institutions considered here have delegations to other states, though a few have observer delegations to other international organizations like the UN and also to each other. The Commission has 104 national or regional delegations as of June 2008.
Sources of Capacity

As the section above discussed, national capacity is the result of national investment in various types of resources. The amount that states choose to invest in capacities for external action, as well as the distribution of that amount across categories of resources, is a function of both overall budget size and national political priorities. States with neutral or pacifist traditions, for example, are much less likely to invest heavily in military capacity. States with national traditions of social solidarity may project that value internationally through their generous foreign aid budgets.\textsuperscript{60}

Institutions have two major sources of capacity, their ‘own capacities’ and capacity seconded from member states. The previous section discussed some sources of own capacity, but others exist. For example, institutions, especially larger ones, possess a legitimacy that lends weight to their statements. Declarations and other foreign policy outputs from these bodies require the agreement of a large number – and correspondingly large range – of states, and this broad acceptance gives the output greater legitimacy in the eyes of targets or recipients. This legitimacy is a form of ‘own capacity’ for an institution, and it is not dependent on states agreeing to loan their capacity to the group.

Institutions also obtain capacity from seconded national capacities when states agree to provide resources in support of some collective endeavor. These may be troops or equipment in the case of a peacekeeping intervention, humanitarian aid in response to a natural disaster, funding to support a democratization initiative, or anything else. Institutions only have access to member-state resources with the consent of the member-state. Most institutions have limited resources of their own, which means that the primary source of institutional capacity is seconded national capacity. Institutional access to its

\textsuperscript{60} (Noël and Thérien 1995).
own capacities is generally assured; institutional access to national capabilities is not. Uncertainty about access to other states’ resources through an institution may make other states hesitate to propose action beyond what they themselves can support. The choice of forum, in other words, is contingent on *expectations* of sufficient capacity, including political will, to implement the desired action.

*Necessity, Sufficiency, and Foreign Policy Behavior*

Table 2-1 below shows the possible combinations of consensus and capacity and summarizes the foreign policy outcomes associated with each. When neither consensus nor capacity exists, then no collective response is possible. When consensus exists but total capacity is low or lacking, then states are restricted to lower-intensity activity such as issuing declarations or statements. The extent of capacity required to do this is simply some individual who speaks to the media on behalf of the actor; all international organizations and states meet this minimum capacity threshold.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consensus</th>
<th>No Consensus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity</strong></td>
<td>Cooperation, including action, is possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No Capacity</strong></td>
<td>Declarations are possible, but not collective action.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When capacity exists but international consensus is lacking, however, then national actors with sufficient capacity can respond to international events without needing to cooperate. Most states, however, have only a limited capacity to influence world affairs through unilateral action. Even the United States, arguably the world’s most capable state on virtually any dimension, has not been able to induce regime change in Cuba despite nearly half a century of a unilateral trade embargo. Though small states may
try admirably, they can only leverage so much political, military, or economic capability in support of their preferences. This capability constraint severely restricts the usefulness of unilateral action for them, and it causes states to reserve unilateral activity for the limited set of issues on which they feel they have a particular influence for historical, cultural, economic, or other reasons.\(^6^1\)

When a single national actor has insufficient capacity to respond, that actor has the option to form a group of like-minded states – to take advantage of a mini-consensus – to cooperate outside of established organizations. The pooling of resources by a subgroup of states whose preferences already align increases the likelihood that the states will make their individual capacities available for the group’s use. The (typically) small number of states involved means that transaction costs for negotiating the specifics of an action (or less frequently a statement) are low.\(^6^2\) The restricted size of the group becomes a liability, though, when legitimacy is an issue. Ad hoc groupings’ lack of association with recognized international institutions means that the value of a collective statement by these groups is only slightly more than the value of unilateral statements by all the members. Producing a cooperative outcome involved some negotiation and concessions, but since members selected themselves into the group based on their preferences, the additional signaling value of international coordination on a single policy is very little.

Finally, when both consensus and capacity exist within an organization or other group of states, then states will have the full range of foreign policy choices at their

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\(^6^1\) Unilateral activity is possible in all cells, but it should be most frequent in the upper right cell.  
\(^6^2\) The unusually large “coalition of the willing” that the United States assembled for the 2003 Gulf War is an exception here. Many of the states lent political support without making military contributions, which somewhat reduced the costs of organizing action among the subgroup that was willing to act. Negotiating the compensatory packages these states received in return for their support, however, probably negated some of the savings.
disposal. Cooperation – and particularly cooperation to take some form of high-intensity action – is possible in this cell. Both consensus and capacity are jointly necessary for cooperation, but they are not singly or jointly sufficient. Even if consensus and capacity exist, states may decide that the appropriate form of reaction is a low-intensity declaration, or they may decide not to act in that institution on that issue. The latter case could represent either a decision not to take action at all, or it could reflect a desire to act instead through another venue. The substantive component of consensus – what we all agree that we should do – can capture any of these outcomes, and not all of them result in cooperation. Successful international cooperation requires finding something that everyone can agree on and that they have the resources to do, somewhere where everyone can agree to do it.

A caveat is necessary here. The various foreign policy options are not mutually exclusive (with the exception of an explicit choice of ‘do nothing’). States may choose to use one or more tools simultaneously if the conditions exist – for example, unilateral action may occur in tandem with institutional cooperation or extra-institutional cooperation. States always have sufficient capacity to issue their own statements, and sometimes have enough capacity to take independent action, and this capacity exists even if consensus and capacity exist in an organization or in an ad hoc coalition.

**Theorizing the Choice Between Options**

The previous section established the set of foreign policy actions that states have and considered the necessary conditions for each to emerge. These foreign policy actions serves as potential strategies that states can use to achieve their preferred outcomes. For example, strategies to achieve an outcome of “reduced tariffs” could include unilateral
reductions, negotiated bilateral reciprocal concessions, multilateral reduction, the use of a trade war to compel reductions by others, etc. As the sections above implied, these choices are strategic and are conditional on preference distributions in each of the available venues. This subsection establishes a basic expected utility framework for understanding the strategy choices of individual states. It then considers when states might cooperate or take unilateral action and then addresses the role of uncertainty. Finally, it examines implications of this framework for the choice between fora.

**Understanding Preferences over Strategies**

Assume that each state $i$ has some most preferred outcome $b_i$ for a given foreign policy situation. The state wishes to obtain the best possible outcome that it can, and to do this, it chooses between doing nothing, taking some unilateral action $a_i$, or participating in some cooperative action $c$ through some existing organization. For simplicity, assume that the choices are evaluated separately as alternatives to the status quo $q$ and are then compared to one another. Each state’s choice is a function of five terms: the value of the status quo, the value of the unilateral action $a$, the value of some potential cooperative measure $c$, and the probability of achieving success with each of those instruments. The expected utilities for state $i$ of taking some unilateral action $a_i$ and accepting some collective outcome $c$ would then be:

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63 Each state has its own ideal point $b_i$, but $c$ is the same for all states who are members of the organization. $C$ is a function of the distribution of $b_i$s in an organization and the organization’s decision rules; as a result, it may differ across organizations as memberships and/or decision rules change. The determination of $c$ is a question of policy content and is beyond the scope of this dissertation. The utility of action $c$ to state $i$, though, is a function of the absolute distance between the state’s ideal point and the cooperative outcome – that is to say, $(b_i - c)$.

64 Success refers to achieving the desired change in conditions or behavior in the target country or on the target issue. The present form of the expected utility expressions assumes risk neutrality for convenience, but this is not a necessary assumption for the results.
\[ EU_{ib} = u_{ia} \cdot p(\text{success}_b) - u_{iq}(1-p(\text{success}_b)) \quad (1) \]
\[ EU_{ic} = u_{ic} \cdot p(\text{success}_c) - u_{iq}(1-p(\text{success}_c)) \quad (2) \]

Cooperation thus occurs only when \( EU_{ic} > EU_{ib} \) and \( EU_{ic} > EU_{iq} \). In an expected utility framework, three elements can decrease the incentives to cooperate. First, as state preferences diverge – as their ideal points become more widely distributed around \( c \) – states may prefer to act alone (i.e., take action \( a_i \)) to achieve their own ideal point rather than accept a cooperative outcome that deviates far from their preferences. Second, as the two probabilities of success change, the expected values of \( a \) and \( c \) will shift. This may cause states to adjust their preferred strategies once some threshold is reached that makes \( EU_{ib} > EU_{ic} \). Finally, uncertainty about any of the four values – \( a \), \( c \), or either probability of success – increases, state strategies may also change. I address each element in turn.

**Why Might Unilateral Action Be More Attractive?**

Unilateral action may be more attractive to states when distribution problems are severe. Severe distribution problems emerge under two conditions. First, an institution's members may have widely distributed preferences (i.e., the variance of the \( b_i \)'s is large). The decision rules of most international organizations require unanimity or at least consensus to make a collective decision. Under conditions of widely dispersed preferences, no median preference may be able to obtain the support of all members when compared to the status quo or other reversion outcome. Second, even if some compromise position did emerge with reasonably widespread support, individual states may still be substantially displeased with this position if it deviates too far from their own ideal point (i.e., \( b_i - c \) is large). These preference outliers may prefer to pursue their
outside option of unilateral action to obtain their ideal points.\textsuperscript{65} This type of unilateral action can occur with or without the formal use of a veto in the institution.\textsuperscript{66} Either of these two problems – widely distributed preferences or individual states with outlying preferences – can hinder cooperation by prohibiting consensus and also by encouraging states to take unilateral measures.

Moreover, as suggested above, unilateralism becomes more attractive for states with greater capacity precisely because that additional capacity increases the state’s probability of attaining $b$ successfully through its unilateral action $a$. If stronger or more influential states are preference outliers, then their propensity for unilateral action may be compounded: They have both the motive (divergent preferences) and the opportunity (sufficient capacity) to take unilateral measures.

The option of ad hoc cooperation deserves special mention here. States always have the option to form a ‘coalition of the willing,’ or even to form a new organization if existing options fail to meet their needs or desires.\textsuperscript{67} If a cluster of states exists whose members have similar but outlying preferences, this group may choose to pursue its own ideal point in another manner. Ad hoc cooperation is most likely to emerge, then, when the distribution problem is at a moderate severity or when the distribution of preferences is bimodal.\textsuperscript{68} In either case, state preferences may be dispersed, but some concentration exists; a cluster of states have preferences similar enough to one another to be able to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{65} This is particularly true as the capabilities of preference-outlying states increase, as I elaborate below.
  \item \textsuperscript{66} It is especially likely if the institution allows for consensus-based decision making and does not produce policies that are binding on all member states. The only institution able to produce binding mandates to all member states in the area of foreign policy is the United Nations Security Council. As this body is not one of the focal institutions of this study, I will not return to this issue.
  \item \textsuperscript{67} See Jupille and Snidal (2006) on the choice to create new institutions
  \item \textsuperscript{68} Perhaps the best-known example of this is when the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland were reluctant to cede sovereignty to the nascent European Community and instead formed the rival European Free Trade Agreement.
\end{itemize}
reach agreement among themselves. The ability to choose participants on the basis of their preferences is the primary attraction of ad hoc cooperation: States create a group where consensus already exists around a particular outcome. By doing this, states can still reap (at least some of) the gains of cooperation while still obtaining an outcome closer to their own ideal points – provided, of course, that the coalition has sufficient capacity to execute the cooperation successfully.

**Why Might Cooperation Be More Attractive?**

Cooperation, or willingness to participate in some cooperative measure \( c \) even where \( c \neq b \), is most likely to arise when either the state does not have strongly held preferences on an issue, or where the state lacks capacity to act independently.\(^ {69} \) First, a state may have weakly held preferences over its ideal point on a particular issue. The utility of a state’s ideal point \( b \) is weighted by the salience the state assigns to that issue. For example, geographically distant events may not provoke a strong response, nor may events in countries with which the state has few ties.\(^ {70} \) Weakly held ideal points are often not worth defending; gains from obtaining that ideal point may not exceed the costs of defending it, especially if the deviation of \( b \) from \( c \) is minor. Consensus may thus be possible even under conditions of mild distribution problems, if those outlying ideal points are not so strongly held and/or are not too distant from \( c \).

Second, states may also choose to pursue or at least accept cooperation when they lack the capacity to achieve their ideal points through non-cooperative means.

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\(^{69} \) Two situations exist where \( u(c) > u(b) \) is possible: first, if \( a \) (the unilateral action to achieve \( b \)) is very costly or else has a low probability of success, or second, if cooperation itself provides a way to capture more gains than otherwise possible by unilateral action (e.g., trade barrier reduction).

\(^{70} \) As an example, Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini publically alleged that the Scandinavian states had very little interest in Albania’s collapse in 1997 (Bohlen 1997); few states besides South Africa were particularly concerned by the conditions in Lesotho in 1998 (Keesing’s 1998, 42476).
Luxembourg, for example, may wish to send a substantial peacekeeping mission to the Great Lakes region of Africa. Its army, however, numbers only 750 soldiers and it owns only one airplane, which will not be delivered until 2017. To achieve anything near its ideal point, Luxembourg must partner with states who have more soldiers and more transport capacity, but in return for their participation Luxembourg may have to accept a monitoring mission rather than peacekeeping and a smaller ground force than it preferred. This illustrates how the probability of success influences state strategy choices, as well as why states might choose to accept an outcome other than their ideal point.

*The Role of Uncertainty*

Uncertainty about the values of $c$ or $a$, and/or about the probability of success of each, can complicate states' decision-making calculations. As Chapter 1 suggested, one of the defining characteristics of foreign policy cooperation (as opposed to foreign economic policy cooperation) is the inherent uncertainty about the values of outcomes. Existing theory produces clear expectations about what kinds of benefits will emerge from international economic cooperation, and how those benefits will be distributed both domestically and internationally. In foreign policy, however, neither the amount nor distribution of eventual benefits is necessarily clear. Domestic constituencies rarely benefit from foreign policy, let alone foreign policy cooperation.

If we consider the choice to cooperate in an expected utility framework, uncertainty would normally enter the equations through the terms representing the

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72 Occasionally, some ethnic diasporas will organize in pursuit of particular policy goals toward their home country. Typically, their interest is in an end result, a particular policy goal or outcome, rather than in the means (i.e., strategy) used to achieve it. On ethnic diasporas in US foreign policy, see (Rubenzer 2008) or (Ambrosio 2002). Likewise, the military-industrial-scientific complex has a particular set of foreign policy interests for which it advocates, but it usually does not pursue these through advocacy of specific strategies of cooperation.
probability of success for $b$ and for $c$. Even if the utility of acting alone exceeded the utility of cooperating (and a correspondingly low value of $p(\text{success}_a)$), a sufficiently large probability of success for the cooperative action may make its expected utility greater than that of acting alone. This draws our attention again to the joint importance of not only agreeing on what to do (i.e., achieving a consensus), but also having the capacity to carry out that choice, in explaining foreign policy cooperation.

In foreign policy cooperation, though, uncertainty of a different sort also affects the values of $c$ and $b$ themselves. Which of these two is actually more beneficial to the state? This answer is not always evident when states are making decisions, nor does current cooperation theory give much insight. As the value(s) of $c$ and/or $b$ become more uncertain, the difference in success rates must grow proportionally to compensate and continue to make cooperation an attractive option. At more intensive levels of cooperation, where states take collective actions that none could execute alone, this may occur. Larger groups may have more and/or different resources that increase the group’s chances of success, or they may increase the utility of $c$ by reducing its cost to each state.

If both $a$ and $c$ are some form of declaration, which is by far the most common form of foreign policy cooperation, then the situation becomes even murkier. Declarations in general have a relatively low probability of success, but preferences over the content of the declaration can be both quite divergent and also quite indivisible. Was an election “free and fair,” or not? Is a particular conflict “genocide,” or not? These

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73 This is true for the current risk-neutral formulation; this assumption is not, however, crucial to the discussion that follows.
74 In the terms of Morrow (1994), states face an information problem where they are uncertain about the state of the world.
75 This discussion presumes that the declaration’s intended audience is the target country and not some domestic audience or third country. Extensions to allow for alternate targets are left to future research.
terms and many others have explicit (and often legal) connotations, and states may have firmly held preferences on these issues (i.e., have a high utility for \( b \)). As preferences over collective language diverge, the incentive to break from the group increases.

But is a statement representing the (somewhat more mildly worded) opinions of a group of powerful states more likely to achieve the desired effect (say, a new election), than a unilateral declaration with a more strongly worded position? This depends heavily on what influence the declaring state has with the target – a former colonial metropole, or a major aid donor or trade partner, may be more influential than other kinds of states. In general, larger or more powerful states are more likely to achieve some form of success through unilateral declaration, just as they are through unilateral action, since they tend to wield a large range of capacities.

And what about middle powers? Portugal still has strong ties to Angola; the Scandinavian states are both major donors to the developing world and also fierce champions of human rights. These kinds of historical or other ties can influence state preferences on particular issues, and they may well increase the states’ perceived probability of unilateral success by increasing their intangible capabilities (e.g., moral authority/legitimacy, credibility, etc.). States with strong ties to the target or issue may well choose to block cooperation, especially in a venue with fixed membership and where \( c \) is likely to be far from \( b \), and take unilateral action instead.

**The Choice Between Institutions**

The expected utility framework developed above suggests that the two biggest influences on the choice between organizational venues are the set of states that are members (and their corresponding \( b_i \)s), and the probability of success in each venue. The
set of $b_s$ represented in an institution or group substantially contributes to determining $c$. Since $b_i - c$ is a major part of states’ utility for cooperation, states should seek the forum where the (expected) outcome is as close to their own ideal points as possible.

The probability of success likewise influences the attractiveness of a venue. The goal of foreign policy for states is not simply to reach an agreement with partners about foreign policy; the goal is to influence foreign events. If the group is unable – or unwilling – to execute the agreement it adopts, or it lacks sufficient influence to change target behavior through declarations, then cooperation in that venue makes less sense. States interested in influencing foreign outcomes must be attentive to capacity.

**Obstacles to Studying Cooperation**

The study of cooperation as an empirical phenomenon faces two major methodological obstacles. These are the strategic nature of international politics and the resultant selection bias in observed data. I address each in turn, with particular attention to the importance of including negative cases in any study of cooperation.

**Figure 2-4. A Review of the Cooperation Process.**
Strategic Behavior

As Figures 2-1 to 2-3 and the discussion above suggested, cooperation results from a multi-stage process. Figure 2-4 summarizes the earlier figures for convenience. Rational actors will try to predict the likely outcome of a course of action before adopting it. Since the outcome will depend on the anticipated behavior of others over the course of the cooperation process, states will choose their courses of action on the basis of their expectations about others’ actions. The decision to raise an issue for cooperation, and in which forum, is a function of the actor’s expectations about both the likelihood of consensus but also the likelihood of capacity in that forum. Strategic actors will not make a proposal in a forum where they expect either consensus or capacity to be lacking. As a result, we should (and do) observe very few cases of attempted but failed cooperation.

Strategic behavior also produces a second complication. An outcome of ‘status quo’ can emerge from two different processes: either a decision at choice point 1 to do nothing (to outcome A), or from a failed effort to cooperate when no other action is taken (choice point 3 to outcome B). The existence of a choice of “do nothing” illustrates how the status quo is more than just the default or non-decision outcome. A valid test of when states choose to act in foreign policy must also then include this deliberate decision not to act, but obtaining an unbiased sample of non-events is a daunting task. I elaborate on these points in the following section.

The Perils of Studying Success

By this point, the peril of studying only successful cooperation should be clear. Cases will have entered the sample on the basis of their values on the underlying
variables of preference convergence (consensus) and available resources (capacity), creating a pronounced bias. Studying only successful cases may be appropriate for some research questions, but if our interest lies in how that preference convergence arises, for example, then a sample consisting solely of successful cooperation presents only a truncated range of the variable of interest. This limits our ability to generalize beyond the set of successful cases. In addition, selection on this underlying variable that is correlated with success effectively introduces a form of omitted variable bias, which may also mask the influence of other variables.

Scholars have attempted to address this issue by considering prominent examples or cases of failed or non-cooperation in their work. This does not eliminate the selection bias, though it can help to mitigate it slightly. Any set of widely known unsuccessful cases would be biased as well: Non-success would be correlated with an omitted or underlying variable of saliency or prominence. Because norms of secrecy and confidentiality in many institutions prevent the majority of disagreements from becoming public knowledge, only cases with high political value or some similar criterion would enter public discourse through leaks or other forms of journalistic investigation.

**Negative Cases in Cooperation Studies**

Including unsystematically selected negative cases is essential, then, for unbiased analysis. In cooperation, negative cases emerge from three separate processes. First, 

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76 (Geddes 2003, esp. Ch 3). Selection of only successful cases also poses a risk, particularly in small samples, of leading the analyst to conclude that a particular variable is causal even though that variable was present in the non-cases as well.

77 Achen and Snidal (1989) provide a well-known discussion of the pitfalls of prominent failures in the small-N analysis of deterrence. In foreign policy cooperation, attempted but failed cases are probably disproportionately clustered around a 0.5 probability of success – success was likely but not guaranteed.

78 See M.E. Smith (2004) for an elaboration of this confidentiality norm in the context of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Similar norms of diplomatic confidentiality exist in virtually all international institutions, including the set studied here.
states could choose to discuss a topic but then be unable to reach agreement (outcome \textbf{B} in Figure 2-4). Collapsed negotiations leave a paper trail and public records such as media reports and diplomatic documents. This is the obvious route to identify and select negative cases. In more transparent or highly visible international processes such as negotiations to end conflicts or WTO negotiating rounds, this is a valid approach. In these contexts the analyst can identify the entire population of cases using standard tools of data collection, and she can analyze the full population rather than a biased sample.

Negative cases can also occur, though, when the issue is never raised for discussion (choice point \textbf{1}) so that cooperation is never attempted. Two routes to this ‘non-cooperation’ exist. First, non-cooperation could emerge because the issue is collectively deemed unworthy of (or inappropriate for) cooperation. The issue is not part of the institution’s remit, or it is insignificant or irrelevant to the members. These cases exit the decision sequence in Figure 2-4 at outcome \textbf{A}.

The second route involves a more insidious selection mechanism. States may know from previous events or relationships that one or more members of an institution would block cooperation, and so they consciously and strategically opt not to pursue cooperation in that venue. This is a particularly likely series of events if failed cooperation carries substantial costs; the higher the potential costs of failure, the more risk-averse actors are likely to be. In the case of rapidly developing foreign policy crises, failure to cooperate on the first try may have squandered precious time and resulted in a substantial deterioration of the situation on the ground. The public defeat of a state’s preferred policy in a cooperation forum can undermine any subsequent effort to enact that
policy unilaterally or outside of an institutional framework. In both of these situations, failed cooperation would increase the costs of achieving the desired policy goal as well as inflict political and diplomatic costs in the failure process. In this case, the most cost-effective route may be to forego attempting cooperation if it is even marginally unlikely to succeed. These cases, too, exit the decision sequence in Figure 2-4 at outcome A.

Any study of when cooperation occurs, then, must manage to capture all three of these types of negative cases in an unbiased manner. Unfortunately, neither of the two paths leading to outcome A result in any kind of evidence that would allow their systematic capture and inclusion in any typical event sample. Importantly, this is true for both quantitative and qualitative work. Traditional methods of case selection in both of these approaches are unable to provide solutions for systematically identifying cases of when cooperation could have happened but did not, or at least cannot do it without reference to the outcomes. How, then, can we test the consensus-capacity argument?

**Solving the Cooperation Puzzle: Mixed Method Design**

The two major obstacles, strategic behavior and its resultant selection bias in observed events, pose serious challenges for analysis. Obtaining a systematic sample of negative cases is critical for quantitative analysis, since variation on the dependent variable is necessary to obtain any sort of meaningful answer about when and why cooperation will occur. Qualitative analysis, on the other hand, adds an additional constraint of needing to select cases that span the range of potential outcomes while still holding other variables constant.

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79 US efforts to obtain UN authorization for its invasion of Iraq, and the resultant legitimacy concerns this failure caused in the region, are perhaps the most notable example.
My solution is to adopt a mixed-method design. I use quantitative methods to look for patterns in aggregate outcomes, with a random sample of international events and model specifications that account for interdependence between events and outcomes. I then conduct a case study of Albania’s collapse in 1997. By obtaining multiple observations within this case, I can hold constant some variables and study the effects of changes of others. I elaborate on both of these methods below.

**The Quantitative Approach**

Identifying an unbiased sample of cases for cooperation requires a solution that allows all cases, *regardless of their values on the dependent variable*, to enter the dataset. This includes instances of both failed and non-cooperation, instances of unilateral action and ad hoc cooperation. One solution is to identify the set of all international events or issues to which states possibly could have responded. Unfortunately, no such population census of issues and events exists.

A reasonable alternative, though, is *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*. *Keesing’s* is a monthly global news digest that summarizes news from hundreds of sources around the world, using a consistent set of editorial criteria to guide selection and placement of items. It thoroughly covers inter-state relations; it also covers domestic politics in major states and prominent issues in domestic politics of small states (coups, constitutional revision, major protests or riots, natural disasters, elections, cabinet changes, etc.). This extensive and systematic coverage provides fertile ground for capturing all types of events of interest without introducing any deliberate bias by region, issue, or outcome.

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80 Personal communication, *Keesing’s* staff (2007).
In this case, I applied a double-random method to *Keesing’s*. I randomly selected a stratified sample of pages from *Keesing’s* and coded these to identify qualifying international events and issues, and then used a random number generator to select a single qualifying event from each page.$^{81}$ The final dataset spans the period 1994-2003$^{82}$ and contains 300 observations. The events in the final sample span the full range of geographic locations, issue areas, degrees of immediacy or urgency, and levels of salience. Random selection ensures that we have not inadvertently excluded cases based on their values of on any variable. Appendix 1 contains event selection and coding rules, and descriptive statistics for the final sample.

*The Benefits of Using a News Aggregation Source*

Beyond its ability to identify cases independent of their dependent variable value, using a global news aggregator as a data source is useful for the study of foreign policy cooperation for two reasons. First, the inclusion of an event in *Keesing’s* means that it has already reached some initial salience threshold. National and international news media considered the event ‘important enough’ to devote resources to it, and it met *Keesing’s* criteria for inclusion in a space-limited publication. The imposition of this minimum threshold before an event potentially enters the dataset ensures that the events in the dataset are sufficiently ‘important’ that they could justify an international response.

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$^{81}$ Because of the nature of foreign policy cooperation in the EU, instances of foreign economic cooperation or issues of economic policy were not coded. Issues of foreign economic cooperation (trade agreements, loans and grants from international financial institutions, etc.) are addressed in the EU through the Pillar I/EC processes and require cooperation between the Council and the Commission. My interest here is primarily on Pillar II/CFSP cooperation between states only. Other sets of non-qualifying events included state and official visits, military aid, and military equipment sales. Additional details are in Appendix I.

$^{82}$ These dates reflect the creation of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and the year immediately prior to the EU’s “Big Bang” enlargement to central and eastern Europe. I further discuss the causes and effects of this decision in Chapter 3.
The second reason that the use of *Keesing's* is helpful is because it allows a rare glimpse into sub-treaty level cooperation. Studying this ‘second-order cooperation,’ or cooperation on issues within an established institution, has three distinct advantages over studying treaty-level bargaining. First, second-order cooperation differs from treaty-level (‘first-order’) cooperation in that the agreements at this lower level neither persist for long periods of time nor, generally, form the basis of future negotiations. Sub-treaty cooperation is an iterated game with a lower value of the shadow of the future. Actors are not bargaining over the design of an institution that will then set future policies; they are bargaining over the substance of policy itself. Second, and as a result, studying second-order cooperation allows us to hold the institutions fixed during the study. This isolates the effects of changes in the content area under contention, in institutional membership, or in other factors, from changes in (or debates over) the institution itself.

The final reason to study second-order cooperation is that treaty-level cooperation is costly. It requires a substantial and public commitment of resources over an extended period, and collapsed negotiations cause all parties involved to lose face with domestic and/or international audiences. This results in states being highly selective about opening treaty-level negotiations; doing so requires a high level of confidence that they can reach an agreement on issues that are likely to be highly salient. Second-order cooperation carries less visibility and less prestige, and thus slightly lower costs for failure. Together these should make states more willing to take mild risks with the issues they raise in existing institutions.
Cooperation In and Across Institutions

This dissertation contains two complementary quantitative chapters drawing on the random events dataset. Chapter 3 is an in-depth study of cooperation in a single institution, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This chapter uses a relatively large dataset with nearly 300 events to capture a wide range of variation in substantive content, issue prominence, and other characteristics that might influence a group’s propensity to cooperate. Using the insights of the consensus and capacity framework, this chapter begins to answer the question of when states choose to cooperate in international institutions at all, using the EU as a most-likely forum and foreign policy as a least-likely subject matter to test these arguments.

Estimating the likelihood of cooperation within a single forum, however, without considering the other choices and outside options, means that we have artificially truncated the dependent variable by ignoring other relevant alternatives. The choices are not “cooperate” and “not cooperate.” They are “cooperate,” “not cooperate,” and “cooperate elsewhere.” As the sections above made clear, this insight has important implications for both theory and empirical analysis.

This insight forms the basis for Chapter 4’s analysis of patterns of cooperation across and between four institutions, and decisions not to cooperate as well. Chapter 4 expands from studying outcomes in CFSP to include the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),[83] the Council of Europe (CE), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These institutions vary across a number of dimensions and allow us to analyze the effects of variation in institutional design across an identical set of issues. It explores not only patterns of cooperation in each institution, but also patterns of

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[83] This organization was the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) until 1995.
cooperation across them. When do states use these institutions in combination with one another, and when do institutions substitute for one another? When do states use unilateral activity or extra-institutional cooperation as a replacement for institutional cooperation, and when do these outcomes occur together? The increased data demands of this chapter restrict analysis to a subsample of the dataset, but the gains in complexity and nuance of the analysis more than outweigh the loss of observations.

Together, these two chapters provide both a deep look at a narrow slice of the institutional system, and a broad overview of a wide span of the outcome space. They also allow us to study the effect of estimating the influence of various factors on cooperation without considering the interdependence of institutions. By comparing the estimated effects in both the EU-alone models and the EU-as-part-of-a-system models, we can identify the bias created by ignoring substitutable outcomes. Creating this explicit link between substantive findings and the methods used to obtain them is an important step in the empirical study of cooperation.

**The Qualitative Approach**

Quantitative approaches emphasize the search for general patterns, trends and regularities across large numbers of cases, at the cost of the details of specific cases. Quantitative analysis can identify correlations and other relationships between putative causal and outcome variables, but verifying hypothesized causal mechanisms is difficult. Qualitative methods, on the other hand, often rely on the in-depth examination of one or a few cases to trace causal mechanisms. They may also explore outlier or poorly predicted cases to see why the case diverges from predictions. When used in tandem, the two methods buttress each other’s weaknesses and provide more confidence in the analysis.
Chapter 5 extends the consensus-capacity framework from examining overall outcomes to examining the behavior of individual states. I use an in-depth study of the collapse of Albania in early 1997 to explore whether states actually expressed concern about the kinds of things the consensus-capacity framework would have expected. This particular case is understudied in the literature more generally, but it is useful for this project for two main reasons. First, the crisis itself is protracted. Events of interest to this study occurred over the six month period from January to June 1997. Second, during this period, at least five distinct phases of the crisis occur; these stages vary across a range of other variables such as issue area of the most salient crisis elements and the likely degree of crisis externalization. This multiplies the number of in-case observations and allows us to test the hypotheses against more data points with different values on variables of interest. At the same time, though, using multiple observations in the same case holds constant key variables such as geographic location, relative power and capabilities of all the participants, and the structure of the international system.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has summarized major strands of research on cooperation, focusing on the decisions to cooperate, to use an institution, and to choose between existing institutions. These literatures focus on one of the branches leading from their choice points, the positive (‘yes’) one, to the exclusion of studying what happens when states decide, for example, not to cooperate, or to cooperate outside of existing institutions.

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84 Issue areas differ in the extent and depth of relevant norms, in payoff structure to actors, and in their ‘fit’ with national roles and identities. All of these elements are of key interest in their ability to influence consensus. Thus, variation in issue area is useful in tests of the consensus-capacity framework.
The consensus-capacity framework, and its extended view of cooperation as a multi-stage process, helps to fill this gap. It provides predictions of when foreign policy behaviors including, but not limited to, institutional cooperation will emerge. States use unilateral action, ad hoc cooperation, and combinations of response tools to address foreign policy, and the consensus-capacity framework helps to account for the full range of behaviors.
Chapter 3

When Do States Cooperate? The Case of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy

Chapter 2 established a framework for understanding foreign policy behavior. Its key insight is that cooperation emerges from institutions only when both consensus and capacity exist together. This chapter begins testing the consensus and capacity framework by examining states’ choices to cooperate through the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It emphasizes factors that might facilitate or inhibit consensus, including characteristics of cooperation in institutions more generally, and of the European Union (EU) in particular. This allows us to begin to answer the question of, “When do states cooperate through international institutions?”

EU foreign policy is an appropriate locus for testing theories about cooperation in institutions for two reasons. First, the EU has a number of similarities to other organizations active in foreign policy cooperation during this era. Its membership represents the core of all other foreign policy institutions, and CFSP – like other international organizations – is fully intergovernmental and allows national vetoes. These elements suggest that theories predicting cooperation in the EU will also have some success in other organizations as well.

85 The supranational elements of the EU, specifically the Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice, are excluded from participation in the foreign policy cooperation process.
Second, the EU differs in key ways from the other European foreign policy cooperation bodies, and these differences help to make the EU a particularly appropriate test for arguments about cooperation. The foreign ministers of the EU meet more frequently than in any other institution, and procedures exist for cooperation between meetings. Moreover, the EU’s jurisdiction is unlimited; it is not confined by geographic region or issue areas. These two characteristics give the Union the best possible chance of reacting to foreign policy events. A theory that can predict cooperation in the most-likely venue will then have justification for testing in narrower circumstances.

This chapter first draws on the existing literature to establish hypotheses about cooperation, and more specifically about cooperation in formal international organizations. It considers characteristics of cooperation as a general phenomenon, characteristics of foreign policy as an issue area, and characteristics specific to the EU as a forum for cooperation. The second section addresses issues of research design, including sampling methods and the importance of including all types of negative cases in the analysis. The third section tests the hypotheses and discusses the results. The final section concludes.

Explaining Cooperation

As Chapter 2 suggested, extant scholarship identifies conditions that facilitate cooperation; these conditions usually relate to achieving consensus in the group. The literature does not, however, go on to test its claims against an unbiased dataset. In this chapter, I identify variables that the consensus-capacity framework argues would facilitate cooperation in formal institutions. Since the existence of consensus and capacity
cannot be measured or observed directly, though, I identify and measure variables that theory presumes would affect the existence of either consensus or capacity.\footnote{C.f. (Ehrlich 2007).} In the case of foreign policy cooperation, these variables include factors related to cooperation in general (regardless of issue area), and issue-specific factors related to foreign policy cooperation. Finally, since I test these hypotheses using the EU’s CFSP as a forum, we must also consider characteristics of the EU as an institution that might influence the choice to cooperate.

**Characteristics of Cooperation in General**

Previous studies of international cooperation as a general phenomenon have identified a number of factors that influence states’ ability to achieve cooperation. Four are relevant to this study: centralization, distribution problems, institutional socialization processes, and the number of members in an institution. I address each in turn.

Abbott and Snidal (1998) argue that states choose to pursue cooperation through formal international institutions at least in part because of the centralization benefits that these institutions provide. Centralized information provision and distribution, bargaining, monitoring, dispute resolution, enforcement, and other similar features increase benefits to states by decreasing the costs of cooperation. Multilateral bargaining facilitates issue linkage,\footnote{(Sebenius 1983).} and increasing the amount of common knowledge among participants can help to decrease information problems. By doing these things, institutions can help to improve the chances that the members will reach consensus on a particular agreement that benefits all of them. Since this dissertation addresses conditions that lead to cooperation, rather
than the phases after cooperation itself, the hypothesis only addresses benefits of institutions that accrue before or during cooperation.88

**H1:** Measures that promote centralization of bargaining, decision-making and information provision should increase the probability of cooperation.

A second prominent factor that can impede states’ ability to reach a consensus on cooperation is the existence of distribution problems. Distribution problems occur when the actors hold different preference orderings over the set of possible outcomes – they disagree on which outcome is most desirable. Chapter 2 emphasized that international organizations decide by unanimity or consensus. Unlike most domestic legislating or decision-making bodies, outliers in international organizations have the ability to veto any form of cooperation that would be worse for them than the status quo or other reversion outcome. Additionally, the cost to other states of buying off or compensating outliers rises sharply as the outliers become more extreme, so that strategies of issue linkage or side payments may no longer be viable. Together, these factors suggest that the probability of achieving consensus, and by extension cooperation, is less likely as participating states’ preferences diverge.

**H2:** Increases in the magnitude of the distribution problem should decrease the probability of cooperation.

A third element that may influence states’ likelihood of cooperation is the existence of socialization processes within institutions. Socialization is the process by

88 In other words, I set aside the compliance debate now. As one justification for this decision, Ginsberg (1989) and others argue that foreign policy cooperation is generally a coordination problem, in which no or few incentives to defect exist. In this case, concerns about compliance and enforcement are minimal and should not influence behavior substantially. In contrast, a second argument from Axelrod (1984) and Fearon (1998) claims that concerns about the future enforceability of particular bargains can impede reaching agreement at the bargaining stage, which suggests that institutional enforcement powers should influence the initial decision to cooperate. As neither the EU nor the other institutions considered in Chapter 4 have formal enforcement powers, any bias from my exclusion of enforcement concerns should be constant across all cases and institutions.
which states internalize the norms and roles associated with membership in a particular
group.\textsuperscript{89} This process occurs over time as actors come to understand the expectations
associated with their roles and react to social pressure to conform to these expectations.\textsuperscript{90}

We should expect, then, that as time passes and actors gain experience both in their roles
and in the institution, consensus and therefore cooperation should become more likely.\textsuperscript{91}

\textit{H3: Increased time of exposure to an institution’s rules and norms should
increase the probability of cooperation.}

Finally, changes in the institution, particularly increasing the number of members,
may affect cooperation. Enlargement of an institution brings, at a minimum, increased
transaction costs of bargaining with a larger number of states. Additionally, the new
member(s) will alter the preference distribution of the membership, so that the median
preference of the group is likely to change. The net result of more members, though,
regardless of their preferences, should be a decreased chance of cooperation.\textsuperscript{92}

\textit{H4: An increase in the number of members should decrease the probability of
cooperation.}

Enlargement may also have some social effects. Immediately after enlargement,
the new members require time to adjust to their new roles and to complete their
internalization of the organization’s norms of behavior, and the old members must adjust
to the new dynamics of the enlarged group. As states complete these adjustments,
however, the immediate impact of enlargement should decline and the rate of cooperation

\textsuperscript{89} (Johnston 2003); (Bearce and Bondanella 2007).
\textsuperscript{90} Even if rates of internalization differ across states, the hypothesis should hold so long as the rate of
internalization is positive in all states.
\textsuperscript{91} A parallel rationalist argument exists for socialization effects. States update their perceptions about, e.g.,
the distribution of member state preferences and the effects of institutions through each additional set of
interactions. Socialization, then, is nothing more than the process by which the marginal change from each
round of updating reaches some low and stable level.
\textsuperscript{92} (Koremenos et al. 2001).
should stabilize at some new equilibrium level. The social effects of enlargement, then, should be especially pronounced immediately after enlargement but dissipate with time.\textsuperscript{93}

\textit{H4a: After a membership change, the probability of cooperation should decrease sharply and then move back towards its previous level after some time lag.}

\textbf{Characteristics of Foreign Policy}

Issues of security and conflict resolution often involve crisis management and rapid decision-making, or what Wagner (2003) describes as “fast coordination.”\textsuperscript{94} These events in many ways demand a response from the international community; conflict and instability spread without regard for borders. Rapidly moving events on the ground leave small windows of opportunity where a collective policy has some chance of achieving its goals. Under these conditions of minimal bargaining time, even a small distribution problem can potentially block cooperation in organizations with unanimity voting rules.

This brief bargaining window, however, perhaps masks an underlying consensus on the need for cooperation on these kinds of issues. The EU’s members are for the most part small and medium-sized states. None of them – with the potential exception of France and the UK – have the capacity to influence foreign conflicts and emergent conflicts independently, and even those two great powers have limited independent

\textsuperscript{93} A parallel rationalist argument exists here as well, suggesting that states instead need to update their perceptions of member preferences and to identify new potential coalition partners in the changed bargaining space. Perhaps the only difference in empirical predictions between this hypothesis and the social effects of enlargement one above is that in a world of full rationality actors should calculate updated perceptions with very little time lag. As a result, we should not see an effect of enlargement for this reason – there should be no shock-and-dissipation effect, only the permanent effect of the increased distribution problem and greater numbers of members. A finding of insignificance on the coefficient testing Hypothesis 4a would suggest support for this alternative argument.

\textsuperscript{94} Michael E. Smith, however, explicitly contends that CFSP is “not explicitly designed …. [for] quick crisis management using military means.” Since the EU takes no military action on events in this sample, and since all events had equal opportunity for non-military responses such as declarations and the dispatch of assistance, this should not be an issue. In any case, fast coordination can involve non-military responses. (M. E. Smith 2004, 196).
operating capacity. This leaves the EU’s member states with no choice but to cooperate if they wish to influence most global events. The combination of lack of individual capacity and a consensus on the importance of preventing the spread of violence should make crisis issues more likely to receive some type of response.

\[H5: \text{Crisis issues are more likely to result in cooperation.}\]

That said, a variety of types of crises exist, and different kinds of crises carry different effects on the probability of cooperation. For the purposes of this project, crisis issues include incidents that threaten international security, domestic security within a non-EU state (e.g., large-scale rioting, hostage situations involving foreign nationals or armed combatant groups, civil conflict), and efforts to resolve ongoing domestic or international conflicts (e.g., peace talks, deployment of peacekeeping missions). Given differences among the EU’s member states about security policy, as I address below, we might expect these three groups of conflicts to have different response patterns.

First, all groups of states in the EU agree that conflict resolution is desirable; indeed, this priority is enshrined in CFSP’s founding Treaty. A second consensus may also exist that international security crises, where war is imminent (or may have already occurred), deserve a response calling for peaceful resolution of the situation and/or condemning the use of force. These two points suggest that both conflict resolution and security issues are more likely to receive CFSP responses.

A third possibility, though, is that differences between member states on the optimum institution for creating cooperative security policy would result in less

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95 Both states have only minimal long-range transport capability, in particular, and lack deployable field command centers.

96 The Union itself lacked military (or civilian) crisis response units until the creation of the 1999 European Defense and Security Policy. The resultant “Rapid Reaction Force” was not operational until late 2001 and did not deploy in response to any of the events in this sample.
cooperation on security issues than on other types of issues. Some member states of the EU, as I discuss below, have a strong preference for using the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Exploring possible substitution effects between the EU and NATO is the focus of Chapter 4, but we must acknowledge that under the EU’s unanimity voting rules, these NATO-preferring states may block security policy cooperation there in favor of pursuing it elsewhere.

\textit{H5a: Issues of conflict resolution are more likely to receive a response.} \\
\textit{H5b: Issues of international security are more likely to receive a response.} \\
\textit{H5c: Issues of international security are less likely to receive a response.}

Event salience may also play a part in provoking cooperative responses. Salience, or “the extent to which an issue is temporally compelling to policymakers,”\textsuperscript{97} can affect policymaking by helping to define the set of issues on which actors consider cooperation appropriate or useful. Media coverage also plays a key role here. Highly salient events on which no reaction is forthcoming may trigger discontent at home for governments; citizens become aware of salient events through their own news media and may pressure the government to respond.

\textit{H6: Events that are more salient should be more likely to receive a response.}

Finally, geographic proximity should affect cooperation. Nearby events have the potential to spill over into the territories of the acting states. The risk of this kind of contagion should prompt cooperation from potentially affected states to try to prevent it. Moreover, the EU’s move towards open internal borders (the Schengen Agreement) at

\textsuperscript{97} (Busby 2007, 252).
the time could lead contagion to spread widely and rapidly. The possibility of contagion should attract more EU attention to its geographic region than elsewhere.

\textit{H7: Events in nearby states should be more likely to receive a response.}

\textbf{EU-Specific Characteristics}

Three features of the EU itself may influence the probability of CFSP cooperation on an issue: devices within the Union’s policymaking system that create an underlying consensus on some issues, the existence of two other Union bodies that also act in foreign policy, and the EU’s strong internal leadership system. I address each in turn below.

\textit{Pre-Existing Consensus}

Two structures allow the EU to create underlying consensus on issues before specific events occur. First, the EU has established several priority issue areas for CFSP. The Treaty on European Union (Article 11, ex J.1) identifies these as the promotion of human rights, democratization, regional integration, international security, and conflict resolution. The inclusion of these issues in the treaty implies that some baseline degree of consensus exists about the importance of Union activity in these issue areas, which should increase the probability of CFSP activity. The prior section addressed activity on security and conflict resolution issues. As additional examples, the EU conditions a range of development, pre-accession, and other aid on the recipient state’s human rights

\footnote{At the same time, many states in the EU’s geographic neighborhood were applying to join the EU. The EU’s “Copenhagen criteria” placed strict elements of conditionality on accession, including that the candidates respect human rights, protect cultural minorities, and conduct politics democratically. The enlargement process created a strong system of monitoring for all states that expressed interest in joining, which should also increase the EU’s attention to its own neighborhood. This element of concern about the region is perhaps more a characteristic of the EU as an institution rather than foreign policy as an issue area, but detangling the two effects is not possible here. See also (K. E. Smith 1999) on enlargement as a form of foreign policy.}
behavior and on progress towards democratization.\textsuperscript{99} In addition, the Union frequently takes positions and introduces resolutions in major international human rights bodies.\textsuperscript{100} These patterns should carry over into the EU’s behavior more generally.

\textit{H8: Events in issue areas specified by the Treaty as priority areas should be more likely to receive a response.}

Second, the EU may have previously developed common policy on an issue that establishes a level of consensus about policy. In particular, the EU’s Treaty of Amsterdam (1997, in force 1999) took steps to address problems of policy coherence across time and issue areas by creating a new type of policy instrument, the Common Strategy. Common Strategies adopt a holistic view of the EU’s activity on a particular issue (e.g., environmental protection in the Mediterranean), or relations with another country (e.g., Russia), and are the basis for all future policy on that issue. These Common Strategies presumably represent the establishment of a unanimously agreed set of foreign policy objectives.\textsuperscript{101} If so, then after the EU adopts a Common Strategy, any issues that arise under its purview should have an increased probability of cooperation, since the Common Strategy negotiations would have resolved some of the distribution problems.\textsuperscript{102}

\textit{H9: Events on which the Union has already established a Common Position should be more likely to receive a response.}

\textsuperscript{99} (Williams 2004).
\textsuperscript{100} Karen E. Smith (2006) also introduces data showing that the member states are still individually active in these fora, alongside their collectively introduced positions. This raises interesting questions about how states weigh the benefits of unilateral action in this context, where they clearly also perceive some (joint and/or individual) gain from collective activity.
\textsuperscript{101} (Ginsberg 2001, 48).
\textsuperscript{102} I ignore the problem of which issues or topics receive Common Strategies for now. The extended negotiations on the small number of Strategies that were adopted suggest that the choice of issues was based on substantive relevance or political importance, rather than a ‘low-hanging-fruit’ approach. If Common Strategies were only adopted where consensus already existed, then negotiations would not have been as protracted as they were. Also, if the intended targets of such strategies were going to be issues on which consensus existed, then little reason would have existed for the creation of such a policy instrument. The desired policy coherence would have already existed as a function of the consensus.
**Substitutability**

CFSP, however, is not the only branch of the EU that acts in foreign and security policy. In particular, the European Commission and European Parliament (EP) both play roles in the EU’s external policy. First, the EU’s Council of Ministers has delegated certain tasks, particularly the allocation and administration of humanitarian aid, to the Commission. As a result of this delegation, Commission activity may be a possible substitute to or complement for Council action in the CFSP.

Second, while the EU’s founding treaties make no reference to EP in foreign policy, the Parliament has carved out its own role. The Parliament’s activity mainly takes the form of passing a substantial number of resolutions each year to state its reaction to world events. It is particularly vocal about human rights abuses, with the rhetoric of its statements often going far beyond what the Council, as a body composed of states and their representatives, might otherwise be willing to say.\(^{103}\) This suggests a possible substitute or complement relationship here as well, and one might surmise this is particularly true in human rights issues. The Council might consciously or unconsciously defer to Parliament to say things that it cannot.\(^{104}\)

\(^{103}\) For an example of the Parliament’s outspokenness on human rights matters, see their 2001 resolution on the sexual abuse of women, especially Catholic nuns by priests. (European Union. 4-2001, 1.2.1).

\(^{104}\) Unfortunately, this dataset does not allow testing of the latter conjecture; an interaction term for EP activity and *Human Rights Issues* was too collinear to include in any models.
Institutional Leadership

Finally, the leadership of the EU may also affect cooperation. Leadership in the EU, and most particularly in CFSP, emerges from a presidency that rotates among members every six months. The presidency has a substantial amount of influence over the agendas of Council meetings, including those that approve CFSP documents; its representatives also chair drafting committees and work groups. Presidency staff draft and circulate statements to other member states for written approval between meetings.\(^{105}\) The presidency state can also use its position as the external ‘face of the Union’ to direct attention to issues it considers important. The slow-moving nature of the policy process tempers the presidency’s ability to shape the Union’s policy agenda somewhat, but the presidency does have some influence.\(^{106}\)

These institutional prerogatives of the presidency should allow a state to amplify the influence of its preferences during the term in which it holds the presidency.\(^{107}\) We might expect this tendency to be particularly pronounced for states whose foreign policy preferences are not near the middle of the group’s distribution. These states are able to use their vetoes to block unacceptable policy, just like all other states, but they also have the ability to prevent undesirable items from reaching the agenda, to create texts in line with their own preferences that may not be acceptable to the rest of the group, and to convene working groups on issues of importance to them. If states are as attentive to their own interests during their term in the presidency as they are at other times, these abilities should generally result in less cooperation as the outlier presidencies make use of their

\(^{105}\) (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006, 172).
\(^{106}\) (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006, 166-67).
\(^{107}\) (Edwards 2006, 55); Schalk et al. (2007) provide evidence of presidency effects in Pillar I (economic affairs) bargaining.
temporary powers. Even though norms in the EU encourage the state holding the presidency to act impartially and in the Union’s interests rather than its own, setting aside some deeply ingrained preferences may create major domestic costs for outlier presidencies and so encourage them to violate the norm.\textsuperscript{108}

\textit{H11: Events during the presidency of a state that is a preference outlier should be less likely to receive a response.}

In European foreign policy, the primary dimension on which states can be outliers is security policy. Two distinct European security identities exist: formally neutral states and states with an “Atlanticist” orientation in their security policy.\textsuperscript{109} Formal neutrality is a fairly extreme position in that its formality makes it a more rigid form of non-alignment, which is more extreme than a policy that allows for flexible or short-term alignments. When security issues arise, a neutral state holding the presidency may prefer to step aside and defer to another security-oriented institution or ad hoc grouping in which it does not participate, rather than to try to lead cooperation itself.

On the other hand, Wivel (2005) argues that the peaceful resolution of disputes is often a critical component of security policy identity for small and neutral states. We might expect, then, that neutral states would become more involved in conflict resolution, particularly by offering mediation or other “carrots” to support conflict resolution

\textsuperscript{108} Duke and Vanhoonacker (2006:176) argue that the presidency’s strong “brokerage” role in CFSP demands impartiality to be successful. My argument suggests that outlier presidencies are less impartial than more centrist states (and thus less effective at achieving cooperation) as a result of domestic or other pressure on them to protect their relatively extreme preferences.

\textsuperscript{109} Chapter 4 provides a more extensive discussion of these identities. All states who are not Atlanticist or neutral in this context are described and coded as noncommittal.
processes. Neutral presidencies should preside over more foreign policy cooperation in conflict resolution issues than other types of presidencies.\textsuperscript{110}

Similarly, we may expect that states with an Atlanticist foreign policy orientation – those with a strong and persistent preference to use NATO as the primary institution for security issues – would be more likely to defer to NATO or some other institution to act, and thus would be less likely to use the EU for these issues during their presidencies.\textsuperscript{111}

\textit{H11a}: Security events during the presidency of an Atlanticist state should be less likely to receive a response than other types of events.

\textit{H11b}: Security events during the presidency of a neutral state should be less likely to receive a response than other types of events.

\textit{H11c}: Conflict resolution events during the presidency of a neutral state should be more likely to receive a response than other types of events.

**Research Design**

In the preceding subsections I established a set of hypotheses about when cooperation should occur in CFSP. This section addresses the methodological obstacles to studying the question of \textit{when} cooperation happens, particularly the importance of studying unsuccessful cases and the challenge of obtaining a sample of events chosen without reference to their outcomes.

The quantitative study of EU foreign policy activity patterns dates back to Ginsberg (1989), who examined whether a range of foreign policy actions from 1958 to 1985 were prompted by pressures associated with interdependence, externalization of internal policies, or a “self-styled” logic related to then-EC’s conception of its place in

\textsuperscript{110} A neutral presidency might also make a particularly active effort to exert leadership during its tenure to demonstrate that its neutrality was not going to impede the development of CFSP. Several observers believe that this occurred during the initial presidencies of Austria, Sweden, and Finland. These states had repeatedly declared during the accession process that they would participate fully in the CFSP, including in its security components. (Ferriera-Pereira 2004).

\textsuperscript{111} Conflict resolution is not a salient component of Atlanticist security identities, so no hypothesis exists for the conjunction of those two characteristics.
the world. In explaining the causes of the EU’s actions, however, Ginsberg’s research design reveals a critical gap: an inability to know about what causes an action to occur in the first place. The study of only successfully concluded instances of cooperation, and the relative frequency of causes associated with successes, tells us nothing about what prompts action – only about the characteristics of successful action. The proportion of successful cases that result from externalization-based pressures, for example, tells us little about the incidence of externalization pressures in world events more broadly. Without knowing this, we cannot understand whether externalization pressures are more likely to produce cooperation than are other potential causes. Ginsberg reports \( \frac{\text{number of successful cases under one particular logic}}{\text{number of successful cases under all logics}} \). Making the claim about which of Ginsberg’s logics is most likely to result in cooperation requires knowing something about the quantity \( \frac{\text{number of successful cases under this logic}}{\text{total number of cases where states could have cooperated under this logic even if they did not}} \). This limits Ginsberg’s conclusions to stating that “the logic of \( x \) is the most common reason for cooperation” rather than making claims about causality.

Ginsberg’s choice to study only successful outcomes was a reasonable first cut at the study of EC/EU foreign policy activity, given the paucity of existing data and computing resources at the time. Unfortunately, though, it introduces an issue of selection bias into the analysis. When success (cooperation) could result from any of several causes, we can only distinguish between the causal patterns by studying cases where

\[ \frac{\text{number of successful cases under one particular logic}}{\text{number of successful cases under all logics}} \]

\[ \frac{\text{number of successful cases under this logic}}{\text{total number of cases where states could have cooperated under this logic even if they did not}} \]

\[ \text{the logic of } x \text{ is the most common reason for cooperation} \]

---

112 A similar statement would describe the current compliance literature – we know when states will comply with the agreements they have made, but we still have little sense of when they would have made an agreement in the first place, let alone why they signed the agreement that they did. As Chapter 2 argues, the sample of successfully completed agreements is in itself a biased sample; the agreements that states did not sign cannot be enforced, nor would states have been likely to comply with them had they been signed.
these causes are both present and absent in different combinations, and where variation in outcomes exists. Negative cases are thus essential to unbiased causal analysis.

The practice of looking for (and looking at) the ‘dogs that did not bark’ is common in large-n empirical political science. Scholars of international conflict, for example, have often assumed that states have the option to go to war with one another every year. This assumption allows them to approximate the population of all possible cases of war – both negative and positive – by studying all dyad-years in the international system. But how do we identify cases where foreign policy cooperation potentially could have happened, but did not?

Rather than a dyad-year strategy or another approach that attempts to approximate the population of cases, I have instead created a random sample of international events that represent the plausible targets of foreign policy cooperation by states and/or one or more European foreign policy institutions. To build a dataset that represents the full universe of cases, I first took a random sample of pages from Keesing’s Contemporary Archive, a monthly global news digest, and used a random number generator to select which qualifying international event from each entered the final sample. The resulting double-random sample of 300 events is broadly representative of the types and

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113 By not including negative cases, Ginsberg is effectively trying to explain a constant – cooperation – with a variable (type of “logic”). If externalization causes cooperation, and interdependence causes cooperation, then what causes non-cooperation?
114 Geddes (2003) and Achen and Snidal (1989) make powerful cases for careful case selection. Studying only the ‘success’ cases involves an implicit assumption on the analyst’s part that the relationship between outcome and independent variables is the same across the independent variable’s full range of values, and this can be dangerous – and sometimes misleading – if the variable that causes ‘success’ correlates with another underlying variable.
115 Lewis and Lewis (1980) establish a typology of negative cases and argue for their inclusion in data collection and analysis projects.
distribution of issues that states confront in foreign policy.\textsuperscript{116} It contains events in a wide range of issue areas and at varying levels of prominence and urgency.

The dataset spans the period 1994 to 2003, representing the first full year of CFSP operation to the last full year before the EU’s enlargement from 15 to 25 members. The exclusion of the earliest post-Cold War years has both practical and theoretical justifications. First, in practical terms, the CFSP did not exist until November 1993. Prior to this, European foreign policy cooperation occurred under the rubric of “European Political Cooperation.” This system was explicitly not institutionalized; it existed outside the treaty frameworks with the exception of the (rather small) Council Secretariat being charged to support EPC as well as Council activity in EC matters.

Second, theoretically speaking, the earliest post-Cold War years were a time of great change when state interests were uncertain.\textsuperscript{117} Events in this period are not likely to reflect the same kinds of dynamics as during periods of (increasing) preference stability. This uncertainty and fluctuation in preferences in the early post-Cold War period would confound the causal patterns that the consensus-capacity framework tries to explore by increasing the difficulty for states of estimating the preferences of their partners.

Theoretical and practical reasons also prevent the extension of the dataset beyond 2003. First, the accession of 10 states to a body that previously contained only 15 represents an enormous shock to the system. Decision-making dynamics changed substantially as the new member states joined or created coalitions on various issues.\textsuperscript{118} The foreign policy backgrounds of these new states are incredibly different from older

\textsuperscript{116} The sample excludes foreign economic policy issues. The Appendix contains further details and justifications about the sample selection process and coding rules.
\textsuperscript{117} (Ginsberg 2001, 16).
\textsuperscript{118} (Edwards 2006).
member states, to the point where we might expect substantially different theoretical models of preference formation and policy behavior from them. These factors likely make pooling pre- and post-2004 events inappropriate. Moreover, in practical terms, few of these new member states have widely accessible documentation of their foreign policy during the earlier part of the study period. This would result in substantial amounts of non-random missing data, which would undermine the study’s analysis.

The sample used here consists of 300 observations of randomly selected international events. The EU’s norm of not addressing events that involve its member states or that occur on members’ territory (i.e., the norm of domaines réservés) means that the eighteen observations occurring inside the EU drop from the sample.\textsuperscript{119} This leaves 282 observations for analysis in this chapter. Figure 3-1 displays the distribution of these remaining events by region of origin.\textsuperscript{120}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{distribution_of_events_by_region.png}
\caption{Distribution of Events by Region.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{119} The dropped intra-EU observations return to the analysis in Chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{120} The category of “International” is \textit{Keesing’s} classification for events, issues, or developments that are global in scope. Examples of this (not all of which are in the sample) include the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the crisis in the aviation industry after 9/11, the opening of a new UN General Assembly session, an FAO report on the extent of world hunger, etc. They have no target or region of origin, so in any models where “Greater European Region” is variable, these observations are coded 0. I
Understanding Patterns in EU Foreign Policy Cooperation

The following subsections test the hypotheses developed above on the effect of variables related to cooperation in institutions, foreign policy as a broad issue area, and EU-specific characteristics. In all models that follow, the unit of observation is an event from the random event dataset described above. Likewise, the dependent variable in all models is whether the EU made any type of formal response: issuing a statement or declaration, or conclusions; passing a Common Position; or undertaking a Joint Action.\(^\text{121}\) Table 3-1 shows the distribution of EU cooperation over time on events in the sample.

Table 3-1. CFSP Activity by Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No Activity</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Successful Cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The decision to code declarations and conclusions as foreign policy activity deserves some discussion, especially in light of debates in the CFSP literature on whether these rhetorical moves actually represent cooperation beyond what the states themselves would have done individually.\(^\text{122}\) First, both rationalist and constructivist arguments suggest that public statements serve a function in foreign policy. For constructivists, such

\(^{121}\) For our purposes, differentiating between these subgroups is not necessary. Statements, declarations and conclusions pool as low-cost rhetorical behaviors, and Joint Actions and Common Positions pool as higher-intensity behaviors that require resource commitments.

\(^{122}\) See, e.g., Davidson (1997/98); Hoffmann (2000). In effect, these authors argue that CFSP serves more as a forum for foreign policy coordination than cooperation, as Keohane (1984, 51-52) defines it.
statements can contribute to creating or shaping the global discourse about a particular issue; they can also be part of a process of 'naming and shaming,’ in which states and international organizations try to use social pressure to change the target state’s behavior. For rationalists, public statements can generate audience costs and serve as costly signals. Not all statements will have this effect – many are probably cheap talk – but where the statement makes a threat or promise, the audience costs of the statement may help the actors commit to that path of action and signal their credibility to the target.\textsuperscript{123} Neither of these functions requires that states commit themselves to anything beyond what they would otherwise have done.

As additional justification for treating declarations and statements as forms of cooperation in this project, consider the following two arguments. If declarations are cheap or costless, then states or international organizations should issue them on more – or even all – events. But at the same time, if joint declarations are simply what states would do anyway and are thus unlikely to have any additional effect (i.e., have a low probability of achieving success when used alone), then why do states use them at all? The existence of 80 instances of declarations or statements in the dataset poses a puzzle, especially since 70 of those instances occur where no form of higher-order (resource-committing) cooperation occurs. In these arguments, the content of the declarations is beside the point; their mere \textit{existence} is the puzzle.\textsuperscript{124}

\textsuperscript{123} See Morrow (1994) on cheap talk and Fearon (1997) on costly signals. The possibility exists as well that the actor’s intended audience for the statement is others beside the target state: other states, domestic publics, other international organizations, etc.

\textsuperscript{124} The other two instances of EU activity in the dataset are ones with higher-order but no lower-order cooperation: a Common Position on the opening of voter registration in what was widely expected to be a fraudulent election in Nigeria, and a Joint Action related to the postponement of municipal elections in Bosnia as a result of irregularities in registration.
Declarations and statements are actions that require consensus among the participants but only a minimal level of capacity. Unfortunately, these events comprise the majority of cooperation successes in the dataset. Testing hypotheses related to institutional capacity is not possible in this dataset, since it includes only twelve instances of higher-order cooperation involving the commitment of resources (i.e., Joint Actions and Common Positions). This is insufficient variation to obtain reliable estimates in ordered models. Similarly, the institution’s membership, structures and/or resources do not change substantially during the period of study (1994-2003), so testing capacity arguments is not possible in this context either. As a result, I defer discussion of capacity variation to Chapter 4.

**Cooperation in Institutions**

Hypotheses 1 through 4 consider characteristics of cooperation in institutions that should affect the probability of observing it: distribution problems, socialization, the number of members, the effects of membership change, and the centralizing role of institutions. Variables to capture these concepts were coded especially for this study.

I measure the severity of the distribution problem using the Comparative Manifesto Project’s Left-Right orientation scale. The Government Orientation scale weights the preferences of the parties in government by their share of the government’s parliamentary majority, then sums the weighted party scores. The emphasis here is on the *dispersion* of preferences, rather than their precise location, so I take the standard deviation of the mean EU member government preference, measured monthly. This
coding accommodates changes in government during the year and is reasonably reflective of the Council’s composition at each meeting.

Left-right preferences are a crude proxy for foreign policy preferences, since we might expect that ideologically similar governments would share at least some common preferences in foreign policy.\(^{125}\) I use the left-right ideological positions rather than the positions on European integration measure because coding of the latter conflates all dimensions of European integration into a single indicator (“all positive references to European integration” – “all negative references to European integration”). The left-right variable includes positive and negative codings on thirteen different elements.\(^{126}\)

Socialization is a process with few overtly observable characteristics. By definition it is a process of internalization of norms and roles or identities, meaning that the key elements of the process occur inside the minds of participants. What we can observe, however, is the occurrence of events or behaviors that scholars theorize contribute to socialization. Chief among those is repeated exposure to or participation in the desired behaviors, and/or extended periods of practicing a given role.\(^{127}\) To capture this, I use the time in months between the event and the creation of the CFSP. The data sample used here, 1994-2003, begins just after the creation of CFSP in November 1993, and so this captures almost the entire extent of state exposure to and activity under

\(^{125}\) Whether governments of the left or right are more inclined to international cooperation is an open empirical question beyond the scope of this chapter; the use of the standard deviation of mean preferences renders the point irrelevant. Chapter 4 addresses justifications for and objects to the use of manifesto data in more detail.

\(^{126}\) (Marks, et al. 2007). Coding all European issues in a single variable conflates issues of economic integration (often favored by the right but opposed by the left) with issues of social integration (often favored by the left and opposed by the right) and political integration (where party orientation predicts irregularly). As a result, the European Integration variable is very noisy, and so I opt not to use it here. See also (Aspinwall 2007).

\(^{127}\) (Johnston 2003); (Bearce and Bondanella 2007).
CFSP’s rules and structures.\textsuperscript{128} Since CFSP functions through a series of (typically) monthly meetings on a range of professional levels, the use of a month-based indicator measures exposure to these rules and expected behaviors in a fairly direct manner.

As an indicator of the number of members, I use a dummy variable coded 1 for all events that occur after the EU’s “Northern Enlargement” on January 1, 1995. This is functionally equivalent to a variable that indicates the number of members and changes from 12 to 15 on that date, but the dichotomous variable facilitates interpretation.

To capture the social effects of enlargement – that the alteration in membership is a shock to the established social system in the group – I use three indicators with differing rates of decay. Table 3-2 displays these rates of decay. This allows me to vary the shape of the decay function (linear in Enlargement 2 and Enlargement 3; nonlinear in Enlargement 4), the rate of decay (slopes of -0.25 in Enlargement 2 and -0.33 in Enlargement 3), and also the time required for the effect to dissipate (24 months for Enlargement 2; 18 for Enlargement 3 and Enlargement 4). The six-month intervals each correspond to a term of the presidency in the EU.\textsuperscript{129} The varying shapes of the decay functions are all monotonically negative, but they differ in the distribution of that dissipation over time.

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Term (Presidency State)} & \textbf{Enlargement 2} & \textbf{Enlargement 3} & \textbf{Enlargement 4} \\
\hline
Jan-Jun 1995 (France) & 1.0 & 1.0 & 1.0 \\
Jul-Dec 1995 (Spain) & 0.75 & 0.66 & 0.5 \\
Jan-Jun 1996 (Italy) & 0.5 & 0.33 & 0.25 \\
Jul-Dec 1996 (Ireland) & 0.25 & 0 & 0 \\
Jan-Jun 1997 (Netherlands) & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Values of Dissipating-Enlargement-Shock Variables.}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{128} The creation of CFSP codified EPC but added formal institutions and new policy tools, including tools for action as well as declarations.
\textsuperscript{129} I discuss the presidency and its role in greater detail below. For purposes here, the presidency is the common time unit for understanding EU activity. Because each presidency enters with a policy agenda, each six-month period is effectively a distinct policy cycle, even though completion of some initiatives may well continue for a year or more afterward.
Finally, Hypothesis 4 suggested that institutional features that led to increased centralization should improve the chances of cooperation. In 1999, the EU’s Treaty of Amsterdam came into effect, bringing with it several enhancements to the CFSP that increased centralization. The Treaty of Amsterdam created a “High Representative” for the CFSP, who is a proto-Foreign Minister; this individual serves as the EU’s mediator in a variety of global crisis situations and also works to increase the public visibility of CFSP. The Treaty also created the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, which assembles senior foreign service officers of the member countries to generate common strategic analyses and policy papers. It aims to improve the chances of consensus by creating a unified understanding of ‘the problem’ at or before its emergence, rather than waiting for states to develop their own positions and working backward to a consensus.

I test these hypotheses using a probit model, with standard errors corrected for clustering on major groups of events (i.e., Middle East peace process, Bosnia, etc.). As the results in Table 3-3 show, none of the hypotheses about characteristics of cooperation in general receives even mild support in the data. No specification produces a significant coefficient, even under the more generous one-tailed tests presented in the table. Hypotheses from both the rationalist and constructivist ‘conventional wisdom about cooperation are equally unsupported by this model. Possible reasons for this include the somewhat simplistic measurement of most variables and the admittedly partial model specification.

130 The presidency serves as the public face of CFSP, but with the presidency rotating between states every six months, the EU’s leaders felt that a permanent face would help personalize and personify CFSP to the ordinary citizen.

131 Probit specifications are appropriate because the dependent variable is binary (cooperate or not); clustered standard errors allow for possible non-independence of events in clusters. 72 cases of success appear across the 288 observations. Rare events logit maximizes its usefulness with a ratio of 1 success to 2 failures; the current specification is approximately 1:3. Thus, the rare events procedure is unlikely to produce substantially different results than the current estimations. See King and Zheng (2001).
Table 3-3. Probit Model of EU Activity and Characteristics of Cooperation in General.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model A</th>
<th>Model B</th>
<th>Model C</th>
<th>Model D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff</td>
<td>Robust SE</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>Coeff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preference Dispersion</strong></td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socialization (Time)</strong></td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centralization</strong></td>
<td>-0.430</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>-0.431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enlargement</strong></td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>0.417</td>
<td>0.468</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enlargement 2</strong></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enlargement 3</strong></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enlargement 4</strong></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.942</td>
<td>0.460</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Log pseudolikelihood</strong></td>
<td>-169.30</td>
<td>-169.30</td>
<td>-169.21</td>
<td>-169.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pseudo-R²</strong></td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>282</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on issue group. p-values represent one-tailed tests.
**Characteristics of Foreign Policy**

Foreign policy as an issue area includes many fast-moving events with broad ramifications for the international system. This is particularly true for wars and conflicts, which cause avoidable death and suffering and which may spread to neighboring states. The variable *All Crisis Issues* captures all issues with security ramifications, including issues classified as both domestic and international peace and security, and issues of domestic and international conflict resolution.

A second factor that may affect foreign policy cooperation is the event’s level of salience. Highly salient events – those obtaining much media coverage and that other members of the foreign policy community (including the media) perceive as important – should also be more likely to receive a response. To capture salience, I use the word count of the article in *Keesing’s Contemporary Archive* from which the event was selected. These word counts are logged to reduce the influence of outliers; in addition, all entries over four pages long have an arbitrarily high word count of 1000. Figure 3-2 displays the distribution of (logged) salience in the sample.

Figure 3-2. Frequency Distribution of Salience (Logged).
Finally, geographic proximity may affect foreign policy cooperation behavior since many forms of crisis and conflict spread easily over national borders. In the case of the EU, the variable *Greater European Region* captures all events in non-EU Europe (including Turkey) and the former Soviet Union.\(^{132}\)

### Table 3-4. Probit Models (Minimal) of EU Activity and Foreign Policy Characteristics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>Robust SE</th>
<th>(P)</th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>Robust SE</th>
<th>(p)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Crisis Issues</strong></td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greater European Region</strong></td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Salience (logged)</strong></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.491</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-0.767</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-3.203</td>
<td>0.650</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-166.75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-157.66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R(^2)</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>282</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>282</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on issue group. \(p\)-values represent one-tailed tests.

Table 3-4 provides a preliminary test of hypotheses related to characteristics of foreign policy as an issue area. Model A is a limited model, examining only Hypotheses 5 and 7. *All Crisis Issues* has a positive and significant relationship with CFSP responses. In this limited specification, geographic location is not related to EU cooperation. Overall, the model performs poorly.

Model B expands the set of explanatory factors slightly by adding *Salience* to test Hypothesis 6. *Salience* is highly significant, with a large and positive effect. With all else held at its median value, moving *Salience* from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above increases the probability of cooperation by 21.76%. *All Crisis Issues* retains its positive and significant relationship in this specification, but *Salience* alone accounts for some 5.2% of the model’s explanatory power.

---

\(^{132}\) A longstanding norm prohibits the EU from using its foreign policy mechanism to address or respond to events in the EU itself; these observations are excluded from the dataset, and so coding them as part of the “Greater European Region” is not necessary in this chapter. On *domaines réservés*, see, e.g., (M. E. Smith 2000).
The models in Table 3-5 disaggregate *All Crisis Issues* into its component parts and examine them separately to test Hypotheses 5a, 5b and 5c. Model A examines the combination of *All Security Issues* (both domestic and international) and *All Conflict Resolution Issues*. First, disaggregation improves the model’s fit by an additional 2%. This represents a substantial increase over the extremely low level of variation explained by Table 3-4’s models, though the overall variance explained remains low. Second, the model suggests that the EU is significantly more likely to respond to *Conflict Resolution Issues*, but no relationship appears to exist between *All Security Issues* and CFSP activity. This suggests that two different causal processes are at work in these sub-issues.

Model B continues the disaggregation process by considering only *International Security Issues*, which are the primary focus of the hypotheses, and *Conflict Resolution Issues*. The results, however, parallel the findings in Model A; *Conflict Resolution Issues* and *Salience* remain significant, and *Greater European Region* and *International Security Issues* are not. Model C, which reintroduces *Domestic Security Issues* as a separate variable, produces comparable results. Neither *Security Issue* variable approaches significance at conventional levels.
Table 3-5. Probit Model of EU Activity and Characteristics of Foreign Policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>Robust SE</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>Robust SE</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>Robust SE</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model A</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Security Issues</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All International. Security Issues</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Domestic Security Issues</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Conflict Resolution Issues</td>
<td>0.603</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.583</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.602</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater European Region</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience (logged)</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.489</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.201</td>
<td>0.653</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-3.206</td>
<td>0.667</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-3.207</td>
<td>0.653</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Model B**          |       |           |       |       |           |       |       |           |       |

| **Model C**          |       |           |       |       |           |       |       |           |       |

**Notes:** Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on issue group. $p$-values represent one-tailed tests.
To summarize, the models in this section produce strong support for Hypothesis 6 on the role of event salience in predicting CFSP responses. Salience alone accounts for a substantial portion of the model’s explanatory power. Hypothesis 7 on geographic proximity, however, receives no support here. Neither pooled indicators of all crisis issues, nor disaggregated variables reflecting international and domestic security issues, have significant relationships with CFSP activity. Hypotheses 5b and 5c thus both lack support. Hypotheses 5a, however, gains considerable support; conflict resolution issues are a significant predictor in all models in which they appear. Moreover, disaggregating the crisis issues in this manner explains less variation than the pooled model, which is unexpected since conflict resolution and security issues appear to behave very differently.

EU-Specific Characteristics

Specific characteristics of the EU as a venue should also influence cooperation. First, the Treaty on European Union, which created CFSP, specifies five priority areas as “objectives”\textsuperscript{133}: international security, conflict resolution, democratization, human rights, and regional integration. Because these are part of the Treaty, and the Treaty required the unanimous consent of the member states, we should expect that a greater underlying consensus exists on these issues and that we should see more cooperation on them.\textsuperscript{134} The following models reflect two codings of the issue areas. Model A in each table shows the treaty issues pooled into a single variable (All Treaty Issues); Model B disaggregates the issue areas into separate variables.

\textsuperscript{133} (European Union 1991, Art 11, ex J.1).
\textsuperscript{134} Each event may code as up to two issue areas. For example, violence erupted at the opening of the Haitian Legislature in 1994. As this was both an instance of substantial domestic unrest, it codes as a (domestic) security issue, and since this was the first democratically-elected legislature, it also codes as democratization issue.
Second, and for similar reasons, we might also expect issues on which the EU has established a Common Strategy to be more likely to receive responses from the Union. As I discussed above, the negotiations to produce the Common Strategies should have helped to resolve many of the underlying distribution problems on that issue and to establish a basis for future policy. Because a Common Strategy is both fairly recent and also fairly detailed, we would expect its effect to be stronger than that of treaty issues; it would both reflect current member state governments’ preferences and also have addressed distribution problems on more specific issues. To capture this, I create a dichotomous variable where events on which the Union had established a Common Strategy have a value of 1.

Third, CFSP is not the only component of EU external activity. Two other EU bodies, the European Commission and the European Parliament (EP), make statements, and the Commission also acts in international affairs. As the discussion above suggested, the behavior of these two bodies may either substitute for or complement CFSP activity. The dichotomous variables Commission and EP capture action by these bodies.\(^{135}\)

Finally, Hypothesis 11 proposed that the preferences of the state holding the EU’s rotating presidency should influence the Union’s propensity for cooperation. The powers of the presidency may allow the state holding it to express its preferences more fully during its term in office than it might otherwise. Preference Outlier captures whether the presidency state has a constitutional or other legally-binding commitment to neutrality or nonalignment in its security policy (Ireland, Finland, Sweden, or Austria), or a historically Atlanticist security policy orientation (the UK, Germany, Spain, and

\(^{135}\) I do not test Hypothesis 11 (the general substitute/complement hypothesis) directly with a variable that captures action by either body. The different powers and resources granted to the two bodies would make pooling inappropriate as it would conflate the very different processes underlying each body’s behavior.
Denmark). These states have distinct preferences that are far from the median preference, and we might reasonably expect them to behave differently. Therefore, *Preference Outlier* codes both of these types of presidencies as 1 and all others as 0.\(^{136}\)

### Table 3-6. Probit Models of Cooperation as a Function of EU-Specific Variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model A</th>
<th>Model B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff</td>
<td>Robust SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Treaty Issues</td>
<td>0.475</td>
<td>0.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Security Issues</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Conflict Resolution Issues</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Human Rights Issues</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Democratization Issues</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Integration</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Strategy</td>
<td>0.845</td>
<td>0.350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>0.958</td>
<td>0.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pref. Outlier Presidency</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
<td>0.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.046</td>
<td>0.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-155.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R(^2)</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>282</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on issue group. *p*-values represent one-tailed tests.

Table 3-6 shows two probit models of EU cooperation. Model A pools all the Treaty-specified issues into a single variable; Model B disaggregates them. In Model A, strong and significant effects appear for both *All Treaty Issues* and *Common Strategies*. Being a treaty issue increases the probability of a CFSP response by 13.33% over the baseline of 15.00%; having a Common Strategy results in an increase of 27.61% percent.\(^{137}\) Given the rather low baseline, these increases are substantively significant as well – nearly doubling for treaty issues and nearly trebling for issues with a Common Strategy. The *European Parliament*’s behavior is also a significant predictor of

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\(^{136}\) Later models disaggregate this variable into Neutrals and Atlanticists.

\(^{137}\) All other variables held at their medians (0); calculations performed in Stata 8.0 using CLARIFY ((King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000); (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2001)). Baseline represents all variables set to 0.
cooperation \((p < 0.000)\), though its sign is positive. This strongly suggests that a CFSP response and EP behavior are complements rather than substitutes.  

Model B’s picture is more nuanced, showing the separate effects of the component issue areas in the Treaty. The bulk of the Treaty’s influence appears to come from two issues, Conflict Resolution \((p < 0.000)\) and Democratization \((p < 0.006)\). Regional Integration marginally misses conventional levels of statistical significance in a one-tailed test \((p < 0.123)\), even with a control for Commission activity on that event. Security and Human Rights issues, however, are insignificant \((p < 0.155\) and 0.362, respectively). European Parliament activity continues to have a strong and significant positive relationship, though as before, the coding procedures prohibit any causal conclusions from this finding. The influence of Preference Outlier presidencies, however, becomes substantially more certain, though it too still fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance \((p < 0.159,\) one-tailed test).

Table 3-7 extends the analysis by disaggregating the preference outliers into neutral and Atlanticist states. Model A, with the pooled treaty issues, suggests that the two types of outliers do indeed behave differently. Atlanticist Presidencies appear less likely to cooperate, though the coefficient just misses conventional levels of statistical significance \((p < 0.107,\) one-tailed test). Neutral Presidencies have an unexpected positive sign though they are nowhere near statistical significance.

---

138 The coding of the data does not, however, allow us to determine whether EP behavior leads to CFSP action, or vice versa. Coding procedures captured whether the EP or Council made any reactions to the event/issue within a standard time frame of two months before the event to one month after. It did not capture the specific dates of the reactions. In any case, these dates would be influenced by preset meeting schedules to an extent where the enactment dates themselves are fairly meaningless unless they are separated by some significant span.

139 That the EU is more likely to act on conflict resolution issues is no surprise to EU scholars and practitioners. Hill (2004155) notes, “The EU is good at the theory of conflict resolution, if nothing else.”

140 The lack of significance on Security is perhaps not surprising given the range of security policy preferences in the EU, as I discuss below.
### Table 3-7. Probit Models Disaggregating Preference Outliers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>Robust SE</th>
<th>(P)</th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>Robust SE</th>
<th>(p)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Treaty Issues</strong></td>
<td>0.498</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>All Security Issues</em></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>All Conflict Resolution Issues</em></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.771</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>All Human Rights Issues</em></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>0.325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>All Democratization Issues</em></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.413</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Integration</strong></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Common Strategy</strong></td>
<td>0.827</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.914</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>European Parliament</strong></td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.984</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commission</strong></td>
<td>0.150</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.353</td>
<td>0.426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Atlanticist Presidency</strong></td>
<td>-0.192</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>-0.228</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neutral Presidency</strong></td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.397</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-1.069</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-1.010</td>
<td>0.201</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-155.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-151.40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R(^2)</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>282</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>282</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on issue group, \(p\)-values represent one-tailed tests.

Model B disaggregates both the outliers and the treaty issues. *Security and Human Rights* issues remain insignificant, and *Regional Integration* moves from marginal to significant \(p < 0.09\), one-tailed test). Common Strategies and EP behavior remain significant while Commission activity continues to be insignificant. Turning to the preference outlier presidencies, Model B presents clear evidence that the two types of outliers do indeed behave differently. *Atlanticist Presidencies* are now significantly less likely to preside over cooperation than states with the median (noncommittal) security policy preference \(p < 0.074\), as theory predicts. Holding all other variables constant at their medians (0 in this case), moving from a noncommittal presidency to an Atlanticist one decreases the probability of cooperation by 4.92%. *Neutral Presidencies* remains highly insignificant; this suggests that these states behave in a very similar way to states with median preferences.
Table 3-8 presents tests of interaction hypotheses 11a, 11b, and 11c. These hypotheses relate presidency security identity to issue area and allow for a more refined test of the argument that the reactions of the two outlier security identities, Atlanticist and neutral, are different from both other (non-committal) states and also from each other. The models in Table 3-8 include variables interacting both neutral and Atlanticist presidencies with security issues and, for neutral presidencies, with conflict resolution issues. Both security identities contain clear predictions about their expected behavior on security issues – Atlanticists should prefer action through NATO and neutrals should prefer no action. Only the neutral identity contains expectations, though, about behavior on conflict resolution issues. Support of activity in this field is a significant part of the neutral identity, at least as practiced by the states in this sample, and so we should expect a positive effect of the interaction.

Table 3-8 shows the by-now standard pattern of significance across Common Strategies, EP activity, and Commission behavior. Among the issue areas, Human Rights and Regional Integration remain clearly insignificant and Democratization remains significant and positive.

---

141 The tacit interaction of Neutral Presidencies and Atlanticist Presidencies drops as the categories are mutually exclusive.
142 Switzerland, whose neutrality is perhaps most easily understood, does not typically act on this component of the ‘neutral’ identity. This is perhaps because its confederal system of government produces only a weak prime minister who may lack the international credibility to be an effective global presence. While none of the other neutral states here – Ireland, Austria, Sweden, and Finland – are particularly powerful or strong states, each of their prime ministers has engaged in international mediation at some point, and all four contributed to a range of UN peacekeeping missions during the period of interest.
Table 3-8. Interaction Effects in EU Cooperation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>Robust SE</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Security Issues</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>0.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Conflict Resolution Issues</td>
<td>0.469</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Human Rights Issues</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Democratization Issues</td>
<td>0.397</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Integration Issues</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Strategy</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.355</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>1.033</td>
<td>0.260</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td>0.357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanticist Presidency</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral Presidency</td>
<td>-0.338</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral Pres. * Conflict Res.</td>
<td>1.431</td>
<td>0.524</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral Pres. * Security</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>0.439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanticist Pres. * Security</td>
<td>-0.428</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.996</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log pseudolikelihood       -147.14
Pseudo-R^2                  0.135
N                            282

Notes: Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on issue group. p-values represent one-tailed tests.

From there, however, the results begin to diverge from earlier models. Considering first the components of the interaction terms, Security is borderline significant (p < 0.105) in the presence of the interaction terms, suggesting that states with no distinct security identity (the noncommittal states, who comprise the excluded category for this variable) are more willing to use the EU for security matters than the outliers are. The positive and significant coefficient on Conflict Resolution suggests that the marginal effect of conflict resolution issues among non-committal and Atlanticist states is positive. Atlanticist Presidencies are negatively related to cooperation (though the coefficient is insignificant); Neutral Presidencies are now significant and negatively related to cooperation. Both of these findings are consistent with Hypothesis 11.

The interactions, though, tell another story. Interacting Neutral Presidencies and Security issues produces no significant effect, but a very large positive effect appears on
the interaction of *Neutral Presidencies* and *Conflict Resolution* issues. As Table 3-9 shows, a non-conflict resolution issue with a noncommittal presidency has a 16.42% chance of receiving a CFSP reaction (Cell A); this is a baseline probability of cooperation for most events. As we vary the two elements of interest, for example to a non-committal presidency *with* a conflict resolution issue (Cell B), we observe a near doubling of the probability of cooperation, to 30.33%. Altering, instead, to a conflict resolution issue and a neutral presidency (Cell C) produces a *decrease* of 6.49%, thanks to the negative coefficient on *Neutral Presidencies*. Finally, when we observe both a neutral presidency and a conflict resolution issue (Cell D), the probability of a CFSP reaction jumps by an astounding 53.77%, to a total 70.19% probability of cooperation.

These strong results for *Neutral Presidencies* fail to emerge for other outlier presidencies. In contrast to the models in Table 3-7, *Atlanticist Presidencies* are no longer significantly related to cooperation. Their interaction with security issues produces a negative coefficient, though, and is marginally significant ($p < 0.108$, one-tailed test). The cumulative effect of a security issue with an Atlanticist presidency is to reduce the baseline in Cell A of Table 3-9 by 3.21%, to a total of 13.21% chance of response.

**Table 3-9. The Effects of Neutral Presidencies and Conflict Resolution Issues.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neutral Presidency</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>A. 16.42%</td>
<td>B. 30.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(baseline)</td>
<td>(13.91%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>C. 9.93%</td>
<td>D. 70.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-6.49%)</td>
<td>(53.77%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes:* Top entry is total probability, bottom entry is change from baseline value (Cell A). Predicted probabilities generated using CLARIFY and coefficient estimates from Table 8, with the exception of clustered standard errors. Cell entries may not sum precisely due to rounding.
Taken together, the models in this section suggest that presidency effects do exist, with neutral and Atlanticist presidencies both less likely to preside over foreign policy cooperation. The exception to this negative trend is conflict resolution issues, where neutral presidencies demonstrate a marked willingness to engage in foreign policy cooperation. The finding of presidency effects in CFSP cooperation contradicts repeated evidence in the EU studies literature – and indeed, the Council’s own *Presidency Handbook* – on the norm of presidency neutrality.\(^{143}\) During a period when the state holds the presidency, it is expected to set aside its national interests and work in the interests of the Union. The bulk of the evidence for this proposition comes from “Pillar I” (EC/economic) issues, however, and the findings here may be evidence of a different dynamic operating in CFSP (Pillar II).\(^{144}\)

*A Consolidated Model*

The models above segregated variables into conceptually related groups. What does a consolidated model tell us? The model specification in Table 3-10 includes all of the variables used in previous models. The inclusion of the security interaction terms precludes the disaggregation of security issues into their domestic and international components (as in Table 3-5); instead, we must pool them into *All Security Issues*.

The results differ strikingly from the segregated models. The baseline probability of cooperation now is 10.97\%, which is notably lower than in most prior models.\(^{145}\) None

\(^{143}\) (European Union. General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers. 2001).

\(^{144}\) Schalk et al. (2007) and Dür and Mateo (2004) address presidency norms and treaty-level bargaining. Edwards (2006) provides evidence from elite interviews that national interests regularly influence CFSP.

\(^{145}\) In all predicted probability reports in this section, *Salience, Socialization* and *Preference Dispersion* are at their means. All other variables are held at their medians, which is 1 for *Enlargement* and *Amsterdam* and 0 for all others. As with all other CLARIFY estimates, robust standard errors are omitted.
of the variables reflecting ideas about ‘cooperation in general’ were significant in the earlier specifications; here, Socialization (time in months) has a significantly positive effect. Moving Socialization from its median (64 months, reflected in the baseline value) to its 75th percentile (93 months) increases the probability of cooperation by 5.65%. As discussed above, the process driving the change in behavior may be more of a rationalist perception updating one rather than a socialization one, but the model here is unable to distinguish. At a minimum, this model clearly suggests that some form of learning – either an individual form or a social form – occurs over time, so that the group finds reaching consensus easier as time passes.

The variables capturing characteristics of foreign policy as a broader issue area produce largely the same results as in the earlier models. Salience continues to have a strong and positive relationship to cooperation, as do Conflict Resolution Issues; moving Salience from its mean (reflected in the baseline) to one standard deviation above its mean increases the probability of cooperation by 7.73%. Geographic location continues to be insignificant. Given the context of the EU and its immediate interests in its neighbors, both as sources of potential instability and as candidates for EU membership, this insignificance is somewhat surprising.146 This model is unable to test arguments about all crisis issues, or about domestic and international security issues, but it does produce a positive significant effect for All Security Issues (domestic and international).

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146 The EU may convey its interest in events in these states through channels other than the CFSP, such as the quarterly Accession Councils held with prospective members.
Table 3-10. Consolidated Probit Model of EU Activity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>Robust SE</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preference Dispersion</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization (time)</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization</td>
<td>-0.598</td>
<td>0.503</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlargement</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>0.554</td>
<td>0.417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlargement 4</td>
<td>-0.319</td>
<td>0.497</td>
<td>0.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Security Issues</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Conflict Res. Issues</td>
<td>0.511</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater European Region</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience (logged)</td>
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<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Democratization Issues</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Integration</td>
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<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Strategy</td>
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<td>0.360</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>1.120</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.397</td>
<td>0.385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanticist Presidency</td>
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<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral Presidency</td>
<td>-0.363</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral Pres. * Conflict Res. Issues</td>
<td>1.450</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral Pres. * Security Issues</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>0.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanticist Pres.* Security Issues</td>
<td>-0.394</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>0.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.951</td>
<td>1.402</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log pseudolikelihood     -136.48
Pseudo-R²                 0.197
N                         282

Notes: Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on issue group. p-values represent one-tailed tests.

Security Issues and Conflict Resolution Issues comprise two of the five issue areas that the EU’s founding Treaty specifies as its CFSP priorities. Of the rest, Human Rights Issues continue to have no statistically significant relationship to cooperation. Given the amount of literature on the EU’s activity in this issue area, both through CFSP and other tools, this finding is somewhat surprising. The coefficients on Democratization and Regional Integration are both significant and positive. This is true for Regional Integration even in the presence of a control for Commission activity, where much of the

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147 See, e.g., (Williams 2004), (K. E. Smith 2006).
practical support for regional integration elsewhere emerges.\textsuperscript{148} \textit{EP} activity and the existence of a \textit{Common Strategy} continue to have their usual strong and positive effects. Issues or events on which the EP has acted are 31.56\% more likely to receive a CFSP response than those with no EP attention.\textsuperscript{149} In this consolidated model, both the short-term/recently-generated consensus of a Common Strategy and the long-term/underlying consensus of Treaty inclusion appear to increase the chances of a CFSP response.

The variables reflecting presidency security policy orientation also continue to have similar effects as above. \textit{Atlanticist Presidencies} are no more or less likely than noncommittal ones to preside over cooperation. On the other hand, \textit{Neutral Presidencies} are significantly less likely to preside over cooperation – the probability of observing a CFSP response decreases by 4.71\%, or nearly half of its baseline value. As preference outliers, these states appear to use their agenda power to take advantage of the lack of consensus and obtain outcomes nearer their own ideal points. On conflict resolution issues, however, the neutrals continue to be very active. A neutral presidency facing a conflict resolution issue increases the probability of a CFSP response by an enormous 48.92\%, even in the presence of all the variables proposed by other hypotheses.\textsuperscript{150}

F-tests of \textit{Neutral Presidency}, \textit{Neutral * Security Issue}, and \textit{Neutral * Conflict Resolution Issue} show that the three terms are jointly significant ($p < 0.015$). This indicates that in general, neutral presidencies do behave differently on all forms of security and conflict resolution issues. Atlanticist states, however, show no such pattern. Joint tests of \textit{Atlanticist Presidency} and \textit{Atlanticist Presidency * Security Issue}, and of

\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{148} The effect of \textit{Commission} activity itself continues to be insignificant, though.
\textsuperscript{149} Again, coding procedures prohibit conclusions about causality.
\textsuperscript{150} This predicted probability holds \textit{Salience} at its mean. Since most crisis issues have \textit{Salience} levels above the mean, however, the true increase is probably even larger.
Atlanticist Presidency and Security Issue, both fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance ($p < 0.257$ and $p < 0.230$, respectively, two-tailed tests). These states do not behave differently in any statistically distinguishable manner from non-committal states.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored factors that drive states to cooperate in foreign policy in a formal international organization, and in particular it studies those factors influencing when states choose to cooperate within the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy framework. The answer to “when do states cooperate through international institutions?” involves a number of elements related to institutional and issue area characteristics.

Several variables clearly affect states’ ability to reach consensus on a common response. In particular, salience has a substantial effect. Highly salient or prominent events have a much greater chance of obtaining a CFSP response. This effect is consistent across all models. Events that can tap a pre-existing consensus, whether from a Common Strategy or from the EU’s Treaty basis, also have a significantly higher chance of cooperation. Human rights is the only issue area specified in the Treaty that never attains statistical significance; this is perhaps because the current measurement conflates both positive human rights developments and negative ones.\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{151} Running Table 3-10’s consolidated model with separate indicators for positive and negative human rights developments does not substantially improve the model’s fit (model not shown). Positive Human Rights Issues is just barely significant ($p < 0.100$, one-tailed test) and positively signed, but Negative Human Rights Issues is nowhere near significant ($p < 450$, one-tailed test). Most EU human rights proponents would have expected a reverse effect, with strong positive effects for Negative Human Rights Issues.
Distribution problems themselves, as measured by the left-right preference dispersion of member governments, fail to predict cooperation in any model specification. Other indicators related to distribution problems, however, perform somewhat better. An indicator of whether an Atlanticist state holds the presidency is negatively related to cooperation, though in some models it fails to reach statistical significance even in the more generous one-tailed tests. Atlanticist states holding the EU’s presidency are somewhat less prone to cooperation, but the finding is not robust.

Indicators of neutral state presidencies perform more consistently, producing negative and significant effects in all models. The effect is reversed, however, on conflict resolution issues. In these cases, neutral presidencies are operating on issues that are consistent with their self-perceived security identity, and the interaction term produces a statistically significant and substantively quite large positive effect.

The EU, however, is not the only institution for European foreign policy cooperation. Several others exist, and their existence may influence decisions to conduct cooperation through the EU. The use of an institution is a choice, as is the decision on which institution to use. We are also unable to test variables related to capacity in the context of a single organization, since the EU varies only slightly in both membership and “own capabilities” over time. Chapter 4 examines these effects by considering variables about both capacity and consensus across four European foreign policy venues.

152 “Own capabilities” are capabilities of the institution itself rather than of its member-states. Examples include NATO’s ownership of several AWACS planes and its own situation center. The EU later acquires a satellite center (inherited on the dismantling of the Western European Union), but it continues to lack any non-bureaucratic capabilities of its own other than the Commission’s pool of foreign aid money.
Chapter 4

The International Politics of Forum Choice:
Foreign Policy Behavior In and Out of Institutions

The previous chapter explored the determinants of cooperation through an institution, and in particular through the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). As Chapter 1 suggested, however, the choice to cooperate is not the only foreign policy option states have. A number of other outcomes are possible: the status quo (do nothing), unilateral action, cooperation outside institutions, or cooperation through a different institution. Compounding the problem, these options (other than ‘do nothing’) are not mutually exclusive.

How, then, do states decide which option – or options – they will select? This chapter explores the international politics of policy choice by studying characteristics of institutions, issues, and states. In particular, it examines how these characteristics influence which kinds of foreign policy outcomes emerge – status quo, unilateral action, institutional cooperation, and extra-institutional cooperation – using a subset of Chapter 3’s random events dataset. As in Chapter 3, the focus here continues to be at the level of international outcomes, rather than the level of actions or preferences of individual states.153 In addition to studying patterns of event outcomes in several institutions, I also examine these international outcomes in the context of non-exclusivity: which institutions or outcomes occur in which combinations for which issues?

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This chapter first establishes claims from the literature on cooperation, and foreign policy cooperation in particular, that help to explain the range of outcomes we observe in foreign policy. It emphasizes the role of characteristics of institutions, such as their membership, and characteristics of states, such as security policy preferences, that may influence perceptions about consensus and capacity. The first section also suggests hypotheses to this effect. The second section follows the general line of existing literature on cooperation and tests only hypotheses that address when states should choose to cooperate through institutions. This narrow focus speaks clearly to our current understandings of cooperation. It also, however, establishes baseline expectations for comparison with models that treat the full range of foreign policy outcomes jointly.

The third section examines patterns of substitutability and complementarity in foreign policy outcomes. When does unilateral activity occur alone, and when does it occur alongside other forms of behavior? Which institutions are complements and which substitutes? This section contends that existing arguments about ‘forum shopping’ fail to predict international outcomes well because they treat outcomes as mutually exclusive and they neglect both non-cooperative and extra-institutional options. The consensus-capacity framework treats foreign policy as a series of decisions and relates all of these options to one another. The empirical models in this section thus treat the full set of foreign policy options as interconnected rather than mutually exclusive.

The final section compares the third section’s multiple-outcome analysis with the institutional-cooperation-only models of the second section. This comparison provides a clear picture of the effect of ignoring other foreign policy choices in the study of
cooperation. It ends by assessing the contributions of this chapter’s analysis to the consensus-capacity framework.

**Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior**

In this section, I hypothesize that the consensus and capacity framework leads us to focus on three sets of variables to explain international cooperation: characteristics of the institutions, characteristics of states that are considering cooperation, and interactions of the two. These characteristics influence whether cooperation is attractive for states in any given situation. I address each set of variables in turn.

**Institutions and Cooperation**

Organizations and groupings differ in four ways that influence their attractiveness as cooperation fora: the number and preferences of their members, the existence of tools and resources, the enforceability of agreements, and finally, the organization's jurisdiction. Number and preferences of members and jurisdiction affect the organization’s ability to reach consensus on an agreement; concerns about enforceability and the organization’s resource pool influence the organization’s capacity to execute the agreement successfully. I illustrate the importance of these factors by first comparing the advantages and disadvantages of large and small institutions in terms of membership, resources, and enforceability. I then address why jurisdiction is important.

**Enforceability and the Number and Preferences of Member States**

The number and preferences of members both influence an organization's attractiveness for cooperation since both affect the organization’s ability to achieve
consensus. Large organizations, like the United Nations or the OSCE, have problems on this front. As the number of states increases, the number of preference points also generally increases, which potentially hinders the organization’s ability to agree on a single course of action.\textsuperscript{154} Since international organizations generally operate under either consensus or unanimity decision rules, reaching an agreement will become more difficult as the number of members increases. The presence of even one extreme preference outlier can be fatal to cooperation if the institution’s decision rules allow that actor to exercise a veto. Large organizations implicitly acknowledge this problem in their institutional design and in their activity by trading unanimity decision rules for consensus ones, allowing abstention, and producing non-binding agreements.\textsuperscript{155}

Larger groups also have difficulty providing public goods, of which foreign policy is a classic example.\textsuperscript{156} Under typical conditions states have strong incentives to free-ride on others’ contributions, and monitoring and enforcement instruments are weak. Lack of enforcement is a vicious cycle. If actors believe that other actors will not contribute, and that the public good is not likely to be successfully provided as a result, then they themselves have no incentive to contribute, and then the public good is even \textit{less} likely to be provided or to succeed. Consequently, international public goods such as international security or environmental protection are often underprovided.

Compared to smaller groups, large organizations engage in high-intensity actions much less often. Instead, they frequently use low-level resolution-making, such as

\begin{itemize}
\item The UN’s decision-making institutions reflect this dynamic. If the 192-member UN required unanimity or consensus among all of its members to adopt any kind of text, action would be slow indeed. Instead, the most rapidly moving and sensitive issues go to a subset of the membership, the Security Council.
\item These two characteristics, the veto and the abstention, are in large part why the predictions of the median voter theorem do not hold in international organizations.
\item (Olson 1982).
\end{itemize}
'Hallmark diplomacy'\(^{157}\) (the issuing of congratulatory, sympathetic, or condemning statements or resolutions) or other weak courses of action. This kind of activity carries very low costs, and participants normally have very little incentive to defect. Even if states did have incentives to do so, the effect on participating states’ expected utility from the declaration is small. The probability of a declaration alone achieving the desired outcome is very small, and the utility from the kinds of watered-down language that compromise among large groups usually produces, means that the effect of most kinds of defection would be minimal.\(^{158}\) Because of their large and diverse membership, and their non-majoritarian decision rules, these organizations must settle for a ‘lowest common denominator’ response. Put another way, larger institutions usually sacrifice depth of cooperation and instead privilege breadth of membership.\(^{159}\)

Smaller organizations do not often share these problems. Typically, smaller institutions are “clubs,” formed of states that have like interests on issues under the organization's jurisdiction.\(^{160}\) The deliberate selection of members on the basis of their preferences enhances the group's ability to reach consensus. The smaller number of preference points that must be accommodated in any decision also contributes by limiting the quantity of potentially divergent preference points where concessions might be required. Smaller organizations may also have more success at enforcing agreements. Monitoring costs are proportionately less, and both reputation effects and a credible threat of punishment in a future round are more likely within a smaller group that

\(^{157}\) Sarah Croco coined this term for the practice.

\(^{158}\) I conceptualize defecting from a declaration or statement as issuing a statement or taking an action that differ from the common policy agreed in the collective statement.

\(^{159}\) Gilligan (2004) presents an alternative perspective on the number of members and the outcomes of cooperation; in particular he argues that the ‘broader-deeper’ tradeoff does not formally exist.

\(^{160}\) (Drezner 2003).
interacts repeatedly.\textsuperscript{161} Informal agreements and agreements at less than the treaty level can be buttressed by the threat of peer sanctioning for deviation, even if the agreement itself contains no official sanctioning procedure.\textsuperscript{162} Though none of the institutions considered here have the ability to pass legally binding foreign policy agreements, agreements that are socially or politically enforceable should have a higher probability of success – after all, if states do not do as they agreed, the action cannot possibly succeed.

One of the potential drawbacks of a small organization, however, is the pool of resources that group of states possesses. Coordinated foreign policy action - as opposed to joint declarations or statements - requires the pooling of resources. Depending on their membership, smaller institutions are more likely to have access to shallower pools of resources.\textsuperscript{163} All other things equal, organizations with deeper resource pools should have the capacity to support more cooperation and should therefore be more attractive as fora.

Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 about organization size, member preferences, and resources follow from the discussion above.

\textit{H1: An increase in the number of member states should decrease the rate of cooperation.}

\textit{H2: As an organization’s resource pool grows, the rate of cooperation should increase.}

\textit{H3: Increased dispersion of member preferences should decrease the rate of cooperation.}

\textsuperscript{161} E.g. (Axelrod 1984).
\textsuperscript{162} Germany extended diplomatic recognition to Croatia earlier than an EU agreement had specified, and faced a substantial amount of peer displeasure as a result. (Ginsberg 2001, 7)
\textsuperscript{163} The Benelux countries may wish to deploy peacekeepers somewhere, but according to their Defense Ministries’ web sites, between them they have eight helicopters currently in service and two planes which will not be delivered until 2017 and 2018. On the other hand, a three-member grouping of France, Germany, and the UK would have a much larger pool of resources, including aircraft carriers and long-range transport aircraft. As the consensus and capacity framework suggests, though, such a great-power grouping is unlikely to form for anything but the highest-intensity types of cooperation; the participating states have sufficient independent capacity to execute anything else unilaterally.
Jurisdiction

The final factor that may affect the probability of cooperation is the range of issues over which it has competence. Jurisdiction may derive from formal international law (the organization's charter), or it may emerge informally from a perceived sense of the legitimacy of the organization's action on that issue. An example of jurisdiction emerging from perceived legitimacy among the membership occurs in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO was originally authorized to operate defensively on the territory of member states in case of a direct attack. After the demise of the Soviet Union, however, and the abrupt abolition of a need for this type of action, NATO's members confronted the decision whether to go “out of area or out of business.” They chose to reconceptualize the institution as a broader regional security organization and began to act in peacekeeping and conflict resolution functions outside of NATO’s original region of jurisdiction.

As the NATO case illustrates, cooperation is typically not limited to only issues in the institution’s jurisdiction. States can and do choose to act on issues not formally in the institution’s jurisdiction. Cooperation should be more likely in institutions that formally or informally claim jurisdiction over a particular issue or region. Because formal jurisdiction provides an explicit legal basis for activity, it should have a larger effect than informal jurisdiction. Hypotheses 4 and 4a summarize this section’s conjectures.

H4: Issues within an institution’s jurisdiction should be more likely to receive cooperation than issues on which it has no jurisdiction.

H4a: The effect of formal jurisdiction on the rate of cooperation should be stronger than the effect of informal jurisdiction.

Few international organizations have explicit prohibitions on their areas of activity; the most prominent one of which I am aware excludes the EU’s economic decision-making structures from acting on any issues with national defense or security implications (e.g., no regulation of defense industries).
**Characteristics of States and Cooperation**

Apart from the characteristics of the institutions, two key sets of member state characteristics can also influence the organization’s propensity for cooperation. The first set affects cooperation through institutional leadership structures, which allow the state holding the leadership position an opportunity to express its preferences more fully than it might otherwise. These state preferences are a function of historical and situational ties to other states that may be the targets of potential responses. The second set of factors affects cooperation through the set of ‘outside options,’ or non-cooperation response choices, available to states. When member states have viable outside options, then cooperation at a point other than the state’s ideal point becomes much less attractive. I address each of these sets of factors in turn.

**State Preferences and the Role of Leadership Structures**

First, a range of situational or historical factors can affect state preferences, either by influencing the location of the state’s ideal point, or by causing it to hold its preferences more strongly than one might otherwise expect. Among the situational factors, geographic proximity is central. States have incentives to be more attentive to their neighbors since instability spreads easily. Both refugees and rebels often cross borders, creating both domestic and international challenges for the neighboring state. Other concerns such as contagious diseases (SARS, avian flu, etc.), illicit narcotics, and some forms of economic disruption also flow easily over borders.

Among historical factors, colonial relationships are quite important. France, the UK, and Portugal all have associations of their former colonies, and these associations often act to exert influence on other members. The British Commonwealth has suspended
members with flagrant human rights violations on several occasions and has sent investigative missions in other cases. These post-colonial ties can also shape trade, as the so-called “Banana War” between the US and EU attests.\textsuperscript{165} France and the UK continue to maintain military bases in a number of their former colonies, which makes them both more attentive to issues there and also better able to execute a higher-intensity response. Therefore, all else equal, European states should be more attentive to affairs in their former colonies than in states with which none of them have historical ties.

A state’s traditional orientation in foreign and security policy is also a major determinant of its preferences. Over the course of the post-war period, a number of European states have developed longstanding patterns of preferences in security and defense policy; indeed, several states have enshrined their preferences in their national constitutions.\textsuperscript{166} Four distinct profiles exist here, ranging from Atlanticist to European, neutral, and post-Communist. These profiles or “identities” shape state preferences both over policy content and also over which forum (if any) is appropriate for cooperation on security and conflict issues.\textsuperscript{167} As a result, we would expect that when a state holding an institution’s leadership position has a relatively extreme preference security policy (i.e., the state is a preference outlier), the institution is less likely to cooperate. The state holding the agenda power probably does not have preferences that are similar to the majority’s. This should be particularly true for issues with security and defense implications, but it should hold more generally.

\textsuperscript{165} The “Banana War” explicitly questioned the legality under WTO rules of the EU’s preferential pricing schemes for banana-producing former colonies of EU members, versus its less preferential schemes for “dollar-denominated” bananas from areas formerly under US influence. (Alter and Meunier 2006).

\textsuperscript{166} Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Austria have legally entrenched neutrality provisions, though the form and precise content of those statements vary.

\textsuperscript{167} Atlanticists, for example, prefer the use of NATO over any other available institution. No identity contains a general preference for cooperation; indeed, a key difference between them is which institution is the preferred venue. I elaborate on these categories below in the empirical tests.
One caveat applies to expectations about the influence of state characteristics on cooperative outcomes in institutions. Because the absence of cooperation can result from various factors, we are generally unable to determine, using qualitative or quantitative means, which particular state “caused” the failure of cooperation. Indeed, as Chapter 2 established, the absence of cooperation can emerge from a failed attempt at cooperation, from a decision not to pursue cooperation after a discussion, or from self-censoring caused by knowing that one’s partners in an institution will never agree to such a proposal. As a result, our only opportunity to examine where the preferences of a specific state matter is through organizations that contain some type of rotating internal leadership structure. When a state holds the chair of an organization, institutional rules such as agenda powers or control over draft text allow that state to express its own preferences more fully than it might at other times. Hypotheses 5 and 6 summarize expectations about historical and situational characteristics of states, leadership, and cooperation.

In institutions with leadership structures, and ceteris paribus,

H5: Leadership by a state with strong historical or situational ties to the target state will increase the probability of cooperation.

H6: Leadership by a preference-outlying state will decrease the probability of cooperation. This should be especially true if the outlier also has high capacity.

Outside Options and Foreign Policy Cooperation

The second state characteristic that influences choices to cooperate is whether the states in question have sufficient capacity to act independently. Outside options always exist in foreign policy cooperation. Indeed, unilateral state action is the default expected action – this ability is a key component of the Westphalian definition of statehood.168 States also retain the opportunity to engage in ad hoc cooperation outside of existing

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168 (Krasner 1999).
institutions or to form new institutions.\textsuperscript{169} The persistent availability of these choices – even when/where institutional options for cooperation exist – can decrease the attractiveness of cooperation, at least for states that have sufficient capacity to achieve their ideal points through unilateral or ad hoc behaviors. As the attractiveness and feasibility of these outside choices grows, states will increasingly have incentives to hold out for their ideal points in cooperative behavior.

Conversely, as the capacity and consensus framework suggests, capacity limitations may prevent states from taking some action strategies that they might otherwise prefer. All states have sufficient diplomatic capacity to issue declarations and statements, though national predilections for doing so vary.\textsuperscript{170} In many cases, though, higher-order responses such as military intervention, the granting or withholding of aid, or even the expulsion of diplomats may not be possible. Weak or smaller states lack the budgets, militaries, or diplomatic leverage to execute them.\textsuperscript{171} As states’ national capabilities decrease, their propensity for non-cooperative responses should also decrease as these outside response tools become unavailable to them. The hypotheses below summarize this section’s arguments.

\textit{H7: States with greater capacity are more likely to engage in unilateral action.}\textsuperscript{172} 
\textit{H8: States with greater capacity are more likely to participate in ad hoc (extra-institutional) cooperation.}\textsuperscript{173}

\textsuperscript{169} (Jupille and Snidal 2006).
\textsuperscript{170} The cause is not entirely clear; at a minimum national political culture (or the institutional culture of the government) exerts influence.
\textsuperscript{171} Most pairs of weaker states lack reciprocal embassies. For example, Finland accredits 104 ambassadors, meaning that some ninety states lack representation there and thus cannot have their diplomats expelled.
\textsuperscript{172} As an additional implication, this should be particularly true for actions as opposed to statements, but all forms of activity should be more likely and they should not be conditional on collective activity. Data limitations, however, prevent the testing of this implication in this dissertation.
\textsuperscript{173} These hypotheses speak to the behavior of individual states and so is tested in Chapter 5.
Testing Hypotheses About Foreign Policy Choice

This section tests the hypotheses presented above about foreign policy behavior choices. This chapter’s data are a subset of the random international events dataset introduced in Chapter 3. In particular, I analyze the sixty most salient events in the dataset. Using only events that received a substantial amount of coverage in the international press maximizes the probability that these events will be of sufficient interest to states that we obtain some form of meaningful variation in reactions. Reactions include official statements, informal statements from authorized figures (spokesmen, secretaries general, etc.), formally adopted actions, and informal missions and delegations. In addition to the data on EU foreign policy behavior presented in Chapter 3, I also test these hypotheses on the behavior of three other European foreign policy institutions: NATO, the Council of Europe (CE), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, formerly the Conference/CSCE).

As Table 4-1 shows, responses varied widely for the sixty events represented here. Panel A shows that as Realists would expect, unilateral action remains the most common way for states to conduct foreign policy. That said, the EU responded to nearly half the total sample of events, and to a majority of events to which its foreign policy mechanism was eligible to respond (28 of 54, 51.9%). The EU’s 28 instances of cooperation are more than three times greater than the next most frequent responder, NATO. Overall, institutions responded 56 times to the 60 events in this sample. Even when we restrict the set of events to the greater European region (Table 4-1, Panel B), where NATO and the other institutions are on more secure jurisdictional footing, the EU

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174 Early efforts to collect data on EU responses indicated a high probability that a random sample of events would produce a sample with few or no successful cases of cooperation in some of the institutions. The distribution of observed successes in even this high-salience sample suggests that this intuition was correct.
responds to half of the events, whereas the CE responds to about 62% and NATO and the OSCE only respond to 25%. Unilateral behavior is always more frequent than EU responses, both within the region and elsewhere.

The patterns in Table 4-1 are not a function of all the institutions responding to the same events. Table 4-2 shows the distribution of responses, separated by total responses (unilateral, ad hoc, and from each institution), and institutional actions only.

### Table 4-1. Behavior Across Outcomes.

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<th>Institution</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>No Activity</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
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<td>56</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
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<td>54</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Inst</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subtotal</th>
<th>56</th>
<th>239</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Unilateral  | 39       | 21          | 60    |
| Ad-hoc      | 7        | 53          | 60    |

| Total Activity | 102 | 313 |

**Notes:** One observation is a qualifying international event from a random sample; entries indicate whether that reaction occurred on that issue. a “Greater European Region” includes EU Europe, non-EU Europe, and the former Soviet Union. b EU norms prohibit addressing events inside the EU itself through its foreign policy mechanisms. c “Other institutions” includes reactions by other bodies in which European states form a notable body of members: the OECD, the UN, and the G-7/8.

### Table 4-2. Total Amounts of Cooperation Per Event.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. All Forms of Response</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total responses</td>
<td>Freq.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. Institutional Responses Only</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total responses</td>
<td>Freq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>3</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Maximum of 7 in Panel A represents possible responses of unilateral action, ad hoc cooperation, four European institutions (EU, NATO, OSCE, CE), and non-European institutions. Maximum of 4 in Panel B represents only the four European institutions.

The modal event receives two responses (Panel A); twenty-one cases are in this category. Closer inspection of the data suggests that the most likely combinations are the
EU and unilateral. Only one event, Russian efforts to negotiate a ceasefire and peacekeeping arrangement in Kosovo, received all seven forms of responses. Panel B shows that the modal event – and very nearly the median event – did not receive a response from any institution. Among institutions, response from a single institution is by far the most common form of response. Only nine events received a response from more than one institution. Two events – creation of Albania’s national reconciliation government and Russia’s efforts to end the Kosovo crisis–received reactions from all four institutions; these two events alone represent half the observed total of OSCE activity.

**Characteristics of Institutions**

This section tests the influence of four sets of institutional characteristics on cooperation: members and resources, dispersion of member preferences, and jurisdiction.

**Members and Resources**

Hypothesis 1 suggested that institutions with more members should produce less cooperation; Hypothesis 2 suggested that institutions with greater capabilities should produce more cooperation. Unfortunately, capabilities and number of members variables are endogenous, both theoretically and by construction. As the number of members increases, by definition the amount of potentially available capabilities must increase as well. As a result, these independent variables cannot appear in the same equation.

I use two indicators of capabilities - logged GDP from the World Development Indicators and the Correlates of War Composite Capabilities Index – in separate

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175 The return of Kosovar Serbs to their homes after the peace settlement received responses from all but the OSCE; the creation of a government of national reconciliation in Albania in early 1997 received no responses from non-European organizations and saw no ad hoc activity.
models.\textsuperscript{176} The models include activity by the EU, NATO, Council of Europe, and Conference/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, over the period 1994-2003.\textsuperscript{177} Since the unit of analysis is the institution-year (with a maximum \( n \) of 40), these values are summed for all members of an institution and lagged one year to reflect the minimum capabilities available to the group at the start of the year.\textsuperscript{178}

Table 4-3. Poisson Models of Cooperation by Year, Measured as Count.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model A</th>
<th>Model B</th>
<th>Model C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coeff</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>( p )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Members</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COW Capabilities, lagged</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP, lagged</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.469</td>
<td>0.662</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log Pseudolikelihood

Wald \( \chi^2 \) (p-value)

\( N \)

Poisson goodness of fit \( \chi^2 \) (p-value)

-55.097
-45.010
-55.049
10.65 (0.001)
18.99 (0.000)
13.75 (0.000)
40
36
40
51.09 (0.076)
29.39 (0.241)
51.00 (0.077)

Notes: Poisson models of number of instances of cooperation observed per year in EU, NATO, OSCE, and CE; standard errors clustered by institution to adjust for other unobservable institution-specific characteristics.

Tables 4-3 and 4-4 below examine Hypotheses 1 and 2 using two different measures of the dependent variable, cooperation output. The Poisson event count models in Table 4-3 consider the number of instances of cooperation per year in a given institution, over the set of events in the sample. The OLS regression models in Table 4-4

\textsuperscript{176} (Bennett and Stam, 2000); (Singer, 1987); (World Bank, 2006). Efforts to obtain measures of diplomatic capacity such as number of representations abroad and/or number of diplomats were unsuccessful.

\textsuperscript{177} See Chapter 2 for justification of this time period and set of institutions. Because the COW data end in 2001, models with the lagged composite capabilities indicator drop each institution’s 2003 observation.

\textsuperscript{178} Using an organization’s budget allocation as an indicator of capacity would be problematic for at least two reasons. First, most of the organizations in this study have minimal budgets for their day to day operations (and sometimes for continuing programs). Individual programs and efforts that occur during a year are funded by either special GDP-based levies on all states (e.g., the EU, some NATO activity), or by the participating states (e.g., OSCE, some NATO activity). Using their annual budgets would miss the component of seconded national capacity that the national contributions represent. Second, using the organization’s end-of-budget-year total expenditures would be inappropriate not least because of a strong element of endogeneity. Total annual spending would then include contributions to fund the events and activities that comprise the dependent variable.
correct for the unequal number of cooperation opportunities per year in the sample by using as the dependent variable the percentage of events receiving a response out of the total number of events in the sample for that year. All Poisson and OLS models present robust standard errors clustered on the institution to capture unmodeled features that would plausibly influence cooperation rates (frequency and timing of meetings, etc.).

Poisson models of cooperation counts present a negative and significant coefficient for the number of members in an institution: Larger institutions produce less cooperation. Both measures of capacity also exhibit highly significant effects, but their signs contradict the theory’s predictions. To some extent, as I discussed above, this may be a result of construction: With an additive indicator, capabilities must increase as the number of members increase. This mathematical element is compounded further, though, by the nature of membership variation across these institutions. The European states with the most capabilities – France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and perhaps Italy and Spain – are members of all four institutions. Variation in capabilities, then, comes from combinations of smaller states whose capabilities add to some (relatively high) constant

Table 4-4. OLS Models of Cooperation per Year, Measured as Percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model A</th>
<th>Model B</th>
<th>Model C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coeff.</strong></td>
<td><strong>SE</strong></td>
<td><strong>P</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Members</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COW Capabilities, lagged</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP, lagged</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>0.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.292</td>
<td>0.368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** OLS regression models of OSCE, CE, EU and NATO cooperation behavior; responses to eligible events measured as annual percentage.
The combination of minimal variation across institutions caused by the core membership and the additive structure of the indicator create a situation where the number of members and their pooled capabilities co-vary and are likely capturing the same concepts rather than different ones.

The regression results in Table 4-4 paint a similar picture, with the dependent variable in these models being the percentage of events in the sample to which an institution responded in a given year. In a one-tailed test, the number of members in an institution falls just below conventional levels of statistical significance ($p < 0.104$). Its substantive significance is less clear; each additional member decreases the percentage of events receiving a response by just less than 1%. The GDP and military capabilities variables, on the other hand, are both statistically and substantively significant in bivariate models, but they are again incorrectly signed. The most likely reason for this continues to be the additive nature of the capabilities measures.\footnote{Given the structure of membership in the four institutions – that Russia (and its capabilities) belongs to both large institutions – how this might be rectified is unclear.}

**Preference Dispersion**

Hypothesis 3 argues that as the dispersion of preferences increases, cooperation should be less likely. Dispersion of preferences here is one aspect of measuring the severity of distribution problems.\footnote{The salience of the issue to each actor is the second. As this would require state-level data, I leave it to further research.} Preferences may differ and still be fairly closely clustered in space; under these circumstances, cooperation is typically possible. As

\footnote{Russia is the only state with significant capabilities that is not a member of all four institutions. It is a member of the C/OSCE for the whole period and joins the Council of Europe in 1996. These two institutions have the largest number of members by a substantial amount (the EU has 15, NATO has 19, the CE has 45 and the OSCE 49), and so the indicator conflates Russia’s capabilities with the substantial number of additional members.}
preferences diverge, however, actors’ utility for the more distant points drops substantially, and finding an agreement that is acceptable to all becomes more difficult.

Attempting to collect reliable data on how fifty-odd states would have preferred to respond to sixty different events would be an overwhelming and time-inefficient task. Even if we could obtain multiple interview sources for each state on each event, verifying their accuracy and placing the preferences relative to one another would be difficult.\textsuperscript{182} In general, we cannot measure preferences directly; we can only use post-revelation evidence (actions, statements) to estimate pre-revelation ‘true’ preferences.

Because capturing information on specific (and often un-revealed) preferences for this many governments and events is infeasible, I rely here on a general estimate of government preferences as revealed through the government’s election campaign promises. Such measures are appropriate for two reasons. First, the preferences are revealed prior to the initiation of the event itself, meaning that to the greatest extent possible these capture underlying preferences which are then applied to the event of interest when it occurs.\textsuperscript{183} Second, ideological proximity may indicate a sense of shared goals and similar set of foreign policy objectives. Even though no theoretical consensus exists about whether parties of the left or right should be more interested in international cooperation, a focus on dispersion of preferences rather than their absolute location makes this criticism is less relevant.\textsuperscript{184} As this second component suggests, measures of

\textsuperscript{182} (Dorussen, Lenz and Blavoukos 2005). \textit{European Union Politics} (6,3) is a special issue devoted entirely to evaluating the use of expert interviews. See also (Thomson, Stokman and Koenig 2006) for an example of the use of expert interviews to generate large-N datasets.

\textsuperscript{183} On manifestos separating preferences from behavior, see (Marks, et al. 2007). Few events in the dataset occur in a manner where the event’s occurrence (or expectation of it) precedes elections so that the event might affect parties’ platforms. These are essentially limited to the two 2003 Iraq observations and the two 1997 Albanian observations, and observations related to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.

\textsuperscript{184} See Chapter 3 for a further discussion of this issue.
government preferences via party manifesto coding are not without weaknesses.\textsuperscript{185} For the purposes of this dissertation, however, most major critiques do not apply.

The use of manifesto data, and in particular the Comparative Manifesto Project data,\textsuperscript{186} creates an unfortunate restriction on testing hypotheses about international cooperation. Manifesto data are only available for highly developed countries and a subset of Central and Eastern European countries. The only European foreign policy organization for which all member countries have Manifesto data is the European Union. As a result, we cannot compare the effects of preference dispersion across institutions with different numbers or compositions of members; we can only study it in the context of the European Union.

Table 4-5. Probit Models of EU Cooperation and Preference Dispersion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coeff.</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preference dispersion</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience (logged)</td>
<td>1.906</td>
<td>0.631</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gr European region</td>
<td>0.896</td>
<td>0.461</td>
<td>0.417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-10.197</td>
<td>4.104</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR $\chi^2$ (p-value)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td></td>
<td>-31.745</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-5 shows the results of a probit model examining the probability of any EU reaction as a function of preference dispersion, the event’s salience, and its geographic location. Preference dispersion is measured as the standard deviation of EU

\textsuperscript{185} The Manifesto Project’s left-right government measure codes the election manifesto of each political party to establish a percentage of manifesto statements that are left-oriented and a percentage right-oriented. These are subtracted to obtain a single indicator of party placement. The ideology of a government, then, is a sum of the component parties weighted by each party’s share of the parliamentary majority. A number of scholars have raised objections to this approach, arguing that the measure captures salience of issues rather than ideology (i.e., that missing elements are nonrandom); that the items composing the left and right indicators themselves are incomplete and inaccurate (Aspinwall 2007); or that the proper weighting should be seats in the cabinet rather than the legislature. All of these are valid criticisms of the Manifesto ideology measure; Volkens (2007) provides an extensive discussion of all of these critiques. My use of the standard deviation – a measure of relative position rather than absolute position – mitigates their effect somewhat.

\textsuperscript{186} (Budge, et al. 2001); (Klingemann, et al. 2006).
member government preferences on the Manifesto Project’s left-right scale, calculated monthly. Salience, or “the extent to which an issue is temporally compelling to policymakers,” parallels its usage in Chapter 3; it is the logged word count of the original *Keesing’s* article. Finally, geographic region is a dummy variable indicating whether the event occurs in the greater European region (non-EU Europe and the former Soviet Union). The model shows, as expected, that salience has a strong and positive effect on cooperation; events which receive more coverage in *Keesing’s* are notably more likely to receive a response from the EU. Surprisingly, events in the EU’s geographic region are not more likely to receive a response, though this may be because most of the European events in the sample are also highly salient. Dispersion of preferences, on the other hand, is not significant in a one-tailed test ($p < 0.182$). In the presence of this restricted set of controls, and on this study’s limited sample, the spread of ideological positions among EU member states does not appear to influence cooperation behavior.

The EU is an unusual institution for several reasons, not least of which are the breadth and depth of its foreign policy cooperation and the fairly homogenous set of states that compose it. These two elements restrict our ability to generalize from the EU to the other institutions examined here. NATO’s cooperation is very deep but very limited in scope, the OSCE has member states that vary in their commitment to democratic principles, and the Council of Europe has a diverse membership with a weak

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187 (Busby 2007, 252).
188 The European events in the truncated 60-observation sample used in this chapter are related to Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Gibraltar, and Northern Ireland. A longstanding norm prevents the EU from acting on issues inside or between its member states through the foreign policy mechanism, however, and as a result the Gibraltar and Northern Ireland observations are dropped from the sample for EU models only. The remaining events on Albania, Bosnia, and Kosovo are all of very high salience. All models for institutions other than the EU include these observations.
institutional structure. Hopefully, future developments in data collection will allow testing of these hypotheses on a broader set of states and institutions.

**Jurisdiction**

Hypotheses 4 and 4a spoke to the role of an institution’s jurisdiction in its attractiveness for cooperation. Peculiarities of the European foreign policy system, however, complicate testing somewhat. The Treaty on European Union, which created the CFSP, explicitly gives the EU jurisdiction to respond to any event of any type, in any region.\(^{189}\) The EU thus lacks variation on this variable.

NATO lacks variation as well, but for a different reason. NATO’s formal jurisdiction is direct attacks on the territory of its member states. The only event of this type occurred during the sample period of 1994-2003, the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States, were not selected for the dataset; formal jurisdiction is therefore 0 for all cases in the sample. Moreover, during this period NATO constructed its own informal jurisdiction by extending its mandate to crisis management on its borders. This includes its activity in the Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts. The dataset contains only events related to these two conflicts, and two events related to the Albanian crisis of 1997, as events in NATO’s informal jurisdiction. NATO’s informal jurisdiction correlates nicely with its activity simply because the activity captured here is precisely the activity NATO used to define its informal jurisdiction. Finally, in the current sample of events the OSCE acts only on events in its jurisdiction, meaning that it too lacks

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\(^{189}\) The Treaty does specify a set of priority issues. Chapter 3 tests whether these issues receive different treatment than others and finds that some, but not all, of the Treaty-specified issues have statistically significant results. These effects, however, are strongly dependent on model specification.
variation on this independent variable. The resulting perfect prediction means that multivariate analysis is not possible.

To summarize, the EU always acts in its formal jurisdiction because its formal jurisdiction is universal. NATO only acts in its informal jurisdiction because it has been successful as a deterrent and has not faced armed attack from outside its borders. The OSCE has not acted outside of its formal jurisdiction. The only institution for which adequate variation exists to study the effect of jurisdiction conditional on other factors is in the Council of Europe. Of the 60 events in the sample, six receive some reaction from the CE; three of those are in the institution’s formal jurisdiction.

Model A of Table 4-6 shows a probit model of CE activity on formal jurisdiction. As expected, formal jurisdiction has a strong and significant positive effect on cooperation. A similarly salient event inside the CE’s jurisdiction is 37.9% more likely to receive a response than one outside.\(^{190}\)

| Table 4-6. Probit Model of CE Cooperation. |
| Coeff. | SE | p | Coeff. | SE | p |
| Log salience | 1.563 | 0.683 | 0.011 | 2.130 | 0.960 | 0.015 |
| Formal jurisdiction | 1.672 | 0.619 | 0.004 | 2.554 | 0.934 | 0.003 |
| Informal jurisdiction | -- | -- | -- | 1.919 | 0.938 | 0.021 |
| Constant | -11.303 | 4.342 | 0.005 | -15.627 | 6.409 | 0.008 |
| Pseudo R\(^2\) | 0.319 | | 0.462 | |
| Log likelihood | -13.280 | | -10.488 | |
| N | 60 | | 60 | |

Hypothesis 4a suggested that having formal jurisdiction should produce a larger effect on the probability of cooperation than informal jurisdiction. Model B of Table 4-6 adds a variable for events that occur within the institution’s self-defined informal

\(^{190}\) Predicted probabilities generated with CLARIFY ( (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000); (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2001)).
jurisdiction. The effect of informal jurisdiction is also strongly significant and positive, with an event in the CE’s informal jurisdiction 20.6% more likely to obtain a response than one outside of it. As Hypothesis 4a predicts, the effect of formal jurisdiction appears larger than that of informal jurisdiction, but t-tests of the two coefficients cannot rule out equality ($p < 0.394$).

These models represent only a partial test of the hypotheses about jurisdiction. While testing this argument against other institutions would be ideal, none of the other organizations in this study are suitable for large-n analysis, as I discussed above. Instead, Table 4-7 below shows the distribution of activity for NATO under its informal jurisdiction (Panel A), and the OSCE under its informal and formal jurisdictions (Panels B and C, respectively). As we can see, both NATO and the OSCE are more likely to act when they have jurisdiction. Chi-squared tests suggest that the distributions are unlikely to occur by chance; in the case of NATO at least this is largely by construction since NATO was defining its informal jurisdiction by its actions on the events studied here.

Table 4-7. NATO and OSCE Cooperation by Jurisdiction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Informal Jurisdiction</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. NATO</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 30.3772$ Pr = 0.000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Response</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informal Jurisdiction</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Formal Jurisdiction</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson $\chi^2 (1) = 15.495$ Pr = 0.000

Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 27.857$ Pr = 0.000
Characteristics of States and Leadership

Hypotheses 5 and 6 speak to the role of leadership within an institution in encouraging or hindering cooperation. This section primarily tests Hypothesis 6, which examines the effect of having preference-outlier states in the leadership position.\textsuperscript{191}

Three of the four institutions in this study have internal leadership structures that rotate among member states. NATO lacks such a structure; its day to day leadership and public face are provided by the Secretary-General. Of the three remaining, the EU’s presidency is most powerful. The state holding the presidency has the ability to set the agenda, to draft all texts and preside at all working group and other meetings, and to speak to the press as the ‘face of the Union’ between meetings. The OSCE and CE, in contrast, have much weaker presidencies\textsuperscript{192}; both presidencies usually require authorization from the group to make statements to the press, and have little control over the text drafting process or meeting agendas.

Institutional positions such as leadership matter because these roles potentially allow for the amplification of any extreme preferences the leader may have. The presidency’s agenda and drafting powers allow the state holding it to express its preferences more fully than it can when it does not hold the presidency.\textsuperscript{193} Data limitations restrict the current analysis to the EU and CE.\textsuperscript{194} The notable differences

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{191} Events in the subsample of data used here have insufficient variation on historical ties to allow testing of Hypothesis 5. Of the 60 events, about one-third of the target countries have at least nominal ties to the United Kingdom. One has ties to France, and depending on the extent of historical ties allowed, one has ties to Portugal and up to two have ties to Spain.
\item \textsuperscript{192} I use the term ‘presidencies’ generically to convey the sense of leadership. In the CE, the foreign minister of the country holding the leadership position is officially the “Chair of the Council of Ministers”; the OSCE’s title for the same position is the “Chairman-in-Office.”
\item \textsuperscript{193} Spain, for example, chose to prioritize relations with Latin America during its 1995 presidency of the European Union.
\item \textsuperscript{194} While the OSCE does have a presidency of sorts, no comprehensive list of its presidencies exists on its website; the Information division has not responded to requests for this data. Moreover, unlike most
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
between the two organizations and the roles of their presidencies mean that pooling the observations for a single analysis is inappropriate. The EU’s president (and the High Representative for foreign policy) may make informal statements on the Union’s behalf without additional authorization; the CE’s cannot, and its meetings are much less frequent than the EU’s. Because of this, I analyze each institution separately.

For the purposes of this project, national security identities are a key set of preferences to study. Most European states have stable security policy profiles or identities, adhering to one of four durable patterns of behavior and expressed preferences in security policy. These identities largely align on a single dimension, the role of military power in security policy, and I summarize them as neutral, post-Communist, Atlanticist, and Europeanist. Formally neutral states see the role of military power as minimal and are generally unwilling to use it (here, neutral states include Switzerland, Ireland, Finland, Sweden, and Austria. Atlanticist states have a strong and sustained preference that favors NATO as their primary forum for security policy coordination, and they see the United States as an appropriate and often necessary actor in European security. Atlanticist states include the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and Denmark, as in Chapter 3, and also Iceland. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary join this group after their accession to NATO in March 1999.¹⁹⁵ A general consensus exists in the literature that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many central and Eastern European states turned to NATO, and particularly to the United States, as guarantors of

¹⁹⁵ Staff at the Atlantic Council of the United States identified these states, along with Turkey and Canada, as having Atlanticist policy orientations (using the definition provided above) through the early part of the 1990s. Canada is not an European state and so is excluded from this study. Turkey does not hold the chair of any institutions during the period of the study.
their security. As a result, these states fall between the non-committal states and the Atlanticist ones on the security orientation dimension.196

The remaining category of states are the non-committal. These states have not consistently espoused a pattern of behavior consistent with a single security identity; their policy profiles have been unstable and frequently changed with each new cabinet. Here, consistency of preferences over time is key. As constructivists argue, state identities change slowly. To qualify as either Atlanticist, Europeanist, or neutral requires a sustained pattern and national consensus about the appropriate form of security policy for the state. Various Italian governments, for example, have alternately leaned towards NATO or towards the budding EU security policy structure, but this very malleability of national policy signals that the state does not self-identify its overall security policy stance as part of a national policy tradition.

Table 4-8. Council of Europe Cooperation by Presidency Security Identity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CE Presidency Security Identity</th>
<th>Response by CE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncommittal</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Communist</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanticist</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>54</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-8 shows CE cooperation behavior on the subsample of 60 events studied in this chapter. Two striking observations emerge from this table. First, the CE produced a very small number of instances of cooperation – a total of 6 – even on 60 of the most prominent global events of the period 1994-2003. Second, five of the six instances of

196 The fifth security identity, Europeanist, is generally comfortable with the use of force, but prefers the exclusion of the United States and other non-European states from European security affairs. Because the only state with a consistently Europeanist policy orientation is France, including a category for this identity would effectively dummy for France. I thus pool France with the non-committal.
cooperation came under the leadership of states who are preference outliers. This bivariate analysis clearly discredits Hypothesis 6.

Table 4-9. Probit Model of CE Preference Outliers and Cooperation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coeff.</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preference outlier presidency</td>
<td>1.167</td>
<td>0.719</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gr European region</td>
<td>1.937</td>
<td>0.8422</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience (logged)</td>
<td>2.276</td>
<td>1.058</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-16.982</td>
<td>7.075</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5151</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td></td>
<td>-9.457</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-9 shows a probit model of CE cooperation on salience, geographic location, and presidency security identity. For simplicity, I pool both kinds of preference outliers – states with constitutional neutrality and those with Atlanticist leanings - since the prediction is the same for both.\textsuperscript{197} These results confirm the intuition suggested by Table 4-8: Hypothesis 6 lacks support. All three independent variables are highly significant, with preference outliers notably more likely to preside over cooperation.

Two explanations for the unexpected sign on preference outliers exist. One possibility relates to the very small number of instances of cooperation in the sample. Even a casual glance through the CE’s archives show that its level of output is substantially higher than the observations here would lead us to believe. The events in this model are a subsample of a set of randomly chosen world events, however, and European affairs form only a small part of the sample. The six instances of cooperation here were under the leadership of six different states, five of whom – Finland, Ireland, Hungary, Iceland and Germany – are preference outliers.\textsuperscript{198} The combination of a

\textsuperscript{197} Models entering the two groups (neutral and Atlanticist) separately produce substantively similar results.
\textsuperscript{198} Finland and Ireland are constitutionally neutral; Germany, Iceland, and Hungary (after its 1999 accession) are strongly pro-NATO during this period.
relatively small sample with a very small number of successes could mean that the results are simply a statistical fluke.

A second possibility acknowledges that the outcome coding here reflects only the existence of a response and not its content or form. The CE’s responses include four actions – higher-order cooperation – and four statements, but what did the statements say? Perhaps the preference outliers are using their powers during their presidencies to produce minimal outcomes that suit their preferences as a way to preempt efforts from the floor that may be less to their liking. This result suggests that the presidency’s drafting power, or perhaps the agenda power more generally, may be driving the result. Explaining this relationship is grounds for future research.

Table 4-10. Cooperation by EU Presidency Security Identity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Presidency Security Identity</th>
<th>Response by EU CFSP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncommittal</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanticist</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables 4-10 and 4-11 show a similar pattern with the European Union. As in Table 4-8 above, Table 4-10 shows that the non-committal states (those without distinct security identities) lead cooperation at the lowest rate, despite having the largest number of opportunities. Table 4-11 presents multivariate findings. As expected, salience is positive and highly significant; geographic region is insignificant, as we might also expect from a body that explicitly claims universal jurisdiction. Preference outlier status remains positive, but it is no longer statistically significant under a one-tailed test.

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199 Two of the observations received both a statement and an action. The dependent variable here codes only that one of these happened.

200 The number of cases for the EU is smaller than the number for the CE, NATO and OSCE because events inside or between EU member states are excluded from discussion or response under CFSP mechanisms.
Table 4-11. Probit Models of EU Preference Outliers and Cooperation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coeff.</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gr European region</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience (logged)</td>
<td>1.894</td>
<td>0.623</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference outlier</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>presidency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-11.414</td>
<td>3.706</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1621</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Complementarity and Substitutability in Foreign Policy

Like many issue areas in international affairs, cooperation on foreign policy occurs in a dense institutional environment. A range of appropriate fora exists for addressing any given issue or concern. These institutional options sit alongside the ever-existing options of unilateral activity and extra-institutional cooperation. The existence of multiple possible response options gives states – particularly those with outlying preferences – incentives to choose strategically between the institutions or to involve multiple institutions in complex ways to obtain outcomes closer to their ideal points. The overall foreign policy outcome of a situation is a function of the various separate responses. Strategically-minded states can manipulate these separate responses to tap synergies between the responses and thus amplify the total effect of responding.

Responses from different institutions or states may be complements in this fashion, but they can also be substitutes. If France is already conducting an evacuation from Congo-Brazzaville, then perhaps arranging for your handful of citizens to exit with the French makes more sense than conducting your own evacuation or trying to get an international organization to coordinate it. A NATO peacekeeping mission obviates the need for the EU or UN to send one. Even declarations may have this property – a
declaration from an institution may reduce the incentives for the member states to issue their own unilateral statements.

As a result of these complementary and substitutable relationships, foreign policy behavior cannot be studied as a series of independent decisions that result in single outcomes. The existing literature on foreign policy behavior fails to capture this insight. Davis’s (2006) study of trade dispute settlement is a case in point. She evaluates what conditions lead the United States to pursue a dispute through the World Trade Organization (WTO) or through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). These two fora are clearly substitutes for one another, but Davis overlooks the decision to pursue the case at this level in the first place. Some other disputes were submitted to arbitration or settled informally. These are also substitutable responses, and the choice to pursue settlement in a formal institution is itself the product of a selection process between these substitutes. As a result, the observed pool of dispute cases in either or both of these bodies is biased. Likewise, Jupille and Snidal (2006) allow states to choose between using existing institutions, modifying existing institutions, and developing new institutions. They neglect, however, the options of doing nothing, acting alone, or cooperating without using an institution, and they fail to consider the possibility that states may pursue more than one of these options.\footnote{Perhaps the best example of this is the Kosovo crisis of 1999, where NATO, the EU, the UN, and the OSCE attempted to mediate simultaneously. The US, UK, France, and Russia created an informal ‘Contact Group’ to continue and coordinate their high-level unilateral efforts, all while they continued to participate in institutionally-coordinated efforts. On the Contact Group, see (Gegout 2002).}

Because foreign responses are neither mutually exclusive (with the exception of ‘do nothing’) nor independent of one another, the use of a multinomial probit model or similar large-n estimation strategy is inappropriate. Multinomial probit accommodates
mutually exclusive but unordered outcomes. It falters in this particular case because of the non-exclusive outcomes. Even if each exclusive category referred to a combination of outcomes, rather than to a single outcome, the model still fails on two accounts. First, the number of categories still exceeds the model’s manageable maximum of approximately five outcomes. Approximately 17 different combinations of outcomes appear in the data, and most of those appear only a very limited number of times. Second, such a model almost certainly fails to satisfy the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption that multinomial probit requires. The institutions themselves are both potential complements as well as potential substitutes. As a result, the probability of choosing the option “unilateral + EU” is not independent of the probability of choosing “unilateral + EU + CE.” This violates the model’s assumption that the probabilities of observing the possible outcomes be independent of one another.

Instead, simultaneous estimation of a set of models allows for the occurrence of multiple outcomes on any given event, and it also allows for the non-independence of observations across models. Each model represents a different possible outcome, and the simultaneous estimation adjusts standard errors for the non-independence of the observations. Model A in Table 4-12 below estimates the influence of all available variables on each outcome, and it adjusts for non-independence in this manner. In this model, the variable “Non-European institutions” refers to action by a body outside the sample group here: the United Nations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Group of 7/8 (G-7/8), etc. This controls, at least partially, for action by groups other than the bodies of interest.

---

202 (Greene 2003).
203 An event for which “do nothing” was the observed response has 0 as its dependent variable in all six equations.
### Table 4-12. Simultaneous Estimation of Probit Models, by Outcome.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coeff.</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Coeff.</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unilateral Action</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience (logged)</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.572</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.572</td>
<td>0.387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater European region</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.401</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.401</td>
<td>0.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any European institution</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any non-European institution</td>
<td>-0.159</td>
<td>0.607</td>
<td>0.397</td>
<td>-0.159</td>
<td>0.607</td>
<td>0.397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.140</td>
<td>3.376</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>-1.140</td>
<td>3.376</td>
<td>0.368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-34.452</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-34.452</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR ( \chi^2 ) (p-value)</td>
<td>8.79 (0.067)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.79 (0.067)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ad Hoc Cooperation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience (logged)</td>
<td>-0.137</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>0.401</td>
<td>-0.137</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>0.401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European region</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>0.169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any institution</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.556</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.556</td>
<td>0.494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any non-European institution</td>
<td>1.292</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>1.292</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.737</td>
<td>3.060</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>-0.737</td>
<td>3.060</td>
<td>0.405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-18.577</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-18.577</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR ( \chi^2 ) (p-value)</td>
<td>6.07 (0.194)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.07 (0.194)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU Cooperation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience (logged)</td>
<td>1.740</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.625</td>
<td>0.539</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European region</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>0.394</td>
<td>-0.246</td>
<td>0.465</td>
<td>0.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Neutral presidency</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.517</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0.307</td>
<td>0.509</td>
<td>0.273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Atlanticist presidency</td>
<td>-0.222</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td>-0.238</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>0.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any non-European institution</td>
<td>0.758</td>
<td>0.679</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.726</td>
<td>0.661</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions other than EU</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>0.614</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-10.525</td>
<td>2.966</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-9.859</td>
<td>3.215</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-30.752</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-30.240</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR ( \chi^2 ) (p-value)</td>
<td>14.72 (0.012)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15.75 (0.015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATO Cooperation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience (logged)</td>
<td>1.372</td>
<td>0.673</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.972</td>
<td>0.638</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European region</td>
<td>1.176</td>
<td>0.521</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>1.116</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any non-European institution</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td>0.530</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td>0.265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions other than NATO</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.633</td>
<td>0.601</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-10.061</td>
<td>4.247</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-7.944</td>
<td>3.860</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-17.531</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-17.020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR ( \chi^2 ) (p-value)</td>
<td>12.06 (0.007)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13.08 (0.011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OSCE Cooperation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience (logged)</td>
<td>-0.445</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>-0.445</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any non-European institution</td>
<td>0.612</td>
<td>0.710</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.612</td>
<td>0.710</td>
<td>0.195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.070</td>
<td>2.580</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>1.070</td>
<td>2.580</td>
<td>0.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-14.254</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-14.254</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR ( \chi^2 ) (p-value)</td>
<td>0.88 (0.643)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.88 (0.643)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Continued, next page*
The simultaneously estimated probit models in Table 4-12 suggest that the mechanisms driving unilateral and ad hoc responses differ from one another and from the other forms of institutional cooperation studied here. The action of non-European institutions (the UN, etc.) substantially increases the probability of ad hoc cooperation by European states. Unilateral action, on the other hand, is related to the activity of European institutions; the positive association suggests that unilateral action serves as a complement to cooperative action for European states. These results hold in both Models A and B, since the ‘institutions other than’ variable does not enter for these dependent variables. Salience and region are insignificant in both models; this generally conforms to expectations, especially in the unilateral model, where the dependent variable captures action by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, or Italy.

For the institutions, salience is regularly significant and in the expected direction. In the OSCE model, jurisdiction and region variables are not included as a result of perfect prediction, so perhaps the OSCE results emerge at least in part from omitted variable bias. Intriguingly, only salience is significant in the EU model. The

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204 The interpretation of the positive coefficient on non-European institutional activity for ad hoc cooperation is unclear from the present codings. Without knowing which organization(s) and states responded, we cannot determine whether the positive relationship indicates action by states uninvolved with the collective response, or additional action by states who are already part of the collective response.
insignificance of region is perhaps expected, since the institution claims global jurisdiction. Additionally, all of the European institutions except for the Council of Europe appear indifferent to (or at least unaffected by) the action of non-European institutions; the cause of this effect is not clear.

Model A allows for weak interdependence among the outcomes, with a tie through the error term but no direct effect of one on the other. This is statistically defensible, but it almost certainly underestimates the effect of the substitutability and/or complementarity among the outcomes. Even a casual reading of cases shows that states perceive a heavy degree of complementarity between institutions, with the EU, for example, often funding initiatives of the CE and OSCE. Ignoring dependency of this nature, where one institution’s behavior explicitly influences the behavior of another, would lead to omitted variable bias.\textsuperscript{205} Model B (Table 4-12 above) allows for a much stronger degree of interdependence by explicitly including in each institution’s equation an independent variable indicating whether any of the other institutions in the study had acted on the event.

These variables are not unproblematic. In particular, since the outcome in each institution influences all other institutions, introducing these “Institutions Other Than” (IOT) variables creates a distinct case of endogeneity. The outcome in one institution affects the probability of cooperation in the second, third, etc., institutions, but in turn we want to use the outcomes in institutions 2, 3, and 4 to predict cooperation in the first. Endogeneity of this nature leads to the endogenous explanatory variables being correlated with the error terms. The typical solution to the endogeneity problem is to use an instrumental variables framework, in this case with appropriate instruments for the

\textsuperscript{205} (Franzese and Hayes, 2007).
behavior of the other institutions, so that the instruments are not correlated with the error terms. If only a single variable were endogenous, this would likely be a viable strategy. Unfortunately, this case would require instruments for several jointly endogenous variables. Finding an instrument that is exogenous to all four institutions but still predicts the activity of one is a daunting prospect – finding four such instruments is likely impossible.

Instead, I mitigate this problem somewhat by coding the IOT variables as whether any of the remaining institutions acted, rather than including separate variables for whether each acted. To take the case of IOT\textsubscript{EU}, for example, three sets of independent variables – those explaining whether the CE, OSCE, and NATO reacted – are involved in determining whether the value of IOT\textsubscript{EU} is 1. The EU’s own outcome is in each of those sets, but the number of other variables cushions the effect of the EU. Moreover, since only one of those components needs to be a success (produce cooperation) for IOT\textsubscript{EU} to equal 1, the total effect of the EU’s implicit entry on the right hand side of its own model is smaller than if each of the institutions were a separate variable.\footnote{Models which included the responses of each of the ‘other than’ institutions separately collapsed as a result of collinearity and perfect prediction.}

Model B presents the results of a second simultaneous estimation that now includes the (endogenous) IOT variables.\footnote{The model for OSCE activity does not include an IOT\textsubscript{OS} variable as it predicts perfectly.} Even though the IOT variables fail to attain statistical significance in their own right, several notable differences emerge between this model and Model A. For the EU, the sign on geographic region has reversed, though the coefficient itself remains insignificant; salience remains the sole significant predictor. For NATO, salience loses some significance; the same happens for action by other non-European institutions in the model of CE behavior. In the Council of Europe as well, the
effect of non-European institutions becomes insignificant in the presence of the IOT control. The model for the OSCE remains unchanged and continues to perform poorly.

The models in Table 4-12 describe relationships between the predictive variables and institutional output. While the IOT variables and the seemingly unrelated probit framework allow the coefficients to reflect interdependent relationships between the outcomes, Table 4-12 does not allow us to make direct conclusions about complementary and substitutable relationships between the available outcomes. Table 4-13, on the other hand, allows us to draw these conclusions. It shows correlations between the residuals generated by Models A and B from Table 4-12 in panels A and B, respectively. These correlations capture unmodeled relationships between the different outcomes; by comparing these directly across the models, we can obtain estimates of the relationships between the outcomes. Positive correlations in this case reflect a complementary relationship between outcomes; the use of one makes the occurrence of the other more likely. Likewise, negative correlations reflect substitutable relationships, where the occurrence of one outcome makes another less likely.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Model A</th>
<th>Unilat.</th>
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<th>NATO</th>
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**Notes:** Cell entries are correlations of residuals from Models A and B of Table 4-12.
Model A does not contain the ‘institutions other than’ variables. The unexplained portions of the observations are thus somewhat larger than in the Model B because the variance captured by the IOT variables remains in the residuals in Model A. As a result, most of the correlations are larger in absolute terms in Model A. Substantively, Model A suggests two important things. First, unilateral action complements ad hoc activity, though the relationship is only moderately strong. Also, a slightly weaker relationship exists between unilateral behavior and NATO action; this deserves further investigation. Second, a strong complementarity relationship exists between NATO, the OSCE, and the CE ($r > 0.4$), but none of these bodies has a strong relationship to the EU. This is perhaps a function of the institutions’ substantive jurisdictions; the three institutions’ jurisdictions overlap substantially, and the EU’s jurisdiction contains a number of issues that are not part of these three bodies’ remits. This finding is perhaps more intriguing in light of the extensive formal ties and coordination structures between the EU and the OSCE and CE, which we might have expected to produce strong positive correlations between them. The EU’s residuals correlate to the OSCE’s at $r = 0.11$, suggesting a mild complementarity, but this value is not particularly large relative to the values for the OSCE and CE.

Model B, on the other hand, contains the IOT variables in the institutions’ models. The models for unilateral and ad hoc behavior have not changed, so the moderately complementary relationship of Model A persists here as well. The moderate relationship between unilateral and NATO activity has strengthened as well, though it still falls short of the relationship between unilateral and ad hoc behavior. The OSCE, CE, and NATO continue to be strongly related, though to a lesser degree now that the behavior of the other institutions is directly modeled in the simultaneous estimates. The most intriguing
difference between the two models appears here in the relationship of the EU and NATO. These two institutions go from having a positive but substantively insignificant relationship in Model A \( (r = 0.0356, \text{panel A}) \) to having a moderately strong substitute relationship in Model B \( (r = -0.1522, \text{panel B}) \). When the models allow for more explicit interdependency between the outcomes, we see a substitution relationship emerge. This is perhaps suggestive of the ‘division of labor’ that the organizations sought to reach at various points during this period. While the member states never reached a formal agreement on a division of labor between the two bodies, some informal jurisdiction splitting did occur, at least on a case-by-case basis. This relationship deserves further investigation, perhaps through detailed policymaker interviews, to elucidate how the two bodies interact and whether this relationship has changed over time.

**A Precautionary Note About Statistical Power in Small Samples**

This chapter has explored relationships between forms of foreign policy behavior using a series of increasingly complex econometric tools on a relatively small sample of 60 cases. The limited variation contained in these cases has severely restricted the set of possible analyses and has most likely affected the findings. The OSCE is a case in point. Across the 60 events, it responds to only 4; the CE likewise responds to only 6 of 60. The resultant constraints on the dataset – particularly the limited set of contexts in which ‘success’ occurs – almost certainly weaken the model’s ability to find statistically significant relationships. These constraints are only magnified as the complexity of the model being estimated increases. Thus, some of the weak findings, particularly in the seemingly unrelated simultaneous models, are probably not so much a function of the
weakness of the theory as they are a function of the weakness of the data. Further work will expand the dataset and re-test the hypotheses on more diverse data.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has examined patterns of outcomes in foreign policy behavior, focusing on the role of variables related to capacity and consensus in determining which outcomes emerge in international events.

Indicators of consensus, or an institution’s likely ability to achieve it, include the distribution of member preferences, the number of members, the institution’s formal and informal jurisdictions, security policy orientations of institutional leadership, and the event’s overall salience. Salience is a fairly stable predictor of cooperation, with increased salience leading to increased probabilities of cooperation. The number of members has a strong and negative effect on an institution’s ability to achieve cooperation, as measured by the institution’s annual cooperation output. Models examining distribution problems, measured as dispersion of government preferences, consistently have the correct sign though they fail to attain statistical significance; data limitations restrict this finding, however, to models of the EU only.

Indicators of capacity are fewer and less informative for two reasons. First, the institutional capacity needed to act in this study is the ability to pass a declaration. No variation exists on this variable: All of the institutions and individual states considered here have that capacity. Second, the two primary measures of capacity used here are blunt and, partly as a result of their construction, not particularly informative. Capabilities, measured as both (logged) GDP and as the Correlates of War Composite Capabilities
Index, produce significant effects on an institution’s annual amount of cooperative output. Because both are constructed as additive measures of member state capabilities, though, these measures by definition have to increase as the number of members increases. The negative coefficient most likely results from the positive correlation between number of members and the capabilities measures.

The analysis in this chapter leaves open a number of questions, however. The role of capacity is still unclear, particularly in explaining unilateral behavior and extra-institutional cooperation. When states have decided to use an institution, how do the kinds of general capacities examined here relate to institution-specific capacities such as particular aid programs or access to particular equipment or expertise? Do states deliberately try to maneuver around potentially obstructionist states by choosing fora that exclude, marginalize, or disenfranchise the preference outliers? Why do states choose to use multiple forms of response - and in particular several institutions - simultaneously when this imposes higher coordination costs without producing a clear benefit?

In-depth examination of a single case can help to shed light on these questions. Chapter 5 returns to the case of Albania’s collapse in early 1997, when the states of Europe enacted one of their most complex and drawn-out responses ever. This case affords a range of outcomes – from unilateral statements and actions by some but not all actors, to statements and independent actions by some but not all institutions, and finally to a coordinated action. It also includes a range of potential motivating factors – geographic proximity, cultural differences, security aspects, and human rights and economic concerns. The combination of these factors makes it a rigorous and challenging test for explaining foreign policy behavior at the state level.
Chapter 5
Preferences, Strategies, and Outcomes in Albania, 1997

“To be frank, we do not know what to do.”
- Swedish Foreign Minister Lena Helm-Wallen, March 15, 1997

The previous chapter explored patterns of outcomes across events and international institutions using quantitative techniques. At the outcome level, we observe no association between unilateral activity and institutional actions. This suggests that states treat most forms of foreign policy cooperation as complementary to, rather than a substitute for, their own foreign policy activity. The focus on outcomes, however, masks important variation in how individual states treat cooperation.

This chapter expands the test of the consensus-capacity framework beyond the level of outcomes by providing preliminary tests of hypotheses about the behavior of individual states in pursuit of the outcomes studied in Chapters 3 and 4. Do states explicitly strategize about venue choice with concerns about consensus and capacity in mind? Under what conditions are states willing to act outside institutions, either unilaterally or collectively?

The collapse of Albania in early 1997 provides an excellent opportunity to test hypotheses at the level of individual states. When extensive Ponzi (pyramid investment)

208 Quoted in (MacKinnon 1997).
schemes collapsed, ties between the pyramids and the ruling party turned economic chaos into political breakdown. The government refused to act, either to suppress the pyramids or to protect its already-impoverished citizens from the scams. Citizens in the hardest-hit areas took up arms and eventually marched on the capital. The country hovered on the brink of civil war for several weeks until a belated European diplomatic mission successfully negotiated a solution. Over a month later, a peacekeeping force finally deployed to facilitate weapons collection and new elections.

This complicated scenario engendered an even more complex set of responses from other European states. Over the course of the crisis, we see issues of humanitarian relief, democratization, economics, domestic (internal) security, and international security. The final foreign policy outcome of the crisis involved a range of both institutional and unilateral actions. Unilateral activity ranged from declarations to military deployment; institutional responses included a number of declarations of concern and support along with a UN-authorized, OSCE-organized, Italian-led ad hoc military intervention.

Examining an extended, multifaceted crisis with a nuanced and highly-contested outcome is advantageous because it provides an opportunity to extract multiple observations from this single “case.” By identifying discrete events or phases within the crisis and studying the responses of multiple states, I expand the number of observations within the case to reduce overdetermination while holding other factors about the crisis constant across all phases. While the evidence here is preliminary and drawn from secondary sources, it nevertheless provides a clear picture of states evincing explicit
concern about capacity and contesting the definition of the issue to obtain action in their preferred venue.

From an empirical standpoint, the Albanian case is a good focus for testing these hypotheses for several reasons. First, it is sufficiently after the substantial preference upheaval and institutional redesign that accompanied the end of the Cold War. By 1997, states’ preferences had begun to stabilize, and they had begun to acclimate to the new dynamics in the various institutions. Second, the Albanian crisis contains several non-conflict-oriented elements. The economic element, for example, triggers different sets of interests and concerns among other states while also expanding the set of institutions that states would consider as part of their response. Finally, the crisis was unexpected; it was not something for which states had had pre-established policy or pre-drafted response plans. The lack of prepared policy or anticipated responses forced states to enact the entire policy planning process in public in a short period of time. This allows observers to obtain a fuller picture of the crisis than might otherwise be possible.

This chapter first discusses consensus and capacity as state-level concerns and hypothesizes about how they would affect individual states’ behavior. The second section presents a brief background to the crisis and a summary of events during the crisis itself. The third section presents evidence about state behavior on two key issues in the crisis and analyzes this data in relation to the hypotheses. The final section concludes by assessing the usefulness of the consensus-capacity framework at the state level.

209 NATO, for example, is much less of an appropriate institution for the crisis in its early economic phase. Kosovo, in contrast, was something that policymakers had begun to expect even as early as 1997; several sources speak of concerns that civil war in Albania would give ethnic Albanians in Kosovo reasons to take up arms against the Serbs.

210 The Bosnian crisis of 1993-95 is less appropriate on each of these counts. The OSCE did not even exist in its current form during this period, and the EU’s CFSP was in the process of being completed. Russia’s likely response was very uncertain, and the relevance of the crisis to some great powers was also less clear. Finally, the strongly military nature of the crisis reduced the set of potentially relevant institutions.
Consensus and Capacity as State-Level Concerns

Two main sets of hypotheses exist about how consensus and capacity should matter in individual states’ decision-making processes. They address the distinction of preferences over outcomes versus preferences over strategies: Who should be willing to act outside institutions, and who should prefer which of the venues for cooperation.

The distinction between preferences over outcomes and preferences over strategies is important here. States have preferences over the set of possible outcomes in any situation. Outcomes are final conditions or end-states such as the cessation of hostilities, a fresh election, a clear military victory for one side, an end to the refugee flows, etc. Because the events under consideration are fast-moving and constitute second-order cooperation, however, I assume that these preferences are generally exogenous and fixed in the short run.

The first subsection below presents hypotheses about which states should prefer extra-institutional strategies of ad hoc cooperation or unilateral action, and under what circumstances. The second subsection discusses hypotheses for how states choose between the institutional venues available to them when they decide to pursue cooperation in an existing group.

212 Identifying the sources of state preferences is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
213 States could, however, perceive cooperation as an end in itself, as an outcome over which they hold a preference. Several lines of thought, including one on the ‘coordination reflex’ in studies of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, suggest that such a preference exists. These authors believe national preferences are malleable through interaction and socialization, but they acknowledge that such change is likely to be slow, measured in decades rather than the handful of months the Albanian crisis persisted. Even for states who have a preference for cooperation itself, their observed strategy/outcome preference should not change over the course of the two or three months of this crisis. These states, however, should be very unlikely to propose unilateral action, and they should be unlikely to propose any action outside of an institution. See (M. E. Smith 2004) and (Glarbo 1999) for prominent examples of this cooperation-as-a-preference argument in the context of CFSP as well as a good review of similar literature.
**Acting Outside Institutions**

Two forms of activity occur outside of institutions: ad hoc cooperation and unilateral activity. The consensus-capacity framework suggested that extra-institutional cooperation should occur when a cluster of states with like preferences exists, but a general consensus in existing institutions does not. A cluster’s similar preferences allow the members to reach a consensus among themselves on a policy response. That cluster of states, however, must have sufficient capacity to undertake the desired action with an acceptable probability of success. Because the participants in an ad hoc action must generate all of their own required capacity from among themselves (no institutional capacity is available), adding many low-capacity states increases transaction costs without substantially increasing the available resources.

*H1a:* Participants in ad hoc cooperation will belong to a preference cluster.

*H1b:* States with moderate to high capacity are most likely to participate in ad hoc cooperation.

Ad hoc cooperation thus requires consensus on a smaller scale and some degree of capacity pooling. On the other hand, consensus of any variety is not a necessary condition for unilateral activity. Unilateralism can arise under conditions of consensus or dissensus, though the theory suggests it is more likely under the latter. Actors choosing to take unilateral action generally are not satisfied with either the non-cooperative status quo or the new potential cooperative outcome. The latter group are easy to identify as preference outliers within a given group or organization.\(^{214}\) The former group, those unhappy with non-cooperation, may be more difficult to spot, however; their stated preferences could be anywhere on the policy dimension that is not the status quo. The

\(^{214}\) Preference outliers have preferred outcomes that lie far from the group’s median.
identifying feature for this group is the difference between their (stated) ideal outcomes and the status quo.

The necessary condition for unilateral action is capacity, but a caveat applies. Because all states have the minimum capacity needed to produce declarations or statements, we must distinguish here between unilateral statements (low-intensity behaviors) and unilateral actions (high-intensity behaviors). Hypotheses 2a and 2b reflect this logic:

\[ H2a: \text{Preference outliers with moderate to high capacity should be willing to act unilaterally. High and low intensity behaviors are possible. At moderate levels of capacity policymakers should evidence some concern about capacity constraints.} \]

\[ H2b: \text{Preference outliers with low capacity may be willing to act unilaterally but will only be able to take low-cost actions. Policymakers will be concerned with capacity constraints.} \]

Direct evidence of concern about capacity constraints could take the form of policymaker statements about inability to do particular tasks, lack of resources, or possibly requests for help from states who do have particular forms of capacity.

**Venue Preferences**

The second set of hypotheses addresses how states choose between existing fora. Even when states do decide to cooperate, and do decide to cooperate through an institution, they still face the decision of which institution to use. In the case of European states and the Albanian crisis, options included the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and for some aspects of the crisis, the Council of Europe (CE).

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215 Similar ideas appeared in Chapter 4 as Hypotheses 7 and 8, but testing was deferred to this chapter.
The membership, capacity, substantive jurisdictions, and decision-making rules of these institutions vary dramatically. The combination of these elements will alter the likely type of cooperation that the institution can produce. Differing preference distributions and decision rules will shape outcomes; outcomes will interact with capacity to produce an estimated net benefit of cooperation that states can compare to the status quo and to their own ideal points.\textsuperscript{216} Thus, these institutional differences should allow states to discriminate between them.

\textit{H3: Preference outliers should express preferences for institutions or venues where they are pivotal voters, as determined by that venue’s voting rule.}

\textit{H4: States should base their venue preferences on their estimation of the likely cooperative outcome and the estimated deviation of this from their ideal points.}\textsuperscript{217}

In previous chapters, a state’s security identity served as a crude proxy for preference outlier status since it was available cross-nationally and had a definition that was invariant to the issue under consideration. In the case of the Albanian crisis, however, more nuanced measures are possible. In particular, we can identify single policy dimensions at several points in the crisis and order states by their policy preferences on that dimension. By studying several stages that invoke different policy issues, we can vary the set of states that are outliers to see if this affects their stated preferences or behavior. This also allows the substantive content of policy to re-enter the picture; data constraints led previous chapters to ignore this in favor of simply noting whether any cooperation occurred.

\textsuperscript{216} This paragraph summarizes the conclusions of the expected utility framework in Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{217} In the terms of Chapter 2, these are $c$ and $(b_i - c)$. 
Background to the Albanian Crisis and Brief Chronology

This section provides a brief overview of the crisis in Albania to set the stage for discussions of state preferences during the crisis. I begin by discussing prevailing economic and political conditions in Albania in the period leading up to the crisis itself. I then discuss the transformation of the situation from an economic crisis to a political disaster and the efforts by other states and institutions to resolve the crisis. The final subsection addresses the implementation of the agreement, the deployment of peacekeeping forces, and the election itself.218

Figure 5-1. Map of Albania.

Source: (United States. Department of State. 2008).

Prelude

Even prior to the collapse of Communism in late 1990, Albania was one of the poorest countries in Europe. Its longtime dictator Enver Hoxha adopted autarkic

218 This account is based heavily on Pettifer and Vickers (2007), Vaughan-Whitehead (1999), and Perlmutter (1998). As most of the basic details are common knowledge, I cite only specific facts not ordinarily found in multiple sources.
economic policies through much of the 1980s, prohibiting not just trade with the outside world but virtually all other contact with it as well. After Hoxha’s death in 1985 and the fall of his handpicked successor Ramiz Alia in 1991, Albanians entered the transition to a market economy even more ignorant of its workings than other former Communist states.

The combination of desperate economic conditions and ignorance about market economics made Albanians very susceptible to a range of fraudulent investment schemes.\(^{219}\) Ponzi (pyramid) schemes swept through most Eastern Bloc countries at some point in the early 1990s, but in Albania they found particularly fertile ground.\(^{220}\) By late 1996, some twenty pyramid schemes operated in the country, taking in $3-4 million a day,\(^{221}\) and some had existed for half a dozen years.\(^{222}\) Experts later estimated that the total investment in the schemes exceeded $2 billion – which is no mean feat in a country with a GDP around that amount\(^{223}\) – and that some half or more of the population received a regular income from the schemes.\(^{224}\) Despite warnings from the International Monetary Fund, the pyramids continued to operate openly through late 1996.

Meanwhile, on the political front, hard-fought national parliamentary elections in May 1996 drained both parties’ treasuries. Both parties turned to various pyramid schemes to raise additional funds. The ruling Democratic Party (DP) was quite overt

\(^{219}\) (Jarvis 2000, 46).
\(^{220}\) Pyramid schemes pay exorbitant rates of “interest” on investments; the ‘pyramid’ structure emerges because early investors must recruit additional participants. Pyramid funds may invest in some productive activity, but crucially, though, the bulk of their “interest” payments come from the principal payments of later depositors. As a result, these schemes are mathematically unsustainable. Once the pyramid exhausts the supply of gullible investors, it loses the stream of income by which it paid interest to earlier entrants. Only early entrants can possibly profit from these schemes – if the scheme survives long enough to repay their investment. Later participants will lose their investment entirely; their principal was not invested but was instead used to pay interest to early entrants.
\(^{221}\) (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, 194).
\(^{222}\) (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 4).
\(^{223}\) (Economy's losses caused by schemes estimated at 2bn dollars - Koha Jone 1997); (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, 192); see also (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 5).
\(^{224}\) (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, 204); Jarvis (2000, 46) cites IMF statistics suggesting that two-thirds of the population had invested in the schemes.
about their ties. Posters everywhere proclaimed “With the DP, Everyone Wins” and showed a photograph of the DP’s local candidate surrounded by the names of major pyramid companies.\(^{225}\) Despite equally heavy (and equally suspect) spending by the Socialists, the election was a landslide; the DP won 122 of the 140 parliamentary seats and handily re-elected the DP prime minister. External observers confirmed widespread electoral fraud, and the Socialists boycotted the new Parliament.\(^{226}\)

October’s local elections were an even bigger fiasco. The Democratic Party, upset by the fraud pronouncements in May’s election, refused to accredit a group of OSCE observers for the local elections. The West saw this as a clear signal that the DP, under Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi and President Sali Berisha, intended to win this election by fraud as well. They were probably right; the DP won 86.9% of the country’s mayorships and communal councils.\(^{227}\) The shunning of observers, however, and overt fraud made continued support of Berisha’s regime more difficult for Western states.\(^{228}\)

\textit{Collapse and Crisis}

The first pyramid to collapse was a smaller Tirana-based scheme run by an illiterate Gypsy named Sudja, who had made her fund’s financial decisions by consulting her crystal ball. Sudja’s bank closed in December 1996; Sudja herself was arrested in mid-January for fraud. More seriously, two of the larger funds (Xhaferri and Populli) stopped paying interest in mid-January.\(^{229}\) When the government arrested leaders of these

\(^{225}\) See, e.g., (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, 197); this particular element of the campaign is widely noted in accounts of the crisis.
\(^{226}\) (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, 206).
\(^{227}\) (Biberaj 1998, 313).
\(^{228}\) (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 6-7).
\(^{229}\) Significantly, both of these pyramids had close ties to the opposition Socialist Party.
schemes for fraud, citizens believed that the government had done it to steal their money, and the demonstrations outside the kiosks and in Tirana began to include slogans of “down with dictatorship” as well as “we want our money.” In a desperate attempt to prevent further collapses, the government froze the two schemes’ deposits (some $255 mln), began rationing bank withdrawals, and created commissions to reimburse those funds’ investors and to investigate the remaining pyramids.

The government’s attempts to stem the economic collapse and placate citizens failed. January 22 saw thousands of demonstrators “fighting a pitched battle” with police in the streets of Tirana, demanding that their investments be repaid. Five thousand citizens rampaged in Lushnja on the 24th, burning the city hall and destroying most government offices in their dissatisfaction with government policy. When the foreign minister visited Lushnja the next day, to try to placate the citizens, he was beaten and stoned by a mob. By the 26th, fourteen cities were reporting rioting and violence. On January 27, an estimated 35,000 citizens clashed with riot police in Tirana’s central Skanderbeg Square, calling for the government’s resignation. The same day, in the face of DP supporters marching in Tirana and protests in DP-loyal cities, the DP-dominated Parliament buckled and granted Berisha emergency powers.

230 (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 11). The Albanian authorities closed Xhaferri largely at the insistence of Western governments, who had evidence that the nascent Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had deposited substantial amounts of funds there. Xhaferri’s depositors, however, were heavily concentrated in the southern city of Lushnja, where support for Berisha’s Democratic Party was weakest. This had important consequences later.
231 (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 10).
232 (Standish 1997).
233 (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 10).
234 (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, 210).
235 (Robertson 1997).
236 (Dhimigjoka 1997).
The rosy picture of Albania as the showcase economy of Eastern Europe\textsuperscript{238} fell apart rapidly after that. Almost all of the major funds had fallen by February 5, and the largest of all dangled by a thread. Around two-thirds of the population had money invested in the pyramid schemes.\textsuperscript{239} A large number had sold their land or farm animals to invest additional money in the pyramids, and many had encouraged their relatives working abroad to send back larger remittances for this purpose too. The Southern part of the country was home to a number of the longest-lived and widely-subscribed schemes; citizens and the local economy were particularly devastated by the collapses.

\textit{Government Incompetence and the Escalation of Violence}

The sheer extent of the crisis was compounded by the government’s refusal to take responsibility for allowing the pyramids to persist and to capture gullible investors. On January 30, the largest scheme placed a letter in the \textit{Financial Times} denying that it was a pyramid, apparently at the urging of the government. One pair of observers describes this as “a complete divorce from reality in the Albanian fiscal world,” and the currency plummeted as citizens tried to trade \textit{leks} (the local currency) for dollars.\textsuperscript{240} Berisha did not admit any responsibility or mistakes on his part until February 15, and even then he insisted that most responsibility rests with the citizens and that the government would not compensate them for their losses.\textsuperscript{241}

In the face of this government refusal to address the problem of the pyramids or the devastation they caused, violence escalated and continued to spread through February

\textsuperscript{238} (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, Chapter 1).
\textsuperscript{239} (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, 217).
\textsuperscript{240} (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 12-13).
\textsuperscript{241} (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, 210).
and into March. Berisha sacked Meksi’s government on March 2\textsuperscript{242}; but the DP-dominated parliament re-elected Berisha to another five-year term on March 3.\textsuperscript{243} This prompted the now-unified opposition to call for more protests, and even DP supporters were beginning to question why the government had remained blind to the schemes for several years. In the South, anti-Berisha forces were highly displeased with the re-election, and they seized small arms and light weapons from army weapons depots on March 3.\textsuperscript{244}

By mid-March, the insurgency had taken on a political slant that had very little connection to the original pyramid scheme crisis. The economic crisis may have provided the initial impetus, but the primary emphasis now was on removing the DP government. ‘Salvation committees’ in the south, largely using Communist-era political actors and political and military structures as a basis, began taking cities and re-establishing order; rebels controlled fourteen southern cities by March 14.\textsuperscript{245}

As the boundary of rebel-controlled territory crept closer to Tirana, insurgent groups in the north also armed themselves and pushed south. The north was traditionally a bastion of DP strength, and Berisha himself came from there; the south was a Socialist stronghold. But because regional lines in Albania coincided with party lines \textit{and} with ethnic lines, and because a large number of looted weapons were now easily available,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{242} (State of Emergency Called as Albania on the Brink 1997).
\item \textsuperscript{243} (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, 212). In a belated show of disapproval, ambassadors from EU member states declined to attend the swearing-in ceremony. (Fox 1997).
\item \textsuperscript{244} (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 20).
\item \textsuperscript{245} (US employees, citizens ordered to leave Albania 1997). The Partisan popular army tradition was a key element of Albania’s World War II experience; it relied on all citizens having a basic knowledge of defense and community-based defense practices. This continued in the formal “civilian military education process” of the Hoxha era, where among other things all citizens were drilled in how to improvise defensive strategies against potential invasion and were given basic training in the use of small arms. See (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 26-27).
\end{itemize}
outside powers became very concerned about the risk of civil war.\footnote{Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 27-28}. At a minimum, the looted weapons could easily find their way across the border into neighboring Kosovo and destabilize the situation there further.

*Threats to the Outside*

Beyond the risk of exacerbating tensions in Kosovo – a prospect which Germany desperately wanted to avoid\footnote{Barber 1997} – the Albanian crisis created at least two other threats for the international community. These were the need to protect and evacuate their own citizens from the strife-torn country, and the large numbers of refugees fleeing the economic and/or political consequences of the crisis.

By March 11, Western states had begun to evacuate their nationals from Tirana. By this point, though, the chaos in Albania was so far along that the evacuation process was a mess. Civilian flights from Tirana airport had ceased a week earlier, forcing embassies to make alternate plans.\footnote{In one widely reported incident, a British evacuation convoy’s vehicles had a pile-up accident as they neared the port at Durres; the missionaries and aid workers were stranded overnight on the beach with armed gangs firing shots into the air all around them.} Well over a dozen naval vessels from seven countries gathered in the Adriatic, patrolling the waters and serving as landing pads for helicopter evacuations.\footnote{American helicopters came under fire near the Tirana airport, (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 27-28). Ethnic Ghegs are concentrated in the northern part of the country and typically vote for the DP (or other parties of the right), and the southern Tosks support the Socialist Party and its Communist predecessor, the People’s Party of Albania. In hindsight, Greco disagrees with the imminency of the civil war threat (2001, sec. 2), though contemporary commentators appear to believe it quite plausible. (e.g., *Irish Independent*, March 1997, various issues). He also cites disagreement (2001, sec. 3) on the risk of the crisis spilling over to Kosovo and Macedonia.} American helicopters came under fire near the Tirana airport,
and the evacuation was suspended until the airport area was more secure. A German helicopter was also the target of hostile fire, provoking the soldiers aboard to fire shots on foreign soil for the first time since World War II.\textsuperscript{250}

Meanwhile, as conflict in the south became more severe, Albanians began to flee in larger numbers. The south had suffered more than the north from the collapse of the pyramids, at least in part because more southerners worked abroad and had invested their earnings in the schemes. It was also much less supportive of the DP than the north, it was home to the largest bases of the Albanian Mafia, and it was closest to Italy. Anyone who could afford to do so paid the Mafia or other enterprising boat-owners to cross the narrow Strait of Otranto to Italy.\textsuperscript{251}

The situation in Italy rapidly became dire. On March 9 news sources reported that the flow of illegal immigrants “has not exceeded by much the scores that normally try to make it to Italy on average weeks.”\textsuperscript{252} By March 15, though, the Italian navy and coast guard had intercepted some three thousand refugees,\textsuperscript{253} and another thousand arrived by the evening of the 16\textsuperscript{th}.\textsuperscript{254} Altogether, over 11,000 refugees arrived in southern Italy over the course of less than a week,\textsuperscript{255} utterly overwhelming Puglian social service providers and prompting the Italian government to declare a state of emergency on March 19.\textsuperscript{256}

\textsuperscript{250} Comments in the press speak of the UK effort as being the center of evacuation efforts for all EU citizens. Meanwhile, a US Department of State spokesman describes the whole evacuation as “a coordinated NATO military action.” (Burns 1997). See also (North Atlantic Treaty Organization. North Atlantic Council. 1997).

\textsuperscript{251} By March 20, the going rate was between I£100-400 (Johnston 1997).

\textsuperscript{252} (Italy sends back 38 Albanians to homeland 1997).

\textsuperscript{253} (Thomas 1997).

\textsuperscript{254} (Ulbrich 1997). The refugees included the crews of three Albanian naval ships (along with many of their family members), the crews of at least three army helicopters, and a MiG plane whose two pilots landed on a NATO airstrip in Italy and asked for political asylum. Berisha’s two adult children also fled to Italy on one of the last commercial ferry departures. See (Walker, Amnesty bid … 1997, 11); (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 37); (Italy fears refugee influx as two of Berisha's children arrive in Bari 1997).

\textsuperscript{255} (Perlmutter 1998).

\textsuperscript{256} (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, 213).
**Efforts at Settlement**

Amid this context of escalating violence and rising emigration, Europe belatedly tried to intervene. Both the Italian and Greek prime ministers telephoned Berisha on March 5, urging him to compromise with the opposition’s demands. A mediation delegation from the Council of Europe arrived in Tirana on March 6, but its meetings produced little.\(^{257}\) A second delegation, headed by the President of the EU’s Council of Ministers, Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo, arrived in Tirana on the 7\(^{th}\) for a fact-finding mission.\(^{258}\) Yet a third delegation, this time from the OSCE and headed by former Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitsky, arrived on the 8\(^{th}\), after a delay caused by Berisha’s threat to refuse to receive the delegation.\(^{259}\) On March 10, an Italian warship in the Adriatic hosted talks with the rebels, trying to consolidate the government’s amnesty offer and plan for a Government of National Reconciliation,\(^{260}\) while Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini met with Berisha in Tirana to dangle aid as a carrot.\(^{261}\)

Berisha finally consented to appointing a Socialist prime minister and named Bashkim Fino to the post on March 9th, but this had little effect on the violence. As the situation continued to deteriorate and fighting reached the outskirts of Tirana, European organizations played a game of ‘hot potato’ with the idea of an intervention. NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana bluntly stated, “In Albania at the moment, politics has to be done; diplomacy has to be done. It is not for a military operation by NATO or

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\(^{257}\) (EU delegation arrives in Albania 1997); (Council of Europe delegation arrives 1997).

\(^{258}\) See (EU delegation arrives in Albania 1997), and the extensive statement issued that night. (European Union. Presidency. 1997). Berisha categorically refused all outside intervention in the early stages of the crisis, hoping to delay it until he had strengthened his position by regaining control of key southern cities and ports. (Walker, Fighting grows as Albania clamp tightens 1997).

\(^{259}\) (OSCE envoy in talks with Albanian opposition 1997).

\(^{260}\) (Italy mediates in Albanian crisis 1997).

\(^{261}\) (Prime minister, Italian foreign minister discuss situation, aid 1997).
anybody else.” NATO’s ambassadors discussed and formally rejected the idea on March 11, calling only for the appointment of Government of National Reconciliation as soon as possible. The European Parliament passed a resolution urging an international military response on the 12th, and the Western European Union began to plan for such action. The OSCE debated sending a small policing mission to buy weapons back from the population and dispatched yet another representative to Berisha to discuss the idea.

On March 13, OSCE mediator Vranisky returned to Tirana for a second round of talks. That evening, Berisha and Prime Minister Fino formally asked the Netherlands, which held the EU presidency, to intervene militarily. By the next morning, the OSCE’s chair (held by Denmark) publicly described intervention as “probable,” though he did not specify which institution would head it. Amid calls from French President Jacques Chirac for the EU to respond (and equal opposition to the idea from German Chancellor Helmut Kohl), the WEU met at French insistence to discuss the situation and recommended that planning continue.

The OSCE meeting on the 15th, however, nearly derailed the emerging plans by passing a resolution “insisting that it was not the appropriate forum to decide on a potential troop deployment.” Amid public statements from the United States and

262 (Pettifer 1997).
263 (NATO voices concern over Albanian crisis 1997). A government of national reconciliation, sometimes called a government of national unity, intentionally includes all major political and/or violent factions.
264 (France tells its people in Albania to get out 1997); (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 44).
265 (OSCE envoy to head back to Albania to mediate crisis 1997).
266 (URGENT Albania lodges formal request for military intervention 1997).
267 (Choppers under fire as foreign police mooted for Albania 1997).
268 (Choppers under fire as foreign police mooted for Albania 1997).
269 (URGENT Albania lodges formal request for military intervention 1997).
270 (Berisha stands firm in Albania chaos, EU hints at force 1997).
Germany favoring Berisha’s removal, the EU’s foreign ministers gathered at Apeldoorn. The Albanian situation dominated the agenda of the scheduled meeting, but the results disappointed most observers. The EU’s member states could only agree to send a high-level advisory mission to study the situation. While they had cautiously accepted the possibility that any humanitarian or civilian assistance mission would require a small protection force, they insisted that any such intervention would first require approval from the UN Security Council.

Somehow – none of the sources are very sure how – and after ten more days of additional confusion and shuttle diplomacy, the OSCE finally voted to organize an intervention on March 27. That afternoon, the Italian and Albanian Ambassadors to the UN jointly requested a meeting of the Security Council to obtain a formal authorization for the mission. In a meeting hastily convened before the Easter recess, the Security Council approved a three-month mandate for the Multinational Protection Force (MPF), which Italy would lead and organize within an OSCE framework. The mission was charged with protecting and providing humanitarian aid and helping to organize new parliamentary elections in June.

The Aftermath

By April 8-9, the Italian parliament approved dispatching troops to Albania until one month after the elections; the Turkish and Romanian parliaments followed within the
next several days.\textsuperscript{276} Troops began to arrive in Albania on April 15.\textsuperscript{277} Over the course of the next month, more than 6300 troops from over 11 countries deployed as part of ‘Operation Alba.’ Table 5-1 shows known force contributions.

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Contributions to the Multinational Protection Force, as of 21 May 1997.}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Country} & \textbf{Forces} \\
\hline
Italy & 3068 \\
France & 952 \\
Greece & 802 \\
Spain & 340* \\
Austria & 110* \\
Denmark & 59* \\
Turkey & 774 \\
Romania & 100\# \\
Portugal & \\
Slovenia & 100\# \\
Belgium & \\
\hline
\textbf{Total:} 11 states & 6556 – 7215) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textbf{Source:} (Greco 2001); * initial deployments from (Pettifer and Vickers, The Albanian Question: Reshaping the Balkans 2007, 68); \# projected contributions from (Graham 1997). No estimates of Belgian or Portuguese contributions exist.

OSCE-organized national parliamentary elections occurred under the supervision of MNF troops and outside observers on June 29. While neither the setting nor the conduct of elections were perfect, the Alba troops did at least ensure a reasonably peaceful environment for the conduct of an election. As expected, citizens removed the DP from office and replaced it with a solid Socialist majority. In mid-June, Italy organized a multilateral donor conference, including representatives of both interested states and international organizations, for the rebuilding of Albania.

\textsuperscript{276} (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, 214). Greco (2001) suggests, however, that Italian approval occurred only “only after a harsh political debate that almost brought [Prodi’s government] down.”\textsuperscript{277} Pettifer and Vickers (2007, 70-71) discuss this sequence of events as occurring in March. All other sources, including all available news reports and Vaughan-Whitehead (1999), concur that the events occurred in April. The March timeline seems unrealistic as on March 15 the OSCE declared itself an inappropriate venue for troop deployment decisions and the EU ministers had not yet met at Apeldoorn to discuss the possibility of a deployment.
Evaluating Hypotheses About State Behavior

This section presents evidence about two episodes in the Albanian crisis: the outflow of refugees in early March, and European intervention efforts in early and mid-March. While much of the evidence is anecdotal and from secondary sources, it nevertheless allows us to provide at least a preliminary test of the hypotheses. The final subsection evaluates the evidence against the hypotheses.

Intervention

At the onset of the crisis, the Europeans (and for that matter the Americans as well) exhibited an all-around aversion to intervention in the region, with one commentator describing it as a kind of “Balkan fatigue” following so close on the conclusion of the Bosnian conflict. As one source noted, “No one is at all keen on wading into such a confused situation,” not even the states that favored an intervention. In some part conditions on the ground influenced this reluctance. As Italy argued, intervening while Berisha still held power would be the equivalent of “pick[ing] sides inside Albania,” and this view “was widely shared inside the EU.”

Developments in the European Union at the time suggest that the EU’s CFSP would have been the logical center for any reaction, and numerous evaluations of the press and public agree with this as well. Despite several attempts, though, the EU was unable to agree on a response. The primary focus of this section, then, is to explore why

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278 (Bohlen 1997).
279 (EU and NATO rule out Albania intervention 1997). As Pettifer and Vickers note, “there was very little sense of any agreement [among European states] on how to deal with [the crisis]. In a way this was not surprising, as the rebellion was turning into an armed uprising of the people against a repressive government along lines that had not been seen in Europe since the nineteenth century” (2007: 33).
280 (Barber 1997).
major European states preferred not to use the European Union for this task, and how they then established preferences for other strategies to achieve their preferred outcomes.

Venue Preference

The consensus-capacity framework predicts that state preferences over potential venues should be related to their position in the preference distribution in each venue, and to the venue’s potential ability to succeed with the proposed or desired action. In the case of the Albanian crisis, determining the states’ positions in the preference distributions is complicated: The parties were slow to reach consensus on a venue because they disagreed on the nature of the crisis itself. Was this a humanitarian situation, or a conflict prevention situation? An effort to prevent a failed state, or to rebuild a collapsed economy? An effort to prevent the resurgence of conflict in the recently-pacified Bosnia, or to prevent it from spreading to neighboring Kosovo? States formed their venue preferences at least in part on the assumptions of different underlying issue areas. Since preference distributions are issue-specific, the choice of underlying issue has implications for how states conceptualized the role and function of any intervention and thus for the creation of consensus on the issue. It also influenced the set of institutions states considered, since not all institutions had jurisdiction on all issues.

Pro-Intervention States

Decision-makers in Italy and Greece generally perceived the issue as one of threats to their own internal stability. For them, continued economic crisis in Albania would lead to an influx of poor migrants, many of whom would probably be armed with

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281 Greco (2001) in particular emphasizes this as a major obstacle to achieving any form of response.
looted weapons, and possibly to the entry of individuals connected with organized crime. Neither of these situations was particularly attractive.

From there, though, their treatment of the situation diverged. Greek officials originally preferred that NATO address the situation, and spoke openly of this possibility as early as March 10 though NATO’s secretary general had publicly ruled out such an intervention the week before. At a special meeting of NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) convened for discussing the Albania crisis, however, the NAC was only able to agree to a statement calling for a Government of National Reconciliation as soon as possible; they made no reference to an intervention.  

Italy continued to call for NATO intervention even as late as March 13, even though the NAC again said in its March 13 statement that it supported the actions of all other institutions and member states in the situation, and that it urged them to continue and do more.

NATO, however, does not appear to have been Italian policymakers’ first preference. Early comments by Prime Minister Romano Prodi and others suggest that Italian diplomatic effort was first directed at the EU. On March 6, however, Foreign Minister Dini noted disagreement among EU members about the urgency of the crisis, saying “We cannot hide the fact that in the union [sic] are Nordic countries that look on what is happening in the Balkans with a certain detachment.” When a joint Greco-Italian initiative in the EU in early March apparently failed to reach fruition, the

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283 (Italy calls for NATO role in Albanian crisis 1997).
285 Quoted in (Bohlen 1997).
286 (Premier favours political solution to crisis 1997). The failure of this initiative and of other early Italian bilateral efforts also led Greece to become openly critical of Italy’s management of the crisis, thus creating another breach in the EU’s efforts to present a unified face to the world. Perlmutter (1998) argues that Italy’s efforts to take the lead in this crisis were an effort to demonstrate its ability to perform the kind of...
Italians refocused on NATO. NATO was the Italians’ second choice, but when the NAC again declined to intervene on the 13th, Italian policy once again made a tactical shift. Prime Minister Prodi began backing off his previous insistence on a military intervention and calling for OSCE involvement instead.\(^{287}\)

*The Naysayers*

Germany’s opposition to intervention was strongly contingent on the proposed venue; in particular, its preferences for the EU as a venue appear to be centered squarely on capacity concerns. Kinkel’s main argument about why the OSCE was appropriate was because this body – unlike the other two organizations under serious consideration at the time, the EU and the WEU – included both the United States and Russia.\(^{288}\) Kinkel and other German policymakers feared that the situation could turn into Bosnia, where the EU attempted to act alone with an unclear mission, poor military planning, and inadequate coordination. The resulting policy disaster was a serious blow to the confidence and prestige of the fledgling CFSP.\(^ {289}\) German aversion to sending troops also echoed this Bosnia argument, with Kohl stating “If we send soldiers, what are we going to give them for a mission?”\(^ {290}\) Outside of this, available evidence suggests that Germany primarily saw the situation as an issue of refugee or border control; I return to this point below.\(^ {291}\)

In summary, German preferences for using the OSCE centered on two capacity-based elements. First, the OSCE had a higher capacity for action than the EU because it

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\(^{287}\) (Italy fears refugee influx as two of Berisha's children arrive in Bari 1997); (Pina 1997).

\(^{288}\) (Berger 1997).

\(^{289}\) (Die EU will Albanien helfen 1997).

\(^{290}\) (Kohl dubious about military intervention in Albania 1997).

\(^{291}\) (Barber 1997). The possibility of refugee movement into Kosovo, and particularly the possibility of the movement of weapons, raised strong fears for Germany that the crisis could spread there as well.
could draw on the capabilities (and influence) of both the United States and Russia. Second, as German policymakers argued, the OSCE as an organization had task-specific capabilities that it had used successfully in previous similar conflicts. This preference persisted well after the initial OSCE declaration that it was not an appropriate place for troop deployment decisions.

British policymakers perceived the situation very differently than their German counterparts. For the UK, the evidence suggests that the Major government saw the Albanian crisis as an internal problem, for which international intervention was inappropriate. That said, internal politics in the UK itself eventually led to a slight weakening of that resistance. John Major’s Conservative Party had close ties to the Berisha’s DP, but in early 1997 two scandals about the Tories and the DP broke into the British media and further weakened Major’s government. In the face of domestic political challenges, and with a general election approaching, Britain’s policy of unconditional support for Berisha and unconditional opposition to intervention weakened slowly. In early March, Foreign Secretary Malcom Rifkind threatened to block foreign aid in response to Berisha’s anti-democracy moves, but the threat was widely believed to be non-credible.

See, e.g. (EU-Aussenminister erörtern Hilfsaktion für Albanien Einzelne Mitgliedstaaten bieten militärischen Schutz an 1997). Which conflicts these were is not entirely clear. To the best of my knowledge, the OSCE had not been substantially involved in administering or organizing any international peacekeeping or crisis management efforts during its “CSCE” phase (pre-1995), and the Bosnian conflict was almost exclusively an EU effort.

One involved Berisha’s gifts to the Queen and Prime Minister on a recent state visit, which he likely had taken illegally from the Albanian State Museum, and the second involved illicit (and under Albanian law, illegal) election assistance from the Tories during Albania’s openly fraudulent 1996 elections. See (Ball 1997); (Bevins 1997); (Alderman 1997).

Indeed, no record exists of Rifkind or Major actually suspending or limiting aid in any way, though Berisha’s fall may have occurred too rapidly to allow them to take action.
The ruling parties in these two intervention-resistant states, Germany’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the UK’s Tories, had been among Berisha’s strongest supporters.\textsuperscript{296} At least part of the reason that these government parties opposed intervention, then, was probably because any intervention was almost certain to end with Berisha losing office. The aforementioned Italian preference to avoid “pick[ing] sides” within Albania was a common sentiment in the EU, meaning that no intervention to “stabilize the situation” – i.e., to restore the authority of the current government – would be approved. The German concern over refugees, however, seems to have made it willing to sanction an intervention, even if Bosnian ghosts kept it from participating itself.\textsuperscript{297}

\textit{The In-Betweeners}

Three other states are of interest here: The Netherlands, Denmark, and France, who held leadership positions in the EU, OSCE, and WEU, respectively. Briefly, the Netherlands held the EU’s rotating presidency at the time. No evidence exists in available press sources that the Netherlands made any efforts to push the EU as an appropriate venue for an interventionist response, even though reports of Dutch support for intervention ranged from “moderate” to “strong.”\textsuperscript{298} Dutch policymakers did appear to believe, however, that the EU needed to offer some type of reaction or response to the crisis, and they pushed for conclusions on the issue at the Apeldoorn meeting.\textsuperscript{299}

\textsuperscript{296} (Owen 1997).
\textsuperscript{297} Greco disagrees, identifying the major deterrent as “skepticism about the effectiveness of any military involvement and …the fear that foreign peacekeeping troops could become hostage to the domestic political struggle and hence contribute to exacerbate [sic] it rather than facilitate national reconciliation.” (Greco 2001, sec. 3).
\textsuperscript{298} (MacKinnon 1997); (Ulbrich 1997).
\textsuperscript{299} ‘Conclusions’ in the EU are summaries of meeting discussions and of any policy consensuses reached during the talks.
In the OSCE, evidence does suggest that Denmark, which held the organization’s chair at the time, pushed mildly for the “strike force” option that circulated there. How this proposal for a military “strike force” related to the OSCE’s declaration that it was not an appropriate venue for military troop decisions is unclear, however. The Danish position on an intervention force – and quite possibly the Danish proposal for it – gained additional support from a number of other states. German leaders seemed to see it as an alternative to the EU, though the German press suggests that Kohl and Kinkel supported the proposal less for the OSCE component and more for its Danish origin. Additional reports suggest that Spain and Austria also “supported the Danish position” even as early as March 15, when the OSCE passed its resolution of objection.

Finally, France was the most active of presidency-holding states during the crisis. In addition to a number of unilateral statements, it made several proposals inside the EU for intervention forces. One joint proposal with Italy explicitly allowed for a non-military intervention. In its role as the presidency of the Western European Union, however, French policymakers called extraordinary meetings of that body’s Council to discuss the situation. They also tasked the WEU staff with beginning intervention plans. Nothing ever came of this planning, but it was an extraordinarily active response nonetheless, even when compared to typical French foreign policy behavior in regional crises.

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300 (Berger 1997); (Ulbrich 1997). Only German sources provide discussion of this OSCE proposal prior to its enactment; their term is “Schutztruppen.”
301 See, e.g., (Inacker 1997); (Berger 1997); (Die EU will Albanien helfen 1997); (Kein militäerisches Eingreifen in Albanien Die EU schickt Berater nach Tirana 1997).
302 (EU divided on calls for Albania military intervention 1997).
303 See, e.g., (Albania: plea for European Force 1997); (Fox and Rhodes 1997).
304 (MacKinnon 1997).
305 Pettifer and Vickers (2007, 69) also claim that “[i]n the early weeks of the crisis the Italian and French governments had put pressure on the EU and NATO to organise a military intervention on Berisha’s behalf.
In a final odd development, some evidence exists that the neutral states were among the strongest supporters of military intervention, particularly within the EU.\textsuperscript{306} The source of this preference is not clear, and very little confirmatory evidence is available from these states in their own national presses.\textsuperscript{307} Perhaps the most plausible explanation for such a preference, if indeed the reports are accurate, is that these states defined the situation in Albania as primarily a humanitarian or human rights issue. Even so, why the EU would be the best available venue for a humanitarian or human rights intervention is not particularly clear. Ascertaining this motive, however, will require policymaker interviews and/or access to documentary records of the crisis; the available secondary literature and contemporaneous news coverage is insufficient.

\textit{Unilateral and Ad Hoc Behavior}

The consensus-capacity framework suggests that states with greater capabilities are more likely to participate in ad hoc cooperation or unilateral activity. Here I assess the available evidence about states’ rationales for unilateral or extra-institutional activity during the crisis.

\textit{Unilateral Activity}

Unilateral intervention activity was mostly diplomatic. Both the Italians and the Greeks sent their foreign ministers to Tirana to meet with Berisha, and both capitals were

\textsuperscript{306} (Ulbrich 1997).
\textsuperscript{307} The Irish press, for example, is silent on the government’s preferences for response. Neither the \textit{Irish Times} nor the \textit{Irish Independent} contain any mention of national preferences on the issue during March or April 1997. The closest is an op-ed in the \textit{Independent} by the minister of state for European affairs, that the crisis itself posed a threat to European security more broadly. (Mitchell 1997).
in regular telephone contact with Berisha and Fino.\textsuperscript{308} Despite the close ties that both of these states had to Albania – Italy at one point had controlled it as a colony and was its current largest source of foreign investment, and Greece was its largest source of migrant employment and remittances – neither were particularly effective either as bilateral negotiators or as mediators.

\textit{Ad Hoc Cooperation}

Ad hoc cooperation occurred on several levels during the crisis; here I focus on the decision of states to participate in the Multinational Protection Force (‘Operation Alba’). While technically this intervention was organized by the OSCE, sources agree that at a practical level it was an Italian-led operation.\textsuperscript{309} The lack of any permanent military structures in the OSCE meant, in any case, that the military coordination occurred among states that were not members of a standing group, entirely outside of formal OSCE-supported channels.

None of the parties had a stated preference for using a ‘coalition of the willing’ model to respond to the Albanian crisis. It appears to be, instead, the fallback option after the other institutional choices were exhausted.\textsuperscript{310} In February 1998, the Balkan Director of the Italian Foreign Ministry stated that “[w]e, Italy, fell back on it because of the lack of response from the established institutions that should have had primary responsibility, NATO, EU, UN, WEU, OSCE, you name it.”\textsuperscript{311} The ordering of the institutions is

\begin{thebibliography}{1}
\bibitem{308} See, e.g., (EU presidency banks on political-only solution for Albania 1997), (Premier asks Albanian government to protect Greek minority 1997), (Prime minister, Italian foreign minister discuss situation, aid 1997), (Greek foreign secretary of state to visit strife-torn Albania 1997), (Greek mission aims to calm Albania crisis 1997). Italian prime minister Romano Prodi also made several trips, though these were mostly towards the end of the crisis, to help prepare politically for the Operation Alba troops. (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, 213).
\bibitem{309} (Greco 2001); (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 67, esp fn 6).
\bibitem{310} (Greco 2001).
\bibitem{311} Quoted in (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 69).
\end{thebibliography}
somewhat telling – even the UN and the largely inactive WEU come before the institution that eventually organized the intervention. Italia desired an intervention enough to bear the brunt of the costs, but the preference for a coalition over unilateral action suggests that it believed it lacked sufficient capacity to intervene effectively.

The countries that chose to participate in the coalition are an odd group. Table 5-1 showed the participating states and their troop contributions. Italy was the overwhelming provider, with only French contributions signaling anything near the same level of commitment. Danish commitment appears token – a responsibility of (as well as a link to) the OSCE’s presidency. No available sources shed light on the Austrian or Belgian decisions to participate; neither have any known direct interest in Albanian affairs, nor do sources suggest that either saw the intervention as primarily humanitarian.

The cases of Slovenia, Romania, and Poland are particularly interesting. All three participated in the eventual ad hoc group. Romania repeatedly expressed its willingness to participate in an intervention even before it had been agreed, and both it and Poland actually created crisis teams at their foreign ministries. The most plausible explanation for this behavior centers on another international organization, NATO. NATO was scheduled to extend membership invitations to a select group of countries at its summit in July 1997, and all three of these countries (along with Hungary and the Czech Republic) were widely seen as top candidates for invitations. None of these states had immediate

\[312\] Indeed, the speaker does not seem to acknowledge that the OSCE responded at all or was even involved in coordinating the response.

\[313\] The missing capacity may have been as much political as military; no sources suggest that Italian military forces themselves were inadequate.

\[314\] (Romania Ready to Join Satabilization [sic] Forces for Albania 1997).

\[315\] (Albania anti-crisis team set up in foreign ministry 1997); (Embassy begins evacuating Romanian citizens from Albanian capital - Romanian Radio 1997).

\[316\] In this context, the lack of any reported responses from Hungary is somewhat surprising. No evidence exists in the English or French language media that the Hungarian foreign ministry even issued statements.
interests in Albania, but demonstrating their ability to interoperate with NATO forces and their willingness to participate fully in regional security activity would likely have augmented their cases for membership.

Refugees

The issue of intervention is primarily concerned with issues of international security. To vary the issue dimension, I examine the issue of refugees and asylum-seekers during the crisis. This issue involves more aspects of humanitarian concerns. It also, however, engages some elements of internal (domestic) security for the receiving states; the easy availability of weapons and the strength of the Albanian Mafia in the heaviest refugee-sending regions were serious concerns.\textsuperscript{317} As above, I first review preferences over venue among major actors, and then address unilateral and ad hoc activity.\textsuperscript{318}

Venue Preference

In 1997, no European institution had explicit jurisdiction over refugee and asylum policy.\textsuperscript{319} Among European institutions, the organization with perhaps the best claim to refugee concerns would be the OSCE, through the ‘human dimension’ of the Helsinki Final Act. Even there, though, no explicit claim to jurisdiction on refugee issues

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{317} Following the fall of Albanian army arms depots at the end of February, the going rate on the streets for Kalashnikov rifles fell to as little as $4 (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 46). An open-air arms market (frequented by representatives of the Kosovo Liberation Army) developed on the docks of Vlora (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 37). Both elements made access to weapons very easy, even for the poorest Albanians.
\item \textsuperscript{318} I separate the refugee issue from the provision of humanitarian aid for the southern part of Albania. Many commentators conflate the two (e.g., Pettifer and Vickers 2007:37), since the desperate conditions in the south often increased the pressure to flee, but the international responses were quite distinct.
\item \textsuperscript{319} At this time, the 1992 Treaty on European Union governed EU jurisdiction; the “Justice and Home Affairs” pillar (Pillar III) primarily addressed issues of police and judicial cooperation. The Union later gains some jurisdiction over refugee and asylum policy in the Treaty of Nice (European Union 1999, in effect 2002).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
emerged.\textsuperscript{320} This absence of jurisdiction helps to explain the lack of any clear venue preference among key actors during the Albanian crisis. The only discussions of Albanian refugees in European fora seemed to be in two contexts: repeated German insistence that it would not take any, and later requests from Italy for assistance in providing for them.

\textit{Unilateral and Ad Hoc Behavior}

Most of the states bordering Albania took unilateral actions to control potential refugee flows. Macedonia, Montenegro, Greece, and Italy mobilized their militaries to seal their borders against potential immigrants.\textsuperscript{321} Unilateral military action is typically highly resource-intensive. In this case Macedonia and Greece both lacked the resources to block their own borders effectively; press sources spoke openly of gaps in border coverage or of insufficient amounts of troops or equipment to block small passes through the mountains. For these two states, even unilateral action that was not entirely successful was better than either the status quo (do nothing) alternative, in which substantial numbers of refugees would probably arrive. Greece, however, took the additional (and somewhat unusual) step of increasing its number of legal entrance visas during the crisis.\textsuperscript{322} This had the advantage of both easing the refugee pressure at the border while also allowing it better control over which individuals entered the country.

Italian interdiction efforts were substantially more robust. The Italian coast guard and navy patrolled the Adriatic and intercepted a large number of vessels. Intercepting the vessels while they were still at sea helped to ensure that the refugees came ashore

\textsuperscript{320} At the broader international level, the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross had some minimal authority in the area, but neither were invoked during the Albanian crisis.

\textsuperscript{321} (Fox 1997).

\textsuperscript{322} (Greek mission in Albania to ease crisis by granting more visas - ATA News Agency 1997).
under the control of Italian authorities.\textsuperscript{323} Still, the situation overwhelmed Italian authorities. The arrival of nearly 11,000 refugees in six days,\textsuperscript{324} with around 14,000 total arriving since the fall of the pyramids in January,\textsuperscript{325} prompted Italy to declare a state of emergency and call for international assistance in providing for them.

The German reaction to the entire Albanian crisis focused almost exclusively on the issue of refugees. In the absence of a land border – or even a sea one – with Albania, and with the suspension of commercial flights out of Tirana, the source of German policymakers’ fears is unclear. No obvious rationale exists for why Germany would be the preferred destination for Albanian refugees who left the immediate geographical area, or for why Albanian refugees would be resettled in Germany. The only piece of information cited in the media to help explain this situation is that Germany had recently absorbed some 320,000 Bosnian refugees, substantially more than any other European state, and it was not pleased about this situation. At the EU meeting in Apeldoorn, Kinkel estimated that the Albanian crisis would result in some 120,000 additional refugees. On March 16, he bluntly told the media, “With the current situation we can’t take any mentionable number of refugees. Our boat is full.”\textsuperscript{326} German fears about Albania following the path of Bosnia probably also included issues of refugee resettlement as well as EU military incompetence.

\textsuperscript{323} It also helped to reduce the number of refugee deaths on the unseaworthy ships the Albanians used to make the crossing. As the number of ships remaining in Albania shrank, this became an increasingly important issue. (Peacemaker backs off to avert civil war 1997).
\textsuperscript{324} (Perlmutter 1998, 203).
\textsuperscript{325} (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, 214).
\textsuperscript{326} (Foreign Minister Says Germany Can't Take Any More Refugees 1997). The source does not state clearly whether these 120,000 included all Albanian refugees to all states, or whether this entire number was expected to flee to Germany.
Analysis

This section evaluates the evidence for the hypotheses established above about consensus and capacity as state-level concerns. I begin with the hypotheses about activity outside of established institutions and then consider hypotheses about venue preference.

Extra-Institutional Activity

The refugee case results in no ad hoc activity, so I proceed directly to hypotheses about unilateral action. For the most part, behavior in this case supports Hypothesis 2a and 2b about the relationship of capacity to unilateral action. Greece, Macedonia, and Italy were preference outliers in the sense that they preferred to act promptly on the issue to avoid any direct effect on themselves. Most other states had no borders with Albania and few interests there, and so they were much closer to indifferent on this issue.

Italy is likely a moderate-to-high-capacity state in this context, and Greece probably has moderate capacity, and so their behavior relates to Hypothesis 2a. This hypothesis expected that high and moderate capacity states would be willing to act alone and to take high-intensity actions like military mobilization, and that states with more moderate levels of capacity would do so but express concerns about their own capacity to do so effectively. As the evidence above showed, Italian sources clearly expressed both willingness to act unilaterally and constraints on their ability to do so. While no reports exist of Greek policymakers expressing capacity concerns, media reports documented above suggest that it was an issue.

Hypothesis 2b relates to low capacity states, such as Macedonia. It expected that these states would only be able to take low-intensity actions. Macedonia provides mixed

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327 These are my global assessments of capacity in components relevant to refugee control, based on my knowledge of these states’ militaries and governments, and on contemporary media reports.
support for this hypothesis, but its behavior does support the consensus and capacity framework more generally. Macedonia also mobilized its military to seal its border with Albania. Few outside actors had any confidence in the Macedonian military’s ability to do this effectively, and indeed media reports about its weak coverage surfaced along with Greece’s. The issue of refugee control, however, was highly salient for Macedonian policymakers. Even though the likely success of border operations was fairly low, the utility of that action was weighted by the high level of salience. The net result was a willingness to take high-intensity forms of unilateral action even under conditions where the action was not likely to achieve the actor’s ideal point.

The intervention case showed the opposite pattern of extra-institutional activity: very little unilateral activity (Hypotheses 2a and 2b), and substantial amounts of ad hoc coordination (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). In the intervention case, we see some support for Hypothesis 1a, which suggested that participants in ad hoc cooperation would be part of a preference cluster, and moderate support for Hypothesis 1b about the expected capacity of acting states.

The bulk of the states who participated in the Multinational Protection Force (MNF) were moderate to high capacity states. France is clearly high-capacity, and Italy and Spain are moderate-to-high capacity. These three states account for close to three-quarters of the MNF troop commitment. Turkey and Greece probably classify as moderate capacity; Portugal, Belgium, and Denmark have small but well-equipped and highly trained militaries, which probably puts them in the moderate category as well. All
four of these moderate capacity states are highly integrated into NATO’s interoperable command structure, which may reduce or discount any disparities in capacity.  

One unusual case of a state in the outcome preference cluster who did not participate in the ad hoc group deserves some discussion. The intensity of Germany’s preferences not to see Albania collapse into a refugee-generating civil war might have led us to expect its participation in the intervention force, particularly since Germany would under most circumstances be a high-(or high-to-moderate) capacity actor. Its absence from the coalition is somewhat difficult to explain on the basis of available sources. Media sources, particularly in the German press, carry repeated statements by policymakers that they ‘did not want this to turn into Bosnia,’ but the meaning of this comparison is not clear. It may have referred to the refugee costs imposed on Germany, to the lack of confidence and credibility in the CFSP that the crisis caused, to German psychic pain that resulted from inability to stop the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, or something else entirely. Whatever this analogy meant to Kohl and Kinkel, it was sufficiently negative to block German involvement in the intervention.

Finally, some participation in the ad hoc intervention group appears to have come from states outside (or only marginally in) the preference cluster and seems unrelated to issues of consensus or capacity for the intervention itself. Instead, the actions of Slovenia, Poland, and Romania – all of whom are moderate-to-low capacity actors – reflect some type of cross-institutional, inter-temporal signaling. Their actions appear to be motivated by some discounted hope of future benefits in another institution rather than by benefits

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328 Austria, however, is clearly a moderate-to-low capacity state. As I am not able to locate justifications for its behavior in the available sources, I relegate explanations for its participation to later work.
329 An informal poll of several dozen Germans provided roughly equal levels of support for each of these three arguments.
from Operation Alba itself. By participating in the Albanian intervention, they (probably)
hoped to shift NATO members’ beliefs about their willingness and ability to participate
in regional security efforts. These altered beliefs would in turn influence the
establishment of consensus in NATO about their readiness for membership.

The consensus-capacity framework does not anticipate or theorize about cross-
event – and so implicitly inter-temporal – logrolling or signaling.\textsuperscript{330} It treats each event
that emerges as reasonably separable from other events. One of the ways in which the
consensus-capacity framework improves on earlier understandings of state foreign policy
behavior is that it explicitly relates the full range of possible foreign policy outcomes on a
particular event or issue to one another. This helps to close the gap between policymaker
behavior and scholarly treatments of the foreign policy or cooperation decision making
process. This case study draws attention to the need to expand the framework to
accommodate the shadow of the future. States expect future relationships with each other
in these various contexts. Concessions with implicit future reciprocation are a normal part
of diplomatic life; future studies of foreign policy cooperation in particular should
address this fact.

\textit{Venue Preference}

Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 speak to different factors that influence states’ decisions as
they from preferences over existing institutional fora. Hypothesis 3 suggests that
preference-outlying states should pursue their preferred policies in institutions where
their votes are pivotal. In the case of intervention in Albania, German resistance to action
through the EU appears to have been critical in causing states to consider seriously a

\textsuperscript{330} Within each event or institution, however, the use of side payments to influence consensus would not
conflict with the framework’s logic.
different venue. The existence of both a formal unanimity decision rule and an explicit national veto in CFSP meant that German threats to block cooperation were credible.

The UK’s behavior provides somewhat contradictory evidence. The Major government was adamantly against intervention. It had several opportunities to block an intervention, notably the EU, NATO, and the UN Security Council. If it were that strongly against intervention, why did it not use the veto available to it in the Security Council? The OSCE decision rules are largely consensus-based, meaning that so long as no state openly objects, a decision passes. Objection in this forum, too, would have reached the UK’s ideal point, yet it declined to do so. In short, the UK could have obtained its ideal outcome through unilateral action – a veto – in any of the institutions that considered the matter. Instead, it allowed the intervention decision to pass from NATO and the EU, where its veto power was firmly entrenched, to the OSCE, where veto power is weaker. The most likely explanation for this behavior is that Berisha’s hold on office had weakened to the point where no British unilateral action could obtain the ideal outcome of keeping him in office. In that context, a veto would be obstructionist and unproductive, if not even counter-productive, if the crisis developed further.

Hypothesis 4 argued that states will prefer the institution where the expected cooperative outcome deviates the least from their own ideal point. We see some evidence for this in Germany’s behavior. German policymakers wanted an outcome where someone intervened but they themselves were not obligated to act. An intervention organized through the EU would not have had these qualities. Germany would have faced

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331 The UK is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and as such it has the ability to veto any Council decision.
strong pressure to participate in any CFSP-based intervention, and the EU’s budgeting rules would have assessed all member states to pay for the intervention.

Italian behavior, on the other hand, does not fully support this hypothesis. Italian preferences for which institution should intervene shifted several times over the course of the crisis. For Hypothesis 4 to be supported in this instance, Italy would have had to be very uncertain (or else poorly informed) about its partners’ preferences. It would have had to mis-predict probable outcomes in not one but probably three institutions (NATO, EU, WEU), so that as states revealed more information about their own preferences, it could update its perceptions enough that the preferred strategy changed.

Shifting Italian venue preferences and willingness to act unilaterally do, however, cast doubt on the existence of an underlying preference for cooperation among European states.\(^{332}\) While the foreign ministry official quoted above identified a number of European institutions that Italy would have preferred to see act, Italian officials did not hesitate to threaten unilateral action during the weeks of frantic but ultimately unsuccessful diplomacy preceding the intervention. Indeed, Italy’s decision to mount naval patrols in Albanian territorial waters was an instance of unilateral action during this period that sent a strong signal to other states of its willingness to act in Albania. For Italy, cooperation in an institution seems to have been a preferred strategy rather than an end in itself. The most preferred outcome was an intervention, but with whom and under what flag was an open question.\(^{333}\)

Mixed support for these hypotheses probably results, at least in part, from the absence of primary source material. The content of negotiations inside international

\(^{332}\) For this claim, see (M. E. Smith 2004); (Glarbo 1999).

\(^{333}\) In short, the question about Italy’s behavior reduces to why it did not anticipate the difficulties in NATO and the EU, and go straight to the OSCE instead.
organizations rarely becomes public. Without access to policymakers’ privileged knowledge, establishing firm support for some of the hypotheses is quite difficult. Future research should attempt to draw on these sources.

Finally, in the refugee policy issue, we find evidence of a different factor operating in states’ preference formation processes, jurisdiction. At the time of the crisis, no European organization had formal jurisdiction over refugee and asylum policy. We observe no efforts by states to coordinate their policy on this issue: The preferred venue was no institution. While drawing inferences from silence in the historical record is difficult, the very strong results of the statistical analysis in Chapter 4 suggest that such an inference would be appropriate in this case (see, e.g., Table 4-6). An institution’s jurisdiction appears strongly related to states’ decisions to use it.

**Conclusion**

This chapter used the case of Albania’s collapse in 1997 to examine the foreign policy behavior of individual states. It drew hypotheses from the consensus-capacity framework about how states form preferences over the set of available venues, and about who should participate in extra-institutional foreign policy activity. It examined two issues within the case, refugee policy and the question of intervention, to multiply the observations and provide variation on the independent variable of issue area.

Support for the capacity hypotheses is fairly strong. States of moderate capacity did express concerns about the ability of various coalitions to achieve specified cooperative goals, and they also expressed concern about their own inability to carry out high-intensity unilateral actions satisfactorily. Lower-capacity states, however, did not
publicly make these kinds statements on their own behalf, though press accounts include statements to that effect. Lack of evidence for this may be as much an issue of media-source-induced selection bias as it is an issue of non-behavior by the weak states. Contrary to expectations, lower capacity states were willing to take higher-intensity actions with even a low probability of success, provided that the issue’s salience was high enough to compensate for the low success rate.

Somewhat less support exists for some of the consensus-based arguments, however. At least in part, this seems to come from a reluctance on the parts of the British or Germans to exercise a public veto in the EU or, in the case of the UK, the UN Security Council. Other states, though, did act strategically in the pursuit of their most preferred outcomes. France, for example, tried to manipulate the issue of intervention into the jurisdiction of a smaller organization in which it currently held the chair. Using the power of the chair could have helped France to obtain its ideal form of intervention.

Evidence from these cases suggests that being a member of a preference outlier cluster is neither necessary nor sufficient for predicting participation in high-intensity extra-institutional cooperation. German non-participation shows that cluster membership is insufficient, and the participation of NATO candidates Poland, Slovenia, and Romania shows that it is not necessary either.

This chapter has explored the underlying politics of the institutional outcomes examined in Chapters 3 and 4. The hypothesized mechanisms of the consensus-capacity framework generally appear to operate as expected in the case of the 1997 Albanian intervention. In the absence of primary sources, though, and in particular without interviews with involved policymakers, showing direct causal connections is virtually
impossible. Future work should aim to incorporate this type of data into the existing case, and to test the model in other cases.
As Chapter 5 showed, the international community’s response to the Albanian crisis was a complex and multi-layered effort. It combined elements of unilateral action with deliberate unilateral non-action, and with cooperation both inside and outside of institutions. International cooperation was just one of the many foreign policy options states chose to manage this multidimensional crisis. Any theory of cooperation or of foreign policy behavior more generally must acknowledge and accommodate these alternatives. States choose foreign policy actions from a buffet, not a fixed menu.

This dissertation proposed and tested a framework for explaining states’ decisions to cooperate that also explained states’ decisions not to cooperate or to choose other options instead. It establishes two necessary (but insufficient) conditions for cooperation – the need for consensus and the need for capacity – and uses their presence or absence to predict the types of outcomes that are likely to emerge in response to international events. Consensus without capacity leads to collective declarations but no action. Capacity without consensus often results in unilateral activity or extra-institutional cooperation. Finally, when neither are present, no collective response occurs.

This chapter summarizes the findings of this dissertation by first reviewing the main components of the framework and establishing its major claims. It then summarizes
the evidence for the consensus-capacity framework and assesses the overall support. The third section considers my findings in the context of larger debates about cooperation and forum shopping, and the fourth section discusses directions for future research. The final section concludes.

The Consensus-Capacity Framework: A Summary

The consensus-capacity framework explains state cooperation on foreign policy. Foreign policy cooperation is collective reactions to (or attempts to manage) issues and events that occur outside or across the states’ boundaries. Explaining foreign policy poses a challenge to arguments about the causes of cooperation because it includes a range of substantive issue areas, because its gains for citizens and/or states are unclear, and because states are protective of their sovereignty. Europe is an appropriate region for testing the consensus-capacity framework because it has multiple established foreign policy cooperation venues with overlapping jurisdictions and memberships. These maximize variation on key institutional variables while still holding important elements like geographic region and key member-states constant. Europe is also the only region that contains multiple states with sufficient capacity to act independently in world politics. A framework that predicts institutional cooperation opposed to other options such as unilateral action and ad hoc cooperation must have actors that are capable of choosing from the full range of possible outcomes.

The consensus-capacity framework considers cooperation as one of many options that states can choose from in their foreign policy decisions. States can choose unilateral activity, cooperation outside of an institution, or cooperation inside one of several

334 On the bias induced by single-issue studies, see (Gabel, Hix and Schneider 2002).
institutions. The latter two forms of cooperation are collective decisions made by the entire (or proposed) membership. Under the rules of most international organizations, this requires unanimity or *consensus* among the members. Because resources are scarce, states prefer to take actions for which they expect the greatest probability of successfully achieving their desired ends. Resources that improve the ability of states or other actors to achieve their desired goals are elements of *capacity*.

Capacity, then, is the ability to execute policy in international affairs; consensus is the collective decision on what policy should be executed. Both of these elements are necessary – but not sufficient – for international cooperation through an international institution. When one or both are absent, alternate outcomes emerge. Unilateral action is possible under all combinations; extra-institutional cooperation occurs where capacity exists but consensus among all members of an institution is missing. Where consensus exists but capacity is missing, an institution’s members will often resort to issuing collective declarations, but they will not be able to manage higher-intensity responses.

The consensus-capacity framework improves on our understanding of cooperation in two ways. First, it considers outcomes as interdependent, such that both substitute and complementary relationships are possible. States need not – and indeed, usually do not – restrict themselves to using only one form of response for a given event or issue. Second, the framework allows for decisions to occur at multiple points. Cooperation is a process, not simply an outcome. Reaching agreement requires successfully navigating a series of other steps where the process could have collapsed. By treating outcomes as interdependent (rather than mutually exclusive), and by including multiple decision

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335 Abstention may be possible in some institutions.
points in the sequence, the consensus-capacity framework brings the study of cooperation and of foreign policy more in line with practice.

The multi-stage nature of cooperation, and the potential for failure at so many points, draws our attention to the need for inferential strategies that accommodate this complication. At a minimum, the pool of only successful cases of cooperation is a biased sample; only those cases in which consensus and capacity existed could have reached the success point, so all success cases will be above the threshold on those variables. Correcting this requires a case identification strategy that does not rely on the value of the dependent variable (or of any independent variables) for selection into the dataset. I achieve that here using a newly developed dataset of 300 randomly selected international events.

The second inferential complication that the consensus-capacity framework highlights is the need to accommodate the range of alternatives that states face. Cooperation is not simply “do x or do nothing”; it is “do x, do y, do z, or do nothing.” Failure to allow for possible substitution and complement effects risks biasing the analysis by omitting a causal factor, action in (an)other venue(s). I do this here by modeling each outcome separately by simultaneously estimating a series of seemingly unrelated probit models. The simultaneous estimation allows for interdependence among the error terms of the separate models, thus accounting for – but not coercing – substitute or complement relationships among the available outcomes.
Summarizing the Evidence

Chapter 3 inquired into the conditions that led states to cooperate through formal international organizations. It specifically considered the case of the European Union’s Common and Security Policy (CFSP). CFSP is a most-likely venue for cooperation because of its unlimited jurisdiction, but the issue of foreign policy itself is a least-likely issue area. The combination suggests that this is a fair test of the consensus-capacity framework. The lack of substantial variation in capacity measures in the EU during this period precludes testing hypotheses about capacity there, but hypotheses about consensus do quite well. In particular, Chapter 3 shows that both long-term and short-term consensus-building devices increase the probability of cooperation. Most, but not all, of the issues that the Treaty on European Union specifies as priorities of CFSP are more likely to receive cooperation than non-treaty issues. Treaty inclusion is an indicator of long-term preference convergence that occurred somewhat prior to the period under study. After 1999, the EU began adopting Common Strategies, which are medium-term statements of policy objectives and guiding principles. The adoption of a Common Strategy on an issue also significantly enhances the probability of that issue receiving a CFSP response; the magnitude of this is similar to that produced by Treaty inclusion.

Perhaps the most surprising finding in this chapter is the evidence that states holding the EU’s presidency do not always adhere to the norm of presidency impartiality. A strong norm in the EU’s Council of Ministers calls for the presidency-holding state to act in the Union’s interests rather than its own during its term. Instead, and contrary to much of the CFSP and EU studies literature, Chapter 3 finds strong evidence of distinct patterns of behavior during the presidencies of states that are foreign and security policy

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preference outliers. Neutral states in particular are less likely to act in foreign policy overall, and they are even less likely to do so on security issues.\textsuperscript{337}

On issues of conflict resolution, however, the effect is entirely reversed, with neutral presidencies showing a marked improvement in the probability of a response. The combination of a neutral presidency and a conflict resolution issue can result in as much as a 50\% increase over non-committal presidencies and non-conflict resolution issues.\textsuperscript{338} The difference between neutral behavior on conflict resolution and on other issues is a strong indicator of the strength of the presidency’s role in CFSP. Where the presidency disagrees with the majority, it has a distinct ability to block policy. When it agrees with the majority, however, as neutral states do on conflict resolution issues, a substantial increase in probability of response results.

Chapter 4 then expanded the analysis to include three other European foreign policy institutions, the OSCE, Council of Europe, and NATO, and unilateral and ad hoc activity. Adding these dependent variables allowed me to test hypotheses about when cooperation should occur, and also to study how the outcomes relate to one another. In testing the hypotheses about cooperation in institutions, models examining the role of capacity (as the pool of member-state resources that an institution could potentially access) were mixed. The number of members had a negative influence, as expected. The influence of greater capabilities – measured as either logged GDP or the Correlates of War Capabilities Index – were both highly significant and negative in OLS and Poisson

\textsuperscript{337} Atlanticist states, those with a sustained preference for using NATO to coordinate foreign and security policy, have no consistent relationship between events during their presidencies (no matter the issue) and CFSP cooperation.

\textsuperscript{338} See Table 3-9.
models. The hypotheses expected greater capabilities to result in more cooperation, not less, and it warrants further investigation with better measures of capabilities.

When we model the full set of foreign policy outcomes simultaneously, several intriguing results appear. In models of Council of Europe activity, jurisdiction (formal or informal) strongly and significantly predicts responses. When other alternative responses are included in the simultaneous model, however, jurisdiction is no longer a significant predictor. Additionally, the Council of Europe’s behavior is related to whether any non-European institution acted – but strangely, non-European institution activity means that CE activity is much more likely. A similar positive effect holds for ad hoc (extra-institutional) cooperation among European states: If non-European institutions are acting, then extra-institutional cooperation is substantially more likely.\(^{339}\)

Finally, Chapter 5 explored the consensus-capacity framework’s predictions for state-level behavior and preferences. A qualitative study of the 1997 Albanian crisis provided an opportunity to leverage the advantages of mixed-method research, namely the ability to identify causal mechanisms in action and to look for their existence in broader patterns. Unlike Chapters 3 and 4, the Albania study was able to look for evidence of states’ concern about capacity to execute desired foreign policy operations. Italy, a middle power, expressed willingness to intervene unilaterally in Albania, but it also actively sought assistance from international organizations. The refusal of German policymakers to organize an intervention through the EU stemmed at least in part from concerns about the EU’s capacity to manage such an intervention, and from the possibility of obtaining Russian assistance in a larger organization like the OSCE.

\(^{339}\) Limitations of statistical power probably also influence results in this chapter.
This chapter also identified two important additional insights for the consensus-capacity framework. First, issue definition is critical when states form their preferences over the available strategies and institutions. Issue definition matters for two reasons. Because institutions differ in their issue jurisdiction, the definition of the issue can help to create focal points or to exclude certain institutions. Also, states use their definition of the issue to calculate the likely position of the other members or participants (i.e., to determine the preference distribution), and they use this to determine the probable outcome in each venue. States that define the issue differently may thus see different institutions as the appropriate forum, and/or may base their preferences and expectations on different preference distributions.

Second, the behavior of Romania, Slovenia, and Poland raises the issue of cross-temporal or cross-venue behavior. These states selected their response to the Albania crisis not on the basis of the crisis’s likely effect on them, but on the likely effect of their response on their chances of obtaining NATO membership. These states identified a component of their utility for action that the consensus-capacity framework did not anticipate. While their behavior is not inconsistent with the consensus-capacity framework – the framework does not, after all, predict national preferences for outcomes, only for strategies – it does raise further questions about the value of foreign policy behavior for signaling to third-party audiences.

**Contributions of this Dissertation**

The consensus-capacity framework and the tests of it presented here contribute to several different dialogues in the scholarly community, including current debates on
‘forum shopping’ in international relations. Chapter 3 makes an additional contribution to the literature on European foreign policy integration.

**Forum Shopping in International Relations**

The concept of “forum shopping” first emerged in the work of Baumgartner and Jones (1993). Advocacy groups seeking domestic policy change sought venues at various levels (local, state, national, international) where they felt their cause would obtain the most sympathetic hearing. By manipulating the frame through which relevant actors view the issue, advocacy groups can reassign the issue to a more favorable venue.

As Baumgartner and Jones importantly note, “the simple existence of alternate policy venues is more important than the distribution of advantage conferred by a particular venue.”

Actors who find themselves disadvantaged in one venue can push to define the issue as something appropriate for an alternate venue where the structure or decision-making rules are more favorable. Similar processes are at work in international politics, as Chapter 5 showed. States defined the ‘problem’ of the Albanian crisis differently and had different response preferences as a result. With no institution claiming formal jurisdiction over refugee policy at the time, states defining the problem in this manner often chose unilateral action. Those who saw it as a regional security concern often leaned towards NATO or the EU/WEU.

This process of issue definition is currently neglected in studies of forum shopping in international relations. Existing arguments about how states choose between

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340 (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 35).

341 At the time the WEU was formally tasked with executing EU CFSP activities involving military force.
fora have focused on the role of legal precedent, the influence of domestic politics, and the effect of international power. In these cases, consensus already exists on the nature of the issue: trade dispute, free trade agreement, standards-setting. When the issue definition is contested, however, as it was in the case of Albania, actors consider (and bargain over) a far wider range of fora than in narrower, issue-defined cases. This dissertation contributes to the literature here not just in examining cases with contested issue definitions, but also by explicitly including a larger number and range of fora than most other studies consider as potential choices.

In addition, the consensus-capacity framework can make predictions about which of the available fora (or forms of non-institutional activity) states are likely to prefer, given their definition of the issue. Institutional decision-making rules influence the state’s preference formation process: The distribution of preferences within an organization interacts with the existence of veto players to make some fora more preferable than others for actors who want – and who do not want – a response. By explicitly considering the effect of collective decision-making under conditions of preference dispersion, this dissertation returns to a more practical consideration of forum choice than most scholars have previously used.

342 (Alter and Meunier 2006).
343 (Pekkanen, Solis and Katada 2006), (Ortiz Mena 2005), (Davis 2006).
344 (Drezner 2003).
345 For example, Drezner’s (2003) powerful states have already converged on a desired form and venue for response. Pekkanen et al. (2006) and Ortiz Mena (2005) treat venue or strategy choice as effectively unilateral, etc.
This dissertation also contributes to the literature on foreign policy cooperation and/or integration in the European Union. Indeed, one of the main debates is whether what occurs in CFSP is actually coordination (states doing what each of them would have otherwise done, but doing it in a concerted manner), cooperation (states adopting policy measures that differ from what they would have done unilaterally but still thinking about policy separately), or integration (states actively thinking about foreign policy as a unit and working together to create common policy). Chapter 3’s findings about the influence of presidency preferences on cooperation is particularly important in this regard. The persistence of presidency effects – consistent ones for neutral states and sporadic ones for Atlanticist states – and their magnitude strongly suggests that states are still seeing foreign and security policy as self-oriented rather than collectively oriented. As the UK’s behavior in the Albania case suggests, and Michael E. Smith’s (2004) detailed study supports, the behavior of all states – not just presidencies – in CFSP includes strong elements of self-interest. This largely supports a “cooperation” view of CFSP.

Existing literature on CFSP fails to find any presidency effects. This dissertation’s findings suggest that the no-effect conclusion may result from the CFSP scholarship’s intense focus on cases of successful cooperation. Very few case studies of non-cooperation or failed cooperation exist. As Chapter 2 established, the study of only

346 (Gordon 1997/97) (Hoffmann 2000).
347 Smith does find evidence, though, for a “coordination reflex” in which states consult with their partners almost automatically before taking their own unilateral action. Whether their responses change as a result of the consultation, though, remains an open question.
348 In his evaluation of the “effectiveness” of EU foreign policy, Ginsberg (2001) examines several failed cases. His definition of a “failure” includes both failures to create policy as well as failures on the ground of the policy itself. Ginsberg’s case selection is never justified, though: why are some instances of non-
successful cases produces a distinctly biased sample. Omitting unsuccessful cases artificially truncates the sample on the basis of some underlying variable that correlates with success.

In the case of CFSP cooperation and presidency effects, this selection bias has particularly unfortunate consequences. The selection effects argument is compelling for the presidency findings precisely because the direction of effect is negative. Presidency effects produce less successful cooperation. This means that cases where presidency effects would be most pronounced are cases that are systematically less likely to be the focus of scholarly inquiry. The empirical strategy used here deliberately includes negative cases in approximately their true population proportion. When these cases are included in the model, strong, negative presidency effects appear. In earlier studies, these effects are masked by other variables associated with observing positive outcomes. This reinforces the importance of studying cooperation across the full sample of cases rather than only on successful cases.

**Directions for Future Research**

Research on forum shopping in foreign policy cooperation, and in foreign policy behavior more generally, is still at a very early stage. By linking the study of cooperation to the study of foreign policy, the consensus-capacity framework is able to draw on the contributions of both to explain a range of behaviors under a single overarching set of principles. Additional work should draw more on theory developed in foreign policy
analysis on issue linkage, and it should also work to improve measurement in its empirical testing.

**Theory Development**

As is the case in most of the scholarship on international cooperation, theory development in forum shopping more broadly lags behind its empirical applications. In some part, the absence of many studies examining the initial decision to cooperate, and then to use an institution, probably hinders this development. Without a solid understanding of the dynamics of intermediary phases, explaining later steps will be difficult. The consensus-capacity framework contributes here by linking the phases both theoretically and empirically in a way that allows the explanation of forum choice to be part of a larger process of cooperation rather than an isolated decision.

Despite this focus on the broader process of cooperation, the consensus-capacity framework continues to treat events as discrete, unrelated occurrences. With the exception of some formal elements of EU cooperation, it generally ignores the role of policy legacies generated in previous interactions. It also does not recognize the potential for issue linkage across foreign policy events, or across foreign policy events and other forms of cooperation. Development along these lines would allow the consensus-capacity framework to explain a broader range of behavior, such as linkage behavior across time as well as across issues.

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349 c.f. (Martin and Simmons 1998)
Empirical Testing

Three prominent issues remain for future research to address, all related to measurement. These are the need for better measurement of capacity, better measurement of presidency interests and their relationship to issue dimensions, and better data on policymaker and national preferences for state-level hypotheses.

First, the need for more refined measures of capacity is evident. Current measures are noisy and unreflective. National GDP and the Correlates of War Composite Capabilities Index reflect nonspecific forms of general capacity rather than issue-specific capacity. Iron and steel production capacity, for example, is part of the Index, but it is probably not a relevant resource when encouraging other states to democratize. These broad, general measures are also not reflective of the capacities available to the institution for action at a given time. States are usually only willing to commit a certain fraction of their resources to foreign policy and an even smaller fraction to foreign policy cooperation. Moreover, no reason exists to believe that these fractions are the same for all states, or for all types of resources.\textsuperscript{350} States’ willingness to second capacity to international institutions and the amount they are willing to second are very different concepts than the sum of all resources available to all the institution’s members.

Even with better measurement of capacity itself, however, the endogeneity of institutional capacity to the institution’s membership (both the number and identities of members) will continue to present difficulties for large-N testing. Small-N work with more refined indicators of issue-specific capacity is more likely to be useful in this task, \textsuperscript{350} If the belief that all states contributed at the same rate on each type of capability were plausible, this criticism would be less relevant. Including the entire GDP, for example, would then be a linear function of the true value, and linear permutations would not influence large-N results.
particularly in a cross-institutional context. These studies would also allow investigation of how uncertain access to seconded national capacity influences behavior.

Second, Chapter 3 found strong presidency effects in the EU. These effects hold for some groups of states using very blunt indicators such as the state’s historical orientation to security policy. These measures are invariant to the issue under consideration, they capture only a small range of a state’s foreign policy interests, and they do not vary over time. More refined measures of presidency interests and their relation to issue dimensions would allow for more accurate testing of presidency effect hypotheses. In addition, these tests should also expand to other institutions to see if similar effects exist there. The EU’s presidency structure is quite strong; do the observed effects result from peculiarities of the Union’s leadership structure, or do similar effects exist even where leadership structures are not as powerful?

Finally, tests of hypotheses about state preferences and behavior call for state level data. National security interests and strong norms of confidentiality in interstate negotiations mean that very little data is publicly available, nor do researchers have access to internal documents about recent events. Mixed support for the state-level hypotheses in this dissertation probably results, at least in part, from the absence of primary source material. Without access to policymakers’ privileged knowledge, establishing firm support for some of the hypotheses is quite difficult. In the Albania case, for example, the meaning of the “Bosnia” analogy to German policymakers cannot be obtained from secondary research. Tests of state-level hypotheses will require substantial fieldwork, especially policymaker interviewing, to be credible.

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Most foreign ministries have a 30-year embargo on the declassification of even minimally sensitive documents.
Conclusion

Pettifer and Vickers bluntly describe the Albanian crisis that motivated this dissertation by saying, “The political incapacity and internal divisions in the EU over the crisis … led to the OSCE taking on a leading conflict resolution role” (2007, 39). The lack of capacity – both political and, though Pettifer and Vickers do not state it, military – in the EU resulted in the Union producing only weakly worded declarations about the crisis rather than decisive action.

The framework developed in this dissertation aims to explain this behavior by focusing on the two necessary conditions for international cooperation: the existence of consensus about a policy to enact and the existence of sufficient capacity to execute that policy with an acceptable probability of success. The consensus-capacity framework treats cooperation as one of a series of possible results of state foreign policy behavior. Other possible outcomes include unilateral action, extra-institutional cooperation, doing nothing, and acting through any of a set of alternate organizational venues. By linking cooperation to the broader process of foreign policy decision-making, the framework generates hypotheses about both individual state behavior and preferences and also about patterns in international outcomes. Cooperation is not a yes/no decision; it is the product of a lengthy selection process that involves choosing between a set of interdependent, nonexclusive outcomes.

To test this argument, I developed an extensive dataset of 300 observations that accommodates the many layers of selection bias that strategic state interaction generates. I then employed theoretically appropriate models – ones that allow for interdependence across the possible foreign policy outcomes and for the non-exclusivity of outcomes – to
test the framework’s hypotheses. This strategy allows for a more complete and more accurate test of cooperation arguments than those in the current literature.

A number of consensus-based arguments gained support in the qualitative and quantitative analyses conducted here. Salience is highly conducive to states reaching consensus; having a preference outlier state in an institution’s leadership position often reduces the chance of cooperation. Capacity arguments were more difficult to test for a number of conceptual and methodological reasons. Nonetheless, they too gained some support from the evidence presented here. In particular qualitative evidence about German preferences in the Albanian crisis (Chapter 5) supported these claims. German concern about the incapacity of the EU – and conversely, about the capacity of the OSCE, in which the United States and Russia participated – were influential in its preference for the latter body to organize an intervention.

To revisit the Albania case a final time, two unexplained elements remain: why states tried to act in the EU at all, and why the OSCE became the lead actor instead of another organization. Future research in this case, and in others, should prioritize better measures of institutional capacity, state interests, and policymaker preference formation. Several states pushed initially for the EU to lead the response to the crisis in Albania; why did they attempt to organize cooperation there if German preferences to act elsewhere made consensus in the EU impossible? Why did the OSCE, which had no standing military structures or intervention experience, end up taking the lead on this multifaceted crisis? In a more general form, how do states choose between institutions? Do they choose sequentially, or simultaneously? Do preferences rely on general properties of the institution (such as the OSCE’s broad membership and presumably

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greater legitimacy), or from specific capacities of the institution itself? How do the differences between consensus and unanimity decision rules influence decision-making? The consensus-capacity framework here gave some preliminary hypotheses about some of these elements, but much more remains to be done.
Appendix

Event Selection Process

This appendix describes the multi-stage process by which observations entered the main dataset used in Chapter 3.

Fully Random Sampling for Pages

The initial method of page selection was a fully random sample of pages. Microsoft Excel generated six sets of 400 random numbers between the page numbers comprising the first substantive page of the January 1994 issue and the last substantive page of the December 2003 issue. Ideally, a fully random sample would produce some but not excessive variation in draws across months and years. The initial criteria were 45-55% of valid page observations before December 1998 (the chronological midpoint of the sample), not more than ten months lost for no observations drawn, and also having moderate variation across months and years. Moderate variation here meant a ratio of not more than 1:1.5 between the lowest and highest monthly mean (across all years), and between the lowest and highest yearly mean (across all months).

These criteria reflect the realities of both international cooperation and data analysis. The meetings of many international bodies are highly cyclical. Oversampling particular months, or having too many months fall out of the dataset, risks biasing the
data in unpredictable ways. European vacation patterns mean that European institutions act much less frequently in August than in any other month; only the highest-profile items seem to disrupt the vacation period. In most summers, the primary CFSP decision-making body only meets two out of three months, and even then with a distorted agenda of high-profile items and items related to the change of presidencies which occurs each year on July 1. The EU’s highest body, the European Council, meets in June and December, and frequently in March and September or October, so that meetings leading up to these summits are often occupied with preparatory matters rather than substance. Other international organizations have similar routines.

In addition, issues themselves may be cyclical. Conflict initiation is much less likely in the winter than in other seasons; hurricanes, cyclones, and other natural disasters which may require humanitarian aid are more likely in the summer months than at other times of the year. Coefficients related to institutions whose mandate or other characteristics make them more likely to respond to these types of cyclical events would be affected by samples which over- or under-sample cyclical events.

**Selecting a Sample**

As mentioned above, I initially generated six fully random samples (FRS). To select the random sample with the best properties, I proceeded by determining how many months from each sample contained no observations. The fully random samples had a median of 4.5 months where no pages drawn fell within the month (range: 1 – 6). As this was promising, I began by investigating months which contained only one page
observation. The median number of months lacking observations rose to 9 (range: 5 – 11), but some samples were still promising.

I then proceeded to discriminate among the six FRS by examining the distribution of their observations more closely. FRS 6, which had lost the fewest months for lack of observations, had only 41% of its observations before the chronological midpoint. Since several hypotheses rely on the duration of membership/participation or the sequential joining of members, this amount of deviation seemed unacceptably high, and the sample was eliminated from contention. The two FRS with the lowest average variation across both months and years were FRS 5 and 1 (1.81 and 1.84, respectively), and these were subjected to further analysis. The selected pages in months with only two observations were coded to determine how many of these pages contained no observations and would thus risk eliminating the month from the sample. At this stage, the samples began losing months very rapidly, and the random sampling strategy was abandoned.

**Stratified Sampling of Pages**

The failure of fully random sampling strategies to produce reasonably good samples led to the adoption of a stratified sampling scheme. This scheme relies on thousands of pages as the stratification unit. *Keesing’s* does not have a set number of pages per month or year; indeed, the number of pages per month varies from 30 to 78, and the number of pages per year varies from 563 to 743. Since thousands of pages do

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352 Total pages are always in multiples of four for publishing purposes, including the table of contents and index, which double as the front and back covers respectively. Here I count only substantive pages containing news briefs; this excludes the contents, index, and any advertising for other *Keesing’s* products that the company inserts to reach the necessary multiple of four pages.
not coincide with chronological units, sampling by thousand achieves a fairly even spread of observations without forcing a specified number of observations per month or year.

Stratification occurred by having Microsoft Excel generate 450 three-digit random numbers (instead of the five-digit fully random but bounded values of above). Each of these values was assigned an ‘observation number.’ The three-digit numbers were then assigned sequentially to the thousands values included in the 1993-2003 range – 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45 – to create a composite five-digit number. This results in an equal distribution of observations across the thousands. Because the relevant *Keesing’s* page range was 39798 to 45762, however, some of the composed page numbers fell outside the range and were discarded.

While the two samples are not precisely comparable (largely as a result of the decision to include 1993 in the stratified sample and also to discard composed pages out of the desired range), the properties of the stratified sample were substantially better than those of the fully random samples. The stratified sample ties with FRS 2 for fewest observations lost as invalid pages. Observation distribution over the duration of the year was the best value of all seven samples. Distribution across years for a given month had a suitably low ratio of averages, though the presence of more observations in the later years increased the ratio of standard deviations. Because the number of pages that *Keesing’s* devotes to a year generally increases over time, the second half of the dataset contains approximately 52% of the observations. Eight months contain no observations. Since the within-month deviation exceeding desired levels can be explained largely as a function of

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353 1993 was included for future use in a study of whether the change in institutions in November 1993 produces any effect on the probability of cooperation. It also ensures that the full range of 1994 pages is included in the center of the page range and does not risk truncation.
the thousands-based stratification scheme, and no other criteria were substantially outside the tolerable ranges, this sample became the basis for all further data collection.

**Coding Rules for Qualifying International Events**

The purpose of the sample is to identify events or issues to which states or international organizations might respond by choosing to cooperate on foreign policy. The coding rules for identifying ‘qualifying international events’ (QIEs) reflect this purpose. I briefly describe the major coding rules below.

Instances of violence between states constitutes a QIE, as do efforts to settle such conflicts. Interstate tension of a political/military nature (i.e., not trade disputes) also qualifies as potential conflict. Strong norms for peaceful resolution of conflicts in the international system, and particularly among the types of international institutions studied in this project, make these prime targets for cooperation.

Internal conflicts qualify as well. Civil war, whether declared or undeclared, or an effort to settle such conflicts, constitutes a QIE. Similarly, I code reports of refugee flows, or efforts by the international community to intervene. Domestic unrest at a scale less than civil war can qualify as a QIE if rioting or demonstrations (related to non-economic issues) occur in which

a) more than 25 people were killed, *or*

b) the media present extensive reports of brutality or other human rights abuses by the authorities, *or*

c) major political opposition figures are harmed, suppressed, or otherwise abused by the authorities, *or*
d) the non-democratic government is reported to deem the scale and scope of the demonstrations or riots to be a threat to its stability.

National strikes are not QIEs unless they have a clearly non-economic motivation (i.e., they are political in nature) and meet one of the domestic unrest criteria outlined above.

Many of the institutions of interest in this project claim a particular interest in human rights. Major reported human rights violations thus constitute QIEs. I particularly code for reports of media suppression or violation of freedom of the press (Yugoslavia revokes all foreign journalists’ visas, 1994; India bans six Urdu-language newspapers, 1995), and reported violations of religious freedom or important developments in church-state relations (e.g., Tajikistan bans religious parties, 1998). I also code instances of state behavior which indicate widespread lack of observance of human rights, particularly in the realms of due process and law enforcement restraint (e.g., the unprovoked killing of peasants by Brazilian and Mexican law enforcement officers in 1996 and 1995, respectively). In addition, this category includes allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and action on the basis of these charges in domestic courts.

Natural and man-made disasters also constitute QIEs. This includes humanitarian situations such the situation of refugees, famines and epidemics, earthquakes, hurricanes and floods, and the like, and also man-made disasters such as air or sea transit disasters killing more than 25.

Finally, QIEs include action by institutional bodies when those actions are not the result of direct interstate cooperation. This includes reports released by the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change, the World Health Organization, and the UN Food Program. It also includes indictments from international criminal tribunals and decisions from other international judicial bodies. Reports from other blue-ribbon commissions are included if they have a distinctly international component. In this dataset, that includes the Vatican’s report on Church behavior during the Holocaust (1998) and the Volcker Commission’s report on the size and disposition of dormant (Holocaust-era) Swiss bank accounts (1999).

*Keesing’s* entries do not conform to a uniform length. Longer articles have a greater probability of having their topic enter the dataset. That said, however, individual Keesing’s entries can contain more than one QIE. For example, the seven-page entry about the start of the 2003 US-Iraq war contains separate QIEs about the US buildup in the Middle East, the formation of the ‘coalition of the willing,’ Hussein’s missile launch that initiated ground combat, and several other elements. This strategy of locating multiple QIEs within a single entry helps to mitigate the effect of article length on the probability of a QIE entering the dataset.

*What is Not a QIE?*

Economic events, including budget announcements, mergers and acquisitions, and military purchases or contracts do not constitute QIEs. None of these types of news items are likely to provoke any response from other states. Loans from international financial institutions are excluded as well. These represent the outcome of cooperation already, and one which is filtered through an extensive chain of delegation, rather than an event or issue for potential response. Trade disputes and trade agreements are excluded as well.
Finally, diplomatic visits and the extension of diplomatic recognition do not constitute QIEs. These are most often bilateral interaction, and are also unlikely to provoke cooperation or, in the majority of cases, any reaction at all, from other states. A few high-profile exceptions may exist – for example, an Arab state recognizing Israel, or the North Korean leader visiting the United States or Europe – but no event which would strain this coding rule occurred on the sampled pages. Likewise, summits (bilateral or multilateral) are excluded.

**Distribution**

The minimum number of QIEs on a page was 0; the maximum number was 7. The median page contains two QIEs.

**Event selection**

Pages containing no QIEs were dropped from the sample. Pages with only one QIE automatically had that QIE included in the dataset. For all pages with more than one QIE, Microsoft Excel generated lists of random numbers corresponding to the total number of QIEs on the page. Pages were then assigned to a random number in the order in which the page observations were drawn (not the order in which the pages occur). This ensures the preservation of the initial random characteristics.
Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pages with 2 observations</th>
<th>Pages with 4 observations</th>
<th>Pages with 7 observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rand</td>
<td>Obs #</td>
<td>Pg #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>39339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>43179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>44316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>43797</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final sample used for analysis contains 300 events from 1994-2003. This represents 37.68% of the 796 qualifying events observed in the initial sample.

355 1993 observations are not included in this analysis; they will form part of a future project.
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