EMOTIONAL SUBSTRATES OF WHITES' RACIAL ATTITUDES

by

Antoine J. Banks

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Political Science)
in The University of Michigan
2009

Doctoral Committee:

Associate Professor Vincent L. Hutchings, Co-Chair
Associate Professor Nicholas A. Valentino, Co-Chair
Professor John E. Jackson
Professor Donald R. Kinder
Professor Norbert W. Schwarz
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation bears only my name but there are several people that contributed to its completion. First and foremost are my friends and family without their support and guidance the project would have never come to fruition. My grandmother, Regina Banks-Clark, has not only been my emotional backbone throughout the process but has given up many nights to edit several drafts of the dissertation. My mother, Juanita Banks, gave me the confidence to push through each difficult question or perplexing finding. Much of the credit for my perseverance goes to them. The motivation to finish the dissertation solely rests on Jarred and Jourdan, they reminded me that a larger purpose was at hand.

I owe a great deal of intellectual debts. Most important are Nicholas Valentino, Vince Hutchings, Donald Kinder, John Jackson and Norbert Schwarz who guided me through the dissertation. I am especially grateful to Nick and Vince who instilled in me that knowledge and good scholarship are what this enterprise is about. I am honored to have learned from these two great individuals. I would also like to thank many of the faculty members at the University of Michigan for their advice at numerous stages of the dissertation, particularly, Ted Brader, Hanes Walton Jr., Nancy Burns, Robert Franzese, James Jackson and W. Russell Neuman.

The interaction with my fellow graduate students at the University of Michigan was invaluable. They created an environment for me to express my ideas while
providing much needed feedback. I am especially grateful to my good friends Eric Groenendyk and Dominick Wright who never let me settle and continued to push me to think harder about the project and its contribution. I am also thankful for the helpful feedback of Ismail White, Corrine McConnaughy, Tasha Philpot, Irfan Nooruddin, Katie Drake, Andrea Benjamin, Harwood McClerking, Anne Davis, Rosario Aguilar, Gaye Muderrisoglu, Liz Suhay, Ashley Jardina, Nathan Kalmoe, Davin Pheonix, Lefleur Stephens, Menna DeMessie, Erin Bryd (University of Texas), Joanna Ibarra (University of Texas) and Eric McDaniel (University of Texas). I also want to acknowledge all the people that helped in some fashion along the way, Nathaniel Clark, Christopher Malone, Benjamin Andrews, Nicholas Dunkley, Brenda Cruz, Brent Weiss, Paul Demarinis and Karol Figueroa. I want to give my sincerest appreciation to you all for your assistance throughout this journey.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</th>
<th>ii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF APPENDICES</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. A Theory of Emotion in Racism</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II. The Emotional Substrates of Racial Attitudes</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Emotions Underlying Contemporary Racial Threat Attitudes</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Emotions and White Support for Presidential Candidates</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Conclusion</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## APPENDICES

APPENDICES 113

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

122
LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE

II.1. Priming Symbolic Racism via Emotion 57
II.2. Priming Old-fashioned Racism via Emotion 59
III.1. Priming Group Conflict Attitudes via Emotion (College Sample) 84
III.2. Priming Group Conflict Attitudes via Emotion (Southern Residents) 85
IV.1. Candidates: Priming Symbolic Racism via Emotion 102
IV.2. Candidates: Priming Group Conflict Attitudes via Emotion 104
LIST OF TABLES

TABLE

II.1. Bivariate Relationship between Emotion, Racial and Non-racial Attitudes 51
II.2. Manipulation Check 52
II.3. Priming Symbolic Racism via Emotion 53
II.4. Priming Old-fashioned Racism via Emotion 54
II.5. Priming Limited Government via Emotion 55
II.6. The Direct Effect of Emotions on Opposition to Racial and Non-racial Policy 56
III.1. Manipulation Check 80
III.2. Priming Group Conflict Attitudes via Emotion (College Sample) 81
III.3. Priming Group Conflict Attitudes via Emotion (National Sample) 82
III.4. Priming Group Conflict Attitudes via Emotion (Southern Residents) 83
IV.1 Candidates: Priming Symbolic Racism via Emotion 100
IV.2. Candidates: Priming Group Conflict Attitudes via Emotion 101
LIST OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX

1. Scale/Index Construction 114

2. Facial Expressions Used in Emotion Induction Task 121
Chapter I

A Theory of Emotion in Racism

Political scientists have begun to notice that emotions might play a powerful and independent role in explanations of public opinion formation and political behavior. Kinder (1994) makes the point strongly: “Emotions are the stuff of political life, too. Without emotion, what would citizens do? Why would they do anything at all? And yet in contemporary studies of public opinion, emotions are conspicuous primarily by their absence. In contemporary studies the emphasis, instead, is upon the cognitive” (pg. 277). Though emotions are commonly invoked, their particular contribution, independent of cognitive forces, is rarely pursued. Furthermore, the distinct effect of some emotions as opposed to others in the formation and application of racial attitudes is unknown at this point. This literature has focused far more on the cognitive rather than the emotional elements of racial prejudice despite the fact that Black intellectuals and leaders have provided a plethora of reasons to suspect race-relations in America are emotionally charged.

Numerous historical accounts suggest that the feeling prevalent in Whites’ reaction to Blacks attempts for racial progress is anger. Dubois describes the South during reconstruction as “the [W]hite laborer joined the [W]hite landholder and capitalist and beat the [B]lack laborer into subjection through secret organizations and the rise of a new doctrine of race hatred” (Dubois 1935, 670). He further testifies that Whites were strategic in how to infuse thoughts of Blacks with feelings of hate.
“War, righteous Hate and then Suspicion. It was very easy to be deceived by the other races; to think of the Negro as good-natured … No. Look for low subtle methods and death dealing ideals. Meet them by full-blooded contempt for other races. Teach this to children so that it will become instinctive. Then they won’t get into trouble by playing artlessly with colored children or even with colored dolls unless, of course, they are attired as servants” (DuBois 1940, 162).

Anger and hate represent similar concepts, and some psychological theories suggest they are functionally linked. Lazarus (1991), for example, argues “A large number of words fall within the emotion family of anger … such as, … hatred” (pg. 227).

The treatment of Blacks as second-class citizens reflects an angry time in American history for both Whites and Blacks. This is especially evident during the civil rights movement. Blacks’ desire for equal treatment in the 1960s and 1970s was met with fierce opposition. A march in the summer of 1966, in Chicago, led by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. exemplified Whites hatred of racial progress. In a *New York Times* article, Dr. King states: “I think the people from Mississippi ought to come to Chicago to learn how to hate” (Roberts 1966). Whites surrounding the demonstration were quoted as saying “God, I hate niggers and nigger-lovers” and “I worked all my life for a house out here and no nigger is going to get it.” Little did Martin Luther King Jr. know from his time in Birmingham that Whites’ anger would travel so quickly up North. In his letter from the Birmingham city jail, he pointedly captured the hate and anger seething in many Whites at the time.

“[W]hen you have seen vicious mobs lynch your mothers and fathers at will and drown your sisters and brothers at whim; when you have seen hate filled policemen curse, kick and brutalize, and even kill you black brothers and sisters with impunity; … when you have to concoct an answer for a five-year-old son asking in agonizing pathos: ‘Daddy, why do [W]hite people treat colored people so mean?’; … then you will understand why we find it difficult to wait” (King 1963).
Black leaders like Malcolm X also revealed Whites’ malcontent and hypocrisy. “For the [W]hite man to ask the [B]lack man if he hates him is just like the rapist asking the raped, or the wolf asking the sheep, ‘Do you hate me?’ The white man is in no moral position to accuse anyone else of hate!” (Haley 1964, 241). Self-righteousness and moral indignation found strong voice in many White politicians opposed to racial desegregation of schools, fair housing laws, and guarantees of basic democratic voting rights. For instance, George Wallace, former governor of Alabama, stated in a speech on integration in 1962 that “in the name of the greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw the line in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny, and I say segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever.”1 This righteous indignation was met with equal passion from Black leaders, who could barely conceal their anger over the treatment of their people.

Given the anger apparent on both sides of the racial divide throughout American history, it is surprising that so little attention has been paid to this particular emotion in modern studies of racial policy opinion. This dissertation attempts to fill that void. The thesis advanced here is that anger, and not fear or other emotions, provides the foundation upon which contemporary racism (or racial resentment) is built.2 As a result of this emotional underpinning, I argue that the experience of anger in the context of modern

---

2 I define racism as “[B]lacks should behave themselves. They should take quiet advantage of the ample opportunities now provided to them. Government had been too generous, had given [B]lacks too much, and [B]lacks, for their part, had accepted gifts all too readily. Discrimination [is] illegal, opportunities [are] plentiful. Blacks should work their way up without handouts or special favors in a society that was now color-blind” (Kinder and Sanders 1996, 105). These sentiments are still evident in Whites thinking today-based on the 2004 American National Election Study (ANES), where a majority/plurality of Whites endorse these ideals.
American politics can still powerfully activate negative thoughts about Black among a large percentage of White Americans.

An alternative viewpoint is that racial prejudice is driven by fear (Blumer 1958). Here racism resides in a sense of group position - “realistic conflict over group interests and perceptions of threat from inferior groups” (Sears, Hetts, Sidanius and Bobo 2000, 24). This perspective claims that “fear is an emotional recoil from the endangering of group position” (Blumer 1958, 4). More specifically, “[t]he remaining feeling essential to racial prejudice is a fear or apprehension that the subordinate racial group is threatening, or will threaten, the position of the dominant group” (Blumer 1958, 6). I argue that the cognitive elements necessary to experience fear (Lazarus 1991; Smith and Ellsworth 1985) do not correspond with Whites’ present-day racial attitudes. In addition, American norms toward race have changed. Candidate racial appeals have shifted from explicit racial messages (i.e. miscegenation and disenfranchisement) perhaps tied to fear, to implicit racial cues (hard work and government spending) probably linked to anger (Mendelberg 2001).

The Emotional Underpinnings of Racial Attitudes

Understanding the emotional underpinnings of racial attitudes answer two important questions. The first is whether racial prejudice has transformed from old-fashioned bigotry based on social distance and ideas about biological differences between the races into a new more subtle form driven by perceived violations by Blacks of basic American values (Sears and Kinder 1971). The second question my dissertation attempts to answer is whether emotions determine which belief system (racial attitudes or non-racial attitudes) will be applied to Whites’ racial policy opinions in any given situation.

---

3 I treat fear and anxiety interchangeably, as most scholars do within the emotion literature (Marcus et al. 2000).
Some scholars are skeptical of the evidence that has been marshaled to demonstrate a new subtle form of racism (Sniderman and Tetlock 1986; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Proponents of the “new racism” perspective claim that old-fashioned racism and today’s new subtle form of racism are empirically distinct and have separate and independent political effects (Bobo and Kluegel 1997; McConahay and Hough 1976; Kinder 1986; Sears 1988). Old-fashioned racism is rooted in social distance and open support for segregation and discrimination (McConahay 1982). This belief system is based upon pre-Civil War racial stereotypes of intelligence, “dirtiness” and slovenliness (Katz and Braly 1933). Fredrickson (1971) testifies to “the popularity around the turn of the century of the stereotype of the ‘Negro as beast’” (pg. 275). Therefore, it seems that the emotion driving old-fashioned racism is disgust for the out-group (Blacks). If such a change has occurred, as Sears, Kinder and their colleagues suggest, an expectation is that the emotion undergirding racial prejudice has changed. My dissertation intends to examine whether this argument is correct. I contend that old-fashioned racism is primarily driven by disgust and today’s subtle form of racism centers on anger. This has transpired because the dominant theme surrounding race has changed from Blacks as beastly creatures to people who simply lack American moral values (Ryan 1976; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears 1988).

The psychological mechanism connecting emotions and racial attitudes is priming (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Priming calls “attention to some matters while ignoring others” (pg. 63). Few have investigated whether the emotion itself brings certain attitudes to mind, mainly because priming is thought of as a cognitive process. Bower’s (1981) associative network theory posits that emotion is instrumental in memory, learning and recall. This
theoretical framework provides the leverage to link emotional states to Whites’ racial attitudes. Bower finds that information learned in a particular emotional state is recalled more accurately when the individual experiences the same emotion. So if racial prejudice is the negative information learned about Blacks in an anger state, then future anger episodes should activate these attitudes from memory. On the other hand, fear should not produce this same effect.

Myrdal (1944) highlighted the conflict between the American Creed of freedom, justice and equality and Blacks’ treatment in the American South, which fell far short of this ideal. He proposed two solutions to this dilemma; 1) publicize the “Negro” problem - if Whites knew the facts they would be more willing to help Blacks; and 2) educate Whites to Blacks’ situation. Six decades later most believe Myrdal’s solutions have been implemented. Some consider that the civil rights movement of the 1960s publicized and educated Whites to the “Negro” problem and with this we saw the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Nevertheless, some insist that racism still dominates Whites opposition to racial policies and candidates (Sears and Kinder 1971; Kinder and Sears 1981; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Bobo 1988; Sidanius and Pratto 2000). Why has racism continued even though Myrdal’s suggestions have been enacted? One explanation is that we have failed to identify the emotion driving racial antipathy and to find a solution to quell these feelings.

I contend, as most scholars in the debate concede, that racial prejudice exists and is still a major force in American politics. A great deal of evidence has been amassed over the past several decades to support this conclusion (Sears and Kinder 1971; Bobo and Kluegel 1997; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Bobo and Taun 2006).
A different explanation, however, has been proposed. Though racism has not faded away entirely, this alternative argument states, its power to affect racial policy opinions has been nearly eliminated (Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Sniderman, Carmines, Layman and Carter 1996; Sniderman, Crosby and Howell 2000; Thernstrom 1987; Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997). Instead, policy opinions are driven much more significantly by non-racial political ideology, mostly regarding the proper size and role of government, and by values and norms regarding individualism. This perspective criticizes the “new racism” theorists’ conceptualization of racial prejudice. They contend that symbolic racism does not consist of ant-Black affect and individualism, additively or when you interact the two terms (Sniderman, Crosby and Howell 2000).\(^5\) These results according to Sniderman and colleagues, exonerate individualism as a component of symbolic racism. Whites believe Blacks and eastern European immigrants should work equally hard, there is no evidence of a racial double standard. “We, therefore, conclude that neither Sears nor Kinder has yet met his burden of proof” (Sniderman, Crosby and Howell 2000, 248). Kinder argues that the “new racism” theorists never intended for race-neutral principles to have no impact on racial matters or to mask racism. “We differ, surely, but less than might appear to be the case from the long indictment of our work that Sniderman and Tetlock have drawn up, and certainly less than would be the case if we were to be interpreted as arguing that traditional values are merely convenient rationalizations for racism” (Kinder 1986, 155).

Although proponents of the new racism perspective and politics-centered approach are at odds, I accept that both attitude dimensions contribute to Whites’ racial policy opinions and candidate preferences. For instance, “conservatism most certainly is

---

\(^5\) Sears and Henry (2003) find that the blend of anti-Black affect and individualism is a better predictor of symbolic racism than the additive model or when you interact the two terms.
something in addition to a nervous response to racism … Even when symbolic racism is controlled, liberalism – conservatism was highly correlated with candidate preference in the mayoralty election” (Sears and Kinder 1971, 77-78). My priority is not to decipher which belief system has the largest impact, but instead to explore whether distinct emotional systems activate these different dimensions as criteria for evaluating racial policies and candidates.

My position is that Whites’ contemporary racism are linked to anger early in life, making it resistant to the ameliorating effects of the norm of equality. So later in life, simply experiencing anger (even unrelated to race or politics) should bring racial prejudice closer to the surface. Therefore, racial cues do not need to be invoked for Whites to reject race-targeted policies (Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings and White 2002). The power of these cues lies in an emotional mechanism, the mere experience of anger.

Evidence shows that Whites attitude toward race “is acquired fairly early in life, according to numerous studies of children’s racial socialization” (Sears 1988, 70). For instance, Miller and Sears (1986) find that pre-adult socialization explains prejudice far better than the environment surrounding us as adults. Parents pass on their thoughts about race in the home after experiencing a frustrating (or anger inducing) event (Harding, Proshansky, Kutner and Chein 1968).

Emotional experiences are part of the socialization process. For instance, negative attitudes toward Nazi’s and Communists were attributed to feelings about the group that was acquired in late childhood and early adolescence (Zellman and Sears 1971). The link between the group (Blacks) and the emotion get passed down through generations. So people are naturally inclined to think in terms of groups (Converse 1964), and link the
cognitive and affective responses toward the group with attitudes toward policies (Nelson and Kinder 1996).

Appraisal theories of emotion (Lazarus 1991a; Smith and Ellsworth 1985) and associative network theory (Bower 1981) help to determine which emotions undergird racial bigotry. One of the values of appraisal theory is its ability to distinguish between the causes and consequences of discrete emotions. Based on the appraisals of blame, certainty and control, I argue that anger rather than fear underlies contemporary racism. Emotions driving race-neutral principles must also be considered. Violation of (non-racial) the Protestant work ethic or increase in the size of government could trigger anger. However, I contend that no one emotion is central to race-neutral principles, since they include many political issues and beliefs (Converse 1964; McClosky and Zaller 1984).

**The Racial Attitudes Debate**

The literature on racial attitudes has attempted to resolve a particular conundrum: Whites’ support for the principle of racial equality has increased, support for policies designed to reduce inequality has not. For example, Schuman, Steeh, Bobo and Krysan (1997) found in 1995 that 96-percent of White respondents supported the principle that White students and Black students should attend the same schools. However, support for actual school desegregation policies is much lower. In 1994, only 25-percent of Whites agreed that the government should intervene in school integration (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo and Krysan 1997). This underwhelming support resonates with other government efforts to

---

6 Sniderman argues that the gap in support of racial equality in principle and policy is an illusion. To argue a gap exists is to take a liberal outlook. He asserts that Whites’ positions on racial policies derive from the competing perspectives of liberalism and conservatism. As a result, there is no dilemma for conservatives’ because their support for racial equality in principle prompts their rejection of policies that endorse race-based preferences. Conservatives’ objection to affirmative action, therefore, is consistent with their principles.
alleviate racial inequality. In 1992, 75-percent of Whites were against “quotas” to admit Black students at universities. In 1997, the same trend mirrors Whites’ position regarding preferential hiring and promotion of Blacks – 78 percent of Whites were in opposition (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo and Krysan 1997). Several explanations have been offered to explain the divergence in support for racial equality in principle and policy.

One explanation for Whites’ opposition to racial policies derives from a new subtle form of racism (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears and Kinder 1971; Kinder and Sears 1981). This perspective recognizes that Whites no longer oppose policies designed to assist African Americans because they regard them as racially inferior. Instead, racism has transformed into a combination of anti-Black affect and the belief that “[B]lacks do not try hard enough to overcome the difficulties they face and that they take what they have not earned” (Kinder and Sanders 1996, 106). Segregationist views of Blacks as biologically and intellectually inferior no longer reflect the majority of Whites’ sentiment. After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, most Whites believe that racial equality is the norm. The inner city violence (riots) that swept through the country during the 1960s and early 1970s, according to Kinder and Sanders (1996), spawned a new form of racism that Blacks should behave themselves and work their way up with no special favors since we now live in a color-blind society.

The appellation of this form of racism has varied – “symbolic racism”, “modern racism” and “racial resentment”. Whatever the designation, racial resentment is known to be a strong determinant of voting preference and racial policy opinions (Sears and Kinder 1971; Kinder and Sears 1981; Kinder and Sanders 1996). Measures of symbolic racism impact Whites’ voting behavior over and beyond the effect of racial threat and ideology.
Symbolic racism was a strong predictor of support for the White conservative, Sam Yorty over the Black liberal, Thomas Bradley in the 1969 and 1973 Los Angeles mayoral race. Utilizing the 1986, 1988 and 1992 American National Election Study (ANES), Kinder and Sanders (1996) found that Whites’ objection to racial policies was mostly an expression of racial resentment, controlling for material threats to self-interest, American principles (equality, economic individualism and limited government) and social and demographic variables.\(^7\)

An alternative explanation for Whites’ opposition to racial policies argues that these views are contingent on their non-racial political choices (Sniderman, Crosby and Howell 2000; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). One feature is ideological continuity, where the political parties present policy alternatives in a liberal-conservative framework across issues (including racial policies). This framework leads to a clash over the proper responsibilities of government and the appropriate obligations of citizens. In short, Whites’ opposition to racial policies does not stem primarily from their feelings toward Blacks, but their belief that these government sponsored-programs waste money by adding to the government bureaucracy.\(^8\) Sniderman and his colleagues contend that race-neutral principles are the main determinants of Whites’ racial policy preferences. In addition, they find conservatives are consistent in their position on racial policies, no matter the beneficiary (Blacks or immigrants from Europe) or the justification (Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock and Kendrick 1991; Sniderman, Carmines, Layman and Carter 1996). Since conservatives’ opinions towards racial policies are constant, Sniderman argues it is

\(^7\) The racial policies examined were fair employment, school desegregation, federal spending, government effort, preferential hiring and college quotas.

\(^8\) Sniderman makes the distinction that the more educated are more likely to use their principles and the least educated are more likely to use their negative feelings toward Blacks (Sniderman, Brody, Kuklinski 1984).
incorrect to consider their position as representing racism because they treat all groups equally.

A third explanation for Whites’ racial policy preferences is group position theory. This perspective grows out of Campbell’s (1967) realistic group conflict theory and Blumer’s (1958) group position model. Whites’ opposition to racial policies is stimulated by perceiving Blacks as competitors for jobs, promotions and other goods. The architects of this belief system contend that racism stems from resource conflicts between groups. The group position model relies on the stratification system that distinguishes between dominant and subordinate groups. Three concepts have emerged from the group position model (Bobo and Kluegel 1997; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Bobo and Taun 2006).

The first concept developed out of the group position model was dubbed laissez-faire racism (Bobo and Kluegel 1997). According to this theory, Whites’ contemporary racial attitudes consist of negative stereotypes of Blacks and placing the responsibility for the socio-economic racial gap on Blacks (Bobo and Kluegel 1997). Whites’ negative racial attitudes were transformed from Jim Crow racism to laissez-faire racism after the demise of the labor-intensive agricultural South. The change in the economic system did not, however, alter Whites’ belief of entitlement to their group position. Laissez-faire racism defends Whites’ dominant position within the new economic system. This form of racism, Bobo (2000) argues, derives from Whites’ perception of Blacks as competitive threats for valued social resources, status and privilege, which in turn influences their positions on race-targeted policies.
The other two concepts are not equated with racism, but are found to have a strong influence on Whites’ racial policy preferences (Bobo and Taun 2006; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). The second concept developed out of the group position model is group conflict - a person’s perception of threat or zero-sum competition with racial out-groups for scarce social resources (Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Bobo and Hutchings (1996) found that Whites’ perception of Blacks as competitive threats for social resources was based upon three types of race-based attitudes: racial prejudice, negative stereotypes, social distance, and racial alienation or a sense that Whites as a group have not received sufficient benefits in society. Group conflict attitudes were found to predict White Wisconsin residents’ opinions on Native American treaty rights (Bobo and Taun 2006).

The third concept is social dominance, where Whites—or any other relatively privileged group in society such as men, or the affluent—, on average, aspire to maintain a non-egalitarian social structure, which reduces support for policies designed to benefit Blacks (Sidanius, Singh, Hetts and Federico 2000; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Social dominance orientation is the degree to which social group hierarchies are accepted and in fact endorsed. The theory asserts that it is people’s commitment to anti-egalitarianism that evokes resistance to racial policies (Sidanius, Devereux, and Pratto 1992). This reasoning is resultant of a personality dimension that Sidanius and Pratto label social dominance orientation (SDO). Sidanius and Pratto state “SDO will be driven by one’s membership in

---

9 Racism is only one reflection of social dominance, sexism, classism and meritocracy also result from group-based social hierarchy (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Group conflict is also considered an overarching theory that not only encompasses prejudice, but also self-interest, and in-group preference.

10 They do not find negative affect, one form of racism, to determine Whites’ perceived threat of Blacks. This effect might be the result of them measuring negative emotion in general and not discretely. Racial alienation corresponds to a group’s historical position. Group’s who feel alienated are more likely to see other groups as competitive threats.
and identification with arbitrary, highly salient, and hierarchically organized arbitrary-set groups” (Sidanius & Pratto 1999, 49).

Opinions diverge from what actually constitutes racism between the symbolic attitudes perspective (Sear and Kinder 1971; Kinder and Sanders 1996) and the group position perspective (Bobo and Kluegel 1997; Blumer 1958). My dissertation accepts that these two belief systems are related but capture different dimensions of racism. Rather than focus on the cognitive elements that make up racism, I push the debate in a different direction. Recently, attention has steered toward the mechanisms that activate racial considerations, such as framing and racial priming (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings and White 2002). My dissertation falls in line with this area of research, but is distinctive by focusing on the emotional underpinnings of racial attitudes. Because of the powerful link between particular emotions and racial attitudes presumed by my theory, I predict that the experience of anger, independent of thoughts about politics or race, is enough to activate contemporary racial bigotry.

**Emotions and Race in America**

Scholars have already given us reason to expect that racial politics stimulate strong emotions (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sniderman, Crosby and Howell 2000; Bobo and Taun 2006). Emotion is built into the theory of symbolic racism – which has been defined as the blend of negative feelings toward Blacks and the value of individualism (Sears and Henry 2003). The group position model also considers negative affect to be an integral part of racism. Emotions are implicated in a number of racially charged public policy debates. For instance, Kinder and Sanders (1996) found anger, disgust and fury to have a strong
negative relationship with Whites’ attitudes toward affirmative action for Blacks.

Similarly, Sniderman, Crosby and Howell (2000) found that most Whites (liberals and conservatives) were angered or upset by the phrase, “Black leaders asking for affirmative action.” Although these studies are illuminating, there is very little theory devoted to how emotions operate within the domain of racial policy opinion. We seem to know intuitively that emotions play a role, but exactly which emotions are powerful, and why, is less understood.

In much of the racial policy opinion literature, all negative emotions are treated as synonymous. The effects of anger and fear are discussed as interchangeable (Bobo and Taun 2006, Kinder and Sears 1981; Kinder and Sanders 1996). For instance, racial attitude theorists first posit “symbolic racism is rooted in … early learned racial fears” (Kinder and Sears 1981) and then contend anti-black affect is “experienced subjectively as fear, avoidance and a desire for distance, anger, distaste, disgust, contempt, apprehension, unease or dislike” (Sears 1988, 70). The group position theorists are also guilty of this generalization of negative emotion - “[p]rejudice is most directly expressed in the form of negative stereotypes and negative feelings or affect” (Bobo and Taun 2006, 107). Sears (1988) recognizes the weakness of the measurement strategy, stating “[d]irect measures of anti[B]lack affect have, to date, been rather crude … the main measuring instrument has been the ‘feeling thermometer’ used by the National Election Studies, which measures simple evaluations of ‘[B]lacks,’ ‘[W]hites’ and other objects on a warm-cold scale” (p. 70). There is, therefore, good reason to investigate the impact of particular negative emotions on the activation of racial attitudes as criteria for evaluating racial policies.
If anger drives racism, we would know more about if it is likely to surface, and we may also better understand its behavioral implications. History has shown us that racism leads to various types of adverse behaviors from White flight to lynching. A common behavioral consequence of fear is avoidance or escape, while anger often triggers approach. “[A]nger, in contrast with fright and anxiety, is potentiated by an appraisal that the demeaning offense is best ameliorated by attack” (Lazarus 1991a, 225). Averil also discusses aggression as a consequence of anger, where this behavior is a “response intended to inflict pain or discomfort upon another” (Averill 1982, 30). In contrast, “[i]n both fright and anxiety, the action tendency is avoidance or escape” (Lazarus 1991a, 238). Witte and Allen (2000), similarly, find as fear intensifies avoidance and defensive behaviors increase. Avoidance entails disengaging in any behavior because of the perception that whatever action is taken will not reduce the threat. Lazarus clearly illuminates this point, “[c]oping potential is uncertain in both fright and anxiety” (Lazarus 1991a, 237). Behaviors presumably related to racism constitute avoidance (White flight) or attack (lynching). Although this dissertation does not examine the behavioral outcome of triggering specific negative emotions, it does argue that we need to better understand which emotion activates racial bigotry. If anger underlies contemporary racial prejudice then behaviors that represent attack are to be expected.

**General Theories of Emotion**

Over the last 20 years, the link between emotion and political outcomes have begun to receive scholarly attention (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Brader 2006; Kinder 1994; Conover and Feldman 1986; Brader and Valentino 2007). The growth in the

---

11 The strength of this effect is contingent on the level of efficacy. In other words, when an individual believes he/she is unable to alleviate the threat the behavior of avoidance will be at its highest.
literature surrounding emotions has provided a multitude of insights in political science. Primary among these is the recognition that emotion and cognition are fundamentally linked (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Lazarus 1991a; Brader 2005; Smith and Ellsworth 1985) and not separate systems as earlier scholars assumed (Zajonc 1980). “[A]ffect and reason [are] two complementary mental states in a delicate, interactive, highly functional dynamic balance” (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000, 8). Scholars establishing this interconnection have found emotions to influence information seeking and participation (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Brader 2005; Rudolph, Gangl & Stevens 2000; Nadeau, Niemi & Amato 1995; Valentino, Hutchings, Banks and Davis 2008; Valentino, Gregorowicz & Groenendyk 2008; Brader, Valentino & Suhay 2008, Valentino, Hutchings, Banks & Davis 2009), risk perceptions (Lerner and Keltner 2001; Huddy, Feldman and Cassie 2007) and political judgments (Kinder 1994; Conover and Feldman 1986).

Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen (2000) introduce emotion and cognition as intertwined entities in their theory of affective intelligence. This theory suggests two systems that manage people’s decisions and behaviors. The disposition system is responsible for controlling the flow of habitual behavior. Enthusiasm manages this system in informing us that everything is running according to plan. The surveillance system monitors for threatening and novel stimuli, which interrupt habitual routine and leads to, engaged thought. Fear signals that the environment is novel and threatening and prompts greater attention. Empirical evidence does in fact suggest that fear increases attention to the political campaign - decreases people’s reliance on partisanship and refocuses attention on candidate qualities and policy preferences (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus,
Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Brader 2005). Affective intelligence theory focuses on primary and automatic processes. The brain reacts instantaneously and certainly preconsciously to a stimulus and triggers either the surveillance or disposition systems.

“[E]motional evaluations of and reactions to symbols, people, groups and events, are generated before conscious awareness … a great deal of emotional processing never reaches the level of conscious awareness” (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000, 28).

Recently, scholars have begun to show that particular appraisal patterns determine the emotion an individual experiences (Lazarus 1991; Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Lerner and Keltner 2001). Consciousness is an important feature of appraisal theory, because socially consequential emotions are triggered by an individual’s evaluation of the relationship between themselves and their environment. Appraisal theories of emotion are not necessarily at odds with affective intelligence, but enhances our knowledge of how people’s conscious awareness of their environment influences the emotion that ensues.

“[E]motions are always about person environment relationships that involve harm (for negative emotions) and benefit (for the positive emotions)” (Lazarus 1991b, 820). For instance, “the sensory pleasure of being stroked or stimulated sexually may lead to satisfaction when it is interpreted as signifying love or if there is willing participation, but to distress (e.g., anger, fear or despair) when it is deemed inappropriate and unwanted” (Lazarus 1991b, 821). Therefore, a given stimulus is evaluated very quickly along several dimensions (blame, credit, intentionality, control, etc.) and the results of these appraisals determine if the sexual act is wanted or unwanted and the resultant emotion.

Lazarus (1991) identifies two types of appraisals. The first is primary appraisals, determining if an encounter is congruent with our goals. This beginning step distinguishes
whether we experience a positive or negative emotion. Next are secondary appraisals – it
differentiates between particular emotions and provides coping strategies. These appraisals
are blame and credit, coping potential and future expectancy. Smith and Ellsworth (1985)
provide additional secondary appraisals – certainty/uncertainty and control. Since my
dissertation mainly focuses on distinguishing anger from fear, most of my time is spent
discussing these appraisal patterns.\footnote{12}

To experience \textit{anger}, the appraisals of blame, certainty and control are central. For
example, when a person is frustrated (or threatened) and is certain who is responsible or
blameworthy for the offense and could have controlled his/her action – anger results.
Conversely, \textit{fear}'s appraisal pattern consists of lack of control and uncertainty. In other
words, when one is frustrated (or threatened) and is uncertain about who is responsible (no
blame) and lacks control – fear arises. Appraisal theory provides more than just the ability
to differentiate between emotions; it gives us a fuller understanding of what it means to
experience these emotions. The benefit of appraisal theory is that it enables us to think
about how emotion is connected to concepts like racial prejudice.

\textbf{Linking Emotion and Racial Attitudes}

Blame is a critical feature of racism (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Bobo and Kluegel
1997). Symbolic racism’s central argument is that Whites believe Blacks are to blame for
their disadvantaged status (Sears and Kinder 1971; Kinder and Sears 1981; Kinder and
Sanders 1996). “\textit{Laissez-faire racism encompasses an ideology that blames Blacks
themselves for their poorer relative economic standing, seeing it as a function of perceived
cultural inferiority}” (Bobo and Kluegel 1997, 95). Appraisals of certainty and control are

\footnote{12 Chapter 2 discusses in-detail the cognitive elements associated with disgust.}
also likely among racially resentful Whites. Whites’ prejudiced attitudes consist of their
certainty that Blacks are responsible for not working hard and they can control their
groups’ failings if they would only try. Therefore, contemporary racism signifies all the
cognitive properties necessary to experience anger.

Another prediction of the current approach is that racially sympathetic Whites are
least likely to associate anger with their racial attitudes. This expectation is drawn from
Devine’s (1989) work on stereotypes and prejudice. She finds low-prejudice and high-
prejudice people are equally knowledgeable of stereotypes of Blacks. However, low-
prejudice people censor and control these thoughts and replace them with non-prejudiced
values. Fazio and Dunton (1997) find a similar pattern where some individuals are
motivated to control their prejudiced reactions because they do not appreciate having their
attention drawn to race. Therefore, I posit that racially liberal Whites control and inhibit
themselves from associating anger with their attitudes toward race because they do not
want to be perceived as racist.

Political strategists, politicians, the news media and other forms of elite
communication employ various strategies attempting to invoke race. Triggering race
influences how people think about welfare, crime and affirmative action (Gilens 1999;
Kinder and Sanders 1996; Valentino 1999). Valentino (1999) found that news coverage of
crime committed by minorities, primed racial attitudes that in turn influenced evaluations
of political candidates. Implicit racial cues are another strategy activating Whites’ racial
considerations and subsequently influencing their candidate preference (Mendelberg 2001;
Valentino, Hutchings and White 2002). Mendelberg states,

“"The most important and underplayed lesson of the Horton message is that, in a
racially divided society that aspires to equality, the injection of race into campaigns
poses a great danger to democratic politics – so long as the injection of race takes place under cover. When a society has repudiated racism, yet racial conflict persists, candidates can win by playing the race card only through implicit racial appeals. The implicit nature of these appeals allows them to prime racial stereotypes, fears, and resentments while appearing not to do so. When an implicit appeal is rendered explicit – when other elites bring the racial meaning of the appeal to voters’ attention – it appears to violate the norm of racial equality. It then loses its ability to prime white voters’ racial predispositions” (pg. 4).

The racial priming literature treats priming as a cognitive process. Recent evidence has shown that emotion and cognition are intertwined, therefore emotions may fit within this process (Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Brader 2005). Bower’s (1981) associative network theory clearly illuminates emotions role in the priming process. His model is based on state-dependent memory where events learned in one emotional state will be recalled better when one is put back into that state. He finds evidence for the state dependent effect for both recall of words and actual personal events. In an experiment, Bower (1981) had subjects’ record emotional events daily in a diary for a week. In their diary, they were asked to rate the event as pleasant or unpleasant on a 10-point scale. After a week, participants were randomly assigned to a pleasant or unpleasant mood induction and then asked to recall any event they could from what they recorded in their diary. He found people in the pleasant condition recalled more of their pleasant experiences and participants in the unpleasant condition recalled more of their unpleasant experiences. Relating this to the domain of race, I expect racial attitudes to be learned in a particular emotional state, therefore in future incidents of experiencing the emotion these attitudes will more likely be recalled from memory.

**Overview of the Chapters**
Chapter 2 explores the emotional substrates of racial and non-racial attitudes. In this chapter, two different approaches are utilized – a national survey and an experiment. The first study utilizes the 1985 American National Election Study, to determine if anger is correlated with symbolic racism, disgust is associated with old-fashioned racism and none of the emotions are related to race-neutral principles. The second study performs an experiment on a national sample through an Internet survey company (Polimetrix) to test if anger, not related to politics or race (general), primes symbolic racism, disgust (general) primes old-fashioned racism and none of the emotions activate race-neutral principles (non-racial individualism, limited government and general ideology). If my theory is correct, then the incidental experience of emotion should make racial attitudes more salient.

Chapter 3 uses two experiments, one on a national sample and the other on a local college student sample (Midwest) to determine whether anger or fear activates group conflict attitudes. This chapter directly tests whether fear serves as the anchor of racial threat attitudes (Blumer 1985). It also examines when Whites proximity to Blacks increases, if fear than activates group conflict attitudes and boosts opposition to racially redistributive policies.

Chapter 4 moves beyond racial policy opinions and examines candidate preferences. Racial attitudes do not only impact the policy domain but support for candidates. Utilizing a local sample, I examine whether anger or fear primes racial attitudes and boost their impact on candidate evaluations. Whites may perceive candidates to possess more control over implementing a racial agenda, therefore if fear is to impact race it should appear when candidates are evaluated.
Finally, the conclusion chapter summarizes the findings and discusses its implications. It also plots the course for what is next to come. How does emotions interact with Whites attitudes toward other minority groups? More specifically is anger only related to prejudice toward Blacks or translates to other marginalized groups like Hispanics and homosexuals. Does fear drive Blacks’ (or Hispanics) negative attitudes toward Whites? Do emotions explain why some Blacks adopt a Black Nationalism perspective instead of an integrative outlook?
Chapter II

The Emotional Substrates of Racial Attitudes

The cognitive components of racial and non-racial attitudes have garnered much attention within the racial policy opinion debate while the contribution of emotion is less understood. This chapter examines the emotional foundation of racial and non-racial attitudes, more specifically racial resentment, old-fashioned racism and race-neutral principles. I argue that identifying the emotion undergirding these belief systems provides insight into their distinctiveness and when they will be applied to racial policy opinion. Scholars within the racial policy opinion debate all agree that issues of public policy involving race engender strong emotions. Disagreements, however, have emerged as to the particular cognitions that are driving Whites’ racial policy opinions. Broadly speaking, scholars such as David Sears and Donald Kinder have argued that a modern form of racism represents the best explanation for Whites’ policy preferences on racial matters. Paul Sniderman, and his various co-authors, on the other hand maintains that non-racial ideology rather than prejudice primarily accounts for these views. This chapter takes a step back and examines whether these competing explanations for racial policy opinions have distinct emotional antecedents. If in fact this is the case, then the debate about racial policies is not simply about proper attitude measurement and model specification (Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings and White 2002).
Contemporary explanations of racial policy opinion, debate both the measurement and explanatory power of racial versus non-racial attitudes. A collection of “new racism” theories including symbolic racism (Sears and Kinder 1971), racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders 1996), and modern racism (McConahay and Hough 1976), argue that “old fashioned” racist beliefs—based on the presumed biological inferiority of Blacks—have receded over time in both prevalence and influence. In their place, a new form of racial conservatism has emerged. Contemporary racial animus is seen as more deeply rooted in an organic combination of anti-black affect and the sense that Blacks violate cherished American values, in particular general individualism (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears and Henry 2003).

The politics-centered approach (Sniderman et al. 2000), on the other hand, posits a different attitudinal structure underlying opposition to racial policies. This argument suggests that the new racism theories overestimate the role of racial animus, and that more abstract and global values regarding the size of government, general ideology, and non-racial individualism dominate explanations of racial policy opinion. This criticism focuses on two related dimensions. First, Sniderman and his colleagues contest whether old-fashioned and symbolic racism are distinct attitudes. “Kinder not only claims that symbolic and old-fashioned racism are worth distinguishing; he claims that they have been proven to be different. We do not believe available data warrant this conclusion” (Sniderman and Tetlock 1986, 179). Sears, Kinder and colleagues provide two different forms of evidence demonstrating old-fashioned and symbolic racisms’ distinctiveness. Using factor analysis, McConahay (1986) shows two independent factors for modern racism and old-fashioned racism. Second, Kinder and Sears (1981) show that symbolic racism and old-fashioned
bigotry have distinguishable effects on opposition to busing; with symbolic racism having
the strongest effect. Sniderman and Tetlock (1986) are skeptical. They indicate that

“every observed cause of the one has also been found to be a cause of the other; and
every observed consequence of one has been found to be a consequence of the
other. Hence, it is prudent – indeed, necessary – to ask whether the two ‘types’ of
racism differ” (Sniderman and Tetlock 1986, 180).

While I might take issue with their conclusion, it is important to investigate the antecedents
of racial attitudes. If the same emotion drives both forms then the two belief systems may
not differ as much as Sears and Kinder suggest. However, if the emotional substrates of
old-fashioned racism differ from that of symbolic racism, then the independence of these
dimensions would be further established. In addition, identifying the specific emotional
substrate of each attitude informs us of which particular racial attitude gets activated, and
come to explain racial policy opinions. This helps us better understand why some people
oppose racial polices even though they endorse racial equality in principle.

A second and related criticism is that measures of symbolic racism are
contaminated with non-racial attitudes about the size of government, general political
ideology, or non-racial individualism (Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Sniderman and
Tetlock 1986). These dimensions, not racism, are the major determinants of opposition to
racial policies (Sniderman and Piazza 1993). In other words, measures of symbolic
racism capture race-neutral principles. Whites “endorse standing on your own two feet
when it comes to whites as when it comes to blacks. There is no evidence at all of a
racial double standard” (Sniderman et al. 2000, pg. 247). Conservatives believe everyone
should work hard, which explains why they score highly on the symbolic racism scale. If
symbolic racism is measuring race-neutral principles then the same emotion should drive
both attitude dimensions.
My contention is that old-fashioned racism is primarily driven by disgust, while symbolic racism centers mainly on anger. The two belief systems are learned under different emotional states, therefore when a particular emotion (anger) is primed the corresponding thought (racial resentment) is brought to mind (Bowers 1981). Race neutral principles, such as limited government, ideology and non-racial individualism are not driven by any dominant emotional state. I argue that since ideology encompasses various attitudinal dimensions (i.e., race, democracy, capitalism etc…) (Converse 1964; McClosky and Zaller 1984) it is unlikely that any one emotion is dominant at the time of acquisition. Therefore, my theory predicts that no particular emotion is central to race-neutral principles.

Each of the theories of racial policy opinion discussed suggest that negative emotions accompany if not drive these different dimensions. To date, however, there has been very little theory devoted to how specific emotions undergird racial attitudes. Usually a simple valence approach, grouping all negative emotions together, is employed (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears 1988; Bobo and Taun 2006). For example, Sears and Henry state (2003) “[t]he hypothetical underlying negative evaluation of Blacks might then yield a wide variety of manifest negative emotions toward Blacks” (pg. 260). The politics-centered approach references negative emotions too. Sniderman, Crosby and Howell (2000) state “it is not possible to escape controversy on so emotionally charged a subject as race” (pg. 236). Despite their lack of specificity on the emotional antecedents of these attitudes, each theory offers clues about which negative emotions are most important.

This chapter begins by reviewing these clues or beliefs that make up old-fashioned racism, racial resentment and race-neutral principles. I use these insights in
conjunction with appraisal theories of emotion to make important distinction between these attitudinal dimensions. Finally, I present data from two studies. The first study utilizes the 1985 American National Election Study (ANES) examining whether anger, fear or disgust is correlated with racial and non-racial attitudes. The second study is an experiment on a nationally representative sample. The purpose of this experiment is to determine if anger (independent of thoughts about politics or race), fear or disgust activates racial and non-racial attitudes and boost their impact on racial policy opinions.

**Racism – Old to New**

“Jim Crow”, “Old-fashioned”, and “Red neck” racism consists of support for segregation and the beliefs that Blacks are biologically and morally inferior. McConahay (1982) states, “Old-fashioned racism is the overt expression of negative feelings toward blacks in negative beliefs and open acts of discrimination and oppression… it is no longer fashionable to express these beliefs or to support these practices openly in the elite circles of our society” (pg. 705). Survey evidence corroborates this statement, showing that these beliefs are no longer widely endorsed by Whites (Schuman et al. 1997). Today, the vast majority of Whites do not publicly endorse the notion that Blacks are an inferior race nor do they oppose interracial marriage. For instance, the 1986 American National Election Study (ANES) reported that only 14% of Whites thought Blacks came from a less able race and the 1997 Gallup poll found that 67% of Whites approved of interracial marriage (Schuman et al. 1997). Today, overt racism resonates with a small percentage of the White population. Despite their low levels of acceptance it is still valuable to understand the emotional underpinnings making up old-fashioned racism, in order to grasp its distinctive nature from more contemporary racial biases.
Whites’ negative racial attitudes were not interpreted as racist until abolitionists began to question the servitude of Blacks. Fredrickson testifies to this –

“It took the assault of the abolitionists to unmask the cant about the theoretical human equality that coexisted with the Negro slavery and racial discrimination and to force the practitioners of racial oppression to develop a theory that accorded with their behavior” (Fredrickson 1971, 43).

This theory nested on what Allport (1954) calls the faulty generalization of Blacks.

 “[P]rejudice is an antipathy based upon faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that group” (pg. 9). Several characteristics were attributed toward Blacks - beastly, lazy, immoral, criminal, unintelligent and savages who prey on White women. These beliefs were used to justify slavery, the lynching of Blacks during Reconstruction (Page 1904) and support for segregation (Fredrickson 1971).

After emancipation, real concerns grew over the “Negro” problem. Fredrickson (1971) argues that the means to control Blacks became a real issue for southern Whites during Reconstruction. The institution of slavery ended and White southerners searched for new means to control Blacks. One strategy was to intensify the racist doctrine, by promoting violence and placing greater public emphasis on the negative attributes attached to Blacks. Thomas Page, a proponent of racism, makes the contrast between Blacks under slavery and when freed during Reconstruction.

“This proposition is borne out also by the testimony of the great majority of Southern whites who live in constant touch with the blacks; who have known them in every relation of life in a way that no one who has not lived among them can know them. Universally, they will tell you that while the old-time Negroes were industrious, saving, and, when not misled, well-behaved, kindly, respectful, and self-respecting, and while the remnant of them who remain still retain generally these characteristics, the ‘new issue’ for the most part are lazy, thriftless, intemperate, insolent, dishonest, and without the most rudimentary elements of morality” (Page 1904, 80).
Characterizations of Blacks as lazy and immoral began to surface but the bombardment of elite messages fueling racism did not end here. It was argued that this new found freedom on the part of Blacks would also lead to an increase in criminal behavior. “These facts furnish some statistical basis and warrant for the popular opinion, never seriously contested, that under present conditions in this country a member of the African race other things equal, is much more likely to fall into crime than a member of the white race” (Willcox 1908, 444). If imprisonment did not control Blacks, lynching was a means for White “justice”. Proponents of this ideology viewed lynching as a deterrent to ravishing White women. Religious figures like Josiah Priest (1843) supported this way of thinking by arguing that Blacks were the descendants of Ham who had overdeveloped sexual organs and was guilty of all forms of lewdness. Whites perceived that Blacks’ freedom put White women in danger.

“Then came the period and process of Reconstruction, with its teachings. Among these was the teaching that the Negro was the equal of the white … The growth of the idea was a gradual one in the Negro’s mind. This was followed by a number of cases where members of the Negro militia ravished white women; in some instances in the presence of their families” (Page 1904, 94).

In summary, old-fashioned racism was a broad ideology, dominated by beliefs reflecting Blacks inferiority, biologically and morally.

There are few surveys that have captured this overt form of racism. Two psychologists, Katz and Braly, conducted one of the first studies to sample Whites’ racial attitudes. The study consisted of 100 students from Princeton University who had to characterize traits attributable to Blacks. Katz and Braly (1933) found that a majority of Whites attributed two characteristics to Blacks – superstitious (84%) and lazy (75%). During the same period, Blake and Dennis (1943) examined the traits Whites attributed to
Blacks across different levels of schooling (from 4th grade to 11th grade). They found as age increased, agreement with negative stereotypes of Blacks increased as well; with 89-percent of Whites agreeing that Whites were more intelligent, 86-percent agreeing Blacks were lazier and 95-percent agreeing Whites were cleaner. Karlins, Coffman and Walters (1969) followed up Katz and Braly’s (1933) study and found that the characteristics most attributable to Blacks in 1967 were superstitious, lazy and musical. In summary, the stereotypes most attributable to Blacks during the early and mid 20th century were superstitious, lazy, unintelligent, and dirty.

Stereotypes are not the only means of gauging overt racism. Surveys of racial attitudes are another litmus test of the racial climate during this period. For instance, in 1958, 96-percent of Whites disapproved of intermarriage and 62-percent supported laws against intermarriage (Schuman et. al 1997). Segregation was another attitude endorsed by a majority of Whites. Gallup reports in 1942, 68-percent of Whites thought White and Black students should go to separate schools. This view dominated White opinion until 1963. Similarly, 56-percent of Whites supported separation of Whites and Blacks in streetcars and buses. Overt racial bigotry was also reflected in Whites’ belief of entitlement and privilege. In 1944, 55-percent of Whites believed that “white people should have the first chance at any kind of job” over Blacks (Schuman et. al 1997). Prior to the mid 1960s, explicit forms of racism dominated Whites’ racial opinions.

McConahay and Hough (1976) argue that

“racism has most frequently appeared in two ways. First, it was expressed in the public sector by support for overt acts of discrimination such as de jure segregation in public schools and other public agencies … Second, it was indicated by the belief in our expression of negative racial stereotypes i.e., blacks are lazy, dumb, shiftless” (pg. 24).

After the civil rights movement there was a dramatic decline in Whites’ support
for overt discrimination. For instance, following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, most Whites expressed support for racial equality in national surveys (Schuman et al. 1997). Segregationist views of Blacks as biologically and morally inferior no longer reflect the majority of Whites’ sentiment (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Schuman et al. 1997). It seemed that racism declined substantially— a majority of Whites now supported racial equality in principle. Sears, Kinder and McConahay disagreed with this point of view. They argued that racism had not subsided but transformed into a new subtle form of racism. This new form of racism is a product of the riots that swept through the United States in the 1960s and 1970s. Whites’ believed that as a result of the successes of the civil rights movement, virtually all barriers and obstacles Blacks faced had now subsided. As inner city violence increased in the 1970s a different type of racism emerged resting on the beliefs that Blacks were not living up to American traditional values. Today, according to this view, racism is a combination of anti-Black affect and the belief that “[B]lacks do not try hard enough to overcome the difficulties they face and that they take what they have not earned” (Kinder and Sanders 1996, 106).

It would seem clear from the literature that old-fashioned racism and racial resentment rely on different attitudinal dimensions. Old-fashioned racism is open bigotry and racial resentment is a subtle expression of prejudice. While there is some support for this distinction (McConahay 1986) more investigation is necessary, especially examining the emotional antecedents that make up old-fashioned and racial resentment. The theory of racial attitudes I lay out predicts that these dimensions are conceptually distinct and triggered by the experience of different emotions.
Appraisals as Foundations for Racial Attitudes

A hallmark of what scholars term “old-fashioned racism,” the racial belief system that dominated white America until the second half of the 20th century, centered on Black’s biological inferiority to Whites (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears 1988). Biological stereotypes of Blacks as beastly, apelike and sub-human were often quite explicitly a part of the cultural dialogue of race in that earlier era (Mendelberg 2001; Fredrickson 1971). Myrdal (1944) captures these sentiments in describing Whites' early 20th century racial opinions: "the Negro was heathen and a barbarian, an outcast among the peoples of the earth, a descendant of Noah's son of Ham, cursed by God himself and doomed to be a servant forever on account of an ancient sin" (p. 85). Blacks were seen as contaminated and any interracial contact would lead to the ”mongrelization” of the White race. Segregation and discrimination were deemed essential in maintaining the American Creed. "When one speaks about 'Americans' or 'Southerners', the Negro is not counted in. When the 'public' is invited, he is not expected. Like the devil and all his synonyms and satellites, he is enticing at the same time that he is disgusting" (Myrdal 1944, 101). This quote by Myrdal illuminates what I consider to be a central emotional underpinning of the old-fashioned racist belief system: disgust.

Rozin and Fallon (1987) define disgust as "revulsion at the prospect of (oral) incorporation of an offensive object. The offensive objects are contaminants; that is, if they even briefly contact an acceptable food, they tend to render the food unacceptable" (p. 23). In appraisal theory, Lazarus (1991) considers disgust as “a strong desire to keep the substance away to preserve one’s bodily integrity” (p. 260). Smith and Ellsworth (1985) found disgust stemming from “situations in which someone else did something
physically repulsive that they wanted to shut out and get away from” (p. 833). Therefore, I propose that disgust’s appraisals—thoughts of contamination or poisonous (Rozin and Fallon 1987)—dominate Whites’ old-fashioned racist beliefs.

Another element of old-fashioned racism is Blacks’ moral inferiority (Fredrickson 1971). Arguments about the uncivilized and backward moral character of Blacks gained momentum after emancipation in order to undermine Blacks’ freedom. Blacks’ presumed lack of moral character called into question their ability to function in society. High rates of poverty, criminality and lack of education were seen as evidence confirming Blacks’ nature as innately incapable of becoming fully functioning citizens. Though a wide array of negative stereotypes of Blacks were common among Whites in the post—Civil War period, they carried a paternalistic dimension: Blacks were inherently inferior and therefore needed to be kept separate from Whites for their own good, and for the good of Whites (Katz and Braly 1933; Blake and Dennis 1943; Karlins Coffman and Walters 1969). As a result, prior the civil rights movement, disgust supported Whites’ beliefs of moral superiority.

The experience of anger requires a different set of appraisals—blame, certainty and control (Lazarus 1991; Lerner and Keltner 2001: Smith Hayes Lazarus and Pope 1993). Anger occurs when one can attribute blame to someone else for an unwanted or threatening situation. The certainty with which one can claim another has wronged them is also linked to anger. Finally, the degree to which an individual feels they have control over the offending situation will be positively linked to the experience of anger (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). Lerner and Keltner (2001) found angry people to make more optimistic risk assessments and these effects were moderated by control and certainty. I
speculate that these appraisals map primarily onto symbolic racist (or racially resentful) beliefs.13

Current racial attitudes have evolved, according to the theories of symbolic racism (Sears and Kinder 1971; Kinder and Sears 1981) and racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Beliefs about the biological inferiority of blacks, built upon and linked to feelings of social disgust, have declined dramatically (Schuman et al. 1997). Beliefs about the moral inferiority of Blacks, however, have persisted. This is especially true for dimensions such as laziness versus hard work. The appraisals associated with the laziness stereotype are likely to trigger anger: Blacks could choose to work as hard as other groups and pull themselves out of poverty, but they do not. Further, many Whites may feel that they can control Black’s ability to “take advantage” of the system by making demands they do not deserve: By opposing policies such as affirmative action and welfare. My position is that appraisals of blame, certainty and control are critical elements of symbolic, and not old-fashioned racism.

Understanding racial attitudes through the lens of appraisal theories of emotion helps explain the roots of non-racist White beliefs as well. According to my logic, racially sympathetic Whites may be least likely to be angered by interracial conflict or Black demands for equal treatment. Devine (1989) finds that people are equally knowledgeable of negative Black stereotypes no matter their position on the prejudice scale. However, racial sympathizers censor these negative characterizations of Blacks

13 These appraisals may also occur for old-fashioned racists because such individuals may perceive blacks to be intentionally acting “above their station” or failing to accept their subordinate position. As a matter of theoretical discrimination, I choose to focus on what are likely to be the dominant appraisals within each attitude dimension here, while accepting there may be some overlap in these negative emotions across attitude dimensions. In fact, old-fashioned racism may have tapped into several negative emotions Whites experienced with regard to blacks- fear, anger, disgust, pity, sadness. I merely suggest that disgust is a very central emotion, and may in fact be dominant. In contemporary racism, I think, most of these other emotional states have dissipated, leaving primarily anger.
and replace them with non-prejudiced values. These individuals are motivated to control their stereotypes of Blacks because they are unappreciative of their attention having been drawn to race (Fazio and Dunton 1997). In a similar vein, I expect that racially liberal Whites will not have developed angry reactions to racial matters. As a result, anger should not activate racial attitudes very powerfully in this group.

So far I have left unconsidered a central negative emotion often referred to in the racial policy opinion literature: fear. According to appraisal theory, fear occurs when an individual experiences a threat that he has little control over or confidence about handling (Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Lerner and Keltner 2001). The idea that resources will be redistributed from White to Black communities and that there is little the average (White) citizen can do about it may very well prompt anxiety or fear. Group position theory (Blumer 1958) and the racial threat hypothesis (Key 1949) both argue that racial prejudice flows, at least in part, from fear. This Chapter does not fully test the linkage between fear and these other potentially independent racial attitudes,14 rather examines whether old-fashioned racism and/or racial resentment are linked to fear. My position is that they are not, as a result of the discussion of fear’s dominant appraisals, which seem not to be central to these attitudes.15

Appraisals underlying non-racial explanations of racial policy opinions must also be considered. The non-racial approach suggests people oppose racial policies such as affirmative action not so much because the recipients are Black but because such programs require large and inefficient government bureaucracies to manage, and because they undermine the value of individual achievement and reward. These attitudes are not

14 Chapter 3 in detail examines the relationship between fear and the group position model.
15 More explanation of this theory is drawn out in Chapter 3.
presumed to be emotion-free. The violation of these values, especially when facilitated by government, could trigger anger in Whites’ mind. For example, Sniderman, Crosby and Howell (2000) found most Whites (liberals and conservatives) were angered or upset by the phrase, “Black leaders asking for affirmative action.” My expectation is that no one dominant emotion undergirds race-neutral principles. This occurs because non-racial ideology consists of a wide array of beliefs (Converse 1964; McCloksy and Zaller 1984) and not just opinions about Blacks. So if anger activates racial resentment but not these non-racial attitude dimensions, it further distinguishes between the two dimensions as explanations of racial policy opinion.

The Mechanism Linking Emotions to Racial Attitudes: Priming.

The psychological mechanism underlying the connection between emotion and racial attitudes is priming. Associative network theory contends that emotion is instrumental in memory, learning and recall (Bowers 1981). State dependent memory is when events learned in one emotional state are more easily recalled when subjects returned to that state. I apply this same logic to the linkage between specific emotions and racial attitudes as follows: Group attitudes are acquired early in life (Sears 1988; Zellman and Sears 1971). Parents pass on their thoughts about race in the home perhaps after experiencing a specific negative interaction with a person of a different race (Harding, Proshansky, Kutner and Chein 1968).

If racial attitudes are learned in a specific emotional state during childhood or adolescence, then similar emotional episodes in adulthood may activate these same attitudes from memory. If my speculations about the dominant emotional underpinnings of specific racial attitudes are correct, then they should be primed when the linked
emotion is experienced. This prediction is similar to the standard racial priming hypothesis (Mendelberg 2001, Valentino et al. 2002). The emotion is strongly linked to racial schemas in memory, so the experience of the emotion— even when triggered by an event outside of politics— can bring the racial attitude to the top of the head. Subsequently, political judgments should be more dependent upon the racial attitude. A final implication of my approach is that if racial resentment has become the dominant and most common form of racial animus in society today, simply experiencing anger— even triggered by non-racially relevant thoughts— may increase opposition to racial policies in the population as a whole. My specific hypotheses are therefore as follows:

\[H_1: \text{The experience of anger, even independent of thoughts about politics or race, primes racial resentment and boost its impact on racial policy opinions.}\]

\[H_2: \text{The experience of disgust, even independent of thoughts about politics or race, primes old-fashioned racism and boost their impact on racial policy opinions.}\]

\[H_3: \text{Neither old-fashioned racism nor racial resentment should be activated by fear.}\]

\[H_4: \text{Race-neutral principles such as a belief in limited government should not be triggered by anger, fear or disgust.}\]

\[H_5: \text{Anger, more than any other emotion, should boost opposition to racially redistributive policies in the population as a whole.}\]

**Study 1**

My first test is to examine bivariate correlations between emotions, racial attitudes, and non-racial values. Such correlations would be necessary if my hypotheses
are correct, but they would not provide evidence of a causal relationship. The 1985 ANES pilot study is an ideal dataset for making an initial test of my hypotheses. The study is a sub-sample of 429 participants from the 1984 ANES, a probability sample of Americans of voting age containing 392 whites. The study contained various questions about emotional reactions to racial policies and the presidential candidates.¹⁶ My expectation is that anger will correlate strongly with racial resentment, disgust with old-fashioned racism, and fear with neither. Preference for limited government should not be strongly correlated with any of these emotions.

In column 1, of Table 2.1, my expectation finds modest support. Whites’ anger is related to racial resentment, controlling for fear, disgust, ideology, Southern residence, education, age and gender. Also in line with my prediction, fear and disgust are not significantly linked to racial resentment. In column 2, disgust is modestly related to old-fashioned racism, while anger and fear are not. These results are consistent with my suspicion that each of these attitude dimensions may have a distinct underlying emotional

¹⁶ The emotions measures asked how “preferential treat to Blacks”, “changes in race relations” and “presidential candidate Mondale” makes the respondent feel. The exact wording of the questions is in Appendix 1. This study contained an experimental manipulation in which respondents were randomly assigned to read one of two question frames about affirmative action. The story suggested some people supported affirmative action as remedial action for past discrimination, but others opposed it either because it amounted to reverse discrimination or unfair advantage for Blacks (Kinder and Sanders 1996, 175). My judgment is that this framing manipulation should not moderate the relationship between anger/fear/disgust and these attitude dimensions. The reason is that both frames contain similar appraisals (blacks getting something they do not deserve). Therefore, the analyses presented here pools the whole sample. Nevertheless, I did observe slightly different patterns across the two frames, particularly for racial resentment. Anger is strongly correlated with racial resentment in the “affirmative action gives Blacks advantages they haven’t earned” frame but not in the “affirmative action discriminates against Whites” frame. Fear, on the other hand, does have a significant impact in the latter frame but not the former. This unexpected difference in the association between fear and racial resentment depending on the frame suggests the ways in which an issue is described may in fact change the kinds of appraisals being made and therefore prime different emotions. While I cannot investigate this possibility further in this dissertation, I strongly encourage future researchers to do so. For now, I report the overall pattern, which appears to be consistent with my expectations.
structure. Finally, in column 3, preference for limited government is not correlated with anger, disgust or fear.\textsuperscript{17}

[Insert Table 2.1 Here]

The results in Table 2.1 are consistent with the proposition that distinct negative emotions are linked to symbolic versus old-fashioned racism. However, I need a different test to determine if specific emotions prime specific racial attitudes. After all, emotions could be the consequence, and not the cause, of these attitudes. Furthermore, these correlations are ambiguous because the emotion measures explicitly invoke affirmative action. It could be that thoughts about this issue, and not the emotions per se, are responsible for the correlations I observe. My theory suggests pure emotions, independent of thoughts about politics or race, activate racial attitudes- because people learn the attitudes in specific emotional states. To test this conjecture, one must trigger distinct emotional reactions and then measure the power of old-fashioned racism, racial resentment and non-racial values to explain racial policy opinions.

\textbf{Study 2}

An experiment on a nationally representative sample was used to test the hypotheses outlined above. The study was collected through Polimetrix, an Internet survey company, from April 21 to April 30, 2008. Polimetrix uses a matching technique to produce a nationally representative sample. Respondents were matched to the national population on gender, age, race, education, party identification and political interest. The total sample size was 243 Whites.\textsuperscript{18} There was good variation on age (26-percent were 18-

\textsuperscript{17} In fairness, the emotions in this study are linked to affirmative action and race-neutral principles like limited government.
\textsuperscript{18} Seven subjects were dropped from the analysis because they failed to follow proper instructions. None of the results change substantively if these respondents are included in the analysis.
34; 38-percent 35-54; 36-percent were 55 and over), gender (48-percent female) and education (43-percent high school degree or less; 30-percent some college; 18-percent college graduate). An over-sample of the South (128 respondents) was included in order to increase variation in old-fashioned racism, since this belief system is more prevalent in Southern states (Valentino and Sears 2005). As a result of the oversample, the sample was more likely to identify as Republican (49-percent including leaner) and conservative (49-percent including leaner). The sample is weighted back to known population parameters when I analyze the data.\(^1\) The random assignment of subjects to conditions was successful: there were no significant differences across cells of the design in the proportion of socio-demographic or partisan variables. As a result, any differences in the post-stimulus dependent measures can be attributed to the manipulation and not to other factors (Shadish, Cook and Campbell 1979).

The experiment was conducted in two waves. This is an important, though costly, design choice. Many priming studies measure the primed dimensions in the post-test, because researchers fear the pretest measures themselves may prime all subjects, thus eliminating any differences between control and treatment groups. However, asking these items in the post-test carries a different risk: that the stimulus will affect the distribution of opinion on the primed dimension. A preferable design is to measure the primed dimension in a pretest far enough in advance that it is unlikely to remain salient by the time the individual is exposed to the stimulus in the second wave.\(^2\) I employed the pre-test

---

\(^1\) My inferences do not depend on whether or not I use the weights.

\(^2\) This design has a potential drawback of its own, related to biased mortality between the first and second waves. If some respondents (say, racially conservative ones) were turned off by the measures of racial attitudes in the pre-test, they might have been more likely to opt out of the second wave. This effect could dampen priming effects if these respondents would have been more reactive to the emotional stimulus. Fortunately, I do not need to be concerned about this possibility since mortality between the two waves was 60-percent, and did not create any biased distributions across conditions.
measurement technique, measuring the primed dimensions (racial attitudes) about a week before subjects were exposed to the stimulus. The first wave consisted of racial and general attitudes measures, i.e., racial resentment, old-fashioned racism, ideology, individualism and preference for limited government. Seven days later, respondents participated in Wave 2, which consisted of the manipulation followed by measures of racial policy opinions.

**Experimental Manipulation**

The emotion-induction manipulation utilized two techniques common in psychological studies of emotion (Bower 1981; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Ekman 1993). Subjects were asked to recall and focus on events, people, or occurrences that led them to experience a given emotion, while viewing an image of a person with a facial expression corresponding to that emotion.\(^{21}\) The reason for giving the written and visual stimuli simultaneously is to ensure respondents experience distinct negative emotions (i.e., anger, disgust and fear). Facial expressions have been shown to trigger the same emotion in the viewer (Ekman 1993). Subjects were asked via the computer to respond to the following query:\(^{22}\):

"Here is a picture of someone who is (ANGRY/AFRAID/DISGUSTED). We would like you to describe in general things that make you feel like the person in the picture. It is okay if you don't remember all the details, just be specific about what exactly it is that makes you (ANGRY/AFRAID/DISGUSTED) and what it feels like to be (ANGRY/AFRAID/DISGUSTED).

Please describe the events that make you feel the MOST (ANGRY/AFRAID/DISGUSTED), these

---

\(^{21}\) The facial expression images were of the same middle age White women. The pictures are drawn from Ekman’s archive of emotional expressions (Ekman 1976). Each picture was judged to determine the emotion that best described each photograph. Eighty eight percent of respondents judged the fear expression correctly and 100-percent judged both the anger and disgust expressions correctly.

\(^{22}\) For the relaxed condition there was no facial expression, subjects responded to the following query “Now we would like you to describe in general things that make you feel RELAXED. It is okay if you don't remember all the details, just be specific about what exactly it is that makes you RELAXED and what it feels like to be RELAXED. Please describe the events that make you feel the MOST RELAXED, these experiences could have occurred in the past or will happen in the future. If you can, write your description so that someone reading it might even feel RELAXED.”
experiences could have occurred in the past or will happen in the future. If you can, write your description so that someone reading it might even feel (ANGRY/AFRAID/DISGUSTED).”

Note this technique does not focus the respondent’s attention on politics in general or race in particular. This is, therefore, a very precise and conservative examination of the emotional foundations of racism. The images used in the induction procedure can be viewed in Appendix 2. The response length was unrestricted but subjects were told to take a few minutes to write down anything in general that made them feel the intended emotion. After the induction, subjects completed a post-test questionnaire that included a variety of policy-opinion measures.

Results

First I conducted a manipulation check to determine if the induction procedure operated as expected. The open-ended responses to the induction task were blind double-coded by two trained graduate students unaware of the hypotheses. They were asked to select the dominant emotion expressed in the responses, and how intensely that emotion was expressed (scale ranged from 0-1, 0=none, .5=some and 1=extreme). The results of the manipulation check are presented in Table 2.2. As expected, participants in the anger condition expressed significantly more intense anger than those in the control (relaxed) condition, but did not express more fear or disgust. Correspondingly, respondents in the fear condition expressed much more fear, but not more anger nor disgust relative to the control. Participants in the disgust condition expressed more disgust, but also slightly more anger than the control. Overall, these results indicate that the induction performed

\[23\] The Cronbach Alpha’s reveal a high level of reliability across the two coders – anger (.85), fear (.93) and disgust (.87).
as intended. The slightly overlapping experience of anger and disgust is not unexpected, given how often these two emotion co-occur in real life. This also makes for an even more conservative test of my hypotheses about the distinctive links between each emotion and various attitude dimensions.

[Insert Table 2.2 Here]

My central prediction is that for Whites in the contemporary period, anger is linked in memory to thoughts about Blacks. I examined support for a variety of racial policy opinions: Busing, Government assistance to Blacks, and Martin Luther King Jr. holiday. Affirmative action is not a measure of support or opposition to affirmative action but the perceived harm from affirmative action.24 Confederate flag measures if the flag symbolizes racial prejudice. These policies and issues cover a broad spectrum of economic and symbolic remedies to eliminate racial inequalities (Sniderman and Piazza 1993). My prediction is that the experience of anger (but not fear or disgust) will significantly boost the impact of racial resentment on these policy opinions. Table 2.3 shows evidence consistent with these predictions. I regressed each racial policy and issue opinion on emotion dummies (anger, disgust and fear), racial resentment and the interaction between the two, controlling for ideology, education, gender, and age.25 The interaction between anger and racial resentment is in the expected direction in all 5 cases, and is substantively and statistically significant for affirmative action, confederate flag

24 Affirmative action is not an actual measure of support or opposition to the policy. Instead it measures whether or not Whites are disadvantaged by the policy. Bobo (2000) states that affirmative action “programs that call for the application of quotas and clear-cut racial preferences are highly unpopular, even among blacks” (pg. 140). This lack of support is reflected in my sample where only 8-percent of Whites favored “preferential hiring and promotion of Blacks” and 16-percent favored “quotas to admit Black students”. Since there is little variation along the dependent variable it is difficult to determine why Whites’ oppose/support affirmative action.

25 Controlling for region (South) did not change the magnitude and in most cases the significance of the coefficients. Therefore, I omitted region as a control.
and busing. Neither fear nor disgust significantly boosts racial resentment’s impact on racial policy opinion.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the effects in Table 2.3. Anger boosts support for these policies among race liberals, while it undermines support among conservatives. On most dependent variables the effect of anger among liberals is small. Nevertheless, I speculated earlier that liberals would censor and control their negative thoughts tied to Blacks under states of anger.

Turning to my second hypothesis, I expected disgust to boost the impact of old-fashioned racism on racial policy and issue opinions. Table 2.4 shows that disgust did have this effect, but so did anger and even fear (in one case). In 4 of the 5 cases, old-fashioned racism was more strongly related to racial policy and issue opinion among those in the disgust condition compared to the control. In three of those cases, the effect was statistically significant (affirmative action, busing and government assistance to Blacks).

In addition, and contrary to my expectation, the impact of old-fashioned racism on government assistance to Blacks and Martin Luther King Jr. holiday were significantly higher for those in the anger condition compared to those in the control group. This suggests that anger is linked to both symbolic and old-fashioned racism. Also unexpected was my finding that fear boosted the impact of old-fashioned racism on affirmative action opinion. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, these priming effects are substantively powerful: anger and disgust, and to a lesser extent fear, moved the most racially conservative respondents half of the racial policy scale compared to those in the control. These results
suggest that, contrary to my expectation, old-fashioned and racial resentment may be only partially distinct, since they share anger as an antecedent.

[Insert Table 2.4 and Figure 2.2 Here]

Table 2.5 examines the emotional underpinnings of a race-neutral principle, preference for *limited government* that has been central to the argument that non-racial attitudes drive racial policy opinions. My prediction was that such general and abstract values would have weaker and less distinct emotional antecedents. The results in Table 2.5 seem to support this expectation. None of the interactions are substantively large or statistically significant. I replicated these analyses for two other race-neutral dimensions: non-racial liberal-conservative ideology and individualism. I again found no significant interactions, except between anger and individualism on support for the Martin Luther King Jr. Holiday. Even there, however, anger did not boost the effect of individualism but returned it to zero (since the effect of individualism in the control group was strongly negative).\(^{26}\) Therefore in no instance does anger boost the impact of race-neutral principles on racial policies.

[Insert Table 2.5 Here]

Finally, I examine if anger (not fear or disgust) has a direct effect on racial policy opinion. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that anger underlies the most common form of racial animus in the contemporary period: racial resentment. The results from these analyses are presented in Table 2.6. I regressed racial policies and issues on the treatment conditions (anger, fear and disgust) controlling for education, gender and

\(^{26}\) Results for the priming effect of negative emotions on ideology and race-neutral individualism are available from the author upon request.
age. Table 2.6, shows that anger does indeed increase the perceived harm from
affirmative action (.15, p ≤ .05), the confederate flag is not symbolic of prejudice (.16, p
≤ .05) and opposition to the Martin Luther King Jr. Holiday (.13, p ≤ .1). Disgust also
increased opposition to Martin Luther King Jr. Holiday (.11, p ≤ .1). Fear did not
significantly affect support for any of these variables. In addition to priming racial
resentment, then, anger altered Whites’ opinions on a variety of racial policies and issues.

One remaining question is whether these effects are unique to racial policy opinions
or apply to broader policy domains. To test whether anger might boost opposition to non-
racial but emotionally charged issues, I analyzed measures of opinions about abortion
and Iraq war. The final columns in Table 2.6 show anger’s impact on non-racial policy
opinions is essentially zero.

In summary, the results from Study 2 show that anger activates racial resentment,
while disgust is linked primarily to old-fashioned racism. However, anger also seems to
boost the impact of old-fashioned racism for a variety of policy opinions. I will review
some explanations for this result below. In any case, experiencing anger independent of
thoughts about race or politics activated both of these attitudes, making them more
powerful predictors of policy opinions. Disgust was more distinctively linked to old-
fashioned racism, as I had originally predicted. Fear played a minor role in priming old-
fashioned racism, but was otherwise did not seem to play a powerful role in activating
any of these attitudes.

**Discussion**

27 Controlling for ideology does not alter the significance or magnitude of the coefficients.
The purpose of this chapter was to explore the specific emotional substrates of Whites’ racist attitudes. Several theories assume the importance of negative emotions as a critical component of opposition to racial policies such as affirmative action. Most, however, suggest that a blend of anger, disgust, and fear are felt by Whites toward Blacks. Given the attributions of historical accounts have documented in the rhetoric of race, I predicted that specific negative emotions, disgust versus anger, would trigger old-fashioned racism and racial resentment, respectively.

My results suggest that racial resentment is indeed a unique and powerful racial disposition, undergirded primarily by anger, rather than disgust or fear. However, this belief system is said to have emerged from old-fashioned racism which itself was grounded more firmly in disgust, but also anger, felt toward Black Americans by Whites. Finally, contrary too much conventional wisdom and scholarly speculation, we found no association between any of these belief systems and fear.

I was surprised at the power of anger to trigger old-fashioned racism. In hindsight, perhaps this blending of anger and disgust as a substrate of old fashioned racism is not too surprising. After all, the feelings of moral superiority that characterized White racial beliefs in the early 20th century may have led to anger when Blacks began to demand equal rights. In the contemporary period, then, paternalistic views that characterized this belief system in the past have been infused with anger. Replicating these analyses would be well worth the effort.

When the subjects experienced specific negative emotions- even outside a political or racial context- racial attitudes were powerfully primed. Anger activated racial resentment and boosted its impact on racial policies and issues, while both anger and
disgust activated old-fashioned racism. This suggests that symbolic and old-fashioned racism are at least partially distinct belief systems, built up on a different pattern of emotions. Disgust and anger are more central to old-fashioned racism, while only anger undergirds racial resentment. Third, none of these negative emotions activate race neutral principles, providing further evidence that racial and non-racial antecedents of racial policy opinion are indeed distinct. These results further support the argument that racial resentment measures racial prejudice and not simply non-racial ideology or principles (Sears and Henry 2003). Finally, experiencing anger shifts opinions against several racial policies and issues in the sample as a whole. Fewer whites harbor old-fashioned racist beliefs, so experiencing disgust at the aggregate level does not significantly move mass opinion.

I also found that fear rarely to be linked to either old-fashioned and racial resentment. Whites’ subtle racist beliefs were not linked to or activated by fear, while in only one instance was fear linked to old-fashioned racism. Many who presume fear is central to Whites’ racial attitudes believe racial prejudice resides in-group competition (Key 1949; Blumer 1958). The next chapter determines whether fear drives racism in situations where group competition over concrete rights and resources is salient. My speculation, however, is that fear is not as central to these dimensions of prejudice as some have suggested. This is because even when competition for resources is perceived (if not real), Whites would also often presume that, as members of the majority they have some control of the direction of racial policy, and this appraisal is likely to undermine the experience of fear (Lerner and Keltner 2001; Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Recent successful efforts to restrict affirmative action policies around the country should serve to
further undermine the linkage between fear and racial resentment.

In some cases, I found anger and disgust seemed to push race liberals to be *more* supportive of racial policies and issues. Not only do racial conservatives link anger and disgust to the controversy surrounding racial policies, but so do race liberals. A post-hoc explanation is that race liberals are angry and disgusted about the discrimination and racism Blacks have endured. This would suggest these negative emotions are linked to race among all Whites, but they push opinions in different directions based on the context in which they were learned in the first place.
Table II.1. Bivariate Relationship between Emotion, Racial and Non-racial Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Racial Resentment</th>
<th>Old-fashioned Racism</th>
<th>Limited Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \beta ) (s.e.)</td>
<td>( \beta ) (s.e.)</td>
<td>( \beta ) (s.e.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>.15** (.06)</td>
<td>-.05 (.07)</td>
<td>.07 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>.03 (.05)</td>
<td>.05 (.07)</td>
<td>.02 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disgust</td>
<td>.08 (.05)</td>
<td>.11* (.06)</td>
<td>.06 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.09** (.05)</td>
<td>-.26*** (.06)</td>
<td>.11** (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.02 (.04)</td>
<td>.06 (.05)</td>
<td>.16*** (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.00 (.03)</td>
<td>.01 (.03)</td>
<td>-.02 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.000 (.001)</td>
<td>.003*** (.001)</td>
<td>.002** (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>.01 (.03)</td>
<td>.07** (.04)</td>
<td>.03 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.52*** (.05)</td>
<td>.19*** (.06)</td>
<td>21*** (.05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 261 276 257

* \( p \leq .1 \) (two-tailed test) ** \( p \leq .05 \) (two-tailed test) *** \( p \leq .001 \) (two-tailed test)

Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and the standard errors are in parentheses.

Source: 1985 ANES pilot study. Anger and Disgust comprise of 1) Think about changes over the last 20 years in relation between Blacks and Whites in this country. Have these changes ever made you feel angry/disgusted; 2) Has preferential treatment of Blacks ever made you feel angry/disgusted; 3) Think about Walter Mondale. Now, has Mondale (--Because of the kind of person he is, or because of something he has done --) ever made you feel angry/disgusted? Fear comprises of 1) Think about changes over the last 20 years in relation between Blacks and Whites in this country. Have these changes ever made you feel afraid/uneasy; 2) Has preferential treatment of Blacks ever made you feel afraid/uneasy; 3) Think about Walter Mondale. Now, has Mondale (--because of the kind of person he is, or because of something he has done --) ever made you feel afraid/uneasy?
Table II.2. Manipulation Check

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intensity of Anger Expressed</th>
<th>Intensity of Fear Expressed</th>
<th>Intensity of Disgust Expressed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger Condition</td>
<td>.51*** (.04)</td>
<td>.01 (.03)</td>
<td>.02 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear Condition</td>
<td>.03 (.04)</td>
<td>.48*** (.03)</td>
<td>.00 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disgust Condition</td>
<td>.13*** (.04)</td>
<td>.01 (.03)</td>
<td>.44*** (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>01 (.03)</td>
<td>.00 (.02)</td>
<td>.01 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and the standard errors are in parentheses. All analyses included the weight variable to compensate for the over-sample of the South. Anger, Fear and Disgust are dummy variables, where 1=if they were in the treatment condition and 0= if they were in the “relaxed” condition.
Table II.3. Priming Racial Resentment via Emotion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Affirmative Action</th>
<th>Confederate Flag</th>
<th>Busing</th>
<th>Government Assistance to Blacks</th>
<th>Martin Luther King Jr. Holiday</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \beta ) (s.e.)</td>
<td>( \beta ) (s.e.)</td>
<td>( \beta ) (s.e.)</td>
<td>( \beta ) (s.e.)</td>
<td>( \beta ) (s.e.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger*Racial Resentment</td>
<td>.43*</td>
<td>.48*</td>
<td>.31*</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td>(.26)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear*Racial Resentment</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.21)</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger Condition</td>
<td>-1.18</td>
<td>-1.23</td>
<td>-1.27**</td>
<td>-1.08</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disgust Condition</td>
<td>-1.15</td>
<td>-1.17</td>
<td>-1.17</td>
<td>-1.05</td>
<td>-1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear Condition</td>
<td>-1.14</td>
<td>-1.12</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Resentment</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>.68***</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.22**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-1.04</td>
<td>-1.14*</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.003**</td>
<td>.004**</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.59***</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*  \( p \leq .1 \) (two-tailed test)  **  \( p \leq .05 \) (two-tailed test)  ***  \( p \leq .001 \) (two-tailed test)

Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and the standard errors are in parentheses. All analyses included the weight variable to compensate for the over-sample of the South. Variables are coded 0-1, where higher values indicate more opposition. Racial Resentment comprises of 1) Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve; 2) Government officials usually pay less attention to a request or complaint from a Black person than from a White person; 3) It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as Whites; 4) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class. The wording for the other variables is in the Appendix.
## Table II.4. Priming Old-fashioned Racism via Emotion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Affirmative Action</th>
<th>Confederate Flag</th>
<th>Busing Government Assistance to Blacks</th>
<th>Martin Luther King Jr. Holiday</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \beta ) (s.e.)</td>
<td>( \beta ) (s.e.)</td>
<td>( \beta ) (s.e.)</td>
<td>( \beta ) (s.e.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger*Old-fashioned Racism</td>
<td>.45 (.31)</td>
<td>-.15 (.37)</td>
<td>.35 (.24)</td>
<td>.52** (.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disgust*Old-fashioned Racism</td>
<td>.46* (.27)</td>
<td>-.19 (.33)</td>
<td>.40** (.22)</td>
<td>.41* (.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear*Old-fashioned Racism</td>
<td>.58** (.29)</td>
<td>.30 (.35)</td>
<td>.11 (.23)</td>
<td>.25 (.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger Condition</td>
<td>.06 (.07)</td>
<td>.19** (.08)</td>
<td>-.08 (.06)</td>
<td>-.03 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disgust Condition</td>
<td>-.03 (.07)</td>
<td>-.03 (.08)</td>
<td>-.12** (.06)</td>
<td>-.05 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear Condition</td>
<td>-.08 (.07)</td>
<td>.04 (.08)</td>
<td>-.06 (.06)</td>
<td>-.03 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old-fashioned Racism</td>
<td>.04 (.21)</td>
<td>.37 (.29)</td>
<td>-.12 (.17)</td>
<td>-.28 (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.30*** (.09)</td>
<td>.29*** (.09)</td>
<td>.25*** (.07)</td>
<td>.42*** (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.08 (.08)</td>
<td>-.14 (.08)</td>
<td>-.10 (.06)</td>
<td>-.08 (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.04 (.05)</td>
<td>-.06 (.05)</td>
<td>-.03 (.04)</td>
<td>-.02 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.001 (.001)</td>
<td>.003* (.002)</td>
<td>.001 (.001)</td>
<td>.000 (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.30** (.10)</td>
<td>.23*** (.11)</td>
<td>.73*** (.08)</td>
<td>.60*** (.09)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* \( p \leq .1 \) (two-tailed test)  ** \( p \leq .05 \) (two-tailed test)  *** \( p \leq .001 \) (two-tailed test). Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and the standard errors are in parentheses. All analyses included the weight variable to compensate for the over-sample of the South. Variables are coded 0-1, which higher values indicating more opposition. Old-fashioned racism consists of 1) Do you oppose interracial marriage between Blacks and Whites; 2) If a Black family with about the same income and education as you moved next door, would you mind it a lot, a little or not at all; 3) How strongly would you object if a member of your family had a close relationship with a Black person? The wording for the other variables is in the Appendix.
Table II.5. Priming Limited Government via Emotion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Affirmative Action</th>
<th>Confederate Flag</th>
<th>Busing</th>
<th>Government Assistance to Blacks</th>
<th>Martin Luther King Jr. Holiday</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>β (s.e.)</strong></td>
<td><strong>β (s.e.)</strong></td>
<td><strong>β (s.e.)</strong></td>
<td><strong>β (s.e.)</strong></td>
<td><strong>β (s.e.)</strong></td>
<td><strong>β (s.e.)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger*Limited Government</td>
<td>-0.23 (.20)</td>
<td>0.08 (.21)</td>
<td>0.05 (.15)</td>
<td>-0.09 (.16)</td>
<td>-0.06 (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disgust*Limited Government</td>
<td>0.01 (.24)</td>
<td>0.20 (.24)</td>
<td>0.20 (.16)</td>
<td>-0.03 (.18)</td>
<td>0.19 (.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear*Limited Government</td>
<td>0.06 (.19)</td>
<td>0.08 (.21)</td>
<td>0.05 (.14)</td>
<td>-0.03 (.16)</td>
<td>-0.05 (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger Condition</td>
<td>0.28** (.13)</td>
<td>0.12 (.14)</td>
<td>-0.05 (.10)</td>
<td>0.09 (.10)</td>
<td>0.14 (.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disgust Condition</td>
<td>0.04 (.15)</td>
<td>-0.17 (.15)</td>
<td>-0.19* (.10)</td>
<td>0.01 (.11)</td>
<td>-0.01 (.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear Condition</td>
<td>-0.03 (.13)</td>
<td>0.02 (.14)</td>
<td>-0.10 (.10)</td>
<td>0.08 (.11)</td>
<td>0.06 (.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Government</td>
<td>0.38** (.15)</td>
<td>0.23 (.17)</td>
<td>0.25** (.11)</td>
<td>0.43*** (.12)</td>
<td>0.08 (.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>0.14 (.12)</td>
<td>0.16 (.12)</td>
<td>0.07 (.08)</td>
<td>0.13 (.09)</td>
<td>0.28** (.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.11 (.08)</td>
<td>-0.22** (.08)</td>
<td>-0.13** (.06)</td>
<td>-0.09 (.06)</td>
<td>-0.06 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.04 (.05)</td>
<td>-0.05 (.05)</td>
<td>-0.03 (.03)</td>
<td>-0.01 (.04)</td>
<td>0.08* (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.002* (.001)</td>
<td>0.004** (.002)</td>
<td>0.001 (.001)</td>
<td>0.000 (.001)</td>
<td>0.001 (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.13 (.12)</td>
<td>0.22** (.13)</td>
<td>0.66*** (.09)</td>
<td>0.51*** (.10)</td>
<td>0.21* (.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p ≤ .1 (two-tailed test) ** p ≤ .05 (two-tailed test) *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test)

Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and the standard errors are in parentheses. All analyses included the weight variable to compensate for the over-sample of the South. Variables are coded 0-1, which higher values indicating more opposition. Limited government comprises of 1) “Some people think the government should provide fewer services in order to reduce spending. Other people feel it is important for the government to provide more services even if it means an increase in taxes; 2) Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. The wording of the other variables is in the Appendix.
Table II.6. The Direct Effect of Emotions on Opposition to Racial and Non-racial Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Racial Policies</th>
<th>Non-Racial Policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>Confederate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Flag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>.15** (.07)</td>
<td>.16** (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disgust</td>
<td>.04 (.07)</td>
<td>-.04 (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>.01 (.07)</td>
<td>.06 (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.11 (.09)</td>
<td>-.19** (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.00 (.05)</td>
<td>-.02 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.00 (.00)</td>
<td>.00 (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.37*** (.10)</td>
<td>.39*** (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p ≤ .1 (two-tailed test) ** p ≤ .05 (two-tailed test) *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test)

Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and the standard errors are in parentheses. All analyses included the weight variable to compensate for the over-sample of the South. Variables are coded 0-1, which higher values indicating more opposition.
Figure II.1 Priming Racial Resentment via Emotion

**Affirmative Action**

- X-axis: Racially Sympathetic, Racially Resentful
- Y-axis: Opposition to Affirmative Action
- Black line: Anger Condition
- Gray line: Control Condition

**Confederate Flag**

- X-axis: Racially Sympathetic, Racially Resentful
- Y-axis: Support for Confederate Flag
- Black line: Anger Condition
- Gray line: Control Condition

**Busing**

- X-axis: Racially Sympathetic, Racially Resentful
- Y-axis: Opposition to Busing
- Black line: Anger Condition
- Gray line: Control Condition
Note: The figure is derived from the results in Table II.3. The graphs are based on the direct effects of racial resentment, anger and control conditions and the interaction terms.
Figure II.2 Priming Old-fashioned Racism via Emotion
Note: The figure is derived from the results in Table II.4. The graphs are based on the direct effects of old-fashioned racism, anger, fear, disgust and control conditions and the interaction terms.
Chapter III

Emotions Undergirding Contemporary Racial Threat Attitudes

There are several approaches to understanding Whites’ racial policy opinions, including the racial resentment perspective explored in the previous chapter. This approach insists that White opinions about racial policy are driven by beliefs about how closely Black Americans adhere to traditional American values combined with negative affect. In the last chapter, we found evidence for the particular negative emotion that is linked to and can trigger racial resentment: anger. In this chapter, I explore the emotional underpinnings of related, but arguably a distinct racial belief system.

Competing explanations for Whites’ racial policy opinions include the racial threat hypothesis (Key 1949; Giles and Evans 1986) and the related but distinct group position theory (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1983). Proponents of the group position theory argue that racial prejudice is a consequence of Whites’ concern that Blacks will take away resources from Whites (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1983; Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Resource threats should produce fear among Whites because Blacks are viewed as (potentially) undermining social structures and hierarchies that benefit Whites (Key 1949; Blumer 1958). Fear’s role has been assumed but never empirically examined in the racial threat literature. In this chapter I explore whether fear is linked to, and can trigger, the belief systems described by racial threat and group position theory.

There is good reason to suspect that fear undergirds racial threat. Key states, “In such areas whites feared the possibility of Negro control of city, county, and other local
governments. Throughout, whites in such areas have furnished the main strength of the movement to keep the Negro out of politics” (pg. 652). After emancipation, there was concern about Black suffrage and the political changes it would bring. The end of slavery eliminated Whites’ most effective method of control of Blacks. Here was a group (Blacks) for the first time in American history inserted into the political system. Twelve million Blacks were now free and needed to be integrated into society (Wood 1970). Whites, particularly in the South, were threatened of what a Black voting block meant to White supremacy. This threat led to the implementation of the Black Codes and various forms of legalized discrimination.\footnote{Some codes limited the areas Blacks can purchase goods or rent property. They also imposed penalties if Blacks did not work, whether they wanted to or not. Black codes were a form of controlling Blacks after the Civil War in the South.} Key (1949) testified to Whites concern with maintaining control over Blacks.

“The hard core of the political South – and the backbone of southern political unity – is made up of those counties and sections of the southern states in which Negroes constitute a substantial proportion of the population. In these areas a real problem of politics, broadly considered, is the maintenance of control by a white minority. The situation resembles fundamentally that of the Dutch in the East Indies or the former position of the British in India. Here, in the southern black belts, the problem of governance is similarly one of control by a small, white minority of a huge, retarded, colored population. And, as in the case of the colonials, that white minority can maintain its position only with the support, and by the tolerance, of those outside – in the home country or in rest of United States” (pg. 5).

Despite its presumed role in group position theory, it is possible that fear is not the primary emotion undergirding contemporary racial attitudes (Blumer 1958). The change in the racial discourse after the civil rights movement (Mendelberg 2001; Kinder and Sanders 1996) and the appraisals required to experience fear (Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Lerner and Keltner 2001) suggest fear may not occur very often in the White mind when considering race. In fact, it is possible that racial threat attitudes simply capture
racial resentment, and therefore may be driven by anger as well. In other words, Whites may be angry, not afraid, that Blacks are vying for economic and political mobility when such improvements are thought to be undeserved.29

Anger’s role in racial threat can be documented back to Reconstruction. During this period several White terrorist organizations emerged in an attempt to address the threat of Blacks’ freedom. Trelease (1971) states

“the Klan movement reached its fullest dimensions only with the advent of Negro suffrage, first in Tennessee and then in the South at large … Klansmen repeatedly attacked Negroes for no other stated offense than voting or intending to vote …terrorism represented the only remaining way of seizing political control” (p. xlvii).

The Ku Klux Klan’s activities were not only fueled by Black suffrage but also by interracial mixing. “A former Mississippi Klansman justified violence as the only way of protecting white families against what he conceived to be ‘the threatened and rising arrogance of negroes’” (Trelease 1971, xliii). The Klan’s activities seem to reflect strong anger, not fear. Lynch mobs protecting White families from the arrogance of “negroes” exemplify an angry reaction. Lazarus (1991) states that “the action tendency in anger is attack on the agent held to be blameworthy for the offense” (pg. 226). In addition, Averil (1982) claims that “[a]nger, as here conceived, is the name of an emotional syndrome; aggression – a response intended to inflict pain or discomfort upon another –is one way in which anger is sometimes expressed” (pg. 30). The Klan’s actions were intended to inflict pain and discomfort upon Blacks during Reconstruction.

This chapter investigates which emotions prime (anger and fear) group conflict attitudes most powerfully. This prediction is based on Bower’s (1981) associative

29 Of course, it is possible that Whites experience fear when their resources are threatened, especially if they feel they have no control over that outcome
network theory in that emotions and cognitive objects are learned simultaneously and inducing the emotion activates the corresponding thought.

**Appraisals Underlying Racial Threat Attitudes**

After emancipation, racial threat was situated in the concern over Blacks' freedom. Institutional barriers were created to disenfranchise Blacks - the poll tax, White primaries, and literacy tests. Key (1949) states, “[to] them, a single Negro vote threatened the entire caste system” (pg. 649). Giles and Hertz (1994) conceptualize racial threat as “relationships between groups as a function of their competitive positions in political, economic, and social arenas. This competition is conceptualized as contextually conditioned” (317). The racial threat hypothesis, which presumes real conflict over resources, is measured as the percent of Blacks in a respondent’s geographical area. Giles and colleagues find that this contextual variable was correlated with registration rates and Whites’ racial policy preferences (Giles and Evans 1986; Giles and Hertz 1994).

For Blumer (1958) racial threat is not only captured in actual conflict over resources, but is also attitudinal in nature. He argues that there are four elements to racial prejudice; 1) feelings of superiority; 2) belief that the subordinate race is intrinsically different and alien; 3) belief in a proprietary claim to certain areas of privilege and advantage; 4) fear and suspicion that the subordinate race harbors designs on the prerogatives of the dominant race (p. 4). Bobo and colleagues find that this conceptualization of racial prejudice, referred to as group conflict, predicts opposition to busing (Bobo 1983), affirmative action (Bobo 2000) and Native American Treaty Rights (Bobo and Taun 2006).
Based on Blumer’s conceptualization, it may be that anger and fear’s appraisals are integral to group conflict attitudes. Threats can produce either fear or anger, depending on the appraisals people make about the source of the threat and their ability to deal with it (Lazarus 1991; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Smith and Ellsworth 1985). If the threat suggests future harm and there is uncertainty and lack of control in coping, then fear is experienced. However, if we are certain who is responsible (blameworthy) and we believe our response is likely to effectively control the problem, anger is more likely to occur. The next section discusses whether anger and fear are the emotional substrates of group conflict attitudes.

**Emotions Driving Contemporary Racial Threat Attitudes**

The changing nature of racial discourse in America suggests that fear’s impact, if present in the past, has subsided and anger has continued to fuel contemporary racial animus. Mendelberg (2001) discusses how racial appeals emanating from social and political elites evolved from a norm of racial inequality to one of racial equality. After emancipation, candidate racial appeals focused heavily on racial inequality by evoking feelings of anger, disgust and fear. For instance, she states “the content of racial appeals during the nineteenth century was remarkably constant across campaigns. It drew on deeply rooted stereotypes, fears and resentments, and enduring notion of racial inferiority” (pg. 29). Mendelberg gives good reason to suspect that fear and anger underlie racial threat attitudes during the time when the norm of racial inequality was dominant. This connection is evident in her discussion of the issue of sexuality.¹³

¹³ The issue of inter-racial marriage may evoke two emotions: disgust and fear. Disgust is experienced if Whites believe Blacks are biologically inferior and beastly. The thought of race mixing may also ignite anxiety because of Whites inability to control Black-White interactions (causes a high level of uncertainty), especially during the Reconstruction period.
“Often the myth that black men had designs on white women had overtones of illicit power and violent threat. Sexual retribution by black men became a salient worry during times when whites’ control over blacks seemed more tenuous or when blacks made political gains” (pg. 31). She further claims “[t]he rise of social Darwinism after the 1830s brought a great deal of anxiety about the reproductive consequences of the sexual mixing of races” and “[t]he worry about violence committed by African Americans and about their work ethic sharpened as the free black population grew in the early decades of the nineteenth century” (pg. 31). These sentiments may reflect fear or an excuse for moral outrage, anger and brutality against Black people in general. *This chapter is unable to decipher which emotion undergirds racial threat attitudes during this period.* Nevertheless, I am able to investigate whether anger or fear drives contemporary racial threat attitudes.

The change in racial discourse, from explicit racial appeals to implicit racial appeals, is attributed to the civil rights movement (Mendelberg 2001; Kinder and Sanders 1996). The norm in America no longer tolerated open forms of bigotry. Racial appeals that emphasize the threat of miscegenation, Black political participation or Black’s distinct physical characteristics were no longer accepted. These attitudes (maybe tied to fear or anger) have dissipated from American discourse and are regarded as a violation of the American Creed. Mendelberg (2001) states

“Thus, as the norm of racial inequality declined, and the norm of racial equality spread, the rhetoric of white supremacy changed. In national forums, white supremacists ceased to warn of ‘beastly black rapists’ and reverted, at first, to paternalistic arguments about the well-being of African Americans and then to race free rhetoric” (pg. 79).
Racial appeals now often emphasize the unfair privileges Blacks receive which threaten Whites’ jobs and educational opportunities. The rhetoric of contemporary racial threat relies less on the threat of “race mixing” and a loss of control as a result of Blacks entering the political system but more on the taking away of Whites’ opportunities and rights (Bobo and Hutchings 1996, Bobo and Taun 2006; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Therefore, the discussion of race has transformed from Black inferiority to Black responsibility for Black failures, with no role for discrimination (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Mendelberg 2001; Bobo and Kluegel 1997). Contemporary racial threat attitudes are defined as “zero-sum competition with blacks for jobs, promotions, admission slots to colleges, government contracts, or other goods” (Sears, Hetts, Sidanius, Bobo 2000, 22).

My contention is that anger is the emotional substrate of contemporary racial threat attitudes. Many Whites hold Blacks responsible for their economic and political woes. Bobo and Kluegel (1997) agree, stating that the group position perspective maintains that Whites “blame blacks themselves for their poorer relative economic standing, seeing it as a function of perceived cultural inferiority” (pg. 95). Proponents of this perspective contend that Whites are entitled to these resources. For example, Blumer (1958) states that the “dominant group of being entitled to either exclusive or prior rights in many important areas of life” (pg. 4). According to this view, prejudiced Whites regard Blacks as undeserving not only because Blacks are responsible for their group’s failings but also because Whites are entitled to these resources. This suggests that anger underlies the threat of the inferior group (Blacks) vying for upward mobility at the expense of Whites. Sidanius and Pratto (1999) find tentative evidence supporting this position, where internal attributions are strongly correlated (.34 and .49) with social dominance orientation (SDO).
(another measure of group conflict attitudes). They define internal attributions as “laziness or inability, locate the blame on the individual or group and in the political sphere, are used against remediation” (p. 88). The finding that SDO and blame are highly correlated suggests that anger is linked to contemporary racial threat attitudes.

An alternative explanation is that contemporary racial threat attitudes are driven by fear. Just as racial threat was in all likelihood situated in fear after emancipation, this feeling continues to map onto contemporary visions of racial threat. There is some tentative evidence that supports this proposition. Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) found that fear and threat over safety were highly correlated with attitudes toward Blacks. This suggests that Whites’ racial fears currently reside in the perceived threat to Whites’ safety posed by Blacks. After the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., riots swept through the country and “conservative arguments took on new appeal, now in tune with white apprehensions. There was less talk about equality and more about law and order” (Kinder and Sanders 1996, 105). Law and order became the code word for racial antipathy. For instance, the issue of crime became a major determinant in the outcome of the 1988 presidential election. Willie Horton became a household name due to the campaign advertisement run by the Bush campaign. Mendelberg (2001) states “The Horton story was an appeal to white voters’ fears … it was a political play on the injurious stereotypes whites had developed about black men’s proclivity to rape white women” (pg. 3).

The reality of race relations in the contemporary period does not provide strong justification for White fear. Support for affirmative action is an appropriate test case for

---

31 Willie Horton was a convicted murder and was sentenced to life in a Massachusetts prison. He escaped while on furlough and raped a White woman. The advertisement blamed Massachusetts governor and at the time presidential candidate Michael Dukakis.
investigating the role of fear as a driver of racial threat (group conflict) attitudes. This policy has elements of zero-sum competition: Blacks’ opportunities via college admission and hiring may come at the “expense” of Whites. As a result, affirmative action could be framed in a way that draws on Whites’ racial fears. Gamson and Modigliani (1985), however, did not find this frame to be prevalent in contemporary discourse. Looking at television coverage, news magazines and cartoons they found affirmative action was framed mostly as “no preferential treatment”, “reverse discrimination” and “unfair advantage”.32 These frames, I would argue, are rooted in anger rather than fear. Blacks are presented as getting undeserved advantages.

Furthermore, Whites may well believe they have some control over the outcome of the contemporary affirmative action debate. A state-by-state strategy to end affirmative action engineered by Ward Connerly, an African American businessman from California, has achieved substantial success. Affirmative action has been eliminated in states (Michigan, California and Washington) through ballot initiative. This success may engender sentiments of control and certainty in the White public. Furthermore, previous research suggests anger about affirmative action is widespread among Whites (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sniderman et al. 2000). The question at hand, however, is whether anger or fear fundamentally drives the racial attitudes (in this case group conflict opinions) that ultimately predict support for affirmative action.

The current racial-gap is more evidence that Whites’ fear of Blacks vying for resources is unjustified. Duncan’s socioeconomic index of occupational prestige showed

---

32 The no preferential treatment frame focuses on whether the policy is going to allocate rewards based in part on an individual’s race or ethnicity. Reverse discrimination is predominantly framed as whether the policy is going to sacrifice individual rights in order to advance the well being of some ethnic or racial groups. Undeserving advantage is mostly presented as some specially approved groups (Blacks) are going to be given advantages they have not earned and do not deserve (Gamson and Modigliani 1985).
that in 1940, White men scored 30 while in 1980 Black men scored 31 \(^{33}\) (Allen and Farley 1986). This difference reveals that the status of a White man’s job in 1940 is equivalent to the status of a Black man’s job in 1980. The index demonstrates a 40-year lag in occupational prestige between Blacks and Whites. Rate of completion of college degree is another indicator of a racial gap in achievement. In 1981, Whites were twice as likely than Blacks to have completed college (24-percent to 12-percent, respectively Allen and Farley 1986, pp. 291). Results from the 2006 Current Population report shows that the racial gap has continued. For instance, Whites’ median income in 2006 was $50,673 compared to $31,969 for Blacks (a gap of nearly $19,000). Furthermore, 24-percent of Blacks live below the poverty line compared to 10-percent of Whites. Turning to healthcare, we continue to see considerable racial disparities, 15-percent of Whites are uninsured in comparison to 21-percent of Blacks. My point is that Black-White differences remain so stark that it is unlikely that Whites would possibly fear losing resources to Blacks.\(^{34}\)

**Hypotheses**

*H*\(_1\): *The experience of anger, even independent of thoughts about politics and race, primes group conflict attitudes and boosts their impact on racial policy opinions.*

*H*\(_2\): *The experience of fear, independent of thoughts about politics and race, will not prime group conflict attitudes and boost their impact on racial policy opinions.*

\(^{33}\) The index scores are a summary of the comparative occupational prestige of jobs held by Blacks and Whites. Scores at the upper end of the scale signify high prestige jobs and those at the lower end signify low-prestige jobs. For instance, occupations in the professional category are awarded scores of 74 or higher (Allen and Farley 1986).

\(^{34}\) Even though racial differences (i.e., income, education etc…) have narrowed since Reconstruction, I contend that the racial gap is still substantial and unlikely to threaten Whites’ social status.
In this chapter, I use two experiments to determine whether anger or fear is central to contemporary racial threat (group conflict opinions) attitudes. The first experiment employs a college student sample conducted at a large Midwestern university. The second experiment employs a national sample in order to replicate the findings from the first study.

**Study 1**

**Participants and Overview**

The study was conducted in a computer lab at the Marsh Center for Journalistic Performance at the University of Michigan from May 17 to May 31 of 2007. The total sample size consists of 288 participants. Since the analysis only pertains to Whites, the sample reduces to 182. The sample was mainly comprised of college students. As a result, there is little variation in education (73 percent completed some college) and age (80 percent were 22 or under). Gender is evenly split (48 percent women), but Republicans (20 percent) are underrepresented. The random assignment of subjects to condition was successful: there were no significant differences across cells of the design in the proportion of these socio-demographic and partisan variables. Therefore, any differences in the post-stimulus dependent measures can be attributed to the manipulation and not to other factors (Shadish, Cook and Campbell 1979). The sample does not permit strong inferences about the levels of racial animus in society, or overall levels of support for racial policies.

**Procedure**

Subjects were recruited with flyers in downtown Ann Arbor, at local businesses and in university office buildings. Respondents were informed that they would receive $10 for
answering questions about media habits and current events. Once in the lab, subjects were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (anger, anxiety or control) and then led to a cubicle where they interacted solely with the computer in order to minimize the potential for interviewer bias. The pre-test questionnaire included racial and general attitude measures, more specifically, group conflict, ideology and partisanship. After completing pre-test measures, respondents were informed that they had finished study one and were now taking a second study unrelated to the first. This second study was presented as collecting information on media consumption and policy opinions. This was done to minimize the priming of racial attitudes, while still measuring them in the pre-test. After participants completed a battery of 10 media consumption questions, they were randomly assigned to conditions intended to induce the emotions of anger and anxiety; or to a control group, where subjects thought about things that made them feel relaxed.

The prediction is that the general emotion will trigger group conflict. Most studies of emotion ask about emotional reactions to political or racial targets (as in “how much does affirmative action/presidential candidate make you angry/anxious”). The problem with using these items is that it is difficult to know whether the emotion or the semantic political/racial content is driving any effect. Therefore, this study employed an induction procedure free of political and/or racial content. Subjects were asked via the computer to respond to the following query:

"Now we would like you to describe in general things that make you feel (ANGRY/ANXIOUS). Please describe how you felt as vividly and in as much detail as possible. Examples of things that have made some people feel

35 For the relaxed condition, subjects responded to the following query “Now we would like you to describe in general things that make you feel relaxed. Please describe how you felt as vividly and in as much detail as possible. It is okay if you don't remember all the details, just be specific about what exactly it was that made you relaxed and what it felt like to be relaxed. If you can, write your description so that someone reading it might even feel relaxed. Take a few minutes to write out your answer.”

72
(ANGRY/ANXIOUS) are problems: they have in their life, with their partner, the weather and the commute to work. It is okay if you don't remember all the details, just be specific about what exactly it was that made you (ANGRY/ANXIOUS) and what it felt like to be (ANGRY/ANXIOUS). If you can, write your description so that someone reading it might even feel (ANGRY/ANXIOUS). Take a few minutes to write out your answer.”

The response length was unrestricted and subjects were encouraged to take a few minutes to write down anything in general that made them feel the emotion. After the induction, subjects completed a post-test questionnaire that included racial and general policy measures as well as thermometer ratings.

**Results**

A manipulation check was used to determine if the induction procedure was successful. Coders were asked to select the dominant emotion expressed in the responses, and how intensely that emotion was expressed (scale ranged from 0-1, 0=none, .5=some and 1=extreme). Table 3.1 indicates participants in the anger condition expressed anger (.62, p ≤ .001) but no fear relative to the control group. Respondents in the anxiety condition expressed a high degree of fear (.60, p ≤ .001) and hardly any anger relative to the control condition. These results indicate that the induction independently produces anger and fear. Participants discussed events in their personal lives that could reasonably be assumed to produce the intended emotion. No respondent was unable to supply content that corresponded to a given emotion.

---

36 The language of the manipulation might bias against anxiety because it tells respondents to focus on the past rather than the future. In the second study, I modify the language to represent the future and find no difference between the two.

37 The cronbach alpha’s reveal a high level of reliability across the two coders – anger (.95) and anxiety (.94).

38 I treat fear and anxiety as interchangeable. Some classify these concepts as distinguishable and would expect respondents to interpret them differently (Lazarus 1991; Ohman 2000). However, the findings from Study 2 reveals that subjects interpret fear and anxiety similarly.
I expect that anger will prime group conflict attitudes and boost their impact on racial policy opinions, while fear is predicted to have a null effect. Three racial policies were examined; *affirmative action*, *government assistance to Blacks* and *government aid to Blacks*. Affirmative action measures perceived harm from affirmative action and not support/opposition. These policies may all be perceived as redirecting resources from Whites to Blacks. This is a conservative test because if fear has a priming effect in any policy domain, it should be this one (Bobo and Kluegel 1997). In Table 3.2, for the three racial polices, the interactions between anger and group conflict attitudes are insignificant. Anger was unable to boost the impact of group conflict attitudes on racial policy opinions relative to the control condition. Focusing on the second row, supporting Hypothesis 2, fear does not prime group conflict attitudes and boost their impact on racial policy support. Instead, the interaction between fear and group conflict attitudes is negative for affirmative action (-.41, \( p \leq .1 \)), government assistance to Blacks (-.41, \( p \leq .05 \)) and government aid to Blacks (-.31, \( p \leq .1 \)). Figure 3.1 illustrates these effects. In both the control and anger conditions, as respondents move from the low end to high end of the group conflict scale, their opposition to racial policies increases. This effect is in contrast to the fear condition, where the slope remains relatively flat. Overall, these results, suggest that there is no strong priming effect of anger on group conflict attitudes relative to the control group.

---

39 Affirmative action does not actually measure support or opposition to the policy. Instead it measures whether or not Whites are disadvantaged by the policy. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the way the affirmative action questions are worded biases respondents to be more in opposition to the policy. For instance, in my sample only 8-percent of Whites favored “preferential hiring and promotion of Blacks” and 16-percent favored “quotas to admit Black students”. Since there is little variation on the dependent variable it is difficult to determine why Whites’ oppose/support affirmative action.

40 For affirmative action, the effects of anger are indistinguishable from the effects of fear.
Fear, on the other hand, seems to *depress* the linkage between group conflict attitudes and these policy opinions. Higher scores on the group conflict scales produce MORE, not less support for racial policies relative to the control condition when Whites experience fear.

[Insert Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1 Here]

In summary, contrary to the prediction, anger in comparison to the control group did not boost the impact of group conflict attitudes on racial policy opinions. Furthermore, fear’s depressive effect is counterintuitive. Instead of the predicted null effect, we see that fear depresses the impact of group conflict attitudes on racial policy opinions. The most racially threatened Whites, when experiencing fear, suppress their opposition to race redistribution the most. This finding is similar to race of the interviewer effects that shows when Whites are interviewed by Blacks rather than Whites their responses are more racial tolerant (Hatchett and Schuman 1976; Kinder and Sanders 1996). Hatchett and Schuman (1976) found a 46-percent gap on the issue of interracial marriage. Seventy two-percent of Whites were in support when the interviewer was Black, while support dropped to 26-percent when the interviewer was White. This effect might not only be contingent on the race of the interviewer but on the fear evoked by a Black individual asking about race. If this is true, however, fear should presumably suppress the impact of racial resentment and old fashioned racism. But this is not what happens (in Chapter 2). These unexpected results for fear in interaction with group conflict attitudes require further consideration and empirical research.

A limitation of Study 1 is that the sample consists of college students, where there is little variation along important economic indicators (i.e., income). The threat of Blacks vying for economic and political resources may not be fully realized by respondents in the
sample. A stronger test is to replicate the findings on a national sample (more variation on social status). In addition, the next study enables me to determine whether fear’s negative effect on group conflict is an artifact of the data or a more systemic process.

**Study 2**

**Participants and Overview**

Study 2 uses an experiment on a nationally representative sample to test whether anger or fear primes group conflict attitudes. The full details of Study 2 were outlined in Chapter 2, so I will summarize here. The study was collected through Polimetrix an Internet survey company, from April 21 to April 30 of 2008. The sample consists of 187 Whites. Random assignment seemed successful; there were no significant differences in demographic variables across the conditions. The experiment was conducted in two waves separated by seven days. The first wave consisted of racial and general attitude measures and the second wave consisted of the manipulation and racial policy opinions. The manipulation contained an emotion induction task meant to cause respondents to experience particular emotional states.41

**Results**

One purpose of this study is to replicate the findings from Study 1 on a national sample. In particular, one might be concerned that the fear result is in the wrong direction. Perhaps when considering respondents who reside in close proximity to Blacks (Southern states), a positive linkage will emerge between fear and group conflict attitudes. The dependent variables examined were opinions about *affirmative action*, *government assistance to Blacks*, and *government aid to Blacks*. Table 3.3 shows that the direction of

---

41 See Chapter 2 for more details about the manipulation.
the coefficients is consistent with previous findings, where the interaction between fear and 
group conflict attitudes is consistently negative across the three racial policies. It appears 
that again fear depresses the effect of group conflict. But, caution must be mandated 
because this result should be interpreted heedfully as the results are not statistically 
significant. The benefit of this study is it allows for a stronger test of racial threat attitudes. 
Proponents of the racial threat perspective expect fear’s impact to be strongest in areas 
where there is a high concentration of Blacks (Key 1949). To determine whether this is the 

case, the sample is split in half and only Southern residents are analyzed.42

Looking at Table 3.4, fear’s ability to prime group conflict attitudes on racial policy 
opinions is stronger among Southern residents.43 As in the previous study, fear again 

depresses the impact of group conflict attitudes on support for government assistance to 
Blacks (-.55, p \leq .05) and government aid to Blacks (-.57, p \leq .05). These results show 
again that fear causes Whites who score high on the group conflict measures to adopt the 
more racially liberal position. Figure 3.2 illustrates these effects. The pattern resembles 
the results from Study 1. The slope is steeper for respondents in the anger and the control 
conditions, where as the fear condition’s slope remains flat (in some instances decreases).

In summary, I find that inducing (non-racial) anger does not boost the impact of 
perceptions of competitive racial threat attitudes on racial policy preferences. Fear 
produced a counter-intuitive result, depressing the effect of group conflict on policy

\[\text{Insert Table 3.3}\]

\[\text{Insert Table 3.4 and Figure 3.2}\]

42 For non-southern residents none of the interactions were significant.
43 These results suggest that generic fear influences racially threatened Whites to adopt a more liberal 
position on race. When racialized fear is induced the results might mirror the expectations of the racial 
threat theorists. A problem with inducing racial fear is that it is hard to untangle which item is driving the 
effect thoughts about Blacks or the expression of fear.
opinion in both studies. Examining two different populations a consistent finding emerges – (non-racial) fear often causes racially threatened Whites to be more supportive of redistributive (racial) policies than comparable Whites in the control condition. An explanation for these counterintuitive findings is that racially threaten Whites under states of fear are concerned with appearing racially insensitive. This result shows that the findings in Study 1 were not merely an artifact of the data. Overall, the results show that triggering anger and fear do not boost the impact of group conflict attitudes on racial policy preferences.

**Discussion**

This chapter set out to determine which emotions prime contemporary measures of racial threat. The main findings from this chapter are summarized as follows: inducing fear in subjects actually depresses rather than enhances the association between group conflict attitudes and racial policy opinions while inducing anger generally has no effect. Understanding fear’s attributes may explain these findings. First, to experience fear the threatening stimulus has to be perceived as novel. Relating this to racial attitudes, emancipation intensified the racial problem in America where fear was a likely emotional response because of the novelty of the threat. Second, fear is an emotion most people do not like to experience, especially if the threat cannot be alleviated (Marcus et al. 2000). If the threat persists and cannot be addressed then it may lead to avoidance or possibly transform into anger (Lazarus 1991). Discriminatory laws and intimidation were implemented to quell racial fears and if these forces were unsuccessful then anger was the following response. Racial fears were further diminished by the change in racial rhetoric
that followed the civil rights movement. The racial problem lost its novelty, and, given the deep and enduring history, this may explain why fear is not the primary emotional ingredient driving contemporary negative racial attitudes.

It is possible that the presence of fear in racial prejudice has not completely evaporated. Instead, this feeling may remain relatively dormant because the current racial dialogue draws on anger rather than fear. Therefore, in the future, fear’s role may increase in debates over racial matters. Fear may remerge as a presence if a new dominant frame is injected into the debate on race. Barack Obama, the first, African American president may be the novel stimulus that will shift the racial conversation. Perhaps the novelty of a Black president and the uncertainty it brings, and lack of control Whites may perceive, will vault racial fear to the top of conversation. A *New York Times* article reported that fear was a common response by Southern Whites regarding Obama’s victory in the 2008 presidential election. Adam Nossiter states that “[o]ne white woman said she feared that blacks would now become more ‘aggressive,’” where another woman contest that “I think there are going to be outbreaks from blacks” (pg. 3-4). The next chapter begins to examine this question by looking at the emotion underlying opposition to Black figures/leaders (particularly Barack Obama).
Table III.1. Manipulation Check

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intensity of Anger Expressed</th>
<th>Intensity of Fear Expressed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \beta ) (s.e.)</td>
<td>( \beta ) (s.e.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger Condition</td>
<td>Fear Condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.61*** (.03)</td>
<td>.01 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00 (.03)</td>
<td>.60*** (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00 (.02)</td>
<td>02 (.02)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 178

* \( p \leq .1 \) (two-tailed test)  ** \( p \leq .05 \) (two-tailed test)  *** \( p \leq .001 \) (two-tailed test)

Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and the standard errors are in parentheses. All analyses included the weight variable to compensate for the over-sample of the South. Anger and Fear are dummy variables, where 1 = if they were in the treatment condition and 0 = if they were in the “relaxed” condition.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Affirmative Action</th>
<th>Government Assistance to Blacks</th>
<th>Government Aid to Blacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger*Group Conflict</td>
<td>-.28 (.24)</td>
<td>-.15 (.20)</td>
<td>.06 (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear*Group Conflict</td>
<td>-.41* (.23)</td>
<td>-.41** (.19)</td>
<td>-.31* (.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger Condition</td>
<td>.03 (.08)</td>
<td>.07 (.07)</td>
<td>-.02 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear Condition</td>
<td>.06 (.08)</td>
<td>.03 (.07)</td>
<td>.05 (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Conflict</td>
<td>.67*** (.17)</td>
<td>.55*** (.14)</td>
<td>.35** (.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.19* (.10)</td>
<td>.47*** (.09)</td>
<td>.46*** (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.14** (.07)</td>
<td>.24** (.06)</td>
<td>.28*** (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p ≤ .1 (two-tailed test) ** p ≤ .05 (two-tailed test) *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test)

Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and the standard errors are in parentheses. All analyses included the weight variable to compensate for the over-sample of the South. Group Conflict consists of 1) More good jobs for Blacks means fewer good jobs for members of other groups; 2) The more influence Blacks have in local politics, the less influence members of other groups will have in local politics; 3) As more good housing and neighborhoods go to Blacks, there will be fewer good houses and neighborhoods for members of other groups; 4) Many Blacks have been trying to get ahead economically at the expense of other groups.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Affirmative Action</th>
<th>Government Assistance to Blacks</th>
<th>Government Aid to Blacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger*Group Conflict</td>
<td>.10 (.26)</td>
<td>-.08 (.21)</td>
<td>-.04 (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear*Group Conflict</td>
<td>-.09 (.24)</td>
<td>-.28 (.20)</td>
<td>-.28 (.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger Condition</td>
<td>.09 (.12)</td>
<td>.06 (.09)</td>
<td>.04 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear Condition</td>
<td>.05 (.10)</td>
<td>.10 (.08)</td>
<td>.17 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Conflict</td>
<td>.47** (.17)</td>
<td>.31** (.14)</td>
<td>.42*** (.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.31*** (.10)</td>
<td>.39*** (.08)</td>
<td>.36*** (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.01 (.10)</td>
<td>.03 (.07)</td>
<td>.08 (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.00 (.05)</td>
<td>.03 (.04)</td>
<td>.00 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.001 (.002)</td>
<td>.000 (.001)</td>
<td>.001 (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.06 (.12)</td>
<td>.46*** (.09)</td>
<td>.29*** (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p ≤ .1 (two-tailed test) ** p ≤ .05 (two-tailed test) *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test)

Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and the standard errors are in parentheses. All analyses included the weight variable to compensate for the over-sample of the South.
Table III.4 Priming Group Conflict Attitudes via Emotion (Only Southern Residents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Affirmative Action</th>
<th>Government Assistance to Blacks</th>
<th>Government Aid to Blacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>β</strong> (s.e.)</td>
<td><strong>β</strong> (s.e.)</td>
<td><strong>β</strong> (s.e.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger*Group Conflict</td>
<td>-.14 (.26)</td>
<td>-.07 (.32)</td>
<td>-.03 (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear*Group Conflict</td>
<td>-.46 (.35)</td>
<td>-.55** (.28)</td>
<td>-.57** (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger Condition</td>
<td>.23 (.18)</td>
<td>.09 (.15)</td>
<td>-.03 (.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear Condition</td>
<td>.16 (.15)</td>
<td>.18 (.12)</td>
<td>.28** (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Conflict</td>
<td>.60** (.03)</td>
<td>.31 (.22)</td>
<td>.51** (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.42** (.15)</td>
<td>.44*** (.11)</td>
<td>.44*** (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.05 (.15)</td>
<td>.02 (.11)</td>
<td>.22** (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.03 (.08)</td>
<td>.01 (.06)</td>
<td>-.06 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.003 (.003)</td>
<td>.001 (.002)</td>
<td>.002 (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.03 (.18)</td>
<td>.36** (.14)</td>
<td>.10 (.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p \leq .1$ (two-tailed test)  ** $p \leq .05$ (two-tailed test)  *** $p \leq .001$ (two-tailed test)

Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and the standard errors are in parentheses. All analyses included the weight variable to compensate for the over-sample of the South.
Figure III.1 Priming Group Conflict Attitudes via Emotion (College Sample)

Note: The figure is derived from the results in Table III.2. The graphs are based on the direct effects of group conflict, anger, fear and control conditions and the interaction terms.
Figure III.2 Priming Group Conflict Attitudes via Emotion (Southern Residents)

Note: The figure is derived from the results in Table III.4. The graphs are based on the direct effects of group conflict, anger, fear and control conditions and the interaction terms.
Chapter IV

Emotions and White Support for Presidential Candidates

Previous chapters focused on the link between emotions and racial attitudes as predictors of racial policy opinions. A related question is whether these same emotions boost the impact of racial attitudes in candidate evaluation and vote choice. Though candidates, especially White candidates, may not explicitly invoke thoughts about race, their policy positions may be implicitly racialized (Berinksy and Mendelberg 2005). This chapter examines how emotions shape the relationship between contemporary racial attitudes and support for candidates that favor Black interests.

A recurrent finding in this dissertation is that anger, far more than fear, boosts the impact of negative racial attitudes on Whites’ racial policy preferences. It is reasonable to wonder, however, whether this effect is general, or if it applies narrowly to racial policy opinions. Another obvious place where racial attitudes may affect political outcomes is in elections involving candidates who promote Blacks’ economic and political interests. These candidates may pose a greater threat to Whites because they could implement a broad racial agenda that undermines White social status and redirects resources to Blacks. Fear, therefore, may increase the impact of contemporary racial bigotry, instead of decreasing it, in the context of an election with racially progressive candidates, especially if they are African American.

Scholars have long posited that fear drives Whites opposition to candidates that favor policies that benefit Blacks. Jamieson (1992) states “[e]arly in the history of U.S.
politics, fears of “race mixing” became campaign fodder. In the Lincoln-Douglas debates the future president faced an opponent who repeatedly exploited audience fears by tying Negro equality and intermarriage” (pg. 76). Reeves (1997) argue that campaign strategists still use fear appeals to ignite racial prejudice during elections. For instance, he contends that “[t]he Horton-furlough campaign tactic was meant to stir and arouse the racial anxieties of white southerners” (p. 17). Bush’s victory in the 1988 presidential contest was at least partly due to his campaign’s strategy utilizing the Willie Horton ad to stoke White racial animosity (Mendelberg 2001). The Horton ad linked Michael Dukakis to a Black convicted murderer (Willie Horton) that escaped while on furlough and raped a White Maryland woman and assaulted her fiancé. Mayer (2002) states “[t]he Republicans cunningly used prison furloughs and the death penalty to reignite white fears of black crime and to remind white voters of the alleged leniency of liberal Democrats toward black miscreants” (pg. 201). He further suggests that a central problem with the Dukakis campaign was their failure to find “a way to respond to Bush’s cynical use of racial fears that did not dismiss white anxieties about black crime or exacerbate them” (p. 227).

Another example of a political appeal used to awaken subtle racial animus was the “white hands” advertisement run by Jesse Helms in the 1990 North Carolina senatorial contest against Harvey Gantt. Jamieson (1992) claims the ad played “to whispered fears, prejudices privately held but publicly denied” (p. 84). The advertisement shows a white hand of a male crumbling a rejection letter as the announcer says “You needed that job, and you were the best qualified. But they had to give it to a minority because of racial quotas. Is that really fair?” The perception is that the “white
hands” and Horton ads scared Whites into believing that if liberal candidates were elected that crime would be rampant and handouts would be the norm (Jamieson 1992). Fear’s ability to ignite prejudice and contribute to the election of conservative candidates, like George H. Bush and Jesse Helms (Mayer 2002; Jamieson 1992) has never been empirically examined.

An alternative explanation given the results in Chapter 2 is that anger, rather than fear, most powerfully activates racial attitudes during contemporary campaigns. This would happen if Whites have the same perception about, say affirmative action policies as they do about candidates who support such policies. In either case, Blacks may be seen as potentially getting advantages in the political arena that they do not deserve. The argument would be, therefore, that anger connects racial prejudice to candidates who support giving Blacks “unfair handouts.” This chapter examines whether anger or fear primes racial attitudes for some candidates but not others. But, first it’s important to identify if and how race impacts voter choice.

A substantial literature debates the role of racial prejudice in elections involving Blacks candidates. Sears and Kinder (1971) find that symbolic racism is a strong predictor of White vote preference in the race between conservative Sam Yorty versus the liberal Tom Bradley in the 1969 and 1973 Los Angeles mayoral races. Reeves (1997) arrived at a similar finding in an experiment that pitted a White and Black candidate against one another. His results showed that prejudice surfaced only when the candidate is Black and he is characterized as a supporter of affirmative action. Sigelman et al. (1995) also find that the policy stance of the candidate mattered to White voters. For instance, the Black candidate garners more support from Whites when his policy
positions are more moderate. Citrin, Green and Sears (1990) find race is significant when contextual factors come into play. They find that when little information about the candidate is known, the race of the candidate is used as a cue in voting decisions. In addition, Sears, Citrin and Kosterman (1987) find racial attitudes (negative feelings of Blacks) are the strongest factors in Whites assessment of Jesse Jackson.

Contrary to the research just presented, Highton (2004) contends that Whites’ voting discrimination does not significantly impede a Black candidate’s electoral success. Other factors like party identification and incumbency, rather than race of the candidate, are influential in vote choice. One concern with Highton’s model is that he considers all Whites to share similar perceptions of Black candidates. He even finds that “among Republicans, Democratic voting decreases between four and five percentage points with a black Democrat. Thus there does appear to be some aversion to African American Democratic candidates on the part of Republicans” (pg. 16). Therefore, Highton finds that the very group that is expected to employ racism, actually did, when evaluating Black candidates.

A candidate’s skin tone is another factor that influences vote outcomes. Terkildsen (1993) finds that the dark-skin tone candidate is evaluated more negatively than the light-skin tone candidate. Aguilar (n.d) finds that the effect of skin tone stretches beyond the borders of the U.S. to Mexico as well. In an experiment, she varies the phenotype (White, "Mestizo" (a blend of White and Indigenous) and Indigenous) of Mexican candidates and finds that the White candidate is evaluated more positively and the Indigenous looking candidate is evaluated more negatively. Hochschild and Weaver (2007) state that “skin color discrimination is just as bitter as, perhaps even more painful
than racism – if only because it can come from people inside as well as outside their own group and because it can be highly personalized and intimate” (p. 661). The next section looks at five candidates (Al Sharpton, Jesse Jackson, Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton and John Edwards) to determine whether specific emotions prime racial attitudes during candidate evaluation and vote choice.

**Liberal Candidates**

Candidates’ political platforms vary, especially regarding the issue of race. Some candidates favor reparations while others are content with an apology from the United States government. Candidates have even changed their stance on racial issues during their political careers. For instance, David Duke when serving in the Louisiana state legislature was an unapologetic racist who openly supported segregation but later softened his racial rhetoric (at least publicly) in his gubernatorial race against Edwin Edwards (Jamieson 1992). Mayer (2002) professes that “[r]ace and the array of issues surrounding it have been crucial to every presidential election since 1960” (p. 3). Therefore, a candidate’s position on race can be instrumental to their ability to get elected to office.

Jesse Jackson is considered the first viable Black candidate to seek a major party’s presidential nomination (Mayer 2002). Baker (1989) suggests that “Jackson’s candidacy could be viewed as an attempt to fill a leadership void left by Martin Luther King and to once again focus attention on the importance of finishing the work of King and the civil rights movement” (p. 31). Jackson’s involvement in civil rights dates back to the 1960s, where he marched with Martin Luther King Jr. in Selma, Alabama and was an organizer with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Jackson
continued to dedicate part of his career to fighting for civil rights by heading two non-profit organizations Operation People United to Save Humanity (PUSH) and National Rainbow Coalition. Besides spearheading organizations that promoted racial equality Jackson also took a strong stance on racial issues. At the 1984 Democratic National Convention, Shipp a columnist for the *New York Times*, commented that Jackson vowed to press his liberal agenda. “His agenda included commitments to peace, affirmative action, enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, creation of jobs and the elimination of racial separation in South Africa” (p. 16). Jackson used his presidential bid to push for issues of importance to minority communities that he felt were often ignored by the Democratic Party (Baker 1989).

Al Sharpton’s career path practically mirrored Jackson’s. They both were ministers within the Black church and fought for civil rights. Sharpton even worked for Jackson’s organization operation PUSH in the late 1960s. From his experience in PUSH he created his own organization, the National Action Network (NAN), which tackles racial injustice and discrimination. Sharpton is probably best known for his work in New York City dealing with the issues of racial profiling and police brutality, in particular, the Tawana Brawley incident. Ms. Brawley falsely accused six White male police officers of rape and Sharpton’s initial unwavering support shaped his national image. Some consider Sharpton a racial agitator, while others view him as a proponent of racial equality.

Senator Barack Obama’s (D-IL) candidacy for president has spurred criticism within and outside the Black community. For instance, the media questioned Obama’s “silence” on racial issues. David Ehrenstein, a columnist for the *Los Angeles Times*
referred to Obama as the “Magical Negro,” referring to his ability to “appear non-threatening to Whites and having them embrace him as their candidate” (pg. 1). This perception of Obama may be attributed to his avoidance of issues like affirmative action and reparations. Dawson Bell, a columnist, for the Detroit Free Press reports that Obama was able to avoid the hot button social issues (i.e., affirmative action). He states

“[Both candidates] would prefer voters do their choosing based on Iraq, tax policy, oil drilling, judgment, … When it comes to wedge issues – guns, gay rights, abortion, affirmative action, research using human embryos – McCain and Obama mostly have tried to avoid public engagement” (pg. 1).

Obama’s website supports Bell’s claim that race has taken a back seat. The website, under the issue of civil rights, devotes a sentence or two to “strengthen civil rights enforcement” or “racial profiling” and mentions nothing in regards to affirmative action. In contrast, looking at issues pertaining to women, Obama’s website devotes at least six sentences to “research on women’s health” or “domestic violence”.

A majority of the public perceived Obama to represent all of America. A poll conducted by Time magazine in late September of 2008 showed that likely voters did not view Obama’s candidacy through a racial lens. The poll asked whether respondents thought that “Barack Obama’s policies would favor minorities over White people”. Sixty-seven percent of participants responded no. In addition, only 5-percent of respondents considered him “a traditional Black candidate” while 57-percent believed he signifies “a candidate of a new generation of Americans.” People’s impression was that Obama represented a new face of America that was neither White nor Black. For instance, the poll asked “[h]ow well does the following statement describe Obama … [he] isn’t White or Black; he’s a little of both.” Sixty-four percent of respondents agreed with this statement. This finding raises eyebrows because historically one drop of “Black
“blood” was enough for an individual to be considered Black by the law (Fredrickson 1971). The poll showed that Obama was successful in appealing to a broad audience by not talking about race at all.

Senator Hilary Clinton (D-NY) and former senator John Edwards (D-NC) also contended for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2008. Both candidate’s positions on race were very similar to Obama’s – but not much was made of their racial views either. Jill Lawrence, from USA Today states that the Edwards campaign pledge was to “end poverty, provide health care for all, inspire Americans to help others and make his country once again ‘the great light for the rest of the world’” (pg. 1). Instead of focusing on racial divisions, the Edwards campaign wanted to address class differences. Clinton’s campaign followed a similar tone. One of her top priorities was fixing the health care crisis the country was facing. A Washington Times article - quoted Clinton as stating “I have been fighting for universal health care for a long time, and I’ve got to tell you I will never give up on the very fundamental right that Americans should have, to have access to quality, affordable health care, no matter who they are” (pg. 1).

My expectation is that the same psychological process discussed in Chapter 1 governs White evaluations of candidates. As a result, anger should boost the impact of contemporary racial antipathy toward candidates that are perceived to promote Black interests. In this case, anger increases the connection between negative racial attitudes (racial resentment and group conflict attitudes) and evaluations of Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton. Since Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton and John Edwards are moderate on the dimension of race, anger should not activate prejudice when voters assess these

---

44 Electing Jackson and Sharpton may represent a stronger cue of Blacks getting unfair advantages more so than racial policies. If elected these figures are able to implement several perceived “undeserving” policies like reparations and affirmative action.
candidates. Anger should have its largest priming effect when there is a clear signal that a candidate supports (and will implement) policies to redress racial injustice. For instance, Reeves (1997) found that a racial cue in the form of a Black candidate is not enough to activate racial prejudice. Racial bigotry appeared only when a Black candidate supported affirmative action.

The influence of fear on attitudes toward liberal candidates must also be considered. Evidence presented thus far suggests fear will not prime racial resentment or group conflict attitudes and boost their impact on racial policy opinions. It is possible, however, that fear may prime racial attitudes during evaluations of candidates who take strong stances on racial issues are evaluated. We may then expect fear to activate racial bigotry and decreases support for figures like Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton (Reeves 1997). This Chapter uses an experiment to test these expectations, more specifically, whether priming general negative emotions (i.e., anger and fear) activate racial attitudes for the more racially liberal candidate.

Hypotheses:

$H_1$: The experience of anger, even independent of thoughts about politics and race, primes racial resentment and group conflict attitudes and boost their impact on evaluations of Jackson and Sharpton.

$H_2$: The experience of fear, even independent of thoughts about politics and race, will not prime racial resentment and group conflict attitudes and boost their impact on evaluations of Jackson and Sharpton.
$H_3$: Neither the experience of anger nor fear, even independent of thoughts about politics and race, will prime racial resentment and group conflict attitudes and boost their impact on evaluations of Clinton, Edwards and Obama

**Methods and Procedure**

The experiment described in Chapter 3 permits a test of these hypotheses. The experiment not only consisted of questions pertaining to racial policy opinions but also included feeling thermometers about particular elected officials and leaders. The dependent variables are evaluations of: (1) Barack Obama, (2) Jesse Jackson, (3) Al Sharpton, (4) Hillary Clinton and (5) John Edwards. The thermometer ratings ranged from 0-100, with 0 representing an unfavorable opinion and 100 equaling a very favorable opinion. The particulars regarding this experiment were laid out in detail in Chapter 3, but I will briefly review its main characteristics. For a more complete discussion please reference Chapter 3. The experiment was conducted on a predominantly college-student sample (182 Whites) at a large Midwestern university. The study included an apolitical emotion induction manipulation, where respondents had to write about things that made them feel angry, anxious or relaxed (control). Pre-test measures included racial attitudes (i.e., group conflict attitudes and racial resentment) with the manipulation and post-test measures (feeling thermometers) of candidate support.

**Results**

My first expectation is that anger boosts the impact of racial resentment on evaluations of Sharpton and Jackson. I regressed evaluations of the individual (Obama, Sharpton, Jackson, Clinton and Edwards) on anger, fear, racial resentment, ideology and
the interactions between anger and racial resentment and fear and racial resentment. Table 4.1, shows evidence supporting Hypothesis one.

The interaction between anger and racial resentment (-33.36, p ≤ .1) is significant, substantively large and in the right direction in the case of Sharpton. In the case of Jackson, the anger by racial resentment interaction is less than half the size of the effects of Sharpton. Still, the results are in the hypothesized direction, although the effect falls well short of statistical significance. Turning to evaluations of Obama, Clinton and Edwards, as expected the interaction between anger and racial resentment is insignificant and close to zero. Another prediction is that fear increases the impact of racial resentment. Table 4.1 shows that only in the case of John Edwards does fear boost the impact of racial resentment (-44.37, p ≤ .05). This effect is unexpected and possibly driven by his stance on eliminating poverty in the United States. When considering other candidates the effect of fear is statistically insignificant. More specifically, fear did not prime racial animosity for racially liberal candidates like Jackson and Sharpton. Figure 4.1 illustrates these effects. The figure shows that anger activates negative thoughts about Blacks and connects it to Sharpton more than the control condition and has the steepest slope.

[Insert Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 Here]

The priming impact of various emotions on group conflict attitudes was also examined. As discussed previously, this attitude domain captures the threat Blacks pose to Whites’ social status. Table 4.2 shows the results from these analyses. Counter to my

45 The dependent variable is coded where a higher score reflects more favorable feelings towards the individual.
46 Although the coefficient on the interaction between fear and symbolic racism for Sharpton is substantial it is not significant and as large as the effect between anger and symbolic racism.
prediction, anger does not activate group conflict attitudes when Jackson and Sharpton are evaluated. When considering Obama, a significant positive interaction emerges between fear and group conflict attitudes ($33.33, p \leq .05$). Instead of fear decreasing support for Obama, it actually remained flat in comparison to the control condition. In other words, the group conflict scale has a predictably negative effect on evaluations of Senator Obama in the control condition, but surprisingly in the fear condition this effect all but disappears.

This finding for fear resembles the results reported in Chapter 3. Fear appears to effectively short-circuit the anticipated effects of group conflict attitudes on at least some candidate preferences just as it does on some policy preferences. Figure 4.2 shows these effects. For subjects in the fear condition, support for Obama remained relatively constant for people, regardless of their position on the group conflict scale. In contrast, support for Obama was substantially lower among individuals who scored highly on group conflict attitudes in the anger and control conditions compared to the fear condition.

[Insert Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2 Here]

In summary, there is some support for Hypothesis one. Anger boosted the impact of racial resentment on evaluation of Sharpton. Another finding was that fear primed group conflict attitudes for Edwards and Obama. At least for Obama, fear again pushes Whites who endorse group conflict attitudes to the racially liberal position relative to the control group. An explanation may be that racially threatened Whites under states of fear are concerned with appearing racially intolerant.

Discussion
Voters can focus on any one of several characteristics when deciding how they will cast their ballot. Candidate preferences are not just a function of party identification (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960) but also include other factors, such as racial antipathy. Racial animosity has contributed to opposition to the candidacy of Jesse Jackson (Sears et al. 1987) Thomas Bradley (Sears and Kinder 1971) and even a fictitious Black candidate (Reeves 1997). This chapter attempted to build on this work by examining the interplay between emotion and candidate preference. I found some suggestive evidence that anger can activate racial attitudes, particularly with candidates who espouse an overtly progressive racial agenda.

The results presented here are consistent with previous findings. In Chapter 2, anger drove opposition to racial policy opinions, but not attitudes about abortion and the Iraq war. Here I witness similar results in that anger leads to negative evaluations of Sharpton but not Obama, Clinton and Edwards. One explanation for the evidence presented so far is that anger drives White opposition to candidates/policies that are perceived to favor government “handouts” to Blacks.

The most interesting result is that counter to my expectations, fear appears to short-circuit the relationship between group conflict attitudes and candidate evaluations. Eliciting fear did not bring to mind prejudiced beliefs and apply it to candidates who openly favor racial policies. The effect on group conflict attitudes for Obama remained relatively flat but somewhat positive relative to the control group. In other words, group

---

47 I did not get significant effects for Jackson whose evaluation was interchangeable with Sharpton on the feeling thermometer. This result is possibly due to the fact that Sharpton was a more salient figure at the time. He recently ran for president in 2004. The sample mainly comprised of college students who were probably unaware of Jackson’s run for presidency in 1984 and 1988.
conflict suppressed support for Obama unless people were frightened, in which case
group conflict had no effect.

The findings for Obama must be considered in the context in which the data were
collected. The experiment was conducted in May of 2007, three months after Obama
announced his candidacy for president. The political views and biography of Senator
Obama were virtually unknown to most Americans at this time. In addition, the data
were collected before Reverend Jeremiah Wright’s comments surfaced on the Internet
and Obama had to publicly address the issue of race. There was a significant degree of
uncertainty about Obama’s personal qualities and political positions, which poses a
conservative test. Hence, there was not much (racial) information for the public to rely
on in forming an opinion of Obama. These issues pose a different explanation as to why
anger did not boost the impact of racism on evaluations of Obama. It was not Obama’s
ideological views that were responsible for suppressing racism but the amount of
information available about him.

Previous research has shown that race of the candidate is not enough in
awakening prejudice (Reeves 1997; Sigelman et al. 1997). I contend that as long as
Obama strayed away from race he was able to keep racism at bay. This explanation
seems consistent with the Time’s poll reported earlier, where voters did not view
Obama’s candidacy through a racial lens. He was considered a different candidate than
other Blacks and represented everyone interests not just minorities.
### Table IV.1 Candidates: Priming Racial Resentment via Emotion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Barack Obama</th>
<th>Al Sharpton</th>
<th>Jesse Jackson</th>
<th>Hillary Clinton</th>
<th>John Edwards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anger</strong> Racial Resentment</td>
<td>2.93 (17.79)</td>
<td>-33.36* (17.47)</td>
<td>-13.73 (17.70)</td>
<td>3.43 (22.38)</td>
<td>-3.82 (15.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fear</strong> Racial Resentment</td>
<td>-17.23 (18.28)</td>
<td>-24.80 (17.95)</td>
<td>.43 (18.19)</td>
<td>-14.22 (23.00)</td>
<td>-44.37** (15.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger Condition</td>
<td>1.64 (8.70)</td>
<td>15.53* (8.54)</td>
<td>11.35 (8.65)</td>
<td>-1.35 (10.94)</td>
<td>4.44 (7.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear Condition</td>
<td>6.78 (8.25)</td>
<td>6.74 (8.10)</td>
<td>5.54 (8.21)</td>
<td>10.52 (10.38)</td>
<td>16.82** (7.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Resentment</td>
<td>-9.47 (12.14)</td>
<td>5.40 (11.92)</td>
<td>-7.92 (12.07)</td>
<td>-10.30 (15.27)</td>
<td>1.41 (10.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-34.53*** (8.28)</td>
<td>-11.94 (8.14)</td>
<td>-21.87** (8.24)</td>
<td>-39.35*** (10.42)</td>
<td>-16.02** (7.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>79.70*** (6.25)</td>
<td>42.04*** (6.14)</td>
<td>47.72*** (6.22)</td>
<td>67.09*** (7.86)</td>
<td>58.36 (5.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*  p ≤ .1 (two-tailed test)  **  p ≤ .05 (two-tailed test)  ***  p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test)  
Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and the standard errors are in parentheses. Racial Resentment comprises of 1) Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve; 2) Government officials usually pay less attention to a request or complaint from a Black person than from a White person; 3) It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as Whites; 4) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class. The wording for the other variables is in the Appendix.
Table IV.2 Candidates: Priming Group Conflict Attitudes via Emotion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Barack Obama</th>
<th>Al Sharpton</th>
<th>Jesse Jackson</th>
<th>Hillary Clinton</th>
<th>John Edwards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
<td>β (s.e.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger*Group Conflict</td>
<td>20.94 (16.01)</td>
<td>-20.40 (16.92)</td>
<td>-18.13 (16.64)</td>
<td>12.23 (20.07)</td>
<td>-3.84 (14.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear*Group Conflict</td>
<td>33.33** (15.23)</td>
<td>13.86 (16.10)</td>
<td>17.98 (15.83)</td>
<td>5.00 (19.10)</td>
<td>6.73 (13.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger Condition</td>
<td>-2.85 (5.45)</td>
<td>4.28 (5.76)</td>
<td>7.69 (5.66)</td>
<td>-2.75 (6.83)</td>
<td>5.15 (4.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear Condition</td>
<td>-4.62 (5.44)</td>
<td>-7.55 (5.75)</td>
<td>-1.72 (5.65)</td>
<td>5.62 (6.82)</td>
<td>.15 (4.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Conflict</td>
<td>-37.37*** (11.01)</td>
<td>3.42 (11.63)</td>
<td>-10.20 (11.44)</td>
<td>-25.35* (13.80)</td>
<td>.77 (9.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-35.00*** (6.93)</td>
<td>-27.32*** (7.33)</td>
<td>-24.44*** (7.21)</td>
<td>-45.96*** (8.69)</td>
<td>-32.49*** (6.188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>84.75*** (4.45)</td>
<td>51.10*** (4.70)</td>
<td>51.10*** (4.60)</td>
<td>71.00 (5.57)</td>
<td>65.21 (3.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p ≤ .1 (two-tailed test) ** p ≤ .05 (two-tailed test) *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test) Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and the standard errors are in parentheses. Group Conflict comprises of 1) More good jobs for Blacks means fewer good jobs for members of other groups; 2) The more influence Blacks have in local politics, the less influence members of other groups will have in local politics; 3) As more good housing and neighborhoods go to Blacks, there will be fewer good houses and neighborhoods for members of other groups; 4) Many Blacks have been trying to get ahead economically at the expense of other groups. The wording for the other variables is in the Appendix.
Figure IV.1 Candidates: Priming Racial Resentment via Emotion

**Support for Al Sharpton**

**Support for Jesse Jackson**
Note: The figure is derived from the results in Table IV.1. The graphs are based on the direct effects of racial resentment, anger, fear and the control group and their interaction terms.
Figure IV.2 Candidates: Priming Group Conflict Attitudes via Emotion

Support for Al Sharpton

Support for Jesse Jackson
Note: The figure is derived from the results in Table IV.2. The graphs are based on the direct effects of group conflict, anger, fear and the control group and their interaction terms.
Chapter V

Conclusion

“The unwelcomed, unwanted, unwarranted, and force-induced intrusion upon the campus of the University of Alabama today of the might of the central government offers frightful example of the oppression of the rights, privileges and sovereignty of this state by officers of the federal government” (Wallace 1963).

The motivations and beliefs underlying opposition to racial integration and other policies designed to achieve racial equality remain a subject of passionate scholarly and popular debate. While all participants, and for all time, have admitted the powerful role emotions play in opinion formation and opinion expression around issues of race in America, few studies have attempted to explore their specific impact. In other words, it is plausible that George Wallace’s vehement opposition to integration may have reflected White fear over losing privileged status, or it may have sprung from moral outrage about Blacks asking for something they didn’t deserve, or even from disgust towards Blacks as a race less than fully human. Scholarship over the past 50 years has often posited a role for fear, anger, and disgust in Whites’ opinions about racial policies.

My thesis is that contemporary racial animus is driven primarily by anger not disgust or fear. The evidence presented in this dissertation suggests anger plays a significant role in activating modern forms of racial animus. First, even when triggered by thoughts unrelated to politics or race, anger primed racial resentment and boosted its impact on racial policy opinions. Anger also had a direct effect on racial policy opinion,
showing that it underlies the most common form of racial animus. Second, a broader set of negative emotions including anger, disgust and even fear activated old-fashioned racism. These results suggest that racial resentment and old-fashioned racism are not completely independent belief systems. Old-fashioned racism shares with racial resentment a link to anger. Fear, however, is uniquely linked to old-fashioned racism but not racial resentment. Third, none of the negative emotions primed race-neutral principles demonstrating that indeed racial resentment is distinct from the politics centered approach. Fourth, fear did not boost the impact of group conflict attitudes on racial policy opinions. This is an interesting, although counterintuitive result that the experience of fear seems to depress the impact of group conflict attitudes. Finally, anger’s effect stretches beyond policy preferences to affect candidate evaluations. Negative evaluations of Al Sharpton were attributed to racist sentiment brought forth by anger.

The purpose of this dissertation was to better understand why Whites oppose racial policies and candidates that favor Black interests while still claiming they support racial equality in principle. Several implications emerge from my set of findings. First, anger is the driving force behind policies or candidates that Whites perceive to give Black’s advantages they do not deserve. Currently the country is facing an economic recession partly due to the mortgage crisis. Some lawmakers propose giving people mortgage assistance, where Blacks are likely to get a disproportionate share (because they are more likely to be in trouble to begin with). This type of policy may ignite an angry reaction from Whites and lead to opposition.\textsuperscript{48} Another issue is voting rights for

\textsuperscript{48} This might be less likely today because the economic crisis affects a large part of the population. Although, Blacks may benefit disproportionately from mortgage assistance, a substantial number of Whites
residents of the District of Columbia. Currently, these residents do not have representation in the House of Representatives and the senate. Some pundits believe that with a Democratic controlled congress and presidency DC residents may finally have the votes to enact legislation. Anger is a likely reaction from such a policy because Blacks makeup a substantial number of DC residents.

Another implication of my dissertation is for scholars to take an even closer look at racism in America, especially how it is summoned and applied to policy opinion and candidate preference. This endeavor has already begun with the racial priming literature (Mendelberg 2001; Valentino et al. 2002; White 2007). Anger tied to policies and candidates are not the only mechanism that awakens racist sentiment. Simply inducing anger in general brings forth opposition to racial equality in practice. This mechanism is another way to gauge racism’s prevalence. The process illustrates the ease with which racism is brought to mind and that its force has not subsided. In some instances, it may only take someone knowingly stepping on the foot of another person for racism to be called upon. Having subjects think about their husband’s memory loss or recalling sexual abuse from their father is likely to bring forth negative thoughts about Blacks. This paints a disturbing picture about the future of race relations. Racism is not only tied to stereotypes like lazy and unintelligent or government spending and higher taxes but the experience of everyday anger. Therefore, quelling racism is not as simple as Myrdal envisioned.

will also benefit. When a policy seems to benefit Blacks at the exclusion of Whites that is when anger will drive opposition.

49 They have found that public derogatory statements of Blacks made in public have lost their appeal. Explicit racial cues are ineffective because Whites do not want to be seen as violating the norm of racial equality. Instead, implicit racial messages give people the opportunity to oppose racial policies/candidates without seeming racist.
Barack Obama’s speech entitled “A More Perfect Union”, in the Constitution Center in Philadelphia on March 18, 2008, sums up well my argument and evidence. In a speech, condemning Reverend Jeremiah Wright’s comments about race, Obama stated, “the anger is real, it is powerful; and to simply wish it away; to condemn it without understanding its roots, only serves to widen the chasm of misunderstanding that exist between the races.” I agree that neglecting the emotional underpinnings of contemporary racism can lead us to ignore the role that racism continues to play in modern society and the impact it has on policy preferences. Myrdal believed the solutions to the “Negro” problem were to educate Whites and publicize the problem. While most Whites believe racial discrimination has been eliminated, my findings mandate caution. Racial animus remains because the negative emotions underpinning White attitudes have toward Blacks are so common in everyday life. The solution to Myrdal’s “race problem,” therefore, may be more difficult to achieve because it rests in our society’s ability to decouple powerful negative emotions from ideas of race. This must be done, I think, at an early age because the experience of these emotions later in life will quite easily activate prejudice.

**Future Steps**

Examination of the racial dialogue over time is necessary in order to identify whether the dominant emotion used to express racism shifted. If anger, fear and disgust were used to express Jim-crow racism then it should be reflected in American discourse. The racial discourse should also mark a change in American norms (racial inequality to equality) toward race (after the civil rights movement) with anger now appearing as the dominant expression of racial antipathy. The next step in the project is to conduct a content analysis of White candidate speeches on race. The time-line will be from the
1870’s (Reconstruction Period) to present-day. Local and national contests will be included in the analysis. Using speeches as the unit of analysis enables me to identify how elites convey race to the public. The text in the candidate speeches will be coded for the emotions and the appraisals (blame, control, certainty etc…) required to experience these emotions. Other relevant race-related variables will be included in the coding scheme. This dataset addresses some important unanswered questions left from my dissertation. For instance, is the racial dialogue framed more in terms of lack of control or responsibility/blame? If so, what period did these appeals dominate?

My dissertation is a first step at uncovering the emotion central to contemporary racism. The evidence marshaled so far brings up several interesting questions. Does anger drive negative racial attitudes toward other marginalized and minority groups? Homosexuals as a group encounters a great deal of hostility and discrimination. Recently in the state of California, voters through ballot initiative (proposition 8) defined marriage between a man and a woman. Several emotions possibly underlie people’s opposition to gay rights. Uncovering the emotion driving homophobic sentiment, allows us to compare the struggle for equality by gays and lesbians with other discriminated groups –Blacks.

Immigration is another contentious and emotionally charged issue. Opponents of immigration argue that immigrants (Hispanics) take earnings from American citizens, create an underclass, and fracture the culture and identity of the United States (Borjas 1990; Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong 1997). A wall has even been proposed across the Mexico and United States border. From a cursory reading of the immigration debate it is evident that emotions are strong on both sides. Brader and Valentino (2007) found that
Hispanic prejudice is correlated with several emotional reactions to immigration.\textsuperscript{50} Although the study is a first step, a closer examination is needed between the interplay of emotion and racism toward Hispanics.

Martin Luther King Jr’s letter from a Birmingham city jail reveals that Blacks also have strong emotions toward race. However, no attention has been devoted to how emotion interacts with Black opinions on racial matters. Group consciousness or linked-fate is a way for Blacks to organize their thoughts about race. These belief systems constitute “the degree to which African Americans believe their own self-interests are linked to the interests of the race” (Dawson 1994, 77). There is a strong sense of homogeneity within the Black community when it comes to racial issues.

Although linked-fate serves as a guide for Blacks’ on issues that affect Blacks as a group, their opinions are disparate in how to address racial inequality. Dawson (2001) argues that Black thought consists of several ideologies. He states, “Black ideological conflict occurs precisely over what constitutes the best political path for the race” (pg. 11). The question I propose, is whether these different perspectives are grounded in distinct emotion states? In other words, are certain Black ideologies tied to particular emotions? For example, is Black Nationalism mostly expressed through anger while the tendency to support integrative measures driven by fear? Addressing these questions are vital to understanding the diversity in Black thinking. More importantly, uncovering the emotion tied these beliefs informs us when such a perspective like Black Nationalism will be brought to mind and applied. The different emotional reactions Black’s have to racial inequality explains why a common approach to solving the racial problem has not

\textsuperscript{50} They found that anger toward immigration to have the strongest relationship with racism toward Hispanics.
sustained. Disagreement between Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Dubois or Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X may be attributed the feelings they developed toward racial inequities.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1

Scale/Index Construction

*Anger, Fear and Disgust* (Polimetrix and Midwest Study) are dummy variables, where 1=if they were in the treatment condition and 0= if they were in the “relaxed” condition. *Anger and Disgust* (ANES 1985) are both the sum of three measures recoded onto a 0-1 scale, where 0=not angry/disgusted and 1=angry/ disgusted. Three items were additively scaled for each emotion. The specific items are 1) Think about changes over the last 20 years in relation between Blacks and Whites in this country. Have these changes ever made you feel angry/disgusted; 2) Has preferential treatment of Blacks ever made you feel angry/disgusted; 3) Think about Walter Mondale. Now, has Mondale (--Because of the kind of person he is, or because of something he has done --) ever made you feel angry/disgusted?

*Fear* (ANES 1985) comprised of six measures (combination of uneasy and afraid) and was recoded onto a 0-1 scale, where 0=not fearful and 1=fearful. Six items were additively scaled. Response options for each question was “yes” or “no”. The specific items are 1) Think about changes over the last 20 years in relation between Blacks and Whites in this country. Have these changes ever made you feel afraid/uneasy; 2) Has preferential treatment of Blacks ever made you feel afraid/uneasy; 3) Think about Walter Mondale. Now, has Mondale (--because of the kind of person he is, or because of something he has done --) ever made you feel afraid/uneasy?
Racial Resentment (Polimetrix, Midwest and ANES studies) comprised of four measures and was recoded onto a 0-1 scale, where the higher values correspond to endorsement of symbolic racism. Four items were additively scaled. Response options for each question ranged from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. The specific items are; 1) Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve; 2) Government officials usually pay less attention to a request or complaint from a Black person than from a White person; 3) It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as Whites; 4) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class. Two additional items have been used in the past for racial resentment, but given their manifest policy content, we decided to omit them.

Old-fashioned racism (Polimetrix Study) consists of three measures and was coded onto a 0-1 scale, where the higher values correspond to endorsement of old-fashioned racism. Three items were additively scaled. The specific items are; 1) Do you oppose interracial marriage between Blacks and Whites (response options - yes or no); 2) If a Black family with about the same income and education as you moved next door, would you mind it a lot, a little or not at all; 3) How strongly would you object if a member of your family had a close relationship with a Black person (response options – strongly, somewhat, a little, not at all)?

Old-fashioned racism (ANES 1985) consists of three measures and was coded onto a 0-1 scale, where the higher values correspond to endorsement of old-fashioned racism. Three items were additively scaled. Response options for the first two questions ranged from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. The specific items are; 1) In past studies, we
have asked people why they think White people seem to get more of the good things in life in America -- such as better jobs and more money -- than Black people do. Here is a reason given by both Blacks and Whites. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree. The differences are brought about by God; God made the races different as part of His divine plan; 2) Blacks come from a less able race and this explains why Blacks are not as well off as Whites in America; 3) Suppose there is a community-wide vote on a general housing issue. There are two possible laws to vote for. One law says that homeowners can decide for themselves who to sell their house to, even if they prefer not to sell to Blacks. The second law says that homeowners cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color. Which law do you support?

*Group Conflict* (Polimetrix Study and Midwest Study) comprised of four measures and was recoded onto a 0-1 scale, where the higher values correspond to endorsement of symbolic racism. Four items were additively scaled. Response options for each question ranged from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. The specific items are; 1) More good jobs for Blacks means fewer good jobs for members of other groups; 2) The more influence Blacks have in local politics, the less influence members of other groups will have in local politics; 3) As more good housing and neighborhoods go to Blacks, there will be fewer good houses and neighborhoods for members of other groups; 4) Many Blacks have been trying to get ahead economically at the expense of other groups.

*Ideology* (Polimterix, Midwest, and ANES studies) is coded onto a 0-1 scale, where the higher values correspond to identifying as strong conservative. The measures were based on a two-item skip pattern. 1) “We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. On a 7-point scale, where 1 is very liberal and 7 is very conservative,
where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?”

2) If respondent enters 8 “haven’t thought much about this” then they get “If you had to choose, would you consider yourself a liberal, a moderate or a conservative?”

*Limited government* (Polimetric Study) consisted of two items, coded onto a 0-1 scale, where 0= increase government spending and 1=reduce government spending. Three items were additively scaled. 1) “Some people think the government should provide fewer services in order to reduce spending. These people are at point 1 of the scale. Other people feel it is important for the government to provide more services even if it means an increase in taxes. These people are at point 7 of the scale. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?”

2) Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. These people are at point 1 of the scale. Other people feel it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. These people are at point 7 of the scale. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?”

*Limited government* (ANES 1985) consisted of one item, coded onto a 0-1 scale, where 0= increase government spending and 1=reduce government spending. The following item was used: Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. These people are at point 1 of the scale. Other people feel it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. These people are at point 7 of the scale. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?”
Affirmative action additively combined two items. The variable ranges from 0-1, where the higher value corresponds to affirmative action does discriminate against Whites. The response options for each question ranged from “very likely” to “not very likely”. The specific items are; 1) “What do you think the chances are these days that a White person won’t get a job or promotion while an equally or less qualified Black person gets one instead”; 2) “What do you think the chances are these days that a White person won't get admitted to a college or university program while an equally or less qualified Black person gets admitted instead?”

Government assistance to Blacks (Polimetrix Study and Midwest Study) ranges from 0-1, where the higher value corresponds to opposition to government assistance to Blacks. The following item was used: “Some people think that Blacks have been discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards. Others believe that the government should not be giving special treatment to Blacks.”

Government aid to Blacks (Polimetrix Study and Midwest Study) ranges from 0-1, where the higher value corresponds to opposition to government aid to Blacks. The following item was used: “Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of Blacks. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help Blacks because they should help themselves.”

Confederate flag (Polimetrix Study) ranges from 0-1, where the higher value corresponds to the confederate flag is a symbol of prejudice.
*Busing* ranges from 0-1, where the higher value corresponds to opposition to busing. The following item was used: “There is much discussion about the best way to deal with racial problems. Some people think achieving racial integration of schools is so important that it justifies busing children to schools out of their own neighborhood. Others think letting children go to their neighborhood schools is so important that they oppose busing.” (7-point scale)

*Martin Luther King Jr. Holiday* (Polimetrix Study) ranges from 0-1, where the higher value corresponds to the celebration of the national holiday is unimportant.

*Abortion* (Polimetrix Study) ranges 0-1, where the higher value corresponds to opposition to abortion. The following item was used: “Some people feel, by law, abortion should never be permitted. Others think that, by law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?” (7-point scale)

*Iraq war* (Polimetrix Study) ranges from 0-1, where the higher value corresponds to support for the Iraq war. The following item was used: “Some people strongly support the War in Iraq. Others strongly oppose the War in Iraq. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?” (7-point scale)

*Candidate Feeling Thermometers* (Midwest Study) range from 0-100, where the higher value corresponds favorable opinion of the candidate. The following item was used: “We would like to get your feelings about some candidates and groups in American society. When you see the name of a person or group, please rate it with what we call a feeling thermometer by typing a number from 0 to 100. On this feeling thermometer, ratings between 0 and 49 degrees mean that you don't feel favorably toward the person or group
and that you don't care too much for that person or group. Ratings between 51 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorably and warm toward the person or group. If you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward a person or group you would rate them at 50 degrees. How do you feel toward Barack Obama/Hillary Clinton/John Edwards/Jesse Jackson/Al Sharpton?

*Gender* is a dummy variable, where 0=female and 1=male.

*South* is a dummy variable, where 0=non-southern resident and 1=southern resident. The southern states are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, D.C., Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.

*Education* is coded onto a 0-1 scale, where the higher value corresponds to post-graduate degree.

*Age* is a dummy variable, where 0=54 years old and below and 1=55 years old and above.

*Income* is coded onto a 0-1 scale, where the higher value corresponds to highest income bracket.

*Word count* is the total number of words participants used in response to the emotional induction query.

*Intensity of emotion* is coded on a 0-1 scale, where the higher values indicate extreme emotion expressed. The coder unaware of the emotional condition read each response to the induction and assessed the degree of anger, fear and sadness expressed. The values given were 0 (None), .5 (Some) and 1 (Extreme).
APPENDIX 2

Facial Expressions Used in Emotion Induction Task

Anger Condition                     Disgust Condition

Fear Condition
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aguilar-Pariente, Roasrio (n.d.) “We Can’t Have Racism Here. We are all Mexicans, aren’t We? The Effect of Phenotypic Prejudice on the Behavior of Voters in Mexico”. Manuscript: University of Michigan.


King, Martin Luther Jr. 1963. Letter From Birmingham City Jail.

Lawrence, Jill. 2006. “Edward takes another shot at run for White House.” USA Today.


