Race in the Floodwaters:
Constructing and Deconstructing Television News Coverage of Hurricane Katrina

by

Debra Burns Melican

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Communication)
in The University of Michigan
2009

Doctoral Committee:

      Professor Nicholas A. Valentino, Co-Chair
      Professor Catherine R. Squires, Co-Chair, University of Minnesota
      Professor Susan J. Douglas
      Professor Vincent L. Hutchings

Dedicated to

Megan, Molly & Mom,

You have always been the wind beneath my wings.

Acknowledgements

A dissertation is far more than years of work, a group of studies, and words put on paper. A dissertation is a journey involving networks of people who contribute in different ways both to improve the final product – and to make the process bearable. Family is most affected by the stress and demands of undertaking a dissertation, and I especially thank my daughters, Molly and Megan, for their enthusiastic support of this last hurrah of degrees at my alma mater.

A profound, heartfelt thank you also to my co-chairs Catherine Squires and Nicholas Valentino. The two of you inspired and challenged me to think harder and longer about media and race in America and to strive to offer some new insight into the "American dilemma." Through your wisdom I was able to tackle very different approaches to my work, and I believe I am a better scholar for your counsel. Without doubt you have stood with me through thick and thin, and words are quite simply inadequate to express my appreciation. Additional thanks goes to Susan Douglas, committee member and Chair of the Communication Studies Department. Susan's clear insight, strategic advice, probing questions, and constant push to excellence were both welcomed and needed. Special thanks also to Vincent Hutchings, committee member, who supported my early endeavors and provided guidance in thinking through this project. Above all, I am both honored and humbled that scholars of the stature of the four of you would take the time to serve on my dissertation committee. To the extent I have

Dissertation Writing Institute. Special thanks goes to Paul Barron who patiently read numerous drafts of several chapters and provided helpful suggestions. To all the members of my DWI cohort (Kentston Bauman, Deniz Erkmen, Jason Herlands, Eric Huneke, Clara Hong, Vera Irwin, Mike Layne, Bo Liu, Goran Selanec, Lindsey Waddell, and Vanessa Will) thank you for slogging through that first very, very rough attempt to write up experimental data. I am truly sorry that I was not farther a long when you read that draft.

In addition to faculty and students, dedicated staffs enable programs to function effectively and efficiently. A special thank you to the three people who served consecutively as Graduate Program Coordinator of the Communication Studies Department while I pursued this degree: Darci Dore, Christopher Gale, and Cornelius Wright. You each offered valuable support and encouragement as needed. Additional thanks to Dawn Viau who ran the Comm ship effectively and efficiently. I appreciated the counsel from all of you on matters practical and not.

As graduate students at the University of Michigan, we are also fortunate to have access to a wealth of support services. I am very appreciative of the Center for Statistical (CSCAR) and its staff, especially Lingling Zhang and Joe Kazemi who were extremely patient and helpful as I worked through the statistical analysis of my data. I also wish to acknowledge the Knowledge Navigation Center and the Faculty Exploratory. You helped me with matters great and small, and I especially appreciated the help of Diana Lee Perpich and Laurie Sutch in launching my web questionnaire.

Other faculty also offered support and guidance, and I particularly wish to thank Professors Michael Traugott and Aswin Punathambekar. At various times, Professor

Traugott served as Director of the graduate program, Department Chair (and acting chair), but regardless of his duties, Mike always had the time to offer practical advice and perspective on a variety of matters. Aswin also shared his time by reading a draft of one chapter and offered a fresh insight about the material. Thank you to you both.

Still more people made a difference in this dissertation journey, helping in various ways. Thanks to the members of my cohort and others who helped make classes interesting, provocative, and bearable (not already named): Roei Davidson (who I hope will undertake a collaborative project with me now that I have finished), Megan Biddinger, TaKeshia Brooks, Tamika Carter, Grace Yang, Ann Williams, Yong Park, and Krysha Gregorowicz. And a special thanks to the Comm grads who forged the path before us: Sung-Hee Joo, Jen Stevens Aubrey, Dmitri Williams, Marko Skoric, Christine Brittle, Laramie Taylor, and Nat Poor. You helped create the great atmosphere in the Frieze Building by sharing your knowledge and sociability with the newbies. I actually ended up missing that place, and I believe that it is largely because of you.

Beyond academia are other friends, both old and new, who offered encouragement and diversion when needed. To Cheri Chandler, Gretchen Rudy, and Barb Silkworth, who welcomed me back to Michigan and helped to steady the course, thank you for hanging in there with me. Dear friends: here's to another 30 years. To my lunch-buddies, Peg and Jim Durkin, who would have ever guessed we would end up in Ann Arbor together? Thank you for your constant support and encouragement. To the community of St. Francis (especially Fr. Jim McDougall and Scott Wright), the Peace and Justice Committee (especially Chuck and Patti Yonka), and the GOING SOUTH teams (I simply can't name you all here, but I do want to mention Patti and Chuck again

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

List of Appendices

ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores a puzzle that has troubled policymakers for some time: If there is widespread support for the norm of racial equality in America, why do Whites oppose policies designed to achieve that goal? Employing three interrelated studies, I explore the possibility that the news media may alter the characterization of a policy such that specific racial attitude dimensions become more or less salient. Particular media frames of policy-relevant events may help to socialize attitudes that can subsequently depress support for policies such as affirmative action or welfare.

Television news can play a powerful role in providing information about the world, and television coverage of Hurricane Katrina brought the disaster into people's homes. The first two studies examine the visual and verbal construction of television news coverage of the disaster and look for patterns reflective of four theories (i.e., prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic racism, the politics-centered approach, and whiteness) offered to explain the gap between egalitarian norms and policy preferences. The first study uses textual analysis to assess how whiteness emerged in television news coverage of Hurricane Katrina. Three themes become evident: law and order, White normalcy, and White determination. The second study employs quantitative content analysis and begins to tell a story about construction of the coverage through elements of group position, symbolic racism, and whiteness.

The third study is an experiment investigating how the policy preferences of White participants change as the frame of a news story is manipulated to emphasize

considerations that underlie the four theories. The expected differences between the racial frames did not emerge as strongly as expected, and these mostly null results might suggest that these racial attitudes are largely overlapping psychological constructs. Yet, because in numerous cases the results are in the correct direction, there is also a suggestion that something is occurring worth additional study.

This dissertation was designed to explore a possible relationship among Whites' policy preferences, four theoretical perspectives, and television news coverage. These first steps invite further empirical work to understand the gap between White opinions and policy preferences—and ultimately our democratic future.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The sixties are renowned for many things, perhaps most importantly the end of Jim Crow racism and the passage of major civil rights legislation to ensure the equal legal status of Black Americans. Indeed, according to public opinion surveys, Whites' attitudes toward Blacks have improved dramatically since the 1960s (Kinder & Sanders, 1996, p. 342; Sears, Hetts, Sidanius, & Bobo, 2000; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). Of course, that is to not say that White Americans harbor only feelings of good will toward Blacks or that negative stereotypes about Black Americans have vanished. Rather, public endorsements of Black inferiority have declined, and public endorsements of equality in the abstract have increased (Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Sears et al., 2000; Sears, Van Laar, Carrillo, & Kosterman, 1997; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). However, White preferences about public policies designed to alleviate racial inequalities in life outcomes seem to reflect an unwillingness to act in accordance with these attitudes (Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Sears et al., 2000; Sears et al., 1997). This discrepancy between intention and action has been the subject of much research (Bobo & Tuan, 2006; Entman, 1990, 1992; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Sears et al., 2000; Sears et al., 1997; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). The phenomenon of interest in my dissertation is this gap between White racial attitudes and policy preferences.

1

Survey research has provided most of the evidence about White racial attitudes and preferences on policies designed to alleviate gaps in life outcomes between Whites and Blacks, and the survey work has included experiments embedded in surveys (Bobo & Tuan, 2006; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Sears et al., 1997; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). However, research has not thoroughly explored the role of mass media in relationship to this inconsistency between White racial attitudes and racial policy preferences (but see Entman & Rojecki, 2000). Because media exposure is pervasive in contemporary society, this dissertation contends that examining the media for patterns in news coverage can help explain why White Americans support egalitarian principles but oppose policies designed to effectuate them.

The news media help people fill in the gaps between daily experience and the world beyond their doorsteps (Lippmann, 1922). Moreover, the media serve as a site for constructing "a definition of what *race* is, what meaning the imagery carries, and what the 'problem of race' is understood to be" (Hall, 1981, p. 35). At the same time, we have come to understand that media texts, including the news, are sometimes contradictory. This raises the possibility that news media might create and perpetuate an environment where many White Americans can simultaneously profess belief in racial equality and non-discrimination and oppose policies designed to alleviate racial gaps in life outcomes. News media accomplish this task through the framing choices that are made in the normal course of newsmaking. These choices may affect preferences on a variety of public policies. Such frames may also socialize Americans to normalize the existing racial hierarchy of White dominance, and thus the media may function institutionally to perpetuate racial inequality (Hall, 1981).

In order to explore and test these ideas, this dissertation will examine four proposed theoretical perspectives for understanding the gap between White attitudes and public policy preferences: three prominent theories from political psychology about White racial attitudes (i.e., symbolic racism, prejudice as group position, and a politics-centered approach) and the prominent, though less developed, concept of whiteness from critical race theory. (Each will be discussed in detail below.) My argument is that the beliefs that drive each theory should be found in the verbal and visual text of the news, and it may be possible to discern which are most prevalent and then test their impact on policy preferences. Do news frames reflect or resonate with one or more of these theories? Is one better than another at explaining the gap between White racial attitudes and policy preferences?

In this dissertation I also seek to develop an operationalization of "whiteness" to determine where it intersects with the theories about White racial attitudes and where it deviates from them. To date, the concept of whiteness has generally been developed through cultural studies approaches, though quantitative measures and standard social scientific hypothesis testing has begun to be appear in disciplines other than communication studies, notably sociology (Bahk & Jandt, 2004; Croll, 2007; Hartmann & Croll, 2008).

The dissertation consists of three interrelated studies that investigate the form, persistence, and impact of racialized news frames. The first is a textual analysis to examine how norms of whiteness emerged in television news coverage of Hurricane Katrina. The uniqueness, unexpectedness, and extensiveness of the ensuing disaster required a quick response from news institutions and their staff. According to Brian

Williams, anchor of *NBC Nightly News*, Katrina revealed racial and economic "cracks in our society" (Williams, 2006). The rapid elite response to Katrina tapped into unprotected and unrehearsed thoughts and practices that allowed "cracks" in our media institutions to appear, too—cracks that revealed problematic racial frameworks. Previous whiteness studies have not examined news coverage, instead focusing primarily on entertainment content (but see Brooks & Rada, 2002; Squires, 2007). This dissertation will fill that lacuna in our knowledge about media effects. The second study also looks at television coverage of Hurricane Katrina but employs a quantitative content analysis. The coding scheme evaluates whether elements of the major theoretical fames—prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic racism, and the politics-centered approach—appeared in the news, and which, if any, dominated news frames. Moving from the coverage of Hurricane Katrina, the third study is experimental. I test the impact that news frames (i.e., in terms reflective of prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic racism, politics-centered approach, or whiteness) have on policy preferences of White participants. This study is the first to look at all of these theories and their relationship to news media, to attempt to differentiate among the theories in the framing of the news, and to begin to measure whiteness quantitatively.

Crossing disciplinary boundaries and mixing methods through the threes studies will not only triangulate the findings but also increase our theoretical knowledge base. Therefore, the dissertation has several goals: 1) To determine if and how news frames affect White racial attitudes and, consequently, the racial power hierarchy of the United States; 2) To map the intersections of various theories of racial attitudes currently debated in the racial public opinion literature; 3) To rigorously measure and examine the concept

of whiteness; and 4) To illuminate how different theoretical and methodological foundations can be utilized to increase our understanding of racial attitudes and their relationship to media with the goal of improving democratic citizenship.

This introductory chapter lays the theoretical foundation for the studies in my dissertation. The first section reviews the literature on symbolic racism, prejudice as group position, and the politics-centered approach to understanding white racial attitudes. The next section discusses the social scientific media effects literature from 1955 to the contemporary period. I then turn to the critical/cultural approach in the third section where I focus on the literature of whiteness studies within critical race theory. The fourth section reviews the role of the media as understood through cultural studies approaches. The fifth section brings these bodies of work into conversation, with the specific aim of articulating how whiteness studies may illuminate and enhance traditional social scientific approaches to race, media, and public opinion. Finally, I outline the chapters and offer a brief conclusion.

Racism or Just Politics?

In this day and age, relatively few White Americans express blatantly racist attitudes on surveys, and the media do not regularly convey explicitly racist views. Old-fashioned or "Jim Crow" racism no longer persists as the dominant belief system, at least as measured through public opinion polls (Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Sears et al., 2000; Sears et al., 1997; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). Characteristics of old-fashioned racism include open intolerance, belief in biological inferiority, belief in negative stereotypes about Blacks, restrictions on social contact through social distancing and segregation, and opposition to equal access or equal

opportunity by supporting discriminatory practices (Sears, 1988). The acceptance of violence against Blacks frequently went along with old-fashioned racism. Yet, at the same time that Jim Crow institutions and practices have been ruled illegal and explicit bigotry has become socially unacceptable, de-facto racial segregation of neighborhoods and schools persists, and White Americans do not generally support public policies designed to alleviate racial gaps in socioeconomic status (Sears et al., 1997, p. 16). Further, White Americans continue to express support for certain negative stereotypes (Sears et al., 2000; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). For example, as recently as the 2004 American National Election Survey (ANES), seventy-one percent of Whites with no college education and forty-three percent of Whites with a college education agreed with the statement that "Blacks should try harder" to succeed. Such a result may suggest a belief in the stereotype of Blacks a lazy, though it could also suggest a belief that everyone should try harder. Additionally, almost half of all White respondents in the 2004 ANES (49%) disagreed with the statement that "history makes it more difficult for Black to succeed." Such responses resonate with the stereotype of Blacks as lazy and with discourses about individualism and shrinking the federal government that began in the 1980s (Edsall & Edsall, 1991).

In trying to understand these gaps between polls and real-world outcomes in an era of formal, legal equality, many researchers find new forms of racism have emerged. Sears offers the term "symbolic racism" (Sears, 1988, 1993), and Kinder and his colleagues use the term "racial resentment" (Kinder & Sanders, 1996). Other terms include "modern racism" (McConahay, 1986), "aversive racism" (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), and "subtle prejudice" (Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Pettigrew & Meertens,

6

1995).[1] Some have bemoaned the attempt to distinguish between various forms of new racism concepts, and standard practice seems to dictate that they are mostly interchangeable (Entman, 1990, note 1, p. 343). Entman and Rojecki (2000) offered the term "racial comity" to pull together elements of the different theories.

Some of the concepts and measures in these approaches overlap. For example, both symbolic racism and the politics-centered approach include values (e.g., belief in the importance of hard work) as part of their conceptualization. Sears and his colleagues attempted to bring clarity to the field by grouping the theories according to their foundations in different academic disciplines, i.e., as sociopsychological, sociostructural, or politics-centered (Sears et al., 2000). These three broad categories also reflect the different views on the underlying processes and provide the framework for taking a more comprehensive and discriminating look at individual theories and their relationship to the news in this dissertation.

Symbolic Racism

Symbolic racism, racial resentment, and modern racism fall under the broad umbrella of sociopsychological theories. According to Sears and colleagues, these theories have "slightly different interpretations of the same general reasoning and measurement" (Sears et al., 2000, p. 17). In general, these theories are a "coalescing of negative racial affect with the perceived violation of such traditional values" (Sears et al., 2000, p. 17). More specifically, Blacks are perceived by Whites to violate "such cherished American values as the work ethic, self-reliance, impulse control, and

---

[1] To fully define and differentiate each of these theories would be beyond the scope of this dissertation, though the reader may indeed be curious. As will be noted below, Sears and colleagues (2000) sought to clarify the situation by grouping the theories and discussing their general characteristics. The point is that many definitions exist, and the fact of conceptual and measurement overlap is an underlying motivation for my work.

obedience to authority." Negative Black affect and the related negative stereotypes are acquired through continuing socialization. These theories also predict that old-fashioned racism maintains weak predictive power of White racial policy or candidate preferences and that "Blacks should try harder to make it on their own" because discrimination is a thing of the past (Sears et al., 2000, p. 17). Of these sociopsychological theories, symbolic racism has evolved into one of the leading theories to explain the gap between White racial attitudes and White policy preferences (Hutchings & Valentino, 2004).

The theory of symbolic racism grew inductively from work on the 1969 Los Angeles mayoral race between Sam Yorty and Tom Bradley (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears & Kinder, 1971). Symbolic racism has been measured through survey items that ask respondents how much they agree or disagree with certain statements. For example, respondents indicate whether they think Blacks are pushing too hard or too fast, and Blacks are receiving special favors or treatment by government, such as excessive welfare, or unfair or excessive economic gain (Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Sears, 1988; Sears, Henry, & Kosterman, 2000; Sears et al., 1997). Another question asks about ongoing discrimination against Blacks. These questions are designed to assess anti-Black affect as indicated by antagonism, resentment, anger, and lack of sympathy. Other items assess the extent to which Whites perceive that Blacks violate the values that comprise the Protestant work ethic (e.g., hard work, thrift, punctuality, and delay of gratification). Violation of these values would be indicated by being lazy, impulsive, and seeking handouts or special favors. These values are also indicated by rejecting the concepts of group fate, group help, and special favors for group members. Further, by rejecting group-based beliefs the respondents are affirming the values of individualism and

individual merit. These measures have been used in the General Social Survey (GSS) and National Election Studies (NES) to indicate symbolic racism.

Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position

The second broad category of theories suggested by Sears and colleagues (2000) is sociostructural; it includes laissez-faire racism, group position theory, and social dominance theory. Both social dominance theory and laissez-faire racism are based on "the assumption of a social stratification system that distinguishes dominant and subordinate groups" (Sears et al., 2000, p. 25). However, unlike laissez-faire racism, social dominance theory "regards individual differences in personality within these groups as crucial elements in maintaining that hierarchical system" (Sears et al., 2000, p. 25).

Bobo and colleagues developed the term laissez-faire racism to reflect the economic basis of race prejudice (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Bobo, Kluegel, & Smith, 1997). Critically, this form of prejudice is "not a new brand of racism, but instead reflects the transformation of Whites' group interests and their continued defense of those interests" (Sears et al., 2000, p. 25). However, more recent work by Bobo and Tuan (2006) uses the language of group position theory, which will be used in this dissertation.

Prejudice as a sense of group position derives from the work of Herbert Blumer (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999; Bobo & Smith, 1998; Bobo & Tuan, 2006). Blumer's theory has four components: a feeling of superiority by dominant group members; a belief that the subordinate group is intrinsically alien and different; a sense of proprietary claim by the dominant group to scarce resources, rights, and statuses; and a perception by the dominant group of threat from the subordinate group to such resources, rights, or statuses

(Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Tuan, 2006; Sears et al., 2000). The latter two features

differentiate this theoretical approach from mere prejudice and set it apart from symbolic

racism (which focuses on Blacks violating values such as hard work and individualism,

among other things) and the other sociopsychological theories (Bobo & Tuan, 2006). The

key is that the "source of race prejudice lies in a felt challenge to this sense of group

position" (Blumer, 1958, p. 5). Bobo and Tuan (2006) update the language of Blumer's

four features and explicitly incorporate the ideas of the nature and effects of racial

identities, the role of affect and emotions, and the role of group interests.

Laissez-faire racism has been measured through questions on the General Social

Survey.[2] These survey questions begin with the set-up that "some people think that

discrimination is a big problem in this country for Blacks, while others think that it is not

a big problem" and then go on to ask about discrimination hurting Blacks in getting a

good job, in renting or buying a house, and with respect to jobs, income and housing

(Bobo et al., 1997; Valentino et al., 2002). Thus, these questions tap perceptions about

discrimination and its effect on the ability to get jobs, income, and housing. However,

these questions also contain overlap with some of the ideas about symbolic racism noted

above; e.g., denial of continuing discrimination and negative racial stereotypes.

One goal of this dissertation is to distinguish among the three different theories,

and this differentiation becomes particularly problematic when considering the overlap

between prejudice as group position and symbolic racism. Whereas symbolic racism

"focuses on the continuing socialization of negative affect toward Blacks and perceptions

that they violate cherished American values," group position theory privileges the

---

[2] I am using the term laissez-faire here (as opposed to group position) because that term was used in the works that I am discussing in this paragraph.

historical context and analyzes the changing economic and political situation, especially

the "transformation of Whites' group interests and their continued defense of those

interests" (Sears et al., 2000, p. 25). Because both theories include negative stereotyping

and negative affect, the key for differentiating between group position and symbolic

racism is to look at group entitlement and the sense of threat (Bobo & Tuan, 2006).[3]

Whereas Bobo and Tuan (2006) argue that group position theory subsumes symbolic

racism, this dissertation will test whether they can be distinguished, at least to the extent

that news frames may reflect one theory more than the other. In other words, if traces of

threat to scarce resources, rights, and statuses appear in the news, that would be

suggestive of a group position framing, and conversely, if only cues for negative affect

and negative stereotypes appear, then the framing would be suggestive of symbolic

racism. It may be that they appear at different times and in different circumstances or that

they appear together. The specific operationalizations to make these differentiations will

be addressed in Chapter Three and Four.

The Politics-centered Approach

In contrast to both the sociopsychological and the sociostructural theories, the

politics-centered approach argues that the gap between attitudes and policy preferences is

not the result of the racist beliefs of White Americans. Though many Whites harbor

negative feelings toward Blacks, policy opposition springs mostly from non-racial

principles such as the desire for smaller government (Sears et al., 2000; Sniderman &

Carmines, 1997; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). Also, researchers from this perspective

argue that general moral values, such as individualism and equality, are important general

---

[3] Blumer (1958) writes that it is the element of threat that is the key to race prejudice; having feelings of superiority, viewing the subordinate group as alien and different, and having a sense of entitlement to resources, status, and privileges were not sufficient.

values that are not specifically related to race. Proponents believe that "the public can be more easily swayed about racial policies than previously supposed, if convincing moral arguments are made, because attitudes about racial policy are at heart about politics and not race" (Sears et al., 2000, p. 29). Bobo and Tuan (2006) refer to this approach as the injustice frame because it claims "minority group rights, claims and policies are rejected by the majority of Whites on sensible, reasoned, and concrete grounds" (p. 135).

Sniderman and his colleagues have found a variety of evidence to support the position that racial policy opinions are, at root, not primarily driven by racial animus. One study provided Whites with an excuse or "plausible reason" to oppose a policy on crime or welfare other than on the basis of race (Sniderman & Carmines, 1997). They focused only on Whites who had previously said that Blacks were law-abiding and did not believe that Blacks are violent or aggressive. In one instance, the difference in the percentage of White respondents who thought that White versus Black suspects using foul language should be searched for drugs was statistically insignificant (66% and 60% respectively). "In short, these results suggest that Whites who said they thought well of Blacks meant what they said; even when they had a socially acceptable excuse to think badly of Blacks, they did not take advantage of it" (Sniderman & Carmines, 1997, p. 67). In addition to drugs, they looked at welfare and government dependency and concluded that policy preferences reflect concern about the role of government and fairness, not White attitudes toward Black people.

In summary, the research that developed the theories of symbolic racism, prejudice as group position, and the politics-centered approach to racial attitudes offer three different perspectives on the source of White public opinion toward racial policies.

These theories can be viewed as having dimensions of contact along the concepts of stereotypes, affect, threat, and values as illustrated in Table 1.1.

[Table 1.1 about here]

In a review of research on the intersection of prejudice, politics, and public opinion, Krysan (2000) similarly looked at three theoretical perspectives that she termed "new racism approaches, politics and nonracial principles and values, and group conflict" (p. 136). Her description and explanations track well with the typology that Sears and his colleagues developed and the work of this dissertation. Importantly, Krysan (2000) calls for a move toward complexity and understanding that racial policy attitudes involve a "mix of social, psychological, and political forces" and that such work "requires considerable attention to nuance and the integration of ideas and methods" (p. 162). Thus, I bring in the role of the media as part of the story about White racial attitudes and policy preferences.

None of the three theories discussed so far prioritize the role of the media in development or reinforcement of White opinion on racial policies, though Blumer (1958) saw a role for the media in understanding the development of the theory of prejudice as a sense of group position. Describing the formation of a sense of group position as a process, he claimed that it "operates chiefly through the public media" (p. 3).[4] However, little subsequent work about group position has elaborated on Blumer's statement about the role of media. Entman (1990, 1992) focused on one theory—symbolic racism—in his content analysis of local news and did not attempt to differentiate among theories. I argue that we need to build on our knowledge about media, especially news, and increase our

---

[4] Blumer also describes the process as "a complex interaction and communication" through " talk, tales, stories, gossip, anecdotes, messages, pronouncements, *news accounts*, orations, sermons, preachments, and the like" (emphasis added, p. 5).

understanding about the different theories. I turn now to what we have learned about media effects through social science approaches using quantitative methods.

What Have We Learned about Media Effects?

To argue for analyzing the news is not to claim that the media have direct effects on persuasion. A long line of research has found little evidence for such claims (Katz, 1957, 1987; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955; McGuire, 1986). Instead, considerable research has demonstrated indirect effects through the mechanisms of agenda-setting, priming, and framing (Entman, 1993; Gamson & Modigliani, 1987; Iyengar, 1991; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; McCoombs & Shaw, 1972; Mendelberg, 2001; Valentino et al., 2002). In other words, while the media may convey specific messages, people do not follow blindly what they are told to do, think, or say. Instead, the media may affect what people think *about* as opposed as to what they actually *think* (Cohen, 1963; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Rogers & Dearing, 1988). The media have also been found to influence later judgments and behavior by triggering, or priming, concepts that do not appear to be explicitly or obviously connected (Anderson, 1983; Berkowitz, 1993; Price & Tewksbury, 1997; Roskos-Ewoldsen, Roskos-Ewoldsen, & Dillman Carpentier, 2002). This can occur by making concepts more accessible to audiences (Fazio & Williams, 1986). Priming can be defined as "the tendency of audience members to evaluate their political leaders on the basis of those particular events and issues given attention in recent news reports" (Price & Tewksbury, 1997, p. 175).

The concept of priming grew out of work in cognitive psychology based on network models of memory and became the foundation for research examining media violence and aggression (Anderson, 1983; Berkowitz, 1984; Josephson, 1987). According

to one explanation of priming, the memory functions through networks of associated

nodes in the brain, and activation of one node through some sort of cue can influence

activation of another associated node through spreading activation (Anderson, 1983).

Additionally, the extent of the priming effect is a function of both the intensity or

frequency of activation of a node and the recency of activation of a node (Roskos-

Ewoldsen, Roskos-Ewoldsen, & Dillman Carpentier, 2002). In other words, more

frequent and recent triggering produces higher baseline accessibility for a given schema.

This of course implies that effects fade over time if schemas are not activated regularly.

Beyond work on media and violence, researchers have also examined priming in

political communication (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Mendelberg, 2001; Price &

Tewksbury, 1997; Valentino, Hutchings, & White, 2002). This research demonstrates

that "racial 'coding' of welfare and crime can activate racial thinking" (Valentino,

Hutchings, & White, 2002, p. 75). Of particular relevance for this dissertation, scholars

have looked at implicit and explicit priming in terms of race and the news media

(Mendelberg, 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, & White, 2002). An explicit message uses

words such as "Blacks,' 'race,' or 'racial' to express anti-Black sentiment or to make

racially stereotypical or derogatory statements" (Mendelberg, 2001, p. 8). When negative

racial stereotypes are explicitly endorsed, according to Mendelberg, the norm of equality

leads the audience to suppress racial resentment in making political decisions.[5] Implicit

racial messages "convey the same negative message as explicit racial appeals, but they

replace racial nouns and adjectives with more oblique references to race" (Mendelberg,

2001, p. 9). Interestingly, Mendelberg fails to explain exactly what oblique references to

---

[5] Mendelberg found very few instances of explicit racial messages, though she did not systematically look for them.

race are, though she does say, "Visual images are a more effective way to communicate implicitly" (Mendelberg, 2001, p. 9). In essence, Mendelberg treats implicitness and explicitness as a dichotomy, whereas it is possible that gradations exist such that a continuum exists with something more or less implicit. Specifically, it is problematic to think of all racial imagery as implicit.

Expanding on Mendelberg's work and using issues that were expected to be non-racial (e.g., wasteful government spending, taxes, and health care), Valentino et al. (2002) looked specifically at the ability of various forms of implicit cues to activate racial attitudes that affected candidate preference. The experiment employed simulated political advertisements and differentiated among three levels of implicit appeals: narrative with neutral visuals, narrative with race comparison, and narrative with undeserving visuals of racial comparisons (White and Black), and narrative with visuals of undeserving Blacks. They found that the interaction among racial attitudes and the undeserving Black cue powerfully shifted the basis of preferences.[6] Additionally, the "results suggest that exposure to implicit racial cues, especially the undeserving Black cues, makes racial attitudes more accessible *and* makes group concerns more important in the voting calculus" (Valentino et al., 2002, p. 84).

Collectively, Mendelberg (2001) and Valentino et al. (2002) offer evidence that explicit stereotype reinforcing cues do not prime racial attitudes and that when implicit

---

[6] The dependent variable was support for Bush in the 2000 presidential contest between Bush and Gore. The three implicit cues alone generally did not produce significant results, with the exception of the undeserving blacks cue. It was significant for laissez-faire racism and "blacks have too much influence," but in the wrong direction. In other words, the undeserving black cue seemed to be recognized by people and then they reacted against that racial cue and moved toward supporting Gore. However, when the interaction between racial attitude or opinion is considered, the cue works powerfully and changes the coefficient from .49 ($p < 0.05$) to .77 ($p < 0.01$) for laissez faire racism, from .41 (not significant) to .61 ($p < 0.05$) for racial resentment, and from .25 (not significant) to .60 ($p < 0.01$) for blacks have too much influence.

cues become recognized they do not prime racial attitudes. Thus one can argue that there are various levels of "implicitness."

Huber and Lapinski (2006) re-addressed the idea of explicit and implicit appeals using an experiment wherein participants watched political ads on their own television.[7] Because their goal was to test Mendelberg's theory about explicit and implicit priming, Huber and Lapinski used the same dichotomous definition as Mendelberg (Huber & Lapinski, 2006). While confirming that explicit appeals do not prime racial attitudes, Huber and Lapinski also concluded that implicit appeals do not prime racial attitude, but an important caveat must be noted. As Huber and Lapinski acknowledged, one could argue that all four of their treatment conditions are highly racialized; they have no manipulation check to say otherwise. They responded to that concern by noting that the conditions are less explicit than the actual explicit treatment. Considering explicitness as a continuum, one could argue that a highly racialized implicit message is sufficiently close to being explicit so as to dull the experimental effect. People may recognize that it is racialized and apply the norm of equality. In other words, this "loud" implicit appeal may function as though explicit. In some sense, there may be a ceiling effect occurring. Additionally, in contrast to Valentino et al. (2002), Huber and Lapinski used a pre-test to assess racial attitudes. This factor, too, could affect the outcome by essentially priming race among all subjects, or triggering the norm of equality. In either instance, one would not expect to find racial priming.[8]

---

[7] They conducted two experiments with Knowledge Networks' Web-TV survey panel with a large representative sample (N= 6300).
[8] Huber and Lapinski (2006) explain, "Unlike some earlier research (e.g. Valentino et al. 2002), we placed our anti-black predispositions battery in the pre-test because we were concerned that the discussions of deservedness of welfare recipients in our experimental manipulations, especially when linked either implicitly or explicitly to race, would affect the responses of participants to the survey items used to construct the measures of anti-black perceptions… exposure to race-related policy discussions alters

A recent critical exchange between Mendelberg (2008) and Huber and Lapinski (2008) summarized the differences in their work. Importantly for this dissertation, Mendelberg reviewed 17 studies that found evidence of implicit cues generating racial effects. [9] Mendelberg also critiqued the methodology of Huber and Lapinski and noted that the study did not correctly replicate the literature. Mendelberg concluded, "But for now, the weight of the evidence clearly points to the unique power of implicit communication in an age of egalitarian norms" (p. 139). Additionally, Mendelberg revised her thoughts of explicit and implicit as a dichotomy and concluded that they are "two endpoints on a continuum" (p. 118). She also called for more work on explicit appeals, especially the conditions under which they might work.

Related to priming is the concept of framing. The way a story is told, or framed, by the media organizes "the world both for journalists who report it, and in some important degree for us who rely on their reports" (Gitlin, 1980, p. 7). Thus a "frame is a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them. The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue" (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143). Some go so far as to say that the frames "select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation" (Entman, 1993, p.

---

expressed anti-black predispositions. If this occurred despite a constant true relationship between anti-black predispositions and policy opinions, analysis of the relations between *expressed* anti-black predispositions and opinion would find a larger effect of anti-black predispositions in the treatment case…In our approach we run the risk of priming racial considerations with the pre-test but implement a full control group in experiment A and four different racial message styles in experiment B" (p. 7, footnote 7). Interestingly, this discussion ignores the idea that the pretest would potentially elevate white egalitarian norms.

[9] The primary source of the disagreement focuses on methodology and how they characterize the other's work. They also disagree about which studies are relevant comparisons. For example, Huber and Lapinski disagree with Mendelberg's list of studies because the others were not testing for explicit priming but only implicit.

52). People's policy preferences have been shown to be affected by the choice of frames (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987; Iyengar, 1991; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997). Thus, the way in which a story is framed is of particular interest in considering the potential relationship between the media and racial attitudes because these framing choices can comprise the stimulus for priming racial attitudes.

As noted in the beginning of this section, the media have generally not been found to have direct effects. While it may well be that the media do have a long-term effects in the areas of racial attitudes similar to the effects found in the aggression literature, or in the cultivation theory work, no long-term study has attempted to track race in the same way, and thus such conclusions would be mere speculation. Accordingly, this dissertation will examine indirect effects of the media and argue that (1) patterns in the framing of news stories will reflect theories about White racial opinions and (2) these frames matter because exposure to them will affect policy judgments and racial attitudes. To explore these ideas both a quantitative content analysis and an experiment were conducted.

In addition to the theories of prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic racism, and the politics-centered approach, this dissertation crosses methodological boundaries to increase understanding about the gap between White racial attitudes and policy preferences by including whiteness from the critical/cultural studies.

<center>What is Whiteness?</center>

Whiteness studies grew out of the work of critical race theory that originated in the 1970s by Derrick Bell and others (Squires, 2007; Taylor, 1998). Critical race theory focused on the lack of progress in the post-civil rights era. The basic argument is that

<center>19</center>

traditional legal discourse about racial matters perpetuates White power and privilege because civil rights remedies that threatened White status could not be legally sustained. According to this theory, Black progress can only occur when it does not threaten White interests; stated differently, progress occurs when there is a convergence between White interests and Black interests (Bell, 2000). Delgado (1995) has noted how there is a need to hear the story of the oppressed through their voices because they have been shaped by that oppression, whereas the oppressor sees the story through a different lens. This telling may take the form of stories and narratives. Critical race theory argues, "It is White race-consciousness, a consciousness guilty of abiding the continuing destruction of minority communities and minority lives, that requires immediate and sustained attention, not the race-consciousness of non-Whites" (Haney Lopez, 1996, p. 153). Crenshaw writes that part of addressing White racial domination "is revealing the contingency of race and exploring the connection between White race consciousness and the other myths that legitimate both class and race hierarchies" (Crenshaw, 1988, p. 1385). A key component of critical race theory is the belief that White racism is a normal, everyday practice, embedded in the institutional fabric of our country and unrecognized by most White Americans. From this body of critical legal scholarship came whiteness studies.

Whiteness is premised on the idea of race as a social construction (Frankenberg, 1993, 2001; Rasmussen, Klinenberg, Nexica, & Wray, 2001). Race is neither a fixed, concrete, biological essence nor merely an ideological construct (Omi & Winant, 1994). Rather, race can be defined as "a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies" (Omi & Winant, 1994, p. 55). In other words, race involves political and social struggle among different groups of

people, and one of the most powerful groups has been labeled White. Whiteness then is a social identity that results in economic, educational, social, and cultural privilege (Rasmussen et al., 2001). The advantages conferred by White identity result in a sense that there is value to being White, a sense of a "possessive investment in whiteness" (Lipsitz, 1998). Other scholars have identified the economic benefits of being White as the "wages of whiteness" (Roediger, 1991). Harris (1996) discusses "whiteness as property."

A critical part of whiteness is *not* being Black, other, of color, or non-White. Frankenberg (1993) discusses the lopsided relational aspect of whiteness with blackness and "otherness" such that whiteness comes to represent dominance; she writes, "This coconstruction is, however, fundamentally asymmetrical, for the term 'whiteness' signals the production and reproduction of dominance rather than the subordination, normativity rather than marginality, and privilege rather than disadvantage" (p. 236). Then in simplest terms, whiteness is dominance, normativity, and privilege, and these elements converge into power. However, whiteness must not be treated as a monolithic whole or essentialized without recognizing that geographic and class exceptions exist, e.g., "White trash" and "rednecks." In addition to these exceptions, there is also the historical messiness of changing perceptions about which groups of people are White and which groups are not White. For example, Irish and Jewish people began the 20th century as non-Whites but overtime "became" White (Brodkin, 1998; Ignatiev, 1995). Thus, whiteness is mutable.[10]

---

[10] The fact that some groups do become white raises the question: What is required to become white? A discussion of this question would entail far more time and study than the direction that this dissertation was

To grasp the extent to which White people understand race and White privilege, Frankenberg (1993) conducted intensive interviews of White women. She found evidence of three primary racial discourses: essentialized racism, color- and power-evasiveness, and race-cognizant, with the color- and power-evasive discourse dominant. That is, to not appear racist, many Whites would avoid acknowledging seeing racial differences at all. If such differences became evident, they were discussed in a way that ignored any power dimension of the relationship between Black and White. More specifically, the concept of a structural or institutional racism was avoided, such that the problem centered on the individual. Thus, a person might be racist, but not society as a whole. This unconsciousness and ability to ignore or evade racial thinking, identity, and one's White privilege are key elements that work to maintain social and political domination (Squires, 2003).

More recently, Frankenberg (2001) set forth an eight part definition of whiteness describing it primarily as a "location of structural advantage in societies structured in racial dominance" (p. 76). This means that whiteness is a "standpoint" to view others as well as ourselves. It also is a "site of elaboration of a range of cultural practices and identities, often unmarked and unnamed as national or 'normative' rather than specifically racial" (p. 76). At the same time that it intersects with other qualifiers of advantage or subordination it, whiteness is also a "product of history." Finally, to say that whiteness is socially constructed does not mean that the effects are unreal in their impact.

---

designed to take. However, Brodkin (1998) and Ignatiev (1995) provide an excellent discussion about the story of "becoming white" for Jewish people and the Irish, respectively.

While the early work of Dyer (1987) and Frankenberg (1993) noted the invisibility of whiteness, Frankenberg (2001) raises the important question about to whom whiteness is invisible; she contends that it is "bizarre" to think that people of color do not see whiteness and further claims that White people see their whiteness when needed. In a similar vein, Shome (2000) notes that when threatened whiteness marks itself so as to become visible and re-establish its hegemonic normalcy. Squires (2007) also notes how the affirmative action debates have brought whiteness into the spotlight, especially in news portrayals of Whites who transgress boundaries by not fulfilling expected roles.

In summary, whiteness is a historical identity that is socially constructed through political and cultural practices that have material and discursive effects. Because White identity has been defined as a normative, superior identity, it derives power from its sense of being the "normal" way of being, thinking, and doing. Through its normativity, whiteness as a racial category remains largely invisible to most White people most of the time. This lack of knowing serves to mask a complicity with the institutions that have created and maintained a racial hierarchy (Harris, 1996; Roman, 1997). Such a lack of knowing or acknowledgement reaffirms structures of racial inequality. With this underpinning about whiteness, I now look at the relationship between media and race as examined through cultural studies.

<center>Media and the Construction of Racial Meaning</center>

The media play a crucial role in developing the meaning of race. Cultural theorist Stuart Hall writes that "the media construct for us a definition of what *race* is, what meaning the imagery of race carries, and what the 'problem of race' is understood to be"

and provide the place where ideas about race are "articulated, worked on, transformed, and elaborated" (Hall, 1981, p. 35). Omi and Winant (1994) call such workings racial projects that "connect what race *means* in a particular discursive practice and the ways in which social structures and individual experiences are racially *organized*, based upon that meaning" (emphasis original, p. 56). Racial projects are dynamic and interact with one another to become racial formation, "the process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed and destroyed" (Omi & Winant, 1994, p. 54). Whiteness then must be understood as a social construct that is "productively understood as a communication phenomenon" (Nakayama & Martin, 1999, p. viii). Accordingly, the media play a role in developing our understanding of whiteness as well as blackness and "otherness."

Film analysis provided one of the first forays into examining the role of the media and the concept of whiteness as a socially constructed category reflecting a societal norm (Dyer, 1988, 1997). Dyer claimed that "whiteness secures its dominance by seeming not to be about anything in particular" (Dyer, 1988, p. 44). Instead, looking at non-dominant groups tends to reproduce the sense that they are different, and the dominant group, the norm, continues as though it is the inevitable way of being human. Becoming the norm, or being perceived as the norm, constitutes a way of exercising power. In his film analysis Dyer (1988, 1997) sets forth characteristics of whiteness and blackness: Whites are seen as embodying intelligence, order, rationality, civility, power, control (both physical and emotional), aesthetic refinement, and religiosity, and Blacks are seen as unintelligent, disorderly, child-like, powerless, lacking control, uncouth, and representing a lack of humanity.

Recent work has looked at contemporary film as a site to socially produce, maintain, and construct White identity (Madison, 1999; Shome, 2000; Tierney, 2006). Shome (2000) argues that Whites are generally taught about racism as something that puts others at a disadvantage, but not about their own White privilege that resulted from the disadvantage suffered by others. A White American president in crisis results in a focus on the individual "bad" guy, and the institutional or structural problems are left intact and unexamined. This normalness, this everydayness, appears in the accepted values of individualism and meritocracy, values that disguise the systems that produced and maintain White privilege. Madison (1999) argues that the "anti-racist-White-hero-films" reproduce White supremacy by defining it as something distant, extreme, and blatant. These films also give agency to the White perspective and White voice in contrast to Blacks who are seen "largely from the outside through the eyes of the 'White' hero or heroine" (Madison, 1999, p. 407). For example, in *Mississippi Burning* the heroes are the White FBI agents, not the Black leaders who organized and planned Freedom Summer. Tierney (2006) examines the strategic rhetoric of whiteness as a means for rationalizing the cultural appropriation of others.

While analysis of popular films has provided important insight into how entertainment media has functioned to reproduce and maintain whiteness, the news media's relationship to whiteness has been less studied. However, work is beginning to emerge. One study found that news coverage of the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal described "Black support" for President Clinton but did not similarly name "White support" (Brooks & Rada, 2002). Such omissions and non-naming contribute to the sense of White as the norm. Additionally, Squires (2007) examines the way that news media coverage of

25

affirmative action controversies continues to frame stories in ways that do not challenge or discuss White privilege and institutional racism. Squires argues that the framing of the coverage of two brothers who changed their racial identity on a civil service exam from White to Black provides insight into how the news media furthers affirmative action as a Black/White issue. Generally, the narratives that supported this frame did not address White privilege and did not link this case to other similar cases of affirmative action abuse by Whites. By omitting the linkages to other cases, the brothers are presented as individual wrongdoers, and this presentation then obscures the idea of White group privilege, structural advantage, or ongoing institutional racism. Another way to think about the deployment of whiteness is viewing it as strategic rhetoric (Nakayama & Krizek, 1999; Tierney, 2006). I argue that news media utilize and recirculate the strategic rhetoric of whiteness. Thus, whiteness theory provides insight into the role the media play in perpetuating a racial hierarchy of White dominance.

In this dissertation I take ideas from whiteness studies and political psychology and apply them to studies of the news media. Yet, before proceeding to discuss the studies, it is important to understand how prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic racism, the politics-centered approach, and whiteness interrelate with one another.

<div align="center">Mapping Social Science and Critical Theory</div>

To date the social science theories and whiteness studies have not attempted to speak across disciplinary lines. Social scientists may view whiteness as vague and un-falsifiable, and cultural theorists may consider that the social science approach is asking the wrong questions. I argue that it is crucially important to begin to talk across disciplinary lines in order to increase our knowledge and understanding about the source

of White opinion on racial matters because such knowledge affects the long-term stability of our democracy. This section looks at the commonality that maps across the disciplinary approaches and brings the discussion of whiteness to the table with prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic racism, and the politics-centered approach.

Symbolic Racism and Whiteness

Symbolic racism is based on the idea that old-fashioned racism has little power in predicting White racial policy or candidate preferences. There are three basic tenets to symbolic racism, each of which seems to be consistent with the concept of whiteness. First, socialization of negative Black affect and stereotypes about Blacks continue, despite the progress of the civil rights era. Whiteness studies says that historical economic and political processes have allowed, and continue to allow, Whites to segregate themselves from Blacks, both physically and socially, and then the media become a key instrument for learning about blackness. Frankenberg (1993) illustrates how narratives of the other permeate Whites' consciousness through family, schools, etc. Negative stereotypes and portrayals of Blacks offer plausible reasons why Blacks do not succeed and detract attention from possible institutional factors.

Second, according to symbolic racism, Blacks are perceived by Whites to violate traditional American values, such as the work ethic, self-reliance, impulse control, and obedience to authority. Whiteness studies argues that dichotomizing Black/White characteristics into binary oppositions through stereotypes, such as Whites as hard-working and Blacks as lazy, reinforces the idea that Blacks do not act in accordance with important American values. Such binary oppositions perform the critical function of meaning-making (Branston & Stafford, 2003).

Third, symbolic racism posits that discrimination is part of the past, and therefore Blacks simply need to exert more individual effort to succeed (Sears et al., 2000). Whiteness studies look at how Whites and White-dominated media institutions create narratives that support this denial of ongoing discrimination at a structural level. For example, Shome (2000) and Madison (1999) describe how popular films do the work of individualizing discrimination such that societal structures are not questioned as problematic. Acts of discrimination are done by individuals, and the individual is caught and punished or in some way banished. Society and its institutions are left unexamined and intact. Thus, whiteness maps onto symbolic racism quite precisely.

Group Position and Whiteness

Looking next at group position, a similar mapping of the two theories occurs. Group position has four basic tenets. The first two are that Whites feel a sense of superiority (as the dominant group) to Blacks, who are seen as alien and different. Stereotypes and negative affect convey these ideas, and the ideas expressed above linking symbolic racism and whiteness studies also apply to group position. Two additional tenets of group position, however, are not part of symbolic racism but do track with whiteness. They are a sense of proprietary claim by the dominant (White) group to scarce resources, rights, and statuses and a sense of threat from the subordinate (non-White) group to these scarce resources, rights, and statuses. Whiteness studies focus heavily on the concept of proprietary claim and threat. Lipsitz (1998) described a "possessive investment in whiteness" that echoes the group position ideas of a propriety claim to resources, rights, and statuses. Roediger (1991) focused specifically on the financial benefit of being White, calling it the "wages of whiteness." Harris (1996) looked at

historical legal definitions and implications about being White. She noted how White

status was once the key to owning property (and voting) and thus being White was a

property right.

Additionally, both group position and whiteness look to the importance of group-

level as opposed to individual-level analysis. Denial of group complicity is a critical

component of whiteness; such denial is seen in White narratives that individualize racist

acts and distance them from structural factors. The denial frequently takes the form of "I

didn't lynch anyone" or "I don't discriminate, and therefore, it is not my problem." These

denials comprise a type of "White innocence." Whiteness scholars argue that focusing on

individual culpability deflects analysis of the historical development of institutional

structures that perpetuate inequality. Another way of denying complicity is through

narratives that re-write White agency into the past, rather than the present, such that

Whites are given a sanitized version of history where they perform heroic roles even if

the portrayal distorts reality and contributes to a type of nostalgia (Baker, 1995).

Politics-centered Approach and Whiteness

The third theory to consider in relationship to whiteness is the politics-centered

approach that argues that people's decisions are generally based on principles about the

size of government and important values, such as equality and individualism. Advocates

of the politics-centered approach argue that policy preferences are based on preference

for a reduced role for government, especially the federal government, as opposed to being

based on racial criteria. Whiteness scholars would argue that the belief in less

government is dependent on the recipients. Historically, the federal government has at

times played an active role in providing economic opportunities and redistribution of

money through a variety of programs, and the governmental largesse has gone primarily to Whites (Brodkin, 1998; Brown et al., 2003). For example, Congress explicitly excluded domestic and agricultural workers from Social Security coverage when it was first passed, as well as public employees and workers in non-profits; thus, "Almost three-fifths of the Black labor force were denied coverage (Brown et al., 2003, p. 28). Federal labor and housing policy form the New Deal also benefited Whites but not Blacks. Thus, the politics-centered approach and whiteness differ explicitly regarding the role of government. Politics-centered advocates focus on the current situation and argue for less government. In contrast whiteness scholars look to the history of governmental action in favor of Whites; they argue that affirmative action had been explicitly sanctioned by the federal government for White males because only White men could become naturalized citizens according to the Naturalization Act 1790, a requirement that was not deleted until the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 (Haney Lopez, 1996).

The values of individualism and equality are also key components of the politics-centered approach. Individualism focuses on personal hard work and effort. Individualism relates to the symbolic racism tenet about stereotypes and affect, and as noted above, whiteness studies maps onto this tenet through negative stereotypes that dichotomize Whites as competent, hard-working, and independent, and Blacks as incompetent, lazy, and needy. Moreover, individualism functions to whitewash links between government social programs and current White status. For example, after World War II, the GI bill provided education funds for returning service men, the bulk of whom were White, and they were also eligible for federal loans to buy houses. Opportunity and support to buy houses provided government support for the creation of wealth, an

opportunity not similarly open to Blacks. Such programs allowed for the accumulation of wealth by Whites (Brown et al., 2003).

The value of equality is also a key component of the politics-centered approach. To a large extent it relates to the idea from symbolic racism that discrimination is past history and not part of contemporary society; therefore, the norm of equality dictates that Blacks simply need to "try harder." If discrimination is part of the past, then many/some argue for the soundness of a colorblind approach and misuse the legacy of Martin Luther King, Jr. by co-opting his language beyond his intention (Turner, 1996). By wiping out historical context and the ongoing impact of discriminatory practices of the past, the norm of equality conveys a sense that nothing more needs to be done, nothing more needs to be questioned; the norm of equality perpetuates the existing racial hierarchy. Without context but with a focus on a colorblind righteousness, people then have difficulty even having a conversation about race because the rules of the game cast anyone who voices concern about race as illegitimate. The question of race becomes about "others," not the people who hold power. In this way Whites remain raceless and invisible.

Thus whiteness theory has dimensions of contact with symbolic racism, prejudice as group position, and the politics-centered approach, and Table 1.1 should be expanded to include whiteness. (See Table 1.2)

[Table 1.2 about here]

Summary of Dissertation Chapters

In summary, this dissertation is a mixed methods design based on theories from different disciplinary approaches using different methods. The overall goal is to explore the relationship of the theories to news content in order to address the puzzle: If there is

widespread support for the norm of equality in the United States, why do Whites oppose policies designed to achieve that goal? The specific methods used to address this question are textual analysis, quantitative content analysis, and experiment as indicated in the following chapter summaries. Each will be explained in detail in the appropriate chapter.

Chapter 1 serves as the introduction to the dissertation and provides the theoretical background. The chapter reviews the literature about the theories of symbolic racism, prejudice as group position, the politics-centered approach, and whiteness, and explores the dimensions of contact among them. The chapter also reviews what has been learned about the role of the media via quantitative social science and cultural studies methods. The chapter also explores linkages among the theories.

Chapter 2 presents the findings from a textual analysis of television news stories about Hurricane Katrina and the ensuing disaster. The goal in this chapter is to build on the work that examines whiteness in visual media and expand the analysis to television news. I argue that news media are a major part of the institutional framework that perpetuates and reinforces White dominance by conveying whiteness as normalcy. I further contend that generally it is not the intentional work of White people that furthers whiteness and reaffirms the existing racial hierarchy, though there may be those who are intentional. Rather, whiteness is normalized through framing according to standard news norms, combined with an institutional framework that does not bring in historical context. The news perpetuates the sense that Whites are the standard to which non-Whites in general, or Blacks in particular, do not measure up.

Chapter 3 reports the results of a quantitative content analysis of the news coverage of Hurricane Katrina. The goal was to examine the news for patterns of framing

choices that represent the three social science theories about racial attitudes: symbolic racism, prejudice as group position, and the politics-centered approach. An extensive codebook was developed requiring many subjective judgments by the coders. The coding scheme sought to explore the specific elements of the theories with the goals of a) distinguishing amongst them and b) determining if patterns reflective of one theory occurred more frequently than patterns reflective of the other theories. When the measures for the study turned out to be unreliable, a second coding scheme was developed with more modest goals that looked at more manifest content. The results of this second content analysis are presented.

Chapter 4 takes the work of the previous chapters one step further and tests the impact of the four news frames (i.e., group position, symbolic racism, politics-centered, and whiteness) on policy preferences of a group of White participants. I argue that under different conditions different theories may be more plausible and affect public policy preferences in predictable ways. A second part of the experiment looks at how manipulating the race of the subject in the news story affects polity preferences within that theoretical frame.

Finally, Chapter 5 connects the previous chapters and discusses the knowledge gained from this dissertation. Further, the conclusion describes future work that will augment the results of this dissertation. The chapter will also address the decision to focus on White participants and propose ways for analyzing the findings of this dissertation with other groups.

<div align="center">Conclusion</div>

As a White woman who came of age in the late 1960s/early 1970s, I resisted seeing the world in terms of people's color–either my own or that of others–believing in the importance of a color-blind society; such myopia enabled me, like most White people, to live a life of unexamined racial privilege. When I did see color, it was certainly not in terms of power, a state that Frankenberg (1993) called color- and power-evasiveness. By recognizing how White identity is socially constructed through historical amnesia and mis-remembering, it becomes possible to envision a different and more just world (McPherson, 2007).

The results of this dissertation matter not because they will provide a magic solution to racial inequality in the United States but rather for two instrumental reasons if equality is our ultimate goal. First, increased knowledge about the impact of media frames on policy preferences, particularly among White people, improves the possibility of informed decision-making as opposed to conjecture and supposition as the basis for policy judgments (Bobo & Tuan, 2006, p. ix). Such knowledge will improve our ability to make decisions that lessen ongoing racial inequality and ultimately ensure the future of our democracy. Second, and beyond such practical applications, this body of work will increase theoretical knowledge and understanding in the areas of media and race that will provide a foundation for additional empirical work.

Table 1.1. Dimensions of Contact: Symbolic Racism, Group Position & Politics-Centered

	Symbolic Racism	Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position	The Politics-centered Approach
Stereotypes	Yes	Yes	No
Negative Affect	Yes	Yes	No
Threat	No	Yes	No
Values	Yes	No	Yes

Table 1.2. Dimensions of Contact: Symbolic Racism, Group Position, Politics-Centered

& Whiteness

	Symbolic Racism	Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position	The Politics-centered Approach	Whiteness Studies
Stereotypes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Negative Affect	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Threat	No	Yes	No	Yes
Values	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

Chapter 2

Race in the Floodwaters:
A Textual Analysis of Whiteness in Television News
Coverage of Hurricane Katrina

Television news plays a powerful role in providing information about the world to

those who choose to view it. Television coverage brought the Hurricane Katrina disaster

into people's homes. The drama unfolded over the course of days and weeks as the storm

struck southern Florida, crossed the Gulf of Mexico, and wreaked havoc along the Gulf

Coast. Much criticism was leveled at the government over its response and at the media

over its coverage. Spike Lee's "When the Levees Broke: A Requiem in Four Acts" offers

a nuanced, human telling of the disaster that differs from what most Americans saw on

their television screens. The point here is not simply to offer more general criticism of

media work. Instead, I use the coverage of the disaster to demonstrate how a particular

theory about White racial attitudes is reinforced through the framing of the television

news stories about the disaster. Framing is one of the ways that media distribute and

reinforce racial power (Entman, 2007).

The study of whiteness explores how White people can fail to see their own color

and its related privilege even while they benefit from the historical and institutional

arrangements that perpetuate White privilege (Harris, 1996; Lipsitz, 1998; Roediger,

1991). Television news media in particular reinforce the "dynamic of whiteness," a

relationship of power in which Whites are generally constructed with positive

characteristics (e.g., as law-abiding, normal, and determined) and Blacks are generally

37

constructed with the opposite, negative characteristics (e.g., lawless, deviant, and helpless) (Headley, 2004, p. 99; Mellinger, 2003, n. 8, p. 148). The constructions work together to establish what it means to be White or Black (Dyer, 1988, 1997). Television is important in this construction because it is a primary place of learning and understanding for Americans about who is a citizen and what constitutes citizenship, especially cultural citizenship (Miller, 2007). Ultimately, television helps to construct our understandings about race (Entman & Rojecki, 2000).

My goal in this chapter is to build on the work that examines whiteness in visual entertainment media and expand the analysis to mainstream television news, an area where whiteness has not been explored. It is not the intentional work of media organizations that furthers whiteness and reaffirms our racial hierarchy where Whites remain dominant, though there may be those who hold such motivations. Rather, whiteness is normalized through framing according to standard news norms, combined with an institutional framework that does not promote reporting that is historically situated. Television news perpetuates the sense that Whites are the standard against which non-Whites in general, and Blacks in particular, are held.

My analysis reveals that Whites are generally presented in the news media as the norm, as law-abiding citizens, and hard-working, determined individuals. These three themes–White normalcy, law and order, and White determination–strike at the heart of dominant constructions of what it means to be White in the United States. The themes are constructed through the words and visual imagery of Whites and Blacks. First, there is the theme of White normalcy, a sense of "we-ness," humanness or humanity, which is contrasted to the alleged or implied deviance of Blackness. Second, the theme of law and

order permeates the stories with Whites as law-abiding and law-fearing citizens and Blacks as looters and criminals. Finally, White determination establishes the traditional American value of individualism. Whites are portrayed as working hard for their success, purportedly without help. In contrast, Blacks are portrayed as lazy, helpless, and dependent, especially on the government. Four stories exemplify how the news media function to convey whiteness; these stories were selected for the clarity with which they articulate the themes and the various ways that whiteness is communicated.

As I undertake this work, I recognize that I am perpetuating the imbalance in the literature that focuses on Whites and Blacks to the exclusion of other racial and ethnic groups. However, it is my hope to use this basic analysis to lay a foundation from which to launch additional analyses that move beyond a Black/White binary. Before turning to the textual analysis, I first present a brief overview of scholars' work on whiteness and mass media.

<div align="center">Whiteness and Mass Media</div>

The media play a crucial role in developing the meaning of race and in developing our understanding of whiteness as well as blackness and "otherness." Cultural theorist Stuart Hall writes that "the media construct for us a definition of what *race* is, what meaning the imagery of race carries, and what the 'problem of race' is understood to be" and provide the place where ideas about race are "articulated, worked on, transformed, and elaborated" (Hall, 1981, p. 35). Omi and Winant (1994) call such workings racial projects that "connect what race *means* in a particular discursive practice and the ways in which social structures and individual experiences are racially *organized*, based upon that meaning" (emphasis original, p. 56). Racial projects are dynamic and interact with one

another to become racial formation, "the process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed and destroyed" (Omi & Winant, 1994, p. 54). The media provide ongoing space for portraying, constructing, and changing representations of race, including what it means to be White, even if racial formation is not an explicit or understood goal.

Developing dichotomous poles helps to communicate meaning by illustrating what something is not (Branston & Stafford, 2003). Thus, the meaning of White identity is dependent on the existence of Blackness (and otherness). While meaning may be established through binary oppositions, the relationship between White and Black is lop-sided and contains unequal dimensions of power. Frankenberg (1993) explains, "This coconstruction is, however, fundamentally asymmetrical, for the term 'Whiteness' signals the production and reproduction of dominance rather than subordination, normativity rather than marginality, and privilege rather than disadvantage" (p. 236). In simplest terms, whiteness is dominance, normativity, and privilege, and these elements converge into power. Yet, whiteness must not be essentialized or treated as a monolithic whole because geographic and class exceptions exist, as evidenced by such derogatory terms as "White trash" and "rednecks." At the same time it is important to recognize that whiteness is mutable and has changing boundaries as illustrated by the groups that were once *not* considered White but then became White, such as the Irish or Jewish people (Brodkin, 1998; Ignatiev, 1995).

Whiteness studies grew out of the work of critical race theory that originated in the 1970s by Derrick Bell and others (Squires, 2007; Taylor, 1998). Critical race theory focused on the lack of progress in the post-civil rights era. The basic argument is that

traditional legal discourse about racial matters perpetuates White power and privilege because civil rights remedies that threatened White status could not be legally sustained. According to this theory, Black progress can only occur when it does not threaten White interests. Therefore, progress occurs only when there is a convergence between White interests and Black interests (Bell, 2000). A key component of critical race theory is the belief that White racism is a normal, everyday practice, embedded in the institutional fabric of our country and unrecognized by most White Americans. The advantages conferred by White identity result in a sense that there is value to being White (Harris, 1996; Lipsitz, 1998; Roediger, 1991). In other words, whiteness is a social identity that results in economic, educational, social, and cultural privilege (Rasmussen, Klinenberg, Nexica, & Wray, 2001).

Film analysis provided one of the first forays into examining the role of the media and the concept of whiteness as a socially constructed category reflecting a societal norm. In his film analysis Dyer (1988, 1997) sets forth characteristics of whiteness and blackness: Whites are seen as embodying intelligence, order, rationality, civility, power, control (both physical and emotional), aesthetic refinement, and religiosity, and Blacks are seen as unintelligent, disorderly, child-like, powerless, lacking control, uncouth, and representing a lack of humanity. A wide body of social science research has found that these characteristics have become stereotypes that convey a sense of negative affect; e.g., Blacks as criminals or welfare dependents (Dixon & Linz, 2000a, 2000b; Entman, 1990, 1992; Gilens, 1999). Using contrasts between Whites as intelligent, rational, and orderly/law-abiding and Blacks as unintelligent or less intelligent, irrational or emotional,

and lawless tends to reinforce the sense that the non-dominant groups are different and that the dominant group, the norm, embodies the way it is to be human.

Other work has looked at contemporary film as a site to socially produce, maintain, and construct White identity (Madison, 1999; Shome, 2000; Tierney, 2006). Shome (2000) argues that Whites are generally taught about racism as something that puts others at a disadvantage, but not about their own White privilege that resulted from the disadvantage suffered by others. This sense of normality appears in the accepted values of individualism and meritocracy, values that disguise the systems that produced and maintain White privilege. Madison (1999) argues that the "anti-racist-White-hero-films" reproduce White supremacy by defining it as something distant, extreme, and blatant. These films also give agency to the White perspective and voice in contrast to Blacks who are seen "largely from the outside through the eyes of the 'White' hero or heroine" (Madison, 1999, p. 407). Tierney (2006) examines the strategic rhetoric of whiteness as a means for rationalizing the cultural appropriation of "others."

While analyses of popular films have provided important insight into how entertainment media has functioned to reproduce and maintain whiteness, the same process has not been examined as carefully within the news media. However, work is beginning to emerge. One study found that news coverage of the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal described "Black support" for President Clinton but did not similarly name "White support" (Brooks & Rada, 2002). Such omissions and non-naming contribute to the sense of White as the norm.

A second exception to the lack of research into whiteness and news is scholarship on the framing of news stories about abuse of affirmative action policies by Whites in the

Boston Fire Department who claimed Black and Hispanic identities. Squires (2007) argues that the analysis of affirmative action frames provides insight into how the news media furthers affirmative action as a Black/White issue in ways that do not challenge or discuss White privilege and institutional racism. The stories were generally framed as erratic instances of abuse and corruption within bureaucracies that allowed the frauds to slip through the system. Generally, reporters did not address White privilege and did not link this case to other similar cases of affirmative action abuse by Whites. By omitting the linkages to other cases, the brothers are presented as individual wrongdoers, and this presentation then obscures the idea of White group privilege or structural advantage.

In summary, whiteness must be understood as a social construct that is formed through communication (Nakayama & Martin, 1999). Whiteness derives power from its discursive construction as the normal way of being, thinking, and doing. Through its normalcy, whiteness remains largely invisible to most White people most of the time. This lack of knowing masks a complicity with the institutions that have created and maintained a racial hierarchy (Harris, 1996; Roman, 1997). I argue that the news media are a major part of the institutional framework that perpetuates and reinforces White dominance by representing and perpetuating whiteness as normalcy.

This chapter builds on the preceding work but also fills a void in whiteness scholarship by looking specifically at television news coverage. Before examining the news coverage of Hurricane Katrina, I first offer a brief chronology of the storm.

Hurricane Katrina

On Thursday, August 25, 2005 Hurricane Katrina struck land as a Category 1 storm in a populated area of southern Florida. The hurricane turned south and then southwest through the Everglades and the Gulf of Mexico. Over the next several days the storm became larger in area with more powerful winds, eventually reaching Category 5 status. As the news media sought to describe the enormity of the potential impact on the Gulf Coast states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and the panhandle of Florida, the viewer heard and saw other large hurricanes from the past and their damage, e.g., Andrew, Camille, Betsy. The great fear was that Hurricane Katrina would arrive as a Category 5 storm and directly hit the City of New Orleans, a metropolitan area of 1.2 million people that sits below sea level and is protected by a series of levees. A storm of such magnitude had not struck the continental United States since Hurricane Andrew in 1992, let alone directly hit a city that sits below sea level.[1]

On Saturday, August 27, 2005 Governor Kathleen Blanco of Louisiana urged a voluntary evacuation of the City of New Orleans, and Mayor Ray Nagin declared a state of emergency in the city. At that time the storm was a Category 3, but overnight the storm grew to Category 5 proportions. On Sunday morning, Mayor Nagin announced a mandatory evacuation. However, many poor residents, who were mostly Black, did not have transportation. The Superdome was opened as a shelter of last resort and eventually the Convention Center was also opened. The news kept the viewer apprised of the projected path of the storm and the clogged highways.

On Monday, August 29, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana as a Category 4 storm. Although the storm did not directly hit New Orleans, the geographic

---

[1] Other major hurricanes include: the Labor Day Hurricane of 1935, Hurricane Camille 1999, and Hurricane Charlie in 2004, though the later was only Category 4. The deadliest hurricane was the Galveston Hurricane of 1900 where more than 8,000 people died.

size of the storm combined with the high winds wreaked havoc there and across the Gulf Coast. The City of New Orleans mostly survived the winds; the primary damage came from the floodwaters. The flooding began at 8:00 am as the Industrial Canal was breached, and by 9:00 am the Lower Ninth Ward of New Orleans was under 6-8 feet of water. By 11:00 am neighboring St. Bernard parish was under 10 feet of water, submerging many houses. As the day progressed breaches were also confirmed at the London Street Canal.. President Bush declared national disaster status for Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.

With this chronology in mind, I turn now to my analysis of the television coverage of the aftermath. I begin with a section on my specific methods and then turn to the analysis that will reveal how news media convey and perpetuate the sense of White normalcy and Black deviance.

Method

To accomplish my work I conducted an in-depth textual analysis of the television news coverage of Hurricane Katrina. I watched all the stories about Hurricane Katrina on CNN, ABC, NBC, and FOX from two days before the storm struck land to a week into the crisis (August 27, 2005 – September 8, 2005). The recordings of the broadcasts were obtained from the Vanderbilt Archives through the Katrina News Project at the University of Michigan. I watched all stories at least twice, and each story presented here was viewed repeatedly over the course over the course of days, weeks, and months. During the first two viewings of all the stories, I took notes about the content of the stories, the use of language, the choice of visuals, and the juxtaposition of visuals and words. I looked at the race of the people chosen for sound bites and the context in which

they appeared on camera. I considered the context of the specific story and the assumptions that underlay its choice. From this process I first began to identity dominate patterns and themes. I then selected a group of stories that seemed to offer the clearest illustration of how the media perpetuates whiteness, and four are presented here.

To delve more deeply into the meaning in these stories, I developed a series of 15 questions to use as guidelines to consider as I watched. (The questions appear in Appendix A.) In answering the questions I began to identify how certain stories reinforced whiteness and to assess the patterns and themes in the frames. Focusing closely on the juxtaposition of image and language for those stories, I then created an annotated transcript indicating the speaker, the words, and the visual(s) on the screen when the words were spoken.[2] This work entailed repeated viewings of the same segments in order to be as accurate as possible. It is only through such an iterative viewing process that we can begin to unpack and itemize how racial hierarchies are naturalized through journalistic routines that, when slowed down and visually analyzed, can be exposed as affirming and reaffirming White normativity. To be sure that no key stories were overlooked, I went back again and annotated all the stories from August 29 – September 8, 2005. (A sample annotated transcript is attached as Appendix B.) To test the validity of my findings I conducted member-checking sessions with colleagues and presented findings for feedback at professional conferences.

Whiteness in Television News Coverage

---

[2] The annotated transcript began as an excel spreadsheet with separate columns for anchor comments, time on screen, reporter words, visual imagery, time the visual appears on screen, and comments. Unfortunately, the spreadsheet became so wide that when printed it was first simply cumbersome and then when the print was reduced to fit on fewer pages, it became difficult to read. The more successful annotated transcript format was created in word and captures the same information but in three columns. That sample appears in the Appendix.

Four stories are offered here as exemplars of the potential for communicating whiteness as the norm through television news coverage. In presenting the analysis I demonstrate how the news coverage of Hurricane Katrina helped to perpetuate the racial hierarchy in the United States in which Whites are the dominant group and others, particularly Blacks, are not. The media accomplish this task through imagery and language that maintains and reinforces White normativity. Imagery and language work both separately and together to do this work. Two of the stories are taken from the same CNN news program on Tuesday, August 30, 2005, the day after the hurricane made landfall in Louisiana. The other two stories are taken from broadcasts roughly one week later, one on CNN on Wednesday, September 7, and another on NBC on Thursday, September 8. In the telling of the news of Hurricane Katrina, three themes appear and reappear: law and order, White normalcy, and White determination. The stories offer a coherent perspective on the way in which the news functions to convey whiteness. I begin each section by summarizing the story and then analyzing it as I connect what is happening in the story to the themes.

Story One: CNN, Tuesday, August 30, 2005

The first story was aired by CNN on August 30th at 9 pm EST, the day after the hurricane made landfall in Louisiana, the day after the levees were breached, the day Governor Blanco of Louisiana ordered the city of New Orleans to be evacuated, including the Superdome, and the day that it was realized that the breached levees could not be plugged. The story is Aaron Brown's roughly six-minute overview of the situation along the Gulf Coast. Although Brown anchors the entire two-hour program, in this story he also serves as the reporter. The story contains seven sound bites with six different

people. Three are of White governors: two with Governor Kathleen Blanco of Louisiana and one with Governor Haley Barbour of Mississippi. The fact that the governors are White is not surprising because until the 2006 election of Deval Patrick as Governor of Massachusetts only one other Black person, Douglas Wilder of Virginia, had been elected a state governor. The remaining four sound bites are of people on the street and are equally divided in terms of race and gender; there is a White man, a Black man, a Black woman, and a White woman.

The story opens the program, and lead stories are generally deemed the most important by the producers and are expected to attract the attention of the viewers, often affecting perceptions about the importance of an issue (Gans, 1979; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). In this opening story, all three themes are evident in the visual imagery and language choices; that is, the segment stresses law and order, presumes White normalcy, and emphasizes White determination. The themes are expressed by contrasting Whites and Blacks in a variety of ways.

Two of the themes are introduced in the first minute: law and order and White normalcy. Aaron Brown, a White male, is the anchor of a two-hour show from a major media institution, CNN. Although CNN is headquartered in Atlanta, Brown sits behind a desk in New York City, as evidenced by the words "live" and "New York" that appear intermittently at the top of the screen. Brown wears a suit and tie, a symbol of upper middleclass, white-collar status. Of course, anchors are typically White males who wear suits, but with such a major story as this one, especially given the victims and their portrayal, Brown's whiteness stands out. Brown embodies the characteristics Dyer

associates with whiteness: intelligence, order, civility, and rationality. Brown exudes authority.

In the first minute and 14 seconds, Brown explicitly brings in the theme of law and order with his comments about "the sort of disaster humans cause," "looting and lawlessness," "desperate," "unsafe," and "overwhelming…the ability of police to keep order," and he concludes, "It is everything we feared." The complete quote is:

> Good evening again, everyone. We said as we went off the air last night, we felt certain today was going to be worse along the Gulf Coast. It has been worse, much worse. Hurricane Katrina, now a mere tropical depression over the State of Tennessee, but the disaster it left behind grows by the hour. *It is not simply a natural disaster tonight. It is becoming the sort of disaster humans cause. There is looting and lawlessness, overwhelming in some places the ability of police to keep order. The more we see tonight, the more difficult, the more unsafe, the more desperate things appear.* When dawn broke today the scope of the devastation across three states became far clearer. In parts of Mississippi entire neighborhoods destroyed. In New Orleans a major breach in a levee overnight sent more water pouring into an already flooded city. Efforts to fix it have failed, and the water is expected to begin rising rapidly yet again. Residents are being urged to find higher ground as soon as possible, to get out. It's now a race against time to find survivors. Where to take them is the problem, a huge problem. We have a better view of the wide-shot than we did 24 hours ago, and it is everything we feared. [emphasis added]

Brown begins the discussion of problems by noting, "It is not simply a natural disaster."

For the seventeen seconds that follow the visuals are four different scenes run together: 1)

three African Americans carrying large White plastic bags as they climb over debris; 2)

young African American boys coming out of a store, two carrying plastic bags; 3) three

African American youth running, two carrying clothes, one grinning and pulling up his

pants as he runs; and 4) three figures with clothes and plastic bags walking by a dumpster

(Sequence A). The italicized words in the quote are what Brown is saying as the images

appear. The implication is that these images in Sequence A are of looting because they

coincide with Brown's language, and certainly the imagery is consistent with the

everyday understanding of the meaning of looting. The images fit with the stereotype of

Blacks as criminals. In terms of binary oppositions and meaning-making, the Black men

are being disorderly, even lawless, in contrast to the calm, order, and authority of the

reporter. The viewer sees images of Black people, images that coincide with Dyer's ideas

about Blacks as disordered and the stereotype of Blacks as criminals.

In this opening segment Brown also uses the term "we" when he says, "It is

everything we feared." The use of "we" leaves open who is included in the term. Are

"we" law-abiding, White citizens? While Brown would most likely argue "no," that the

"we" refers to Americans in general, including the residents of New Orleans and the Gulf

Coast, the imagery and language in the story dichotomize Whites and Blacks. The images

and language do not suggest a sense of "we" being all Americans. Instead, the contrast

between White and Black supports the idea that Brown's "we" are White Americans;

"we" are afraid of what Blacks will do. "We" are the norm against which others are

measured.

About two minutes into the story, and after two sound bites from Governor Kathleen Blanco about moving people into the Superdome, the theme of law and order is explicitly restated. Brown says, "In the midst of it all, something approaching anarchy. Looting is going on. The police seem unable to stop it." The viewer does not see White looters or Black figures of authority. The visuals that appear during this eight-second segment by Brown are: 1) a Black woman carrying three packages that appear to be diapers and using them to block herself from the camera; 2) Black people streaming out of the door of what appears to be a store, some carrying things (though the viewer does not see a sign or inside the store); and 3) the back of the head of a man standing in front of the door watching (Sequence B). Brown calls it "something approaching anarchy." One might question if taking diapers is anarchy or survival. There is no suggestion of sympathy for the woman carrying the diapers.

Again the viewer has the contrast between the rationality, order, and authority of Brown in opposition to the "lawlessness" of the people. There is something disproportionate about Brown's position and word choice and the people and actions in the visuals. This disproportionateness echoes the aspect of asymmetrical power that Frankenberg argues is part of whiteness and blackness. The word "anarchy" combined with the visuals also reinforces the stereotype of Blacks as disorderly, and possibly as criminals. Of course, one would not expect an anchor or reporter to be disorderly or lawless, but the key is the one-way contrast between White and Black.

Whiteness continues to be reinforced as the third theme of White determination enters into the story, and the theme of law and order temporarily disappears. White normalcy is reinforced and White determination is introduced through the use of the four

sound bites of everyday people. Here we see meaning being conveyed through the creation of opposing poles, the negative stereotypes of Black people in juxtaposition to relatively positive representations of White people. I will describe and analyze each sound bite individually and then address them jointly.

The White man appears first. He is clean and calm and stands alone in front of an apparently pleasant-looking—though somewhat damaged—house. He appears on the screen for roughly 13 seconds in a close-up view and expresses gratitude. He says, "We were sitting there in the storm. We did not even know, have any idea of the destruction going around us. When we got out and saw the destruction, we just feel so blessed and thank God we're alive." The White man conveys many of the characteristics of whiteness that were also seen with Brown (i.e., calmness, order, rationality, and self-control), but here the element of religiosity is added. The White man has a soul; he is human. He also conveys a sense of White innocence; he did not know the extent of the destruction and was not concerned. By appearing first the White man may set the stage for what is important and what is the norm.

Seventeen seconds later—after some aerial footage of flooded houses, the airport, highways, people pushing a shopping cart of things, an aerial view of the flooded downtown—the next sound bite comes from an African American woman. She is standing in front of an unidentifiable concrete building with another African American woman. The speaker is a large woman, wearing a white shapeless t-shirt. She speaks in a flat voice:

Twin spans are down. The bridges are down. There is no electricity. Phone lines are down. Cellular phone lines are down. There is no way of us getting in contact

with any of our families, friends, anybody that's left behind. Out of those

casualties, we don't know who's hurt, if they are related to us or what. We just

can't. We're gonna be here whether we like it or not because we can't take any

road home. There's trees. The causeway is no more. It's gone.

She appears on camera for roughly 26 seconds and frequently shakes her head back and

forth no. Although her voice is calm, almost emotionless, the words that she uses express

a lack of control over her life, a sense of helplessness in the wake of the devastation. It is

the Black woman who conveys the chaotic state of affairs, the collapse of the city's

infrastructure. The woman embodies Black helplessness, a lack of control. The second

woman shakes her head back and forth, conveying negativity and agreement with the dire

situation that exists in New Orleans. The Black women differ markedly both in

appearance and words from the White man who has expressed thanksgiving for being

alive.

After 15 seconds of viewing a flooded sign, submerged cars, and people climbing

through debris in Mississippi, an African American man is shown on camera for roughly

49 seconds. He is identified as Hardy Jackson. He is dressed in a baggy athletic t-shirt.

Jackson appears distraught, and his voice suggests that he is on the verge of tears. He

talks about rising flood waters in his house, trying to hang onto his wife in the water, and

ultimately losing her. With a cracking voice he ends by saying, "I am lost. That's all I

had. That's all I had." The story is tragic, and the unidentified White female reporter

becomes emotional as she asks Jackson questions about losing his wife. At the end of the

segment we see a boy leaning against Jackson, and Jackson has his arm around him. They

cling together. Jackson has been identified by name which indicates a measure of respect

and suggests his humanity. Jackson is also counter-stereotypical in that he is a Black family man. At the same time, however, Jackson is stereotypical in that he is needy (even pitiable), dependent, and exhibits a lack of control both physically and emotionally. While naming Jackson and representing him as a family man complicates the portrayal of Blackness, Jackson is also seen as unable to take care of his family, which plays into the idea of Black male inadequacy (Moynihan, 1965). Jackson embodies many of the characteristics of Blackness. He seems to be the polar opposite of the White man in the first sound bite, though the White man is unnamed.

The news story ends with an unidentified White woman in a green blouse saying, "Because I am a deep Christian, I, I thought, we're, at least we are alive. That's the important thing. In this part of the world, we are very valiant people, and we do endure." She appears on screen for ten seconds as the closing visual of the story. She is clean and her blouse appears ironed. She exhibits calm, control, rationality, and again religiosity. She has a soul. She is expressing an individualistic and independent value, and she does not seem to be asking for help. Her words and image contrast provide a sharp contrast to the words and images of the Black man and the Black women.

Considering the sound bites collectively, the contrasts between the White and Black representations in the story are vivid. The portrayals of the two Black people are stereotypical. The African American woman is physically stereotypical, and although her voice is calm, her litany of the things that have gone wrong suggest complaints and helplessness. The Black man is shown not only as helpless but also as almost child-like in his grief and vulnerability. Both convey the need for help, though the man is more emotional and specific.

54

The two White figures stand in stark contrast to the two Black figures. Both the White man and the White woman express thanksgiving for having survived the storm. They both make references to God (the man) and Christ (the woman with reference to being a deep Christian). They are not complaining, and they do not suggest helplessness. The White woman takes it a step further and invokes individualism and personal strength when she says, "In this part of the world, we are very valiant people, and we do endure." Her use of the collective word "we" and the reference to "this part of the world" might be viewed as racially ambiguous, but in this story her image of strength and calm does not match the images of the two Black speakers. The Black man is needy and dependent. Although the African American woman speaks calmly, her words and the negative shaking of her head do not convey strength. Additionally, the clothing differences between the White and Black women (a green blouse versus a shapeless White t-shirt) also communicate difference, not "we-ness." The White woman's sense of calm, rationality, and order matches that of the White male speaker and the White reporter. The sound bites are structured such that we see White normalcy at the beginning and at the end.

Concluding the story, Brown echoes part of the White woman's words, "Well, they have plenty to endure tonight." By repeating the word "endure," Brown reinforces and supports what she has said. At the same time Brown differentiates himself from the people in the story by using the term "they." Unlike the opening where he talked about "we," he now distances himself from the people in the story, or at least from some people.

The themes of law and order and White determination appear at different points in the story, and the theme of White normalcy moves throughout the piece. Of the roughly six minutes and ten seconds that the story runs, the African Americans in these sound bites are on-camera for one minute and ten seconds, and the "looting" sequences are seen for two minutes and two seconds. In other words, slightly more than half of the story (three minutes and twelve seconds) has stereotypical representations of Black people in contrast to the images of White people who are the anchor/reporter, the governors, and everyday people. Thus, the persistence of the stereotypes of Blacks as criminals, as deviant from white, law-abiding citizens, is perpetuated. These portrayals of Blacks and Whites interact to create the sense that the only reasonable, rational place from which to speak is White. The next story will similarly utilize these themes, but in a somewhat different way than occurred in the first story.

Story Two: CNN, Tuesday, August 30, 2005

The second story immediately follows the lead story; there is no commercial break. Aaron Brown talks with a female CNN reporter, Adaora Udoji. The story is slightly longer than the opening story, running 6 minutes and 49 seconds (as opposed to 6 minutes, 10 seconds). Udoji is reporting via phone and appears in headshots against a map of Louisiana; the viewer does not see her live on camera. The theme of law and order is the largest part of the story in that Brown asks Udoji specific questions about crime and safety. Udoji has not seen a lot of crime because she has not seen a lot of people. Regardless, the viewer sees Black people as the "looting" sequences from the first story are repeated and reinforce the sense of Blacks as criminals or threats to the social order. Brown is the only White person we see. Udoji is racially ambiguous on the

television screen with light skin but an unusual name.[3] I will now more specifically show how the theme of law and order is the explicit focus by Brown, and how this focus overlaps with White normalcy.

Brown begins by asking Udoji, "I guess the question, Adaora, is how lawless is New Orleans tonight?" Brown has explicitly expressed concern about crime and brought in the theme of law and order. Two things happen with the visuals as Udoji replies. First, the viewer sees a map of Louisiana with a headshot photo of Udoji as she responds, "I think, Aaron, that the police are trying to find that out." She describes "hundreds and hundreds of people who are just sitting on the side of the highway." She says, "They have absolutely no where to go…the center of the city is flooded." She is discussing people who are stranded in the city.

Then, as Udoji discusses these people who have nowhere to go, the visual switches to three scenes of African American people on the street: 1) two people are struggling to free a loaded shopping cart, and eventually one person breaks into a run with the cart; 2) people are seen going into a building; and 3) people are seen picking things up from the street (Sequence C.) For first twenty seconds Udoji is describing human misery, the plight of the people who have nowhere to go. She is not talking about looting or any form of lawlessness, but the visual is of disorder and suggestive of looting. The disconnection between words and images is striking. Udoji goes on to talk about "rescuing hundreds of people," and the imagery is of prisoners sitting on the bridge. Then

---

[3] To date I have not discovered Udoji's race or ethnicity. In the photo she has her hair pulled back tightly and as noted above appears light-skinned. Of course, trying to discern race from physical characteristics is rather ludicrous, though it is often how people assess one another's race. Udoji is from Dearborn, Michigan, and worked as an international correspondent in the Middle East. She may be Arab American, but she is presumably not a practicing Muslim as she was married in a Unitarian Church. She has a BA from the University of Michigan in political science and sociology and a law degree from UCLA. She left CNN in April 2006 to go to Court TV News.

as the third part of the Sequence C appears and runs for roughly another twenty seconds, Udoji addresses lawlessness in language that is less emotional and more low-key than the terms Brown used in the first story. Udoji says,

We have also talked to some police along the way who have told us late in the evening there was some looting along one of the main streets downtown, which is Canal Street. They also said there were several shootings in and around the area of the Superdome, not at the Superdome, but in and around that area. So they were very concerned.

Whereas Brown describes the situation as desperate and lawless, Udoji has spoken with police who say there is "some" looting, "several shootings" and that they were "very concerned." Udoji's response does not convey threat in the same degree as Brown; that is, something may be going on but she is not describing it as desperate or lawless. She goes on to talk about rescuing "hundreds of people" and the "police traveling in packs. . . to work more efficiently." The visuals shift to prisoners on the bridge and the Superdome roof. Thus while lawlessness is part of Udoji's story, the degree and tenor of her words do not match most of the imagery.

Brown re-introduces his concern about law and order and refers to an AP report in which a motel owner said, "People are just filling up garbage bags and walking off like they are Santa Claus." Brown then asks Udoji, "Is it safe to walk the streets, the dry streets, those streets that are dry—I guess in the western part of the city—in New Orleans tonight?" As Brown sets up and poses his question, an approximately 15 second repetition of Sequence A from the opening story appears.[4] This repetition reinforces the

---

[4] For the reader's convenience, Sequence A consists of the following four scenes run together: 1) three African Americans carrying large White plastic bags as they climb over debris; 2) young African American

language from Brown's previous story about looting and disorder. However, now there is a disruption between the imagery and the language as Udoji responds, "Here's the thing Aaron...we did notice, some store windows broken, but it's hard to tell if that's because of the storm itself or of people…we saw very few people." While Udoji describes her view of New Orleans (i.e., some broken windows and few people), the viewer sees a replay of "looting." Udoji's testimony does not verify the rumors of unsafe, crime-filled streets.

As Udoji speaks, Sequence A repeats again in this story, even though the footage being shown does not support or connect with what Udoji is reporting. She has said that she saw few people. Further, after a ten-second interlude of a headshot of Udoji and the map of Louisiana, Sequence B[5] from the first story reappears onscreen. Then Sequence A makes its third complete appearance in this story and is immediately partially repeated. This B/A/partial A loop runs for a little over 45-seconds. Brown's question and the choice of images repeat the idea of a threat to the social order, of crime and disorder, though the reporter's words do not. She says that she does not know and that the broken windows could be from the storm because she saw very few people. The visuals answer the questions one way and the reporter another. In the entire 6 minutes and 49 seconds of this story, scenes of disorder or looting appear for just over 2 minutes. Thus, roughly 30 percent of the imagery is of looting, though the reporter is not talking about widespread looting. The imagery is reinforcing the theme of law and order with the imagery of Blacks being lawless and disorderly, of Blacks as criminals.

---

boys coming out of a store, two carrying plastic bags; 3) three African American youth running, two with clothes, one grinning and pulling up his pants as he runs; and 4) three figures with clothes and plastic bags walking by a dumpster

[5] Sequence B consists of the following: 1) a Black woman carrying three packages that appear to be diapers and using them to block herself from the camera; 2) Black people streaming out of the door of what appears to be a store, some carrying things (though the viewer does not see a sign or inside the store); and 3) the back of the head of a man standing in front of the door watching

Brown brings in law and order again with Udoji, though here the visuals are not suggestive of the law and order theme but rather read more neutrally. The viewer sees helicopters and rescues, empty houses and cars in the flood waters, and a headshot of Udoji with the map of Louisiana. Brown speaks for about thirty seconds and concludes with a question:

> I think overwhelmed is a fair word…yesterday's confidence has given way to today's weariness, in the sense that they do not have a good handle on all of this.
>
> Is there a noticeable, on the streets, is there a noticeable National Guard presence?

Udoji's answer lasts almost a minute. She does not respond to the question about the National Guard but instead seems to pick up on the word "weariness" and returns to her original point about people "who have nowhere to go" and are feeling "a lot of confusion and angst and worry and concern and hurt and of course shock, given what's happened."

Brown calmly repeats, "Adaora, let me ask the question again. Not sure you heard me. Is there a noticeable National Guard presence?" Udoji gives a short (9 second) answer that she has heard that they are there but she has not seen them. Brown replies, "Okay. We only want you to report what you know, not what you think you know, as we often say around here." Because the viewer has heard Udoji describing what she has seen (e.g., a few people in some places and people along the highway in other places), Brown's words sound patronizing. Brown is lecturing Udoji on how to report. The White man is asserting control and authority, and the racially ambiguous woman with an "ethnic" name is being chastised. Race and gender intersect, such that the depiction of whiteness also privileges male identities.

Brown continues and asks if there is anything Udoji wants to add for the viewers "about what it is like for the people who are trying to, to get through yet another night in a city that, in fact, may be getting worse." She says, "I think that they are stunned, and I think that they are making the best." He seems to interrupt with "okay," but she continues to speak for almost another 20 seconds and returns her focus to people along the highway. She ends with "I mean they are trying to make do with what they have because the future is just so unknown." Udoji has consistently focused on the people in need.

Brown ends the segment with his reply, "Stay safe out there, okay?" Telling reporters to stay safe when they are in a dangerous situation seems appropriate. Yet something rings false in his words. It is Brown, sitting in New York, who has been emphasizing crime, and the reporter who is on the street has stated that she has seen little evidence of lawless behavior. Rather, she has seen people in need of help. Despite the words of the reporter, Brown manages to conclude the story with words that reinforce the theme of law and order.

Thus, through the extensive use of visuals and the questions presented by Brown, the theme of law and order continues in the news story, though law and order is not the main emphasis by Udoji. The viewer sees the looping of the "looting" sequences, re-iterating, again and again, the stereotype of Blacks as criminals. Through this iterative looping process notions of White authority and Black criminality are dichotomized and reinforced. This dichotomy contributes to understanding Brown as representative of Whites as normativity. The sense of difference is also perpetuated by the dissimilar perspectives of Brown and Udoji on the subject of law and order.

The first two stories were broadcast in the early days of the disaster. One might argue that the situation was not normal and thus not representative. Conversely, one might argue that because nothing of the enormity of Katrina had occurred in the United States since Hurricane Andrew economically or Hurricane Camille in intensity, the coverage was unrehearsed and tapped into authentic feelings and thoughts. I contend that the latter has greater resonance. However, even if one believes that the first few days were extraordinary, it is important to see that whiteness continues to be reinforced more than a week after the hurricane struck land in Louisiana. I turn now to two additional stories and analyze how they represent whiteness.

Story Three: CNN, September 7, 2005

This third CNN piece is an interview that Aaron Brown conducted on Wednesday, September 7, 2005 with Walter Isaacson. Brown is asking about the future of the city of New Orleans. His interviewee is a White "native son" who now heads the Aspen Institute. He was formerly a boss of Brown's at CNN as comes out in the piece, and he was also a former editor of *Time*. This interview exemplifies how whiteness functions in a news story to maintain a sense of hegemonic White normalcy even when the story does not mention race or include visuals of Black people. The interview sheds light on who is given voice and agency, both in the actual story and who is imagined or expected to be the authority to rebuild the city. The over-arching theme is White normalcy, though there is one implicit reference to law and order.

The interview runs 4 minutes and 44 seconds and for the most part consists of two "talking heads," two White men dressed in jackets and ties. Brown is in New York City, and Isaacson sits in front of a building with pillars and the words "Washington, D.C." in

the upper right corner of the screen. Similar to Brown, Isaacson embodies the establishment, an establishment in which Whites are the dominant group and largely in control of the government, corporate America, and other mainstream institutions. The two men reflect and reinforce the whiteness of one another.

The story is framed in terms of the whether the city has lost its "soul." In this sense the city is being personified. Both men acknowledge that buildings can be rebuilt, but the discussion is on whether the soul will be there.

Brown opens the interview by asking if Isaacson is "heart-broken?" Isaacson responds that he is "definitely heart-broken." He then talks about a group of expatriates that have met "to rally and help it come back." Two things occur here. Isaacson is referring to people who used to live in New Orleans as "expatriates," a term that refers to people who have left a native land or country. His use of the word in connection with an American city where he lived is distancing, suggesting foreignness or difference. Also, the viewer does not know the racial or ethnic make-up of the group of "expats" with whom he met. This detail is ambiguous, but Isaacson uses the term "we" when he talks about the group. He says that they plan to "do what we can to help it [the city of New Orleans] come back." It is not clear to whom the "we" refers or who has the authority to help revive the city. The viewer is not given any clues beyond the appearance of the two White men on the screen. Thus, based on the imagery, "we" are White men.

Later in the interview, however, Isaacson again uses the term "we," and it suggests distancing and separating one group from another. Brown asks about leadership, and Isaacson replies, "You know, that's what we talked about for the past week, those of us who love New Orleans. It's not a place where a lot of Rudy Giuliani's march forward,

take charge, role up their sleeves..." First, Isaacson explicitly says that the people who love New Orleans are the expatriates with whom he has been meeting; his choice of words discounts and ignores the many other people who love New Orleans. Second, Isaacson invokes the image of New York's Mayor Rudy Giuliani, a White man widely acknowledged as a hero on 9/11 and its aftermath. (Indeed, sufficiently so, that he entered the 2008 Republican presidential primary, though he eventually withdrew.) Additionally, prior to 9/11 Giuliani was widely recognized for his work in lessening crime in New York City, and crime is generally associated with Black people (Dixon & Linz, 2000; Entman, 2000). Although not stated in the story, Ray Nagin, the Mayor of New Orleans, is Black. The implication is that Ray Nagin is no Rudy Giuliani. Lastly, it is interesting that this group of people, who no longer live in the city, felt sufficiently empowered to be meeting to plan its future and that Brown chose to give airtime to their views but not the views of Black people and organizations; e.g., the Twenty- First Century Foundation or other Black civic groups.

Brown uses the word "soul" when he says, "rebuilding the soul of New Orleans is a complicated piece of business." Isaacson responds that buildings in the French Quarter, central business district, and warehouse district are not going to be the problem. Instead, "what's going to be the problem is re-creating the magic of the city." As he says "taking what was magical and beautiful about one of the world's greatest cities and restoring" the visual begins with a close-up of a sign that says "never closed" and then pulls back to reveal the backs of three people sitting at a bar. Two of the people are clearly White, a woman and a man, and the third is difficult to discern. He may be Black, or he may be a dark White man sitting in the shadows. Then Isaacson goes on to say, "But maybe getting

rid of some of the things, or many of the things, that were not so good about the city."
The visual here is of office buildings, clearly not the French Quarter. The viewer sees a
military vehicle go through the intersection that is mostly deserted, but then the camera
shows three men in close-up as they cross the street. One in army pants appears White,
and the other two are racially ambiguous, perhaps Latino. Isaacson then reappears on the
screen as he adds, "the sort of torn social fabric that we saw."

As they both appear on screen Brown picks up on that point and notes that over
the past week "we" have seen "abject poverty" and that he "can't image how people live
that way… In a sense is there any magic left at all?" In this way Brown distances himself
from the people who lived in New Orleans. Not only is he physically removed, but his
words reinforce that he is not one of "them." After all, it is "we" who have seen the
poverty. The viewer may wonder what about the words "living that way." The visuals of
previous coverage have shown Black people stranded on rooftops in the floodwaters,
Black people left in the Convention Center or days without food and water, and Black
people being forced to sleep in gymnasiums that have been turned into shelters. It may be
that the "that way" is meant as sympathy for the plight of the people, though the words
seem distancing.

Isaacson gives a long response (1 minute and 47 seconds) that is broken up into
three sections through the use of visuals. This response is almost a fifth of the segment. In
response to Brown's question about any magic being left in the city, Isaacson first
appears alone on camera and responds,

> Oh, I think that there's magic to the city. I think everybody who lived in that city,
> you know from various parts of the city, from the lower 9th ward to uptown, all

had a special feel for New Orleans, and I think still do. I think you saw some

social pathologies there. But you know you have segregation and racism and

problems in any major American city. I think the ones in New Orleans came to

surface because of the flood. But maybe, and—I hate using bad metaphors, and

maybe used to chide you for that as well, but you didn't do it as often—but it

might flush out some of the pathologies, it rises it to the surface, and we can say

let's take this as an opportunity to build the city where we get the social fabric

right, where we get some opportunities for all.

By naming segregation and racism as pathologies Isaacson suggests that the city is

diseased, and again the city is being personified. The city not only has a soul that it has

lost but also has a diseased body. Yet, at the same time he says that all major American

cities have these diseases. Pathologies can also be defined as deviating from normal.

Thus he is contradicting himself. On the one hand, he says that all major American cities

have these problems. On the other hand, he says that these problems are indicative of a

deviation from normal. New Orleans was not normal.

Isaacson appears alone on camera until he says, "but it might *flush out* [emphasis

added] some of the pathologies." At this point the screen shows what appears to be the

causeway across Lake Pontchartrain, with broken and missing sections, stanchions

standing in the water. Water makes up the largest part of the visual. As Isaacson

continues to talk the camera gives closer shots of the broken sections, eventually moving

onto dry land and then back to a long shot of the bridge in the water.

The use of the term "flush out" and the accompanying imagery illustrate the

unconsciousness of choices that are in made in language and visuals that reinforce White

normativity and Black difference. The words and images suggest several different

metaphors. First, one might think of the metaphor of a toilet or sewer system in reference

to the problems of the city. Social pathologies will be flushed out. Most people probably

would agree that the problems were brought to the surface and to the attention of the

nation as a whole during the coverage of the crisis. However, a sewage system carries

waste away, and the user does not see what happens to it. The waste seemingly

disappears. Thus his remarks that racism and segregation (and possibly other

"pathologies") were flushed out can be interpreted as having been flushed *away*, that they

are gone, that they are no longer a problem. A large part of the imagery of the Katrina

coverage featured Black people trying to leave the city and ultimately being relocated in

Baton Rouge, in Houston, and elsewhere. The choice of a toilet/sewer system metaphor

suggests that having Black people "flushed away" is ridding the city of the problems.

They have left the city, and the problems have been flushed away. From that perspective,

the pathologies of racism and segregation, the deviations from normality, are flushed

away, presumably to leave the city "normal." It is suggestive that the visual is of the

broken causeway sitting in the water.

Another interpretation of the metaphor also seems plausible: cleansing or

purifying one's system for health reasons. The city would be cleansed and purified as the

social pathologies are flushed out. Again, the water imagery works with the metaphor.[6] It

is important, however, to recognize that my argument is not about intentional use of such

---

[6] The term "flush out" could also refer to hunting. In that case the dog flushes out the game before it is killed. Because of the imagery of the water, I am more inclined to go with the two interpretations noted in the text, recognizing that the use of metaphors is somewhat vague and open to the interpretation of the viewer/reader.

metaphors, but rather the unthinking way that White people create meanings that further their position of power.

The viewer continues to see the broken causeway in the water until Isaacson again appears alone on camera as he says the word "great,"

> We have a city that can really work and can restore the magic of being what was and will be you know one of the world's great places for great creativity, for music, for art. And one of the great [Isaacson now appearing alone] ports of the world. Something, you know, New Orleans has given a lot to the world and a lot to this nation. It's given its port, its economy. It's helped ship the grain out and ship the oil in and refined the oil. But also created jazz and created great music and created great food. And that came from a magical mix of people in the city of New Orleans. It came from the fact that you couldn't just have a homogeneous group. You had to sometimes have a [sic] very complex layers of society there. The question is: can you get a city back that can be as creative and as good--I am sure you can--and do it where you have a better education system, where you have less crime, where you have less corruption, and have a better social fabric.

What is striking here is that Isaacson appears on camera for the entire discussion of the greatness of New Orleans. Alone on the screen he speaks for 49 seconds, roughly 46% of the long segment. He almost seems to be giving a soliloquy. Although he has mentioned the need for a "magical mix of people," we do not see a mix of people, magical or not. During the discussion of jazz and music we do not see Black musicians, though they are founders, the creators of the music. Isaacson's White face is the only visual seen during this listing of the good qualities of the city of New Orleans.

Brown asks Isaacson about leadership, and both men appear on camera. As Isaacson begins to answer he is alone on camera and says, "You know, that's what we talked about for the past week, those of us who love New Orleans." Then the imagery changes to a visual of a truck clearing brush as Isaacson talks about the lack of leadership. The driver of the truck is not seen, and there are no people in the scene. It is not clear what connection, if any, this visual has to the words. Perhaps it is to indicate the lack of leadership, that there is no identifiable leader working to solve problems. There is no "Rudy Giuliani." The visual of the truck clearing brush remains on screen as Brown says, "It's good to see you." Then, however, Isaacson appears on screen as Brown says, "I confess that I thought a lot about you this week." Both men appear as Brown goes on to say, "And how you must be seeing all of this. I know how you love this city."

Both remain on screen as Isaacson replies, "Well, we love the city. We lost our house, but you know we didn't lose the soul of our city." As Isaacson says those last words, "the soul of our city," the camera view changes from the two men to the solitary figure of Isaacson. The viewer has not been told who the "we" are who love the city, but the imagery is clear. "We" are represented by Isaacson. The White expatriate male has become the personification of the soul of the city of New Orleans. Although Isaacson said earlier that people from "the lower 9th to uptown" had special feelings for their city, here Isaacson says "we didn't lose the soul of our city." As the television cameras have shown for more than a week, Black people left the city. Black people were both abandoned in their early efforts and forced to leave. The words and imagery imply that the loss of Black people does not affect the soul of the city.

Moreover, Brown, as anchor of this broadcast, has chosen to ask a former resident of the city, whether the city can restore its soul. He does not ask everyday people or current residents about the soul of the city. There appears to be an underlying assumption that this White man, a former resident of the city who refers to himself as an "expatriate," has the capacity and authority to talk about the soul of the city. In addition to giving the city this human aspect, Brown has given agency to a non-resident White man to talk about the soul of the city. More bluntly, a White man has been given the voice for all the people of New Orleans. In a city that was almost 70 percent Black, one may question the credibility and authority of a White man to be the only person in the segment to opine on the survival of the soul of the city.

Additionally, this piece generally lacks images of people, though it is framed around the idea of a soul of a city. Seventy-three percent of the story features visuals of the two White men in head shots, alone or together. Both are dressed in jackets and ties, both are *not in* New Orleans. Their White visual presence dominates the story. The viewer sees other people four times, and all are in the segment about the buildings being okay, that they "are not gonna be the problem." Those who are racially identifiable are White. First, there is a White man walking his dog in a deserted French Quarter when Isaacson is saying that the buildings in the French Quarter are okay. There are two White police officers, one leaning against a police car, and then a man walks in front of the camera such that the viewer sees his back as he moves through the camera range. His race is unclear. Isaacson is still talking about the buildings "that most people, visitors, go see" being okay. Then as noted above there are three people in the bar, two White, one ambiguous, and the language is "taking what was magical and beautiful." Finally, there

are the three people crossing the street. The language that is used as the people cross the street is "getting rid of some things that were not good." Though one appears White, the other two are racially ambiguous. Collectively, they are on screen for roughly 32 seconds (11 percent of the complete story). In two instances they present White images, and in three other instances the racial make-up is ambiguous. In no case does imagery make it clear that Black people are part of the story.

In addition to the whiteness of the visuals and choice of language, the tone of the story adds to a sense of "we" and "them." The relationship between Brown and Isaacson appears warm and friendly; they joke with one another and exchange gentle barbs. For example, Isaacson prefaces his metaphor with a smile and says that perhaps he "used to chide" Brown about bad metaphors. One does not tease or joke with strangers. The two exude a sense of camaraderie, and Brown expresses concern for how Isaacson might have felt this past week as he watched coverage of the disaster. This friendly relationship can either work to exclude others or include them into the circle of friendship. I return to the use of the word "we." Nowhere in the piece is there any inclusion of people of color; at most there are four places where race is ambiguous. When the term "we" is used, it explicitly refers to a group of expatriates of the city. In another instance Brown uses "we" to distance himself from the people of New Orleans because he cannot "imagine living like that." Thus, the "we" implied is White people, perhaps White men. This friendly relationship undercuts what is generally one of the assumed assumptions of the news; that it is factual and objective. Here Brown has moved into more of a "soft news" mode, though in general the show is based on the concept of hard news. As noted earlier in this

paper, he chastises a reporter and reminds her that "we report what we know, not what we think we know." Evidently, "we" know that the soul of New Orleans is White (and male).

Lastly, Isaacson uses the metaphor of "social fabric" three times in discussing New Orleans. The metaphor of social fabric is not negative on its face, but there is something problematic about the way it is used in the story. Isaacson is alone on screen when he first says "the sort of torn social fabric that we saw." Again, his use of the words "we saw" indicates that he, the White man, was not part of that torn social fabric. The viewer is not told exactly what the social fabric was, but the television coverage of the disaster showed large numbers of Black people needing rescue, being rescued, standing in lines outside the Superdome and the Convention Center, being disorderly. The next two times Isaacson uses the term, he does not describe it as torn. After his statement about "flushing out" pathologies, he talks about rebuilding and says, "Where we get the social fabric right." The visual imagery is of the broken causeway across Lake Pontchartrain. The imagery of Lake Pontchartrain with the use of the toilet/sewer system metaphor makes some intuitive sense, but the imagery remains on the screen as Isaacson says "where we get the social fabric right." The visual reinforces the idea of "flush out," and then we can improve the social fabric. Finally, Isaacson ends his soliloquy about the greatness of New Orleans with the words "you have a better social fabric." He is on screen alone. Calling it "social" fabric implies people, and as noted above, two White men are the dominant visual throughout the story. Although Isaacson notes the need for a mixture of people, we do not see them in the story. The viewer sees Isaacson as he says the words "better social fabric." At most the viewer sees four racially ambiguous people.

They may be White; they may not. In any event, they are on screen for a short time. The social fabric of the story is White and male.

In summary, the analysis of the Isaacson interview demonstrates how the media perpetuates White as what is the normal way to be and do. This reinforcement occurs in a story that is not explicitly about race and where no Black people appear. The visual imagery and the language perform the work together. The foundation of the story is the assumption that a White male expatriate of the city is an appropriate voice to discuss the future of the city.

To this point I have offered three analyses from CNN with Aaron Brown that exemplified how the media furthers White dominance. However, reaffirming the normality of whiteness is not specific to any one media institution, and accordingly, the next analysis will look at a news segment from the Peabody award-winning coverage by Brian Williams on NBC.

Story Four, NBC, September 8, 2005

The next subject of analysis is a story broadcast on NBC on September 8, 2005, ten days after Hurricane Katrina made landfall in New Orleans. The story is part of the half-hour news program *The Evening News with Brian Williams.* Here again we see themes of law and order, White normalcy, and White determination, though in some instances they are communicated differently and in some cases similarly.

The broadcast opens with Brian Williams in New York. Williams is a White man wearing a dark suit and tie and is seated in the NBC studio. He is no longer broadcasting from the Gulf Coast in khaki shirt and jeans. We learn in the broadcast that as recently as the previous evening he was in Louisiana, but now he has returned home. Similar to

Aaron Brown, Williams embodies whiteness through the clothes that he wears and the sense of authority and command that he evidences. The particular story is the fourth story in the opening line-up. The three preceding stories have also dealt with the aftermath of the hurricane, and they have run consecutively without commercial breaks. Each is roughly two minutes long. To provide context for the analysis of the fourth story, I first present a brief overview of the first three stories, all by White reporters.

The first story features Campbell Brown, a White female reporter who at that time also co-anchored of *Weekend Today*[7]. Her piece is on the beginning signs of rebuilding, and she uses five speakers to tell her story, two Black and three White. The story runs for roughly 2 minutes and 12 seconds. The Black people speak for approximately 6 seconds and the Whites for about 20 seconds. The first speaker is Eddie Compass, Police Superintendent of New Orleans, who says, "The boats are still out. The helicopters are still out. We're still trying to get people who want to get out." Then White store-owner Kevin Murphy speaks for about 9 seconds about his store that was damaged, and while Murphy is still on camera C. Brown says he has good insurance and will reopen someday. The segment with Murphy lasts about 14 seconds in total. An unidentified White woman working at Domino's simply asks, "Large or medium, baby?" to a mixed racial group. She is followed by an unidentified well-dressed Black woman talking to Black and White people outside a Walgreens store; she says, "You need to make sure you get your medicine today, okay?" For about 6 seconds a White woman, Bonnie Cannelli, notes that some businesses are expecting people back to work, and she wonders how they will be able to get there with the government "lock-down." Lieutenant Governor of

---

[7] Campbell Brown worked for NBC for 11 years before announcing her departure in July 07. She also substituted as Evening Anchor for Brian Williams. Brown began working at CNN in February 2008.

Louisiana, Mitch Landrieu, a White man, talks about the need for a long-term commitment from the government to rebuild. C. Brown concludes by telling the viewer that there will be a huge cost to the American taxpayer. Overall, the story portrays Blacks and Whites in a variety of roles, though it is somewhat problematic that White voices in the story are heard more than three times that of Black voices.

Williams transitions to the second story, which features David Gregory, a White male, who at the time of the broadcast worked as a NBC's White House correspondent and sometimes substituted for Matt Lauer on *The Today Show with Matt Lauer and Meredith Vieira*[8]. Williams talks about the "politics of the situation," as he passes the story to Gregory. The opening visual is of African American people in a shelter. After a few seconds, Gregory notes, "Washington rushed to pass more than $50 billion in emergency relief for Katrina victims." As he is talking the camera moves from the crowd shot to center on two African American women sitting on cots and then moves to another African American woman sitting on a cot with a baby lying in front of her. Gregory reports that the President has promised homeless evacuees, "among other benefits, an immediate payout of $2000," and as Gregory speaks these words the camera focuses on a close-up of the African American baby. Research has demonstrated that showing Black visuals with discussions of government spending policies primes negative racial attitudes (Valentino, Hutchings, & White, 2000). Additionally, showing this visual with the discussion of the government payout coincides with Gilens' (1999) work about the people who are shown most often as welfare recipients, African Americans.

---

[8] In 2008 David Gregory was promoted to host NBC's *Meet the Press* with the unexpected death of Tim Russert.

As the Gregory segment continues, the only voices heard are those of White Republicans. Gregory employs sound bites and visuals of President Bush, Vice President Cheney, First Lady Laura Bush, former First Lady Barbara Bush, and Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert. Referring to the former First Lady's comments from earlier in the week that had been called insensitive, Gregory includes a photo of Barbara Bush, the audio of her remarks, and puts the words on the screen. The viewer can both hear and read what the former First Lady said, "Everybody is so overwhelmed by the hospitality. And so many people in the arenas here were, you know, underprivileged anyway. This is, this is working very well for them." One might reasonably wonder why the comments were repeated again, but regardless of motive, the clip supports the stereotype that Black people are not hard-working but actually prefer government support or "handouts." Repeating the quote also supports the earlier visual of the African American women and the language about governmental support. Gregory does include poll results that the indicate people are unhappy with the government's response, and he also refers to the reaction of Democrats Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid. However, Pelosi and Reid are only seen, not heard, though the viewer sees *and* hears Speaker Hastert's response to the Democrats. Only White Republican elites speak in this story, though visuals of Black people appear when there is discussion of government aid.

Williams transitions to Robert Bazell, a science reporter who focuses on health in this story, which is the shortest of the three opening stories, running just under two minutes. Bazell begins by talking about relief supplies being unloaded in Mississippi and doctors from the Navy and FEMA forming strike teams and working in shelters. A White male doctor talks on screen in the shelter, and he is identified by name. A large

unidentified Black man says "been a diabetic for ten years" as a White woman wearing a stethoscope hands him a syringe. Bazell's piece ends with a White female doctor who is treating Black people at a housing project. She is also named. Dr. Gallop asks a Black toddler to say "Ahh." There are more than six African American women and children around her. Dr. Gallop responds to a question from Bazell by saying that she is paying for the supplies out of her own pocket with her "American Express." Dr. Gallop is enterprising. Bazell's inclusion of the White woman doctor treating Black families at a Biloxi housing project suggests the values of individualism and hard-work. The story also reinforces the stereotype of Blacks are helpless and dependent victims, and it is White people who rescue and help. Bazell notes that the strike teams will be there in a few days, an implicit criticism of the time that it is taking them to get into the field. While many Black people were indeed victims in the situation and needed help, the point is that news stories perpetuate this perspective without giving another view. It is the iterative telling and retelling of the stereotypical view that is of concern. In contrast, the White woman packed up her car with medical supplies to help; she just did it, to borrow the language from the well-known Nike ad/slogan.

In summary, these first three stories ran for just over 6 minutes. Three Black people spoke on camera, one of whom was identified, Eddie Compass, the Superintendent of Police. The other two spoke less than 12 words and were not identified. Ten White people spoke on camera. All were identified with the exception of the White female worker at Domino's. Five of the White people were governmental leaders or former governmental leaders. Of the non-elite five, all were presented as hard/working and/or determined. The store owner was going to reopen. He was also smart because he

had good insurance. The woman worried about being able to get to work because of the restrictions in movement. Two White people were doctors taking action and helping the victims. One was even paying for it herself. The fifth White person worked at Domino's. Although the unidentified Domino's worker did not have a prestigious job, she was working. In contrast, the unidentified Black woman outside of Walgreens may have been employee, but nothing reveals whether she is or not; her situation is ambiguous. Additionally, the viewer has heard discussion of government aid coupled with visuals of Black women sitting in a shelter, one with a baby. Additionally, the viewer heard Barbara Bush's comments about "this working well for them." The stage is set for the fourth story with Jon Seigenthaler, a White male reporter.

Williams introduces the piece by talking about people moving to other cities, and the background has the faint imagery of Black people standing in line. While it is not clear if the picture is from the Convention Center, the Superdome, or another shelter, the images of lines of Black people have been widely shown in connection with coverage of the hurricane and its aftermath. As Williams continues his introduction we see a variety of images: Williams with the faint background images of a White man in the foreground and Black woman further back; a map showing New Orleans and Baton Rouge; Williams with the faint background image of a young White woman sitting on the floor, leaning against a doorframe. As these three images appear Williams says, "…since they were forced to evacuate their homes. For example, Baton Rouge, about 90 minutes from New Orleans. Last night it took us hours to make the drive on clogged highways. They call it 'West New Orleans' these days because Baton Rouge has absorbed." Saying that Baton Rouge is becoming "West New Orleans" may be read as a mere geographic reference

relating to the fact that Baton Rouge is north and west of New Orleans, or it may be read as implying that the city is becoming more Black. After all, the portrayal of the victims of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans has largely been of Black people, and the city had a population that was almost 70 percent Black. Williams then appears on camera and introduces Seigenthaler, reporting from "the New Baton Rouge." As the viewer hears the words "the New Baton Rouge," the background changes back to the faint line of Black people that appeared on screen as Williams began the introduction. The combination of language and imagery is suggestive of the idea that something is happening to Baton Rouge: the city is becoming Black.[9]

The segment is the longest of the four stories that open the broadcast at 2 minutes and 26 seconds. The story is framed in terms of the problems being presented by the evacuees from New Orleans to the people of Baton Rouge. The story opens with the voice of Seigenthaler saying, "Gridlock in Louisiana's capitol, and its not even rush hour. Commuters say that since the storm hit traffic has become a nightmare." The image is of lines of cars on the highway. Connie Roblin, a White woman who works in a diner, then appears on camera and says, "It takes me anywhere from an hour and a half to two hours to get home. Yes, and usually it takes me about 20 minutes." The visual is then again of cars but with the focus on two police cars with sirens blaring as Seigenthaler says, "The influx of a quarter of a million evacuees has pushed Baton Rouge to its limit." In conjunction with traffic the police sirens may cue thoughts of accidents, but it is also

---

[9] According to the 2000 Census, the city of Baton Rouge was 46% White and 50% Black. In 2006 (the most recent data available), the White population of the city of Baton Rouge had decreased to 41% and the Black increased to 55%. The Parish of Baton Rouge was 56% White and 40% black in 2000. In 2006 the Parish decreased to 51% White and increased to 54.5% Black. The city decreased in total population from 227,818 in 2000 to 224,959 in 2006, and the Parish grew from 412,852 to 429,073. The bottom-line is that both the city and the parish have become more Black. (retrieved from http://factfinder.census.gov 3/4/08).

possible that following the image of Black people in Williams' introduction the sirens

may cue thoughts of crime. After all, Seigenthaler has said the situation is a nightmare

and the city is being "pushed to its limit." The language combined with the visual and

audio is suggestive of law and order, though the theme is implicit and not as explicit as

we saw in the analysis of the early stories on CNN.

The viewer next sees a second White woman, Karen Cochran, who appears to be

grocery shopping. Cochran and her challenges become the peg for telling the story. She

says, "I've never been in this store in my life that there were not eggs on the shelf."

Cochran is pushing a grocery cart, with empty shelves behind her. The camera then

shows a parking lot as Seigenthaler reports, "The parking lot at stores like Wal-Mart fills

up quickly each day." He continues, "Inside there are plenty of empty shelves," and the

camera shows a close-up of empty shelves. He introduces Cochran and the difficulties in

her life, "For long-time native Karen Cochran an ordinary shopping trip has become a

challenge." Cochran says, "I can't find trash bags, flour, sugar" as she pushes a full-

looking cart down an aisle past shelves that are not empty.

Seigenthaler continues the theme of "challenges." He comments on waiting in line

"for almost everything, including gas" as we see cars at a gas station with a White man

pumping gas. He adds, "Housing here is also limited. There are no apartments available

here to rent." Pat Wattam, a White female realtor, appears on screen and says, "And

sometimes I have to tell people that if you're not ready to buy right now today, I'll get

back to you when the things calm down." Although a tight housing market can be seen as

good for the local economy, Seigenthaler is framing it as another inconvenience as he

follows the realtor's remarks with, "It's not just the day to day inconveniences that have frustrated the people of Baton Rouge."

Now Seigenthaler explicitly brings in the law and order theme; he says, "Some are actually frightened that this sudden explosion in population will lead to an increase in crime, and that's why stores like this are selling 10 times the number of guns they sold before the storm." Seigenthaler appears on camera, first standing in front of a wall of guns and then walking in front of a display of guns. A White man, Jim McClain, the owner of Jim's Firearms, explains, "They're looking for something to protect their loved ones." Thus the story has moved from the "nightmare" of traffic, the challenges of grocery shopping, and the lack of housing to a fear of crime. Research has demonstrated that television viewers associate Black people with crime (Dixon and Linz, 2000; Entman, 1992; Entman & Rojecki, 2000). In this way, the story also invokes Black people, though we have not seen them since Williams' opening.

As a line of cars again appears on screen, Seigenthaler says, "The Baton Rouge Police Department has reportedly said there has been no increase in crime, but there is fear based on stereotyping of the evacuees." It is interesting to note that Seigenthaler qualifies the comment that there has been no increase in crime by saying "reportedly." The word suggests a possible skepticism, but Seigenthaler's word choice also makes it clear that he has not checked it out himself. One may wonder why a reporter would not check out that kind of information. After all, Seigenthaler built the story on the personal opinions of several people—the waitress, the grocery store shopper, the realtor, and the gun store owner. It would seem logical and part of routine news practices to have clarified the question of an increase in crime by talking with a police officer.

Additionally, Seigenthaler has said that the fear is "based on stereotyping of the evacuees." His words may serve to remind the viewer of the stereotype of Blacks as criminals because the viewer knows that the evacuees are mostly Black.

After the reference to stereotypes about the evacuees, the viewer sees Seigenthaler walking with an African American man who is identified as Kip Holden, the Mayor of Baton Rouge. Appearing on screen alone, wearing a suit and tie, Holden says, "Yes, there are problems we have to deal with. Yes. Are there sleepless nights? Yes, but we know that we have a resolve." Holden is on camera for a total of 12 seconds, and he speaks alone on camera for 7 seconds. In this short segment, the viewer sees a well-dressed Black man who holds a position of authority, and the viewer hears that he is dealing with problems and is committed to solving them through "resolve." As described one would think that Holden has agency in this piece. This Black man is not in polar opposition to the White figures; he possesses characteristics associated with whiteness: law-abiding, rational, and authoritative. However, this interpretation is problematic for two reasons. First, the only Black person in this story is on-camera immediately after reference to stereotypes of evacuees. One might argue that because Holden is well-dressed and an authority figure the viewer would not make the connection between stereotypes and Blacks. Second, and even more problematic, is that Seigenthaler responds to Holden's comment with "So does Karen Cochran." To repeat, Holden says that he has "resolve," and immediately Seigenthaler says, "So does Karen Cochran" as she appears on camera with her grocery cart. Seigenthaler does not question Holden about this resolve or share any further comments by Holden about meeting the challenges. Instead, through his words Seigenthaler equates the problems of the Black Mayor of Baton Rouge, a city

whose population has almost doubled in the last week, with a White woman grocery shopper. Cochran appears on camera and says, "It's very, very frustrating. But did your momma ever tell you it's better to laugh than cry? (hah, hah, hah)?" This juxtaposition of imagery and words undermines the authority of the mayor, the only Black person who appears in the actual story and the only Black voice. While at one moment the story provides Black agency, in the next moment the story undercuts that same agency.

Although Seigenthaler has undermined Holden's sense of resolve by ignoring it, Seigenthaler reinforces White resolve and determination. He responds to Cochran's advice from momma by asking if that is what she is trying to do (i.e., laugh so as not to cry), and she replies, "That's what I'm trying to do, yup." The story ends with Seigenthaler signing off as the viewer sees Cochran pushing her loaded grocery cart out the store door.

Thus in this 2-plus minute story all three themes appear. The viewer is reminded of crime with the use of the police sirens, the gun story, the reference to stereotypes, and the questionable lack of reported incidents. As noted previously, research has found that crime is associated Black people. Although the story does not discuss race *per se*, race remains a large part of the underlying story. The viewer knows that the people causing the inconveniences are Black people because a) masses of Black people have been featured for more than a week in the news stories on Hurricane Katrina and b) in case the viewer might forget or have missed that point, the visuals that introduced the story and set the context were of Black people. This unspoken knowledge about Blacks works with the visuals and comments of all the Whites in the story, who contribute to a sense of White normalcy, the way the world should be if not for the Black evacuees. Additionally,

the one Black voice is undermined and equated with the trials and tribulations of grocery shopping. Finally, Cochran is used to convey the theme of White determination. Although the Mayor explicitly talks about resolve, the story is framed in terms of Cochran's determination to laugh, not cry, in the face of problems.

A final comment is in order about the NBC broadcast. I have noted how the first three stories set the context for the Seigenthaler piece. A regular feature of network news is the concluding story that often becomes a human interest type of story. The September 8th broadcast follows that pattern. The broadcast concludes with a story about children who had to leave behind their "comfort" items. Ron Allen, a Black male reporter, presents the piece, and the viewer sees and hears four Black children talking about things that they had to leave behind. Black adults are not featured, other than the reporter. One can argue that the idea behind the story was to make the connection with all people's children, and that is what Williams says in his lead-in. Yet, in the context of a broadcast where the most authoritative Black voice, the Mayor of Baton Rouge, is blatantly undermined, and other Black voices are give little attention and time, the omission of Black adults implies that Black children are the ones who merit White sympathy and identification. Thus again the dichotomy between Black and White appears, even in a human interest story, and this way of meaning-making concludes the broadcast.

Conclusion

The visual and textual analyses of these four stories expand our knowledge about whiteness by revealing how television news media contribute to perpetuating a White norm in the contemporary United States. Establishing White as the normal way to do and be deflects attention from any deeper structural analysis about the gap in life outcomes

between Blacks and Whites. I am not arguing for an intentional media effort to retain

White dominance, but I am arguing that it is precisely this unconsciousness that allows

whiteness to be naturalized and thus left unexamined. The analyses in this chapter

revealed how news media contribute, at least inadvertently, to perpetuating a White norm

by the choices that are made in framing a news story in terms of both visual imagery and

language.

More specifically, three themes emerged that work in various ways to establish

whiteness, and for each the visual imagery is a critical part of meaning-making and

understanding. First, through visuals and language the viewer sees and hears White

people as law-abiding and orderly and Black people as criminals and disorderly. The law

and order theme is conveyed both explicitly and implicitly. Explicit references vary from

Aaron Brown's repetition of the looting sequences and his persistent questions about

crime and safety to Jon Seigenthaler's reporting from the gun store. Implicit references

range from Walter Isaacson's "no Giuliani's" to the background images of Black people

and police sirens. The theme of White normalcy is portrayed by the contrast between

White and Black people, such as the four people from the first CNN story, the omission

of any Black faces and voices in the Isaacson interview, and the undermining of the only

Black person in the Seigenthaler piece. The third theme of White determination (and its

opposite, Black laziness and dependency) is communicated in the first story through the

four people selected to speak and appear on screen. The fourth story uses Karen

Cochran's determination to grocery shop as the mechanism for discussing the

"challenges" posed by the influx of evacuees into Baton Rouge. Although the piece does

not talk about Black people, the imagery and language references work together to

suggest the idea that it is Black people who are creating the challenges. The theme is also furthered through the stories that precede the Seigenthaler piece about Karen Cochran, especially David Gregory's images of Black women and a baby when discussing government support. Each theme deserves more space that can be afforded in a single chapter; future work will devote a chapter to each theme.

For now, however, I turn to questions that flow from the analysis as presented. One may wonder how often similar examples occur or the extent to which they have an effect on the viewer. For example, who else besides Isaacson is asked to speak about the future of the city? Are Black leaders given voice at different times? How often are Blacks and Whites put in such blatant juxtaposition as the ones in the first CNN story? Are there measurable effects on public policies from framing a news story differently? To answer these questions, it is necessary to turn to quantitative social science methods, in particular a quantitative content analysis.

Chapter 3

Examining Theories of White Racial Attitudes:
A Content Analysis of the
Television News Coverage of Hurricane Katrina

This dissertation explores a puzzle that has troubled scholars and policymakers

for some time: If there is such widespread support for the norm of racial equality in

America, why do many Whites oppose policies designed to achieve that goal? My

dissertation explores the possibility that media frames of policy-relevant events help to

socialize particular attitudes that can subsequently depress support for policies such as

affirmative action or welfare. I contend that the way a news story is told may affect a

person's policy preferences in two different ways. First, the framing of the story may

have direct effects such that it boosts the degree to which people take racially

conservative positions, and second, the way the story is told may activate latent racial

attitudes that boost the degree to which people take racially conservative positions. Thus

knowing the actual content of the news is critical.

Previous work utilizing content analysis has looked at racial representations in

television news in terms of roles, sound bites, and visibility and has discussed

implications for race relations, but such work has not attempted to determine the specific

theory that relates to the actual news content (Entman & Rojecki, 2000; Gilens, 1999).

Entman (1990, 1992) employed content analysis to infer how the local news might both

promote modern racism and undermine old-fashioned racism. There also appears to be a

discrepancy between what appears on the news and in real life in terms of representations of lawbreakers, victims, and law enforcers (Dixon, Azocar, & Casas, 2003; Dixon & Linz, 2000a, 2000b). This chapter examines television news coverage for the presence of frames that correspond to different theories and conceptualizations about White racial attitudes.

Most research to date has utilized cross-sectional surveys or survey experiments to explain White racial policy opinions, and the reasons for these choices are clear. Survey work at its best provides good external validity, allowing for inferences about the population from which representative samples are drawn, but does not generally ensure internally valid inferences about cause and effect (Babbie, 2001). The work of Sniderman and colleagues (1993, 1997) addresses this weakness by embedding experiments within surveys. However, a survey cannot reveal the actual content of the news. Some surveys may ask about participants' media exposure, but the responses rely on people's memories of media content, as opposed to the actual content.

Content analysis measures what actually appeared in the information environment surrounding the citizen (Neuendorf, 2002). The challenge in this chapter was to identify patterns in news coverage that would help predict which key attitudes present in each theory of racial policy opinion (i.e., prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic racism, and the politics-centered approach) were most prominent in the media environment. To find such evidence required the coders to look for implicit meanings, which made their task more difficult than if they were simply counting manifest objects. While training and pre-testing are designed to assure that coders "see" the same thing when coding, the fact is that they cannot help but view the text through their own

ideological lenses. Thus, attempting to code latent meaning becomes especially hard to do, though not impossible. Therefore, a research question was posed:

R1: To what extent are specific key concepts represented in major theories of White racial policy opinions (i.e., symbolic racism, prejudice as group position, and the politics-centered approach) privileged in news coverage through the framing choices employed?

Method

What follows is a quantitative content analysis designed to produce "objective, systematic, and quantitative descriptions of the manifest content of communication" (Berelson, 1952; Neuendorf, 2002, p. 10). With careful development and testing of the coding, a quantitative content analysis can also measure latent concepts in communications (Babbie, 2008). Accordingly a coding scheme was developed to analyze the content of news for elements of the theories of group position, symbolic racism, and the politics-centered approach. However, as will be explained below, the original coding scheme did not produce reliable measures. As a result, a second more modest scheme was developed. This section discusses the media content and then sets forth the two coding schemes and their respective reliabilities.

The Media Content

This chapter examines television news stories covering Hurricane Katrina as the case for analysis. The racialized quality of the disaster provides a critical test of the theory that exposure to certain news media frames can affect racial opinions and policy preferences. However, before testing for effects, it is necessary to know the content of what appeared in the news.

Hurricane Katrina was the costliest hurricane in United States history with damage estimates up to $75 billion. Eighty percent of the City of New Orleans was flooded by the storm surge when the levees were breached. Katrina was also the deadliest hurricane since 1928, having killed at least 1400 people. The storm displaced more than 2 million people and destroyed more than 350,000 homes (Williams, 2006). Accordingly, Katrina generated a great deal of news coverage, and revealed "cracks in our society," especially surrounding racial disparities in wealth, health, and security (Williams, 2006).

The analysis was to examine coverage immediately before Hurricane Katrina hit until coverage began to focus on the next hurricane, specifically, from August 27, 2005 through September 23, 2005. All stories about Hurricane Katrina that appeared on three network evening news programs (ABC, NBC, and FOX) and on one cable news station (CNN) were to be analyzed. The stories were obtained from the Vanderbilt Television News Archives as part of the Katrina News Project at the University of Michigan.

Coding Scheme One

The initial coding scheme for the quantitative content analysis of the news coverage of Hurricane Katrina was derived from the three theories of White racial policy opinion: symbolic racism, prejudice as group position, and the politics-centered approach. In his analysis of local Chicago news, Entman operationalized modern racism "as having three major components paralleling the dimensions of survey instruments used to measure concepts: general affective hostility toward Black persons; rejection of Black political aspirations; and denial that discrimination continues to be a problem for Blacks" (Entman, 1992, p. 346). The idea of paralleling the language from survey instruments designed to measure the different theories provided the foundation for the coding scheme

for this content analysis. The specific codes were developed by drawing on the

conceptualization and measures of these theories in previous academic work (Bobo, 1999;

Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Bobo & Tuan, 2006; Entman, 1992; Sears, 1993; Sears, Van

Laar, Carrillo, & Kosterman, 1997; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Sniderman & Piazza,

1993; Valentino, Hutchings, & White, 2002).

The content was coded by a group of trained undergraduate and gradates students

as part of the Katrina News Project at the University of Michigan.[1] Portions of the

codebook for the Katrina News Project relevant to this dissertation appear as Appendix C

and are summarized below.[2] The unit of analysis throughout this study is the story.

As discussed in Chapter One, overlap exists between elements of symbolic racism

and group position theory. Negative stereotyping, discrimination, and violating traditional

American values are part of both theories, and accordingly, the coding serves as

indicators for both theories. More specifically, negative stereotypes about Blacks are

captured by coding for images or utterances that suggest Blacks are lazy, impulsive,

aggressiveness, criminal, or welfare dependent. These negative stereotypes are also

indicative of the violation of traditional American values (e.g., lazy as violating the work

ethic, impulsiveness as violating impulse control, aggressive and criminal as violating

obedience to authority, and welfare dependent as violating self-reliance). To assess

discrimination, coders identified whether or not the stories included historical

background and/or context for racial disparities.

---

[1] Special thanks to Susan Douglas, Chair of the Department of Communication Studies, for her support and encouragement, and for funding from the Marsh Center for Journalistic Performance.
[2] Certain items in the codebook were jointly determined to be of interest to more than one person, and others were of interest to only one person. In this paper I do not specify the source of the code, but I wish to express appreciation for the collective work that supported my endeavors.

Symbolic racism also includes negative or anti-Black affect. While earlier measures of group position did not include specifically negative affect, Bobo and Tuan (2006) state that affect "should be explicitly incorporated into the group position model" (p. 35). Accordingly, negative affect toward Blacks will indicate both theories. It is captured in the coding scheme by asking coders to gauge which emotions might be elicited from a typical American affected by the hurricane. The specific emotions include: anger, pride, resentment, antagonism/hostility, rivalry, sympathy, and respect. The presence of negative affect in coverage of Katrina (anger, resentment, antagonism/hostility, and rivalry) would be suggestive of the presence of symbolic racism or group position framing; the presence of positive feelings (sympathy and respect) would not be indicative of these two theories.

Symbolic racism and group position are distinguished from one another through codes that do not overlap. The predominant means for assessing the prevalence of prejudice as group position focuses on the sense of group entitlement and the sense of threat. Three items address these ideas. First, one asks about entitlement or deservedness to safety, security, other resources, status, or power for people who suffered from the hurricane. The underlying idea is that the dominant group feels a sense of entitlement to these things, and conversely that that other groups are not similarly entitled. Another item asks about a sense of threat (e.g., economic, financial, physical, or other) to Americans beyond the Gulf Coast region; i.e., a sense of threat to the dominant group. The third asks about a sense of threat to the social order from people who stayed in New Orleans. These two latter items go specifically to the theoretical idea that the dominant group feels a threat from the subordinate group.

In order to assess the prevalence of a politics-centered approach in the news, the coding focused on whether the role of the government was discussed as well as ideas about the larger values of individualism and equality, though these two values overlap with symbolic racism. Accordingly, the coding scheme assesses who or what entity is being blamed; the choices include: no attribution of responsibility, nature/God, President, federal government (including FEMA), state government, local government, rescue workers (non-specific), and residents/citizens. The rationale for distinguishing between federal and state or local is to parallel the idea of a larger or smaller role for government, with the choice of federal government being the larger role and state or local as being the smaller role. Another coding item asks about government spending and references to big government. Specific items also ask about individualism and equality.

Of the seventy variables that comprised the codebook, 22 items were designed to assess the prevalence of elements of the theories of symbolic racism, prejudice as group position, and the politics-centered approach. The goal of the content analysis was to reveal patterns in news coverage and determine the extent to which they reflect the prevalence of a particular theory explaining the gap between White public opinion between beliefs in equality and support for policies designed to address inequalities between Whites and Blacks.

Reliability. A critical part of content analysis is determining the reliability of the coding between the coders. The goal is to ensure that they are coding similarly and that agreement is more than by mere chance. Krippendorf's alpha was selected as the index for calculating reliability because it is a conservative measure and can be adapted to all levels of measurement.

The initial goal was to analyze all the stories about the hurricane that were broadcast on ABC, CNN, FOX, and NBC between August 27, 2005 and September 9, 2005, which totaled 496 stories; the remainder would be coded in a second phase. A reliability sample consisting of 105 stories, or 21% of the 496 stories, was compiled. In general it was found that the coding was not reliable. Of the seventy variables that were part of the complete codebook, only three had reliabilities equal to .79 or higher: race of the reporter, gender of the reporter, and gender of the anchor. Three variables fell just below acceptable reliability levels at .65 or .66: discrimination, aggressive, and criminal. A list of the reliable variables and the reliability for each is listed in Appendix D.

The bottom-line is that without satisfactory reliability the results are very difficult to interpret (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, & Bracken, 2002, 2004). If differences between stories are inferred based on unreliable codes, the results could simply be based on chance variation in the categories chosen by the particular coders. The difficulty in achieving reliable coding may have largely been due to the implicit nature of the coding scheme. To address the problem, I developed a new, more simplified code book as explained below.

Coding Scheme Two

With the benefit of hindsight, the primary problem with the first coding scheme was that the code-book had too many codes, especially codes requiring subjective judgments about latent content. As noted earlier, it is a challenge to train coders to code implicit meanings and then find acceptable intercoder agreement. Therefore, the primary goal of the new coding scheme was to create clear, simple codes that would examine more manifest as opposed to latent content.

The new code book included 24 codes. Whereas the first code book attempted to find key concepts reflecting the presence of the three theories and potentially distinguishing amongst them, the second codebook focused more on manifest content from which to infer the presence of framing in line with the different theories; e.g., how often looting occurred, how often there was talk of crime other than looting, or how often experts appeared and their race/ethnicity. If a disproportionate number of Black people were shown as looting, or if talk about crime occurred with imagery of Black people, then the inference could be made about the presence of patterns reflecting the theories of group position and symbolic racism. Additionally, the choice of categories was influenced by the preliminary findings about whiteness in the textual analysis of Chapter Two. If White people are presented as experts and heroes and Blacks are not, then the idea of White normalcy may be conveyed through the story. Most of the answer choices were set up to be dichotomous yes/no variables. Two coders were trained and began coding.[3]

One of the original research questions had asked about the extent to which the television coverage framed news stories to reflect the theories of group position, symbolic racism, or the politics-centered approach. The goal was to have a relatively comprehensive description of the way elements of each theory were incorporated into the news. The new coding scheme was more modest in its ambitions. First, the scheme looked at the extent of crime coverage and the race of the alleged perpetrators to see if the coverage played into stereotypes of Blacks as criminals. Part of this work was also to quantify the use of language with and without visuals. While the expected advantage of

[3] These coders came from the Undergraduate Research Opportunities Program (UROP). Both sophomores, one was a Black male and the other a White female. They worked previously with the author, an advisor, and another UROP student on the reliability for the first coding scheme.

these more modest, manifest codes was to improve reliability amongst the coders, the drawback was that the connection to the latent meanings reflecting the specific theoretical frames would be less solid and more inferential. For example, building on the work of Entman (1990, 1992) if a disproportionate number of stories had visuals of Black criminals, one could reasonably infer the symbolic racism or group position. Using this more modest coding scheme would at least provide a first step in assessing the presence of the theories, and it seemed worthwhile to make such a beginning. Accordingly, the following research questions were posed:

R2: How often do looting and other crime appear in the coverage?

R3: How often is there talk of crime without visuals of crime?

R4: What is the race of the people shown looting or committing the alleged crime?

Second, new questions were posed to look at the juxtaposition of White and Black people and their respective roles in the television coverage. Knowing how often Blacks and Whites are portrayed in different roles will provide information about the way the meaning of a race is constructed in the news story, regardless if the construction is unintentional or not. For example, if White people largely appear as experts talking about the disaster or as heroes helping victims, and Black people do not generally appear in such roles, then one could argue that the stories are contributing to a sense of White normalcy or whiteness. The following research questions were asked:

R5: What is the race of the people presented as experts in a newscast? (Experts were defined not to include government officials.)

R6: What is the race of people presented as heroes or helping victims?

R7: What is the race of people presented as every-day, on-the-street?

In summary, the new codebook had 24 codes, and 7 research questions. Three-hundred twenty-seven stories were coded using the second coding scheme.

Reliability

In order to be certain that the new coding scheme was workable, the author met with the two coders on a weekly basis to talk about the coding and to view some sample stories. A pilot group of 40 stories were selected to test the coding scheme and were coded by both students. We then met to go over the results. When there were differences between the two coders, the author and the students would re-watch the story. In some cases, one of the students would acknowledge that they had simply miscoded, but in other cases, codes were found to be too vague or subject to different interpretations. Because the goal of the new codebook was to be clear as possible, such codes were either revised or eliminated. For example, one question asked about the presence of a mass of Black or White people in the visual. Determining a workable definition for "mass" that was also reliable proved difficult. That question also had the common challenge of making a judgment about the race of people in a large group. The question was eventually dropped. A second pilot study was conducted with 43 stories and some final adjustments made in the wording.

To establish the reliability of the coding for the overall data set, another 72 stories were double-coded, representing 22% of the total number of stories. Krippendorf's alpha was again selected as the calculation for determining reliability. The reliability for all the variables appears in Appendix E. Of the 24 codes, three had reliability levels of at least .80, three had reliability of 1.00, three had reliability between .64 and .69, and eight

had reliability below .60. Additionally, another seven had no variation in the subset, which the author determined occurred because the answers were all 0's.

The Data for Coding Scheme Two

A total of 327 stories comprise the data set for the revised content analysis.[4] The final sample included television news stories in the data base from the day Hurricane Katrina struck land in Louisiana, August 29, 2005, to roughly ten days later, September 9, 2005. Sixty stories are from ABC, 57 from NBC, 76 from Fox, and 134 from CNN, largely from August 30 – September 3rd and then from September 7 – September 9th. That CNN had the largest number of stories is not surprising in it has a 24/7 news format with many shows running for a full hour, in contrast to ABC, for example, which had half of the stories of CNN. Table 1 sets forth the breakdown of stories by source and date. I turn next to the results of the content analysis with the modified coding scheme.

[Table 1 about here]

Results

The first group of research questions (RQ 2 – 4) looks at the content of the television news stories for the presence of looting and other crime. Most stories did not show images of looting. Of the 327 stories that were coded, looting appears in 8.6 % (28) of the stories.[5] Another six stories had visuals of crime other than looting, bringing the total to 9.5% of stories with visuals of crime. Additionally, there was talk of crime without visuals in 35 stories, or roughly 10.7 %. In summary, there was talk and/or visuals of crime in 20% of the stories.

---

[4] The stories from the two pilot studies and the reliability subset are included in the full data set. Thus almost half of the stories had been double-coded and any differences resolved.
[5] The coding scheme had 10 variables that asked about the presence of specific scenes of looting and an eleventh that asked about the presence of any other looting. In order not to count a story twice a variable was created called looting indicator.

With regard to racial cues in the stories, ten of the 28 stories about looting showed Black people involved in this activity. The other 8 stories were about other looting scenes, and then a follow-up question asked about the race of the looters. This race-of-looters variable was not reliable, and thus the race of the looters for these stories cannot be specified. There are at least three possible explanations for why this variable was not reliable. First, it is frequently difficult, if not impossible, to make an accurate judgment about the race of a person based on physical appearance. Second, the footage may have been of people running or people seen in the distance making the discernment of race too difficult. Lastly, it may be that the race of the coders affected their judgments about the race of the looters. One of the coders was a Black male and the other a White female. Additionally, the variable about visuals of crime and talk of crime did not specify race or have follow-up questions to ask about race. Thus, we can confidently and conservatively only claim that 36% of the stories about looting involved Black people. The remaining looting and crime visuals may or may not have been about Black people.

The next research questions (RQ5– 6) were interested in comparing how White people and Black people were portrayed in the news. One question asked about who appeared as an expert, followed by a question asking the race of the expert. Another question asked about groups of experts, followed by a question about race. None of these variables had reliable results. Though unreliable, the data indicate that a single expert appeared in 22 stories (7% of all stories). In one story the expert was Black, and in the remaining 21 stories (95%) the expert was White. Another 14 stories had groups of experts, and in none of these were the experts all Black. Of these 14 stories, nine stories had only White experts, and five stories had mixed Black and White experts. There were

no stories with only a group of Black experts. That is, Blacks appeared as experts in only 17% of the stories with experts (single or group). At the time we reviewed coding procedures, it did not seem difficult for the coders to agree on who was or was not an expert. However, it seems that the definition was more difficult to apply than expected. It did not include government officials, and it may be that determining who was or was not a government official became confusing.

Another question asked whether the story included Black people helping victims or being honored as heroes; the same question was asked about White people. The Black hero question had unreliable results, but the White hero results were reliable. Eight percent of the stories (26 stories) were about Whites as helping victims or being heroes. Although not reliable, Black heroes are 4% of the stories (14 stories),or roughly half of the number of White hero stories.

The next questions asked how often non-expert, every-day, person-on-the street Black people and White people appeared on screen as the intentional focus of the camera and spoke more than a single word. The coders counted the actual number of speakers, and the reliability for both variables was excellent. The results are similar with eighty stories having Black sound bites and eighty-five stories having White sound bites (24% and 26%, respectively).

In summary, 20% of the stories were about crime, and visuals of looting comprised almost 9% of all stories. At minimum, 36% of the looting visuals featured Black people. Stories with White heroes are roughly 8% of the stories. Whites and Blacks who are not experts or government officials have sound bites in roughly the same number

of stories. I turn next to a discussion of the findings, limitations, and then future directions.

Discussion

The new research questions and coding scheme were designed to look at three basic ideas: who is portrayed as a criminal, who is portrayed as an expert or hero, and who is portrayed as the every-day, ordinary person. If Blacks are largely portrayed as criminals, the findings would be consistent with previous research (Dixon & Linz, 2000a; Entman, 1990, 1992). It would also contribute to the idea that the stories are reflecting the theories of symbolic racism and group position. If Whites are portrayed as experts, heroes, and every-day people and Blacks are not, such contrasts offer insight into the way race is represented in television news through binary, opposing forces (Branston & Stafford, 2003). This representation of Whites in juxtaposition to Blacks would also suggest the presence in the news broadcast of characteristics associated with whiteness

The data indicate that roughly a fifth of the stories focused on crime, and crime is generally associated with Black people. Moreover, at least 36% of the stories about looting showed Black people looting. Here, then, the racial construction is of Blacks as criminals, which corresponds with concepts underlying the theories of symbolic racism (stereotypes of Black criminality) and prejudice as a sense of group position (the stereotype and the sense of threat conveyed by Black criminals). It is also important to note that the number of occurrences of looting in a story was not counted; that is, if a looting scene was repeated, it was only counted once. Thus, it is likely that the impact of the 36% of the stories is even greater the percentage suggests. Moreover, the unit of analysis was simply the story. The length of time of the story was not coded, and thus it is

possible these crime stories represented more (or less) than twenty percent of the broadcast. The bottom-line is that the findings about looting and crime suggest the presence of concepts underlying the theories of symbolic racism and group position.

The data also indicate some clear contrasts in the way that Blacks and Whites appeared in the stories. Whites were portrayed as heroes in 26 stories (8%) and Blacks as heroes or helping in 14 (4%) stories. While these numbers do not indicate a lot of stories about heroes in general, the critical point is that stories with White heroes appear twice as often as stories with Black heroes. Such representations illustrate how racial meaning may be constructed through contrasting imagery, and this juxtaposition of images supports the idea of news coverage perpetuating a sense of White normalcy versus Black deviance. Additionally, considering the contrast between Whites as heroes and Blacks as criminals again plays into the idea of whiteness being affirmed through news coverage. Yet, because the Black hero data is unreliable, one must be cautious in inferring too much from this result.

White people are portrayed as experts, people who know more than others, in almost all the stories that included experts, though again it is not a large number of stories (22 stories). The contrast here is particularly vivid with only one story having only a Black expert and *no* story featuring only a group of Black experts. The racial representations position White people as intelligent and knowledgeable and Black people as less intelligent and less knowledgeable through their relative invisibility as experts. Such racial constructions would lend credence to the idea of whiteness being conveyed through news coverage if the inter-coder agreement had been higher.

The contrast between Black and White did not necessarily occur in every story. The every-day people who spoke on camera were both Black and White and appeared in roughly 25% of the stories. Yet, it is important to recognize that simply having the same number of stories with speaking roles may not reveal how people are portrayed. For example, the textual analysis in Chapter Two discussed how the construction of a White man, a White woman, a Black man, and a Black woman worked to reinforce whiteness as powerful and normal through the contrast in their representation, despite the equal numbers. As a next step it would be informative to look more closely at each of the stories with Black and White speakers, as identified in the content analysis, to determine the extent to which they do, or do not, replicate the portrayals examined in the textual analysis.

Overall, the data are highly suggestive that these news stories contributed to a binary construction of the meaning of race with Whites generally cast in a more positive, powerful light and Blacks in a negative role, or simply absent from positions of power. Broadly speaking, Whites are represented as heroes, experts, and every-day people, and Blacks are represented as criminals and every-day people, with some exceptions. At best, Blacks may appear as every-day people similarly to Whites, but stories with Black heroes or Black experts are substantially out-numbered by stories with White heroes or White experts. Such racial constructions help to perpetuate a situation where White people are seen as ideals, as standard-bearers, as normal, and Black people are seen as falling short of such standards. These racial constructions in news coverage help to perpetuate White normalcy, or whiteness.

The original goal of the content analysis was to examine the coverage of Hurricane Katrina for evidence of patterns reflecting the theories of symbolic racism, prejudice as a sense of group position, and the politics-centered approach, and to differentiate among them. The revised, more modest goal was to look for a few indicators that would suggest symbolic racism, group position, and whiteness. The latter coding scheme did not allow for differentiating amongst the different perspectives. Thus, at this point, one can only argue that concepts underlying symbolic racism, group position, and whiteness were all present in the news coverage of Hurricane Katrina, but one cannot claim that a single perspective dominated the framing.

It is important to note that I am not arguing that the news coverage is based on intentional acts designed to perpetuate the current racial hierarchy or White hegemony. Instead, I argue that it is the every-day news routines and journalistic practices that contribute to racial representations that may be unconsciously or institutionally racist in effect. Building on studies such as this one, it may be possible to increase knowledge about how the news inadvertently fuels the situation where Whites are portrayed in more positive ways and Blacks more negatively.

<center>Limitations</center>

The results of this study are highly suggestive of one of the ways race is constructed and understood in the news. However, there are three limitations that must be noted. First, the lack of reliable measures was disappointing and casts a shadow on interpretations of the results. However, because many measures were reliable, I believe that with additional training and revising of the codes, additional reliable measures could be obtained. Second, due to the way the assignments were made to the coders and the

compressed time schedule, there are several days where stories are missing from one of the networks. While I do not believe that the small number of such stories would change the results, it would be important to include those days in any subsequent analysis.

Finally, and arguably most importantly, this study demonstrates the challenge in coding implicit measures. Even in the second coding scheme that was designed to be more straightforward, coders had difficulties with some of the measures. While the coders had high inter-coder agreement on some codes, on other codes the reliability scores fell short. The life experiences and ideological perspectives of coders of different races and gender may have added to the difficulty in coding these implicit measures.

Conclusion

The original goal of this content analysis was to explore the relationship of the theories of prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic racism, and the politics-centered approach to the news and look for patterns suggestive of the prevalence of one theoretical perspective more than the others. Unfortunately, the results for the first content analysis were generally unreliable, and it was decided to conduct a second, smaller content analysis with more modest goals.

Three hundred twenty-seven news stories were coded in the second content analysis. Here the results are suggestive that race was constructed through binary oppositions between Whites and Blacks, and the data suggest the presence of symbolic racism, group position, and whiteness in the news stories. Ideally, these results can serve as a type of pilot study for a subsequent, more intensive examination of the data, bringing in new codes and improving some of the existing codes.

While a content analysis is a good tool for quantitative data collection—especially with clear, manifest content—it cannot be used for causal claims. The task of the next chapter is to explore how changing the frame of a news story affects White policy preferences.

Table 3.1. 2005 Television News Stories about Hurricane Katrina Coded by Source & Date

	ABC	CNN	FOX	NBC	Total by day
August 29	0*	3	0*	0*	3
August 30	8	14	15	8	47
August 31	11	18	16	9	54
September 1	12	24	21	8	65
September 2	10	19	19	9	58
September 3	3	0*	5	10	18
September 7	4	13	0*	0*	17
September 8	7	5	14	5	31
September 9	5	21	0	8	34
Total by source	60	134	76	57	327

---

* The zero means that no stories were coded because of the way the DVDs were assigned.

Chapter 4

Theories about White Racial Attitudes
and Framing of the News:
Exploring a Causal Relationship

The driving concern underlying this dissertation is why White people take the positions that they do on public policies related to race. Many theories have been proposed to explain the gap between Whites' support of equality in principle and in policy. In general, existing theories are not sensitive to context. In particular, the news media may alter the characterization of a policy such that specific racial attitude dimensions become more or less salient. As a result, policy preferences may change over time not because racial attitudes are changing, but because different dimensions are more or less salient. In this chapter, I investigate how public policy preferences change as the frame of a news story is manipulated to emphasize considerations which underlie these various explanations about White racial attitudes: prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic racism, the politics-centered approach, and whiteness.

I conducted an experiment to examine the impact of news frames emphasizing considerations from each of the theories and concepts of interest. The impact of prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic racism, and the politics-centered approach have been examined via standard social scientific methods, mostly with closed-ended questions on public opinion surveys (e.g., Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Bobo & Tuan, 2006; Sears, 1988; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). Whiteness has been examined using more open-ended methods, including in-depth

interviews, textual analyses, and other qualitative techniques (Crenshaw, 1988; Frankenberg, 1993; Rasmussen, Klinenberg, Nexica, & Wray, 2001). Social scientists, however, have begun to use surveys to quantify aspects of white identity (Bahk & Jandt, 2004; Croll, 2007; Hartman & Croll, 2006; Hutchings et al. n.d.).

Bahk and Jandt (2004) develop and test a scale to measure perceptions about being White in the United States. They find that Whites do not see White privilege while respondents of color did. This finding is consistent with the standard notion that ingroup racial identity is mostly invisible to White people (Dyer, 1997; but see, Frankenberg 2001). However, in a nationwide telephone survey 37% of White respondents said that their racial identity was very important to them, and 72% said it was at least "somewhat important" (Hartmann & Croll, 2006). Hutchings, Wong, Johnson, and Brown (n.d.) also developed a measure of White identity, and in contrast to most other such work, found moderate support for the proposition that Whites with higher in-group identity were more likely to hold negative attitudes toward Blacks. Croll (2007) argues that recognizing White identity is crucial to whiteness and that such recognition occurs for both racist and anti-racist Whites; lack of racial consciousness occurs only for those Whites who fall between these two extremes. To date, research has not explored the possibility that the salience of white identity is sensitive to the way the media frames issues related to race.

In my experiment with self-identified White participants, the framing of a news story was manipulated to reflect considerations dominant in each of the four racial attitude dimensions discussed above: group position, symbolic racism, politics centered ideology, and whiteness. I manipulated the theoretical frame in a newspaper story about recipients of a court award for past wrongs by the government. Additionally, the racial

identity of the plaintiff group in the article was manipulated to be either Black, White, or unspecified. These two manipulations represent a fully factorialized 4 x 3 design (i.e., four theories by three racial groups). After reading the news story, participants completed a questionnaire tapping their opinions on a variety of public policy issues.

An important caveat should be noted here: Experiments focused on framing face a special challenge. One of the strengths of experimental work is to demonstrate causal relationships. The ability to isolate the independent variable in a controlled environment permits the reasonable inference that any change in the dependent variable comes from the manipulation and not from alternative explanations (Babbie, 2008). However, framing is a complex phenomenon that does not lend itself to a simple, straightforward manipulation with communication (see Reese, Gandy, & Grant, 2001). Entman (1993) explains that the frame involves "aspects" of reality—not a single aspect—and may involve up to four different pieces of information, including the definition of the problem, the interpretation of causation, a moral evaluation, and a recommended solution (p. 52). The theories and concepts of interest here are comprised of several dimensions that overlap. To ignore one dimension in constructing the frame would be to represent the theory inaccurately. For example, when constructing the symbolic racism frame, I needed to establish ideas about stereotypes (Blacks as violating the traditional values of individualism and hard work), unfair advantage (the government giving Blacks undeserved support) and negative affect. The frame for the politics-centered approach also needed to include values, as well as ideas about the size and role of government. (Specific details about each frame will be set forth in the section on the independent

variable.) The bottom line is that it was not possible to flesh out fully the different theoretical constructions through a one-dimensional variable in this experiment.

Manipulating the frame of the news story to correspond with the different explanations about White racial attitudes—while holding the race of the plaintiff group constant—resulted in three hypotheses and one research question. According to the theory of prejudice as a sense of group position, if a member of the dominant group feels that her/his proprietary claim to resources, rights, and statuses are threatened by members of a subordinate group, then opposition would rise. I hypothesize that:

H1. White participants reading a news story with a group position frame about Black plaintiffs will be a) significantly more *opposed* to public policies that could threaten the resources/status of Whites compared to White participants reading the other theoretical frames with Black plaintiffs, and b) significantly more *supportive* of policies that could decrease the threat to resources/status of Whites compared to white participants reading the other theoretical frames with Black plaintiffs.

According to the theory of symbolic racism, most White people may have moved beyond old-fashioned or blatant racism but still harbor some negative affect toward Blacks, combined with resentment that Black people violate cherished American values. I hypothesize:

H2. White participants reading a news story with a symbolic racism frame about Black plaintiffs will be significantly more opposed to public policies that seem to violate cherished American values (e.g., the work ethic, individualism) and more

likely to endorse stereotypes about Blacks related to these values compared to White participants reading the other theoretical frames with Black plaintiffs.

The politics-centered frame says that White opinion is not primarily about race but rather about beliefs in the proper role and size of government, with the underlying idea being that a smaller, less powerful role is preferred. Therefore, I hypothesize that:

H3. White participants reading a news story with a politics-centered frame about Black plaintiffs will be significantly more opposed to public policies that involve an increase in the size of government and governmental powers compared to White participants reading the other theoretical frames with Black plaintiffs.

Whiteness is based on the idea of white-normalcy, and the particular direction of the effects of this frame is theoretically ambiguous. Therefore, as a first step I pose a research question to begin exploring whiteness in relationship to the other theories.

RQ1. How do responses to public policy questions from White participants reading a news story with a whiteness frame about Black plaintiffs compare to responses to public policy questions from White participants reading the other theoretical frames with Black plaintiffs?

Turning to the second manipulation, Hypotheses 4 and 5 make predictions about the effect of changing the racial identity of the plaintiff group to be Black, White, or unspecified within a single theoretical frame. The idea is that there may be an interaction effect between the race of the plaintiff group and the theoretical frame of the story. The politics-centered frame with racially unspecified plaintiffs will serve as the reference group. The key component of the politics-centered approach is that White opinion and policy preferences are about the proper role of government, not race. Thus, using the

politics-centered frame as a comparison makes theoretical sense. Using racially unspecified plaintiffs makes intuitive sense to compare to racially specified plaintiff groups. Research question 2 poses a question about the effect of the whiteness frame.

Prejudice as a sense of group position is based on the idea that the dominant group (i.e., Whites) feels threatened by the subordinate group (i.e., Blacks) in terms of resources, rights, and statuses. I hypothesize that:

H4. For policies that could threaten resources, statuses, and rights of Whites, White participants reading the group position frame with Black plaintiffs will have significantly harsher (more conservative) policy preferences compared to White participants reading the politics-centered frame with unspecified plaintiffs.

According to the theory of symbolic racism, White opinions stem from a belief that Blacks violate the traditional American values of hard work, individualism, and fairness. I hypothesize that:

H5. For public policies and stereotype endorsements related to traditional American values (e.g., hard work, individualism), White participants reading a symbolic racism frame with Black plaintiffs should result in significantly harsher (more conservative) policy preferences compared to White participants reading the politics-centered frame with unspecified plaintiffs.

Testing whiteness quantitatively is a relatively new venture. Therefore, I begin by posing the following research question:

RQ2. In a whiteness frame, how do responses vary among participants reading the story in the Black plaintiff, White plaintiff, or racially unspecified plaintiff conditions?

Method

Overview

An experiment was conducted to test the hypotheses and address the research questions. The experiment had 12 cells (4 x 3 design) that manipulated the framing of a single newspaper story in terms of prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic racism, politics-centered approach, and whiteness. Additionally, the condition of the story was manipulated to refer to Blacks or Whites or to make no racial identification. A detailed discussion of the design of the study follows.

Participants

A total of 489 people participated in the experiment. Eighty-six percent of the participants in the study came from a voluntary participant pool that is part of an introductory communications course at a large Midwestern university. They were given one hour of course credit for participating. The remaining 14 percent were recruited by flyers posted at public locations on campus and through an ad run in a weekly university publication. The non-participant pool subjects received $10 for their time.

Participants were asked about age, education, income, political ideology, political affiliation, and the importance of religion in their life. The average age was 21. The participants were educated with 30% having at least a high school degree, 64% having some college, and 6.5% a college or advanced degree. The participants were also financially well-off with 64% indicating a yearly income of over $90,000 and another 24% indicating income of $50,000 - $ 90,000. Forty-nine percent of the participants were politically liberal with 4% identifying as being extremely liberal, 29% as liberal, and 16% as slightly liberal, compared to 23.3% identifying as politically conservative, including 3

% as extremely conservative, 10% as conservative, and 13% as slightly conservative. Twenty percent said that they were moderate or middle of the road, and 7% didn't know or hadn't thought about it. Fifty percent of the participants said that they were Democrats or leaned Democratic compared to 27% who said that they were Republican or leaned Republican. Eleven percent expressed no preference, and 12% identified as Independent. Seventy-two percent of the participants were also religious, with 19% indicating that religious provided a great deal of guidance in their daily life, 17% indicating quite a bit of guidance, and 36% indicating some guidance. Twenty-seven percent said that religion provided a little or no guidance in their daily life (17%) or was not important (10%).

Participants were also asked about their racial or ethnic background. Three hundred thirty-three participants (68%) self-identified as White. These White subjects became the basis for analysis as the work of this dissertation is specifically interested in White racial attitudes. Hereafter, participants refers to this group of self-identified White subjects.

In summary, the participants were generally young, financially well-off, religious, and White. They were also more liberal than conservative, whether judged by political philosophy or party identification.

Procedures

Participants came into a computer lab designed for conducting communication studies. The researcher logged them into an online system for conducting surveys at the university. Each participant was seated an individual computer and asked to read a consent form that appeared on screen. After giving their informed consent, they read one of twelve versions of a newspaper article that was randomly assigned through the

computer software. The newspaper article was constructed for the experiment and served as the stimulus. A detailed description of the newspaper article appears below. Cell sizes ranged from 18 to 39.[1] After reading the story, the participants completed a questionnaire with a series of questions about the article, the media, and public policy issues. The public policy questions were the dependent variables. A detailed discussion of the questionnaire also appears below.

The Independent Variable

The primary independent variable in these analyses is the news frame that suggested the four different theories about White racial attitudes: prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic racism, politics-centered approach, and whiteness. The independent variable was manipulated through four different versions of the stimulus, which was a newspaper story created by the author about a circuit court decision granting damages to a group based on past wrongs by the government. The cause of action by the plaintiffs was the alleged wrongful taking of property by the City of Des Moines through the power of eminent domain to build roadways; i.e., people were displaced from their homes and businesses to allow space for the construction of freeways.

The basic newspaper story consisted of a 454-word (including the headline and byline), 5-paragraph article. The third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs were identical. Two manipulations were done, one each in the first and second paragraphs. The four versions of the stimulus are set forth in Appendix F and are described below.

---

[1] The range of cell sizes is broad for two possible reasons. The survey was accessed using the Internet, and the software was set to generate the different versions of the article randomly. The default Internet address went to the survey. It appears that many of the participants attempted to use the Internet on the lab computers after completing their survey, and thus generated another version of the survey. Additionally, before realizing the problem, the researcher set up the computers prior to each scheduled appointment, and then in the case of a no-show the computer registered that a version had been used when in fact it had not.

The theoretical manipulation occurred in the second paragraph of the news story. The paragraph consisted of 138 words written to capture the considerations deemed most fundamental and unique to each theoretical explanation for white opposition to racial policies. Briefly, group position was suggested by language that threatens the claims of White people to resources, statuses, and rights. Symbolic racism employed the elements of unfair advantage, demanding attention from government, and stereotypes about working hard and taking care of property. The story framed with the politics-centered approach used language about the size of government (i.e., opening a new federal office to handle the compensation claims) and creating two classes of people with unequal rights. In the whiteness frame, the normalcy of whiteness was conveyed by claiming that there was no other reasonable alternative.

Additionally, the racial identity of the plaintiff group was manipulated to reflect one of the three racial conditions—White, Black or unspecified (no racial identifier). In the first paragraph, a phrase in one sentence was changed. It read, "The plaintiffs are the descendants of a group of people, largely _____, who lived in the northwest section of Des Moines in the late 1940s and early 1950s." In the Black condition, the plaintiff group is described as "largely African American." In the White condition, the descriptive phrase is "largely white," and in the unspecified condition the phrase was deleted. The racial manipulation was the only difference in the first paragraph of the different versions of the news story. Table 4.1 summarizes the 4 x 3 design and indicates the precise language used to frame the story according to each theoretical perspective.

[Table 4.1 about here]

The Dependent Variable

After reading the news story the participants completed a post-test questionnaire. The questionnaire tapped opinions about a variety of public policy issues (e.g., crime, drugs, government spending, assistance in job hiring and promotion) as well as measures of group position, symbolic racism, the politics-centered approach, and whiteness. The questions came primarily from the General Social Survey, the American National Election Studies, the Multi-city Study of Urban Inequality, and the 1991 National Race and Politics Survey. The questionnaire appears as Appendix G.

The questionnaire contained questions about 20 public policies and 6 questions about stereotypes about Blacks and other racial groups.[2] Answer choices were generally Likert-type responses that were recoded to run from 0 to 1. Policy items were coded so that higher indicates harsher penalties. The only exceptions were the spending items that were recoded to make intuitive sense (i.e., spending less is harsher and is reflected by lower numbers). The eight spending items were tested for inter-item reliability and were not reliable (Cronbach's alpha = .55).[3] Two of the government spending items (spending for unemployment and welfare) did create a reliable scale and were combined (Cronbach's alpha = .72). Only two questions about Black stereotypes were relevant for this study – Blacks as lazy and Blacks as determined to succeed (reverse coded) –

---

[2] The policy items were: crack and powder cocaine, ongoing discrimination hurts Blacks in getting jobs, death penalty, feelings toward the federal government, hiring and promotion assistance for Blacks, job training and educational assistance for Blacks, legalizing marijuana for medical purposes, equalizing the penalties for marijuana and alcohol, power of the government, size of government, spending for culture and the arts, spending for education, spending for the environment, spending for health, spending for police and law enforcement, spending for welfare, spending for unemployment, three strikes laws, and people on welfare prefer work to welfare. There were additional questions in the questionnaire that are not relevant to this analysis (e.g., questions about other racial groups and questions about how well the media performed in covering the different policy areas).

[3] The original eight spending categories were culture and the arts, education, environment, health, police and law enforcement, military and defense, unemployment, and welfare. I tested the reliability of all spending items together, then conducted a factor analysis and tested the reliability of the components suggested through the factor analysis. A six-item scale excluding police and law enforcement and military and defense had modest reliability (Cronbach's alpha = .66), but ultimately, due to the low reliability, I looked at each item separately, with the exception of welfare and unemployment.

because they relate to violation of the traditional value of Americans as hard-working.[4]

The end result was a total of twenty individual policy items and one scale to use for

testing the hypotheses and research questions. Independent analyses of variance

(ANOVA) were conducted for each dependent variable, and the results follow.[5]

Results

This section is divided into two broad areas. The first area of analysis compares

policy preferences across theoretical frames with the Black plaintiff condition because

these theories were developed to explain White racial attitudes toward Black people. The

second area of analysis compares policy preferences within theoretical frames as the race

of the plaintiff changes to be Black, White, or racially unspecified. The dependent

variables that were expected to resonate with the different theoretical frames have been

noted in previous work to tap into prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic

racism, and the politics-centered approach. An orthogonal factor analysis (Varimax

rotation) of the policies found seven factors, four of which loaded together as expected.[6] I

begin with the results of a one-way independent analysis of variance (ANOVA) of public

---

[4] The items stereotypes for about Blacks were: dependable, lazy, determined to succeed, aggressive, irresponsible, and law-abiding. The answer choices were: very accurate, accurate, neither accurate nor inaccurate, inaccurate, and very inaccurate. To have higher numbers be more negative three items were reverse coded: lazy, aggressive, and irresponsible. Although these items produced a reliable scale (Cronbach's alpha = .78), all of the items were not relevant to the symbolic racism theory. It was decided that it would be inappropriate to use the scale. Thus only lazy and determined to succeed (reverse-coded) were used in the analyses.

[5] It is important to acknowledge that there was no consistent baseline or global control group for these comparisons. Instead, ANOVAs were run to compare each frame against the other three frames, which means that the tests are not as clean and independent as would be optimal. Because this study is largely exploratory, it was decided that it would be most interesting to examine the different dependent variables that are expected to tap into the different theoretical frames. If, however, all the frames produce the same result, I would not expect different effects to emerge when tested one against the rest.

[6] Three of the seven factors included items from more than one theory. For example, one factor included government assistance (symbolic racism), spending on welfare and unemployment (politics-centered approach), preferring welfare to work (group position), and spending on health care (politics-centered approach). More will be said about the results of the factor analysis in the discussion section.

policy preferences across theoretical frames (i.e., prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic racism, politics-centered approach, and whiteness) with Black plaintiffs.

White Opinion by Theoretical Frame with Black Plaintiffs

Prejudice as a sense of group position. My first hypothesis was that in the group position frame with Black plaintiffs, public policies that would potentially *threaten* the resources and status of Whites would boost opposition compared to the other theoretical frames. Conversely, policies that would potentially *decrease* the threat to resources and status of Whites would be significantly more supported than in the other theoretical frames. Three items in the questionnaire focused on such threat in terms of social policies, or various resource/status-based threats, and the results are set forth in Table 4.2. The results for the resource/status threat items offer modest support for the hypothesis that those in the group position frame will show the most opposition to policies which threaten status or resources (Hypothesis 1a). Five items in the questionnaire focused on decreasing resource/status-based threat in terms of crime and drug policies, and the results are set forth in Table 4.3. These results also have modest support for the hypothesis that policies that *decrease* threat will show more support (Hypothesis 1b).

[Table 4.2 about here.]

[Table 4.3 about here.]

For the three policies involving economic resource/status threat, participants in the group position frame had the strongest opposition to job training and educational assistance for Blacks as well as hiring and promotion assistance for Blacks, and they disagree most with the statement that people on welfare prefer work to welfare. For job training and educational assistance, an analysis of variance revealed a marginal difference

120

in the effect of the frame, $F(3, 110) = 2.22$, $p < .10$. Post hoc analyses using the Tukey HSD procedure revealed that pairwise differences between participants reading the group position frame ($M = .67$, $SD = .18$) and participants reading the whiteness frame ($M = .54$, $SD = .20$) were marginally distinct ($p = < .10$). For hiring and promotion assistance for Blacks and preferring work to welfare the differences were not significant.

Results for three of the five crime and drug items were in the correct direction, though the differences were not significant. The group position frame had the highest mean for opposition to legalizing marijuana for medical purposes ($M = .49$, $SD = .24$) and opposition to equalizing the penalties for marijuana and alcohol ($M = .61$, $SD = .26$). The group position frame had the highest mean indicating the greatest support for the three strikes laws ($M = .81$, $SD = .22$). The two items that did not support the hypothesis were equalizing the penalties for crack and powder cocaine and support for the death penalty. In contrast to expectations, participants in the group position frame expressed the *least* opposition to equalizing the penalties for crack and powder cocaine ($M = .44$, $SD = .18$), though the differences among the frames were not significant. For support for the death penalty, the mean for the group position frame ($M = .50$, $SD = .24$) fell between the high of the politics-centered frame ($M = .54$, $SD = .27$) and the low of the whiteness frame ($M = .47$, $SD = .24$) with no significant differences between the frames.

Considering both the social and crime policies collectively, for six of the eight policies, the results were in the correct direction with the group position frame generating the highest opposition of all the frames. Overall, the results provide modest support for the expectations laid out in the hypotheses, but most of the differences fell short of statistical significance.

Symbolic racism. Hypothesis 2 was that participants who read a news story framed in terms of symbolic racism with Black plaintiffs would express significantly harsher (or more conservative) policy preferences relevant to "hard work" and would have significantly higher endorsement of relevant stereotypes. Some of the key components of the symbolic racism frame are the belief that Blacks violate certain American values and that discrimination is part of the past. Four items were expected to produce results consistent with these elements of symbolic racism. Results are displayed in Table 4.4. The hypothesis is generally not supported.

[Table 4.4 about here]

Only one item had results in the correct direction. The item asked about government assistance for those who "can't support themselves" by "giving them enough money to meet their basic needs." In essence, the item is about welfare without using that label. Higher numbers mean greater opposition to such government assistance. Participants in the symbolic racism condition should express the strongest disagreement with such government assistance as a violation of the traditional American value of hard work. Indeed, the symbolic racism condition ($M = .55$, $SD = .19$) produces the strongest disagreement, but the difference is not significant.

The results for the other three items (i.e., two about negative stereotypes of Blacks and one about the continuing effect of discrimination) are in the opposite direction from the predictions. The expectation was that participants in the symbolic racism frame would endorse the stereotype of Blacks as lazy more strongly than participants in the other frames because it violates the value of hard work. Instead, participants in the symbolic racism frame had one of the lowest means or least endorsement ($M = .48$, $SD = .20$)

compared to the highest mean in the group position frame ($M = .61$, $SD = .23$). Also contrary to expectations, participants reading the symbolic racism frame were actually more likely to believe Blacks are determined to succeed ($M = .44$, $SD = .16$), and participants reading both the group position frame ($M = .53$, $SD = .21$) and the politics-centered frame ($M = .53$, $SD = .18$) were less likely to believe this claim.

Another aspect of symbolic racism is a belief that discrimination is a thing of the past and no longer presents a large problem for Blacks. Participants were asked about discrimination hurting the chances of Blacks to get good jobs. One would expect that participants in the symbolic racism frame would disagree most with the statement that discrimination hurts the chances of Black to get jobs. Contrary to expectations, participants reading the symbolic racism frame and the group position frames expressed the *least* disagreement with the statement and had the lowest means ($M = .44$, $SD = 15$ and $M = .44$, $SD = .21$, respectively).

In summary, for the symbolic racism hypothesis one item had results in the expected direction. The results for the other three items were in the wrong direction. None of the differences were significant. These results suggest that the symbolic racism frame, emphasizing the possibility that Blacks violate certain cherished values such as hard work, does not directly boost the endorsement of these stereotypes or increase opposition to policies that might discourage hard work.

The politics-centered approach. My third hypothesis was that respondents reading the politics-centered frame with Black plaintiffs would be more strongly opposed to public policies that increased the role, size, and power of government than participants reading the other theoretical conditions. Policy opinions in four areas were expected to be

maximized with the politics-centered frame compared to the other three theoretical frames: feelings toward the federal government, governmental power, size of government, and governmental spending. Table 4.5 sets forth the results for the first three items, and the Table 4.6 set forth the results for government spending. The results are again mixed.

[Table 4.5 about here]

For the three items about views toward government, the results for participants reading the politics-centered frame are in the correct direction, though none are significant. For feelings toward the federal government, respondents were asked to answer on a feeling thermometer that ran from coldest to warmest, which were coded as 1 to 10 and then recoded to run 0 to 1. The prediction was that the politics-centered frame would be coldest compared to the other frames. Participants in the politics-centered frame (M = .52, SD = .17) expressed amongst the coldest feelings, though participants in the symbolic racism frame also expressed similar feelings (M = .52, SD = .18). Another item asked about the federal government becoming too powerful.[7] Theoretically one would expect the politics-centered frame to be most inclined to perceive government as getting too powerful. Participants in the politics-centered frame do find that government is getting too powerful (M = .71, SD = .46) more than participants reading the other frames. A third item asked about the size of the government.[8] Theoretically one would expect that participants in the politics-centered frame to be most inclined to perceive government as

---

[7] The original answer choices were: too powerful, not too powerful, don't know/no interest. The item was turned into a dichotomous variable and reverse coded so that higher numbers mean getting too powerful (i.e., 0 = not too powerful, 1 = too powerful). (Don't know answers were treated as system-missing). Therefore, logistic regression was used to test for any effect for this variable.

[8] The answer choices were too big, just right, and needs to be bigger. The item was recoded to run from 0 to 1 and reverse coded so that higher numbers mean too big (i.e., 0 = needs to be bigger, .50 = just right, and 1 = too big).

124

too big. Participants in the politics-centered frame do have the highest mean and say that government is too big ($M = .63$, $SD = .35$). Thus, the results for these three items go in the direction of the hypothesis, but the differences among the frames are not significant.

Participants were asked about government spending in eight different policy areas: culture and the arts, education, environment, health, military and defense, police and law enforcement, unemployment, and welfare. Likert-type answer choices ranged from spend much more to spend much less and were recoded so that higher numbers meant spend more. Spending for unemployment and welfare were scaled together (Cronbach's = .72) such that there are 7 spending variables. In the broadest conceptual sense, one would argue that increases in government spending will increase the size and power of government, and therefore one would expect participants in the politics-centered groups to be most opposed to increased government spending, and thus they would have the lowest means. Table 4.6 sets forth the results. With one modest exception, the results for government spending do not support the hypothesis.

[Table 4.6 about here]

The expected direction of the results for participants reading the politics-centered frame only occurred for spending for education. Participants favored spending the least for education ($M = .83$, $SD = .130$) together with participants reading the group position frame ($M = .83$, $SD = .134$), but the means were not significantly different among the frames. Moreover, against predictions, participants in the politics-centered frame favored spending the most, not least, in three areas: culture and the arts, police and law enforcement, and welfare and unemployment. The politics-centered frame was not the lowest (nor was it the highest) for spending for the environment and spending for the

125

military. None of these differences were significant. However, there was one significant effect of the frame on spending for health, $F(3, 110) = 4.74$, $p < .01$. Contrary to expectations, the Tukey HSD procedure revealed that the pairwise differences occurred *not* between participants reading the politics-centered frame and the other frames, but rather between participants reading the symbolic racism frame ($M = .74$, $SD = .09$) and the whiteness frame ($M = .85$, $SD = .11$), $p < .01$.

In summary, tests of the third hypothesis about the effect of the politics-centered frame did not support the hypothesis. For the three items that asked specifically about the government and the one item that asked about government spending for education, the results were in the expected direction, but the differences were not significant. Thus, only four of 10 policy opinions had results in the correct direction. Moreover, results for three spending items results were the opposite of predictions with participants in the politics-centered frame favoring spending the most, though the differences were insignificant. Finally, the frame had a significant effect on spending for health, but not for participants reading about Black plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame.

Whiteness. Conceptualizing and quantitatively testing hypotheses based on whiteness studies is a new venture. Thus, Research Question 1 broadly asked how policy responses from participants in the whiteness frame would compare to responses from participants in the other theoretical frames, all with Black plaintiffs. Participants reading the whiteness frame differed from participants reading the other frames for only two policies, spending for health and job training and educational assistance for Blacks.

As noted above, the government spending items were expected to resonate with participants reading the politics-centered frame with Black plaintiffs (see Table 4.6).

Instead, participants reading the whiteness frame favored spending significantly more for health compared to participants reading the symbolic racism frame. The results of an analysis of variance for health spending indicated a significant effect of the frame, $F(3, 110) = 4.74$, $p < .01$. Post hoc analyses using Tukey's HSD revealed that the pairwise differences occurred between participants reading the symbolic racism frame ($M = .74$, $SD = .09$) and the whiteness frame ($M = .85$, $SD = .11$), and the difference was significant ($p < .01$).

Additionally, for job training and educational assistance for Blacks, participants reading the whiteness frame expressed the least opposition (see Table 4.2). The analysis of variance revealed a marginal effect of the frame, $F(3, 110) = 2.22$, $p < .10$. The Tukey HSD procedure revealed that pairwise differences among means were marginally significant for participants in the whiteness ($M = .54$, $SD = .20$) and group position frames ($M = .67$, $SD = .18$) ($p < .10$).

Summary. The results for the four theories are summarized in Table 4.7. The group position hypothesis has modest support. The hypothesis for the symbolic racism has a little support, and the results do not support the politics-centered hypothesis. The findings for the research question about whiteness provide a first step for quantitative testing of the theory.

[Table 4.7 about here]

I turn next to a discussion of the implications of these findings before reporting results for the second group of hypotheses.

Discussion

The results collectively suggest that in most cases the theoretical framing of the story with Black plaintiffs does not have significant effects on the policy preferences of White participants. The results seem to demonstrate the overlap in the construction of the theories noted in Chapter 1. I first discuss a few highlights with respect to each theory before noting some limitations of the study.

The three economic policies expected to be affected by participants reading the group position frame did perform as expected and generated the greatest opposition. Yet, in only one instance were the differences distinct, and even then the differences were not among participants reading the group position, symbolic racism and the politics-centered frames. Instead, for job training and educational assistance for Blacks, the difference was between participants reading the group position frame and participants reading the whiteness frame. This result may be interpreted as indicating the overlap in the construction of the three theories, and if so, then the results should be similar for the other policies (dependent variables).

Indeed, the results for three of four policies in the symbolic racism area also suggest the overlap of the theoretical constructs: opinions did not differ significantly among the theoretical frames. This overlap in the theories is the biggest news for the symbolic racism frame results, but three other aspects merit discussion.

First, each of the three items specifically mentioned "Blacks" in its wording (i.e., Blacks as lazy, Blacks as not determined to succeed, and ongoing discrimination hurting the chances of Blacks to get good jobs). Contrary to expectations, participants reading the symbolic racism frame had amongst the least negative (harsh) views for each policy. It may be that these three dependent variables for symbolic racism are too socially

sensitive. More specifically, participants reading about Black plaintiffs in the symbolic racism frame may have become sufficiently race-conscious when reading "Black" in the statement that the norm of equality was elevated, affecting their expressed opinions (see Mendelberg discussion in Chapter 1).

Second, results for participants' endorsement of the lazy stereotype had an additional interesting outcome. Participants reading the group position frame had the highest endorsement of the stereotype, suggesting that the norm of equality may not function similarly for participants reading the symbolic racism and group position frames. One plausible explanation is that the sense of threat that differentiates group position from symbolic racism operated to overcome or daunt the impulse to equality. However, the differences were not statistically significant. It may be that with a stronger stimulus the difference between the symbolic racism and group position frame would become more distinct, and then it might be possible to determine if feelings of threat daunt impulses to equality. Future work needs to test this possibility.

Third, the one policy where participants in the symbolic racism frame had the predicted harshest opinions was about government assistance. The item read, "The government has an obligation to assistant people in meeting their basic needs." Such government assistance is implicitly about welfare. In thinking about symbolic racism, the underlying idea is that such government assistance violates the traditional American values of hard work and individualism. For this reason participants reading a symbolic racism frame should be most opposed, and they are. In contrast to the three policies where traditional values are also violated and the term "Blacks" appears, this statement does not use the word "Blacks," yet research has shown that Blacks have been associated

with welfare (Gilens, 1996, 1998, 1999). This statement both violates the norms of hard work and individualism *and* involves a racialized policy. Here the norm of equality appears not to have been raised, possibly because no specific reference was made to Black people. Instead, participants reading the symbolic racism frame had the harshest opinions as predicted. More work must be done to test this possibility.

Turning next to the politics-centered frame, again the major story from the results is the overlap in conceptualization of the theories. The three general statements about the size and role of government had results in the expected direction, but the differences were not significant among the theoretical frames. Six of seven spending items also had no significant differences among the frames. Spending for health, however, tells a somewhat different story.

Spending for health is the only spending area where the frame had a significant effect on participants' opinions. Yet, it was not participants reading the politics-centered frame that differed from the others; instead, participants reading the symbolic racism frame wanted to spend significantly less than participants reading the whiteness frame. Supporting the main story of conceptual overlap, it is important to note that results for the symbolic racism, group position, and the politics-centered frames did not differ from one another. However, the results for spending for health merit discussion for two additional reasons. First, consistent with ideas underlying the theory of symbolic racism, these participants may have perceived such government spending for health as violating the traditional American values of hard work and individualism. Participants in this experiment were financially well-off (and thus presumably had health insurance), which may also have also contributed to a sense that government spending for health was for

unworthy others. Second, it is also notable that the item does not refer to Blacks. These results and rationale seem similar to the results and rationale for the policy about government assistance noted above: the statement does not mention Blacks. The item appears race-neutral, and the norm of equality is not raised. People are then comfortable opposing the policy. The results thus suggest that health care has become (or may be becoming) a racialized policy. This explanation is plausible, but more work beyond this experiment needs to focus on that possibility.

It is also worth noting that participants reading the politics-centered frame favored spending the *most* rather than *least* in two policy areas: welfare/unemployment and police/law enforcement. Research has demonstrated how both policy areas have become racialized. Since welfare is associated with Black people and participants reading the politics-centered frame wanted to spend more than other groups, the results are consistent with a possible race-consciousness that elevated the norm of equality. However, the underlying premise of the politics-centered approach is that race is not a primary driver of opinion, and race does appear to have an effect here. Similarly, because crime is associated with Black people, then spending more for law enforcement makes sense as a desire to protect innocent, law-abiding White people from Black criminals. In both cases, it is appears that race was operating to affect policy preferences, which is contrary to the notions underlying the politics-centered approach. Yet again, the differences were not generally significant among the theoretical frames, and future work would need to examine this possibility.

Turning last to the results for whiteness, there were only two policies for which the whiteness frame made a difference in participants' opinions: spending for health and

job training and educational assistance for Blacks. Whiteness is based on a sense that the perspective of White people is the logical, natural, and/or correct way to understand the world. There is also an element of White innocence and White-centrism at work in this perspective. Then arguably, for health spending participants reading the whiteness frame responded as though the policy was for them and expressed opinions supporting the most spending. That result would be consistent with a white-centric focus. However, in some sense the results for job training and educational assistance for Blacks are the opposite. Participants reading the Whiteness frame least opposed such assistance, and it is not clear why White participants reading the whiteness frame would respond in this way. It could be that the mention of Black people raised a norm of equality or fairness, but that fails to explain why the norm was not raised for other policies that mentioned Blacks for participants reading the whiteness frame. Thus, the only two policies where the whiteness frame was significantly different from the other frame produced contradictory results, and no pattern has been suggested for the whiteness framing.

In summary, with a few exceptions, the big story is the overwhelming lack of difference in effect of the different theoretical frames across policy items. It may be that my test was too weak or that my predictions were incorrect. I argue that the former is mostly likely, but I will address both potential explanations, beginning with the latter.

Proponents of the different theories contend that their particular explanation offers the greatest insight into understanding how White Americans can express support for egalitarian principles while failing to support public policies designed to alleviate such inequality. The purpose of this study was to begin to differentiate how and in what contexts each theory might provide some insight into this dilemma. The hypotheses set

forth in this study were based on the key concepts of each theory. Therefore, to the extent that a theory presents a viable explanation, one should be able to manipulate different outcomes. If that cannot be done, it suggests that either the theoretical constructs are not distinct (and then any related hypotheses would be incorrect) or the manipulation was not strong enough to trigger different outcomes.

A stronger manipulation might have produced significant differences between these frames because in numerous instances the results are in the correct direction. One limitation of this study is a lack of pre-testing of the different versions of the stimuli. Although each story uses language that tracks with the wording of survey-items used to assess the particular theory, it may be that one short 38-word newspaper paragraph was insufficient to trigger different outcomes. A pre-test would have indicated whether the stimuli worked as expected.

A second limitation of the study is the make-up of the participants. That they were politically liberal may have made them more socially conscious and resistant to the stimuli in certain instances. Additionally, due to the numerical limitations of working mostly with a university class participant pool, a control group was not included in the initial design. Since the goal of the study was to compare the effects of reading the different theoretical frames with one another, this omission was thought acceptable. However, it would have been informative to compare the results to a group that read a neutral frame.

Additionally, it is worth noting that for one of the policies expected to resonate with symbolic racism, it was the group position frame that had the harshest result, arguably because the sense of threat overcame any impulse to equality. The possibility

that threat trumps equality merits further exploration. Moreover, the earlier theoretical

discussion in Chapter One noted that some theorists argue that group position essentially

subsumes symbolic racism, and these results tend in that direction. The suggestion that

spending for health has also become racialized is also worthy of further work. More

about future directions for this work will be set forth at the end of the chapter. I now turn

to the second manipulation of the experiment and report the responses within each

theoretical frame as the plaintiff group is manipulated to be Black, White, or racially

unspecified.

White Opinion by Race of Plaintiff within Theoretical Frames

The second broad area of hypotheses involved the difference that the race of

plaintiff in the news story would make for policy preferences within each theoretical

frame. It may be that race and frame work differently under different conditions to affect

policy opinions. To analyze the data two-way independent analysis of variance

(ANOVA) with the interaction term Race x Frame were conducted. The racially

unspecified plaintiffs and the politics-centered frame were selected as the reference

groups. Having racially unspecified plaintiffs made both logical and intuitive sense as a

base of comparison for testing the effect of manipulating the race of the plaintiffs to be

Black or White. The theoretical premise of the politics-centered approach is that policy

preferences of White people are generally about the proper role, size, and power of

government and not primarily about race, and therefore White people's opinions should

not be affected by the race of the plaintiffs but rather by the role of the government. Thus,

it made theoretical sense to select the politics-centered frame as the reference group. All

analyses were adjusted for the number of tests performed.[9] Results are organized by theoretical frame (i.e., prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic racism, and whiteness but excluding the politics-centered frame because it is part of the reference group).

Prejudice as a sense of group position. My fourth hypothesis predicted that the effect of race of the plaintiffs in the group position frame will be larger compared to unspecified plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame for certain public policies. In other words, White participants reading about Black plaintiffs in the group position frame will have harsher or more conservative opinions on a variety of public policy issues. It was expected that the Black plaintiff condition would have harsher results than the White plaintiff condition for participants reading the group position frame because the theory is about a sense of threat to a dominant group from a subordinate group. In terms of this theory and United States history of slavery and its legacy, Whites may be perceived as the historically dominant group and Blacks as the historically subordinate group. Means and standard deviations for the relevant policies in the group position frame are set forth in Table 4.8. The results are in the correct direction for four of eight policies, but the differences are not significant (i.e., hiring and promotion assistance for Blacks, job training and educational assistance for Blacks, preferring work to welfare, and three-strikes laws).

[Table 4.8 about here]

---

[9] All analyses also included Levene's test for of the assumption of homogeneity of variances. Unless stated otherwise in the text, the assumption of the homogeneity of variances could not be rejected. Additionally, in order to ascertain pairwise comparsions of differences between groups, Tukey's HSD procedure (equal variances assumed) and Dunnett's 3T (unequal variances assumed) were run for all dependent measures.

Supporting the hypothesis, there was a significant interaction effect between race of the plaintiff and the group position frame on opposition to hiring and promotion assistance for Blacks, $F(6, 320) = 2.77$, $p < .05$. There were no main effects. Figure 4.1 sets forth the results of the interaction for hiring and promotion assistance for Blacks.

[Figure 4.1 about here]

Post hoc pairwise comparisons using Tukey's HSD procedure revealed that the effect of reading about Black plaintiffs in the group position frame, compared to reading about racially unspecified plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame, increased opposition to hiring and promotion assistance for Blacks ($p < .01$). However, the pairwise comparisons also revealed that the effect of reading about White plaintiffs in the group position frame, compared to unspecified plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame, also significantly increased opposition to hiring and promotion assistance for Blacks ($p < .05$). Thus, changing the frame from politics-centered to group position significantly increased opposition to the policy for participants reading about either Black or White plaintiffs.[10] Additionally, the pairwise comparisons revealed that the group position frame alone had a significant effect in the opposite direction and decreased opposition to the policy. Thus, the added effect of the interaction Race x Frame powerfully pushed the results in the opposite direction and increased opposition to the policy, which supports the hypothesis.

---

[10] The post hoc pairwise comparisons also revealed two additional unexpected results for hiring and promotion assistance for Blacks. Participants reading the symbolic racism frame with White plaintiffs had significantly greater opposition to hiring and promotion assistance for Blacks compared to participants reading the politics-centered frame with racially unspecified plaintiffs ($p < .05$). Additionally, there was a marginal increase in opposition to the policy by participants when the plaintiff group was White and the theoretical frame was whiteness, compared to the reference group ($p < .10$). Thus, the plaintiff group being White interacted with each of the group position, symbolic racism, and whiteness frames to increase opposition to the policy, compared to the unspecified plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame.

Race and frame had no significant main effects for opposition to job training and educational assistance for Blacks, and the interaction was nonsignficant. Yet, Tukey's HSD procedure revealed two relevant post hoc pairwise comparisons. When the race of the plaintiffs was Black and the frame was group position, the effect was to increase opposition to job training and educational assistance for Blacks compared to unspecified plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame ($p < .05$). Similarly, participants reading about White plaintiffs in the group position frame were marginally more opposed to the policy compared participants reading about unspecified plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame ($p = .057$). Thus the effects for race of plaintiff and the group position frame are similar for both affirmative action policies, but the overall model is significant only for hiring and promotion assistance and not for job training and educational assistance.

For the statement about people on welfare preferring work to welfare, the univariate analysis of variance revealed no main effects of race or frame but did reveal a marginal effect for the interaction term Race x Frame, $F(6, 320) = 1.96$, $p < .10$. However, the post hoc pairwise comparisons indicated that contrary to expectations, participants reading the symbolic racism frame with unspecified plaintiffs disagreed marginally more with the policy compared to participants reading the politics-centered frame with racially unspecified plaintiffs ($p < .10$). The hypothesis that it would be Black plaintiffs in the group position frame that triggered the harshest response from participants was not supported.

Five crime items involved the idea of resource/status threat: favoring the death penalty, equalizing the penalties for alcohol and marijuana, equalizing the penalties for crack and powder cocaine, legalizing marijuana for medical purposes, and favoring three-

strikes laws. Only the three-strikes laws had the direction as hypothesized with

participants reading about Black plaintiffs in the group position frame being most in

favor of three-strikes laws, but the difference was not significant. The results for

equalizing the penalties for alcohol and marijuana also had no differences. Moreover, the

univariate analysis of variance revealed no significant differences as hypothesized for

equalizing the penalties for crack and powder cocaine, legalizing marijuana for medical

purposes, and supporting the death penalty, though for each there were unexpected

effects not directly related to the hypothesis.[11] Additionally, for equalizing the penalties

for crack and powder cocaine the effect of the interaction with Black plaintiffs in the

group position frame was a marginal decrease in opposition to the policy by participants

compared to participants reading about unspecified plaintiffs in the politics-centered

frame ($p < .10$), which is opposite of predictions. In summary, the five crime items do

not support the hypothesis.

---

[11] For equalizing the penalties for crack and powder cocaine, Race had a main effect on participants'
opinions that was marginally significant, $F(2, 321) = 2.95$, $p = .054$. Reading about Black plaintiffs in the
politics-centered frame significantly increased opposition to equalizing the penalties for crack and powder
cocaine, compared to unspecified plaintiffs in the same frame ($p < .01$). Also, having White plaintiffs in the
politics-centered frame similarly increased opposition to equalizing the penalties compared to unspecified
plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame, though the difference was only marginal ($p < .10$). Additionally,
the univariate analysis of variance revealed that Race and Frame had main effects that were marginally
significant on opinions about legalizing marijuana for medical purposes, $F(2, 321) = 2.57$, $p < .10$ and $F(3,
321) = 2.39$, $p = .10$, respectively. There was no overall effect of Race x Frame. There was a direct effect of
Race when the plaintiffs were Black in the politics-centered frame that decreased opposition to legalizing
marijuana for medical purposes, compared to unspecified plaintiffs in the same frame ($p < .05$). Similarly,
when the plaintiffs were White in the politics-centered frame, there was a marginal decrease in opposition
to the policy ($p < .10$). Thus, in the politics-centered frame reading about Race (Black or White) decreased
opposition to legalizing marijuana compared to reading about unspecified plaintiffs. Additionally, the post
hoc pairwise comparisons revealed one interaction that had a significant effect in the opposite direction.
With White plaintiffs in the Whiteness frame, opposition to legalizing marijuana was significantly boosted
($p < .05$). Although there were neither main effects nor an interaction effect for support for the death
penalty, the pairwise comparisons revealed that the symbolic racism frame with unspecified plaintiffs had
an effect relative to the politics-centered frame with unspecified plaintiffs. Reading the news story with
unspecified plaintiffs in the symbolic racism frame marginally decreased support for the death penalty
compared to reading the story with unspecified plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame ($p < .10$).

Overall then, there was only one result that supported the hypothesis for the effect of reading the group position frame with Black plaintiffs. There was a significant interaction between the race of the plaintiff group and the frame of the story on opposition to hiring and promotion assistance for Blacks. The results are summarized in Table 4.9.

[Table 4.9 about here]

Symbolic racism. Hypothesis 5 predicted that the effect of the plaintiffs in the symbolic racism frame will be larger compared to unspecified plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame for certain public policies, such that reading about Black plaintiffs would produce the harshest (or most conservative) results. The four policy items relevant to the symbolic racism frame are: government assistance with basic needs, a belief about the continuing relevance of discrimination against Black people, and endorsement of two stereotypes about Blacks. Table 4.10 set for the means and standard deviations for these four policies in the symbolic racism frame.

[Table 4.10 about here]

For three of the four items there were no main effects and no significant interactions, and for the endorsement of the stereotype of Blacks there were significant effects but not as predicted (i.e., not involving the symbolic racism frame). Hypothesis 5 was not supported.

For endorsement of the stereotype of Blacks as lazy, there was a significant main effect of Race, $F(2, 320) = 4.44$, $p < .05$. The post hoc tests revealed that the plaintiff group being Black significantly decreased endorsement of the stereotype ($p < .05$). Similarly, the plaintiff group being White marginally decreased endorsement of the

139

stereotype ($p < .10$). There was also a significant main effect of frame, $F(3, 320) = 2.69$, $p < .05$. The post hoc comparisons did not reveal any significant pairwise differences between the frames. Instead, Tukey's HSD procedure revealed that the frame being group position and the plaintiff group being Black significantly increased endorsement of the stereotype of Blacks as lazy ($p < .05$). In other words, the combination of group position and Black plaintiffs worked the opposite of Race alone for either Black or White plaintiffs to increase endorsement of the stereotype.[12] Table 4.11 summarizes the results.

[Table 4.11 about here]

Whiteness. My second research question asked how the responses would vary when the plaintiff group changed from Black plaintiffs to White plaintiffs to racially unspecified plaintiffs in a news story framed to reflect whiteness. Across all policy items there were no main effects for race and frame and no significant interactions of Race x Frame for participants reading the whiteness frame. In order to learn as much as possible

---

[12] There were two additional items with unexpected findings: the idea that government has a basic obligation to assist people in meeting their basic needs and the stereotype that Blacks are determined to succeed. Although there was no effect for Frame or the interaction Race x Frame, there was a marginal main effect of Race on opinions about the need for the government to assist people in meeting their basic needs, $F(2, 319) = 2.78$, $p < .10$. Post hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that when the plaintiffs were Black in the politics-centered frame, disagreement with government's obligation to assist with basic needs decreased (agreement increased) compared to unspecified plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame ($p < .05$). Similarly, with White plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame, disagreement with the statement decreased compared to unspecified plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame ($p < .01$). Participants reading the group position frame with unspecified plaintiffs also disagreed significantly less with the policy compared to participants reading the politics-centered frame with unspecified plaintiffs ($p < .05$). However, participants reading the group position frame with White plaintiffs expressed increased disagreement with the statement compared to the politics-centered frame and unspecified plaintiffs ($p < .05$). For endorsement of the stereotype about blacks being determined to succeed (reverse-coded), there were no main effects and the interaction was not significant, though the post hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that there was one marginally significant interaction. Participants reading about White plaintiffs in the group position frame agreed more with the stereotype compared to participants reading about racially unspecified plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame ($p < .10$). The implications of these results will be addressed in the discussion section.

about how whiteness affects policy opinions, the post hoc pairwise comparisons were examined, and results are noted in footnote.[13]

In summary, the idea that race and frame would interact and produce different effects in different situations had little support. A significant effect of Race x Frame only occurred for one policy—hiring and promotion assistance for Blacks. While there were other significant differences revealed in the pairwise comparisons, which will be addressed in the discussion section, the model itself did not perform as predicted.

Discussion

Overall, the idea that manipulating the frame of the story and the race of the plaintiff group would produce distinct outcomes did not hold up in testing. The one exception was for the policy about hiring and promotion assistance for Blacks, which will be discussed below. Additionally, there are several unexpected results that merit some discussion.

For the policy about hiring and promotion assistance for Blacks, the interaction of Race x Frame significantly increased opposition to the policy. As expected, participants

---

[13] Although not involving main effects or significant interactions, post hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that there were five policies for which participants reading the whiteness frame expressed different responses. Although each has been noted in earlier footnotes, for convenience the four are listed here. For the first four policies, the effect was to increase the harshness of the response, and for the fifth the effect was to lessen the harshness. 1) With White plaintiffs in the whiteness frame, opposition to legalizing marijuana was significantly boosted, compared to unspecified plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame ($p <$ .05). 2) For hiring and promotion assistance for Blacks, participants' opposition to the policy marginally increased when the plaintiffs were White in the whiteness frame compared to participants reading about racially unspecified plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame ($p < .10$). 3) There was also a marginal increase in disagreement with the statement that government has an obligation to assist with basic needs when participants read about White plaintiffs in the whiteness frame compared to unspecified plaintiffs reading the politics-centered frame ($p < .10$). 4) For belief that discrimination hurts the chance of Blacks to get good jobs, participants reading the whiteness frame with unspecified plaintiffs thought that discrimination does not hurt the change of Blacks to get good jobs marginally more than participants reading the politics-centered frame with unspecified plaintiffs ($p < .10$). 5) For spending for welfare and unemployment participants reading the whiteness frame with White plaintiffs favored spending more than participants reading the politics-centered frame with unspecified plaintiffs ($p < .05$). The same effect occurred with Black plaintiffs in the whiteness frame ($p < .05$). However, participants reading the whiteness frame with unspecified plaintiffs were significantly more in favor of spending less ($p < .05$).

reading about Black plaintiffs in the group position frame were more opposed to the policy than participants reading about racially unspecified plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame. However, participants reading about White plaintiffs in the group position frame were also more opposed compared to the reference group. Thus, having Race specified as either Black *or* White in the group position frame increased opposition to the policy, perhaps because people became more race-conscious. A similar pattern occurred for job training and educational assistance for Blacks, the group position frame, and race of plaintiffs, though the model was not significant. Thus reading about Black or White plaintiffs increased opposition to both affirmative action type policies, arguably because threat trumps equality. However, the results also could reflect concern by White participants about *any* group (e.g., Latinos/Latinas, Asian, etc.) receiving special treatment that violates the norm of equality.

Unexpectedly, there were significant main effects of race and frame for endorsement of the stereotype about Blacks and laziness, though the interaction was not significant. Participants reading about Black plaintiffs in the symbolic racism frame expressed less endorsement of the stereotype, as did participants reading about White plaintiffs in the same frame. The specific mention of Race (Black or White) decreased endorsement of the stereotype, perhaps signaling race-consciousness and elevation of the norm of equality in the participants' minds. In contrast, participants reading about Black plaintiffs in the group position frame had greater endorsement of the stereotype. The results suggest that Race alone increased race-consciousness, elevated the norm of equality, and decreased endorsement of the stereotype, whereas the group position frame and Black plaintiffs interacted to increase endorsement. As was noted earlier, it may be

that the sense of threat that is a key component of group position interacts with Black plaintiffs to dampen any impulse to elevate the norm of equality.

There are also instances where participants reading about White but not Black plaintiffs expressed greater opposition to hiring and promotion assistance for Blacks. Participants reading the symbolic racism frame with White plaintiffs opposed hiring and promotion assistance for Blacks, but these participants were not significantly opposed to the policy when reading about Black plaintiffs. Similarly, the whiteness frame with White plaintiffs increased opposition to the policy. For these two theoretical frames, the outcomes suggest that something different is occurring when participants read about White plaintiffs as opposed to Black plaintiffs. Perhaps a norm of equality was raised for participants when reading about Black plaintiffs but not when reading the same frame with White plaintiffs, though in both cases the policy specifically mentions Blacks. It could also be that when reading about Black plaintiffs the White participants were concerned about appearing racist, and thus tempered any opposition to special assistance for Blacks. When reading about White plaintiffs the White participants may not have felt a concern about appearing to be racist, and thus expressed opposition. If so, the question arises: Do these results mean that the opinions expressed by White participants when reading about White plaintiffs were more accurate opinions? If effects such as these are mostly unconscious or driven by implicit cues, it will be hard to trigger them with frames that explicitly evoke race. Yet, race is explicit in the policy (dependent variable), and it appears that White participants reading about White plaintiffs were not concerned about appearing racist in this context. It may be that reading about the White plaintiffs offered a type of safe haven. Future work might try to look deeper into this result.

One of the most troubling findings has to do with the politics-centered approach. This frame with racially unspecified plaintiffs was chosen as the reference group because it is supposed to be primarily about views toward government and not primarily about race. However, in several instances race appears to have made a difference, which is problematic for two reasons. First, it suggests that the theory may not be as non-racial as proponents argue, and that may in turn call into question the choice of this frame as the reference group. For example, post-hoc tests revealed that participants reading about White plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame expressed significantly less opposition to job training and educational assistance for Blacks compared to the participants reading about unspecified plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame.[14] If one is opposed to increased power or involvement of the federal government, then being opposed to this policy makes theoretical sense. The question becomes: Why does specifying White plaintiffs rather than not specifying the race of the plaintiffs decrease opposition?

One is left with a lingering suspicion that something racial is going on in the politics-centered frame. It may be that people imputed "Blacks" when reading about the racially unspecified plaintiffs. In other words, the unspecified group may have been racialized in the minds of many respondents, which elicited their opposition because they

---

[14] Post hoc analyses using Tukey's HSD revealed that for job training and educational assistance for Blacks pairwise differences occurred between participants reading the politics-centered frame with White plaintiffs ($M = .57$, $SD = .20$) and the politics-centered frame with unspecified plaintiffs ($M = .68$, $SD = .20$), and the difference was significant ($p < .05$). Additionally, there was a marginal effect of Race on the idea that government had an obligation to assist people in meeting their basic needs, a policy expected to resonate with participants in the symbolic racism frame. Instead, participants reading about Black or White plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame were less opposed to the policy compared to participants reading about unspecified plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame. Thus, Race appears to have affected the outcome. Similarly, for two of the crime items expected to resonate with the group position frame, Race appears to have affected the outcome in the politics-centered frame. For equalizing the penalties for powder and crack cocaine, participants reading about Black plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame were significantly more opposed than participants reading about unspecified plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame. For legalizing marijuana for medical purposes, the plaintiffs being Black decreased opposition to the policy. For both policies, when the plaintiffs were White, the results were similar to when the plaintiffs were Black, though the results were only marginally different.

could not be accused of being racist. These results raise questions about the choice of the

politics-centered frame as the reference group. This choice of reference group then

becomes a limitation of this study. An additional limitation follows.

Limitations

In addition to the limitations noted in the discussion sections about the strength of

the stimulus and the choice of the reference group, another overall limitation needs to be

brought forth. One of the critical decisions in designing the study was selecting the

dependent variables expected to reflect the different theories. For the most part the items

were selected simply because they had been used in previous survey work to measure

racial attitudes indicative of a particular theory.

After running the analyses describe above, in order to defend against accusations

about selectively choosing the dependent variables and "stacking the deck" in favor of

the hypotheses, a principle component analysis was conducted using a Varimax rotation.

It was expected that the factors would track with the theories of prejudice as a sense of

group position, symbolic racism, and the politics-centered approach and thus serve as a

confirmatory factor analysis. Instead, suppressing loadings under .4 as suggested by Field

(2008), the analysis yielded seven components. Four of the components loaded with

items that resonated with one specific theory, but three had items representing a

combination of different theories. Those that loaded together as expected are detailed in a

footnote; those that did not will be discussed.[15]

---

[15] The four that group together as expected for a particular theory are: 1) spending for art, environment, education, and health for the politics-centered approach; 2) feelings toward the federal government and power and size of federal government for the politics-centered approach; 3) legalizing marijuana for medical purposes and equalizing the penalties for alcohol and marijuana possession for group position; and 4) the stereotypes of Blacks as lazy and not determined to succeed for symbolic racism. The components containing multiple theoretical items were: 1) government assistance (symbolic racism), spending for welfare and unemployment (politics-centered), spending for health (politics-centered), and preferring work

The first component contained items relevant to symbolic racism, group position, and the politics-centered approach. The specific items with the respective theories are: government assistance (symbolic racism), spending for welfare and unemployment (politics-centered), preferring work to welfare (group position), and spending for health (politics-centered). It appears that the idea of welfare connects all the items except spending for health, though, as noted in earlier in this chapter, spending for health may be becoming racialized. Spending for health is the only item that loaded onto two components, and its loading for the other component is higher. Additionally, regarding the item about government assistance, recent work by Sears and colleagues has excluded that item from indicating symbolic racism (See Henry & Sears, 2002; Tarman & Sears, 2005). Excluding it from the group still leaves items from two theories loading onto the component, and they seem to make logical sense to be viewed together.

The second group of overlapping theories loaded onto the third component. It included: hiring and promotion for Blacks (group position), job training and educational assistance for Blacks (group position), and ongoing discrimination hurts the chances of Blacks to get good jobs (symbolic racism). It makes sense that these items loaded together in that symbolic racism items is not only about ongoing discrimination but also mentions jobs. The result confirms the idea of the overlap between group position and symbolic racism theory, at least with respect to affirmative action and jobs.

Finally, the third mixed group loaded onto the fourth component and contained items from group position and the politics-centered approach: death penalty (group

---

to welfare (group position); 2) hiring and promotion for Blacks (group position), job training and educational assistance for Blacks (group position), and ongoing discrimination hurts the chances of Blacks to get good jobs (symbolic racism); and 3) death penalty (group position), three strikes laws (group position), spending for the military (politics-centered), and spending for law enforcement (politics-centered).

position), three strikes laws (group position), spending for the military (politics-centered), and spending for law enforcement (politics-centered). A law-and-order theme emerges here. As originally conceptualized the dependent variables about crime were expected to respond to the group position frame as relating to threat (either decreasing or increasing it), and it may be that spending items for the military and police should not have been expected to resonate with the politics-centered approach.

In summary, these three components make logical sense, even though that is not how they were expected to load.[16] Future work should be clear that the items chosen as dependent variables for the different theories do relate to one another in the expected way.

Conclusion

This chapter explored how the public policy preferences of White participants would change as the frame of a news story was manipulated to emphasize considerations of four theories offered as explanations underlying White racial attitudes: prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic racism, the politics-centered approach, and whiteness. For the most part the findings were null with a few exceptions. However, the implications of these findings—and in many case their ambiguity—underscore the need for additional work in several areas.

First, the lack of distinct differences among the theoretical frames contributes to the idea of an overlap in conceptualization of the theories of group position, symbolic racism, and the politics-centered approach. That is, participants reading stories framed in terms reflecting any of these three theories did not generally offer distinctively different responses. Although it was not necessarily expected that one frame would elicit stark

---

[16] Limiting the principle components analysis to three components did not improve the situation.

opposition and another strong support for a given policy, it was expected that one frame would generate distinctly different responses by degree compared to the others. It may be that the stimulus was not sufficiently strong to trigger this result, but it may also be that the theories are intertwined in such a way that such different results cannot be produced. Two clear next steps are to develop and pretest a stronger stimulus and to include a control group as part of the study design.

Second, it also appears that there were instances where explicit mention of race triggered race-consciousness, elevated the norm of equality, and dampened opposition to certain policies. Yet, the explicit mention of race also appears to have responded not to the norm of equality but rather to a sense of threat. The speculation is that for participants reading the group position frame the explicit mention of race worked differently. It did not bring forth race-consciousness and elevate norms of equality; rather, the race-consciousness appears to have elevated the sense of threat such that threat outweighs equality. The implication of this finding about the possible impact of threat suggests that when White Americans feel that their resources, statuses, or privileges are threatened, they will be less likely to support public policies that work toward racial equality. Future work needs explicitly to test the relationship between the norm of equality and the sense of threat and the contexts in which one may work to overpower the other. It would also be important to seek to clarify the type of threat that might be effective in one context but not another.

Additionally, these results indicate the difficulty in eliciting "true" opinions from White participants when reference is made to Black people. The work on priming is based on the idea that explicit reference to Blacks will fail to trigger responses that could

be perceived as racist by White respondents, whereas implicit cues are able to trigger responses that would otherwise be repressed (Mendelberg, 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White, 2002). The findings about spending for health are particularly interesting in this regard, and it would be highly informative to determine the extent to which this policy area has become racialized.

Whereas the theories explored in this chapter were developed to explain White attitudes about Blacks, it is important to recognize that the world is not limited to these two groups. It would also be appropriate to look beyond Black and White to determine the extent to which mention of other racial groups produces similar or different effects. For example, it was noted that the mention of Black *or* White in several instances produced similar results. What would be the impact of mentioning Asian Americans, Latinos/Latinas, or Arab Americans?

The results of this study are mostly null, in that the expected differences between the racial frames did not emerge as strongly as expected. This might suggest that these racial attitudes are, in fact, largely overlapping psychological constructs such that particular contextual cues are unlikely to selectively activate one dimension (say, symbolic racism) but not another (group position). At the same time, because in numerous cases the results are in the correct direction, there is a suggestion that something is occurring such that context matters. With a stronger stimulus it might be possible to tease apart how the framing of a news story in terms of these theories affects the policy opinions of White participants. If so, we would be one step closer to understanding how White people can express support for egalitarian principles but fail to put them into practice.

Table 4.1. The Second Paragraph of the News Story by Theoretical Frame and Plaintiff Group

	Black Plaintiff Condition	White Plaintiff Condition	Unspecified Plaintiff Condition
Group Position	This court ruling hurts people who are not part of the plaintiff group. City Attorney David Ford warns, "The city cannot pay this award, and ultimately, it will be all American taxpayers who will help fund the award." Plaintiffs, working with other groups that are filing lawsuits across the nation, are petitioning Congress to establish a fund for compensation claims by all people who can prove that they are descendants of such dispossessed people. In some specific situations, the land for highways was taken but the roads were not built, and eventually, the land was developed for businesses and homes by others. Despite this development, the land must be returned to the plaintiffs, according to the court decision. Ford notes, "That means taking land, businesses, or homes from the innocent. The Plaintiff group has different goals and values."	Same language	Same language
Symbolic Racism	Tempers are flaring as some residents argue that the plaintiffs are demanding more than they rightfully should from the government. President of Citizens against the Lawsuit, Robert Sands, claims, "Ultimately, the plaintiffs are taking unfair advantage of the government and demanding more government attention than they deserve." Local business owner John Jones says, "If plaintiffs' ancestors had worked harder and taken care of their homes and businesses, then the property would not have been condemned. It is taking unfair advantage to have pursued the lawsuit at this time." Sands and Jones are organizing a protest against the award on the basis of unfair advantage and undue attention from the government to the plaintiffs. City Attorney David Ford notes, "The property owned by plaintiffs' parents and grandparents constituted the picture of urban blight; in essence it was a ghetto."	Same language	Same language
Politics-centered	City Attorney David Smith expresses grave concern, "Quite simply, the award will create two classes of people with different and unequal rights. America was built on the values	Same language	Same language

	of equality and individualism, not group-based equity. " Plaintiffs, in collaboration with other groups that are planning to file lawsuits across the nation, are petitioning Congress to establish a new office in the Department of Transportation that will coordinate compensation claims by all people who can prove that they are descendants of the people who lost their homes and businesses to build the national highway system. Plaintiff spokesperson Charles Smith says, "This award is the beginning of a massive effort that will expand the scope of government." City Attorney Smith agrees but warns, "And expanding government is not a good thing for the American people. Smaller government is better government."		
Whiteness	City Attorney David Ford explains that the land that was taken was not as economically viable as other areas. "The City had no reasonable alternative" says Ford, "The area that was taken was crime-ridden and represented the picture of urban blight. The only alternative was an area that was designated to become a recreation area with a golf course, tennis courts, swimming pool, and nature center that would benefit all citizens at a minimal cost." Local business owner John Jones agrees, "Look at how our young people have used the golf and tennis facilities! Several have gone on to win golf scholarships to college. For a relatively nominal cost, as compared to country club fees, and residency proof, citizens of Des Moines have access to outstanding facilities. To have sacrificed this land for highways would have been unwise."	Same language	Same language

Table 4.2. Group Position Frame, Threat to Resource/Status, Black Plaintiffs

	Group Position	Symbolic Racism	Politics-centered	Whiteness
Job training and educational assistance for Blacks (favor – oppose)	0.67[a] (0.18)	0.62[ab] (0.19)	0.59[ab] (0.21)	0.54[b] (0.20)
Hiring and promotion assistance for Blacks (favor – oppose)	0.82 (0.19)	0.74 (0.18)	0.75 (0.19)	0.76 (0.18)
Prefer work to welfare (agree – disagree)	0.64 (0.19)	0.57 (0.17)	0.58 (0.20)	0.53 (0.22)

Note: Entries are the means from an analysis of variance. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. The Tukey's HSD procedure was conducted post hoc to determine pairwise differences. All means with different superscripts "a" and "b" across rows denote significance at the .10 level. Means with shared or no superscripts across rows are not significantly different from one another. All the dependent variables have been recoded to run from 0 to 1.

Table 4.3. Group Position Frame, Crime and Drug Policies, Black Plaintiffs

	Group position	Symbolic racism	Politics-centered	Whiteness
Legalizing marijuana for medical purposes (favor - oppose)	0.49 (0.24)	0.45 ().25)	0.36 (0.21)	0.38 (0.20)
Equalizing penalties for marijuana & alcohol (favor - oppose)	0.61 (0.26)	0.57 (0.28)	0.45 (0.28)	0.51 (0.30)
Three-strikes laws (oppose - favor)	0.81 (0.22)	0.80 (0.77)	0.77 (0.22)	0.76 (0.24)
Equalizing penalties for crack & powder cocaine (favor - oppose)	0.44 (0.18)	0.50 (0.27)	0.51 (0.24)	0.45 (0.24)
Death penalty (oppose - favor)	0.50 (0.24)	0.53 (0.31)	0.54 (0.27)	0.47 (0.24)

Note: Entries are the means from an analysis of variance. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. The Tukey's HSD procedure was conducted post hoc to determine pairwise differences. All means with different superscripts "a" and "b" across rows denote significance at the .10 level. Means with shared or no superscripts across rows are not significantly different from one another. All the dependent variables have been recoded to run from 0 to 1.

Table 4.4. Symbolic Racism Frame, Black Plaintiffs

	Group Position	Symbolic Racism	Politics-centered	Whiteness
Government assistance with basic needs (agree – disagree)	0.48 (.0.20)	0.55 (0.19)	0.49 (0.17)	0.46 (0.19)
Endorsement of stereotype of Blacks as lazy (inaccurate – accurate)	0.61 (0.23)	0.48 (0.20)	0.47 (0.23)	0.51 (0.18)
Endorsement of statement that Blacks are determined to succeed (inaccurate – accurate)	0.53 (0.21)	0.44 (0.16)	0.53 (0.18)	0.47 (0.17)
Discrimination hurts chance of Blacks to get good jobs (a lot – none)	0.44 (0.21)	0.44 (0.15)	0.48 (0.18)	0.49 (0.18)

Note: Entries are the means from an analysis of variance. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. The Tukey's HSD procedure was conducted post hoc to determine pairwise differences. All means with different superscripts "a" and "b" across rows denote significance at the .10 level. Means with shared or no superscripts across rows are not significantly different from one another. All the dependent variables have been recoded to run from 0 to 1.

Table 4.5. Politics-centered Frame, Opinions about Government, Black Plaintiffs

	Group Position	Symbolic Racism	Politics-centered	Whiteness
Feelings toward the federal government (colder – warmer)	0.61 (0.18)	0.52 (0.18)	0.52 (0.17)	0.56 (0.17)
Governmental power (not too powerful – too powerful)	0.40 (.61)	0.61 (0.50)	0.71 (0.46)	0.65 (0.49)
Size of government (not too big – too big)	0.58 (0.29)	0.60 (0.32)	0.63 (0.35)	0.59 (0.36)

Note: Entries are the means from an analysis of variance. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. The Tukey's HSD procedure was conducted post hoc to determine pairwise differences. All means with different superscripts "a" and "b" across rows denote significance at the .10 level. Means with shared or no superscripts across rows are not significantly different from one another. All the dependent variables have been recoded to run from 0 to 1.

Table 4.6. Politics-centered Frame, Government Spending (less – more), Black Plaintiffs

	Group Position	Symbolic Racism	Politics-centered	Whiteness
Culture & the Arts	0.60 (0.15)	0.58 (0.16)	0.64 (0.18)	0.61 (0.16)
Education	0.83 (0.13)	0.86 (0.15)	0.83 (0.13)	0.86 (0.13)
Environment	0.79 (0.15)	0.78 (0.17)	0.81 (0.15)	0.82 (0.17)
Health	0.79^{ab} (0.12)	0.74^{a} (0.09)	0.79^{ab} (0.11)	0.85^{b} (0.11)
Military & defense	0.44 (0.12)	0.46 (0.19)	0.43 (0.16)	0.41 (0.20)
Police & law enforcement	0.58 (0.09)	0.57 (0.12)	0.65 (0.16)	0.62 (0.17)
Welfare & unemployment	0.57 (0.15)	0.57 (0.17)	0.61 (0.17)	0.59 (0.14)

Note: Entries are the means from an analysis of variance. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. The Tukey's HSD procedure was conducted post hoc to determine pairwise differences. All means with different superscripts "a" and "b" across rows denote significance at the .10 level. Means with shared or no superscripts across rows are not significantly different from one another. All the dependent variables have been recoded to run from 0 to 1.

Table 4.7. Summary of Results, All Theoretical Frames, Black Plaintiffs

	Group Position	Symbolic Racism	Politics-centered	Whiteness*
Significant differences, correct direction				- Increase spending for health
Marginal differences, correct direction	- Increase opposition to job training and educational assistance for Blacks			- Increase opposition to job training and educational
Not significant, correct direction	- Increase opposition to hiring and promotion assistance for Blacks - Disagree that prefer work to welfare - Oppose legalizing marijuana - Oppose equalizing penalties for alcohol and marijuana - Support three strikes laws	- Most opposed to government assistance for basic needs	- Coldest feelings toward the federal government - Government too powerful - Government too big - Supports least spending for education	
Not significant, neither high or low	- Support for the death penalty		- Spending for the environment - Spending for health - Spending for military and defense	
Not significant,	- Equalizing penalties for crack and powder cocaine.	- Stereotype of Blacks as lazy	- Spending for culture and the arts	

157

wrong direction	- Stereotype of Blacks as determined to succeed - Discrimination in the past	- Spending for welfare and unemployment (scale) - Spending for police and law enforcement
Marginal differences, wrong direction		
Significant differences, wrong direction		

*Note: Although whiteness is being included in this chart, it is important to remember that research questions were posed and that no hypotheses were posed. Therefore, the idea of "correct" or "wrong" directions should be ignored.

Table 4.8. Group Position Frame, All Plaintiff Groups

	Black plaintiffs	White plaintiffs	Unspecified plaintiffs
Hiring and promotion assistance for blacks (favor – oppose)	0.82 (0.19)	0.75 (0.25)	0.68 (0.24)
Prefer work to welfare (agree – disagree)	0.64 (0.19)	0.58 (0.23)	0.55 (0.23)
Job training and educational assistance for blacks (favor – oppose)	0.67 (0.18)	0.63 (0.21)	0.59 (0.25)
Death penalty (oppose - favor)	0.50 (0.24)	0.56 (0.27)	0.46 (0.28)
Equalizing penalties for alcohol & marijuana (favor - oppose)	0.61 (0.26)	0.64 (0.27)	0.57 (0.29)
Equalizing penalties for crack & powder cocaine (favor - oppose)	0.44 (0.18)	0.54 (0.25)	0.43 (0.25)
Legalizing marijuana for medical purposes (favor - oppose)	0.49 (0.24)	0.46 (0.20)	0.53 (0.27)
Three-strikes (oppose - favor)	0.81 (0.22)	0.76 (0.27)	0.79 (0.18)

Note: Entries are the means from an analysis of variance. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. The Tukey's HSD procedure was conducted post hoc to determine pairwise differences. All means with different superscripts "a" and "b" across rows denote significance at the .10 level. Means with shared or no superscripts across rows are not significantly different from one another. All the dependent variables have been recoded to run from 0 to 1.

Table 4.9. Results of ANOVA, Group Position Policies (Unspecified Plaintiffs & Politics-centered as Reference Groups)

	Main effect Race	Main effect Frame	Interaction Race x Frame	Post hoc Pairwise Comparisons	Post hoc Pairwise Comparisons	Post hoc Pairwise Comparisons
				Race	Frame	Race x Frame
Hiring & promotion assistance for Blacks (favor – oppose)	ns	ns	$p = .01$	- Black* - White*	- Group position** - Symbolic racism*	+ Group position by Black** + Group position by White** + Symbolic racism by White** + Whiteness by White*
Job training & educational assistance for Blacks (favor – oppose)	ns	ns	ns	- White**	ns	+ Group position by Black** + Group position by White**
Prefer work to welfare (agree – disagree)	ns	ns	$p = .07$	ns	ns	+ Symbolic racism by White*
Equalizing penalties for crack & powder cocaine (favor – oppose)	$p = .054$	ns	ns	+ Black*** + White*	ns	- Group position by Black*
Legalizing marijuana for medical purposes (favor – oppose)	$p = .08$	$p = .07$	ns	- Black** - White*		+ Whiteness by White**
Death penalty (oppose – support)	ns	ns	ns	ns	- Symbolic racism*	ns
Equalizing penalties for marijuana & alcohol (favor – oppose)	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Three-strikes laws (oppose – favor)	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns

- = decrease; + = increase

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 4.10. Symbolic Racism Frame, All Plaintiff Groups

	Black plaintiffs	White plaintiffs	Unspecified plaintiffs
Government assistance with basic needs (agree – disagree)	0.55 (0.19)	0.51 (0.15)	0.57 (0.19)
Discrimination hurts chance of Blacks to get good jobs (a lot – none)	0.44 (0.15)	0.46 (0.15)	0.43 (0.17)
Endorsement of stereotype of Blacks as lazy (inaccurate – accurate)	0.48 (0.20)	0.48 (0.20)	0.51 (0.17)
Endorsement of statement that Blacks are determined to succeed [reverse] (inaccurate to accurate)	0.44 (0.16)	0.49 (0.19)	0.49 (0.14)

Note: Entries are the means from an analysis of variance. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. The Tukey's HSD procedure was conducted post hoc to determine pairwise differences. All means with different superscripts "a" and "b" across rows denote significance at the .10 level. Means with shared or no superscripts across rows are not significantly different from one another. All the dependent variables have been recoded to run from 0 to 1.

Table 4.11. Results of ANOVA, Symbolic Racism Policies (Unspecified Plaintiffs & Politics-centered Frame as Reference Groups)

	Main effect Race	Main effect Frame	Interaction Race x Frame	Post hoc Pairwise Comparisons	Post hoc Pairwise Comparisons	Post hoc Pairwise Comparisons
				Race	Frame	Race x Frame
Government assistance with basic needs (agree – disagree)	$p = .06$	ns	ns	- Black** - White***	- Group position**	+ Group position by White** + Whiteness by White*
Discrimination hurts chance of Blacks to get good jobs (a lot – none)	ns	$p = .09$	ns	- White**	- Whiteness*	ns
Endorsement of stereotype of Blacks as lazy (inaccurate – accurate)	$p = .013$	$p = .046$	ns	- Black** - White*	ns	+ Group position by Black*
Endorsement of stereotype of Blacks as determined to succeed (reverse-coded) (inaccurate – accurate)	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	+ Group position by White*

- = decrease; + = increase
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Figure 4.1

Hiring and Promotion Assistance for Blacks
Effect of Race by Frame

*p < .05
**p < .01

Figure 4.2

Job Training and Educational Assistance for Blacks
Effects of Race by Frame

*p < .05
**p < .01

Conclusion

This dissertation began with a puzzle: Why do White Americans express belief in egalitarian principles but fail to support public policies designed to alleviate inequality between White people and Black people? Scholars have offered a variety of explanations for this gap between principles and practices, and this dissertation selected four for analysis. Three theories have been developed through hypothesis testing with quantitative methods (i.e., prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic racism, and the politics-centered approach). The fourth explanation, whiteness studies, comes from critical race theory and has largely been developed using qualitative methods. Three methods (i.e., textual analysis, content analysis, and an experiment) were employed to analyze these explanations for the gap between egalitarian principles and practices of White Americans using the televisions news coverage of Hurricane Katrina as the focus. The central thesis was that news media might present coverage that tended to conform to one or another of these attitudinal explanations at different times and in different contexts.

More specifically, the main idea was that news media may alter the characterization of a news story such that specific racial attitude dimensions become more or less salient. As a result, policy preferences may change over time not because racial attitudes are changing, but because different dimensions are more or less salient. This raises the possibility that news media might create and perpetuate an environment where the majority of White Americans can simultaneously profess belief in racial equality and non-discrimination and oppose policies designed to alleviate racial gaps in life outcomes. In this way, the faming of the story may serve as to help distribute and reinforce racial power (Entman, 2007).

Three methods from two disciplinary approaches were employed to examine the framing of news stories: textual analysis, content analysis, and an experiment. The decision to work with two disciplinary approaches was to see how methods associated with each could enhance the findings through triangulation and increase learning about the gap between White principles and policy preferences.

The first study used textual analysis to explore how concepts associated with whiteness were conveyed through language and visual imagery in stories broadcast in the early days after Hurricane Katrina struck landfall in Louisiana. Whereas most academic work on whiteness and media has focused on entertainment, this study expanded existing scholarship by demonstrating how television news can serve to perpetuate, reinforce, and naturalize whiteness through language and imagery. Three specific themes emerged: law and order, White normalcy, and White determination. Future work should explore each of these themes with further examples and expand the time frame to determine if (and how) the themes changed and/or how the means of exemplifying the themes may have changed. A comparison with non-disaster coverage would also be informative about how whiteness may be conveyed through television news. Exploring these changing ways of conveying whiteness would serve to demonstrate the dynamic nature of whiteness and offer at least one explanation for the gap between the egalitarian principles of most White people and their lack of support for certain public policies.

The second study examined television coverage of Hurricane Katrina through a quantitative content analysis. Previous content analyses have looked at racial representations in television news in terms of roles, sound bites, and visibility and have discussed implications for race relations, but such work has generally not attempted to

determine the specific theory that relates to the actual news content (Entman & Rojecki, 2000). The results of the content analysis begin to tell a story about construction of the coverage of Hurricane Katrina and the presence of prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic racism, and whiteness in the news, but from this coding scheme it is not possible to tell which predominated. Additionally, because some codes lacked reliability, it would be worthwhile to view this study as a pilot study. A subsequent, more extensive of examination of the data with new codes to capture more aspects of the theories and the improvement of the existing codes would provide the means to assess more clearly the relative presence of the theories. Yet, at a minimum, evidence of the presences of prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic racism, and whiteness appears in these news broadcast and again offer a glimpse as to factors that may be at play in explaining the puzzle about White egalitarian practices and principles.

By examining the results of the textual analysis and the content analysis, one can assess how they interrelate and support one another. The textual analysis looked at four different types of news stories and how they conveyed whiteness, and each can be connected to results from the content analysis. For example, the first story in the textual analysis illustrates how the three themes of whiteness (i.e., law and order, White normalcy, and White determination) come through the opening story of a broadcast where the anchor is also the reporter. The content analysis began to quantify these three themes. One-fifth of the stories showed crime imagery, talked about crime, or included both visuals and language about crime. The theme of crime is also part of the theories of symbolic racism (through the stereotypes about Blacks) and of prejudice as a sense of group position (through the stereotype about Blacks and the sense of threat to resources,

166

statuses, or privileges of Whites). Thus, one can argue that these three explanations about White racial attitudes are present in the same news coverage, though there is not sufficient information to be certain if one predominated.

The content analysis also provided quantification of White normalcy through the coding of every-day people and experts. The first CNN story illustrates how equal numbers of every-day people (i.e., one White woman, one Black woman, one White man, and one Black man) do not necessarily provide equal treatment in representation. The interview by Aaron Brown with New Orleans expatriate and expert Walter Isaacson in the third story is another way to show how White normalcy is conveyed. The content analysis revealed that of the 327 stories, 22 had single experts, and only one story had a single Black expert. A next step would be to examine more closely that single Black expert's portrayal as well as the other stories with White experts to flesh out how the stories do or do not convey whiteness beyond the simple omission of Black experts.

The NBC story illustrates all three themes of whiteness, but it is framed in terms of White determination to laugh, not cry, in the face of adversity. The Black mayor of Baton Rouge has a brief sound bite in the piece, though his words are undermined by the reporter. This aspect of the textual analysis was not captured by the coding scheme of the content analysis because government officials were not included in the codes. In order to more fully understand the racial representations in the broadcasts, it would be worthwhile to know how often Black officials appeared and whether their treatment was similar or different from that of Mayor Holden.

Together the textual analysis and the content analysis set the stage for thinking about why it matters how the news story is framed. The textual analysis provided a rich,

in-depth description of what was happening in the story, how racial representations were set forth. The content analysis attempted to quantify the frequency of different portrayals. The idea behind both studies was to understand more about how patterns in the news may reflect the four explanations about White racial attitudes.

The third study then brought together all four explanations and investigated how public policy preferences changed as the frame of a news story was manipulated to emphasize considerations which underlie prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic racism, the politics-centered approach, and whiteness. The goal was to tackle the possibility of a causal relationship between the different explanations about White racial attitudes and White policy preferences. While the findings were mostly null with a few exceptions, the implications of these findings—and in many case their ambiguity—underscore the need for additional work in several key areas.

First, the lack of distinct differences in the results among the theoretical frames contributes to the idea of an overlap in conceptualization of the theories of group position, symbolic racism, and the politics-centered approach and the concept of whiteness. It may be that the stimulus was not sufficiently strong to trigger this result, but it may also be that the explanations are intertwined in such a way that such different results cannot be produced. If whiteness is not distinct from the other theories, more work needs to be done to clarify what whiteness adds in terms of explanatory power. These results suggest that, in general, bringing whiteness into the mix with group position, symbolic racism, and the politics-centered approach further did not provide clarity but rather added to the haziness. Clear next steps are to develop and pretest a stronger stimulus and to include a control group as part of the study design.

Second, there were instances where explicit mention of race appears to have triggered race-consciousness, elevated the norm of equality, and dampened opposition to certain policies, but there were also instances where the explicit mention of race appears to have triggered a sense of threat. This latter result suggests the possibility that when White Americans feel that their resources, statuses, or privileges are threatened, they will be less likely to support public policies that work toward racial equality. Future work needs explicitly to test the relationship between the norm of equality and the sense of threat and the contexts in which one may work to overpower the other.

Third, the results of the experiment suggest that there are two policy areas where framing in accordance with the different explanations could potentially make a difference in real-world policy outcomes. One is affirmative action policies, and the other policy area is health care reform.

Consider first how the findings relate to affirmative action policies, such as job training and educational assistance or job hiring and promotion assistance. The results of the experiment showed that in a story with Black plaintiffs, White participants reading a group position frame were most opposed to job training and educational assistance for Blacks and differed from White participants reading a whiteness frame. This result suggests that how the story is framed matters in terms of the strength of White policy preferences. Projecting to the real world of policy and politics, arguably Whites who feel threatened would be more adamant, more strongly opposed than Whites who do not feel threatened about job training and educational assistance. In the current environment of ongoing, record-high unemployment, if news coverage focuses on crime (a staple of local news (Dixon & Linz, 2000a; Entman, 1990, 1992) or continuing job lay-offs, White

people might be even less inclined to support job training and educational assistance, and by extension, possibly government unemployment benefits.

Additionally, manipulation of the race of the plaintiff group in interaction with the frame of the story also sheds light on White policy preferences for affirmative action policies and offers insight into real-world consequences. For hiring and promotion assistance for Blacks, White participants reading the story framed in terms of group position with Black plaintiffs were more opposed, compared to participants reading the more neutral frame with unspecified plaintiffs. However, White participants reading about White plaintiffs in either the group position or symbolic racism frames were also more opposed to the policy. Extending these results to the real world, the sense of threat and the explicit mention of race (Black or White) may decrease support for this type of affirmative action policy. Support for this type of policy to help Black people may also be depressed by stories that talk about unfair advantage or undeservedness of the recipients and mentions White people.

The idea that a story about White people taking unfair advantage can depress support for this type of affirmative action policy—whereas a similar story with Black people does not—highlights the role of race in contemporary U.S. politics. If race is irrelevant, the results should not differ. It also reveals how White people may feel safe or comfortable making racial decisions when they can argue that it is not about race.

The other real-world application of these results is in the area of health care reform. Such reform has been a prime topic of policy discussions since the Clinton administration of the 1990s, and the Obama administration came into office with pledges to reform the health care system. How to do so was the topic of campaign debates. The

findings from this dissertation suggest that something racial may be occurring in this policy area. In the question about government spending for health, participants reading the symbolic racism frame with Black plaintiffs favored spending the least and participants reading the whiteness frame with Black plaintiffs favored spending the most. If television news coverage focuses on Black people as taking unfair advantage in some way (e.g., as criminals, as welfare dependents), then support for health care reform may well be depressed. In contrast, if the news were focused on White normalcy the suggestion is that health care reform might receive stronger support. A study of the framing of coverage of health care would be informative and timely.

The Politics-centered Approach: A Post-Racial World?

Proponents of the politics-centered approach argue that White policy preferences are largely about views toward the proper role of government and not primarily about race. This idea can be said to go along with the notion that we are now living in a post-racial world, and therefore, for the most part, race no longer matters. Indeed, the color-barrier was broken long ago by Jackie Robinson in baseball, and Michael Jordan became a hero to Black and White basketball fans alike. Golf superstar Tiger Woods is beloved by millions, as is comedian and television star Bill Cosby. Many White Americans embrace hip-hop and rap music. There are Black members of Congress, and the United States has elected its first Black president, Barack Obama. The results of this dissertation may shed some light on this notion of a post-racial world, a world where views toward government matter more than race.

On the one hand, as noted above, the results from the experiment were mostly null, and the frames with the politics-centered approach did not produce distinctly different

171

results from the other frames. Arguably, this lack of results gives credence to the accuracy of the politics-centered approach and a post-racial world. On the other hand, however, results from both the experiment and from the textual analysis work together to raise at least some question about this conclusion.

Two particular findings from the experiment are noteworthy, though it is important to recognize is that they are exceptions to the general pattern of null findings. White participants reading the politics-centered frame with Black or White plaintiffs expressed less disagreement with the government's obligation to assist with people's basic needs compared to unspecified plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame. That is, when race was not explicitly mentioned, White participants expressed significantly greater disagreement with the obligation of government to help people in meeting their basic needs. One can only speculate that the reason may be that in a race-conscious world the mention of Black or White triggers the desire not to appear racist and dampens opposition to government assistance, whereas the unspecified plaintiffs allows "true" feelings of opposition to this role of government to be revealed. Additionally, White participants reading about White plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame expressed significantly less opposition to job training and educational assistance for Blacks compared to the participants reading about unspecified plaintiffs in the politics-centered frame. If one is opposed to increased power or involvement of the federal government, then being opposed to this policy makes theoretical sense—regardless of the race of the race of the plaintiff. The question becomes: Why does specifying White plaintiffs rather than not specifying the race of the plaintiffs decrease opposition? Results for both policies suggest that something racial is occurring.

The textual analysis works with these results from the experiment to suggests that the world may not be so post-racial world after all. One might equate the idea of post-racial with Frankenberg's (1993) ideas about color- and power-evasiveness in the minds of White Americans. The textual analysis revealed how race becomes part of the story through the choice of language and visuals. The in-depth analysis of the stories examined each utterance in conjunction with the visual that appeared on the screen. In a post-racial world one would not expect the persistent refrain about crime and looting with imagery of Black people who appear to be looting from CNN anchor Aaron Brown. This language and the imagery reinforce the already existing association of Blacks with crime in the minds of White people (Dixon, 2000a, 2000b; Entman, 1990, 1992; Entman & Rojecki, 2000). While one might have been tempted to argue that the visuals were an accurate portrayal of events and therefore appropriate, it is noteworthy that subsequent analysis has shown that many of the stories about crime turned out to be inaccurate (Brezina & Kaufman, 2008; Thevenot, 2006). Additionally, one of the scenes that appears on screen during the discussion of looting and lawlessness may well have been a store that opened its doors specifically to help people in need (M. Schandorf, personal communication April 15, 2009). The story revealed through the textual analysis hardly seems post-racial.

Even if one accepts or believes that there was much "lawlessness and looting," it is particularly striking that when the on-the-scene reporter, Adaora Udoji, spoke about desperate people with nowhere to go, people sitting alongside the highway, and empty or flooded streets, the choice of visuals were of Black people purportedly looting. The question arises as to why that particular footage was selected and why not other footage, e.g., people sitting alongside the highway, empty streets, or flooded streets, images that

would have coincided with Udoji's words. Perhaps CNN had no other footage, though the lack of alternative footage seems unlikely in a 24/7 news format. Yet, the question would remain about the reason for showing visuals of crime when it was not the focus of the reporter, or at least why the disproportionate and repeated sequences. A study comparing what was provided by the wire services and what appeared as front-page photos in the coverage of Hurricane Katrina illustrates how media gatekeeping functions can made at the institutional level of the newspaper and not necessarily at the wire service level (Fahmy, Kelly, & Kim, 2007). Similarly, knowing what other footage was available and how the decision was made to show those particular clips would give insight into the production values and gatekeeping functions at work in the television newsroom. One is left with the thought that the choice of visuals was not particularly post-racial but rather a reminder of the embedded and persistent nature of institutional racism.

Additionally, the repetition of the different looting sequences (i.e., the "looping" of the visuals) throughout the two CNN stories reinforces the sense of Black people being different from White people. The everyday people shown in the first story include two Blacks and two Whites, but as discussed previously, the representations also reinforce a sense of difference. That sense of difference between Blacks and Whites from the first story is then compounded by the looping of the looting sequences for the opening 13 plus minutes of the broadcast. The meaning of race is structured with stereotypes of Blacks and a sense of threat to the social order of White people. Thus, the viewer does not see a post-racial world, but rather a world where White normalcy and Black deviance are co-constructed.

Final Thoughts

The goal of this dissertation was to shed light on the puzzle about how White people can express egalitarian principles but fail to support public policies designed to alleviate inequalities in life outcomes between Blacks and Whites. To accomplish this task, I looked at the theories of prejudice as a sense of group position, symbolic racism, and the politics-centered approach and the concept of whiteness from critical race theory and used the methods of textual analysis, content analysis, and an experiment to examine the news. The challenge of clarifying overlapping theoretical constructions and quantifying whiteness into measurable components presented even more difficulty than anticipated, and the results do not indicate that a single frame predominated news coverage.

At the same time, the results do suggest that something racial is going on in the news. The findings are consistent with other scholarly work about the portrayal of Black people as criminals, but this dissertation also revealed that the idea of threat as set forth in Blumer's theory of prejudice as a sense of group position can make a difference in White policy preferences, perhaps not at all times but certainly in some instances. Future work needs to focus on this role of threat, the different ways it may be included in a news story through language and imagery, and under what circumstances it seems to make a difference in policy preferences.

Additionally, this dissertation strove to triangulate the findings through the use of the different methods. Where the results are consistent across methods, adds to the credibility of the findings and argues for the importance of this kind of mixed-methods work. Finally, though the puzzle remains, it seems that more work on the framing of

news broadcasts built on what was learned from this dissertation could help with understanding the discrepancy between egalitarian principles and practices and arguably strengthen the foundation of our democracy.

Appendices

Appendix A

Guiding Questions for Specifying Whiteness --
Watching Television News Coverage of Hurricane Katrina

1. Does the particular story talk about physical threat, threat to the way of life
   (statuses or privileges), or scarcity of resources (shortages)?

2. If the reporter uses the word "we" to whom does s/he refer? Do others use the
   term? If so, who, when, and in what context? To whom does that "we" refer?
   What is the race of the speaker? How is the speaker dressed? Is the image of the
   speaker who says "we" juxtaposed with other images? What kinds?

3. Who speaks? (i.e., given agency through sound bites). What is their role? To what
   extent is the story told through official governments and mainstream leaders and
   to what extent is the story told through the voice of everyday people and
   community leaders? What color are the people who speak in the sound bites?

4. What are the images and portrayals of black people in the story? Do they fit
   stereotypes of blacks as criminals, law-breakers, welfare dependent, not hard-
   working, not in control of self, not intelligent, subordinate, lacking souls
   (humanness), and lack aesthetic refinement? If they are not stereotypical, what do
   they convey?

5. What are the images and portrayals of white people in the story? Do they fit with
   images of whites as ordered, rational, rigid, intelligence, financial success,
   civilized, power, achievement, control over self and others (e.g., emotions and
   bodies), discipline, dominance, having souls, and aesthetic refinement? If not, in
   what ways do they violate or transgress these expected roles?

6. Are other ethnic groups in the story? If so, describe their images and portrayals. Are they more in line with black portrayals or white portrayals or different from both?

7. What words are used to describe black people? What words are being said by the reporter when black people are the visuals, even if they are not specifically being described? How does this function as a type of implicit description?

8. What words are used to describe white people? What words are being said by the reporter when white people are the visuals, even if they are not specifically being described? How does this function as a type of implicit description?

9. What words are used to describe non-black and non-white people? What words are used by the reporter when they are the visuals, even if they are not specifically being described? How does this function as a type of implicit description?

10. Does the story mention or imply the values of equality or individualism? Who or what is being shown during at this time? If implied, how is it done?

11. What kinds of explanations are offered in the story for the solution to problems? Does the story discuss the historical legacy of slavery or institutional or structural racism? If not specifically discussed, is it implied, and if so, how is it done?

12. Do the reporters use metaphors in their descriptions? If so, what metaphors?

13. How are the different segments of the story linked together? Where is the story placed in the broadcast? Collectively, how do these stories relate to the other stories in that same broadcast about Katrina? How are they linked? How do they relate to stories within and across the news institutions?

14. How are the stories constructed in terms of linking, framing, nominating, and

summing up?

15. What are the underlying assumptions on which these stories are built?

Sample Annotated Transcript Excerpt

Disk 4
CNN
August 30, 2005

NOTE: All quotes used in paper must be checked against actual DVD before finalizing. This transcript is intended as a working draft to assess what is happening on screen.

9:00:32 – 9:06:56

Aaron Brown White male anchor 9:00:32	Disaster grows by the hour	Brown on camera
9:00:33	not simply natural disaster tonight. It is becoming the kind of disaster humans cause	**Looting Sequence A** (includes this box and next three; four different scenes) Three African Americans carrying large white plastic bags as they climb over debris
9:00:38	There is looting and lawlessness...overwhelming, in some places, the ability of police to keep order	Young African American boys coming out of store, 2 carrying plastic bags
9:00:46	...unsafe…desperate…	3 African American youth running, two with clothes, one grinning and pulling up his pants
9:00:50 – 9:00:51	when dawn broke today	Figures with clothes and plastic bags [end Looting Sequence A]
9:00:52 – 9:01:05	scope of disaster became clear	map - google earth
9:01:06	efforts to fix it [the breach] have failed and the water expected to begin rising rapidly again	house in water almost to roof
9:01:12 – 9:01:16	residents urged to find higher ground	African Am man on sitting on roof
9:01:17 – 9:01:30	race against time	Brown on camera

	"it is everything we feared"	Brown
9:01:30	New Orleans is no longer safe to live in. It is that simple and that stark…things have gotten worse…	aerial view of flooded downtown; office bdlgs [Canal Street?] Zooms in on people in the water, people in a truck
9:01:45	the governor of the state wants to figure out a way to get whoever is left in the city out	aerial of rescue helicopter
Sound bite, white woman Kathleen Blanco, Gov. LA 9:01:58- 9:02:09	"We're putting more and more survivors into the Superdome, and the conditions there are very difficult, but we're worrying first about the medical needy."	Blanco with Senator Mary Landrieu to back right and 3 white men in background, one in military uniform
Brown	...tens of thousands of people…. Those people need to be moved but to where?	Superdome roof and roof and crowd outside
9:02:33 – 9:02:38	in the midst of it all something approaching anarchy…looting is going on. Police seem unable to stop it.	**Looting Sequence B** a black woman carrying three packages that appear to be diapers and using them to block herself from the camera and then the camera moves slightly to focus on black people streaming out of the apparent store door, some carrying things, and the back of the head of a man standing in front of the door watching
9:02:38 – 9:02:41	Their cars are running low on gas.	police car driving down the street
9:02:41-9:02:44	..aren't even jails to house the prisoners they have.	prisoners on bridge

Appendix C

Codes related to
Deconstructing Theory, Constructing News
Content Analysis Codebook – Winter 2006 Edition

Item #	Variable name	Description	Values/Codes
1	DISCRIMINATION HISTORY [discrimhis]	Does the article provide any historical background or context to the discussion of discrimination?	0. No mention of historical background or context. 1. Yes, provides historical background or context.
2	LAZY	Does the article imply that the people who suffered from the hurricane are lazy?	0. No implication of laziness. 1. Yes, implies laziness.
3	IMPULSIVE	Does the article imply that the people who suffered from the hurricane are impulsive or lacking in self-control?	0. No implication of impulsive or lack of self-control. 1. Yes, implies impulsive or lack of self-control.
4	AGRESSIVE	Does the article imply that the people who suffered from the hurricane are aggressive or pushy?	0. No implication of aggressiveness. 1. Yes, implies aggressiveness.
5	CRIMINAL	Does the article imply that the people who suffered from the hurricane are criminals or lawbreakers?	0. No implication of criminals. 1. Yes, implies criminals.
6	WELFARE DEPENDENT	Does the article imply that people who suffered from the hurricane could [should?] pull themselves up by their bootstraps if they tried harder? [Is this too much like individualism? Maybe this way: Does the article imply that people who suffered from the hurricane are [overly?] dependent on government help?]	0. No implication that people could help themselves. 1. Yes, implies that people could help themselves.
7	ANGER	Overall, to what extent is the article likely to elicit anger (frustration, outrage, contempt, disgust) from the typical American viewer?	Code as any number from 0 to 10, where higher numbers refer to stronger emotional responses. For example, 0 indicates the broadcast is likely to elicit NO ANGER AT ALL, a 10 indicates the broadcast is likely to elicit EXTREME

			feelings of ANGER, and remaining numbers indicate emotional responses somewhere between the two poles.
8	PRIDE	Overall, to what extent is the article likely to elicit pride (admiration, satisfaction in what's been accomplished or who we are) from the typical American viewer?	Code as any number from 0 to 10, where higher numbers refer to stronger emotional responses. For example, 0 indicates the broadcast is likely to elicit NO PRIDE AT ALL, a 10 indicates the broadcast is likely to elicit EXTREME feelings of PRIDE, and remaining numbers indicate emotional responses somewhere between the two poles.
9	RESENTMENT	Overall, to what extent is the article likely to elicit resentment from the typical American reader toward the people who need help in the aftermath of the hurricane?	0. Does NOT convey resentment. 1. Yes, does convey resentment.
10	ANTAGONISM	Overall, to what extent is the article likely to elicit resentment from the typical American reader toward the people who need help in the aftermath of the hurricane?	0. Does NOT convey antagonism. 1. Yes, does convey antagonism.
11	RIVALRY	Overall, does the article convey a sense of to what extent is the article likely to elicit resentment from the typical American reader rivalry toward the people who need help in the aftermath of the hurricane?	0. Does NOT convey rivalry. 1. Yes, does convey rivalry.
12	SYMPATHY	Overall, to what extent is the article likely to elicit sympathy from the typical American reader toward the people who need help in the aftermath of the hurricane	0. Does NOT convey sympathy. 1. Yes, does convey sympathy.
13	RESPECT	Overall, to what extent is the article likely to elicit respect from the typical American reader toward the people who need help in the aftermath of the hurricane?	0. Does NOT convey respect. 1. Yes, does convey respect.
14	DISRESPECT	Overall, to what extent is the article likely to elicit disrespect from the typical American reader toward the people who need help	0. Does NOT convey disrespect. 1. Yes, does convey disrespect.

		in the aftermath of the hurricane?	
16	THREAT TO AMERICANS BEYOND GULF REGION [threatAm]	Does the article convey a feeling or sense of threat or loss to Americans beyond the Gulf Coast (economic, financial, physical, or other)	0. Does NOT convey a sense of threat to Americans beyond the Gulf Region. 1. Yes, conveys a sense of threat to Americans beyond the Gulf Region.
17	THREAT FROM LOCAL [threatloc]	Does the article convey a sense of threat to the social order from the people who stayed in New Orleans? (i.e., lawlessness, disorder)	0. Does NOT convey a sense of threat to the social order. 1. Yes, conveys a sense of threat to the social order.
18	DESERVLOC [deservloc]	Does the article convey a sense of deservedness to safety, security, and other resources, status, or power for people who suffered directly from the hurricane?	0. No sense of deservedness for people who suffered directly from the hurricane. 1. Yes, conveys a sense of deservedness for people who suffered directly from the hurricane.
19	BLAME1	Is the person, entity, group, organization, or institution explicitly BLAMED? This can be denial of blame (e.g., "Michael Brown isn't at fault! He did his best!") * Note – for engineers, decide which entity is supplying or directing the engineers; e.g., the Army Corps is FEDERAL; engineers for New Orleans are LOCAL.	0. No blame attributed 1. Nature/God 2. President/White House 3. FEMA 4. Federal Government (not FEMA; includes Army Corps of Engineers) 5. State Government 6. Local Government (includes police, sheriffs) 7. Government non-specific 8. Rescue workers (fire, EMT, Red Cross, medical professionals) 9. Residents of the affected area 10. Other citizen volunteers/ Americans in general 11. Business/corporation 12. National Guard personnel 13. Other/not listed
20	BLAME2	Second attribution of blame	Same choices as BLAME1
21	BLAME3	Third attribution of blame	Same choices as BLAME1

22	EQUALITY	To what extent does the broadcast invoke equality or egalitarianism?	0. No mention of equality or egalitarianism. 1. Implies equality or egalitarianism. 2. Specifically mentions equality or egalitarianism.
23	INDIVIDUALISM	To what extent does the broadcast invoke the idea of individualism or self-help? (i.e., people should pull themselves up by their bootstraps)	0. No implication of individualism or self-help. 1. Implies that people should help themselves. 2. Specifically mentions that people should help themselves.
24	SPENDING	Degree to which the broadcast focuses on government spending, or big government.	0. No mention of government spending or big government. 1. One or two mentions of government spending proposals. 2. Several mentions government spending. 3. Broadcast is dominated by multiple mentions of spending.

Appendix D

Reliable Codes from Coding Scheme One

Variable Name	Description	Krippendorf's alpha
RACEREP1	What is the race of the first reporter to appear in the story?	.79
GENDANC1	What is the gender of the first news anchor to appear in the story?	.83
GENDREP1	What is the gender of the first reporter to appear in th story? (use voice and name to determine if not on camera)	.81
DISCRIMINATION	What does the story imply about discrimination?	.66
AGGRESSIVE	Does the broadcast mention or imply that the people living in the area affected by the hurricane are aggressive or pushy?	.65
CRIMINAL	Does the broadcast mention or imply that the people living in the area affected by the hurricane are criminals or lawbreakers?	.66

Appendix E

Second Codebook with Reliabilities

Variable Name	Description	Code	Reliability
Story	Copy from Index		Krippendorf's alpha
Coder		Isaiah = 1 Mary =2	
loota1	Three African Americans carrying large white plastic bags as they climb over debris	Yes = 1 No = 0	1.00
loota2	Young African American boys coming out of a store, two carrying plastic bags	Yes = 1 No = 0	.66
loota3	Three African American youth running, two with clothes, one grinning and pulling up his pants as he runs	Yes = 1 No = 0	1.00
loota4	Three figures with clothes and plastic bags walking by a dumpster	Yes = 1 No = 0	1.00
lootb1	A Black woman carrying three packages that appear to be diapers and using them to block herself from the camera	Yes = 1 No = 0	No variation
lootb2	Black people streaming out of the door of what appears to be a store, some carrying things (though the viewer does not see a sign or inside the store)	Yes = 1 No = 0	No variation

lootb3	The back of the head of a man standing in front of the door watching	Yes = 1 No = 0	No variation
lootc1	Two African American people struggling to free a loaded shopping cart, and eventually one person breaks into a run with the cart	Yes = 1 No = 0	No variation
lootc2	African American people going into a building (what about a shelter situation?)	Yes = 1 No = 0	No variation
lootc3	African American people picking things up from the street. (Code only the specific scene from our training. Any others that appear to be looting should be coded "moloot.")	Yes = 1 No = 0	No variation
moloot	Beyond what you have already coded in above, is there other footage of "looting?" (Looting is defined as unlawfully taking things.)	Yes = 1 No = 0	.69
lootrace	If yes to the preceding question, please indicate the racial or ethnic identity of the people doing the "looting."	Mostly Black = 2 Mostly White = 4 Both roughly equal = 8 Other/don't know = 9	.59
viscr	Beyond "looting," does the story include other VISUALS of lawlessness, disorder, or criminal activity?	Yes = 1 No = 0	No variation

talkcr	Does anyone in the story TALK about **lawlessness, disorder, violence, or criminal activity**, either by using these words or referring to specific crimes, such as **shooting or rape**? **(Do not include the word looting.)**	Yes = 1 No = 0	.81
exp1	Is the story primarily an interview with a single expert brought into the studio or at a remote site such that the viewer sees mostly "talking heads?" (Expert is defined as an authority figure who is not an elected official or head of FEMA or Homeland security These are not "man/woman-on-the street" interviews.)	Yes = 1 No = 0	.48
exp1ra	If yes to the preceding question, what is the race of the person being interviewed?	Asian = 1 Black = 2 Hispanic or Latino/a = 3 White = 4 Other/don't know = 9	.48
exp2	Is the story primarily an interview with MORE THAN ONE expert brought into the studio or at a remote site such that the viewer sees mostly "talking heads?" (Expert is defined as an authority figure who is not an elected official or head of FEMA or Homeland security. These are not	Yes = 1 No = 0	.37

	"man/woman-on-the street" interviews.)		
exp2ra	What is the race of the people being interviewed?	All White = 4 All Black = 2 Mixed Black and White = 8 Other/don't know = 9	.38
sbblk	How many sound bites does the story include of BLACK people? (A sound bite is defined as a person-on-the-street intentionally speaking on-camera with more than a single word response. We are not including any officials, such as police, coast guard, or firefighters, or volunteer organizations, such as the Red Cross. If the same person speaks repeatedly, count as one.)	~~Yes = 1 No = 0~~ Changed to actual count	.95
sbwht	How many sound bites does the story include of WHITE people? (A sound bite is defined as a person-on-the-street intentionally speaking on-camera with more than a single word response. We are not including any officials, such as police, coast guard, or firefighters, or volunteer organizations, such as the Red Cross. If the same person speaks repeatedly, count as one.)	~~Yes = 1 No = 0~~ Changed to actual count	.88

blmass	Does the story include one or more visuals of what appears to be masses of mostly BLACK PEOPLE STANDING IN LINE or in other crowd scenes? (Code the first impression.)	Yes = 1 No = 0	.44
whmass	Does the story include one or more visuals of what appears to be masses of mostly BLACK PEOPLE STANDING IN LINE or in other crowd scenes? (Code the first impression.)	Yes = 1 No = 0	-.014
blhe	Does the story include BLACK people helping victims of the hurricane or Black people being described, honored or treated as heroes?	Yes = 1 No = 0	.29
Whhe	Does the story include WHITE people helping victims of the hurricane or White people being described, honored or treated as heroes?	Yes = 1 No = 0	.64

Appendix F

Stimulus

1. *Group Position Framing*

-- Des Moines Register, June 1, 2007, by William P. Apple
Headline: Court awards $125 million to Descendants in Eminent Domain Case

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit has ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in a case where the plaintiffs claimed that the City of Des Moines wrongfully exercised its power of eminent domain to take the homes and businesses owned by their parents or grandparents. The plaintiffs are the descendants of a group of people, largely **African American**[*], who lived or had businesses in the northwest section of Des Moines in the late 1940 and early 1950s. The homes and businesses were taken by the city through condemnation proceedings in order to have land on which to build roads to become part of the interstate highway system.

This court ruling hurts people who are not part of the plaintiff group. City Attorney David Ford warns, "The city cannot pay this award, and ultimately, it will be all American taxpayers who will help fund the award." Plaintiffs, working with other groups that are filing lawsuits across the nation, are petitioning Congress to establish a fund for compensation claims by all people who can prove that they are descendants of such dispossessed people. In some specific situations, the land for highways was taken but the roads were not built, and eventually, the land was developed for businesses and homes by others. Despite this development, the land must be returned to the plaintiffs, according to the court decision. Ford notes, "That means taking land, businesses, or homes from the innocent. The Plaintiff group has different goals and values."

The City of Des Moines claims that it acted lawfully in exercising the power of eminent domain and that the city will suffer catastrophic economic consequences if forced to pay the award. To ensure a better future for all of its citizens, the city argued that it needed to become part of the interstate highway system being developed with federal funds in the post World War II era and therefore had the lawful right to take the land under its power of eminent domain. The plaintiffs argued that their parents and grandparents were forced out of their homes and businesses without just compensation from the government. In essence, they were "kicked out of town" says spokesperson Charles Smith.

The plaintiffs further argued, and the court agreed, that the city over-extended its authority, had alternative reasonable choices, and in any event, should have provided just

---

[*] In the White condition, the phrase will be "largely white" or "largle white people from Ireland, Germany, and Scandinavia." Or "largely from Northern Europe?" In the neutral version, the group will not be specified; i.e., the clause "largely African American" will be deleted.

compensation. The court ruled that the city owes the descendants $125 million to be divided amongst them according to the formula specified in the legal proceedings.

The city will appeal to the United States Supreme Court, says City Attorney Ford.

2. Symbolic Racism Framing

-- Des Moines Register, June 1, 2007, by William P. Apple

Headline: Court awards $125 million to Descendants in Eminent Domain Case

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit has ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in a case where the plaintiffs claimed that the City of Des Moines wrongfully exercised its power of eminent domain to take the homes and businesses owned by their parents or grandparents. The plaintiffs are the descendants of a group of people, largely **African American***, who lived or had businesses in the northwest section of Des Moines in the late 1940 and early 1950s. The homes and businesses were taken by the city through condemnation proceedings in order to have land on which to build roads to become part of the interstate highway system.

Tempers are flaring as some residents argue that the plaintiffs are demanding more than they rightfully should from the government. President of Citizens against the Lawsuit, Robert Sands, claims, "Ultimately, the plaintiffs are taking unfair advantage of the government and demanding more government attention than they deserve." Local business owner John Jones says, "If plaintiffs' ancestors had worked harder and taken care of their homes and businesses, then the property would not have been condemned. It is taking unfair advantage to have pursued the lawsuit at this time." Sands and Jones are organizing a protest against the award on the basis of unfair advantage and undue attention from the government to the plaintiffs. City Attorney David Ford notes, "The property owned by plaintiffs' parents and grandparents constituted the picture of urban blight; in essence it was a ghetto."

The City of Des Moines claims that it acted lawfully in exercising the power of eminent domain and that the city will suffer catastrophic economic consequences if forced to pay the award. To ensure a better future for all of its citizens, the city argued that it needed to become part of the interstate highway system being developed with federal funds in the post World War II era and therefore had the lawful right to take the land under its power of eminent domain. The plaintiffs argued that their parents and grandparents were forced out of their homes and businesses without just compensation from the government. In essence, they were "kicked out of town" says spokesperson Charles Smith.

The plaintiffs further argued, and the court agreed, that the city over-extended its authority, had alternative reasonable choices, and in any event, should have provided just compensation. The court ruled that the city owes the descendants $125 million to be divided amongst them according to the formula specified in the legal proceedings.

194

The city will appeal to the United States Supreme Court, says City Attorney Ford.

3. Politics-centered Framing

-- Des Moines Register, June 1, 2007, by William P. Apple

Headline: Court awards $125 million to Descendants in Eminent Domain Case

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit has ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in a case where the plaintiffs claimed that the City of Des Moines wrongfully exercised its power of eminent domain to take the homes and businesses owned by their parents or grandparents. The plaintiffs are the descendants of a group of people, largely **African American***, who lived or had businesses in the northwest section of Des Moines in the late 1940 and early 1950s. The homes and businesses were taken by the city through condemnation proceedings in order to have land on which to build roads to become part of the interstate highway system.

City Attorney David Smith expresses grave concern, "Quite simply, the award will create two classes of people with different and unequal rights. America was built on the values of equality and individualism, not group-based equity. " Plaintiffs, in collaboration with other groups that are planning to file lawsuits across the nation, are petitioning Congress to establish a new office in the Department of Transportation that will coordinate compensation claims by all people who can prove that they are descendants of the people who lost their homes and businesses to build the national highway system. Plaintiff spokesperson Charles Smith says, "This award is the beginning of a massive effort that will expand the scope of government." City Attorney Smith agrees but warns, "And expanding government is not a good thing for the American people. Smaller government is better government."

The City of Des Moines claims that it acted lawfully in exercising the power of eminent domain and that the city will suffer catastrophic economic consequences if forced to pay the award. To ensure a better future for all of its citizens, the city argued that it needed to become part of the interstate highway system being developed with federal funds in the post World War II era and therefore had the lawful right to take the land under its power of eminent domain. The plaintiffs argued that their parents and grandparents were forced out of their homes and businesses without just compensation from the government. In essence, they were "kicked out of town" says spokesperson Charles Smith.

The plaintiffs further argued, and the court agreed, that the city over-extended its authority, had alternative reasonable choices, and in any event, should have provided just compensation. The court ruled that the city owes the descendants $125 million to be divided amongst them according to the formula specified in the legal proceedings.

The city will appeal to the United States Supreme Court, says City Attorney Ford.

195

4. Whiteness:

-- Des Moines Register, June 1, 2007, by William P. Apple

Headline: Court awards $125 million to Descendants in Eminent Domain Case

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit has ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in a case where the plaintiffs claimed that the City of Des Moines wrongfully exercised its power of eminent domain to take the homes and businesses owned by their parents or grandparents. The plaintiffs are the descendants of a group of people, largely **African American***, who lived or had businesses in the northwest section of Des Moines in the late 1940 and early 1950s. The homes and businesses were taken by the city through condemnation proceedings in order to have land on which to build roads to become part of the interstate highway system.

City Attorney David Ford explains that the land that was taken was not as economically viable as other areas. "The City had no reasonable alternative" says Ford, "The area that was taken was crime-ridden and represented the picture of urban blight. The only alternative was an area that was designated to become a recreation area with a golf course, tennis courts, swimming pool, and nature center that would benefit all citizens at a minimal cost." Local business owner John Jones agrees, "Look at how our young people have used the golf and tennis facilities! Several have gone on to win golf scholarships to college. For a relatively nominal cost, as compared to country club fees, and residency proof, citizens of Des Moines have access to outstanding facilities. To have sacrificed this land for highways would have been unwise."

The City of Des Moines claims that it acted lawfully in exercising the power of eminent domain and that the city will suffer catastrophic economic consequences if forced to pay the award. To ensure a better future for all of its citizens, the city argued that it needed to become part of the interstate highway system being developed with federal funds in the post World War II era and therefore had the lawful right to take the land under its power of eminent domain. The plaintiffs argued that their parents and grandparents were forced out of their homes and businesses without just compensation from the government. In essence, they were "kicked out of town" says spokesperson Charles Smith.

The plaintiffs further argued, and the court agreed, that the city over-extended its authority, had alternative reasonable choices, and in any event, should have provided just compensation. The court ruled that the city owes the descendants $125 million to be divided amongst them according to the formula specified in the legal proceedings.

The city will appeal to the United States Supreme Court, says City Attorney Ford.

Appendix G

Questionnaire

Thank you for agreeing to participate in our study of journalistic performance in the coverage of lawsuits and legislation. We are interested in media performance in covering the courts, government, and various social policies.

Let's begin by getting some background information about your media use and preferences.

MEDIA USE AND PREFERNCES

1. On an average day, I generally watch television _____ for hours. [VAR: EXPTV]
2. On an average day, I generally listen to the radio for _____ hours. [VAR: EXPRADIO]
3. On an average day, I generally read the newspaper (not online) for _____ hours. [VAR: EXPNEWSP]
4. On an average day, I generally use the Internet for _____ hours. [VAR: EXPINTER]
5. On an average day, I generally read magazines for _____ hours. [VAR: EXPMAG]
6. What is your primary source of news? (pick one)   [VAR: NEWS]
    a. Internet-traditional (i.e., online versions of newspapers, television news and radio news)
    b. Magazines
    c. Newspapers (not online)
    d. Non-traditional Internet (i.e., news sites that are online only)
    e. People
    f. Radio
    g. Television
7. How often do you read a traditional newspaper (i.e., one that is printed with ink on paper and NOT counting what you read online) – every day, a few times a week, once a week, less than once a week, or never?
            [VAR: TRDNWPR]
    a. 1 Every day
    b. 2 A few times a week
    c. 3 Once a week
    d. 4 Less than once a week
    e. 5 Never
8. People have differing views about the credibility of various news sources. Using a scale where 1 means most credible and 5 means least credible, please indicate which news source you find to be the LEAST credible.
    a. Internet-traditional (i.e., online versions of newspapers, television news and radio news)

b. Magazines
c. Newspapers (not online)
d. Non-traditional Internet (i.e., news sites that are online only)
e. People
f. Radio
g. Television

THE DES MOINES REGISTER NEWS STORY

Now that we know about your media use and preferences, we would like to ask you about the story you just read from the *Des Moines Register*. We are interested in knowing how much you remember about the story.

9. The story from the Des Moines Register was essentially about: [VAR: STORY]
   a. A problem in the structure of the U.S. court system known as eminent domain.
   b. People whose homes and businesses were taken by the City through the power of eminent domain.
   c. The personal life of a group of successful plaintiffs in Des Moines.
   d. None of the above
10. The City Attorney said that   [VAR: ATTRNEY]
   a. The City will accept the ruling because it is less expensive to pay the award than to appeal.
   b. It was all worthwhile because of the interstate highway system.
   c. The City will file an appeal with the United States Supreme Court.
   d. Not applicable because the City Attorney was not part of the story.
11. In the story, the plaintiffs were described as   [VAR: PLNTFF1]
   a. A group of people who are threatening the economic well-being of American taxpayers.
   b. A group of people who are taking unfair advantage of a situation.
   c. A group of people who are not fully committed to the ideals of equality and individualism.
   d. Not applicable because this story was about a situation where there was no reasonable alternative to taking of real property, especially as the only other choice would have deprived all citizens of recreational facilities.
   e. None of the above.

Now we would like to get your opinion about the people involved with this story. For each person or group please indicate if you have strongly negative feelings, somewhat negative feelings, no feelings in either direction, somewhat positive feelings, or strongly positive feelings.

12. How would you rate your feelings toward the leaders of the plaintiffs who pursued the court case?
         [VAR: FEELPL1]
   a. 1 Strongly negative

    b. 2 Somewhat negative

    c. 3 No feelings in either direction

    d. 4 Somewhat positive

    e. 5 Strongly positive

13. How would you rate your feelings toward the City Attorney? [VAR: FEELATT]

    a. 1 Strongly negative

    b. 2 Somewhat negative

    c. 3 No feelings in either direction

    d. 4 Somewhat positive

    e. 5 Strongly positive

14. How would you rate your feelings toward the plaintiff group members who will benefit from the proceeds?   [VAR: FEELPL2]

    a. 1 Strongly negative

    b. 2 Somewhat negative

    c. 3 No feeling in either direction

    d. 4 Somewhat positive

    e. 5 Strongly positive

Now we would like to know about the quality of the *Des Moines Register* story. Media credibility is often discussed as being made up of various components that contribute to quality. Please indicate how well you think the journalist did in meeting these criterion, where 1 means that he did very well and 5 means he did very poorly.

15. How well did the journalist do in terms of OBJECTIVITY? [VAR: OBJECT]

    a. 1 Very good job

    b. 2

    c. 3

    d. 4

    e. 5 Very poor job

16. How well did the journalist do in terms of FAIRNESS?   [VAR: FAIR]

    a. 1 Very good job

    b. 2

    c. 3

    d. 4

    e. 5 Very poor job

ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

We are now interested in learning what you think about the proper role of the government in our lives.

17. In general, how you feel about the federal government? Please indicate how you feel on a thermometer that runs from zero (0) to ten (10). The higher the number, the warmer or more favorable you feel toward the federal government. The lower

the number, the colder or less favorable you feel. If you feel neither warm nor cold toward them, rate it a five.

[VAR: GOVFEEL]
a. 1 Coldest
b. 2
c. 3
d. 4
e. 5
f. 6
g. 7
h. 8
i. 9
j. 10 Warmest

18. Some people are afraid the government in Washington is getting too powerful for the good of the country and the individual person. Others feel that the government in Washington is not getting too powerful. What is your feeling?   [VAR: GOVPOWR]
a. 1 Government is getting too powerful
b. 2 Government is not getting too powerful
c. 3 Don't know/no interest

19. Some people worry that our government is getting too big. Others say that needs to be bigger to meet all its responsibilities. What do you think?   [VAR: GOVSIZE]
a. 1 Too big
b. 2 Just right
c. 3 Needs to be bigger

20. In general, how do you feel about media coverage of the federal government? Please rate how well you think that media do their job covering the government, where 1 means they do a poor job and 10 means an excellent job.   [VAR: COVCRIM]
a. 1 poor job
b. 2
c. 3
d. 4
e. 5
f. 6
g. 7
h. 8
i. 9
j. 10 excellent job

CRIME & DRUG LAWS

21. The "three strikes law" was first enacted in Washington State in 1993. Soon many other states and the federal government followed and enacted various versions of "three strikes." The idea behind the three strikes law is that habitual offenders

(i.e., people who commit serious crimes repeatedly) should face mandatory long-term jail sentences. What do you think? In general, do you
[VAR: THRSTRK]
- a. 1 strongly favor three strikes laws
- b. 2 somewhat favor
- c. 3 neither favor nor oppose
- d. 4 somewhat oppose
- e. 5 strongly oppose three strikes laws

22. Supporters of the death penalty argue that capital punishment helps to deter crime, discourage repeat offenders, and is especially fair in the case of murder. Others argue for abolishing it because life imprisonment works equally well and that the death penalty violates Biblical teaching, discriminates against minorities and the poor, and results in the death of people wrongfully convicted. What do you think? In general, do you
[VAR: DEATH]
- a. 1 strongly favor the death penalty
- b. 2 somewhat favor
- c. 3 neither favor nor oppose
- d. 4 somewhat oppose
- e. 5 strongly oppose the death penalty

23. In May a Department of Justice-appointed judge recommended to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration that the government no longer maintain a monopoly on marijuana for research purposes. Many argue that this decision is a positive step because it will ultimately lead to the legalization of medical marijuana. Others argue that legalizing marijuana for any purpose increases the country's drug problems. What do you think? In general, do you
[VAR: MEDMJ]
- a. 1 strongly favor legalizing marijuana for medical purposes
- b. 2 somewhat favor
- c. 3 neither favor nor oppose
- d. 4 somewhat oppose
- e. 5 strongly oppose legalizing marijuana for medical purposes

24. The law treats marijuana and alcohol differently. Some people argue that smoking marijuana is no different that drinking alcohol: both can be abused by over-indulging but at the same time both can be handled responsibly by adults. Others disagree. What do you think? In general, do you
[VAR: LEGALMJ]
- a. 1 strongly favor laws treating marijuana similar to alcohol
- b. 2 somewhat favor
- c. 3 neither favor nor oppose
- d. 4 somewhat oppose
- e. 5 strongly oppose laws treating marijuana similar to alcohol

25. Advocates for sentencing reform argue that the disparity in the penalty for possession of crack-cocaine and the penalty for power-cocaine must be decreased. Opponents argue that crack-cocaine is a more dangerous drug than powder-cocaine, and therefore, penalties for possession of crack-cocaine should be more

severe than penalties for powder-cocaine. What do you think? In general, do you [VAR: CRACK]
    a.   1 strongly favor similar penalties for crack-cocaine and powder-cocaine
    b.   2 somewhat favor
    c.   3 neither favor nor oppose
    d.   4 somewhat oppose
    e.   5 strongly oppose similar penalties for crack-cocaine and powder-cocaine

26. In general, how do you feel about media coverage of the crime and drugs laws? Please rate how well you think that media do their job covering crime and drugs laws, where 1 means they do a poor job and 10 means an excellent job.   [VAR: COVCRIM]
    a.   1 poor job
    b.   2
    c.   3
    d.   4
    e.   5
    f.   6
    g.   7
    h.   8
    i.   9
    j.   10 excellent job

SOCIAL ISSUES

Now I am going to ask you some questions on various SOCIAL ISSUES. We are interested in whatever thoughts and opinions you have. There are no right or wrong answers.

Gender and Abortion

27. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry and government. Others feel that women's place is in the home. Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this?
    [VAR: EQROLE]
    a.   1 Equal role
    b.   2
    c.   3
    d.   4
    e.   5 In the home

28. Which one of the following opinions best agrees with your view? [VAR: ABOR]
    a.   1 By law, abortion should never be permitted
    b.   2 The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger.

c. 3 The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established.
d. 4 By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.
e. 8 Don't know/haven't thought about it.

Job Discrimination

29. For each group listed below, please indicate how much discrimination you believe that there is that hurts the chances of people in that group to get good paying jobs. Do you think that there is a lot, some, only a little, or not at all?
    a. Asian Americans   [VAR: JOBDASM]
        i. A lot
        ii. Some
        iii. Only a little
        iv. Not at all
    b. Blacks or African Americans   [VAR: JOBDBLM]
        i. A lot
        ii. Some
        iii. Only a little
        iv. Not at all
    c. Hispanics or Latinos   [VAR: JOBDSM]
        i. A lot
        ii. Some
        iii. Only a little
        iv. Not at all
    d. Whites   [VAR: JOBDWHM]
        i. A lot
        ii. Some
        iii. Only a little
        iv. Not at all

Welfare

30. When people can't support themselves, the government should help by giving them enough money to meet their basic needs. In general, do you   [VAR: GOVSUPP]
  1 Agree strongly
  2 Agree somewhat
  3 Disagree somewhat
  4 Disagree strongly

31. Most people on welfare would rather be working than taking money from the government. In general, do you   [VAR: PRFRWEL]

1 Agree strongly
2 Agree somewhat
3 Disagree somewhat
4 Disagree strongly

Affirmative Action (educational assistance and hiring & promotion)

32. Some people feel that because of past disadvantages there are some groups in society that should receive JOB TRAINING and EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE. Others say that it is unfair to give these groups special educational assistance. What about you?   Please indicate for each group whether you favor strongly, favor, neither favor nor oppose, oppose, or oppose strongly job training and educational assistance.
  a. Asian Americans   [VAR: AFFASN]
       i.   1 Favor strongly
       ii. 2 Favor
       iii. 3 Neither favor nor oppose
       iv. 4 Oppose
       v.   5 Oppose strongly
  b. Blacks or African Americans   [VAR: AFFBLK]
       i.   1 Favor strongly
       ii. 2 Favor
       iii. 3 Neither favor nor oppose
       iv. 4 Oppose
       v.   5 Oppose strongly
  c. Hispanics or Latinos   [VAR: AFFHIS]
       i.   1 Favor strongly
       ii. 2 Favor
       iii. 3 Neither favor nor oppose
       iv. 4 Oppose
       v.   5 Oppose strongly
  d. Whites   [VAR: AFFWHT]
       i.   1 Favor strongly
       ii. 2 Favor
       iii. 3 Neither favor nor oppose
       iv. 4 Oppose
       v.   5 Oppose strongly
33. Some people feel that because of past disadvantages, there are some groups in society that should be given preference in HIRING and PROMOTION. Others say that it is unfair to give these groups special preferences. What about you? Please indicate for each group whether you favor strongly, favor, neither favor nor oppose, oppose, or oppose strongly oppose preferences in hiring and promotion.
  a. Asian Americans   [VAR: HPASN]
       i.   1 Favor strongly
       ii. 2 Favor
       iii. 3 Neither favor nor oppose

       iv. 4 Oppose
       v. 5 Oppose strongly
  b. Blacks or African Americans   [VAR: HPBLK]
       i. 1 Favor strongly
       ii. 2 Favor
       iii. 3 Neither favor nor oppose
       iv. 4 Oppose
       v. 5 Oppose strongly
  c. Hispanics or Latinos   [VAR: HPHIS]
       i. 1 Favor strongly
       ii. 2 Favor
       iii. 3 Neither favor nor oppose
       iv. 4 Oppose
       v. 5 Oppose strongly
  d. Whites   [VAR: HPWHT]
       i. 1 Favor strongly
       ii. 2 Favor
       iii. 3 Neither favor nor oppose
       iv. 4 Oppose
       v. 5 Oppose strongly

34. In thinking about news coverage of social issues generally, please rate how well you think that media do their job, where 1 means a poor job and 10 means an excellent poor job.   [VAR: COVSOCI]
  a. 1 poor job
  b. 2
  c. 3
  d. 4
  e. 5
  f. 6
  g. 7
  h. 8
  i. 9
  j. 10 excellent job

GOVERNMENT SPENDING

The government uses our tax dollars to fund various programs. Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please indicate whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more" it might require a tax increase to pay for it.

35. The environment   [VAR: SPENVIR]
  1 Spend much more
  2 Spend more
  3 Spend the same as now

4 Spend less
5 Spend much less

36. Health   [VAR: SPHLTH]
    1 Spend much more
    2 Spend more
    3 Spend the same as now
    4 Spend less
    5 Spend much less

37. The police and law enforcement   [VAR: SPOLICE]
    1 Spend much more
    2 Spend more
    3 Spend the same as now
    4 Spend less
    5 Spend much less

38. Education   [VAR: SPEDUC]
    1 Spend much more
    2 Spend more
    3 Spend the same as now
    4 Spend less
    5 Spend much less

39. Welfare benefits   [VAR:SPWELF]
    1 Spend much more
    2 Spend more
    3 Spend the same as now
    4 Spend less
    5 Spend much less

40. Military and defense   [VAR: SPARMS]
    1 Spend much more
    2 Spend more
    3 Spend the same as now
    4 Spend less
    5 Spend much less

41. Unemployment Benefits   [VAR: SPUNEMP]
    1 Spend much more
    2 Spend more
    3 Spend the same as now
    4 Spend less
    5 Spend much less

42. Culture and the Arts   [VAR: SPARTS]

1 Spend much more
2 Spend more
3 Spend the same as now
4 Spend less
5 Spend much less

COURT CASES IN GENERAL

Now we'd like to get your reactions to some opinions that have been expressed in editorials or on-the-street interviews about court cases similar in some respects to the one you just read. Please tell us whether you strongly agree, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or strongly disagree with each statement.

43. Court rulings awarding compensatory damages for past injustices create two classes of people with different and unequal rights.   [VAR: TWOCLSS]
     a. 1 Strongly agree
     b. 2 Agree somewhat
     c. 3 Neither agree or disagree
     d. 4 Disagree somewhat
     e. 5 Strongly disagree
44. It is necessary to compensate for past wrongs.   [VAR: PSTWRGN]
     a. 1 Strongly agree
     b. 2 Agree somewhat
     c. 3 Neither agree or disagree
     d. 4 Disagree somewhat
     e. 5 Strongly disagree
45. Court rulings that provide compensation to [insert name of group][1] usually hurt non-[insert name of group].   [VAR: HURT]
     a. 1 Strongly agree
     b. 2 Agree somewhat
     c. 3 Neither agree or disagree
     d. 4 Disagree somewhat
     e. 5 Strongly disagree
46. [Insert name of group] share many basic values and goals with non-[insert name of group].   [VAR: VALGOAL]
     a. 1 Strongly agree
     b. 2 Agree somewhat
     c. 3 Neither agree or disagree
     d. 4 Disagree somewhat
     e. 5 Strongly disagree
47. [Insert name of group] have too *little* influence on federal policy. [VAR: INFL]

---

[1] The name of the group will coincide with the plaintiff group in the story (i.e., black or white). In unspecified condition the statements will be modified to make sense using either group, group members, or plaintiffs. For example, #52 would read: Court rulings that provide compensation to members of one group usually hurt non-members.

a. 1 Strongly agree
b. 2 Agree somewhat
c. 3 Neither agree or disagree
d. 4 Disagree somewhat
e. 5 Strongly disagree

48. Many [insert name of group] have been trying to get ahead economically at the expense of non- [insert name of group.]   [VAR: GETAHD]
    a. 1 Strongly agree
    b. 2 Agree somewhat
    c. 3 Neither agree or disagree
    d. 4 Disagree somewhat
    e. 5 Strongly disagree

49. [Insert name of group] have been getting less attention from the government than they deserve.   [VAR: ATTNT]
    a. 1 Strongly agree
    b. 2 Agree somewhat
    c. 3 Neither agree or disagree
    d. 4 Disagree somewhat
    e. 5 Strongly disagree

50. Most [insert name of group] work hard to make a living just like everyone else. [VAR: WRKHARD]
    a. 1 Strongly agree
    b. 2 Agree somewhat
    c. 3 Neither agree or disagree
    d. 4 Disagree somewhat
    e. 5 Strongly disagree

51. Most [insert name of group] take unfair advantage of privileges given to them by the government.   [VAR: UNFAIR]
    a. 1 Strongly agree
    b. 2 Agree somewhat
    c. 3 Neither agree or disagree
    d. 4 Disagree somewhat
    e. 5 Strongly disagree

MEDIA & STEREOTYPES

Some people claim that generally speaking the media has done a poor job in representing certain groups of people and that those representations contribute to stereotyping. Other people say that media does the best it can and changes as people change. Please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, strongly disagree with these statements about WHITE people. Of course, no description fits absolutely everybody, but, as you read each one, please indicate how well you think it describes WHITES as a group. We will ask you later about other groups.

52. U.S. media assume that readers and users are Whites.   [VAR: WHUSEMD]
    a. 1 Strongly agree
    b. 2 Agree somewhat
    c. 3 Neither agree nor disagree
    d. 4 Disagree somewhat
    e. 5 Strongly disagree
53. Whites are the most powerful racial group in the United States. [WHPOWR]
    a. 1 Strongly agree
    b. 2 Agree somewhat
    c. 3 Neither agree or disagree
    d. 4 Disagree somewhat
    e. 5 Strongly disagree
54. Being White doesn't mean much in the United States. (R)   [VAR: WHMEANG]
    a. 1 Strongly agree
    b. 2 Agree somewhat
    c. 3 Neither agree or disagree
    d. 4 Disagree somewhat
    e. 5 Strongly disagree
55. The U.S. society is largely permeated by the values and norms of White Americans.   [VAR: WHNORM]
    a. 1 Strongly agree
    b. 2 Agree somewhat
    c. 3 Neither agree or disagree
    d. 4 Disagree somewhat
    e. 5 Strongly disagree
56. In the United States, being White determines how a person is treated in everyday life.   [VAR: WHLIFE]
    a. 1 Strongly agree
    b. 2 Agree somewhat
    c. 3 Neither agree nor disagree
    d. 4 Disagree somewhat
    e. 5 Strongly disagree
57. Whites can achieve the most success economically in the United States.   [VAR: WHACHV]
    a. 1 Strongly agree
    b. 2 Agree somewhat
    c. 3 Neither agree or disagree
    d. 4 Disagree somewhat
    e. 5 Strongly disagree
58. White people have privilege in the United States.   [VAR WHPRIV]
    a. 1 Strongly agree
    b. 2 Agree somewhat
    c. 3 Neither agree or disagree
    d. 4 Disagree somewhat

e. 5 Strongly disagree

59. The current social status of Whites in the United States is almost impenetrable. [VAR: WHSOCST]
    a. 1 Strongly agree
    b. 2 Agree somewhat
    c. 3 Neither agree or disagree
    d. 4 Disagree somewhat
    e. 5 Strongly disagree

60. In the United States, White people are regarded as superior to people of other racial groups. [VAR: WHSUPER]
    a. 1 Strongly agree
    b. 2 Agree somewhat
    c. 3 Neither agree or disagree
    d. 4 Disagree somewhat
    e. 5 Strongly disagree

61. Whites draw more positive attention from news media in the United States. [VAR: WHMEDIA]
    a. 1 Strongly agree
    b. 2 Agree somewhat
    c. 3 Neither agree or disagree
    d. 4 Disagree somewhat
    e. 5 Strongly disagree

62. Poor white children are more likely to carry knives and other dangerous weapons to school than other poor children are. [VAR: WHKNIFE]
    a. 1 Strongly agree
    b. 2 Agree somewhat
    c. 3 Neither agree or disagree
    d. 4 Disagree somewhat
    e. 5 Strongly disagree

Now please read a few words that news stories sometimes use to describe BLACK people. Of course, no word fits absolutely everybody, but, as you read each one, please indicate how well you think it describes Blacks as a group. Do you think that the word is a very accurate, somewhat accurate, neither accurate nor inaccurate, somewhat inaccurate, or a very inaccurate description of African Americans generally?

63. How about "dependable?" On a scale from 0 to 10, how well do you think it describes most Blacks? [VAR: BLDEPND]
    a. Very accurate
    b. Somewhat accurate
    c. Neither accurate nor inaccurate
    d. Somewhat inaccurate
    e. Very inaccurate

64. How about "aggressive or violent?" (On a scale from 0 to 10, how well do you think it describes most Blacks?)   [VAR: BLAGGR]
    a. Very accurate
    b. Somewhat accurate
    c. Neither accurate nor inaccurate
    d. Somewhat inaccurate
    e. Very inaccurate

65. Most Black people are "lazy?" (On a scale from 0 to 10, how well do you think it describes most Blacks?)   [VAR: BLLAZY]
    a. Very accurate
    b. Somewhat accurate
    c. Neither accurate nor inaccurate
    d. Somewhat inaccurate
    e. Very inaccurate

66. How about "law abiding?" (On a scale from 0 to 10, how well do you think it describes most Blacks?)   [VAR: BLLAW]
    a. Very accurate
    b. Somewhat accurate
    c. Neither accurate nor inaccurate
    d. Somewhat inaccurate
    e. Very inaccurate

67. How about "determined to succeed?" (On a scale from 0 to 10, how well do you think it describes most Blacks?)   [VAR: BLDETRM]
    a. Very accurate
    b. Somewhat accurate
    c. Neither accurate nor inaccurate
    d. Somewhat inaccurate
    e. Very inaccurate

68. How about "irresponsible?" (On a scale from 0 to 10, how well do you think it describes most Blacks?)   [VAR: BLIRRSP]
    a. Very accurate
    b. Somewhat accurate
    c. Neither accurate nor inaccurate
    d. Somewhat inaccurate
    e. Very inaccurate

PERCEPTIONS ABOUT GROUPS

We next have some questions about different groups in our (U.S.) society. It is less clear whether these impressions are based on stereotypes. We are asking you to use a 7-point scale to indicate your thoughts about the characteristics of people in a group. A score of 4 means you think that the group is not towards one end or the other and, of course, you

may choose any number of between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

69. RICH or POOR? A score of 1 means that you think almost all the people in that group are "rich." A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group is "poor." A score of 4 means you think that the group is not towards one end or the other and, of course, you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.
    a. Where would you rate ASIANS on this scale, where 1 means tends to be rich and 7 means tends to be poor?   [VAR: RICHAS]
        i. 1 rich
        ii. 2
        iii. 3
        iv. 4
        v. 5
        vi. 6
        vii. 7 poor
    b. Where would you rate BLACKS on this scale, where 1 means tends to be rich and 7 means tends to be poor?   [VAR: RICHBL]
        i. 1 rich
        ii. 2
        iii. 3
        iv. 4
        v. 5
        vi. 6
        vii. 7 poor
    c. Where would you rate HISPANICS or LATINOS on this scale, where 1 means tends to be rich and 7 means tends to be poor?   [VAR: RICHHS]
        i. 1 rich
        ii. 2
        iii. 3
        iv. 4
        v. 5
        vi. 6
        vii. 7 poor
    d. Where would you rate WHITES on this scale, where 1 means tends to be rich and 7 means tends to be poor?   [VAR: RICHWH]
        i. 1 rich
        ii. 2
        iii. 3
        iv. 4
        v. 5

            vi. 6

            vii. 7 poor

70. Next, for each group, I want to know whether you think they tend to be INTELLIGENT or tend to be UNINTELLIGENT. A score of 1 means that you think almost all the people in that group are "intelligent." A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group is "unintelligent" A score of 4 means you think that the group is not towards one end or the other and, of course, you may choose nay number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

    a. Where would you rate ASIANS on this scale, where 1 means tends to be intelligent and 7 means tends to be unintelligent?   [VAR: INTELAS]

        i. 1 intelligent

        ii. 2

        iii. 3

        iv. 4

        v. 5

        vi. 6

        vii. 7 unintelligent

    b. Where would you rate BLACKS on this scale, where 1 means tends to be intelligent and 7 means tends to be unintelligent   [VAR: INTELBL]

    c. 1 intelligent

        i. 2

        ii. 3

        iii. 4

        iv. 5

        v. 6

        vi. 7 unintelligent

    d. Where would you rate Hispanics or Latinos on this scale, where 1 means tends to be intelligent and 7 means tends to be unintelligent? [VAR: INTELHS]

        i. 1 intelligent

        ii. 2

        iii. 3

        iv. 4

        v. 5

        vi. 6

        vii. 7 unintelligent

    e. Where would you rate WHITES on this scale, where 1 means tends to be intelligent and 7 means tends to be unintelligent?   [VAR: INTELWH]

        i. 1 intelligent

        ii. 2

        iii. 3

        iv. 4

        v. 5

        vi. 6

        vii. 7 unintelligent

viii. 7 Prefer to live on welfare
71. Next, for each group, I want to know whether you think they tend NOT to be INVOLVED WITH DRUGS AND GANGS tend to be INVOLVED WITH DRUGS AND GANGS. A score of 1 means tends not to be involved with drugs and gangs and 7 means tends to be involved with drugs and gangs. A score of 4 means you think that the group is not towards one end or the other and, of course, you may choose nay number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

    a. Where would you rate ASIANS on this scale, where 1 means tends not to be involved with drugs and gangs and 7 means tends to be involved with drugs and gangs?   [VAR: DRUGSAS]
        i. 1 Not involved in drugs and gangs
        ii. 2
        iii. 3
        iv. 4
        v. 5
        vi. 6
        vii. 7 Involved in drugs and gangs

    b. Where would you rate BLACKS on this scale, where 1 means tends not to be involved with drugs and gangs and 7 means tends to be involved with drugs and gangs?   [VAR: DRUGBL]
        i. 1 Not involved in drugs and gangs
        ii. 2
        iii. 3
        iv. 4
        v. 5
        vi. 6
        vii. 7 Involved in drugs and gangs

    c. Where would you rate HISPANICS or LATINOS on this scale, where 1 means tends not to be involved with drugs and gangs and 7 means tends to be involved with drugs and gangs?   [VAR: DRUGHS]
        i. 1 Not involved in drugs and gangs
        ii. 2
        iii. 3
        iv. 4
        v. 5
        vi. 6
        vii. 7 Involved in drugs and gangs

    d. Where would you rate WHITES on this scale, where 1 means tends not to be involved with drugs and gangs and 7 means tends to be involved with drugs and gangs?   [VAR: DRUGWH]
         i. 1 Not involved in drugs and gangs

     ii. 2
    iii. 3
    iv. 4
     v. 5
    vi. 6
   vii. 7 Involved in drugs and gangs

GENERAL QUESTIONS

72. Thinking back to the newspaper story you just read, what to you think about the $125 million award to the Plaintiff group? Please explain your thoughts. Take as much space as you need.

73. In thinking about court cases in general and federal public policies, what do you see as the ideal role of the media? Please explain your thoughts and take as much space as you need.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

74. What is the day, month and year of your birth?   [VAR: AGE]
75. Are you male or female?   [VAR: GENDER]
    a. 1 Male
    b. 2 Female
76. Is it more important to you being American, being your race or ethnicity, or are both equally important to you?   [VAR: IMPRACE]
    a. Being American is most important
    b. Being my race or ethnicity is most important
    c. Both are equally important
77. What race or ethnic group do you consider yourself? [VAR: RACE]
    a. Asian American
    b. Black or African American
    c. Hispanic or Latino
    d. White
    e. Other [if selected, will skip to Please explain.]
78. What is the highest grade or year of school you completed? [VAR: EDU]
    a. Grade school or less (0-8 grades)
    b. Some high school (12 grades or fewer)
    c. High school degree
    d. Vocation or training school
    e. Some college (13 grades or more, no degree)
    f. College degree
    g. Advanced degree
79. When it comes to politics do you usually think of yourself as extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, moderate o middle of the road, slightly conservative,

extremely conservative or haven't you thought much about this?   [VAR: IDEOLGY]

    a. 1 Extremely liberal
    b. 2 Liberal
    c. 3 Slightly liberal
    d. 4 Moderate or middle of the road
    e. 5 Slightly conservative
    f. 6 Conservative
    g. 7 Extremely conservative
    h. 8 Don't know/haven't thought about it

80. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what?   [VAR: PID]

    a. 1 Democrat
    b. 2 Lean Democratic
    c. 3 Independent
    d. 4 Lean Republican
    e. 5 Republican
    f. 8 No preference

81. Please select the income group that includes your best estimate of the income of all members of your family in 2006 before taxes. This figure should include salaries, wages, pension, dividends, interest, and all other income.   [VAR: INCOME]

    a. Less than $20,000
    b. $20,00 - $49,999,
    c. $50,000 – $90,000
    d. over $90,000

82. Would you say that your religion provides little or no guidance in day-to-day living, some guidance in your day-to-day living, quite a bit of guidance, or a great deal of guidance in your day-to-day life, or is religion not important to you?   [VAR: RELIGN]

    a. No guidance
    b. Some guidance
    c. A lot of guidance
    d. Total guidance

CHECKING YOUR MEMORY

83. The plaintiffs in the story are largely of what racial or ethnic group? [VAR: PLNRACE]

    a. Asian American
    b. Black or African American
    c. Hispanic or Latino
    d. White
    e. Unspecified (i.e., race and ethnicity are not mentioned in the story)

Thank you for participating in this study. Please be sure to see the Researcher before leaving the lab. We appreciate your time and thoughts.

References

Altheide, D. L. (1996). *Qualitative media analysis*. Thousand Oaks, London & New
    Delhi: Sage Publications

Anderson, J. (1983). *The architecture of cognition*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University
    Press.

Babbie, E. (2001). *The practice of social research* (9th ed.). Belmont CA:
    Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.

Babbie, E. (2002). *The basics of social science research* (2d ed.). Belmont CA:
    Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.

Babbie, E. (2008). *The basics of social research*. (4th ed.). Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth.

Bahk, C. M., & Jandt, F. E. (2004). Being white in America: Development of a scale.
    Howard Journal of Communication, 15(1), 57-68.

Baker, J., Houston A. . (1995). Critical memory and the black public sphere. In T. B. P. S.
    Collective (Ed.), *The black public sphere: A public culture book* (pp. 7-37).
    Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.

Bell, D. (2000). *Race, racism and American law* (4th ed.). Gaithersburg, MD: Aspen Law
    & Business.

Berelson, B. (1952). *Content analysis in communication research*. New York: Hafner.

Berkowitz, L. (1984). Some effects of thoughts on anti- and prosocial influences of media
    events: A cognitive-neoassociation analysis. *Psychological Bulletin, 95*, 410-427.

Berkowitz, L. (1993). On the formation and regulation of anger and emotional aggression:
    A cogntive neoassociationistic analysis. *American Psychologist, 445*, 494-503.

Blumer, H. (1958). Race prejudice as a sense of group position. *The Pacific Sociological
    Review, 1*(1), 3-7.

Bobo, L. D. (1999). Prejudice as group position: Microfoundations of a sociological
    approach to racism and race relations. *The Society for the Psychological Study of
    Social Issues, 55*(3), 445-472.

Bobo, L. D., & Hutchings, V. L. (1996). Perceptions of racial group competition:
    Extending Blumer's theory of group position to a multiracial social context.
    American Sociological Review, 61(6), 951-972.

Bobo, L. D., Kluegel, J. R., & Smith, R. A. (1997). Laissez-faire racism: The
    crystallization of a kinder, gentler antiblack ideology. In S. A. Tuch & J. K.
    Martin (Eds.), *Racial attitudes in the 1990s* (pp. 15-42). Westport CT & London:
    Praeger Publishers.

Bobo, L. D., & Smith, R. A. (1998). From Jim crow racism to laissez-faire racism: The
    transformation of American racial attitudes. In W. F. Katkin, N. Landsman & A.
    Tyree (Eds.), *Beyond pluralism: The conception of groups and group identities in
    America* (pp. 182-220). Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Bobo, L. D., & Tuan, M. (2006). *Prejudice in politics: Group position, public opinion,
    and the Wisconsin treaty rights dispute*. Cambridge MA & London: Harvard
    University Press.

Branston, G., & Stafford, R. (2003). Narratives. In *The media student's book* (3rd ed., pp.
    32-58). London & New York: Routledge.

Brezina, T., & Kaufman, J. M. (2008). What really happened in New Orleans? Estimates
    of violence during the hurricane Katrina disaster. *Justice Quarterly, 25*(4), 701-
    722.

Brodkin, K. (1998). *How Jews became white folks and what that says about race in
    America*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Brooks, D. E., & Rada, J. A. (2002). Constructing race in black and whiteness: Media coverage of public support for president Clinton. *Journalism and Communication Monographs, 43*(3), 115-156.

Brown, M. K., Carnoy, M., Currie, E., Duster, T., Oppenheimer, D. B., Shultz, M. M., et al. (2003). *Whitewashing race: The myth of a color-blind society*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.

Cohen, B. (1963). *The press and foreign policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Crenshaw, K. (1988). Race, reform, and retrenchment: Transformation and legitimation in antidiscrimination law. *Harvard Law Review, 101*(7), 1331-1387.

Cresswell, J. W. (2003). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches* (2d ed.). Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Croll, P. R. (2007). Modeling determinants of white racial identity: Results from a new national survey. *Social Forces, 86*(2), 613-642.

Delgado, R. (1995). *Critical race theory: The cutting edge*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Dixon, T. L., Azocar, C. L., & Casas, M. (2003). The portrayal of race and crime on television network news. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 47*(4), 498.

Dixon, T. L., & Linz, D. (2000a). Overrepresentation and underrepresentation of African Americans and Latinos as lawbreakers on television news. *Journal of Communication, 50*(2), 131-155.

Dixon, T. L., & Linz, D. (2000b). Race and the misrepresentation of victimization on local television news. *Communication Research, 27*(5), 547-554.

Dyer, R. (1988). White. *Screen, 29*(4), 44-65.

Dyer, R. (1997). *White*. London, New York: Routledge.

Edsall, T. B., & Edsall, M. D. (1991). *Chain reaction: The impact of race, rights, and taxes on American politics*. New York: Norton.

Entman, R. M. (1990). Modern racism and the images of blacks in local television news. *Critical Studies in Media Communication, 7*, 332-325.

Entman, R. M. (1992). Blacks in the news: Television, modern racism and cultural change. *Journalism Quarterly, 69*(2), 341-361.

Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fracture paradigm. *Journal of Communication, 43*, 51-58.

Entman, R. M. (2007). Framing bias: Media in the Distribution of power. *Journal of Communication, 57*(1), 163-173.

Entman, R. M., & Rojecki, A. (2000). *The black image in the white mind: Media and race in America*. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.

Fahmy, S., Kelly, J. D., & Kim, Y. S. (2007). What Katrina revealed: A visual analysis of the hurricane coverage by news wires and U.S. newspapers. *Journalism and Mass Comm Quarterly, 84*(3), 546-561.

Fazio, R. H., & Williams, C. J. (1986). Attitude accessibility as a moderator of the attitude-perception and attitude-behavior relations: An investigation of the 1984 presidential election. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51*, 504-514.

Frankenberg, R. (1993). *White women, race matters : The social construction of whiteness*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Frankenberg, R. (2001). The mirage of an unmarked whiteness. In B. B. Rasmussen, E. Klinenberg, I. J. Nexica & M. Wray (Eds.), *The making and unmaking of whiteness* (pp. 72-96). Durham & London: Duke University Press.

Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (1986). The aversive form of racism. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), *Prejudice, discrimination, and racism* (pp. 61-89). San Diego: Academic Press.

Gamson, W. A., & Modigliani, A. (1987). The changing culture of affirmative action. *Research in Political Sociology, 3*, 137-177.

Gans, H. J. (1979). *Deciding what's news: A study of CBS evening news, NBC nightly news, Newsweek, and Time* (1st ed.). New York: Pantheon Books.

Gilens, M. (1999). *Why Americans hate welfare: race, media, and the politics of antipoverty policy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gitlin, T. (1980). *The whole world is watching: Mass media and the making and unmaking of the new left.* Berkeley CA: University of California Press.

Hall, S. (1981). The whites of their eyes: Racist ideologies and the media. In G. Bridges & R. Brunt (Eds.), *Silver linings: Some strategies for the eighties* (pp. 28-52). London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Haney Lopez, I. (1996). The legal construction of race. In *White by law: The legal construction of race* (pp. 111-153). New York: New York University Press.

Harris, C. I. (1996). Whiteness as property. In K. Crenshaw, N. Gotanda, G. Peller & K. Thomas (Eds.), *Critical race theory: The key writings that formed the movement* (pp. 276-291). New York: The New Press.

Hartmann, D., & Croll, P. R. (2006). Measuring whiteness. In R. T. Schaefer (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of race, ethnicity, and society*: Sage Publications, Inc.

Headley, Clevis (2004). Delegitimizing the normativity of 'Whiteness': A critical Africana philosophical study of the metaphoricity of 'Whiteness.' In G. Yancy (Ed.), *What white looks like: African American philosophers on the whiteness question* (pp. 87-106). New York: Routledge.

Henry, P. J., & Sears, D. O. (2002). The symbolic racism 2000 scale. *Political Psychology, 23*(2), 253-282.

Huber, G. A., & Lapinski, J. S. (2006). The "race card" revisited: Assessing priming in policy contests. *American Journal of Political Science, 50*(2), 421-440.

Huber, G. A., & Lapinski, J. S. (2008). Testing the implicit-explicit model of racialized political communication. *Perspectives on Politics, 6*(1), 125-134.

Hutchings, V. L., & Valentino, N. A. (2004). The centrality of race in American politics. *Annual Review of Political Science, 7*, 383-408.

Ignatiev, N. (1995). *How the Irish became white.* New York: Routledge.

Iyengar, S. (1991). *Is anyone responsible?: How television frames political issues.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Iyengar, S., & Kinder, D. R. (1987). *News that matters.* Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.

Josephson, W. L. (1987). Television violence and children's aggression: Testing the priming, social script, and disinhibition predictions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53*, 882-890.

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984). Choice, values, and frames. *American Psychologist, 39*, 341-350.

Katz, E. (1957). The two-step flow of communication. *Public Opinion Quarterly, 21*(1, Anniversary Issue Devoted to Twenty Years of Public Opinion Research), 61-78.

Katz, E. (1987). Communication research since Lazarsfeld. *Public Opinion Quarterly, 51*(Part 2: Supplement: 50th Anniversary Issue), S25-S45.

Katz, E., & Lazarsfeld, P. F. (1955). *Personal influence: The part played by people in the flow of mass communications*. Glencoe IL: The Free Press.

Kinder, D. R., & Sanders, L. M. (1996). *Divided by color: Racial politics and democratic ideals*. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.

Kinder, D. R., & Sears, D. O. (1981). Symbolic racism versus racial threats to "The good life" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40*, 414-431.

Krysan, M. (2000). Prejudice, politics, and public opinion: Understanding the sources of racial policy attitudes. *Annual Review of Sociology, 16*, 135-168.

Lippmann, W. O. (1922). *Public opinion*. New York: Macmillan.

Lipsitz, G. (1998). *The possessive investment in whiteness: How white people profit from identity politics*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Lombard, M., Snyder-Duch, J., & Bracken, C. C. (2004). A call for standardization in content analysis reliability. *Human Communication Research, 30*(3), 433-437.

Lombard, M., Snyder-Duch, J., & Bracken, C. C. (2002). Content analysis in mass communication: Assessment and reporting of intercoder reliability. *Human Communication Research, 28*(4), 587-604.

Madison, K. J. (1999). Legitimation crisis and containment: The "Anti-racist-white-hero" Film. *Critical Studies in Media Communication, 16*(4), 399-416.

McConahay, J. B. (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence, and the modern racism scale. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), *Prejudice, discrimination, and racism* (pp. 91-125). San Diego: Academic Press.

McCoombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. (1972). The agenda-setting function of the mass media. *Public Opinion Quarterly, 36*, 176-187.

McGuire, W. J. (1986). The myth of massive media impact: Savagings and salvagings. In G. Comstock (Ed.), *Public communication and behavior* (Vol. 1). New York: Academic Press.

Meertens, R. W., & Pettigrew, T. F. (1997). Is subtle prejudice really prejudice? *Public Opinion Quarterly, 61*(1), 54-71.

Mellinger, Gwyneth. (2003). Counting color: Ambivalence and contradiction in the American society of newspaper editors' discourse of diversity. *Journal of Communication Inquiry 27*(2), 129-159.

Mendelberg, T. (2001). *The race card: Campaign strategy, implicit messages, and the norm of equality*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Mendelberg, T. (2008a). Racial priming revived. *Perspectives on Politics, 6*(1), 109-123.

Mendelberg, T. (2008b). Racial priming: Issues in research design and interpretation. *Perspectives on Politics, 6*(1), 135-140.

Miller, T. (2007). *Cultural citizenship*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Nakayama, T. K., & Krizek, R. (1999). Whiteness as strategic rhetoric. In T. K. Nakayama & J. N. Martin (Eds.), *Whiteness: The communication of social identity*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Nakayama, T. K., & Martin, J. N. (1999). Introduction: Whiteness as the communication of social identity. In T. K. Nakayama & J. N. Martin (Eds.), *Whiteness: The*

communication of social identity (pp. *vii-xiv*). Thousand Oaks, London & New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Nelson, T. E., Clawson, R. A., & Oxley, Z. M. (1997). Media framing of a civil liberties conflict and its effect on tolerance. *American Political Science Review, 91*, 567-583.

Neuendorf, K. A. (2002). *The content analysis guidebook*. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications.

Office of Policy, Planning and Research (1965). *The negro family: The case for national action.* United States Department of Labor.

Omi, M., & Winant, H. (1994). Racial formation. In *Racial formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s* (2d ed., pp. 53-76). New York & London: Routledge.

Pettigrew, T. F., & Meertens, R. W. (1995). Subtle and blatant prejudice in western Europe. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 25*, 57-75.

Price, V., & Tewksbury, D. (1997). News values and public opinion: A theoretical account of media priming and framing. In G. A. Barnett & F. J. Boster (Eds.), *Progress in communication sciences* (pp. 173-212). Norwood NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation.

Rasmussen, B. B., Klinenberg, E., Nexica, I. J., & Wray, M. (2001). Introduction In B. B. Rasmussen, E. Klinenberg, I. J. Nexica & M. Wray (Eds.), *The making and unmaking of whiteness* (pp. 1-24). Durham & London: Duke University Press.

Reese, S. D., Gandy, Jr., O. H., & Grant, A. E. (2001). *Framing public life : Perspectives on media and our understanding of the social world.* Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Roediger, D. R. (1991). *The wages of whiteness*. London & New York: Verso.

Rogers, E. M., & Dearing, J. W. (1988). Agenda-setting research: Where has it been, where is it going? In J. Anderson (Ed.), *Communication yearbook 11* (pp. 555-594). New York: Sage Publications.

Roman, L. G. (1997). Denying (white) racial privilege: Redemptive discourses and the uses of fantasy. In M. Fine, L. Weis, L. C. Powell & L. M. Wong (Eds.), *Off white: Readings on race, power, and society* (pp. 57-65). New York & London: Routledge.

Roskos-Ewoldsen, D. R., Roskos-Ewoldsen, B., & Dillman Carpentier, F. R. (2002). Media priming: A synthesis. In J. Bryant & D. Zillman (Eds.), *Media effects: Advances in theory and research* (pp. 97-120). Mahwah NJ & London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Schuman, H., Steeh, C., Bobo, L., & Krysan, M. (1997). *Racial attitudes in America: Trends and interpretations* (Revised ed.). Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press.

Sears, D. O. (1988). Symbolic racism. In P. A. Katz & D. A. Taylor (Eds.), *Eliminating racism: Profiles in controversy* (pp. 53-84). New York & London: Plenum Press.

Sears, D. O. (1993). Symbolic politics: A socio-psychological theory. In Iyengar & McGuire (Eds.), *Explorations in political psychology* (pp. 113-149). Durham NC: Duke University Press.

Sears, D. O., Henry, P. J., & Kosterman, R. (2000). Egalitarian values and contemporary racial politics. In D. O. Sears, J. Sidanius & L. Bobo (Eds.), *Racialized politics:*

The debate about racism in America (pp. 75-117). Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.

Sears, D. O., Hetts, J. J., Sidanius, J., & Bobo, L. (2000). Race in American politics. In D. O. Sears, J. Sidanius & L. Bobo (Eds.), *Racialized politics* (pp. 1-43). Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.

Sears, D. O., & Kinder, D. R. (1971). Racial tensions and voting in Los Angeles. In W. Z. Hirsch (Ed.), *Los Angeles: Viability and prospects for metropolitan leadership*. New York: Praeger.

Sears, D. O., Van Laar, C., Carrillo, M., & Kosterman, R. (1997). Is it really racism?: The origins of white Americans' opposition to race-targeted policies. *The Public Opinion Quarterly, 61*(1, Special Issue on Race), 16-53.

Shome, R. (2000). Outing whiteness. *Critical Studies in Media Communication, 17*(3), 366-371.

Sniderman, P. M., & Carmines, E. G. (1997). *Reaching beyond race*. Cambridge MA & London: Harvard University Press.

Sniderman, P. M., & Piazza, T. (1993). *The scar of race*. Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Squires, C. R. (2003). [review of the book *The race card: Campaign strategy, implicit messages, and the norm of equality*]. *Journal of Communication, 53*(2), 374-375.

Squires, C. R. (2007). "Not as black at the next guy": A peculiar case of white identity in the news. In *Dispatches from the color line: The press and multiracial America* (pp. 75-100). Albany NY: State University of New York Press.

Tarman, C., & Sears, D. O. (2005). The conceptualization and measurement of symbolic racism. *The Journal of Politics, 67*(3), 731-761.

Taylor, E. (1998). A primer on critical race theory. *The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, 9*, 122-124.

Thevenot, B. (2006). Myth-making in New Orleans. *American Journalism Review, 27*(6), 30-37.

Tierney, S. M. (2006). Themes of whiteness in *bulletproof monk*, *kill bill*, and *the last samurai*. *Journal of Communication, 56*(3), 607-624.

Turner, R. (1996). The dangers of misappropriation: Misusing Martin Luther King Jr.'s legacy to prove the colorblind thesis. *Michigan Journal of Race & Law, 2*(1), 101-130.

Valentino, N. A., Hutchings, V. L., & White, I. K. (2002). Cues that matter: How political ads prime racial attitudes during campaigns. *American Political Science Review, 96*(1), 75-90.

Williams, B. (Writer) (2006). *NBC nightly news* with Brian Williams [television broadcast]. In J. Reis (Producer).